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66330186
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Acid Rain (2)
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66330186
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title
Acid Rain (2)
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Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Howard Baker's Subject Files
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66330186
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1988-12-31
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1988
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1987-01-01
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1987
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Baker, Howard H.
Folder Title: Acid Rain (2)
Box: 1
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at:
[email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name BAKER, HOWARD: FILES
Withdrawer
SMF 4/24/2007
File Folder
ACID RAIN (2)
FOIA
F97-066/4
Box Number
1
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date
Pages
2 MEMO
DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL TO RR RE
6 3/9/1987
ACID RAIN OPTIONS (F97-066/4)
10 MEMO
DUPLICATE OF F97-066/4 #16 (F97-066/4
2 11/25/1987
#31)
5/20/09 80B 109
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Ronald Reagan Library
Case: 1078
Archivist: Kelly Barton
DOC
TYPE
DATE
PAGES
CLASS.
CLOSED
1
Memo of Conversation
ND
4
NSC To: #: 90312 WHORM Subject #: PART 3/0/06 NLSF97 -066/4 01-14-2003 # 23
From:
Subject: re 4/5/87 meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
Memorandum
03-09-1987
6
02-24-2003
NSC #: WHORM Subject #:
R
a
u
To: the President
# 24
From: Domestic Policy Council
Subject: re acid rain options for meeting with Prime Minister
Mulroney
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
3
Memorandum
ND
4
02-24-2003
NSC #: WHORM Subject #:
To: the President
From: Domestic Policy Council
Subject: re Joint Report of Special Envoys on Acid Rain (pp. 4-7
only) (document pending further review)
Restriction :
COLLECTION: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
SERIES: I. Subject File
TITLE: Acid Rain (2)
OA/ID NUMBER: 1
BOX NUMBER: 1
Folder #: 2 of 17
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.
FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules
PRA-3 -Release would violate a Federal statute.
and practices, of an agency.
PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
FOIA(b)(3)
-Release would violate a Federal statute.
commercial or financial information.
FOIA(b)(4)
-Release would disclose trade secrets
PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the
or confidential or financial information.
President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
FOIA(b)(6)
-Release would constitute a clearly
PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
personal privacy.
FOIA(b)(7)
-Release would disclose information
C.
-Closed in accordance with restrictions contained
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
in donors' deed of gift.
FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning
PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.
the regulation of financial institutions.
FOIA(b)(9)
-Release would disclose geological of
geophysical information concerning wells.
Page 1
DOC
TYPE
DATE
PAGES
CLASS.
CLOSED
4
Letter
03/09/1987
1
01-14-2003
NSC #: WHORM Subject #:
To: President
D
3/20/6 DLSR97 #25
From: Brian Mulroney
Subject: (advance copy)
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
5
Memorandum
11/20/1987
1
01-14-2003
NSC #: 8617 WHORM Subject #: R
n
To: Nancy Risque
# 26
From: Grant Green
Subject: re letter from PM Mulroney
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
Memorandum
14/20/1987
4
01-14-2003
NSC #: 8617 WHORM Subject #:
L
^
To: Frank Carlucci
#27
From: Melvyn Levitsky
Subject: re letter from Prime Minister Mulroney on acid rain
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
7
Letter
11/16/1987
1
01-14-2003
NSC #: WHORM Subject #:
n
n
To: Reagan
D
#28
From: Brian Mulroney
Subject: re acid rain
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
COLLECTION: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
SERIES: I. Subject File
TITLE: Acid Rain (2)
OA/ID NUMBER: 1
BOX NUMBER: 1
Folder #: 2 of 17
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.
FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules
PRA-3 Release would violate a Federal statute.
and practices of an agency.
PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
FOIA(b)(3) -Release would violate a Federal statute.
commercial or financial information.
FOIA(b)(4) -Release would disclose trade secrets
PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the
or confidential or financial information.
President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
FOIA(b)(6)
-Release would constitute a clearly
PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
personal privacy.
FOIA(b)(7)
-Release would disclose information
C.
-Closed in accordance with restrictions contained
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
in donors' deed of gift.
FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning
PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.
the regulation of financial institutions.
FOIA(b)(9) -Release would disclose geological of
geophysical information concerning wells.
Page 2
DOC
TYPE
DATE
PAGES
CLASS.
