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[AWACS Background Material] (2)
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Baker, James A. III: Files
Folder Title: [AWACS Background Material]
(2)
Box: 15
To see more digitized collections
visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
Qs & As on Saudi Air Defense Enhancement Package
Question. What impact would the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia
have on the military stability in the region? In particular,
what capability would AWACS give Saudi, Syrian and possible
Jordanian air forces individually as a potential adversary of
Israel in another Middle East war? Would this require
significant purchases of counter-measures on the part of
Israel to neutralize the potential offensive capability
associated with AWACS?
Response. As the deployment of USAF AWACS to Saudi Arabia has
demonstrated, the added warning of a potential air attack which
these aircraft provide is a stabilizing influence during periods
of increased tension. During the Iran-Iraq war, AWACS has helped
to deter the belligerents from attacking Saudi Arabia's oil
facilities and other installations.
The sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia will not have a significant
adverse impact on the military stability in the region. Similar
technology already exists in the region; the Saudis will acquire
only 5 AWACS, allowing them to continuously patrol only the
border area at a time for limited periods of time.
In the event of another Middle East war involving Israel, the
Saudis would be very unlikely to employ AWACS opposite Israel.
Such an employment would expose their AWACS to the very real
threat of being shot down by Israeli fighters. It would also
leave largely unprotected the most important Saudi economic and
population centers in the northeast and southwest. Moreover,
in the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1967 and 1973, the Saudis
were not actively involved.
Extensive joint training exercises would be required for the
Saudi AWACS to be effectively used in support of a combined
Saudi, Syrian, and Jordanian offensive threat against Israel.
Saudi Arabia could not conduct such joint training without
our knowledge, since much AWACS aircraft maintenance support
will be provided by US contractors for the foreseeable future.
Additionally, for such combined operations to be effective,
Syria and Jordan would need unique communications and encipher-
ment equipment compatible with the AWACS, which could only
be provided by the United States.
No significant counter-measures on the part of Israel would be
required to neutralize the potential offensive capability
associated with AWACS. Israeli radars and sensors would be
capable of detecting Saudi AWACS aircraft operating near enough
to participate in offensive operations against Israel. Israeli
F-15 aircraft equipped with the AIM-9L and AIM-7F would be a
significant threat to the Saudi if it attempted to remain on
station near Israel.
2
The most effective use of the Saudi AWACS will be its deep
look surveillance capability over the Persian Gulf for early
warning, and its ability to retreat within the Kingdom's
boundaries and assist in directing Saudi fighters against
attacking aircraft attempting to penetrate Saudi airspace.
It is in this air defense role that we expect the Saudis to
employ the AWACS. The Iran/Iraq conflict proved that the
potential threat to Saudi oil facilities is real and urgent.
Without AWACS, the Saudi's air defenses are virtually blind,
unable to detect attacking aircraft, particularly low-flying
ones, and unable to provide warning in sufficient time to respond
effectively. With AWACS, the Saudis will have the capability
to effectively use both the F-15 and F-5 aircraft to intercept
hostile aircraft prior to reaching their designated targets
and maximize the early warning to surface-to-air missile (SAM)
defenses near the target areas.
Question. Is it correct that the F-15s can be effectively
used against targets in Israel?
Response. Saudi F-15s would be, in theory, capable of striking
targets without any improvements to the present F-15 con-
figuration. In practice, however, how effective such an attack
would be is highly questionable since Israel has a highly ef-
fective air defense system and Saudi F-15 main operating bases
are not near Israel. In the unlikely event Saudi Arabia
decided to attack Israel, Saudi F-15s could expect to encounter
a superior, highly trained and experienced Israeli Air Force
consisting of several hundred F-15, F-16, F-4, and KFIR aircraft
before crossing Israel's border. In addition, the Israeli
ground-to-air defense (surface-to-air missiles and air defense
artillery) is substantial and would take a heavy toll on any
strike aircraft.
Another deterrent against an RSAF aggression towards Israel
would be the almost certain reprisal from the Israeli Air Force
against very vulnerable targets within Saudi Arabia. The
relatively small RSAF could not hope to succeed against an
Israeli Air Force that is superior in numbers, training, and
equipment.
Question. What have the Saudis said to us which bears on
Israeli concerns as to the enhancement package? Have we sought
and have the Saudis given any assurances, beyond those already
given in regard to the F-15s themselves?
Response. The Saudis have consistently assured us that they
have no offensive intentions against any state in the area.
The Saudis have also emphasized that their need for the en-
hancement package is for defensive purposes. They have also
agreed not to base their F-15s at Tabuk. Further, the Saudi
Arabian Government has agreed not to transfer any of the equip-
ment or information of the enhancements to other countries in the
region, to use AWACS aircraft only within Saudi borders, and to
share security information with the US.
Question. Have they been asked to give written assurances or
only verbal assurances? In either event, what is the precise
language of any assurances which you consider firm? How bind-
ing do you consider these assurances to be?
