Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
66328587
label
Acid Rain/Environment
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
66328587
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Acid Rain/Environment
citationUrl
collections
Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
James Cicconi's Subject Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
66328587
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1985-12-31
year
1985
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1981-01-01
year
1981
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
cd413bbccee822be
ocrText
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 15, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: EDWIN MEESE III
JAMES A. BAKER III
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
DAVID A. STOCKMAN
RICHARD G. DARMAN
JOHN A. SVAHN
FREDERICK N. KHEDOURI
FROM:
CRAIG L. FULLER
as
SUBJECT:
Acid Rain Meeting
Attached is an outline of the acid rain proposal that
will be discussed on Friday December 16, at 5:00pm in
the Roosevelt Room.
Also attached is a draft announcement of acid rain
action.
attachments
TRANSBOUNDARY ACID RAIN CONTROLS
Proposal
Make a public commitment to enter into negotiations with Canada
to reduce pollution that causes acid rain damage in both
countries. These reductions would be pursued under the inter-
national air pollution Section (Sec. 115) of the Clean Air Act
(CAA). Although Section 115 provides legal authority to address
transboundary pollution, it has not been tested in the courts and
would most likely be challenged. A treaty, which could be more
time-consuming and politically contentious, could supplement
Section 115, if the legal obstacles seemed insuperable.
Process
-
President announces in State of the Union address the
beginning of cooperative discussions with Canada.
-
Draft finding that emissions in the U.S. are causing
acid rain damage in Canada.
-
Develop a finding that Canada has the authority to make
reciprocal reductions.
-
Negotiate an agreement with the Canadians on environ-
mental goals to be achieved through reductions of
transboundary pollution.
-
Develop a joint control program to achieve these goals.
-
Require each State to modify its State Air Plan to
provide for reductions necessary to meet international
target.
- Develop a financing plan to pay for pollution controls
and/or provide miner protection (which would need to be
passed by Congress).
-
Federal enforcement and compliance monitoring.
- Audit environmental results to determine need for
further reductions.
Advantages
-
Administration taking positive action independent of
Congressional debate although financing would ultimately
require Congressional action.
-
Control program would probably be more limited and
better focused on sensitive areas than if Congress
passed new legislation.
-
The process is compatible with the pursuit of a treaty.
-
Can be expanded if research shows need for additional
control.
Disadvantages
-
Section 115 subjects EPA to a number of regulatory
findings and opportunity for legal challenges.
-
Canada has publicly called for a major pollution
reduction
and may be unable to compromise on a more
realistic goal.
-
Even with a financing package, midwestern States may
perceive they bear an unfair burden and some may refuse
to comply with Federal orders to revise State Air
Programs forcing Federal action.
-
Potentially high cost to Treasury or a departure from
polluter pays principal.
Today I have instructed the Administrator of EPA to begin negotiations
with Canada on a program to reduce the acid rain pollution across our
borders. These negotiations will lead to substantial reductions in sulfur dioxide
emissions in both countries.
We are pursuing this approach because it offers the earliest solution to
the acid rain damage presently being experienced in the northeastern United
States and southeastern Canada. Acid rain recognizes no borders. Emissions
from U.S. power plants and other sources are contributing to acid rain damage
in Canadian lakes, and Canadian emissions are contributing to the acid rain
falling on our vulnerable lakes -- particularly in the Adirondacks and
New England.
This joint effort will help protect the most vulnerable environmental
resources in both the United States and Canada. Moreover, by taking
these steps, we can learn more about the acid rain problem, which will
help us better understand the need for further efforts to control acid
rain.
pkg =
sell.
3
goal-setting (319 modifie) peoblems
4
Congress ? (Treaty could be worst of
both worlds)
A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO ACID RAIN
The Administration can deal effectively with the acid rain problem
by negotiating transboundary emissions reductions with the Canadians.
This approach would address the acid rain problem in those regions of
North America with documented environmental damage from acid rain, namely
the northeastern United States and southeastern Canada. Any program that
protects sensitive Canadian lakes would substantially reduce those emissions
causing damage in the northeastern United States.
Negotiated emissions reductions could be acheived with authority already
contained in Section 115 of the Clean Air Act or through a treaty. Each
approach has distinctly different advantages and disadvantages but procedurally
both approaches could be initiated through a similar process. The decision
on how to implement a negotiated emissions reduction agreement with Canada
could actually await completion of the agreement, although it would be far
better to make that call as early as possible.
I. THE INITIAL STEP - Negotiate Common Goals and Optional Control Plans
The process would begin with an announcement by the President that he
was commencing negotiations with the Canadians to (1) mutually establish the
environmental goal of reducing the transboundary pollution causing acid rain
in the United States and Canada and (2) devise emissions reduction strategies
for each country which could attain that environmental goal. These negotiations
would take from 1 to 2 years and would focus on:
a. the geographic regions where mitigation of acid rain is appropriate,
b. the level of reduction in acid rain in each region that is adequate
to prevent or eliminate environmental damage,
C. the relative burden to be carried by each country in reducing emissions
to attain the appropriate goal for each region, and
d. options available to each country in allocating emissions reductions
to their states and provinces.
II. IMPLEMENTATION - Use of Section 115 or a Treaty
Implementation of a negotiated agreement can be acheived through either
a Section 115 regulatory program or through a treaty.
-2-
A. Section 115
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to require states to reduce
emissions to prevent or eliminate health or welfare problems in a foreign
country caused by pollutants from the United States. The use of this authority
to implement an acid rain control program would require the following actions:
1) Make a finding that SO₂ emitted in the U.S. may "reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health and welfare". The finding could
be based upon the report of a "duly constituted international agency"
or on an allegation of environmental harm made by the Secretary of
State.
2) Establish that Canadian law gives the United States the same rights
as those provided to Canada by Section 115.
3) Require states which are the sources of the offending SO₂ emissions to
revise their emissions control plans so as to prevent or eliminate the
specified environmental damage.