CLOSED
8
Letter
11/25/1987
1
01-14-2003
NSC #: WHORM Subject #:
R
3/2/06
NLSE97-066/4 #29
To: Brian Mulroney
From: Reagan
Subject: Mulroney's Nov. 16 letter
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
9
Letter
11-23-1987
1
01-14-2003
NSC
#: WHORM Subject #:
R
#30 30
To: H. Baker
From: John Whitehead
Subject: re response to Mulroney proposal
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
10
Memorandum
11/25/1987
2
01-14-2003
NSC #: WHORM Subject #:
R
-
To: President
5/3/
From: Nancy Risque
Subject: re acid rain policy guidance
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
F
Memorandum
11-25-1987
1
01-14-2003
NSC #: WHORM Subject #:
R
1
To: Secretary of State
<
32
From: Reagan
Subject:
Restriction FOIA(b)1
COLLECTION: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
SERIES: I. Subject File
TITLE: Acid Rain (2)
OA/ID NUMBER: 1
BOX NUMBER: 1
Folder #: 2 of 17
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information,
FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules
PRA-3 -Release would violate a Federal statute.
and practices of an agency.
PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
FOIA(b)(3) -Release would violate a Federal statute.
commercial or financial information.
FOIA(b)(4) -Release would disclose trade secrets
PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the
or confidential or financial information.
President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
FOIA(b)(6) -Release would constitute a clearly
PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
personal privacy.
FOIA(b)(7)
-Release would disclose information
C.
-Closed in accordance with restrictions contained
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
in donors' deed of gift.
FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning
PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.
the regulation of financial institutions.
FOIA(b)(9)
-Release would disclose geological of
geophysical information concerning wells.
Page 3
DOC
TYPE
DATE
PAGES
CLASS.
CLOSED
12
Memorandum
12/02/1987
1
01-14-2003
NSC
#:
WHORM Subject #:
R 3/21/06 NLSE 97 -06614 #33
To: Ralph Bledsoe
From: Richard J. Smith
Subject: re Ottawa BACG meeting
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
13
Talking-Points/Briefing-Paper
ND
2
01-14-2003
NSC #:
WHORM Subject #:
(
n
}
To:
#34
From:
Subject: re Agenda Item 2 (draft with edits)
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
COLLECTION: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
SERIES: I. Subject File
TITLE: Acid Rain (2)
OA/ID NUMBER: 1
BOX NUMBER: 1
Folder #: 2 of 17
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.
FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules
PRA-3 -Release would violate a Federal statute.
and practices of an agency.
PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
FOIA(b)(3) -Release would violate a Federal statute.
commercial or financial information.
FOIA(b)(4) -Release would disclose trade secrets
PRA-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the
or confidential or financial information.
President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
FOIA(b)(6) -Release would constitute a clearly
PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
personal privacy.
FOIA(b)(7) -Release would disclose information
C.
-Closed in accordance with restrictions contained
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
in donors' deed of gift.
FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning
PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.
the regulation of financial institutions.
FOIA(b)(9) -Release would disclose geological of
geophysical information concerning wells.
Page 4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 23, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
FROM:
NANCY J. RISQUE Manuf
SUBJECT:
EPA Testimony and Questions
Lee Thomas spent two hours yesterday before Mitchell's committee.
The press extrapolated from the two hours what they wanted from
Mitchell's rhetoric, which is aimed at proving to the Canadians
(and like-minded Members) that the President doesn't intend to do
anything and so they should help lobby his $12 million for
reduction programs. Specifically, Mitchell tried to show:
1. That the President's announcement was aimed at helping
Mulroney politically and that he did not intend to do
anything more. Lee flat out told Mitchell that he was
wrong, but did not commit to legislation, i.e. an
emissions reduction program. He said that in the
process of "considering an accord," changes in policy
and law would be reasonably considered.
2.
That Lee's position on the "science" was inconsistent
with the President's position on an accord. That is to
say Lee's position (and current Administration
position) is that if the existing science doesn't
conclude that we should have an emissions reduction
program (which is the current policy), why would we
seek an accord? Lee's response was that he supports
the President's efforts in considering an accord and
that from a policy standpoint the steps emanating from
such an effort would be desirable in on-going,
comprehensive acid rain policy review. Lee would not,
however, prejudge the outcome.
Ken, he clearly did support the President, but that wasn't the
issue Mitchell (and others, and the Canadians) want a
mandated emissions reduction program legislated now. Lee would
not give ground on such a program.
From: WH-PA (EOP303)
Posted: Wed 8-Apr-87 11:03 EDT
Sys 64 (53)
Subject: acid rain
April 8, 1987
Memorandum for Senior Communications Officials
From:
Tom Gibson
Director of Public Affairs
Re:
The President's Acid Rain Statement
What follow's are the President's remarks on an "Acid Rain
Accord" taken from his remarks to the Candian Parliament on
Monday April 6, 1987.
