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    "ocrText": "THE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nFebruary 12, 1985\nMEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN\nMICHAEL K. DEAVER\nFROM:\nJAMES CICCONI\nJave\nSUBJECT:\nFollow-Up on Black Strategy\nIn a previous memo, I outlined a possible strategy for reaching\nout to black Americans. Assuming agreement on the need for such\nan effort, it is perhaps useful at this point to provide a more\ndetailed discussion of certain elements.\nBasics of a New Approach\n1. Any new approach to blacks must be rooted in substance, not\njust atmospherics: the latter should showcase the former.\nThis is admittedly different from our past efforts, but it is\na difference born of necessity. Efforts based largely on\nscheduling and symbolism have worked with groups where our\npolicy disagreements are minimal. Blacks, however, perceive\nthemselves to be at odds with most policy priorities of this\nAdministration. The resulting gap can only be closed by\naffirmatively seeking common ground with a significant\nsegment of black Americans.\n2. We must be prepared to sustain any new effort over the long\nterm. Gains from an issue-oriented approach will be\nincremental, and perhaps barely noticeable in the short run.\n3. We must walk before we can run. Any initial gains will be\namong upwardly-mobile blacks who are part of, or\nentering, the middle class; broader targeting would be\npremature. Upwardly-mobile blacks should be inclined toward\nthis Administration's policies, but for a number of reasons\nhave not been supportive. In effect, we must package our\npolicy message for them and, at the same time, minimize\nother obstacles to their support.\n4. We must prevent major goofs. The biggest single obstacle to\nincreasing our black support in the first term was our own\ninability to foresee the perceptual consequences of certain\ndecisions, some of which were considered to be minor at the\ntime. While most of the Administration has grown more\nsensitive in the wake of Bob Jones, such misjudgments still\nrepresent a danger which, unless avoided, can undo any\npolitical gains from our new strategy.\nPage 2\n5. For the immediate future, we must avoid the \"established\"\nblack leadership. As stated previously, such leaders are\nunremittingly hostile to this President and cannot be\nexpected to take a constructive approach. The current black\nleadership seems, quite frankly, more interested in personal\npublicity and enhancing their influence within the Democratic\nParty than they are in new approaches to black problems. In\nfact, they are personally and rhetorically linked to a\nphilosophy which cannot be reconciled with our own. Thus,\nmeetings would not only be unproductive, but would serve to\nstrengthen the position of such hostile leaders within their\nown organizations, and among blacks generally. Instead of\nallowing ourselves to be pressured into such old, no-win\npatterns, we should seek out other blacks with whom there is\na chance of reaching common ground.\n6. We should make clear that favoritism on grants and contracts\nis out-of-bounds, and will not be considered as an aspect of\nour strategy. Too often, political support by certain voter\ngroup members is viewed as a license to demand favoritism on\ngrants or contracts. Our resistance to this pattern has led\nto criticism from some of our black supporters; however, it\nis absolutely essential that we not fall into this \"spoils\nsystem\" trap in the same way that previous Administrations\nhave. As part of our Hispanic strategy, we made clear that\nno one in the White House, including the Hispanic liaison,\nwould discuss grants or contracts, and we must be similarly\nadamant with our black supporters. The political base we\nbuild among blacks must rest on common policy ground, and not\non hope of personal financial benefit.\nShaping our Alternative\n1. We should work to develop a policy package that addresses the\nvery real problems of black Americans from a conservative\nstandpoint. This can include new ideas, as well as\nestablished Administration policies (e.g., enterprise zones,\nyouth opportunity wage) that would be re-packaged to\nhighlight their appeal to black Americans.\n2. Such a package need not be confined to economic issues, but\ncould also include criminal justice and social policy issues.\nBlacks, for example, are victimized disproportionately by\ncrime, yet black politicians are the most ardent foes of\ntougher criminal laws. Similarly, the break-up of the black\nfamily has been an increasing and alarming trend for over\ntwenty years, and has arguably been exacerbated by federal\npolicies. Such issues, often ignored by the Democrats, have\ngood potential for attracting blacks to the Republican Party\nif our solutions make sense.\nPage 3\n3. Our main emphasis should be on the overall philosophical\ndifference between our policies and those of the liberal\nDemocrats. In effect, we would stress the concept of\nproviding incentives for self-reliance, versus the failed\ncourse of increased dependence on government. Current policy\ndynamics favor our approach for several reasons. First, our\npolicies are largely untried, and therefore hold some\nprospect for success, while the liberal methods have been\ntried on a massive scale and, for the most part, have failed.\nSecond, decreasing government resources make the liberal\napproach impossible to sustain financially, and dictate that\nalternatives be tried. Third, there is no longer a national\nconsensus in support of the liberal approach; in fact, the\nopposite is now true. Fourth, there is a significant\nintellectual trend, manifested in a continuing series of\nbooks and articles, toward questioning the social policies of\nthe past twenty years. Given such developments, we stand a\ndecent chance of attracting more adherents to our philosophy\namong black Americans.\nFostering Public Debate\n1. We should attempt to foster, and fuel, a public debate on\npolicies aimed at addressing the problems of black Americans.\nThis is in our interest because, as noted above, the policy\ndynamics favor our argument. Our insurgent ideas will be\npitted against a liberal philosophy that has not yet been\nquestioned on a national scale, and which will be difficult\nto defend. In short, we should foster a public debate\nbecause we can have every expectation of winning it.\n2. We should encourage Republican elected officials to\nparticipate in the debate, even if their policy prescriptions\ndiffer somewhat from ours. For example, it is to our\nadvantage that some GOP Congressmen are publicly pushing a\nblack legislative package, because such actions add to the\ndebate without an appearance of White House orchestration.\n3. Relatively minor items on the President's schedule can also\nadd to the public debate. These could include, for example,\nwire photos with the author of a new book, a publicized phone\nconversation with someone like Thomas Sowell, or a\nPresidential message to a conference that might otherwise go\nunnoticed.\n4. Administration and Republican Party officials can begin\npublicly referring to the fact that \"a national debate is now\noccurring\" on the social policy of the past twenty years,\nwith hints that a change is needed. The President can also\nacknowledge the debate in passing public references.\nPage 4\n5. We must be prepared to give access, and, thereby,\ncredibility, to black groups that show interest in publicly\nespousing new approaches to black problems, even if we differ\non particulars. One example is the new Council for a Black\nEconomic Agenda, which met with the President last month in a\nsession that drew a surprising amount of press attention\n(along with criticism from black leaders that was based\ntransparently on egotism). We should not, however, tie\nourselves to only one group: our interest in fostering\ndebate is better served by a variety of groups, all of which\nare competing for public (and White House) attention.\n6. Once the ground has been prepared through ample public\ndiscussion, the President should raise it to a higher level\nof prominence by publicly laying out our policy package, and\nthen engaging fully in the philosophical discussion. (The\nPresident's personal involvement will increase the level of\npublic attention to such an extent that our policy\nalternative must be ready, and capable of withstanding\nscrutiny.)\nThe Civil Rights Problem\n1. Any new approach to blacks cannot ignore the perceptual\nproblem we face on civil rights. Many black Americans feel,\nquite simply, that this Administration has worked to reverse\nthe legal gains of the Sixties, and some even accept the\nnotion that this President is anti-civil rights. If we are\nto move forward, we must \"clear the decks\" in this area.\n2. Our difficulties on civil rights are rooted mainly in\ninaccurate perceptions that have been propagated by\nWashington's civil rights lobby. This group subsists on fear\nthat the days of state-sanctioned discrimination will return,\nand it creates that fear through alarmist predictions,\nmisrepresentation of motives, exaggeration of current\nproblems, and by downplaying the progress that has been made.\n3. With the objectives of the Sixties largely achieved through\nlegal and even attitudinal changes, we have seen the civil\nrights movement of that era displaced by the civil rights\nlobby of today. No longer seeking the moral goals of\nequality, they are, like any other lobby, seeking to create,\ndefend, and extend special programs and status for the group\nthey represent. In this context, their vested interest in\ncreating misperceptions about our civil rights record is\nunderstandable; indeed, it is to be expected in the same way\nthat the environmental lobby can be expected to distort our\nactions in that area. We should, therefore, deal with them\naccordingly.\nPage 5\n4. We should also recognize that we have unintentionally aided\nsuch programmed misperceptions in two ways. First, we have\nsometimes taken actions without considering the appearance\nthat would be created among blacks (e.g. Bob Jones, and our\ndelays regarding the Voting Rights Act). Second, we have\nunnecessarily picked fights on issues that are tangential to\nour Administration's civil rights policy goals (e.g. the Dade\nCounty set-aside case). The first point has been taken care\nof, to the extent it can be, by experience derived from our\npast mistakes. The second point, however, is still a\nconcern. We dissipate our effectiveness and blur our message\nif we allow ourselves to be drawn into legislative and legal\nbattles on even minor civil rights issues. Our energies and\npolitical capital should instead be expended on those issues\nthat bear directly on our philosophy and on which we can set\nforth a well-reasoned public argument (quotas and busing are\ntwo such examples). Also, since such determinations involve\npolicy, there must be a high degree of coordination by the\nWhite House. We must not allow our civil rights policy to be\nmade on an ad hoc basis by mid-level agency officials, as\noften occurred in the past.\n5. We can also address the \"fear factor\" by beginning to lay out\nwhat we are for, as well as what we oppose, in the area of\ncivil rights. By outlining what we favor and support, we\ndraw implicit limits on our future actions, and negate\nunspoken black concern about how far we are prepared to go.\nThis can be accomplished through a civil rights policy\nstatement, a Presidential speech, or both.\nPacing our Effort\n1. Our effort to offer policy alternatives to black Americans\nmust be properly paced. We should not attempt to do\neverything at once, nor should we move before the groundwork\nhas been properly laid.\n2. For the next several months, we should concentrate on the\neffort to foster a debate regarding U.S. social policy. As\nnoted previously, this should be done in a low-key manner,\nbuilding toward an eventual speech by the President.\nHowever, such a speech (to lay out our philosophy and policy\nalternatives) should not be given until the budget battles\nare well on their way to resolution. To do otherwise would\nrisk both a conflict in our priorities, and accusations that\nwe were trying to distract attention from painful domestic\nbudget cuts.\n3. A statement or speech on civil rights should also be held in\nabeyance until spring, but should be delivered several weeks\nin advance of the philosophy/policy alternatives speech.\nPage 6\n4. The specific policy points for each statement or speech\nshould be quietly developed by the White House, beginning\nimmediately, in order to be ready for a late spring target\ndate.\n5. A senior White House official should be designated to\ncoordinate implementation of this strategy over an\nextended period of time.\n6. A suggested timetable would be as follows:\nFebruary to mid-May\n--\nmeasures to foster public debate\n-- staff development of civil\nrights policy statement\n-- staff development of social and\neconomic policy package\n-- designation of White House\ncoordinator\nMid-May to June\n-- civil rights policy statement\nand/or Presidential speech on civil\nrights\nLate May or\n-- Presidential speech on\nearly June\neconomic/social policy package and\nphilosophy\nThe effort will, of course, need to extend well past June, but it\nis preferable to delay further decisions until reaction to the\nabove steps has been assessed.\nCC: John A. Svahn\nFrank Donatelli\nDecember 21, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nJIM CICCONI\nFROM:\nKEVIN R. HOPKINS\nKRA\nSUBJECT:\nBLACK STRATEGY\nAt your suggestion, I reviewed your December 12, 1984,\nmemorandum to Mike Deaver concerning the Administration's\n\"Black Strategy\". I think the steps you outline are\non-target -- indeed, essential -- to building support\namong blacks for the President's policies.