If the 115 process is chosen as the appropriate path to follow in implementing
an agreement with Canada, the following steps (showing the time required for each
step) would need to be followed to ultimately bring about emissions reductions:
1) Propose a Finding of Environmental Damage (issue immediately upon
completion of the negotiations described on page one)
Based on either an appropriately worded report of an international
agency or on the allegation of the Secretary of State, EPA would issue a proposed
finding that SO₂ emissions from the United States are causing environmental
damage in Canada. Since the final issuance of this finding makes EPA vulnerable
to a citizen suit calling for emissions reductions adequate to eliminate such
damage, issuance of a final finding will be made only when EPA has developed
the regulatory program needed to attain the negotiated emissions reductions.
2) Reciprocity Finding (also issued upon completion of the negotiations)
EPA would establish that Canadian law (in particular House of Commons
Bill C-51, An Act to Amend the Clean Air Act, First Session, Thirty-second
Parliament, 29 Eliz. II, 1980) provides the United States with essentially
the same rights provided to Canada by Section 115. If such a finding could
not be made, the Canadians would have to put such authority in place or the
treaty option would have to be pursued.
3) Propose Guidance to the States on Techniques to be Used in Attaining
Optional Levels of Emissions Reductions (issued 1 year after
completion of negotiations)
EPA would invite public comment on the alternative SO₂ control plans
negotiated with the Canadians and on the proposed regulations describing the
steps to be taken by states in modifying their SO₂ control plans to acheive
the alternative levels of control. This proposal would include the federal
actions (perhaps in the form of uniform emissions limits for power plants in
each state) that would be enforced if states did not comply with the requirements
of the control plan revision process.
- 3 -
4) Propose Financing Legislation (forward to Congress when the proposed
guidance to states is issued)
EPA would propose legislation which would address the financing of the
control options presented in the proposed regulations. The financing package
would provide for financing adequate to cover an estimate of the entire cost of the
proposed emissions reductions, including the costs of capital, operations and
maintenance and fuel premiums. However, this estimate would be a "least cost"
estimate and as such would not provide funds adequate to cover control plans
that relied heavily on expensive technologies such as scrubbers. The funds
necessary to meet the costs of this proposal would be generated through some
combination of an SO₂ tax, an electricity generation tax and/or general
revenues. Because of the length of the regulatory process required under
Section 115, the financing of control costs would not begin until the early
1990's.
5) Final Regulations (issued 1 year after proposal or approximately
4 years from now)
If affirmative Congressional action is taken on financing, EPA would
finalize its finding of transboundary environmental damage and promulgate a
final emissions reduction allocation plan and final guidance to states on the
contents of acceptable state plans to meet the emissions reductions allocated
to them. These state plans would be due to EPA 12 months later, which is
about 5 years from now (early 1989). EPA would take final action on these
plans within six months, promulgating a federal plan if the state plan is found
to be inadequate (promulgation by EPA would add perhaps a year's time).
States would be given up to 3 years to implement their final plans.
This would result in emissions reductions beginning in the 1992 to 1993
time period which is a timeframe similar to many of the proposed Congressional
bills on acid rain.
B. Treaty
Section 115 has the virtue of being an available authority and one under
which EPA could move ahead to deal with the acid rain problem without new
Congressional legislation. But it has drawbacks. It requires a number of
legally challengeable individual procedures, i.e., making findings of
environmental damage and legal reciprocity, developing the control options,
establishing the procedures for state control plan revisions and finally
EPA approval. The sheer number of steps, coupled with the novelty in the use
of this as yet unutilized provision, raises a host of serious legal questions.
Obviously legislation would solve this problem, but might raise a host of
other problems during its consideration by Congress. Another option, which
would not require normal legislative consideration, would be the conclusion of
an agreement through the treaty process. That approach might work as follows.
Similar to the 115 process, the United States would negotiate common goals and
a control plan with Canada. This process, as discussed earlier, would take
from 1 to 2 years. At this point, however, instead of moving forward by proposing
guidance to the states on state control plan revisions, a treaty would be drafted.
Drafting the treaty would take an additional 6 months after completion of the
negotiations on common goals and control options.
Congressional consideration of a treaty would take another legislative year.
Since a treaty would involve all of the controversial elements associated with
acid rain legislation, a major legislative effort would be necessary to acheive
the two-thirds majority required in the Senate. In addition, financing legislation
would have to pass both Houses of Congress, roughly at the same time.
After the treaty is approved by the Congress, it will be necessary to
activate the regulatory steps discussed earlier. EPA would need to propose
and finalize regulatory procedures (under Section 115 or new implementing
legislation) to be followed by the states in acheiving the goals or specific
emissions reduction targets set forth in the treaty. This process would take
approximately 2 to 3 years.
In theory, the passage and implementation of a treaty would take slightly
longer (perhaps an additional year) than implementation of Section 115. Approval
of a treaty, however, greatly diminishes the legal risks inherent in a Section
115 action and as such could greatly reduce the amount of time necessary to
achieve acid rain controls. A treaty poses greater political risks, although
financing legislation may be necessary for both alternatives.
The policy question relates to the certainty the Administration attaches
to avoiding legal obstacles and to the visibility the President wishes to give
to a committment to Canada to deal with the acid rain problem.
62-32
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 7, 1983
SUBJECT:
Acid Rain
Objective:
Develop a program to address public, Congressional
and Canadian concern with both the environmental
and economic consequences of acid rain.
Provide Ronald Reagan with a credible response to
calls for major new regulatory initiatives and
taxing programs.
Program:
Encourage scientific research on the cause, and
effect of acid rain.
and
mctigation
Determine acidity trends, areas of sensitivity, and
significance of various acidic compounds (SO₂, NOx,
H+) on the environment.
Adopt interim measures to mitigate harmful effects
of acid precipitation in sensitives areas (such as
state grants for lake liming
Review state implementation plan limits and compli-
ance.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) presently provides authori-
ty for interstate and transboundary air pollution
control. The EPA in conjunction with the Canadian
government should use the present provisions to
develop appropriate response actions. These
provisions include: (1) the interstate control
requirements established by Section 110 (a) (2) E; (2)
the remedy provision under Section 126, 304 and
307 (b) (1) ; and, (3) the transboundary control
requirements established under Section 115.
Begin work under authority currently provided in
Section 108 and Section 109 to designate sulfates
and nitrates as criteria pollutants for which
maximum air concentration standards should be
established and implemented.