One area of particular concern to all Canadians, I know, is the
problem of acid rain. When the Prime Minister and I met in
Quebec two years ago, we appointed two distinguished envoys, Bill
Davis and Drew Lewis, to examine the problem. They issued a
joint report, which we have endorsed, and we're actively
implementing many of their recommendations.
The first phase of our clean coal technology program is underway
-- the beginning of a $6 billion commitment through 1992; and I
have asked Congress for the full share of Government spending
recommended by the envoys -- $2.5 billion -- for the
demonstration of innovative pollution-control technologies over
the next five years.
Literally thousands of firms and millions of jobs will be
affected by whatever steps we take on this problem -- so there
are no quick and easy answers. But working together, we have
made an important start, and I am convinced that, as in the past,
our disputes will bring us closer as we find a mutual accord, our
differences will become only another occasion for cooperation.
Let me assure you that your concerns are my concerns.
(Two papagraphs follow here on other items.)
Let me add a word, if I can, about our discussions today on two
issues of critical interest to our two countries. The Prime
Minister and I agreed to consider the Prime Minister's proposal
for a bilateral accord on acid rain building on the tradition of
agreements to control pollution of our shared international
waters. The Prime Minister and I also had a full discussion of
the Arctic waters issue. And he and I agreed to inject new
impetus to the discussions already underway. We are determined
to find a solution, based on mutual respect for sovereignty, and
our common security, and other interest.
SECRET
SYSTEM II
90312
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ADD-ON TWO
DEN SIFIED
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
By CCDB
White House August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 5/6/03
April 8, 1987
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI
FROM:
FRITZ W. ERMARTH
N36
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Conversations with Brian Mulroney
April 5, 1987
RECOMMENDATION
That you review and approve the attached Memorandum of Conversa-
tion and authorize Grant Green to sign the memo at Tab I
transmitting the MEMCON at Tab A to State and Defense.
Approve
Disapprove
Prepared by:
an
Tyrus W. Cobb
Attachments
Tab I
Grant Green's Memo to State and Defense
Tab A
MEMCON
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
UNCLASSIFIED with
SYSTEM II
SECRET ATTACHMENT
90312
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ADD-ON TWO
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
COL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Conversation, The President's
Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney of Canada,
April 5, 1987 (U)
Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of
President Reagan's private meeting with Canadian Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney. (U)
Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
MEMCON
UNCLASSIFIED with
SECRET ATTACHMENT
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
SYSTEM II
90312
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADD-ON TWO
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
(U)
PARTICIPANTS: The President
Tyrus W. Cobb, Notetaker
Prime Minister Mulroney
Derek Burney, Notetaker
DATE, TIME
April 5, 1987, 4:55 - 5:31 p.m.
AND PLACE:
Rideau Hall
The Prime Minister opened the private meeting by warmly greeting
President Reagan. Mulroney said that he went on American TV this
morning and stressed the warmth of the relationship Canada and
the United States enjoyed. He added that some critics in Canada
like to make points by casting stones against the United States.
He would not be counted as one of them; he was not a fair weather
friend.
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
F97-066/4
H23
NLS
By
as
, NARA, Date 3/20/06
SECRET
2 -
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The President said that he knew there were many items on the
agenda that needed to be addressed. He would like to initiate
the discussions by mentioning an issue that he knew was sensitive
in Canada; he wanted to raise it privately with Mulroney. This
involved the important question regarding Canadian policy to
restrict film distribution by U.S.-owned companies. The
President said this new policy was discriminatory and would
distort trade. We were particularly concerned about this issue
because this practice could quickly spread throughout the world.
(U)
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The Prime Minister said he wanted to raise two points. On acid
rain, the President had certainly heard enough. He added,
however, that as far as he was concerned the Envoys' Report was
only part of the solution. Canada would continue to seek
standards and reductions of emissions.
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The President continued that he felt that our investigation into
this problem would continue to turn up some rather unusual
conclusions. For example, we were shocked to find out that the
prevention of forest fires had actually contributed to the
problem. In the past, these fires had left a deep base of ash
that served to cleanse the acidic rainfall. The absence of this
base had removed an important cleansing mechanism. Further, we
know that if the lakes are undergirded by limestone that much of
the acid will be neutralized. However, those areas which have a
granite geologic foundation do not fare as well. The President
concluded that we aren't certain what the ultimate solution will
be. He said it is possible that we may have to resort to liming
the lakes.