Response. The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) has provided
both written and verbal assurances.
The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (DD Form 1513) for the F-15
aircraft, signed by the SAG, contains several conditions of
sale, including restrictions on use of the equipment and upon
retransfer of the equipment or data to a Third Country without
prior approval of the US Government (USG). In all our con-
versations with the Saudis, they have consistently indicated that
they will abide by the provisions under which the USG supplies
military equipment.
In addition to the specific security clauses of the contract
between the US and Saudi Governments (the DD Form 1513), there
is a General Security of Military Information Agreement being
developed which provides specific procedures for access to
classified information, periodic inspections, and physical
security, as well as assurance that the Saudi Arabian Government
will provide a degree of protection to any classified information
equivalent to the protection afforded it by the US Government.
In May 1978, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia stated in a letter to
President Carter concerning the F-15 sale that he "would like to
emphasize the planes are being acquired for defense."
During a meeting with Secretary of Defense Brown in May 1978,
Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, affirmed that the SAG
accepted the assurances made to Congress by Secretary Brown
(letter to Senator Sparkman, 9 May 1978), as the intentions and
requirements of Saudi Arabia were strictly defensive.
Since 1978, the Saudis have consistently reassured us that they
have no aggressive intentions against any state in the area,
that their F-15s will be used only in furtherance of their
legitimate self-defense needs, and that they will not employ
the aircraft offensively.
Question. How do you assess Israel's current and projected
capabilities to defend itself against a coordinated Arab attack?
Response. It is our judgment that with a sustained effort and
US assistance, Israel will be able to maintain its margin of
military superiority over the Arab states during the remainder
of this decade, and will remain capable of defeating any com-
bination of Arab forces.
Question. What steps can be taken to help maintain Israel's
faith in US commitments if the 1978 assurances to Congress are
broken?
Response. We believe it is important that our friends be able
to count on our reliability. We are consulting extensively with
Congress and with Israel on the changed circumstances of the
situation in the Middle East. We have asked the Congress to
consider with us whether the 1978 undertaking continues to
serve US interests given the radically worsened strategic
situation in the region and our new strategy for dealing with
it. We have explained our views in detail in our discussions
with Israel.
We do not believe that it is proper to characterize the transfer
of these items as breaking the 1978 assurances. In fact, we
believe consultations and discussions such as these are the
most effective way to ensure that Israel recognizes that our
commitment to its continued security is firm and unshakable. In
our consultations, we are emphasizing the dramatically changed
circumstances in the region, illustrated by the instability in
Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and
enhanced Soviet power projection capabilities. In the light of
these circumstances, the sale contributes to overall stability
in the region and to US cooperation with states there. Con-
sequently, it contributes to Israeli security as well as our own.
Question. Aren't we just formenting a new state in the arms
race in the Middle East?
Response. Saudi Arabia possesses the smallest military forces
of any major state in Southwest Asia. Because the size of its
military is constrained by the relatively small size of its
population, Saudi Arabia has concentrated its efforts to
acquire higher technology arms systems that multiply the
effectiveness of its smaller armed forces.
-- The F-15 enhancement items and AWACS we propose to sell
to the Saudis will significantly improve Saudi Arabia's ability
to defend its vital natural resources.
-- There is no reason why the sale of this equipment to
improve Saudi air defenses should lead to an arms race in the
region. We believe that Israel continues to have a significant
qualitative edge over its Arab neighbors. The US has repeatedly
stated that we will ensure that Israel maintains this advantage.
Question. Could you detail for us the specific circumstances
that have changed since May 1978 which warrant changing the
F-15 assurances contained in Secretary of Defense Brown's
letter?
Response. As Under Secretary Buckley described for the Com-
mittee on February 26, the profoundly worsened security situation
in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region requires that we re-
assess and vigorously respond to the security needs of our friends.
In describing this new approach, Under Secretary Buckley high-
lighted the events that have occurred in the region since 1978:
" The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There are currently
85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan with an additional 35,000
troops actively engaged in support roles just over the Soviet
border. As a result, Soviet tactical aircraft are now within
range of the Hormuz Straits, through which 2/3 of the world's
oil exports must pass."
" The Iranian revolution which has turned a nation which
once was an important factor in regional security into a major
element of instability in the area. We are of course concerned
about the potential for Soviet exploitation of the situation in
Iran. "
"
The Iran/Iraq war has demonstrated again the volatility
of the region and the propensity of two major states there to resort
to
military force and to attacks on critical oil facilities."
Add to these dramatic events the Soviet Union's position in
Ethiopia and South Yemen: both of these Marxist states are
tied to the Soviet Union and to each other by treaties of
friendship and cooperation in which military cooperation is
stated explicitly and prominently.
In sum, the Soviets have achieved a position which states in
the region have long feared: an encirclement of the major Middle
East oil fields, which threatens both the peoples of that area
and the well-being of the industrial democracies.
Question. If these sales are made, what quid pro quo will be
obtained by the US?