Institute a program of universal coal washing/
preparation for medium and high sulphur coals with
nonorganically bound sulphur.
Allow favorable tax benefits and pollution control
bonds for coal preparation and other environmental
precombustion processes. Encourage alternative and
innovative controls.
Use reasonable available control technology to
impose a 4 1b/mmbtu so. 2 national cap equivalent by
1990 and provide for a 2 1b/mmbtu so, national cap
equivalent 1995 if research shows that emissions
are resulting in significant secondary welfare
effects.
Under Section 108/109 authority develop a secondary
so₂ standard for zones of sensitivity.
Financing:
Impose a tax on all fossil fuel based on sulphur
content. Develop a mechanism to provide credits
for both precombustion and post-combustion SO₂ and
NOx reductions beyond those required to meet legal
limits.
Impose a 2 mill
KWH fee on all foreign electri-
city.
Use general treasury funds to continue payment of
Federal research and enforcement.
ACID RAIN STRATEGY
Use of Section 115 allows for a flexible system to deal with
Canadian and State concerns over acid rain while preserving
maximum flexibility to the President. It would allow the
President to announce that EPA would begin negotiations with
Canada on the control of sulfur emissions -- with each country
being required to make reductions.
EPA and the State Department would negotiate with the Canadians on
overall reduction goals, such as deposition loading targets or
percentage reductions. These goals would assure a two-stage
program, evaluating the impact of the initial reduction on the
environment before commencing the second stage.
EPA would then translate these goals into State emission reduction
targets. In doing so, EPA would present regulatory options, providing
a basis for gaining public comment on the options. This evolutionary
and inclusive process would be far preferable to legislation, where
only a limited number of groups participate in the process. By involving
the Canadians, State and local governments and citizens in the decision-
making process, the chance for better understanding and consensus is
enhanced. Overall, the process gives the President a chance to rise
above sectional interests by providing a mechanism in his Administration
for resolving the acid rain issue.
Acid Rain Control Under Current Clean Air Act Authority
If EPA pursued an acid rain control strategy under its
current legislative authority that (1) reduced the United
States contribution to acid rain falling in Southeastern
Canada, and (2) measurably reduced acid rain in the northeastern
section of the United States where acid rain related damages
have been documented, it could ease the existing tensions with
Canada on the acid rain issue and forestall additional acid
rain damage in the Northeast.
In the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Section 115
was added to the Clean Air Act to provide EPA with the authority
to address transboundary pollution problems such as acid
rain. The broad language of section 115 would allows EPA
to pursue an SO₂ reduction program in states upwind of
sensitive Canadian receptor regions. Control in these states
would also significantly reduce acid rain in the northeastern
United States. Perhaps as importantly, reciprocal reductions
in Canada upwind of sensitive receptor areas in the United
States would contribute to the reduction of acid rain in the
one area of the country that we know is presently being
damaged by acid rain.
How Section 115 Works
Section 115 authorizes EPA to require revisions to state
implementation plans (SIPs) to prevent or eliminate health or
welfare problems in a foreign country caused by pollutants
from the United States. The section establishes two procedures
for requiring SIP revisions, one triggered by EPA findings
after receipt of reports of international agencies, and
another triggered by findings by the State Department and
EPA. The two procedures share many common elements. Generally,
the required findings are framed in broad language, which
gives EPA considerable discretion in implementing the provision.
-2-
EPA must begin Section 115 proceedings if (1) an
international agency has submitted information, (2) the
Administrator has reason to believe that a pollutant emitted
in the United States "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare" in another country, (3) the
Administrator determines that the country has given the United
States reciprocal rights and (4) the Administrator identifies
the state or states where the emissions originate.
The findings on the harm caused by a pollutant do not
require conclusive proof of harm, in accordance with the
general precautionary policy of the Clean Air Act. However,
there must be a reasoned basis for concluding that a pollutant
may be causing harm in another country, and that the pollutant
comes from the United States. In addition, the EPA would
have to be able to identify the state where the sources of
the pollutant are located, in order to determine which State
Implementation Plan (SIP) must be modified to correct the
problem. The amount of information needed to make these
determinations would have to be decided on a case-by-case
basis.
The reciprocity finding requires the Agency to conclude
that the foreign country has given the United States the same
rights that Section 115 gives the foreign country. Making
this finding requires the Agency to understand the regulatory
scheme used by the foreign country. In some cases, reciprocal
rights may be created by statutes, while in other cases a
statute followed by implementing regulations may be required.
In any event, the Agency must be satisfied that the United
States in fact has reciprocal rights under the foreign
country's regulatory scheme, whatever form these rights take.
Section 115 proceedings can also be initiated by State
Department and EPA findings. In this case EPA must initiate
Section 115 proceedings if (1) the Secretary of State requests
the Agency to do so, after in effect making findings on harm
comparable to those described above, (2) EPA has concluded
that the country in question has given the United States
reciprocal rights and (3) the Administrator has identified
the state (s) where the emissions originate.
If the requirements of one of the procedures described
above are satisfied, EPA must notify the Governor of the
state (s) in which the pollutant is emitted. This notification
requires the state (s) to revise its SIP to address the problem.
Section 115 requires the foreign country to be invited to
appear at any public hearings associated with the SIP revision.
If a state fails to revise its SIP, EPA is required to
promulgate the necessary changes.
-3-
Making 115 Work
As a practical matter, initiating a 115 action to deal
with the transboundary movement of acid rain from the United
States to Canada is not difficult. Given the reciprocity
provisions of the Canadian Clean Air Act and the findings of
transboundary pollution damage that have already been made by
the International Joint Commission, the major challenge to
the effective use of section 115 would be the resolution of
major technical issues.
The first issue that would need to be addressed would be
the development of the goal to be achieved by the 115 action.
Although a broad range of goals should be considered, the best
candidates are likely to be framed either in terms of a (1)
deposition loading target (such as kilograms of wet sulfur per
hectare per year) or (2) a percentage reduction in our contribution
to acid rain in the sensitive regions of Canada.