\nAs you correctly point out, the first thing the President\nmust do is neutralize institutionalized black hostility\ntoward the President. You accurately observe that current\nblack \"leadership\" is unremittingly antagonistic toward the\nPresident, and correctly imply that these so-called black\nleaders do not necessarily speak for the majority of black\nAmericans. Still, far too many blacks who otherwise might\nsupport us confront such a wall of personal emotional\nresistance to the President and his policies that their\neasiest emotional course is simply to avoid listening to us.\nNor are we blameless. Policy missteps aside, we have made\nno significant effort in our four years to reach out to\nblack Americans other than through public liaison efforts,\na few speeches, and a select few \"pro-black\" policy initiatives,\nsuch as aid to the HCBUs.\nWe must do more than this in our second term. Strategically,\nthree steps are required.\n1. We must undertake a continuous and sincere campaign to\nmake black Americans feel comfortable with Reaganism -- to\nlet them know we want their support. Most important, this\nrequires that the President make more than a speech or two\nfocused on \"black concerns\". Rather, the President should\nbegin to regularly address the plight of blacks and the\npoor in his speeches. Such references should not come\nacross as mere pandering (which, unfortunately, can be the\nimpression if \"black issues\" are relegated to a set speech\nor two or to a single week each year. Rather, they should\nbe seen to stem from the President's deep concern for\nextending the benefits of a healthy economy to all Americans.\nIn other words, we must ask -- repeatedly -- for black\nsupport if we really want to secure it.\n-2-\n2. We must, as you suggest, solidify our support for civil\nrights. Specifying the action this requires goes beyond the\nscope of this memorandum (and you have addressed the matter\nelsewhere in a memorandum I have not had the opportunity to\nreview). But whatever steps we take, we must make it clear\nto the public that we take the protection of civil rights as\na given -- that we intend to enforce the law vigorously and\ncontinuously. Only if blacks perceive they have nothing to\nfear from us on the race issue will they begin to listen to\nus on non-race issues.\n3.\nFinally, we must broaden our policy agenda to encompass\nblacks. This requires not a change in policy, but a significant\nchange in the communication of that policy. We must \"package\"\nour existing policies SO that blacks who are willing to listen\nto us see that they can, indeed, benefit from Reaganism.\nKey here is that we move beyond the so-called \"black issues\".\nTo the average black, HBCUs and SBA minority loans are\ntangential matters. Yet it appears to me that in the first\nterm we used just such policies as the primary justification\nfor blacks' supporting us. In point of fact, we sought to\nuse such \"pro-black policies\" in connection with the second\nobjective above -- solidifying our image on civil rights --\nrather than to advance our overall policy objectives. In\nother words, we confused the \"substance\" of point 2 with\nthe \"objectives\" of point 3, and thus rarely came to the\nstage of asking blacks to support our overall policy goals.\nIt was if (and I exaggerate here for emphasis) we were telling\nthe world we had two sets of policies: tax cuts and low\ninflation for non-blacks, and HBCUs, minority loans, and\nblack appointments for blacks.\nIn the second term we must correct this problem. Specifically,\nour second-term policy objective must be to move beyond civil\nrights into the area of opportunity. We then should proudly\nand confidently place our \"opportunity agenda\" up against\nthe opposition's -- and this is an argument (unlike competition\non civil rights grounds) that we can win.\nElsewhere, I have advocated an overall policy communication\nstructure based on a similar concept (see my attached two\nmemoranda). Moreover, I believe the White House should\nestablish a specific office (under Baker, Deaver, Darman,\nwhoever), the sole purpose of which is to devise substantive\nmeans for broadening the appeal of the entire range of the\nPresident's agenda. I would be happy to discuss this concept\nwith you further at your convenience.\n#\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDecember 19, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nBEN ELLIOTT\nFROM:\nKEVIN R. HOPKINS\nKRH\nSUBJECT:\nPRESIDENT'S SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESS\nThe President's second inaugural address should be heavily\nthematic, and should lay out the broad principles that will\ngovern the President's term. He should stress that after\nfour years of America's learning again what she can do for\nherself, it is time for all people in the country to move\nforward together. In particular, he should call for an end\nto the \"sniping partisanship\" whose only purpose over the\npast four years has been to obstruct for obstruction's\nsake. In this regard, he should cite the deficit issue,\nand point out that those who have been wailing loudest about\nthe deficit problem are the same ones who have been first\nto bail out every spending program on the books. In other\nwords, he should challenge those who have been his opponents\nthese past four years to work with him to do what needs to\nbe done, or to shut up and let those who know what needs to\nbe done, do it.\nParticular themes he should emphasize include:\nTaxes. He should reiterate, in the strongest possible terms,\nthat he will not support a tax increase, for three reasons.\nFirst, it would only feed higher spending. Second, it would\nhurt the economy. Third, people already pay too high taxes.\nThe President should begin his second term determined to\nend the notion that tax increases are an option for reducing\nthe deficit; they are not an option because they do not reduce\nthe deficit. The focus must shift back to where it belongs,\nnamely\nSpending. The President should stress that the number one\nbudget goal in his second term must be to bring down spending\nwithout impairing our national security. In this regard, he\nshould emphasize two aspects of his proposed spending reduction\nplan. First, it eliminates programs where the government has\nno business spending money (e.g., business subsidies). Second,\nin legitimate programs, it removes beneficiaries who don't\ndeserve taxpayer assistance (e.g., middle class in student loans).\nHe should acknowledge that all aid helps somebody, but that the\naid isn't free, and that his standard is whether a worker\nearning $10,000 or $12,000 per year should be taxed to pay for\nthe program. In other words, the focus should be not just on\nreducing spending for spending's sake (though that is part of\n-2-\nit), but on eliminating spending that would be illegitimate\nregardless of economic or budgetary conditions.\nTax Simplification. He should make similar arguments here,\nstressing the populist arguments and those pertaining to the\nfamily (see my Washington Post article). As with spending,\nhe should challenge directly those special interests who\nbenefit at the expense of average people because of special\nprovisions in the tax code.\nEconomic Opportunity. He should re-emphasize that the only\nway all Americans are going to prosper is through economic\ngrowth and economic opportunity. This requires, first of\nall, that government take no action that will impede overall\neconomic growth or individual economic opportunity, which\nshould be stated as a major guiding principle for evaluating\nall current and future laws and regulations (such as higher\ntaxes). Second, it requires the enactment of specific steps\nthat promote growth and opportunity (e.g., enterprise zones).\nFamily. The President should similarly stress the need for\npolicies that help preserve or prevent the break-up of\nfamilies. He should note the central role families play in\nindividual financial security and transmitting socially\nacceptable norms of behavior, and emphasize that no society\nwill be strong and prosperous unless its families first are.\n(See the extensive work by Bruce Chapman in this area.) The\nPresident should also cite the problem of illegitimacy,\nparticularly among blacks, and assert that it must be a major\nconcern of policymakers for the rest of the decade.\nHe should use these five factors to redefine (and rename) the\nfairness issue so that he, and not his opponents, will\ncontrol the debate on this issue in the second term.\n*****\nOn foreign policy and defense, the President must similarly\nmove to recapture the debate in three areas: national security\n(defense spending), arms control, and support for democracies\noverseas. In the first area, he must emphasize how little has\nreally been done to rebuild our defenses (thanks to Democratic\nobstructionism) and reposit the case for strong defense forces,\nespecially conventional forces that can prevent the advance to\nnuclear conflict. In the second area, the President absolutely\nmust shift the debate from space weaponry (essentially irrelevant\nin the current nuclear equation) to the thousands of nuclear\nwarheads aimed at the U.S. that could kill millions of people.\nAnd he should stress that he will sign no arms agreement unless\nit fulfills his objectives, namely, equitably reducing arms on\nboth sides, enhancing stability, and being verifiable. On the\nthird issue, he must strongly draw the distinction between\ndemocracies and totalitarian states, and emphasize that America\nmust first be a friend to democracy (and transition thereto)\n- 3-\nbefore she can ever be a friend to freedom.\nThe recent problems in Ethiopia allow the President to\npowerfully add a fourth item to this list: Third World\neconomic growth. He should emphasize that his foreign\npolicies in his second term will be aimed at giving Third\nWorld nations the option between the mire of socialist policies\n(that have produced, among other things, the famine in Ethiopia)\nand the hope of capitalism and economic growth. He should\nmake it plain that the era of an America subsidizing suffering\nhas come to an end.\n*****\nBoldly setting out themes such as this will, I believe, permit\nthe President to move quickly to control the policy agenda,\nand hence the creation of policy, for the next four years.\n#\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDecember 20, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III\nFROM:\nKEVIN R. HOPKINS\nSUBJECT:\nStrategic Elements of the 1985 Agenda\nFollowing are the key strategic considerations involved in\nsuccessfully implementing the President's 1985 agenda.\nPolicy and Political Objecives in 1985\nA. Policy Objectives\nWithout question, the Administration's four top policy objectives\nin 1985 are: (1) budget reductions; (2) revenue-neutral tax\nsimplification; (3) maintenance of the defense build-up; (4)\nachievement of equitable, verifiable arms reductions. A major\nsecond-tier objective may be the enactment of enterprise zones\nlegislation.\nB. Political Objectives\nIn order to build the political base for post-Reagan Republicanism,\nthe Administration must hold its traditional conservative base\n(primarily by firmly upholding the President's traditional\nobjectives of budget and tax restraint and a strong defense)\nwhile, at the same time, reaching out to \"populist\" liberals and\nmoderates and the poor and blacks. As well, the Administration\nmust continue to build support among emergent Republican\ngroups, such as the youth.\nThe First-term Experience\nThe Administration achieved three significant policy victories\nin 1981: (1) major restraint in spending; (2) significant tax\nrate reductions; and (3) the beginnings of a rebuilding of the\nnation's defenses. However, by 1982 the Administration found\nitself on the defensive in all three areas. In the first, it\nwas asserted that the President's budget cuts had devastated\nthe poor (the fairness issue). In the second, it was aasserted\nthat the tax cuts had helped only the rich (fairness) while\ncreating a $200 billion deficit (the deficit issue). In the\nthird, it was contended that \"huge and unnecessary\" defense\nspending increases had widened the deficit (the deficit issue)\nwhile making the world less safe (the arms control/peace issue).\n2\nAs a result, the Administration spent the last three years of\nthe President's first term: (1) achieving no major new restraints\non the growth of spending, and in many cases sanctioning higher\nthan desired spending levels; (2) acquiescing to four major tax\nincreases; and (3) constantly defending, with only mixed success,\nthe defense rebuilding effort.\nThe Political Landscape in 1985\nGiven the President's landslide victory last November, one\nmight assume a favorable political landscape. But such is not\nthe case. While the electorate proclaimed strong support for the\nPresident and his policies, their role, in business-as-usual\nWashington, is now over for the present. From this point on,\nthe major players are the Administration, the Congress, and\nthe special interests. The latter are as powerful and determined\nas ever to hold on to their special spending programs and tax\nbreaks, while the former (even some Republican members) are\ndecidedly more hostile than in 1981. Therefore, if the\nAdministration is to achieve its principal policy goals in\n1985, it must create an enormous countervailing force --\ngrassroots public outcry -- to offset the greater strength\nof the institutional forces opposing it -- and the Administration\nmust do so to a far greater extent than it did even in 1981.\nThree major steps are required.\nCreate a Political Paradigm\nThe first step must be to create publicly appealing model of\nthe Administration's objectives. The nature of the President's\nproposed budget reductions and the Treasury tax reform proposal,\nalong with the President's repeated emphasis on opportunity,\nsuggest a natural paradigm: now that the economy and our national\nsecurity have been returned to the road to health, it is time to\nreplace the government of privilege with an economy of\nopportunity. Of note, this paradigm should appeal to the\ntargeted political groups (populist liberals and moderates,\npoor, blacks, and youth), while retaining most of the President's\ntraditional conservative base.