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Source Description
On April 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:05 am to 9:43 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 701-002 of the White House Tapes.
Topics include: The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield. The President's schedule - Meeting with John H. Chafee - Melvin R. Laird - Timing - The President's previous talk with H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman - Candidacy for Senate The President talked with Haldeman at an unknown time between 9:05 and 9:08 am. [Conversation no. 701-2A] The President's meeting with Chafee - Purpose - Laird - Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft - Secretary of the Navy - Candidacy for Senate - Presence of others - Laird [End of telephone conversation] Henry A. Kissinger entered at 9:08 am. The President's meeting with Chafee - Laird's presence - Purpose Butterfield left at 9:09 am. - Press conference - Possible location Vietnam - Laird - Criticism - Adm. Thomas H. Moorer - Laird's reaction - Reports - Meeting with the President - Purpose - Air strikes - Authority - Possible criticism - Kissinger - Moorer's opinion - Laird - Weather - Impact - Number of sorties - Damage - Bridge - Convoy - Secondary explosions - Tanks - B-52s - Increase - Number - From the US - Naval Gunfire - Increase - North Vietnamese offensive - US intentions - Amount of preparation - Soviet Union and People's Republic of China [PRC] - Possible impact on the upcoming election - Blockade - Preparation of the Navy - President's instructions - Seriousness - Slow nature of mining - Blockade - Selective nature - Food and medical supplies - Air strikes - Weather - Impact - Months of activity - Laird - Department of State - New ideas - Upcoming meeting - Public relations - Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] crossing - New York Times - Characterization of invasion - Impact - Threefold US reaction - Protection of US forces - Withdrawal program - South Vietnamese resistance - White House, Defense and State Department statements - Inadequacies - Correction - The President's displeasure - Sources - Press coverage - Statement by Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu - New York Times coverage - Quality - News summary - II Corps- B-3 area - US actions - Reports - Answer to Kissinger's question - Moorer - Gen. John A. Vogt, Jr. - President's instructions to Kissinger - Problems - Surface to Air Missiles [SAMs] - Press reports - Public relations - US actions - Compared with Laos - Low profile - Laird's press conference - Press reports - Ronald L. Ziegler - Atmosphere in White House - Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] story - Source - US foreign policy - Soviet Union, PRC - Impact of current offensive - The President's November 3, 1969 speech - Cambodia - North Vietnamese offensive - Success - Encouragement to domestic critics - Nuclear weapons - Blockade - Soviet Reaction - Anatoliy F. Dobrynin - Soviets - The President's forthcoming trip - Poland - Dobrynin - Message from Leonid I. Brezhnev - North Vietnamese offensive - US military - Possible obstacle The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:08 and 9:24 am. [Conversation no. 701-2B] [See Conversation no. 22-72] [End of telephone conversation] Vietnam - North Vietnamese offensive - US reaction - Weather - Naval gunfire - Orders - Cessation - Location of targets - Accuracy - Bombing halt - B-3 area The president talked with Thomas H. Moorer between 9:24 and 9:28 am. [Conversation No. 701-2C] [See Conversation No. 22-73] [End of telephone conversation] Vietnam - Kissinger's forthcoming contact with Ziegler - Report - Timing - North Vietnamese offensive - South Vietnamese countermeasures - Dangers - Quang Tri and Dong Ha - Kissinger's concern - Retreat - Effect on North Vietnamese supply lines - Anticipated results - Hue - Symbolism - Retreat - Counterattack - Laos operation - US Air Force [USAF] - Third division - Kissinger's opinion - Strength - Concentration - Effects of weather - Crossing of river - Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. - South Vietnamese retreats - Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. - Trip to South Vietnam - Possible options - Laird's reaction - Laird ***************************************************************** [Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 09/16/2022. Segment cleared for release.] [Privacy] [701-002- W002] [Duration: 3s] Vietnam - Melvin R. Laird ***************************************************************** Vietnam - Melvin R. Laird - Reaction to offensive - North Vietnamese offensive - US counterattack - Restrictions on statements - Scali - Ziegler - Massive invasion - The President's Responsibilities - Protecting human lives - Ensuring withdrawal - South