Having set the goal for action, the emissions reductions
necessary to attain that goal would be derived by identifying
the relative contribution of (probably through the use of
source receptor models) states, provinces or regions of the
United States and Canada to the existing acid rain levels in
each country. The assignment of emissions reduction targets to
each state would depend on the degree of emissions control
projected in Canada and on the criteria or formula used to
set the level of emissions reduction appropriate for each state.
Tools are available to allocate emissions reductions targets to
states so that the reductions are achieved at least cost. However,
other criteria, such as interstate equity and the joint impact of
some reductions on both U.S. and Canadian areas, would need to be
considered and could result in some modification in a true least
cost emissions reduction program.
Additional procedural steps in the process would include:
(1) Development of the regulatory guidelines for states to follow
in revising their State Implementation Plans.
(2) Negotiations with Canada on the emissions reductions to be
achieved in the U.S. and Canada.
(3) Development of a legislative package for financial assistance
to the states required to reduce emissions and/or to the
miners likely to be affected by fuel switching.
-4-
Impact of Section 115
As a practical matter any reductions in SO₂ called for
under Section 115 will fall most heavily on the Midwest and the
Northeast simply because they represent the nearest upwind
sources contributing to deposition in Canada. Reductions in
States further south or west will not contribute much to
acid rain reductions in Canada (or our sensitive northeastern
areas) and therefore would not be pursued under this policy.
The cost of a Section 115 action is largely a function
of the total size of the emissions reductions called for,
although the way these reductions are allocated to States and
the time allowed to achieve them will also be important.
Timing
Implementation of this approach would probably involve the
following elements:
--Announcement of the intention of the Administration
to pursue this approach.
Development and announcement of the specific environmental
goal of the program
-Negotiation of targets for Canada and the United States
-Allocation of the reduction among the states
-Development of a legislative package for financial assistance
--Publication of guidance to the States concerning
the preparation of acid rain plans
-Submission and approval of State plans
--Installation of controls
Development of the specific environmental goal of the program
could take as little as 2 to 3 months, if the Agency were to
do it unilaterally, i.e. without extensive Canadian or public
review and comment. With such involement, the time frame for
establishing the specific goal could be 8 to 10 months.
It is possible that interests in both this country and in
Canada would insist on knowing the economic consequences of setting
any specific goal before accepting it. In that case, the setting
of a specific environmental goal could be folded into the
reduction target effort. This would not significantly
shorten or lengthen the overall schedule.
Final state allocations could be set in 2 to 3 years depending
on the analytical complexity and controversy of the options pursued.
Although development of guidance to the states on how to
write reduction plans would begin during the state allocation
process, the guidance probably could not be finalized until
the allocations are set. Assuming publication of proposed
guidance soon after allocations are set, final guidance
could be given to states 3 to 3 1/2 years after the beginning
date of this program.
If the States are given 18 months to prepare, adopt, and
submit an acid rain plan, and EPA is given 12 months to review,
propose approval/disapproval, and take final action (including
triggering default limits should the plan be deficient), the
total time for having acceptable state acid rain plans would be
5 1/2 to 6 years.
Although some control actions could be taken within a few
years after approval of the state plan, a better minimum
estimate for the more complex measures would be 5 years.
This would bring the total implementation time, from the time of
the announcement to the time when the controls in place, to
10 1/2 to 11 years.
Financing
The ultimate success of any acid rain control program,
especially one that limits reductions to a relatively small
number of states, depends in large part on the financial relief
made available to the states asked to reduce their emissions.
The cost differentials created by the emissions reduction
targets that could be assigned to some of the larger emitting
states would almost certainly lead to significant political
and legal opposition to even the most equitable solutions to
the acid rain issue. Without the full cooperation of the states
any action designed to address the acid rain problem, either
internationally or domestically, is doomed to failure.
Financing programs relying on some combination
of SO₂ tax, generation tax and general revenues have been
analyzed in detail by the Cabinet Council Working Group.
Minimum-Maximum
Times
Most Likely
(in months)
Time
1) Develop concept for announcement
1 3
2
2) Determine goal
a) Categorize and analyze choices
1 2
2
b) Discuss goal with Canadians
1 6
2
c) Clear proposal through Administration
1 4
2
d) Propose goal and take comment
2 6
4
e) Make final decision on goal, clear,
1 2
2
and announce.
3) Determine reductions for regions
a) Decide division of control
responsibility between U.S.
and Canada.
2 6
4
b) Determine methodology for working
2 6
4
backward from the goal to
reduction for the region. (e.g.
models, percent reduction, etc.)
c) Propose methodology and results
2 4
3
and take comment.
d) Clear proposal through Administration
3 6
5
e) Make final decision on regional
4 - 10
6
rollbacks, clear and announce.
4) Determine methodology for allocating
regional rollbacks to individual
states.
a) Analyze options
3 8
5
b) Publish proposals and take public
3 6
4
comment
c) Clear proposal through Administration
4 10
6
- -2-
Minimum-Maximum
Times
Most Likely
(in months)
Time
c) Make final decision and notify
2 6
3
individual states
5) Develop and guidelines for SIP
content (including default mechanism)
a) Analyze and propose
-
8 - 12
9
b) Clear proposal through Administration
3 - 8
5
c) Propose and take comment
2-4
3
b) Final decision, clear, and announce.
3 - 10
7
6) Submission of state plans
12 - 24
18
7) Verify through discussions and
1 9
3
possibly public hearings that
Canadian reductions (for benefit of
U.S. sensitive areas) are appropriate
and will be enforced.
8) Approval of state plans by EPA
9 - 15
12
(proposal and final) [disapprovals &
triggering of default]
9) Achievement of reduction
3 - 8 years
5 years
ARROUNC EMENT
GOAL
Possible Schedule
analyze
1)) Canadians
c) Clear
d) Public comment
e) Draft & clear
final
REGIONAL REDUCTION
a) Division: US/Canada
D) Methodology
c) Clear
d) Public comment
c) Draft & clear
Final
STATE REDUCTIONS
e) Analyze
)) Clear
:) Public comment
1) Draft & clear
Final
GUIDELINES
) Develop
) Clear
) Public comment
(7)
Final
GOAL
More Realistic Schedu,
analyze
b) Canadians
} Clear
(i) Public comment
e) Draft & clear
final
REGIONAL REDUCTION
a) Division: US/Canada
b) Methodology
c) Clear
d) Public comment
Draft & clear
Final
STATE REDUCTIONS
a) Analyze
b) Clear
c) Public comment
1) Draft & clear
Final
GUIDELINES
1) Develop
1) Clear
:
) Public comment
') Final
A.