\nThe elements of this paradigm include:\nKeep workers' taxes down by ending the special spending\nprograms that line the pockets of corporations, bureaucrats,\nand upper-and middle-income people who can make do on their\nown. The standard by which a program should be judged is\nwhether it is worth raising taxes on a $10,000 or $12,000\nper year worker. The President should stand firm against a\ntax increase because it would only permit more spending and\nmake people worse off.\n3\nSimplify taxes to reduce average workers' tax rates\nwhile ending special tax breaks for business and the\nwealthy.\nIncrease economic opportunity by maintaining economic\ngrowth (and doing nothing to slow it down) and enacting\npro-opportunity legislation such as enterprise zones.\nMaintain a strong defense so that we can achieve real\narms reductions on both sides.\nShift and Hold the Debate to the Administration's Own Terms\nIn order for this strategy to succeed, it is imperative that the\nAdministration keep the debate on its own terms. Just as surely\nas our loss of control of the terms of debate paralyzed our efforts\nin 1982-1984, it will doom our efforts in 1985 and beyond.\nIn particular, we must keep the budget debate on spending, and\nnot deficit, grounds. The moment we allow that our efforts are\ndirected toward reducing the deficit (rather than reducing\nspending), we open the door to a TEFRA-like \"grand compromise\"\nin which taxes shoot back up and spending remains virtually\nuntouched. In fact, we must work explicitly to remove tax\nhikes as a deficit-reduction option; because they slow down the\neconomy and only fuel higher spending, tax increases are not\nmerely an undesirable option for controlling the deficit --\nthey are no option at all.\nSimilarly, while we must advocate spending control for its own\nsake, we must also advocate spending reductions in particular\nprograms because the indicated spending would be unjustified\nregardless of the state of the economy or the size of the budget.\nFinally, we must shift the debate back to our side on defense\nand arms control. Clearly, the anti-defense mood prevalent on\nCapitol Hill makes it difficult to maintain our defense build-up.\nMoreover, both Mondale, during the campaign, and the Soviets,\nnow, have made the principal focus of arms control space weaponry.\nIn the nuclear equation, such weapons are almost irrelevant;\nthe real and continuing danger are the thousands of Soviet\nwarheads aimed at targets in the U.S. and Europe. Unless we\nmake it publicly clear that no arms agreement will be worthwhile\nunless it significantly reduces this most dangerous of weapons,\nthen our failure to achieve an arms accord (should that occur)\nwould place the burden for the failure on us (because we refused\nto give up on SDI), and therefore further undercut support for\nour defense program.\nWage a Grassroots Campaign for the President's Program\nThe elements of this step are outlined in detail in the white\nnotebook.\n\"Notebook prepared for Ed Meese by Bruce Chapman.\nI do not have a copy.\nDecember 21, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nJIM CICCONI\nFROM:\nKEVIN HOPKINS\nKRH\nSUBJECT:\nTHINK TANK IDEA\nIn your memorandum of December 12, 1984, to Mike Deaver,\nyou mentioned the possibility of encouraging formation\nof a \"private, conservative black 'think tank Should\nyou desire to pursue this idea, I think an excellent\ncandidate to head up such a think tank would be Wendell\nGunn, who previously served as Special Assistant to the\nPresident and Assistant Director of the Office of Policy\nDevelopment for Commerce and Trade during 1982-1984.\nWendell is now a privately employed financial and economic\nconsultant, working out of his home in Stamford, Ct. (Phone:\n203/329-0807) In the past, he has expressed to me an\ninterest in creating just such a think tank as you describe.\nIt might be constructive for you to talk with Wendell about\nthis idea. I would be happy to assist you in this endeavor\nin any way you might need.\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nSTATE / CRIWN\nOFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20503\nJanuary 8, 1985\nMEMORANDUM TO: Boyden Gray\nRoger Porter\nJim Cicconi\nKen Cribb\nFROM:\nMike Horowitz\nMY\nSUBJECT:\nTask Force on Barriers to Economic Achievement\nIn light of the day's events, the question of who establishes the\ntask force proposed in the attached memo, and under whose\nauspices it operates, may be somewhat problematic. (My personal\npreference would be for the Vice President to organize and chair\nit.)\nAs the attached editorial from today's Washington Times makes\nclear, however, events will not await the completion of the\n\"transition\" -- hence the attached draft. Moving ahead with the\ntask force would, in my judgment:\no Promote adoption of a clean version of the Grove City\nlegislation favored by the President.\no Enable the Administration to initiate, rather than react to,\nevents.\no Shift the current terms of the civil rights debate.\nI will try to get us together during the current \"interregnum\" so\nthat the proposal/process can be fleshed out. This is a good\ninitiative, in my opinion, and I hope we can get a quick decision\nout of the system re setting the Task Force up.\nAttachments\nMEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL\nTHE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE\nTHE SECRETARY OF LABOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES\nTHE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URDAN DEVELOPMENT\nTHE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION\nDIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET\nFROM:\nSUBJECT:\nTask Force on Barriers to Economic Achievement\nIn 1984, we marked the twentieth anniversary of the passage of\nthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. That legislation signaled\nAmerica's determination to eliminate race, national origin, and\nsex as a basis for decisionmaking by our government, economy, and\nour society as a whole. Clearly, the country has made\nsubstantial progress toward achieving the Act's objectives during\nthe intervening decades and, as we enter 1985, Federal\nenforcement of the Act (and the civil rights legislation which\nsucceeded it) remains a central Federal priority.\nIt is becoming increasingly obvious, however, that while it\ncontinues to be right and necessary to employ the instruments of\ngovernment to eliminate discrimination, including discrimination\nfostered by government regulations, such action alone is\ninsufficient. A true agenda for opportunity must include\naddressing and eliminating the barriers to economic achievement\nby minorities and women, particularly those statutory and\nadministrative barriers imposed by Government itself. To cite\nonly the most obvious examples, such barriers:\nCreate unreasonably difficult or costly licensing\nrequirements for entry into trades and professions, or\nthe establishment of businesses.\nDiscourage employers from locating (and creating new\njobs) in minority communities.\nRestrict the ability of women and others to pursue paid\nemployment within their own homes.\nInhibit effective maintenance of discipline and academic\nstandards in our nation's public schools, effectively\ndenying equal educational opportunities to too many of\nour minority children.\n-2-\nFrustrate the employment of minority youth and restrict\nthe ability of their elders to successfully compete for\nemployment opportunities through minimum wage and similar\nmandates.\nEncourage dependence rather than independence in the\nadministration of public assistance.\nPreclude improved housing for public housing tenants by\nrestricting the privatization of housing units.\nThe President is concerned that America get on with implementing\nthe full agenda for opportunity for those who need it most. As a\nfirst step, [I] [\n] will be chairing a Task Force on\nBarriers to Economic Achievement to identify, and recommend\nstrategies to eliminate, the significant government-created\nbarriers to economic achievement by minorities and women. i am\nasking that each of you provide me, by\n, with the name\nof the senior agency official you have designated to serve on\nthis task force.\nthe endeavor will be a challenging one. with few exceptions, the\nstatutory and administrative mandates which now serve as barriers\nto economic achievement by minorities and women were enacted with\nthe best of intentions. Many of these barriers have also\nacquired powerful constituencies with vested interests in their\npreservation -- who may yet argue that minorities and women\nbenefit from their maintenance, or for still more Federal\nprograms to deal with their effects. They should understand,\nhowever, and the Task Force will need to do the critical work to\nmake clear, that the Administration is determined to proceed with\nthe more effective alternative: removal of the barriers\nthemselves.\nTHE WASHINGTON TIMES\nJanuary 8, 1985\nThe Equal Opportunity Act of 1985\nThe economic liberation of black\neconomic expertise. Within a few weeks they\nAmericans is about to be undertaken, for the\nare to introduce the most important piece of\nfirst time in decades, by political leaders who\ncivil rights legislation in almost 20 years -\nknow what they are about economically.\nan omnibus bill intended to strike down at one\nBlack leaders long have understood that\nblow all the most important barriers to full\nblacks would never be integrated fully into\nblack participation in the American econ-\nAmerican society until they aquired both\nomy.\neconomic and-political power. But the drive\nFew of the proposals are especially\nfor black political rights came first and nat-\noriginal. Many have been kicking around for\nurally enough was dominated by liberal lead-\nyears: education vouchers to let low-income\ners and liberal ideas. The libs are the\nparents send their children to decent\nspecialists in that kind of thing, and so ran\nschools; repeal of the Davis-Bacon Act,\nthe show while conservatives dragged their\nwhich effectively discriminates against inex-\nheels.\nperienced or non-union minority workers on\nAs an unfortunate side effect, by the time\ngovernment-funded construction projects;\nthe essential elements of black political lib-\nurban homesteading to sell public housing\neration had been put into place, the political\nprojects to their occupants; a special sub-\nand economic welfare of American blacks\nminimum wage to help minority teenagers\nhad been entrusted to liberal leaders, even\nget summer job experience; enterprise\nthough in economic affairs they were out of\nzones to attract business to the inner city;\ntheir depth.\nrepeal of home-work regulations that essen-\nLiberal programs for black economic lib-\ntially outlaw cottage industries; perhaps\neration - affirmative action, for example -\neven welfare reform to reduce welfare\nwere only marginally effective because they\ndependency.\nwere based on political concepts such as\nWhat is new is the idea of packaging all\nenfranchisement or bureaucratic notions\nthese proposals together so as to draw atten-\nsuch as credentials. Political concepts have\ntion to their single theme-making the econ-\nlittle use in the economic sphere, where (as\nomy work for disadvantaged minorities. Also\nlong as the government refrains from coun-\nnew is the effort to put these proposals on the\ntenancing discrimination against minorities)\nfront burner. In the past they usually were\nproductivity is more important than legal\nreserved for wishful speeches about what\nentitlement.\nconservatives could do for blacks, if people\nNow, however, a group of young House\nwould step aside and give them the chance.\nRepublicans, for the most part members of\nThese young leaders want to make their own\nthe so-called Conservative Opportunity Soci-\nchance, and after tax reform the administra-\nety, are about to make a major effort to bene-\ntion ought to have no higher domestic prior-\nfit minorities through conservative\nity than helping them.\nRacial politics, black and white.\nA NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA\nBY GLENN C. LOURY\nF\nORTY YEARS AGO the Swedish economist Gunnar\nly on white racism, and which force us to confront funda-\nMyrdal argued in An American Dilemma that the prob-\nmental failures in black society. The social disorganization\nlem of race in the United States cut to the very core of\namong poor blacks, the lagging academic performance of\nour definition as a people. Myrdal described America as\nblack students, the disturbingly high rate of black-on-\na nation which, although founded on the ideals of individ-\nblack crime, and the alarming increase in early unwed\nual liberty and personal dignity, could not bring itself-\npregnancies among blacks now loom as the primary obsta-\nthrough either law or social practice-to treat the descen-\ncles to progress. To admit these failures is likely to be\ndants of slaves as the equals of whites. The dilemma for\npersonally costly for black leaders, and may also play into\nwhite leaders in particular was that these racial prac-\nthe hands of lingering racist sentiments. Not to admit\ntices were so deeply ingrained that even if they wanted\nthem, however, is to forestall their resolution and to allow\nto get rid of them, it seemed politically impossible to do\nthe racial polarization of the country to worsen. If the new\nso. In 1944 Myrdal hardly could have foreseen the ex-\nAmerican dilemma is not dealt with soon, we may face the\ntent to which the United States would confront and\npossibility of a permanent split in our political system\nbegin to resolve this great dilemma. As recently as\nalong racial lines.