(S)
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The President responded that in addition to the $2.5 billion we
were committing we wanted to get Canadian representation on our
panels. He said this was not a problem just for Canada -- he
said we were poisoning our own lakes too. The Prime Minister
replied he was not looking for any favors here but simply to
agree to move toward a treaty. It was necessary to get some of
the President's Democratic critics on board. The President said
SECRET
SECRET
- 4 -
that it was clearly the sense of the American people that there
was a problem here. However, we have an excellent program now in
place and we should concentrate on moving it forward. (S)
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105
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 27, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
FROM:
T. KENNETH CRIBB, JR.
SUBJECT:
Acid Rain
NANCY J. RISQUE ingr
ISSUE:
Implementation of the President's announcement regarding acid
rain in Canada on April 5-6.
BACKGROUND:
In Ottawa on April 6, the President announced: The Prime
Minister and I agreed to consider the Prime Minister's proposal
for a bilateral accord on acid rain building on the tradition of
agreements to control pollution of our shared international
waters." As a first step in implementing this announcement,
decisions are needed on the interagency process for carrying out
the President's request and for engaging the Canadian Government
in discussions.
Attached for your information is a copy of the President's
announcement in March, detailing our current commitments.
RECOMMENDATION:
1.
The DPC should continue to be charged with the review and
development of the policy options.
2.
The Bilateral Advisory and Consultative Group on
Transboundary Air Pollution (BACG), which was set up in
accordance with recommendations by the Special Envoys on
Acid Rain, should continue to be the primary point of
contact between the U.S. and Canada. (The U.S. part of the
BACG includes all departments and agencies with a
significant interest in this issue -- State, Energy,
Interior, Justice, Agriculture, EPA, NOAA, CEQ, NSC, and
OMB. The BACG worked through the Domestic Policy Council
for its policy guidance in preparation for the Shamrock
Summit.)
-2-
3.
The timing for completion of the DPC policy review and
proposals should be synchronized with the work and timetable
of the Vice President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief,
which is due in mid-August. Such a schedule would bring the
issue before the President in early to mid-September.
Attorney General Meese and NSC Advisor Frank Carlucci concur with
this W recommendation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
5/5/87
CC: Kenneth M. Duberstein
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
March 18, 1987
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
I am pleased to announce today several steps being taken to
ensure that the United States continues to work closely with the
Canadian government in determining and addressing the
environmental effects of acid rain. These actions resulted from
a review of this issue I directed my Domestic Policy Council to
undertake and are consistent with the recommendations made by the
Joint Envoys on Acid Rain, Drew Lewis of the United States and
William Davis of Canada. Prime Minister Mulroney and I endorsed
their recommendations in March 1986.
This past year, government-to-government coordination and
research cooperation with Canada on acid rain problems have been
substantially strengthened, as recommended by the Envoys. The
Administration also has implemented the initial phase of the
Department of Energy Clean Coal Technology Program, and has
completed an inventory of federal, state and private clean coal
research and demonstration projects, which are expected to expend
more than $6 billion by 1992.
To maintain the progress we are making, I am directing three
major steps to continue to carry out the Envoys' proposals.
The first will be to seek the full amount of the
government's share of funding recommended by the Joint Envoys
-- $2.5 billion -- for demonstration of innovative control
technology over a five year period. Five hundred million
dollars will be requested for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 to
fund innovative emissions control projects. I will also
encourage industry to invest an equal or greater amount over
this period, and to stimulate development and deployment of
innovative technologies for reduction of air pollution
emissions. This builds on activities already underway in
the Department of Energy Clean Coal Technology Program.
The second step I am taking is to direct the Secretary of
Energy to establish an advisory panel. This panel, which
will include participation by State governments and by the
government of Canada, will advise the Secretary of Energy on
funding and selection of innovative control technologies
projects. Projects will be selected, as fully as
practicable, using the criteria recommended by the Joint
Envoys.
Third, I am asking the Vice President to have the
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which he
chairs, review federal and state economic and regulatory
programs to identify opportunities for addressing
environmental concerns under existing laws. The Task Force
will examine incentives and disincentives to the deployment
of new emissions control technologies and other cost-
effective, innovative emission reduction measures now
inhibited by various federal, state and local regulations.
The findings and results of the Task Force review will be
reported in six months, along with any recommendations for
changes to existing regulations.