ACCELERATE EXISTING PROGRAM
Components:
1. Interagency research
2. Technology research and development
3. Remedial program for sensitive lakes
4. Continue consultation with Canada under MOI
5. Cooperate with states
6. Review impediments to new plants
Costs: $140 million in FY 85
Advantages:
Not committing to expensive control program.
Disadvantages:
1. Congressional critics criticize this as inadequate. Not
even following recommendation of the President's science
advisors report.
2. Poor political position for New England and New York.
3. Undermines Administrator Ruckelshaus' public posture and
standing -- beaten by White House.
(perhaps add "c" and "D" in
with "A". )
B.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH CANADA TO REDUCE POLLUTION THAT CAUSES
ACID RAIN DAMAGE IN BOTH COUNTRIES.
Components:
1. President announces in State of the Union address the
beginning of cooperative discussions with Canada.
2. Negotiate an agreement with the Canadians.
3. Develop a joint control program to achieve reductions.
4. Develop a financing plan to pay for pollution controls
and/or provide miner protection (which would need to be
passed by Congress).
5. Audit environmental results to determine need for
further reductions.
Costs: $2-3 billion annually.
Advantages:
Reduces negative environmental press, although
environmentalist/Democrats may call this a stall.
Disadvantages:
1. Commits the country to a multi-billion dollar control
program -- unlikely that a bill would be forthcoming in
1984.
2. EPA bureaucrats will take control of program with less
public review than would occur through legislation.
3. All the substantive and political problems associated
with an acid rain control program remain: high vs. low
sulfur coal, union VS. non-union mining, near VS. far
source, controls VS. coal switching, financing, etc.
4. Congress enacts legislation, present deadlock is broken
based on Administration finding of damage from acid
rain.
C.
INSTITUTE LEAST COST REDUCTIONS AS RECOMMENDED BY OSTP
REPORT
Components:
1. Insure compliance with state plan limits
2. Recommend in-stack monitoring or coal washing at 50
largest polluting plants
3. Revise stack height regulations
4. Shorter averaging time for SIP compliance
Cost: $1-1.5 billion annually
Reductions: 2-3 million tons annually
Advantages:
1. Positive actions to accelerate reductions of so₂.
2. Consistent with OSTP report.
3. Cost-effective reductions which may not require new
legislation.
4. Publicly defensible -- phased reductions without major
economic dislocation.
Disadvantages:
1. Acknowledges that acid rain is a problem requiring new
controls.
2. Could open congressional process for more draconian
programs.
3. Will not satisfy critics.
4. Legality will be challenged if undertaken under existing
Clean Air Act (CAA).
D.
USE SYNTHETIC FUELS CORP FUNDS FOR CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGIES
Components:
1. Modify Great Plains Project to produce methanol and use
to overfire coal burners to reduce NOx and so₂.
2. Fund regenerable technologies which reduce emissions and
produce salable by-products and reusable reagents.
3. Revise legislation to provide for clean coal technology
development such as FBC, LIMB, and methanol.
Costs: No new costs -- would be redirecting existing $15
billion program.
Advantages:
1. Provides a better use of already committed Federal
funds.
2. Would provide guarantees for presently uneconomic clean
burning technologies.
3. Provides a creative approach to the present acid rain
deadlock.
Disadvantages:
1. Provides Federal funds for private technology
development.
2. Massive government subsidy for coal industry.
E. Go to Hill w/ Legislation : ask for 5m. ton reduction
but say we'll veto any funding provision other
Than "polluter pays"
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 16, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
FROM:
JAMES W. CICCONI
fuc
SUBJECT:
Proposal for Transboundary
Acid Rain Controls
The proposal we have formulated for controlling acid rain presents,
I feel, a good framework for dealing with this problem next year.
Having participated in the discussions which led to the recommen-
dation, I would offer the following additional thoughts on its
strengths and potential liabilities as an option:
1. The proposal allows us to offer a definite commit-
ment for action (i.e. moving beyond research only)
in the State of the Union speech.
2. We should characterize our interaction with Canada
as "discussion" or "consultations, and not as
"negotiations." This distinction is important,
and is left unclear in the current paper. The
term "negotiations" implies a more formal process
and raises expectations for a mutually agreed con-
clusion, but in this case agreement may not be
possible. Also, implying that agreement is neces-
sary allows the Canadians to hold out for a much
greater reduction in what will be a highly charged
U.S. political atmosphere. We should assume that
the Canadians might see some benefit in public re-
lations pressure to achieve their objectives, and
use of a term like "discussions" leaves us less
vulnerable to such pressure.
3.
Our discussion group felt that a series of interim
steps, such as lake liming grants, should be
announced at the same time we announce the commence-
ment of consultations with Canada. Interim steps
send a clear signal that the Administration recog-
nizes the seriousness of the problem, and is com-
mitted to action. Unless some immediate remedial
action is announced, the Canadian talks, may be
viewed as simply another delaying tactic. Coupling
the two allows us to characterize our approach as
entailing both a short-term and long-term attack on
the problem.
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
RE: Proposal for Transboundary
Acid Rain Controls
December 16, 1983
Page Two
no
4. Suggestions that we negotiate a treaty with Canada
should be avoided, if only because of the Congres-
sional problems it presents.
5. In our public explanation of this option, we must
avoid the implication that we are addressing the
acid rain problem solely because of the damage in
Canada, even though that is the legal basis for
our action. (The draft statement attached to the
OK
recommendation demonstrates a way of dealing with
this.)
6. The EPA Administrator's discussions with Canada
should be accompanied by parallel discussions with
governors of affected states and with Congressional
you
leaders. We will not only need their cooperation at
a future point, but will also need to impart a sense
of forward movement on the issue as 1984 progresses.
Components of a Non-legislative Acid Rain Program
1.
Interagency Research
Accelerate ongoing program.
Cost: Propose $55 million FY 85. Almost double the FY
84 level of $27.6 million.