Vietnamese resistance - Public Reaction - Refugees - Anticommunism - Statements - Rhetoric - Scali and Ziegler - President's instructions to Kissinger - Soviet Reactions - Impact of US bombing - Blockade - Ships required - Kissinger's opinion - Legality - Mining - Implementation - Problems - Compared with Cuban missile crisis - Mines - Delayed fuses - Time allotted - Selectivity - Problems - Food and medical supplies - PRC - Prisoners of War [POWs] - Critics - Edmund S. Muskie - George S. McGovern - Statements on escalation - Muskie - Kissinger's view - Charges of escalation - US position - Consequences of victory and defeat - Reaction of the press - Compared with Cambodian operation - North Vietnamese offensive - Impact on election - The President's view - Impact on US foreign policy - Communist powers - Confidence in US - Support - Europe and Asia - Seven points - Communists - The President's possible course of action in 1969 - Seriousness - The President's policy - Compared with Gen. Charles A. J. M. De Gaulle - Resistance to defeat - North Vietnamese Offensive - Moorer's location - B-52s - Attacks on North Vietnam - Target areas - DMZ - Limits to target areas - Possible escalation -18 th parallel - Criticism The President's meeting with Robert S. Ingersoll - Instructions - Kissinger's trip to Japan - Length of meeting - Meeting with Kissinger Vietnam - Air strikes - Kissinger's trip to Japan - Delay - Decision - Delays - Possible duration - Statements - Scali - Ziegler Kissinger left at 9:43 am.
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Butterfield, Alexander P.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Kissinger, Henry A.; White House operator; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.).
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
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417181151
label
Tape 701, Conversation 002 (701-002)
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doc
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audio
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1
Source metadata
id
417181151
contentType
audio
title
Tape 701, Conversation 002 (701-002)
description
On April 4, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon, Alexander P. Butterfield, H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman, Henry A. Kissinger, White House operator, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer met in the Oval Office of the White House from 9:05 am to 9:43 am. The Oval Office taping system captured this recording, which is known as Conversation 701-002 of the White House Tapes.
Topics include: The President met with Alexander P. Butterfield. The President's schedule - Meeting with John H. Chafee - Melvin R. Laird - Timing - The President's previous talk with H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman - Candidacy for Senate The President talked with Haldeman at an unknown time between 9:05 and 9:08 am. [Conversation no. 701-2A] The President's meeting with Chafee - Purpose - Laird - Gen. Brent G. Scowcroft - Secretary of the Navy - Candidacy for Senate - Presence of others - Laird [End of telephone conversation] Henry A. Kissinger entered at 9:08 am. The President's meeting with Chafee - Laird's presence - Purpose Butterfield left at 9:09 am. - Press conference - Possible location Vietnam - Laird - Criticism - Adm. Thomas H. Moorer - Laird's reaction - Reports - Meeting with the President - Purpose - Air strikes - Authority - Possible criticism - Kissinger - Moorer's opinion - Laird - Weather - Impact - Number of sorties - Damage - Bridge - Convoy - Secondary explosions - Tanks - B-52s - Increase - Number - From the US - Naval Gunfire - Increase - North Vietnamese offensive - US intentions - Amount of preparation - Soviet Union and People's Republic of China [PRC] - Possible impact on the upcoming election - Blockade - Preparation of the Navy - President's instructions - Seriousness - Slow nature of mining - Blockade - Selective nature - Food and medical supplies - Air strikes - Weather - Impact - Months of activity - Laird - Department of State - New ideas - Upcoming meeting - Public relations - Demilitarized Zone [DMZ] crossing - New York Times - Characterization of invasion - Impact - Threefold US reaction - Protection of US forces - Withdrawal program - South Vietnamese resistance - White House, Defense and State Department statements - Inadequacies - Correction - The President's displeasure - Sources - Press coverage - Statement by Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu - New York Times coverage - Quality - News summary - II Corps- B-3 area - US actions - Reports - Answer to Kissinger's question - Moorer - Gen. John A. Vogt, Jr. - President's instructions to Kissinger - Problems - Surface to Air Missiles [SAMs] - Press reports - Public relations - US