I have advised Prime Minister Mulroney of these decisions. Next
month, I will travel to Canada to discuss these and other issues
with the Prime Minister. I feel these steps will help both
countries to better understand and address this shared
environmental problem, so that future specific actions that are
taken will be cost-effective, and represent appropriate taxpayer
expenditures.
# # #
- what pitfall?
-John Rouse?
United States Department of State
- BACG
why Gp
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
DPC
Chaired by
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Rres, -DPC is
Washington, D.C. 20520
5
chaired by Pres
April 14, 1987
a
- BACG handles interac 10) Canada CBACG from Envoys
MEMORANDUM
- Canada 15 providing
Rpt.)
1st proposal
TO:
DPC - Mr. Bledsoe
or BACG?
FROM:
OES - John D. Negroponte JAN
SUBJECT: Implementing the President's Decision to Consider an
Acid Rain Accord with Canada
Press
In Ottawa on April 6, the President announced: "The Prime
only
Minister and I agreed to consider the Prime Minister's proposal
for a bilateral accord on acid rain building on the tradition
explan hatf
of agreements to control pollution of our shared international
waters.' As a first step in implementing this announcement,
decisions are needed on the interagency process for
staffing-out the President's decision and for engaging the
meant
Canadian Government in discussions.
I believe that there is solid agreement among U.S. agencies
that the Bilateral Advisory and Consultative Group on
Transboundary Air Pollution (BACG) is the appropriate body to
undertake both responsibilities. The BACG was established in
accordance with recommendations of the Special Envoys on Acid
Rain to be the primary point of contact between the U.S. and
Canada for addressing transboundary air pollution. Over the
past year the BACG convened three times with Canada to review
implementation of the Envoys' Report. The U.S. Section of the
BACG includes all departments and agencies with a significant
interest in the subject. (State, DOE, DOI, DOJ, USDA, EPA,
NOAA, CEQ, DPC, NSC, OMB, NAPAP). Use of the BACG builds on an
established role and positive record of experience and obviates
the need for new institution building.
To follow-up, I propose the following:
1. As Chairman of the BACG, I will contact my Canadian
counterpart promptly and propose a meeting of the joint group
on May 22, 1987 to plan the work of the Group over the next
year and begin bilateral discussion of the President's decision.
-2-
We had agreed before the Ottawa summit that the BACG should
convene shortly after. I understand that Canadian officials
have already said they hope to put a proposed accord before us
in about three weeks. Our taking the initiative, hopefully,
will preempt Canadian alternatives. It will also establish a
timetable to guide, at least, initial U.S. review.
2. A subgroup of the BACG will prepare an options paper
for review by the BACG, the DPC Working Group on Energy,
Natural Resources and the Environment and the DPC itself.
During review of the paper, the decision will be made whether
or what issues should go to the President. The drafting group
will include State, EPA, DOE, OMB, CEQ, and perhaps other
interested offices. The paper should be completed and ready
for review, by the Working Group the first week of May.
me approval
Please let me know if the White House concurs in this
approach.
It will be submitted
to for final
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 9, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
Acid Rain Options for Meeting With Prime Minister
Mulroney in Canada on April 5-6, 1987
Issue: What positions should you take regarding implementing the
recommendations of the Special Envoys on Acid Rain?
Background: At last year's Summit, you and Prime Minister
Mulroney endorsed the Joint Report of the Special Envoys on Acid
Rain and agreed to keep this topic on the agenda of your annual
meetings. Your endorsement stated that the Administration would
seek to provide in the future the recommended funds, but that the
U.S. commitment should also reflect other applicable Federal,
state and private sector investments.
Canada regards our actions to date to implement the Envoys'
Report as inadequate, primarily because projected funding falls
short of the recommended levels and our efforts do not directly
address transboundary pollution.
Prime Minister Mulroney is in political difficulty and wants
movement on acid rain to help meet those difficulties. He has
made clear that without further U.S. action, he could not tell
Canadians at the April summit meeting that we are meeting our
commitment. In addition to implementation of the Envoys' Report,
he has renewed Canada's earlier demand that the U.S. reduce
transboundary flows of pollutants by 50% by 1994. It is unlikely
that any effort short of a major abatement program will
completely meet Canadian concerns. However, there is no support
within the Administration for such a major shift in U.S. policy.
The Domestic Policy Council discussed this issue at meetings on
March 4 and 9, but no consensus was reached. There are two basic
U.S. objectives to be achieved in responding to Canadian concerns
on acid rain:
O
Consistent with U.S. acid rain policy, ensure that bilateral
differences over abatement do not disrupt the Canadian
Government's supportive, pro-U.S. stance on other issues.