\ntwenty years ago many conservatives denied as a matter\nIt is deeply ironic that this dilemma has arisen in the\nof principle that the government should interfere in\nwake of the enormous success of the civil rights move-\nprivate decisions in order to assure equal opportunity\nment. In little more than a generation, the United States\nfor black people. (Ronald Reagan, for example, opposed\nhas changed from a country callously indifferent to the\nthe 1964 Civil Rights Act.) Two decades later that posi-\nplight of its black citizens into one for which that plight is a\ntion has been completely discredited, both legally and\ncentral feature of our political life. A new middle class of\nmorally.\nwell-educated and well-placed blacks has emerged, whose\nThe old racism is not gone, but the disparity between\nmembers can be found in technical, managerial, and pro-\nAmerican ideals and racial practice has narrowed dramati-\nfessional positions throughout the leading institutions of\ncally. Today the civil rights debate is dominated by\nthe nation. Differences in earnings between young, well-\nthe issue of affirmative action, in which the question\neducated black and white workers have diminished dra-\nis whether the history of racism warrants special-not\nmatically; and something approximating parity in eco-\nsimply equal-treatment for blacks. Whereas blacks were\nnomic status has been achieved for young, intact black\nonce excluded from politics by subterfuge and the threat\nfamilies.\nof violence, they now constitute a potent political bloc\nYet, in general, even this class of blacks does not\nwith often decisive influence on local and national elec-\nview itself as being in the American mainstream. There is\ntions. Martin Luther King Jr., whose passionate, relent-\na keen appreciation among blacks of all social classes\nless, and compelling articulation of black aspirations\nthat at least one-third of their fellow blacks belong to\nmade him the nemesis of Presidents, governors, and\nthe underclass. There is no way to downplay the social\nF.B.I. officials alike, is now honored as a national hero.\npathologies that afflict this part of the black community.\nThe moral victory of the civil rights movement is virtually\nIn the big-city ghettos, the youth unemployment rate\ncomplete.\noften exceeds 40 percent. It is not uncommon for young\nAnd yet racial divisions remain. Today we are faced\nmen to leave school at age 16 and reach their mid-20s\nwith a new American dilemma, one that is especially diffi-\nwithout ever having held a steady job. In these communi-\ncult for black leaders and members of the black middle\nties, more than half of all black babies are born out of\nclass. The bottom stratum of the black community has\nwedlock. (In Central Harlem the most recently reported\ncompelling problems which can no longer be blamed sole-\nfigure is 79.9 percent.) Black girls between the ages of 15\nand 19 constitute the most fertile population of that age\nGlenn C. Loury is Professor of Public Policy at Harvard's\ngroup in the industrialized world; and their birth rate is\nKennedy School of Government. He is currently at work\ntwice as high as any other group of women in the West.\non a book about racial advocacy in the post-civil rights era\n(See \"Children As Parents,\" by Ann Hulbert, TNR, Sep-\nentitled Free At Last?\ntember 10.)\nDecember 31, 1984\n14 THE NEW REPUBLIC\nThe undeniable progress of the black middle class has\nerected since 1964 to assure racial fairness, and to the\nbeen accompanied by the undeniable spread of these\nprivate efforts undertaken by a great number of individu-\nproblems. Today nearly three of every five black children\nals and institutions to increase black participation in their\ndo not live with both their parents. The level of dependen-\nactivities.\ncy on public assistance for basic economic survival in the\nA recent Gallup poll conducted for the Joint Center for\nblack population has essentially doubled since 1964.\nPolitical Studies, a black think tank in Washington, re-\nAbout one-half of all black children are supported in part\nvealed the dimensions of the gulf between black and white\nby transfers from the state and federal governments. Over\nperceptions. More than two out of three whites said they\nhalf of black children in public primary and secondary\nbelieve that \"all in all, compared with five years ago,\nschools are concentrated in the nation's twelve largest\nthe situation of black people in this country has im-\ncentral city school districts, where the quality of education\nproved,\" compared to only about one in three blacks.\nis notoriously poor, and where whites constitute only\nNearly one-half of the whites polled were \"satisfied with\nabout a quarter of total enrollment. Only about one black\nthe way things are going at this time,\" but only one-\nstudent in seven scores above the 50th percentile on the\nseventh of blacks were. One-half of blacks felt that \"blacks\nstandardized college admissions tests. Blacks, though lit-\nshould receive preference in getting jobs,\" compared to\ntle more than one-tenth of the population, constitute ap-\none in eleven whites. Some 72 percent of blacks but only\nproximately one-half of the imprisoned felons in the\n31 percent of whites thought of Ronald Reagan as\nnation.\n\"prejudiced.\"\nAmong those great many blacks who have entered the\nThe 1984 Presidential election made distressingly clear\nmiddle class in the past twenty years there is, under-\nwhy this gap is not likely to be bridged. Two-thirds of all\nstandably, a deeply felt sense of outrage at the injustice\nwhites voted for Reagan, while nine-tenths of all blacks\nof conditions endured by the black poor. Somewhat less\nvoted against him. And black leaders went beyond merely\nunderstandable is their reluctance to consider their\nopposing the President. Roger Wilkins lambasted the Ad-\nown success as evidence of the profound change that has\nministration for engaging in a \"concerted effort to con-\ntaken place in American attitudes, institutions, and prac-\nstrict the democratic rights\" of blacks, an effort which\ntices. The position of poor blacks is perceived as being\nCoretta King said was aimed at \"turning back the clock\"\ninherently linked to the racist past of the nation, as prov-\non black progress. Benjamin Hooks declared that the Ad-\ning that the historic injustice of which Myrdal spoke still\nministration had to be \"eliminated from the face of the\nflourishes.\nearth.\"\nMoreover, middle-class blacks do not generally look to\nIt strains credulity to attribute Reagan's broadly based\ntheir own lives as examples of what has become possible\nlandslide to a resurgent racism among whites. Much\nfor those blacks still left behind. Talented black profession-\nbroader forces are evidently at work-just as there are\nals, who in decades past would have had scant opportuni-\nforces broader than racism sustaining and encouraging\nty for advancement, now, in the interest of fairness and\nthe social pathology of the ghetto. But black leaders, like\nracial balance, are avidly sought in corporate board rooms\ntheir constituents, cannot seem to bring themselves to\nor on elite university faculties. Nonetheless they find it\nadmit this. They prefer to portray the problems of the\npossible, indeed necessary, to think of themselves as\nghetto as stemming from white racism, and to foster racial\nmembers of an oppressed caste.\npolitics as the primary means of fighting it. Within the\nDemocratic Party, racial splits such as the one created by\nT\nHE GREAT MAJORITY of Americans do not see the\nJesse Jackson's Presidential candidacy or the civil war be-\nsituation of blacks in this way. Whereas black politi-\ntween Chicago Mayor Harold Washington and his white\ncians and intellectuals consider the ghetto and all that\nopponents may well be a sign of things to come. The\noccurs there to be simple proof that the struggle for civil\nalready tense sparring between New York Mayor Ed Koch\nrights has yet to achieve its goals, others are repelled by\nand his black foes could grow into bitter confrontation in\nthe nature of social life in poor black communities. Though\nnext year's mayoral campaign. By casting their political\nmost are too polite to say so, they see the poverty of these\nbattles in starkly racial terms, black leaders help to pro-\ncommunities as substantially due to the behavior of the\nmote a racial schism in American political life, without\npeople living there. They are unconvinced by the tortured\nnecessarily addressing the most fundamental problems of\nrationalizations offered by black and (some) liberal white\ntheir constituents.\nspokesmen. They do not think of themselves or their\ncountry as responsible for these dreadful conditions. Most\nnonblack Americans know something of hardship. Most\nU\nNFORTUNATELY, neither Democratic leaders nor\nRepublican leaders nor black leaders have much in-\nwere not born wealthy; many have parents or grandpar-\ncentive to prevent this political fracas from exacerbat-\nents who came here with next to nothing, and who\ning the general racial division of American society.\nworked hard so that their children might have a better life.\nThe Democrats, having just finished a campaign in which\nMost aren't hostile or even indifferent to the aspirations of\na quarter of the votes for Walter Mondale were cast by\nblacks. In fact they point with pride to the advancement\nblacks, appear to have a big stake in the perpetuation\nthat blacks have made, to the elaborate legal apparatus\nof racial schism. Far from viewing the \"color gap\"\nDECEMBER 31, 1984\n15\nwith alarm, Democratic strategists have come to depend\nsupport-Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, for example-\non it. Yet under electoral pressure the Democrats have\nare discernibly closer to the center of the Democratic\nhad to keep their distance from the black leadership.\nParty.\nThe Democrats' chief problem is how to maintain the en-\nThe results can be bizarre. Jesse Jackson actually cam-\nthusiasm of black supporters without alienating white\npaigned in the Deep South urging local politicians to\nsupporters. Witness one of the central dilemmas of the\njoin his Rainbow Coalition so that, working together,\nMondale candidacy: how to keep Jesse Jackson close\nthey might enact the Equal Rights Amendment, eliminate\nenough to win blacks but far enough away to placate\nstate right-to-work laws, and secure a nuclear freeze.\nwhites.\nMost candidates running in the South on such a platform\nThe Republicans and President Reagan cannot, in the\nhave short political careers. Lasting alliances between\nshort run, expect to win much support from blacks, no\npoor southern blacks and whites, if they are to emerge\nmatter what they do. Moreover, any such overt appeal to\nat all, will not emerge with this as the substance of\nblacks by Reagan would risk alienating the right wing of\nthe black politician's appeal. Yet southern whites who\nhis constituency. Some right-wing Republican candidates\nare repulsed by such \"progressive\" candidates are writ-\nare not above exploiting the vestiges of racism. (Jesse\nten off as racists. And the incentive for the emergence\nHelms, for example, managed to mention Jesse Jackson's\nof a centrist black leadership which might someday\nname twenty-four times in a fund-raising solicitation dur-\nachieve significant white support is diminished even\ning his recent reelection campaign.) Thus, from Reagan's\nfurther.\npoint of view, the benefits of rapprochement will seem\nslight, and the costs as potentially great. Representative\nNozick once gave a lecture at\nJack Kemp's speech at the Urban League convention last\nDo Intellectuals Hate Capital-\nsummer-in which he made an overt appeal for black\nism?\" and found one intellectual's answer scribbled on a\nsupport, pledging to include the black poor in his \"new\nposter announcing the talk: \"Because we're smart!\" One\nopportunity society\"-was a hopeful exception to the Re-\nway black leaders might answer the question, \"Why are\npublicans' indifference.\nyou so undifferentiated in expressed philosophic perspec-\ntive?\" is: \"Because we're smart\"-smart enough to under-\nB\nUT OF ALL the actors in this drama, black lead-\nstand black interests and to uniformly recognize them to\ners play the most important role, and the most\nbe well served by a left-liberal politics.\nproblematic. The prevailing ideological cast of many\nThis argument, while not implausible, is not necessarily\nprominent black leaders and intellectuals is considerably\ncorrect. An alternative explanation for the ideological pos-\nto the left of the national mainstream, and often of\nture of black leaders is this: the outcome of the internal\nthe black community itself. Because of the long history\nstruggles among black elites for leadership is sharply af-\nof racist exclusion, many blacks place group solidarity\nfected by the general perception of the black community\nabove mere philosophical differences when deciding\non the quality of race relations. When most blacks think\nwhom to support. A black ideologue of the left (or, for that\nthat things are going poorly for the group (as they do\nmatter, of the right-Louis Farrakhan, for example) is al-\nnow), relatively radical forces in the leadership will be\nmost immune from challenge by another black, since it is\nstrengthened. When the American political establish-\nprecisely in ideological terms that whites most often op-\nment, liberal or conservative, reacts negatively to these\npose him. By posing the challenge, the black critic seems\nradical leaders, it becomes all the more difficult for moder-\nto ride with whites against his own race. The black chal-\nate blacks to challenge them.\nlenger may thus forfeit black political support if he ex-\nThis is what happened in 1984. Last summer Jesse\npands his appeal to white voters by criticizing incumbent\nJackson's candidacy came under severe criticism from\nblack leadership. The opposition of whites to the black\nDemocrats and Republicans alike. There was talk of\nincumbent is taken by other blacks as proof that he is\nnot permitting him to speak at the Democratic Conven-\n\"sticking it to the man,\" and thus deserves support. The\ntion unless he repudiated Farrakhan. Conservative com-\nblack challenger winds up appearing, in the eyes of his\nmentators were extremely critical of his post-primary\nown people, to be an agent of forces inimical to their\njunket to Central America and Cuba. At the convention,\ninterests.