Scientifically sound. Will appear to be stonewalling a
"solution" to problem -- not politically acceptable by
itself.
2.
Technology Demonstration
Build demonstration plants for clean coal combustion.
Cost: Propose $64 million in FY 85. A major increase
over FY 84 level of $45.5 million.
Ignore principal that private sector should make this
investment.
3.
Liming of Sensitive Lakes
Periodically add lime to neutralize acid rain to those
lakes that lack natural buffering capacity.
Cost: $5 million/year in grants to States.
Immediate interim action, although it may not solve
problem, and could cause other environmental problems.
Does not address deposition on soil. Will be called a
"band-aid" solution.
4.
Stock Lakes
Fund fish hatcheries and stocking programs.
Cost: $500,000 per year.
Provides an immediate positive action once lakes are
limed.
5.
Tighten Existing Regulatory Programs
Revise stack height regulations; require continuous
monitoring; modify 30 day rolling average; improve
modelling.
Cost: $1 billion per year.
Reduction: 1-2 million tons so₂.
Subject to legal challenges and would required extensive
staff resources.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 15, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: EDWIN MEESE III
JAMES A. BAKER III
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
DAVID A. STOCKMAN
RICHARD G. DARMAN
JOHN A. SVAHN
FREDERICK N. KHEDOURI
FROM:
CRAIG L. FULLER
as
SUBJECT:
Acid Rain Meeting
Attached is an outline of the acid rain proposal that
will be discussed on Friday, December 16, at 5:00pm in
the Roosevelt Room.
Also attached is a draft announcement of acid rain
action.
attachments
TRANSBOUNDARY ACID RAIN CONTROLS
Proposal
Make a public commitment to enter into negotiations with Canada
to reduce pollution that causes acid rain damage in both
countries. These reductions would be pursued under the inter-
national air pollution Section (Sec. 115) of the Clean Air Act
(CAA). Although Section 115 provides legal authority to address
transboundary pollution, it has not been tested in the courts and
would most likely be challenged. A treaty, which could be more
time-consuming and politically contentious, could supplement
Section 115, if the legal obstacles seemed insuperable.
Process
-
President announces in State of the Union address the
beginning of cooperativé discussions with Canada.
-
Draft finding that emissions in the U.S. are causing
acid rain damage in Canada.
-
Develop a finding that Canada has the authority to make
reciprocal reductions.
-
Negotiate an agreement with the Canadians on environ-
mental goals to be achieved through reductions of
transboundary pollution.
-
Develop a joint control program to achieve these goals.
-
Require each State to modify its State Air Plan to
provide for reductions necessary to meet international
target.
-
Develop a financing plan to pay for pollution controls
and/or provide miner protection (which would need to be
passed by Congress).
-
Federal enforcement and compliance monitoring.
-
Audit environmental results to determine need for
further reductions.
Advantages
-
Administration taking positive action independent of
Congressional debate although financing would ultimately
require Congressional action.
-
Control program would probably be more limited and
better focused on sensitive areas than if Congress
passed new legislation.
-
The process is compatible with the pursuit of a treaty.
-
Can be expanded if research shows need for additional
control.
Disadvantages
-
Section 115 subjects EPA to a number of regulatory
findings and opportunity for legal challenges.
-
Canada has publicly called for a major pollution
reduction
and may be unable to compromise on a more
realistic goal.
-
Even with a financing package, midwestern States may
perceive they bear an unfair burden and some may refuse
to comply with Federal orders to revise State Air
Programs forcing Federal action.
-
Potentially high cost to Treasury or a departure from
polluter pays principal.
discussions
Today I have instructed the Administrator of EPA to begin negotiations
with Canada on a program to reduce the acid rain pollution across our
discussion
borders. These negotiations will lead to substantial reductions in sulfur dioxide
emissions in both countries.
We are pursuing this approach because it offers the earliest solution to
the acid rain damage presently being experienced in the northeastern United
States and southeastern Canada. Acid rain recognizes no borders. Emissions
from U.S. power plants and other sources are contributing to acid rain damage
in Canadian lakes, and Canadian emissions are contributing to the acid rain
falling on our vulnerable lakes -- particularly in the Adirondacks and
New England.
This joint effort will help protect the most vulnerable environmental
resources in both the United States and Canada. Moreover, by taking
these steps, we can learn more about the acid rain problem, which will
help us better understand the need for further efforts to control acid
rain.
C
Use of Methanoi in Electric Utility Boilers
CELANESE
Background
Methanol is an organic compound which is widely used as a chemical solvent
and in the production of a broad range of industrial chemical products. It is
produced through a well-established chemical process. Most of the world's
current methanol capacity is based on surplus natural gas. However, metha-
nol also can be produced from a variety of other raw materials, including
coal, petroleum, and biomass.
Although the properties of methanol as a fuel have long been recognized, its
use as a fuel in industrial boilers has become attractive in recent years as a
relatively low-cost way of reducing emissions levels. Because it burns more
cleanly than other boiler fuels, methanol offers significant environmental
and other advantages.
Advantages of Methanol in Industrial Boilers
Electricity production from utility boilers is achieved by combustion of a
fuel (generally petroleum, natural gas or coal) to convert water to high-
pressure steam which drives a turbine. Combustion emissions vary with the
characteristics of the fuel used. Tests using methanol as a substitute for nat-
ural gas or fuel oil show it to be a significantly cleaner fuel with respect to
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulates.
Primary Fuel. A 1981 study conducted by Southern California Edison in
cooperation with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) compared
the heating and emissions characteristics of methanol to those of No. 2 fuel
oil and natural gas in a 44.5 MW power boiler. Results were monitored over
more than 70 hours, using over 400,000 gallons of methanol. As reported by
EPRI, the results showed that methanol's lower combustion temperatures
produced a 50-60 percent reduction in NOx emissions compared to both
natural gas and fuel oil. With water injection, methanol's advantages were
even more marked. Particulate emissions were also reduced compared to fuel
oil. Although the study showed methanol to be slightly less efficient (6 per-
cent) than fuel oil as a primary boiler fuel, it concluded that "methanol can
certainly be recommended as an alternative to conventional fuels if adequate
supplies are available and costs are comparable to conventional fuels."