Response. The sales of this equipment will contribute to an im-
portant and longstanding US objective -- the security of Saudi
Arabia.
By helping to assure the Saudis' ability to defend themselves, the
sales will strengthen their confidence in us and help to build
a sense of common interests. As we seek to develop those in-
terests in support of specific issues, we must continue to
recognize that preserving Saudi Arabia's own stability requires
the Saudi Government to maintain a posture of independence from
US policy.
Saudi Arabia supported the US Middle East peace effort up to
Sadat's Jerusalem trip and continued to do so, though with mis-
givings, through the Camp David Summit.
Although Saudi Arabia has not supported the Camp David process,
it has consistently reaffirmed its support for a just and com-
prehensive Middle East peace settlement. The Saudi desire for
peace reflects in part deep concern that continued Arab-Israeli
tension promotes Soviet and radical influences in the area. As
we continue to seek to bring the Saudis into a more constructive
posture in the peace process, it is important to sustain their
confidence in other aspects of US policy, including our willing-
ness to meet Saudi defense requirements.
Saudi Arabia has not publicly supported the concept of a permanent
US force presence in the area. It has, however:
-- indicated appreciation of a strong US "over-the-horizon"
naval presence;
-- sought an extensive US military supply and training program;
-- requested deployment of AWACS at the outbreak of the
Iraq/Iran war; and
-- been strongly supportive, politically and financially,
of Oman and Bahrain, which provide our forces access.
The Saudis have long opposed the spread of Soviet influence
generally and in the Middle East in particular. They helped get
the Soviets out of Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia. They took the
lead in organizing regional opposition to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. In Yemen, the Saudis have worked with us to
support the economic and defense needs of North Yemen, threatened
2
by Marxist, Soviet-supported South Yemen. The Saudis have taken
the initiative in bolstering Pakistan in welcoming our
cooperation in this effort. The close US-Saudi relationship
has encouraged the smaller Gulf states from Kuwait to Oman to
cooperate with the United States.
Saudi Arabia is critical to our economic objectives. While
neither we nor they see benefit in direct trade-offs, we have
long urged their cooperation in energy and financial matters and
have received it to a remarkable degree.
Over the past years, Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained
significantly higher oil production than its preferred level,
most recently in response to supply shortages resulting from
the Iraq/Iran war.
Saudi Arabia has been a price moderater within OPEC. For extended
periods -- as at present -- it has priced its crude well below
the general OPEC level.
These production and pricing policies are increasingly criticized
in Saudi Arabia. It is obvious that the Saudis will be more
responsive when we demonstrate sustained concern for their
national defense.
The Saudis currently devote a high percentage (almost 10%) of
their GNP to foreign assistance. (The US percentage is 0.2%.)
This policy supports many of our own security and development
objectives in the immediate region and globally. Saudi
assistance has been particularly important to Morocco, the
Sudan, Jordan, and North Yemen. In the coming months, we will
need to urge even greater Saudi lending, particularly toward
key nations such as Turkey and Pakistan.
The Saudis have consistently supported the dollar. Currently,
a large proportion of their more than $100 billion in foreign
official assets is in dollar instruments.
We need a strong overall relationship to sustain a general Saudi
attitude of cooperation in these areas.
Question. Isn't the Saudi request for AWACS being approved
because they have us over the oil barrel and they seek the
latest equipment whatever their real need?
Response. Both we and the Saudis are convinced that there is a
sound military justification for the sale of AWACS to the Kingdom.
The outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, and the belligerents'
use of airpower to destroy each other's oil facilities, high-
lighted to the Saudis the potential vulnerability of their oil
facilities and other installations to air attack. The AWACS
will provide a major boost for Saudi air defense capabilities
in this vital area that cannot be achieved by any other means.
-- Neither we nor the Saudis have ever established a
directlinkage between arms sales and oil pricing or production.
However, we believe that the US and Saudi Arabia share a common
interest in a continuing arms supply relationship, as well as
cooperation in oil pricing and production policies.
Question. If the Saudis do not get this equipment, will we see
another oil embargo? What do you believe the Saudis would do
if these sales were not approved?
Response. There would be substantial negative consequences in
refusing to provide the F-15 enhancement items. It would be
out of character, however, for Saudi Arabia to retaliate in some
direct overt fashion against the US, should these sales be turned
down. We believe the Saudi reaction, however, would be one of
deep disappointment and disillusionment. Without confidence in
the reliability of our commitment to their security, the Saudis
may well lack the political will to take difficult decisions
regarding regional security, oil production and pricing policy,
international financial cooperation, and Middle East peace.
Failure to supply this equipment would be seen as a rebuff of the
Saudi regime not only in Saudi Arabia itself, but in the wider
Arab world. This could damage the position of the royal family
and Saudi Arabia's ability to pursue policies in consonance with
our own. It would diminish the expectations other Arab states
might hold out for themselves as a consequence of closer relations
with us.