actions - Compared with Laos - Low profile - Laird's press conference - Press reports - Ronald L. Ziegler - Atmosphere in White House - Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] story - Source - US foreign policy - Soviet Union, PRC - Impact of current offensive - The President's November 3, 1969 speech - Cambodia - North Vietnamese offensive - Success - Encouragement to domestic critics - Nuclear weapons - Blockade - Soviet Reaction - Anatoliy F. Dobrynin - Soviets - The President's forthcoming trip - Poland - Dobrynin - Message from Leonid I. Brezhnev - North Vietnamese offensive - US military - Possible obstacle The President talked with the White House operator at an unknown time between 9:08 and 9:24 am. [Conversation no. 701-2B] [See Conversation no. 22-72] [End of telephone conversation] Vietnam - North Vietnamese offensive - US reaction - Weather - Naval gunfire - Orders - Cessation - Location of targets - Accuracy - Bombing halt - B-3 area The president talked with Thomas H. Moorer between 9:24 and 9:28 am. [Conversation No. 701-2C] [See Conversation No. 22-73] [End of telephone conversation] Vietnam - Kissinger's forthcoming contact with Ziegler - Report - Timing - North Vietnamese offensive - South Vietnamese countermeasures - Dangers - Quang Tri and Dong Ha - Kissinger's concern - Retreat - Effect on North Vietnamese supply lines - Anticipated results - Hue - Symbolism - Retreat - Counterattack - Laos operation - US Air Force [USAF] - Third division - Kissinger's opinion - Strength - Concentration - Effects of weather - Crossing of river - Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. - South Vietnamese retreats - Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. - Trip to South Vietnam - Possible options - Laird's reaction - Laird ***************************************************************** [Previous PRMPA Privacy (D) reviewed under deed of gift 09/16/2022. Segment cleared for release.] [Privacy] [701-002- W002] [Duration: 3s] Vietnam - Melvin R. Laird ***************************************************************** Vietnam - Melvin R. Laird - Reaction to offensive - North Vietnamese offensive - US counterattack - Restrictions on statements - Scali - Ziegler - Massive invasion - The President's Responsibilities - Protecting human lives - Ensuring withdrawal - South Vietnamese resistance - Public Reaction - Refugees - Anticommunism - Statements - Rhetoric - Scali and Ziegler - President's instructions to Kissinger - Soviet Reactions - Impact of US bombing - Blockade - Ships required - Kissinger's opinion - Legality - Mining - Implementation - Problems - Compared with Cuban missile crisis - Mines - Delayed fuses - Time allotted - Selectivity - Problems - Food and medical supplies - PRC - Prisoners of War [POWs] - Critics - Edmund S. Muskie - George S. McGovern - Statements on escalation - Muskie - Kissinger's view - Charges of escalation - US position - Consequences of victory and defeat - Reaction of the press - Compared with Cambodian operation - North Vietnamese offensive - Impact on election - The President's view - Impact on US foreign policy - Communist powers - Confidence in US - Support - Europe and Asia - Seven points - Communists - The President's possible course of action in 1969 - Seriousness - The President's policy - Compared with Gen. Charles A. J. M. De Gaulle - Resistance to defeat - North Vietnamese Offensive - Moorer's location - B-52s - Attacks on North Vietnam - Target areas - DMZ - Limits to target areas - Possible escalation -18 th parallel - Criticism The President's meeting with Robert S. Ingersoll - Instructions - Kissinger's trip to Japan - Length of meeting - Meeting with Kissinger Vietnam - Air strikes - Kissinger's trip to Japan - Delay - Decision - Delays - Possible duration - Statements - Scali - Ziegler Kissinger left at 9:43 am.
Participants: Nixon, Richard M. (President); Butterfield, Alexander P.; Haldeman, H. R. ("Bob"); Kissinger, Henry A.; White House operator; Moorer, Thomas H. (Adm.).
citationUrl
identifierLocal
wht-701-002
collections
White House Tapes: Sound Recordings of Meetings and Telephone Conversations of the Nixon Administration
Oval Office Sound Recordings
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1
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yes
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Source extras
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417181151
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item
productionDates
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4
logicalDate
1972-04-04
month
4
year
1972
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description
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1
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audio
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03fad78b802b154e