\nmany blacks were disappointed by the limited conces-\nAs a result, many black leaders act in ways which\nsions Mondale offered Jackson supporters. Their discom-\nexacerbate their isolation from the American political\nfort was enhanced by the adoption in Dallas of the most\nmainstream without fear of reproach by more centrist\nconservative major party platform in the last fifty years.\nblacks. The way in which the Voting Rights Act has come\nAs a result, the black leadership was fiercely critical\nto be enforced compounds the problem. To avoid redis-\nof both Mondale and Reagan (for different reasons, of\ntricting battles in courts, legislatures routinely create\ncourse), but virtually silent about some of Jackson's\noverwhelmingly black, electorally \"safe\" districts for\nmore extreme views. It would have required great cour-\nblack incumbents. As a result, most nationally prominent\nage for any black leader of prominence to publicly criti-\nblack politicians do not require white support to re-\ncize, say, Jackson's foreign policy positions, or to publicly\ntain their prominence. Those blacks who do require white\nacknowledge the serious problem of black anti-Semitism\n16 THE NEW REPUBLIC\nduring the campaign-and virtually none did.\nAgain, they do not seem to be doing so, which only\nThis alternative explanation accounts for two central\nwidens the schism between blacks and the American\nfeatures of black politics today that the \"Because we're\nmainstream. It is unhealthy that NBC correspondent Mar-\nsmart\" retort cannot. First, it suggests why black political\nvin Kalb could feel obliged to ask Jesse Jackson, before a\ndebate, though by no means non-existent, is so truncated.\ntelevision audience of millions, whether his loyalties were\nConsider that between 1965 and 1979 the number of low-\nfirst to America or first to black people-especially when\nincome blacks who were victims of robbery rose by 1,266\nthe answer was the latter. When Jackson ended his speech\nper 100,000; among middle-income whites the increase\nat the University of Havana with \"Long live Cuba! Long\nwas 359. But the residents of inner-city Detroit, who face\nlive the United States! Long Live President Castro! Long\none of the highest criminal victimization rates anywhere,\nlive Martin Luther King! Long live Martin Luther King!\nregularly return to Congress John Conyers, who uses his\nLong live Che Guevara! Long Live Patrice Lamumba!\" the\nposition as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crim-\nclear suggestion was that Martin Luther King's movement\ninal Justice to crusade against police brutality and white-\nand Che Guevera's movement are on the same moral and\ncollar crime, but spends little time publicly addressing the\npolitical plane. Such cavalier use of King's moral legacy\nplight of the victims of street crime. No serious challenge\nwill only squander it. And yet while the rest of the elector-\nto Conyers has ever been waged by a black attacking him\nate gasps, blacks seem to slumber.\nfor failing to represent the community's interest in reduc-\nTo be sure, ordinary black people feel a genuine ambiva-\ning crime. Here is a case where, arguably, blacks' interests\nlence about their American nationalism. Blacks find them-\nare not served by Conyers's traditional left-liberal perspec-\nselves in America only because their ancestors were kid-\ntive. What blacks in Detroit need is less, not more, unifor-\nnapped and brought here as slaves. In the century\nmity of opinion.\nfollowing emancipation, black artists and intellectuals—\nWhat conceivable justification can black leaders offer for\nwhose legacy continues to exert a powerful influence on\nsuch limited debate among the victims of crime about\neducated young blacks-found they could only gain free-\nConyers's views on crime? To argue that ordinary black\ndom of action and the recognition for their accomplish-\npeople identify with and excuse the criminals who brutal-\nments by exiling themselves. The complicity of the federal\nize them would be to plumb the depths of fatuity and\nand state governments in sustaining Jim Crow laws and\ncondescension. And yet consider how the N.A.A.C.P.,\nthe de facto system of racial caste, and the ubiquity of\nthe largest and oldest civil rights organization in the coun-\nracist assumptions and practices throughout American life\ntry, characterizes the inner-city crime problem in the April\nhave left deep scars. There can be no forgetting that Mar-\n1983 issue of its magazine, The Crisis:\ntin Luther King Jr. was hounded as a suspected enemy of\nBlacks make up\n12 percent of the nation's total population\nthe state by the F.B.I., even as he was helping to effect the\nan incredible 50 percent of the total prison population\nnation's great moral awakening. Today, when the Reagan\n[but] only 4 percent of the nation's law enforcement person-\nAdministration seems to flinch from condemning the ugly\nnel.\nWhy are so many blacks in prison and\nso few\nracism of South African apartheid, it makes many blacks\nblacks in law enforcement? One inescapable answer applies to\neven more reluctant to embrace fully their American\nboth questions: racism. Superficially, it would appear that\nnationalism.\nblacks commit more crimes than anyone else\n[but the]\nonly explanation for this\ndiscrepancy is conscious choices\nof key decision makers to focus on crimes committed more\nT\nHUS WHITE LEADERS too, if they do not seek to\nunderstand the nature and sources of black political\nfrequently by blacks.\nalienation and respond sensitively to it, are in danger of\nIf the common ideology of the black leadership is this\nmaking our racial dilemma worse. White Democrats and\nreticent to express principled opposition to the damaging\nwhite Republicans who are elected to office without black\ncriminal behavior of a relatively few young black men, it\nsupport will be tempted, as all politicians are, to reward\nsimply does not serve the welfare of blacks.\ntheir friends (i.e., whites), and punish their enemies (i.e.,\nSecond, the \"Because we're smart\" argument cannot\nblacks). If they succumb to this temptation, they will make\nexplain the ubiquitous coolness that nationally prominent\nit infinitely harder for black leaders to adopt positions that\nblack politicians exhibit toward the defense of American\nmake mutual compromise and accommodation possible.\ninterests abroad. The most vulnerable segment of the\nThis is the great problem confronting President Reagan,\nAmerican population to any major setback abroad are the\nas great in its own way as the deficit problem. Even in\nblack inner-city poor. If vital raw materials become scarce,\nthe absence of any short-term political gain, he must\nwho will suffer first and most? If markets abroad disap-\nseek to reach out to the blacks and include them in his\npear, if trading partners can no longer afford to buy our\nnew majority. The President need not pretend to be a\ngoods, who will be unemployed? Of course, factors be-\nliberal Democrat. In a manner consistent with his social\nyond the narrow interests of constituents should deter-\nphilosophy, he should act on the statement he made in\nmine one's foreign policy positions. Still, the answers to\n1982 to the National Black Republican Council: \"No other\nthese questions are sufficiently uncertain that those advo-\nexperience in American history runs quite parallel to the\ncating the interests of the inner-city poor would do well to\nblack experience. It has been one of great hardships, but\nconsider them carefully.\nalso of great heroism; of great adversity but also great\nDECEMBER 31, 1984\n17\nachievement. What our Administration and our party\nsupport for the development of a strong black entrepre-\nseek is the day when the tragic side of the black legacy in\nneurial class. He has to show he is willing to take\nAmerica can be laid to rest once and for all, and the long,\nsome risks, and make some compromises to see that these\nperilous voyage toward freedom, dignity, and opportuni-\nand other initiatives are enacted. In his first term\nty can be completed, a day when every child born in\nthe President seemed reluctant to appear before black\nAmerica will live free not only of political injustice, but\naudiences-perhaps because he feared an ugly reception.\nof fear, ignorance, prejudice, and dependency.\"\nYet, by taking blacks seriously enough to directly seek\nThe President must recognize the damage that is done\ntheir support, he can take the lead in healing the country's\nto the country by poor judgment in policy decisions of\nracial wounds.\npowerful symbolic importance. Two examples of this\nShould Reagan be prepared to take these steps, a histor-\nproblem from Reagan's first term come to mind. The Ad-\nic opportunity will present itself to the black leadership.\nministration appeared to support segregationist Bob Jones\nThe black underclass cannot afford another four years of\nUniversity in its efforts to gain a tax exemption; and it\nwishful thinking from its leaders about the drift of political\nfailed to give early support to a compromise version of the\nideas in contemporary America. Those leaders must find\nbill to extend the Voting Rights Act, and thus permitted\nthe courage and wisdom to heed the growing signs of\nitself to be portrayed as opposing the measure. Such mis-\nracial political isolation, and to seek accommodation and\ntakes served only to insult and further alienate a tenth of\ncompromise. They need not become conservative Repub-\nthe population.\nlicans. What is required is that black leaders, from a ma-\nReagan must also push with greater vigor and urgency\nture and varied set of ideological positions, adopt strate-\nthose initiatives he already supports: enterprise zones, a\ngies consonant with the shifting political realities. Until\nsub-minimum wage for the hard-to-employ, ownership\nthey do so, the new American dilemma will be perpetuat-\npossibilities for responsible public housing tenants, and\ned by blacks and whites alike.\nRESIDENT\nEXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT\nTHE\nUNITED\nOFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET\nSERVE\nSTATE\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20503\nDecember 21, 1984\nMEMORANDUM TO: Jim Cicconi\nFROM:\nMike Horowitz\nM4\nSUBJECT:\nBlack Strategy\nThese are some hasty reactions to your memo, which I believe to\nbe absolutely on target in many of its points.\nThis Administration, under normal circumstances, would be\nexpected to draw considerable support from any group:\nO In which the church is the principle community\ninstitution -- and in which there is accordingly greater\nthan average agreement with Administration positions on\n\"social issues\" such as moral values, school discipline,\npornography, etc.\no Which is by far the most victimized by violent crime, and\nhence has the most to gain from this Admiistration's efforts\nto restore balance to the criminal justice process.\nO Whose children bore the brunt of the deterioration in\neducational standards which occurred during the 1970's, and\nwhich this Administration has done SO much to reverse.\nO Which was (and to the extent that reforms remain to be\neffected, still is) disproportionately represented among\nthose workers taxed, under Great Society policies, to\nprovide transfer payments to support others with a lifestyle\nwhich exceeds their own.\nO Large numbers of whom live in areas which would be\ndesignated as \"Enterprise Zones\", and whose young people\ndisproportionately bear the burden of such interest group\n\"successes\" as high minimum wages.\nO Contains a large and growing middle class, with a vested\ninterest in preserving and expanding individual economic\nopportunity.\nO Which, polls consistently indicate, overwhelmingly favors\na policy of equal opportunity, and which shares this\nAdministration's opposition to busing, quotas, and similar\n\"race conscious\" policies.\nThat we do not, as you correctly emphasize, is not so much a\nfunction of poor salesmanship (to which, we are frequently\nexhorted, the solution is more and better salesmanship) as it is\nthe absence of a coherent and identifiable product to sell -- a\ncore of ideas and beliefs (a policy) based on which this\nAdministration can be consistently seen to act.\nA policy can be evaluated (and sold) in terms of its overall\neffects. A series of ad hoc (and frequently, contradictory)\nepisodes in the various departments and agencies cannot --\nparticularly when they are undertaken with the apparent, vain,\nhope that they will not be noticed. As the predictable result\nhas been a civil rights record about which we have been, by\nturns, defensive, apologetic, or (occasionally) defiant --- but\nall-too-infrequently assertive or affirmatively proud.\nWhile I agree that we should take every opportunity to give\nadditional prominence to the emerging cadre of conservative\nintellectuals and leaders in the black community (and that we\nshould avoid actions which further empower media-created\n\"leaders\") I would put somewhat less emphasis on developing\nleaders or agendas for blacks. As the ovewhelming repudiation of\nthe Mondale campaign (which had an \"agenda\" and \"leaders\" for\nevery discernable group), Americans prefer national leadership\nand a national agenda (even where they do not agree with every\nparticular).\nAs Glenn Loury powerfully emphasizes, blacks are no exception in\nthis regard (although he might tellingly have added that we have\ntoo often acted as though they were). As Loury convincingly\nargues, once the Administration develops a truly national civil\nrights agenda, real debate within the black community can begin.\nA debate from which new agendas and additional leaders can emerge\n- from the black community itself.