If the sales of enhancement items are not approved, the Saudis could
go elsewhere to procure the capabilities. The French appear to
be willing to sell F-ls, Mirage 2000s and, later, the Mirage 4000
with air-ground capability. There have been indications that the
Saudis may also be considering the European Tornado as an alterna-
tive. The UK has refueling aircraft and AWACS-type capabilities
in their Nimrod. The Saudis could cancel the F-15 program
(total cost: over $5 billion), although a February 1981 signature
on an F-15 logistics support package indicates their strong
desire to maintain close ties to the US Government. Clearly, a
Saudi move to non-US military equipment would reduce US influence
with the Saudis and could, therefore, constitute a threat to Israeli
interests as well as those of the US.
Question. How many US military personnel are required for the
support of current and anticipated FMS contracts with Saudi
Arabia? How many current and anticipated contract personnel
have military specialties in which US Armed Forces are in short
supply? What are the salaries and compensation for contract
personnel compared with the salaries and compensation for US
military personnel performing similar work?
Response. Approximately 950 US military personnel, assigned to
locations in the US and Saudi Arabia, are/will be required to
support current and anticipated FMS contracts with Saudi Arabia.
There are no records maintained by the Department of Defense or
the Military Departments which identify the military experience
or military specialties possessed by contractor personnel sup-
porting FMS contracts with Saudi Arabia.
The compensation package of contractor personnel supporting FMS
contracts with Saudi Arabia is considered proprietary information
by the companies holding the contracts, and is not available to
the Department of Defense or the Military Departments.
Question. If Saudi Arabia becomes involved in armed conflicts
and it is determined that US personnel necessary for support or
operation of US-provided equipment are not to be involved, how
will US personnel and sensitive technologies and components be
protected?
Response. The Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) has agreed to
afford US-provided equipment with sensitive technologies and
components the same level of protection as provided by the US
Government. The SAG has fulfilled its responsibilities during
a conflict.
Physical protection of US personnel would be dependent on the
scenario and keyed to such variables as the warning time required
to remove personnel, the nature of the conflict, the vulnerability
to actual danger, the identity of the opponent force (s), etc.
However, in all but minor contingencies, continued US support
of a non-combatant nature would be needed by the Saudis if they
were to continue military operations for an extended period of
time. In such cases, we feel confident of our ability, and that
of the Saudis, to protect US personnel and technologies.
Question. If sensitive technologies in AWACS fell into hostile
hands, would US security be adversely affected?
Response. Concerns over loss or compromise of sensitive
technology fall into two categories: possible Soviet exploitation
of US AWACS technology to counter AWACS operations through
jamming, and application of US technology to advance Soviet
airborne early warning systems. Neither concern is well founded.
The AWACS pulse doppler radar is based upon mid-sixties textbook
technology. An equivalent of the AWACS computer is available
commercially. The only sensitive portion of the technology is
the computer software that integrates the entire system. If
compromised, the job of reverse engineering that software would
be comparable to unscrambling eggs. Should such compromise occur,
however, exploitation of the system to enhance Soviet jamming
of AWACS could be easily avoided by changing the logic key to
the software, which would take only about one week.
Additionally, delivery of the Saudi AWACS will not begin until
late 1985. Prior to that delivery, an extensive security
protection program will be implemented to include procedures,
devices, and facilities needed to protect AWACS equipment in
Saudi Arabia.
Finally, application of AWACS technology to Soviet airborne early
warning systems is not of great concern. The Soviets are
currently developing a new airborne early warning aircraft with
capabilities estimated to be quite similar to those of the US
AWACS. By late 1985, when the first AWACS will be delivered to
Saudi Arabia, it is safe to assume that the Soviets will have an
airborne surveillance platform deployed that is equal to the
20-year old technology of the AWACS.
Question. Why won't ground-based radars provide the necessary
coverage and do it on a full-time basis?
Response. Ground-based radars are being provided to the Saudis
and they, along with AWACS, would provide a complementary system
for full-time coverage adequate to protect the oil assets of Saudi
Arabia. However, ground-based radars in the Persian Gulf region
do not provide adequate coverage or warning time. The low
altitude range of ground-based radars is limited by the curvature
of the earth to about 20-30 miles over flat terrain (as found
along the Persian Gulf coast) ; this does not provide adequate
warning time to detect, identify, and intercept hostile aircraft
transiting the Gulf. Hence, a combination of AWACS and ground
radars is needed to provide the most cost-effective solution
to the overall air defense problem.
Question. Could you review the specific Saudi military justification
for the AIM-9L Sidewinder missile they have requested? Do you
believe their justification is credible?
Response. The AIM-9L missile is much more capable than current
Saudi missiles. It can be fired effectively from any angle,
including head-on, maneuvers. Such a capability could be crucial
in intercepting attacking aircraft before they reached Saudi oil
facilities.