O
Maintain our long-range approach to cooperate in managing the
acid rain dialogue within the framework suggested by
the Special Envoys and current U.S. acid rain policy,
deferring any commitment to an expanded control program until
scientific, technological and other developments warrant.
DECLASSIFIED (RELASO)
NLS +97-066/+ #24
46
CII NARA, DATE 3/21/06
-2-
The Envoys recommended four sets of actions. Our differences
with Canada are in two areas -- I) the five-year, $5 billion
innovative control technology program, and II) review of existing
programs and legislation. Both sides agree that progress is
satisfactory in III) government-to-government coordination and
IV) research cooperation, and that no additional actions in these
latter two areas need be proposed at this time.
Problems and Options:
I. Innovative Control Technologies. This is the major problem
area at this time, with three major differences - A) funding,
B) criteria for selection of projects, and C) establishment of a
project selection panel.
A. Funding. The Envoys said that " the U.S. government
should implement a five-year, five-billion-dollar control
technology commercial demonstration program. The federal
government should provide half the funding - $2.5 billion dollars
- for projects which industry recommends, and for which industry
is prepared to contribute the other half of the funding..."
U.S. Funding To Date. DOE has implemented a $400 million
Clean Coal Technology Program (CCTP) and completed an inventory
of related federal state, and private activities. Some of these
efforts meet the Envoys' recommendations. Also, the FY 1988
budget includes $350 million in matching funds to be expended
over 5-years for demonstration projects which will relate to the
Envoys' selection criteria.
Canadian Response. Canada has pointed out that U.S. levels
of federal funding, actual and projected, fall far short of the
projections of the Special Envoys.
Funding Options
Option 1. Confirm current funding program. Reaffirm that
we will seek appropriations of up to $2.5 billion as promising
technology warrants, and indicate that the present budget
schedule ($350 million over 5-years) is appropriate.
o This would confirm the adequacy of our efforts to date
and is consistent with 1988 budget proposals. However, some
members of Congress and Canadians view this as inadequate,
and much slower than envisioned in the Envoys' Report.
Option 2. Accelerate funding. Reaffirm that we will seek
appropriations of up to $2.5 billion, as promising technology
warrants; that we will seek a budget amendment for the entire
$350 million in FY1988 and FY1989; and that we will commit to a
continuing demonstration program, including a survey of new
projects proposed by industry to determine added funding.
-3-
O Accelerated funding appears warranted based on industry
expressions of interest, and a commitment to additional new
funds would demonstrate Administration support for a
continuing effort. This would entail funding not in the
budget, but leaves open total funding and the time period
for expenditure, and could permit indirect (e.g. tax
incentives) as well as direct funding.
Option 3. Commit now to full funding. Under this option,
we would seek appropriation of the full $2.5 billion, over a
5-year period. However, we would not spend all the funds unless
promising demonstration projects are proposed.
O We would request a budget amendment to appropriate $500
million in FY 1988 and FY 1989, and would encourage industry
proposals and continue the demonstration program over the
full five year period. We would also identify measures to
stimulate development, including tax incentives, and
deployment of innovative technologies. We would conduct
related reviews, as recommended by the Envoys. This would
be the firmest possible statement of support for the Envoys'
Report. Pressures to expend the full $2.5 billion over
five-years will exist whether there are sufficient
technological opportunities for a program of this magnitude
or industry interest to cost-share it.
Option 4. Commit now to full funding; and go beyond the
Envoys' Report by agreeing to spend the funds, regardless of
availability of projects.
O This option goes beyond the Envoys' recommendations. It
would include all the steps in Option 3, and would commit us
to spend the $2.5 billion appropriated, regardless of
whether demonstration proposals are available. This woul
include co-funding retrofits of existing systems.
B. Demonstration Program Selection Criteria. This is another
problem area. The Envoys' recommended that "Because this techno-
logy demonstration program is meant to be part of a long-term
response to the transboundary acid rain problem, prospective
projects should be evaluated according to several specific
criteria. The federal government should co-fund projects that
have the potential for the largest emission reductions, measured
as a percentage of S02 or NOx removed. Among projects with
similar potential, government funding should go to those that
reduce emissions at the cheapest cost per ton. More considera-
tion should be given to projects that demonstrate retrofit
technologies applicable to the largest number of existing
sources, especially existing sources that, because of their size
and location, contribute to transboundary air pollution. In
short, although the primary purpose of this research program is
to demonstrate the kinds of technologies that would be needed for
any future acid rain control program, it should also result in
some near-term reductions in U.S. air emissions that affect
-4-
Canadian ecosystems. Furthermore, special consideration should
be given to technologies that can be applied to facilities
currently dependent on the use of high-sulfur coal..."