Overfiring. An alternative and potentially more promising use of methanol in
boiler applications is as a secondary fuel in "overfiring." This concept divides
the boiler into two stages-the lower stage burning a "dirty" fuel (coal or
fuel oil) and the upper stage burning a "clean" fuel (methanol). Under this
system, NOx emissions from the combustion of the "dirty" fuel are, in
effect, "consumed" through the chemical interaction of the two stages.
Laboratory demonstrations indicate that this interaction has the potential
for reducing uncontrolled NOx emissions by up to 85 percent compared to
METHANOL
2
the "dirty" fuel and up to 40 percent below levels produced by burning
methanol alone. This should yield emissions reductions of 20-30 percent
over current alternative control systems. Test data suggest that this can be
achieved where methanol accounts for 30 percent or less of fuel input on
a Btu basis.
This technology has important implications in areas experiencing severe
NOx problems. For example, NOx emissions from oil-fired utility boilers are
a serious problem in the South California Coast Air Basin. A recent Califor-
nia Energy Commission consultant report has estimated, however, that
methanol overfiring could reduce NOx emissions by 10,000-15,000 tons per
day (15-25 percent reduction below current average emissions) in the Basin
if used at all boilers with the required configuration. Depending on actual
operating characteristics in full-scale boiler operations, the cost of NOx
removal through methanol overfiring can be reduced by 50-90 percent
compared to conventional alternatives. Additionally, by reducing particulate
emissions, methanol overfiring should reduce unit fouling, thus lowering
maintenance costs.
These emission reductions could have important local as well as inter-
regional implications. Locally, NOx reductions could assist non-attainment
areas to meet national ambient air quality standards. NOx emissions have
also been identified as a precursor of acid rain, contributing as much as one-
third or more to total depositions in the United States. While sulfur-type
emissions are a major concern with coal-fired boilers generally, NOx reduc-
tion has also been identified as an important goal.
Economics of Methanol Overfiring
The cost of modifying existing fossil fuel boilers to take advantage of metha-
nol overfiring would be limited to:
Costs associated with additional storage and piping for methanol deliv-
ery to the boiler, and
Costs associated with replacing burners in the upper stage combustion
section to accommodate conversion to methanol.
Small-scale tests indicate that NOx reduction is maximized when the volume
of methanol used is equivalent to approximately 30 percent of the thermal
input to the boiler. Due to methanol's lower Btu (energy) content per unit
of volume, this would require approximately 6 gallons of methanol to every
10 gallons of fuel oil in a typical boiler. This could be readily accommodated
by adding approximately 20 percent more storage capacity dedicated to
methanol as well as the addition or replacement of existing burners with
higher capacity units to achieve the volume flow rates required. The basic
technology is not difficult. Actual hardware costs should be relatively minor.
-3- -
Demonstration Projects
The environmental and economic benefits of methanol overfiring have been
demonstrated on a small scale. Further tests are needed, however, to confirm
these results in medium to large-scale utility and industrial boilers. The pur-
pose of these tests would be to:
o
Confirm reductions in NOx and other harmful emissions, and
o
Develop technical data capable of establishing boiler efficiency ratings
as well as determining the most efficient operating procedures.
The demonstration tests should cover methanol overfiring over natural gas,
fuel oil and coal.
Boiler surveys in Southern California have already been performed to define
the most promising sites for the use of methanol overfiring. These surveys
should be extended to other parts of the country. Federal financial and tech-
nical support for a series of two or three demonstration projects through the
Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of Energy should be
considered in the FY 1985 budget. It is anticipated that these projects could
be completed for less than $1 million.
Summary
Methanol overfiring in industrial boilers appears to hold substantial promise
as a relatively low-cost alternative to other, more expensive control tech-
nology. In particular, its potential for reducing NOx emissions and the pos-
sible benefits of these reductions in addressing the problem of acid rain
should be carefully explored. Federal support of a limited number of over-
firing demonstration projects would provide needed large-scale confirmation
of the benefits of methanol overfiring.
Attachment
300
Overfiring for NO X Emission Control
250
South Coast Air Basin Limit = 225 ppm
200
NOₓ Emissions (ppm)
150
100
Stack
50
0
100%
100%
Methanol
fuel oil or
methanol
overfiring
natural gas
firing
firing
Source: Electric Power Research Institute report, 1981; Cali-
fornia Energy Commission consultant's report, 1983.
Overfiring Concept
Fossil fuel
Methanol
Fossil fuel
Fossil fuel
Conventional firing
Overfiring -
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 20, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
LEE L. VERSTANDIG
her
SUBJECT:
CONEG REQUEST REGARDING ACID RAIN
I am aware of the recent efforts between the White House and
EPA to address the issue of Acid Rain.
As a result of the recent Coalition of Northeastern Governors
(CONEG) meeting, Governor Thomas Kean (R-New Jersev) as
Chairman of CONEG, has requested a meeting of CONEG members
with the President to discuss Acid Rain. I talked with
Governor Kean recently and he stresses the importance of
having such a meeting prior to the upcoming National
Governor's Association meeting and the seriousness of CONEG's
request.
Governors Mario Cuomo (D-New York) and Michael Dukakis
(D-Massachusetts) were leaders in gaining the unanimous
request from the Governors. CONEG members are reacting to the
Acid Rain attention generated by extensive and persistent
coverage in the major media markets of the Northeast.
0
School children have been sent out in Vermont and
Massachusetts to collect rain samples in cups to test
for acidity.
O
Elderly volunteers routinely check the acidity of lakes
in Maine, Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts and New
Hampshire.
C
"Acid Rain trees" have been "decorated" with fish skeletons
in each of the capitols of the Northeastern states.
There is unanimity among the governors of New England, New
York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania that Acid Rain is a national
problem and one that should be addressed by the
Administration.
The Acid Rain political pressures are building. Without any
action, the Administration will generate hostility from CONEG
and prompt strong Acid Rain Resolutions at the February
National Governors' Association meeting.