The US agrees with this assessment. Without AIM-9L Sidewinder
missiles, Saudi interceptors would have to use valuable minutes
to maneuver around behind attacking aircraft to obtain lock-on
with less capable AIM-9P missiles before they could fire and
destroy the attackers. With AIM-9L missiles, lock-on can be
obtained head-on the attacker, enabling the Saudi fighter to fire
and destroy the attackers more quickly and with greater success.
D
THIS BRIEFING IS A TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SAUDI "ENHANCEMENT
PACKAGE." THESE ENHANCEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN SAUDI AIR DEFENSES
AGAINST A MUTUALLY PERCEIVED, INCREASING THREAT.
SLIDE #1
"TITLE"
ONCE FORMAL NOTIFICATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE CONGRESS, SENIOR
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WILL PROVIDE TESTIMONY TO BOTH HOUSE AND SENATE
COMMITTEES ON THE POLITICAL AND GEO-STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED SALE.
5 All
SAUDI ARABIAN
ENHANCEMENTS
EAS
to
ES
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADEQUATE DEFENSE OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI
SLIDE #2
ARABIA, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL PROPOSE THE SALE OF THESE ITEMS - THE E-3A
PACKAG
AWACS, THE KC-707 TYPE INFLIGHT REFUELING TANKER AIRCRAFT, CONFORMAL FUEL
TANKS FOR THE F-15S, AND THE IMPROVED AIM-9L SIDEWINDER MISSILE.
2
ROYAL SAUDI AIR FORCE
ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE
E-3A AWACS
KC-707 TANKER AIRCRAFT
#
CONFORMAL FUEL TANKS
AIM-9L SIDEWINDER MISSILES
2892.1
A LITTLE UNDERSTOOD FACT, IS THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS A BIG COUNTRY. IN,
COMPARISON TO EUROPE, THE SAUDI PENINSULA COVERS THE ENTIRE CONTINENT. IN
SLIDE #3
BRITAIN AND GERMANY, THE U.S. HAS OVER TEN MAIN OPERATING AIRBASES AND
EUROPE/
SAUDI
SEVERAL FORWARD OPERATING BASES. ADDITIONALLY, NATO HAS TWICE AGAIN AS MANY
BASES. BY CONTRAST, SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE DEFENDED BY F-15S FROM ONLY THREE
MAIN OPERATING BASES AT DHAHRAN, TAIF, AND KHAMIS MUSHAYT.
3
JL
LI
1
S A All LND ALD DHAHRAN
and
"I
(=
E A R RA A BI BIA A
FURTHER ILLUSTRATION OF THE SIZE OF SAUDI ARABIA CAN BE SEEN WITH THIS
OVERLAY ON THE CONTINENTAL U.S. SAUDI ARABIA COVERS AN AREA EQUAL TO THE
U.S. EAST OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE KINGDOM HAS A POPULATION OF JUST OVER 8 MILLION,
ONLY SLIGHTLY LARGER THAN THE POPULATION OF NEW YORK.
SAUDI ARABIA FACES POTENTIAL ENEMIES ARE IN ALL DIRECTIONS AND, LOOMING
SLIDE #4
OVER THE ENTIRE AREA, RUSSIAN FORCES ARE POISED BUT 700 MILES AWAY.
U.S./
SAUDI
DEFENDING THIS VAST AREA AGAINST WIDELY SEPARATED THREATS, WITH LIMITED
MILITARY MANPOWER IS THE PECULIAR PROBLEM WHICH SAUDI MILITARY PLANNERS MUST
FACE. DEFENDING A COUNTRY OF THIS SIZE, WITH 60 F-15S AND 80 F-5S, STATIONED
AT THREE REMOTE BASES, REQUIRES EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES, ESPECIALLY IN THE FACE
OF A GROWING THREAT. FOR EXAMPLE, IF DHAHRAN WERE KNOCKED OUT -
-- A LIKELY SITUATION IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON THE OIL COMPLEXES
-- DEFENDING THE OIL FACILITIES FROM TAIF OR KHAMIS WOULD BE LIKE DEFENDING
CHICAGO FROM WICHITA OR DALLAS.
-- DURING PERIODS OF INCREASED TENSION SORTIES FROM THE NEAREST BASE WOULD
STRETCH THE LIMITED FORCES THIN AND THOSE RESOURCES WOULD RAPIDLY BE DEPLETED.
-- IF FLOWN FROM CROSS COUNTRY BASES (1 1/2 HOURS AWAY) THREE HOURS OF
FLYING IS REQUIRED JUST TO GET TO AND FROM THE CONTESTED AREA. CONSEQUENTLY,
MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO INCREASE EFFECTIVE TIME ON STATION BY INCREASING
THE FUEL AVAILABLE.