\nAn obvious first step would be to offer substantive\nAdministration jobs to leaders such as Loury and Sowell who have\ntaken it upon themselves to challenge the assumption blacks\nbenefit from the liberal agenda. To date, we have ignored the\nLoury's and Sowell's (when we have not rejected them outright)\nin favor of \"bridge figures\" (whose message to blacks, in the\nend, is that they should support the Administration \"in spite of\nit all\"). As I indicated yesterday, I believe that the\nappointment of Tom Sowell to a Cabinet-level position could, in\nand of itself, truly affect history -- and not in the area of\ncivil rights alone. I know it will take some tough persuading,\nand personal appeals by the President, but success on this score\nwill, in my opinion, give a basis to a large proportion of the\nblack community (and more media figures than might be imagined)\nto identify with the President's overall program.\nThese are initial thoughts offered in haste as you leave for your\nR & R, and I look forward to further talks when you return.\nHouse GOP priorities (domestic):\n(1) Budget;\n(2) Tax reform;\n(3) Civil rights;\nWhy civil rights should be a priority:\n(1) Opportunity to reach out to black voters;\n(2) Opportunity to push the conservative agenda under the\nbanner of \"social justice\";\n(3) Opportunity to go on the offensive -- to act because we're\ninterested in the social good instead of reacting because we\ndon't agree with the left's approach;\n(4) Opportunity to seize the left's moral high ground by\nchallenging their protection of it.\nThe situation in the 99th Congress:\n(1) The Leadership Conference will introduce another Grove City\nbill. It may be more sophisticated but it will have the same\neffect. [Covering small grocers' because customers buy food\nwith Food Stamps; or farmers because they benefit from price\nsupports.\n(2) If we don't have a positive alternative they will be able to\npaint anyone who questions the measure, or tries to amend it,\na racist -- especially since a handful of conservative GOP\nSenators defeated the bill last year.\n(3) Analysis of statistics and trends gives every indication that\nthe policies now in place aren't working.\n(4) The GOP does have economic proposals that would attack\ndirectly some of the economic problems of blacks.\nA Proposal:\n(1) Make civil rights a GOP priority.\n(2) Embrace documents, such as the bishops draft letter on\npoverty, that point out the problems that do exist.\n(3) Make the case for the failure of the policies now in place.\n(4) Use the inevitable Grove City bill as a wedge to enter the\ncivil rights debate and begin talking about how we can really\nensure civil rights.\n(5) Have an alternative omnibus bill or amendment that can be\noffered as a substitute to Grove City. That bill or\namendment should include:\nGrove City language conservatives can support;\nLanguage reversing the trend toward policies that have the\neffect of racial quotas;\n*\nEnterprise zones;\nYouth opportunity wage;\nPrivatization of housing;\n[It could also include repeal of Davis-Bacon, education\nvouchers, repeal of homework regulations, and a review of\noperational licensing standards and procedures.]\nStrategy:\n(1) Adopt an alternative that dovetails with other priorities\n(like the one suggested above).\n(2) Use every possible forum to talk about it.\n(3) Cultivate media interest -- don't focus on the Washington\nmedia, try Reader's Digest, the WSJ, USA Today, and radio.\n(4) Make our high ground a driving interest in results, not\nprocess and rhetoric.\nTactics:\nIn order for this approach to work civil rights has to become a\npriority -- use every possible forum to bring it up:\nSelect Committee on Children, Youth, and Families could\nhold hearings on black teenage unemployment -- especially\nsince the Democrats want to hold hearings on poverty as\nthe cause of existing problems.\nWhen Revenue Sharing comes up offer an amendment that\nconditions funds on review of state licensing procedures\nand how they impact on black employment.\nGet national religious leaders to sponsor a gala event --\ntalk about the problems and our solutions; solicit ideas\nfrom the people we're trying to help -- whites can't solve\nblacks' problems, they can only get out of the way.\nSell the idea to conservative celebrities -- particularly\nthose who work with inner-city kids and the disadvantaged\n-- and get them to begin lobbying for the approach, in\nWashington and around the country.\nGet GOP youth organizations to take the issue on as their\ncause.\nImmediate goal: Damage control on Grove City\nLong Term goal: Change the focus of debate on civil rights\nBest case scenario:\n(1) Defeat the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill;\n(2) Change the focus of debate;\n(3) Pass our economic proposals.\nWorst case scenario:\n(1) Pass the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill\noverwhelmingly;\n(?) Continue to be at a loss for an alternative to the left's\ncivil rights agenda;\n(3) Continue to vote for civil rights legislation we're opposed\nto.\nMost likely scenario:\n(1) Begin to change the focus of debate;\n(2) Pass bad Grove City language, or moderately bad language,\nwith enterprise zones attached.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDecember 12, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER\nFROM:\nJAMES W. CICCONI\nSUBJECT:\nBlack Strategy\nAt this point, it is perhaps more reflective of current thinking\nto outline a possible black strategy, and secure your reactions.\nIn that vein, I would offer the following points:\n1. Our approach must address, and not ignore, the reasons for\nthe President's current unpopularity with blacks. Much of our\nproblem is rooted in black perceptions that the President is\nanti-civil rights, and that his economic program is unfair to\nblacks. While this seems obvious as a matter of analysis, it\nalso points out the need to correct current misperceptions\nat the same time we are looking forward.\nWe can begin to address the civil rights aspect by clearly\ndefining what we are for, as well as what we are against. (I\nhave already written a memo on the civil rights policy\nproblem, which includes some specific recommendations, and\nwill be happy to send you a copy.) The bottom line here,\nthough, is that much of our problem is based on a fear,\nabetted by our policy missteps, about how far we might go\nin rolling back the civil rights gains of the past 20 years.\nWe can allay that fear only by clearly defining our policy\n(thereby setting some limits), and restoring control of civil\nrights policy-making to the White House (thus making certain\nthat the President's views, and not ad hoc agency decisions,\ndetermine our policy).\n2. We must begin to lay out a \"new agenda for black America\".\nThis requires a good deal of thought, and the participation not\nonly of our political supporters, but also of conservative black\nthinkers from around the country. Faith Whittlesey has begun\nsome contacts with such a group. So far, the meetings have\nbeen less than productive, because they are not goal-oriented\nand have not been integrated with an overall strategy. We\nhave taken steps to correct that, with a view toward encouraging\nformation of a private, conservative black \"think tank.\"\n3. We must begin to form our own black leadership composed of\npeople with whom we can deal. This should not be totally\nRepublican, and need not be in tune with us on every issue--\n- 2 -\nthe key is simply that they not be hostile to the President,\nor to our ideas in general. We can bestow credibility on the\npeople we choose by consulting with them, speaking to their\ngroups, and providing them access within the Administration.\nThis is, of course, precisely what we did with Hispanics.\nBlack leadership is, to a great extent, in the eye of the\nbeholder. We can affect such perceptions by the publicity\nWhite House recognition provides. Change will only come\nslowly, but the espousal of our message by recognizable\nblacks is important to its overall credibility.\n4. We cannot hope to gain ground by dealing with the estab-\nlished black leadership (Jesse Jackson, Ben Hooks, Vernon\nJordan, et al). They are unremittingly hostile to this Presi-\ndent, their agenda is diametrically opposed to ours, and their\nstatus as leaders is dependent on their continued public\ncriticism of our program. If we are seen to be dealing with\nthem, we will only strengthen their credibility among blacks,\nthereby damaging ourselves. We must shut them out of the White\nHouse to the maximum extent possible without adverse publicity.\nWe must also put them in the position of responding to our\n\"new agenda,\" since they will be hard put to oppose many of the\nissues we could put forward.\n5. We must move with deliberation, and not with undue haste.\nA time when severe budget cuts are the primary news is not the\nbest time for a major black outreach effort. Instead, we should\nbegin to put the \"infrastructure\" of such an effort in place.\nThis would include preparation of a \"new agenda\" of policy ideas;\nthe ordering of our own house on civil rights policy, culminat-\ning in a formal policy statement and a major Presidential speech\non civil rights; encouragement for the formation of a private\n\"think tank\" of black conservatives; and identification and\npromotion of an alternative black leadership.\n6. We must work closely in the meantime with other groups, like\nethnics and Hispanics, that were far more supportive of the Presi-\ndent in 1980. Such groups will react with hostility if they feel\nwe are focusing on blacks while ignoring them.\n7. We must recognize up front that progress will be very slow,\nand difficult to measure since we are starting from such a\nsmall base (e.g., a five point increment represents a 50% gain).\nMoreover, we must be prepared to sustain the effort over a\nperiod of years if we hope to show any significant progress.\nThe political arguments for doing so are strong, though, and\nthe increasing racial polarization of U.S. politics adds a\nmoral argument, as well.\nCC: James A. Baker, III\nLong Term goal: Change the focus of debate on civil rights\nBest case scenario:\n(1) Defeat the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill;\n(2) Change the focus of debate;\n(3) Pass our economic proposals.\nWorst case scenario:\n(1) Pass the Leadership Conference's Grove City bill\noverwhelmingly;\n(?) Continue to be at a loss for an alternative to the left's\ncivil rights agenda;\n(3) Continue to vote for civil rights legislation we're opposed\nto.\nMost likely scenario:\n(1) Begin to change the focus of debate;\n(2) Pass bad Grove City language, or moderately bad language,\nwith enterprise zones attached.\nHouse GOP priorities (domestic):\n(1) Budget;\n(2) Tax reform;\n(3) Civil rights;\nWhy civil rights should be a priority:\n(1) Opportunity to reach out to black voters;\n(2) Opportunity to push the conservative agenda under the\nbanner of \"social justice\";\n(3) Opportunity to go on the offensive -- to act because we're\ninterested in the social good instead of reacting because we\ndon't agree with the left's approach;\n(4) Opportunity to seize the left's moral high ground by\nchallenging their protection of it.\nThe situation in the 99th Congress:\n(1) The Leadership Conference will introduce another Grove City\nbill. It may be more sophisticated but it will have the same\neffect. [Covering small grocers' because customers buy food\nwith Food Stamps; or farmers because they benefit from price\nsupports.\n(2) If we don't have a positive alternative they will be able to\npaint anyone who questions the measure, or tries to amend it,\na racist -- especially since a handful of conservative GOP\nSenators defeated the bill last year.\n(3) Analysis of statistics and trends gives every indication that\nthe policies now in place aren't working.\n(4) The GOP does have economic proposals that would attack\ndirectly some of the economic problems of blacks.\nA Proposal:\n(1) Make civil rights a GOP priority.\n(2) Embrace documents, such as the bishops draft letter on\npoverty, that point out the problems that do exist.\n(3) Make the case for the failure of the policies now in place.\n(4) Use the inevitable Grove City bill as a wedge to enter the\ncivil rights debate and begin talking about how we can really\nensure civil rights.\n(5) Have an alternative omnibus bill or amendment that can be\noffered as a substitute to Grove City. That bill or\namendment should include:\nGrove City language conservatives can support;\nLanguage reversing the trend toward policies that have the\neffect of racial quotas;\nEnterprise zones;\n*\nYouth opportunity wage;\nPrivatization of housing;\n[It could also include repeal of Davis-Bacon, education\nvouchers, repeal of homework regulations, and a review of\noperational licensing standards and procedures.]\nStrategy:\n(1) Adopt an alternative that dovetails with other priorities\n(like the one suggested above).\n(2) Use every possible forum to talk about it.\n(3) Cultivate media interest -- don't focus on the Washington\nmedia, try Reader's Digest, the WSJ, USA Today, and radio.\n(4) Make our high ground a driving interest in results, not\nprocess and rhetoric.\nTactics:\nIn order for this approach to work civil rights has to become a\npriority -- use every possible forum to bring it up:\n*\nSelect Committee on Children, Youth, and Families could\nhold hearings on black teenage unemployment -- especially\nsince the Democrats want to hold hearings on poverty as\nthe cause of existing problems.\nWhen Revenue Sharing comes up offer an amendment that\nconditions funds on review of state licensing procedures\nand how they impact on black employment.\n*\nGet national religious leaders to sponsor a gala event --\ntalk about the problems and our solutions; solicit ideas\nfrom the people we're trying to help -- whites can't solve\nblacks' problems, they can only get out of the way.\n*\nSell the idea to conservative celebrities -- particularly\nthose who work with inner-city kids and the disadvantaged\n-- and get them to begin lobbying for the approach, in\nWashington and around the country.