U.S. Action to Date. The U.S. demonstration projects
identified so far were not selected by applying the criteria
suggested by the Envoys, but are broadly supportive of the
Envoys' recommendations, and a number of them meet several of the
Envoys' criteria. The full extent to which these efforts satisfy
the Envoys' recommendations is a matter of judgment over which
there is some difference among U.S. agencies and Canada.
Canadian Response. Canada has labelled the U.S. response to
date a repackaging of existing domestic programs. It has pointed
out that projects selected or identified were not strictly based
on the Envoys' criteria and did not take into account near-term
impact on transboundary flows of pollution.
Options for Program Selection Criteria
Option 1: Direct the Secretary of Energy to apply the
Envoys' criteria as fully as practicable.
Option 2: Seek legislation to authorize project selection
applying the Envoys' criteria.
O Legislation is the only way to explicitly apply the
Envoys' selection criteria, and comes closer to meeting
Canadian concerns. However, it invites Congress to
establish its own criteria. Administrative authority would
preserve flexibility, but Congress could legislate criteria
in any event.
C. Demonstration Program Selection Panel. Another problem
stems from the Envoys' recommendation "that a panel, headed by a
senior U.S. cabinet official, be established to oversee this
research demonstration program and select the projects to be
co-funded by the federal government. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Energy should provide the
technical expertise necessary to select demonstration projects.
Other members of this panel should be drawn from the Department
of State and state governments. Canada also should be invited to
send a representative to sit on this panel."
Action to Date. The panel has not been established, since
legislation is needed to give the panel selection authority.
Alternatives for an advisory panel are under discussion with
Canada but no agreement has been reached.
Canadian Response. Canada renewed its request with the Vice
President that the selection panel be established as the Envoys
recommended.
-5-
Options for Program Selection Panel
Option 1. Direct the Secretary of Energy to establish an
advisory panel.
Option 2. Seek legislation to establish the panel with
selection authority.
O An administratively established panel would be advisory
to the Secretary of Energy, and operate under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which is quite strict and
complicated. Seeking legislative authority would most fully
meet the Envoys' recommendations, but would likely mean loss
of Executive control and result in Congressional constraints
and objections to Canadian participation. It would also
entail a major change in federal procurement practices.
II. Review of Programs and Legislation. Finally, the Envoys'
recommended that "Both the United States and Canada should review
existing air pollution programs and legislation to identify
opportunities, consistent with existing law, for addressing
environmental concerns related to transboundary air pollution.
The results of these reviews should be made available to the
chief environmental officials of both countries for their
.consideration in the management of their respective programs."
Action to Date. The Environmental Protection Agency has
conducted an extensive study of the Clean Air Act. Although
still being reviewed, the basic conclusions are: (1) the
opportunities for directly addressing transboundary air pollution
under the domestically directed Clean Air Act are very limited
and (2) effective use of those opportunities which do exist is
hampered by the current lack of sufficient scientific
understanding to support an effective and equitable program.
EPA's analysis has not yet been shared with the Canadian
government.
Canadian Response. Canada did not carry out a detailed
review of legislation and programs. It has taken the position
that its own control program calling for a 50% reduction in
emission by 1994 adequately addresses U.S. concerns about flows
of air pollution from Canada.
Options for Review of Programs and Legislation
Option 1. Take no further action.
Option 2. Direct the Vice President's Task Force on
Regulatory Relief to review, under existing law, federal and
state economic and regulatory incentives and disincentives to the
deployment of new technologies. The Task Force would also
examine other cost-effective and innovative emission reduction
measures now inhibited by regulation at FERC, state PUC's, and
other regulatory bodies, and to report its findings in 6 months.
-6-
Recommendations: The Council reached consensus on some, but not
all the options presented for your decision. Positions are
outlined below.
Edwin IIL
Edwin Meese III
Chairman Pro Tempore
Decisions:
I. Innovative Control Technologies:
A. Funding
Option 1. Confirm current funding program. This option is
preferred by OMB and HHS.
Option 2. Accelerate funding. This option is preferred by
Energy and Commerce.
Option 3. Commit now to full funding. This is preferred by
EPA, Treasury and CEA.
Option 4. Commit now to full funding; and go beyond the
Envoys' Report by agreeing to spend the funds
regardless of availiability of projects. This is
preferred by State and NSC.