4
DHAHRAN
AWA R.A. BIA
WE PROPOSE TO PROVIDE AN AIRBORNE REFUELING CAPABILITY WITH KC-707
TANKERS. THE KC-707 PERMITS THE F-15 TO ONLOAD THE FUEL NEEDED TO STAY
AIRBORNE LONGER. WITH THIS ABILITY, THE ONLY LIMITATION ON FLYING TIME IS
SLIDE #5
"KC-707"
THE ENDURANCE OF THE PILOT. THE KC-707 IS ALSO OUTFITTED WITH DROGUES FOR
REFUELING THE SAUDI F-5S. THIS IS SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT MAKES THE SYSTEM
COMPATIBLE WITH OUR NAVY WHICH ALSO USES THE PROBE AND DROGUE TECHNIQUE
FOR AERIAL REFUELING.
THIS IS ONLY HALF OF THE SOLUTION, HOWEVER. SHOULD THE SAUDIS BE
THREATENED, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE THREAT WOULD BE SUSTAINED...OR
EXTENDED, AND SUPPORT WILL BE REQUIRED FROM ALL THREE BASES. AERIAL
REFUELING RESOURCES, IF AVAILABLE, WILL BE STRETCHED THIN. CONSEQUENTLY, IT
IS NECESSARY TO INCREASE THE AIRCRAFT'S BASIC RANGE/ENDURANCE THROUGH
INCREASED ON BOARD FUEL CAPACITY.
5
KC-707
AERIAL REFUELER
BOOM FOR F-15s DROGUES FOR F-5s
THEREFORE, WE HAVE PROPOSED PROVIDING THE SAUDIS WITH CONFORMAL FUEL
TANKS, WHICH PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL 9,750 POUNDS OF FUEL. DEPENDING ON
THE MISSION PROFILE, THEY INCREASE RANGE AND ENDURANCE BY 40-70 PERCENT.
SLIDE #6
"CFT"
ANOTHER VITAL ELEMENT OF THE PROPOSED ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM, IS THE
AIM-9L SIDEWINDER MISSILE.
29
i
CONFORMAL FUEL TANK
F-15
CONFORMAL FUEL TANK
WHAT THE SIDEWINDER DOES, VERY SIMPLY, IS PERMIT DEFENDING FORCES TO
CONFRONT A THREAT HEAD-ON. CONSEQUENTLY, MORE TARGETS CAN BE ENGAGED AND
SLIDE #7
VULNERABILITY OF THE F-15 IS ALSO GREATLY REDUCED SINCE THEY DON'T HAVE TO
"AIM-9L"
PERFORM MANEUVERS WHICH INCREASE THEIR EXPOSURE TO THE INBOUND THREAT. THE
INCREASED ABILITY TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY SUPERIOR NUMBERS OF ATTACKING AIRCRAFT
QUICKLY, IS ESSENTIAL IF A THREAT IS TO BE STOPPED BEFORE IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN
ITS MISSION, RATHER THAN AFTERWARD.
THE SAUDIS MUST BE ABLE TO DEFEAT AN ATTACK RATHER THAN MERELY AVENGE IT.
7
AIM-9L
SIDEWINDER MISSILE
BUT FIRST, THE SAUDI DEFENSE FORCES MUST BE ABLE TO SEE A THREAT THE
INSTANT IT PRESENTS ITSELF, IN ORDER TO DETER OR, IF NECESSARY, TO DESTROY
THAT THREAT
SLIDE #8
AFTER THOROUGH STUDY, THE USG DETERMINED THAT THE ENTIRE EARLY WARNING
"AWACS"
SYSTEM NEEDED IMPROVEMENT. THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DOING THAT IS
THROUGH A COMBINATION OF THE E-3A AWACS AND AN IMPROVED GROUND RADAR SYSTEM.
8
the
- U.S.AIR FORCE
80658
E-3A
AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM
AN IMPROVED RADAR GROUND SYSTEM IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE COVERAGE NOT
AVAILABLE WITH THE FIVE ANTIQUATED BRITISH MARCONI RADARS NOW IN SAUDI
ARABIA. THE PROPOSED GROUND RADAR NETWORK WILL BE USED BOTH BY CIVIL AND
MILITARY AVIATION AND WILL PROVIDE SOME IMPROVEMENT IN LOW LEVEL COVERAGE.
HOWEVER, DUE TO THE PROXIMITEY OF THE THREAT THIS LOW LEVEL COVERAGE IS
STILL INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY WARNING. THE AWACS IS NEEDED TO
SLIDE #9
AUGMENT THE LOW LEVEL COVERAGE OF THE PROPOSED GROUND SYSTEM IN CONTESTED
INTERFACE
AREAS. THIS ENTIRE SYSTEM WILL BE LINKED THROUGH A MESSAGE PROCESSING
CENTER.
AN ADDED BENEFIT OF THIS ARRANGEMENT FOR THE U.S. WILL BE THE ABILITY OF
THE SYSTEM TO INTEROPERATE WITH USN SHIPS IN THE ARABIAN GULF, U.S. TASK
FORCE 70, AND U.S. NAVY E-2CS WHEN THEY ARE WITHIN RANGE.