\n*\nGet GOP youth organizations to take the issue on as their\ncause.\nImmediate goal: Damage control on Grove City\n1.\nCoordinative\n:\nJC, Rhodes, Donatelli\nDeaves\n- coordination of overall strategy\n2.\nEvent Strategy\n: Donatelli, Rhodes, JC, Bradley\n- propose a Progression of meetings and events for next 90 days; lay grandate for blitz\n3.\nNew\nAgenda : Chapman, Rhodes, JC, (ontside groups), Holladay Bradley-\n- devise set of initiatives and proposals to attract black support; assemble as pkg.\n4.\nCivil Rights Policy JAB, EM, Svahn (Jc)\n- restructure policy-making process; draft civ its policy statement; Pres'l speech\nis\nNew Leadership : Bradley, Rhodes, Holladay\n- identify, begin cultivating alt black ldrs via meeting, photos, etc; low-key\n6.\nAppointments : Armstrong\n- identify, promote GOP blacks w/ ediship potential; install one or two high-lend applate\nbut\n- Verstanding seeting\n- thank\nyou Sun theon\n- Tobacco investigation>\n- 2 days on this; documents\nUNESCO\n- hearing is Jan 3 (report due by end\nobserves\nSP\nof month)\naware of sit.\nFERC\nGeorgiam\nSheldon\non\nnow assessing\nEd Cox in Dallas wants to help\n= w/in 30 days but\n= what is timetable on this?\nnot before Jan 2\n7510 Salgado -\n= assessing =\nMEMORANDUM\nOFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT\nBue descuss\nWASHINGTON\npls with JCF to\nDecember 14, 1984\nget lave\nare with\nMEMORANDUM TO: Michael Deaver\nFROM:\nSteal\nCureten aremo)\nJ. Steven Rhodes\nSUBJECT:\nBlack Strategy as prepared by Jim Cicconi.\nI would like to respond to Jim Ciconni's memorandum to\nyou by addressing each of the subjects he raised.\nPoint 1: Jim talked about the reasons for the President's\nht.\nI agree wholeheartedly that the President should clearly\ndenunciate this Administration's position on civil rights\nand clearly state what we are for, as well as against.\nAdditionally, civil rights matters must be cleared through\nthe White House because of their impact on numerous con-\nstituencies as women, minorities, handicapped, etc.\nPoint 2: Jim suggests that the White House should try out\nnew agendas for black America. I disagree with this para\ngraph because I feel that the White House should respond\nto the needs and concerns for black Americans and address\nthese issues. The black community should not be patro-\nnized by an assuming White House that knows \"what is best\nfor black America.\" There are a number of black think\ntanks that are ideologically consistent with this Admini-\nstration. Bob Woodson, President of the National Center\nfor Neighborhood Enterprise, is by far the most credible\nof all these.\nPoint 3: 1 agree with Jim. I also agree that we must\ncultivate black leadership which is consistent with the\nAdministration. The White House can reinforce the credi-\nbility of these leaders in America but this leadership\nshould be substantive and articulate.\nPage Two: Memorandum to Michael Deaver.\nPoint 4: Jim discusses the approach we should take with\nexisting black leadership. I agree we should spend more\ntime with those people who can articulate their support of\nthe President as opposed to those who are diametrically\nopposed to the President and the Administration.\nPoint 5: This is the same as Point 2 and 3, however, we\nneed not create new organizations but rather work with\nexisting organizations that support us, are credible and\nhave constituencies - of which there are many. We should\nfocus our time on those issues affecting all Americans but\nthat have more direct impact on the black community. We\nwould thereby bring black America into the mainstream so\nminorities are not treated as second class citizens.\nPoint 6: I agree with Jim wholeheartedly.\nPoint 7: I do agree with the direction Jim is taking, how-\never I feel that if we segment the black community by\ntargeting our message to particular individuals and organi-\nzations concerned with economic development, there is a far\ngreater probability that the President's message will be\nunderstood. Economic development is color blind.\nIn summation, I generally agree with what Jim is saying\nHowever I do not feel that the White House needs to create\nnew black leadership. There are already leaders existing\nin the Administration as well as out.\nAEI and the Heritage Foundation were not created by the\nWhite House. Similarly, the Lincoln Institute and National\nCenter for Neighborhoos Enterprise are established organiza-\ntions with a strong constituency supportive of the President.\nAlthough Jim does not suggest this, I would be remiss if I\ndid not advise that we quickly need to acknowledge black\nRepublicans who labored in the 1984 campaign to re-elect the\nPresident. It would be unprofessional to begin the job of\nOutreach in the black community without thanking the indivi-\nduals who helped to get us here in the first place.\nThe Republican Party has been notorious for not saying thank\nyou to its supporters. This is critical in handling Outreach\nin the minority communities. Symbolism is important in all\nconstituencies as industry, labor, religious, handicapped, etc.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDecember 13, 1984\nTO: MIKE DEAVER\nAttached, per your request, is a\nmemo which reflects my current\nthinking on a possible black\nstrategy. I have shown a draft\nto Frank Donatelli, and he is in\nbasic agreement.\nI have tried to be concise, and\nnot mince words, in order to save\nyour time and draw your honest\nreaction to each point. Obviously,\nthe different points could be\nfleshed out with much more detail;\nalso, there is much here that is\nimplicit.\nI have also attached a copy of a\nmemo on civil rights policy-making\nwhich is a bit more lengthy. So\nfar, only Baker and Svahn have seen\nit, and I'd be interested in your\nreactions.\nThanks-- I'll be happy to have a\nmeeting to discuss these papers at\nany time you wish.\nJim Cicconi\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDecember 12, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER\nFROM:\nJAMES W. CICCONI\nSUBJECT:\nBlack Strategy\nAt this point, it is perhaps more reflective of current thinking\nto outline a possible black strategy, and secure your reactions.\nIn that vein, I would offer the following points:\n1. Our approach must address, and not ignore, the reasons for\nthe President's current unpopularity with blacks. Much of our\nproblem is rooted in black perceptions that the President is\nanti-civil rights, and that his economic program is unfair to\nblacks. While this seems obvious as a matter of analysis, it\nalso points out the need to correct current misperceptions\nat the same time we are looking forward.\nWe can begin to address the civil rights aspect by clearly\ndefining what we are for, as well as what we are against. (I\nhave already written a memo on the civil rights policy\nproblem, which includes some specific recommendations, and\nwill be happy to send you a copy.) The bottom line here,\nthough, is that much of our problem is based on a fear,\nabetted by our policy missteps, about how far we might go\nin rolling back the civil rights gains of the past 20 years.\nWe can allay that fear only by clearly defining our policy\n(thereby setting some limits), and restoring control of civil\nrights policy-making to the White House (thus making certain\nthat the President's views, and not ad hoc agency decisions,\ndetermine our policy).\n2. We must begin to lay out a \"new agenda for black America\".\nThis requires a good deal of thought, and the participation not\nonly of our political supporters, but also of conservative black\nthinkers from around the country. Faith Whittlesey has begun\nsome contacts with such a group. So far, the meetings have\nbeen less than productive, because they are not goal-oriented\nand have not been integrated with an overall strategy. We\nhave taken steps to correct that, with a view toward encouraging\nformation of a private, conservative black \"think tank.\"\n3. We must begin to form our own black leadership composed of\npeople with whom we can deal. This should not be totally\nRepublican, and need not be in tune with us on every issue--\n- 2 -\nthe key is simply that they not be hostile to the President,\nor to our ideas in general. We can bestow credibility on the\npeople we choose by consulting with them, speaking to their\ngroups, and providing them access within the Administration.\nThis is, of course, precisely what we did with Hispanics.\nBlack leadership is, to a great extent, in the eye of the\nbeholder. We can affect such perceptions by the publicity\nWhite House recognition provides. Change will only come\nslowly, but the espousal of our message by recognizable\nblacks is important to its overall credibility.\n4. We cannot hope to gain ground by dealing with the estab-\nlished black leadership (Jesse Jackson, Ben Hooks, Vernon\nJordan, et al). They are unremittingly hostile to this Presi-\ndent, their agenda is diametrically opposed to ours, and their\nstatus as leaders is dependent on their continued public\ncriticism of our program. If we are seen to be dealing with\nthem, we will only strengthen their credibility among blacks,\nthereby damaging ourselves. We must shut them out of the White\nHouse to the maximum extent possible without adverse publicity.\nWe must also put them in the position of responding to our\n\"new agenda,\" since they will be hard put to oppose many of the\nissues we could put forward.\n5. We must move with deliberation, and not with undue haste.\nA time when severe budget cuts are the primary news is not the\nbest time for a major black outreach effort. Instead, we should\nbegin to put the \"infrastructure\" of such an effort in place.\nThis would include preparation of a \"new agenda\" of policy ideas;\nthe ordering of our own house on civil rights policy, culminat-\ning in a formal policy statement and a major Presidential speech\non civil rights; encouragement for the formation of a private\n\"think tank\" of black conservatives; and identification and\npromotion of an alternative black leadership.\n6. We must work closely in the meantime with other groups, like\nethnics and Hispanics, that were far more supportive of the Presi-\ndent in 1980. Such groups will react with hostility if they feel\nwe are focusing on blacks while ignoring them.\n7. We must recognize up front that progress will be very slow,\nand difficult to measure since we are starting from such a\nsmall base (e.g., a five point increment represents a 50% gain).\nMoreover, we must be prepared to sustain the effort over a\nperiod of years if we hope to show any significant progress.\nThe political arguments for doing so are strong, though, and\nthe increasing racial polarization of U.S. politics adds a\nmoral argument, as well.\nCC: James A. Baker, III\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDecember 12, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER\nFROM:\nJAMES W. CICCONI\nSUBJECT:\nBlack Strategy\nAt this point, it is perhaps more reflective of current thinking\nto outline a possible black strategy, and secure your reactions.\nIn that vein, I would offer the following points:\n1. Our approach must address, and not ignore, the reasons for\nthe President's current unpopularity with blacks. Much of our\nproblem is rooted in black perceptions that the President is\nanti-civil rights, and that his economic program is unfair to\nblacks. While this seems obvious as a matter of analysis, it\nalso points out the need to correct current misperceptions\nat the same time we are looking forward.\nWe can begin to address the civil rights aspect by clearly\ndefining what we are for, as well as what we are against. (I\nhave already written a memo on the civil rights policy\nproblem, which includes some specific recommendations, and\nwill be happy to send you a copy.) The bottom line here,\nthough, is that much of our problem is based on a fear,\nabetted by our policy missteps, about how far we might go\nin rolling back the civil rights gains of the past 20 years.\nWe can allay that fear only by clearly defining our policy\n(thereby setting some limits), and restoring control of civil\nrights policy-making to the White House (thus making certain\nthat the President's views, and not ad hoc agency decisions,\ndetermine our policy).\n2. We must begin to lay out a \"new agenda for black America\".\nThis requires a good deal of thought, and the participation not\nonly of our political supporters, but also of conservative black\nthinkers from around the country. Faith Whittlesey has begun\nsome contacts with such a group. So far, the meetings have\nbeen less than productive, because they are not goal-oriented\nand have not been integrated with an overall strategy. We\nhave taken steps to correct that, with a view toward encouraging\nformation of a private, conservative black \"think tank.\n3. We must begin to form our own black leadership composed of\npeople with whom we can deal. This should not be totally\nRepublican, and need not be in tune with us on every issue--\n- 2 -\nthe key is simply that they not be hostile to the President,\nor to our ideas in general. We can bestow credibility on the\npeople we choose by consulting with them, speaking to their\ngroups, and providing them access within the Administration.\nThis is, of course, precisely what we did with Hispanics.\nBlack leadership is, to a great extent, in the eye of the\nbeholder. We can affect such perceptions by the publicity\nWhite House recognition provides. Change will only come\nslowly, but the espousal of our message by recognizable\nblacks is important to its overall credibility.\n4. We cannot hope to gain ground by dealing with the estab-\nlished black leadership (Jesse Jackson, Ben Hooks, Vernon\nJordan, et al). They are unremittingly hostile to this Presi-\ndent, their agenda is diametrically opposed to ours, and their\nstatus as leaders is dependent on their continued public\ncriticism of our program. If we are seen to be dealing with\nthem, we will only strengthen their credibility among blacks,\nthereby damaging ourselves. We must shut them out of the White\nHouse to the maximum extent possible without adverse publicity.