Because the issue has such symbolic importance, I recommend
that the President meet with a delegation of CONEG members
such as: Thomas Kean (R-NJ), Chairman of CONEG, J. Joseph
Garrahv (D-RI) Chairman, CONEG Energy and Environment
Committee, and John Sununu (R-NH), Chairman of the NGA Task
Force on Acid Rain. However, This request may prompt other
governors to seek meetings with the President to discuss the
Acid Rain issue. Therefore we might want to consider that
this meeting on the subject include other governors as well.
I strongly urge that an Acid Rain meeting with the President
and a delegation of governors take place prior to the State of
the Union Address.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SCHEDULE PROPOSAL
December 20, 1983
TO:
FREDERICK J. RYAN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND DIRECTOR OF SCHEDULING
FROM:
LEE L. VERSTANDIG
bee
REQUEST:
Oval Office meeting with the President
and Governors Thomas Kean (R-New Jersev),
J. Joseph Garrahy (D-Rhode Island), and
John Sununu (R-New Hampshire)
PURPOSE:
This would be an opportunity for the
Governors to present the Coalition
of Northeastern Governors (CONEG)
position regarding acid rain and to
talk with the President about acid
rain.
BACKGROUND:
CONEG met in New Jersey on December 4
and 5 to discuss the acid rain problem
and unanimously passed a resolution
requesting this meeting with the
President to discuss acid rain.
PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION:
None by CONEG
DATE:
Open but prior to January 25, 1984
DURATION: 15 minutes
LOCATION:
Oval Office
PARTICIPANTS:
Governor Kean (R-New Jersey)
Governor Sununu (R-New Hampshire)
Governor Garrahy (D-Rhode Island)
Lee L. Verstandig
OUTLINE OF EVENTS:
Informal discussion
REMARKS REQUIRED:
None
RECOMMENDED BY:
Lee L. Verstandig
OPPOSED BY:
PROJECT OFFICER:
Andrew H. Card, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 16, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
FROM:
JAMES W. CICCONI
SUBJECT:
Proposal for Transboundary
Acid Rain Controls
The proposal we have formulated for controlling acid rain presents,
I feel, a good framework for dealing with this problem next year.
Having participated in the discussions which led to the recommen-
dation, I would offer the following additional thoughts on its
strengths and potential liabilities as an option:
1. The proposal allows us to offer a definite commit-
ment for action (i.e. moving beyond research only)
in the State of the Union speech.
2. We should characterize our interaction with Canada
as "discussion" or "consultations," and not as
"negotiations. This distinction is important,
and is left unclear in the current paper. The
term "negotiations" implies a more formal process
and raises expectations for a mutually agreed con-
clusion, but in this case agreement may not be
possible. Also, implying that agreement is neces-
sary allows the Canadians to hold out for a much
greater reduction in what will be a highly charged
U.S. political atmosphere. We should assume that
the Canadians might see some benefit in public re-
lations pressure to achieve their objectives, and
use of a term like "discussions" leaves us less
vulnerable to such pressure.
3. Our discussion group felt that a series of interim
steps, such as lake liming grants, should be
announced at the same time we announce the commence-
ment of consultations with Canada. Interim steps
send a clear signal that the Administration recog-
nizes the seriousness of the problem, and is com-
mitted to action. Unless some immediate remedial
action is announced, the Canadian talks, may be
viewed as simply another delaying tactic. Coupling
the two allows us to characterize our approach as
entailing both a short-term and long-term attack on
the problem.
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
RE: Proposal for Transboundary
Acid Rain Controls
December 16, 1983
Page Two
4.
Suggestions that we negotiate a treaty with Canada
should be avoided, if only because of the Congres-
sional problems it presents.
5. In our public explanation of this option, we must
avoid the implication that we are addressing the
acid rain problem solely because of the damage in
Canada, even though that is the legal basis for
our action. The draft statement attached to the
recommendation demonstrates a way of dealing with
this.
6. The EPA Administrator's discussions with Canada
should be accompanied by parallel discussions with
governors of affected states and with Congressional
leaders. We will not only need their cooperation at
a future point, but will also need to impart a sense
of forward movement on the issue as 1984 progresses.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 16, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
FROM:
JAMES W. CICCONI
SUBJECT:
Proposal for Transboundary
Acid Rain Controls
The proposal we have formulated for controlling acid rain presents,
I feel, a good framework for dealing with this problem next year.
Having participated in the discussions which led to the recommen-
dation, I would offer the following additional thoughts on its
strengths and potential liabilities as an option:
1. The proposal allows us to offer a definite commit-
ment for action (i.e. moving beyond research only)
in the State of the Union speech.
2. We should characterize our interaction with Canada
as "discussion" or "consultations," and not as
"negotiations." This distinction is important,
and is left unclear in the current paper. The
term "negotiations" implies a more formal process
and raises expectations for a mutually agreed con-
clusion, but in this case agreement may not be
possible. Also, implying that agreement is neces-
sary allows the Canadians to hold out for a much
greater reduction in what will be a highly charged
U.S. political atmosphere. We should assume that
the Canadians might see some benefit in public re-
lations pressure to achieve their objectives, and
use of a term like "discussions" leaves us less
vulnerable to such pressure.
3. Our discussion group felt that a series of interim
steps, such as lake liming grants, should be
announced at the same time we announce the commence-
ment of consultations with Canada. Interim steps
send a clear signal that the Administration recog-
nizes the seriousness of the problem, and is com-
mitted to action. Unless some immediate remedial
action is announced, the Canadian talks, may be
viewed as simply another delaying tactic. Coupling
the two allows us to characterize our approach as
entailing both a short-term and long-term attack on
the problem.
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
RE: Proposal for Transboundary
Acid Rain Controls
December 16, 1983
Page Two
4.
Suggestions that we negotiate a treaty with Canada
should be avoided, if only because of the Congres-
sional problems it presents.
5. In our public explanation of this option, we must
avoid the implication that we are addressing the
acid rain problem solely because of the damage in
Canada, even though that is the legal basis for
our action. The draft statement attached to the
recommendation demonstrates a way of dealing with
this.
6. The EPA Administrator's discussions with Canada
should be accompanied by parallel discussions with
governors of affected states and with Congressional
leaders. We will not only need their cooperation at
a future point, but will also need to impart a sense
of forward movement on the issue as 1984 progresses.