9
AWACS INTERFACE
GRND RADAR
AWACS
USN SHIPS
Dhahran 0
E-2C
MPC
TF-70 NTDS
O
SHIPS
Riyadh
GRND RADAR
THE E-3A SENTRY OR AWACS PROVIDES A MOBILE AND RESPONSIVE RADAR
PLATFORM FOR AIR SURVEILLANCE. THE AIRCRAFT DESIGN IS BASED ON THE BOEING
707-320B AIRFRAME. MAJOR EXTERNAL DIFFERENCES INCLUDE THE 30 FOOT DIAMETER
ROTODOME, AND PRATT AND WHITNEY TURBOFAN ENGINES WHICH ARE THE SAME AS THOSE
ON THE C-141, AND A RECEPTACLE FOR INFLIGHT REFUELING.
SLIDE #10
"AWACS"
THE E-3A NORMALLY OPERATES AN ALTITUDE OF 29,000 FEET AND A CRUISE
SPEED OF 0.72 MACH. IT CAN FLY FOR APPROXIMATELY 9-11 HOURS WITHOUT INFLIGHT
REFUELING, AND UP TO 22 HOURS WITH AWACS INFLIGHT REFUELING. THE NORMAL
CREW OF 17 CONSISTS OF 4 FLIGHT CREWMEMBERS AND 13 MISSION CREWMEMBERS. THE
MISSION CREW HAS 9 MULTIPURPOSE CONSOLES WHICH CAN BE USED FOR SURVEILLANCE
AND CONTROL OF THE AIR DEFENSE SITUATION WHILE ON BOARD RADIOS PROVIDE VOICE
AND DATA LINK CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, THE AWACS DOES NOT POSSESS ANY SPECIAL
CAPABILITY FOR GATHERING ELECTRONIC OR SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE.
E-3A AWACS
10
ENDURANCE
OPERATING ALTITUDE
11 HRS UNREFUELED
29,000 FEET
22 HRS REFUELED/AUGMENTED CREW
CREW
4 FLIGHTS
13 MISSIONS
NO ELINT/SIGINT
RADIOS
HF
UHF
VHF
SPEED
CONSOLES
TADIL-A/C
0.72 MACH
9 MULTIPURPOSE
SECURE
THE E-3A IS SIMPLY A RADAR THAT HAS BEEN ELEVATED TO INCREASE ITS LINE
OF SIGHT. THIS EXTENDS LOW LEVEL COVERAGE OUT TO THE NEW RADAR HORIZON
OF APPROXIMATELY 208 NM. SINCE THE E-3A RADAR LOOKS DOWN, IT MUST SEPARATE
OUT THE TARGET RETURNS FROM CLUTTER SIGNALS REFLECTED FROM THE EARTH'S LAND
OR SEA SURFACE. THE PULSE DOPPLER MODE IS USED FOR DETECTING AIRBORNE
SLIDE #11
TARGETS OUT TO THE HORIZON. IT DEPENDS ON THE FACT THAT THE RETURN SIGNALS
RADAR
CAPABILITY FROM HIGH. SPEED AIRCRAFT TARGETS ARE SHIFTED IN FREQUENCY FROM THE
REFLECTIONS FROM THE STATIONARY GROUND. TARGETS MUST BE HIGH SPEED TO BE
DETECTED IN THIS MODE.
THE MARITIME MODE OF THE RADAR IS A MODIFICATION OF THE PULSE MODE USED
TO DETECT SHIPS WITHIN THE HORIZON, AGAINST A BACKROUND OF RADAR REFLECTIONS
FROM THE SEA SURFACE. THIS IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE WATER ABSORBS MUCH OF THE
RADAR ENERGY WHILE LAND REFLECTS THE ENERGY, CAUSING EXECSSIVE GROUND CLUTTER.
THE RADAR USES PROCESSING LOGIC TO SEPARATE TARGET SIGNALS FROM REFLECTED SEA
CLUTTER AND DISPLAYS ONLY THE SHIPS. DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE GROUND RETURN OVER
LAND, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH GROUND TARGETS.
THE AWACS RADAR PROVIDES A DETECTION CAPABILITY OF SMALL SIZE TARGETS
OUT TO 175 NAUTICAL MILES; MEDIUM SIZE TARGETS OUT TO 240 NAUTICAL MILES;
AND LARGER TARGETS OUT TO 360 NAUTICAL MILES. OF COURSE, ANY TARGET BELOW
THE LINE-OF-SIGHT (BEYOND THE RADAR HORIZON) WILL NOT BE DETECTED.