\nWe must also put them in the position of responding to our\n\"new agenda,\" since they will be hard put to oppose many of the\nissues we could put forward.\n5. We must move with deliberation, and not with undue haste.\nA time when severe budget cuts are the primary news is not the\nbest time for a major black outreach effort. Instead, we should\nbegin to put the \"infrastructure\" of such an effort in place.\nThis would include preparation of a \"new agenda\" of policy ideas;\nthe ordering of our own house on civil rights policy, culminat-\ning in a formal policy statement and a major Presidential speech\non civil rights; encouragement for the formation of a private\n\"think tank\" of black conservatives; and identification and\npromotion of an alternative black leadership.\n6. We must work closely in the meantime with other groups, like\nethnics and Hispanics, that were far more supportive of the Presi-\ndent in 1980. Such groups will react with hostility if they feel\nwe are focusing on blacks while ignoring them.\n7. We must recognize up front that progress will be very slow,\nand difficult to measure since we are starting from such a\nsmall base (e.g., a five point increment represents a 50% gain).\nMoreover, we must be prepared to sustain the effort over a\nperiod of years if we hope to show any significant progress.\nThe political arguments for doing so are strong, though, and\nthe increasing racial polarization of U.S. politics adds a\nmoral argument, as well.\nCC: James A. Baker, III\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL\nDecember 12, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III\nFROM:\nJAMES W. CICCONI\nSUBJECT:\nCivil Rights Policy\nDuring the President's first term, a pattern emerged in the\narea of civil rights which has been disturbing, and which has\ncontinually led to problems. In short, it boils down to this:\nour Administration has not formulated a specific civil rights\npolicy framework. Instead, our policy has been determined on\na case-by-case basis by the Civil Rights Division, with little\nor no White House involvement.\nCivil Rights Policy-Making\nOver the past four years, with only occasional exceptions,\nmajor civil rights policy decisions have not been brought\nbefore the President prior to some executive branch action\nwhich either constrained his options, or rendered any dis-\ncussion purely informational. The Cabinet Council on Legal\nPolicy was created in the wake of controversy over Adminis-\ntration civil rights policies, and was designed as a forum for\nidentifying such issues and bringing them before the President\nfor policy decision. This was expected to involve the normal\ndebate of opposing viewpoints and consideration of options\nthat the Cabinet Council system has produced in most other\npolicy areas. The President, hearing the different positions\nand options, would then decide. Unfortunately, the CCLP has\nfailed utterly in fulfilling this function.\nIn the absence of a White House system for setting Adminis-\ntration policy in the multitude of areas encompassing the term\n\"civil rights,\" a vacuum has developed. This has under-\nstandably been filled by the Civil Rights Division, which has\nbeen quite clearly making such decisions in place of the White\nHouse. Policy decisions are reflected in speeches, amicus\nbriefs, interventions, and positions in various lawsuits which\nnot only reverse longstanding Justice Department policy, but,\nin many cases, defy legal precedent.\n- 2 -\nTo be sure, the Civil Rights Division cannot be faulted for\nthese developments. There has indeed been a vacuum in the\ncivil rights policy area which the White House has not moved\nto fill. Failing White House insistence that policy be\ndecided here, the decisions in any policy area will, predict-\nably, be made at the departmental level. The \"vacuum\" is more\nthan a problem of systems, though: it extends to the\nparticulars of our policy itself. We have not fleshed out the\nPresident's philosophy in this area, and, after four years,\nare still left with only certain statements, expanded somewhat\nby last year's ABA speech (e.g. favoring affirmative action,\nagainst rigid quotas and busing). The Civil Rights Division\nhas thus been free to interpret their preferred courses of\naction as being consistent with the President's philosophy\nlargely due to the absence of contrary Presidential\npronouncements. This has given the division a degree of\npolicy leeway enjoyed by few, if any, comparable offices. In\ncontrast, White House involvement has invariably been limited,\nad hoc, and often after-the-fact. The White House usually\nreceives information in one of the following ways:\na. consultation limited to a few individuals in the\nWhite House or OMB who tend to be sympathetic with\nthe Civil Rights Division's position;\nb. limited information provided to either the Counsel's\nOffice or Cabinet Affairs, often at the last minute;\nor\nC.\nparticular White House staffers will hear of an\nissue \"through the grapevine,\" and will request more\ndetailed information from Justice.\nSince the necessary information reaches the White House senior\nstaff either right before, or right after a particular action\nis taken by DOJ, options are constrained accordingly. Meet-\nings are set up to brief appropriate White House officials and\nto answer questions. However, our options are usually\nlimited:\na.\nJustice is given tacit approval to proceed, usually\nwhen a position has already been filed (the Dade\nCounty example);\nb.\nthe Justice position is modified in some way to\nsatisfy significant White House concerns, while\nremaining consistent with the overall DOJ thesis\n(the Grove City example); or\n- 3 -\nC. the Justice position remains intact, but a differ-\nent, and more politically palatable rationale for\nthe stance is presented (the Bob Jones example).\nThe point here is not whether we ended up in a proper or\nill-advised position on a particular issue. It is that the\ncivil rights policy process (if it can be called that) is\noperating beyond White House control or Presidential involve-\nment, and without any considered, coherent strategy except,\nperhaps, on the part of the Civil Rights Division.\nPolicy Consequences\nBeyond the issues of busing and quotas, there is a good deal\nof confusion about what this Administration stands for. As an\nexample, the President has often spoken in a supportive way\nabout affirmation action, yet DOJ actions can, in many cases,\nby interpreted as opposing affirmative action. Similarly, the\nPresident has supported minority set-aside programs on the\nfederal level (even going so far as to reject agency goals,\nand impose higher ones), at the same time his Justice Depart-\nment is fighting them on the state and local level. The\nPresident seems to distinguish between \"goals\" and \"quotas,\"\nwhile DOJ files briefs equating the two.\nThese are symptoms of ad hoc policy-making. It is confused\nbecause we are confused. It is often contradictory because we\noften contradict ourselves (Bob Jones is one example; our\nposition on the Voting Rights Act is another).\nInstead of identifying and focusing on specific policy objec-\ntives, we have repeatedly found ourselves skirmishing over\nissues that were not of our choosing, as in Grove City and Bob\nJones. Ill-considered positions in court have led to unneces-\nsary controversy which, even when we prevailed legally,\nrequired us to confront legislation worse than the situation\nwe sought to correct.\nIn Congress, too, we sometimes \"missed the boat\" because of\nunrealistic assessments of what could be achieved. For\nexample, in early 1981, instead of supporting a straight\nextension of the Voting Rights Act, which would have been\napplauded, we sought significant changes which were unjustly\nportrayed as an attempt to gut the law. The resulting contro-\nversy allowed the civil rights lobby to \"up to the ante.\"\nThough we ultimately decided to support a straight extension,\nit was too late: the bill that reached the President contained\nprovisions far worse than the original Act.\n- 4 -\nThus, in a number of civil rights areas, we have found our-\nselves in battles, by virtue of DOJ decisions, which continue\nto have repercussions in Congress, in the courts, and in the\npolitical arena. Yet, the most striking aspect of the situa-\ntion is that, for all the political damage sustained by the\nPresident, we have achieved very little of substance in such\nbattles. In fact, our main achievements have been in those\nareas where the President's policy is clearest and least\ncontroversial: busing and \"true\" quota cases.\nUnfortunately, it is not our civil rights achievements, but,\ninstead, our often unsuccessful \"rollback\" actions which have\nbeen more likely to stick in the public mind. This is partic-\nularly true with blacks, the media, and those who view them-\nselves as sensitive to civil rights. From a policy standpoint,\nthis has made even our initiatives (e.g. fair housing enforce-\nment) suspect, and vulnerable to being \"trumped\" by the civil\nrights lobby. From a political standpoint, the damage is more\nsevere, and perhaps not reversible for many years. in effect,\nwe have incurred the enmity of 90% of America's blacks, and\ncemented them to the Democratic Party. To be sure, voting\ntrends among blacks have not been promising for the GOP.\nHowever, we have squandered our opportunities by a perceived\nassault on the civil rights laws--an \"assault\" that was not\nplanned, but was instead stumbled into through a lack of White\nHouse attention, and a failure to assert our coordinative\nprerogatives.\nFuture Republican candidates may not be capable of carrying\nthe South, as President Reagan did, while losing 90% of black\nvoters. It is politically imperative that we cut into this\nbloc vote in the coming years, even if our efforts yield only\nseveral percentage points difference. Thad Cochran and Strom\nThurmond have both proven that such efforts, rooted in more\nsensitivity to civil rights concerns, can turn a close\nelection into a safe one.\nMore important, though, is that Republicans begin to identify\nwhat we are for in the area of civil rights, in addition to\nwhat we are against. Otherwise, we risk being viewed as\nreactionaries seeking to undermine civil rights, mostly in a\nsub-rosa fashion. By and large, Americans are proud of the\ncivil rights progress we have made in the thirty years since\nBrown. Republicans have every right to share in that pride--\nKennedy may have sent federal marshals to Birmingham, but Ike\nsent the National Guard to Little Rock. By appearing negative\ntoday, we belie our own Party's contribution to the decline of\nstate-sanctioned racism in the U.S. In fact, the subliminal\nmessage is that we could envision rolling back the clock, if\nonly because our actions, combined with a failure to articu-\nlate limits, raise questions about how far we would go.\n- 5 -\nCivil Rights Policy in the Second Term\nThere are a number of steps that I would recommend be con-\nsidered in a second term:\n1. We should revitalize the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy\nso that it indeed serves as a forum for developing policy\noptions in the area of civil rights. For such discussions,\nboth the chairman of the Civil Rights Commission and the\nchairman of the EEOC should sit as members.\n2. It should be clearly directed that policy questions (as\ndistinct from enforcement actions or case filings where there\nis ample precedent) must be brought to CCLP for discussion.\nThe Administration has tended to allow Justice more discretion\nthan necessary in deciding civil rights policy because of our\nunwillingness to interfere with their decisions about what, or\nwhether, to file in particular cases. Unless our policy is\nalready clear (and in most cases, it has not been), the\nCabinet Council and the President should decide what the\npolicy is; Justice would then file in accord with that policy.\nSimply because DOJ has broad discretion in its judicial\nfilings does not mean the White House must also abdicate\npolicy decisions to them.\n3. A policy statement on civil rights should be drafted and\nthen debated not only within the White House, but among Party\nleaders. Frankly, some black academic thinkers like Thomas\nSowell have done a far better job of articulating a conserva-\ntive civil rights policy framework than this Administration\nhas. We simply must define what we are for, as well as what\nwe are against, and why. This would counter the irrational\nfears conjured by our opponents, and may be the only way we\ncan give blacks a reason for rallying to our Party. It would\nalso provide the Justice Department with the type of central\npolicy guidance that has been lacking in the civil rights\narea.\n4. The President should be engaged directly. He should be at\nthe center of discussions on what our policy is, and what we\nstand for in the area of civil rights. The President should\nalso be exposed periodically, in small sessions, to the views\nof the black community. Too often in the past, the President\nhas been surprised by outcry among blacks about his Adminis-\ntration's policies. Exposure to black viewpoints on such\nissues (including Republicans such as Bill Coleman and Ed\nBrooke) will give the President a direct understanding of how\ncertain civil rights issues are viewed by the black community.\n- 6 -\n5. Legislative strategy on civil rights issues must be\ncontrolled by the White House. On a number of occasions, we\nhave been insufficiently attentive to such issues in Congress,\nleaving them in DOJ's hands until they have passed beyond our\npower to control (e.g. the Voting Rights Act). In the past\nyear, we have done better on several potentially volatile\nissues (insurance equity, comparable worth, Title IX/Grove\nCity legislation) because we have asserted White House control\nat an early stage.\nI will be happy to discuss these points further if you desire."
}