#
11
RADAR M
CANNOT DETECT GROUND TARGETS
USED INSIDE RADAR HORIZON (25-208NM)
DETECTS ONLY AIRCRAFT
BTH ONLY USED BEYOND THE HORIZON (WOULD DISPLAY
EXCESSIVE CLUTTER IF USED INSIDE THE HORIZON)
PULSE (BTH)
MARITIME NOT USED OVERLAND DUE TO EXCESSIVE CLUTTER
USED BEYOND RADAR HORIZON (208NM)
(LAND REFLECTS MORE RADAR ENERGY THAN WATER AND DISPLAYS
DETECTS ONLY AIRCRAFT
EXCESSIVE CLUTTER)
MARITIME (PULSE)
USED 35-208NM
DETECTS SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT
BLANK OVER LAND
100,000 Ft
29,000 Ft
175 NM,
SAND
LIND
208 NM
240 NM!
35 NM
RADAR
360 NM
Bahrain
HORIZON
Iran
Qatar
Oman
Saudi Arabia
UAE
THIS SLIDE SIMPLY SUMMARIZES WHAT THE AWACS CAN AND CANNOT DO
-- IT CAN SEE LOW LEVEL AIRCRAFT, BUT NOT BEYOND 200 MILES
-- IT CAN SEE HIGH SPEED TARGETS, BUT NOT TANKS, TROOPS OR GROUND TARGETS
SLIDE #12
AWACS
-- IT CAN SEE SHIPS AT SEA, BUT NOT TANKS ON THE DESERT
CAPABILITY
-- IT DIPLAYS A STROBE ON THE SCOPE WHEN IT IS BEING JAMMED, BUT IT CANNOT
PERFORM ANY JAMMING
-- IT CAN PERFORM COMMAND AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND CONTROL FIGHTER
INTERCEPTS
-- IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE ANY INTELLIGENCE EQUIPMENT
#12
AWACS CAPABILITIES
CAN
CAN'T
SEE LOW LEVEL AIRCRAFT
SEE BEYOND 200 MILES (LOW ALT)
#
SEE HIGH SPEED TARGETS
A
SEE TANKS, TROOPS, GROUND TARGETS
&
SEE SHIPS AT SEA (MARITIME MODE)
SEE TANKS ON THE DESERT
SEE RADAR JAMMING
2)
PERFORM JAMMING
As
CONTROL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTS
**
COLLECT SIGNAL/ELECTRICAL INTELL-
IGENCE DATA
TAKE PHOTO'S
THE ABSOLUTE NEED FOR AN AWACS TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE AIR DEFENSE FOR
SAUDI ARABIA IS EASILY SHOWN THROUGH A GRAPHIC DEPICTION OF REACTION TIMES
AVAILABLE WITH AND WITHOUT THE AWACS. THE SAUDI GROUND-BASED RADARS ARE
SLIDE #13
LIMITED BY CINE-OF-SIGHT AND PROVIDE A LOW-LEVEL DETECTION RANGE OF 20-30
GRND RADAR
MILES (EARTH CURVATURE LIMITS LINE-OF-SIGHT HORIZON). THIS DOES NOT PROVIDE
ADEQUATE TIME FOR SAUDI DEFENSES TO REACT AND INTERCEPT A THREAT BEFORE IT
REACHES ITS TARGET. ON A LOW LEVEL ATTACK AGAINST THE OILFIELDS THE GROUND
RADAR WOULD PROVIDE 2-4 MINUTES WARNING OF A TARGET APPROACHING AT 4-600
KNOTS. ASSUMING IT TOOK TWO MINUTES TO IDENTIFY THE TARGET AND FIVE
MINUTES FOR THE INTERCEPTORS TO BECOME AIRBORNE (BEST CAPABILITY), THE BEST
THEY COULD DO WOULD BE TO INTERCEPT THE STRIKE AIRCRAFT AFTER THEY HAVE
DESTROYED THE TARGET AND WERE ON THEIR WAY HOME.
13
GROUND RADAR
20-30 NM
DETECTION
Pm
DETECTION TOO LATE TO INTERCEPT
PRIOR_TO_TARGET_DESTRUCTION
5 MIN
LAUNCH
IF THE AWACS IS ON-STATION IN THE AREA, THE SITUATION WOULD BE GREATLY
IMPROVED. WITH THE AWACS' INCREASED DETECTION CAPABILITY, IT COULD ORBIT
SLIDE #14
50 MILES INSIDE THE BORDER AND STILL DETECT THE INTRUDER 150 NAUTICAL MILES
AWACS
COVER
FROM ITS TARGET. USING THE SAME TWO MINUTE REACTION TIME AND FIVE MINUTES
SCRAMBLE TIME, THE INTRUDER WOULD STILL BE 80-90 MILES FROM ITS TARGET WHEN
THE INTERCEPTORS BECOME AIRBORNE. INTERCEPT IN THIS SITUATION WOULD OCCUR
40-50 MILES BEFORE THE INTRUDER REACHES ITS TARGET.
ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT POINT IS THAT SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES ALSO REQUIRE
SOME ADVANCE WARNING OF AN ATTACK TO BRING THEIR SYSTEMS UP. THE GROUND
RADARS DO NOT PROVIDE THIS NEEDED TIME.
14
AWACS
150 NM
DETECTION
INTERCEPT CAN BE COMPLETED
PRIOR TO TARGET
5 MIN
LAUNCH