B. Program Selection Criteria:
Option 1. Direct the Secretary of Energy to apply the Envoys'
criteria as fully as practicable. The Council
recommends you approve this option.
Option 2. Seek legislation to authorize project selection
applying the Envoys' criteria.
C. Program Selection Panel:
Option 1. Direct the Secretary of Energy to establish an
advisory panel. The Council recommends approval of
this option.
Option 2. Seek legislation to establish the panel with
selection authority.
II. Review of Programs and Legislation:
Option 1. Take no further action.
Option 2. Direct the Vice President's Task Force on Regulatory
Relief to carry out this review. The Council
recommends approval of this option.
THE scowerent Das seen 2/19
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Feb 19, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL
SUBJECT:
Joint Report of Special Envoys on Acid Rain
ISSUE: How should the Administration treat the recommendations
of the Special Envoys on Acid Rain?
BACKGROUND: At the Quebec Summit last year, you and Canadian
Prime Minister Mulroney decided that Special Envoys should
examine the dispute over acid rain. The Joint Report of the
Special Envoys on Acid Rain ("the Report") was delivered on
January 8, 1986. Subsequently the Domestic Policy Council
reviewed the Report in preparation for your March 18 meeting
with Prime Minister Mulroney.
From the Canadian point of view, acid rain is the most
important bilateral issue between Ottawa and Washington.
Prime Minister Mulroney has referred to progress on this
issue as the "litmus test" of the relationship. Failure
to achieve positive movement on acid rain at the March
Summit could jeopardize the present Canadian Government's
pro-U.S. stance. This, in turn, could have serious
consequences for the United States in the fields of
trade, investment, and security.
Summary of the Envoys' Report:
The Report begins by describing "things we learned," followed
by accounts of "The U.S. Perspective" and "The Canadian
Perspective" on acid rain. The Report concludes with three
recommendations.
1. The Report says that the Envoys learned that:
- "Acid rain is a serious environmental problem";
- "A serious transboundary problem"; and
- there are only a few, expensive, avenues
to major reduction in acidic air emissions.
Each of these points, properly understood, is
consistent with current policy, although we have
not previously held that acid rain is a "serious
environmental problem" or a "serious transboundary
problem." Also, there are still substantial
scientific uncertainties on many acid rain issues.
Acid rain is certainly not an insignificant problem,
or we would not be spending over $100 Million annually
to assess its exact extent and develop technology for
its possible mitigation. Thus, we need not take the
"lessons learned" as indicating a more serious
assessment of acid rain than current policy warrants.
It certainly is also a transboundary problem, as its
impact on our relations with the Canadians would
indicate, regardless of the scientific assessment
of the exact extent of acid rain effects.
2.
The "U.S. perspective" section is an adequate
presentation of the American view. The section does
not misrepresent current knowledge or Administration
policy, though in several important respects items
favorable to our position are understated or omitted.
For example, our successful efforts to reduce emissions
are not fully reflected. Political constraints, rather
than scientific uncertainties, are stressed as barriers
to immediate action.
3.
The Report recommends:
- A $5 Billion government/private sector program to fund
development of innovative control technologies;
- Cooperative activities, and review of improvements
possible under existing legislation; and
- Research efforts.
Our review suggests that there is significant similarity
between the recommendation for programs to develop
innovative control technologies and the Clean Coal
Technologies Program (CCTP) adopted by Congress in
1985 and now being implemented by the Department of
Energy (DOE). There are also a number of significant
differences, including funding levels, though these
differences are, in our view, not inimical to the
intent of the recommendation.
-2-
There are a number of possible regulatory and
legislative changes that could support
introduction of innovative control technologies
and that would allow more economical control
of emissions. Some of the changes could also
have the effect of lessening emission of the
precursors of acid rain. These should be
reviewed with an eye to possible implementation.
Virtually all research activities recommendations
made in the Report are now being addressed within
the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program
(NAPAP), though some not to the degree suggested
in the Report.
OPTIONS AND SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS:
OPTION 1.
Express support of the Report (as outlined on pages 4-6).
The Report appears to be generally consistent
with current U.S. assessment of the issue and
environmental policies and with current research,
development and demonstration programs.
Any lesser response could reverse the current
significant improvement in Canada-U.S. relations;
would severely endanger support for the U.S. by
the Prime Minister; and is likely to cause the
upcoming Summit to be construed in both Canada
and the U.S. as a failure.
Existing and planned programs address each of
the recommendations in the Report. The existing
Clean Coal program addresses the Envoys' concerns;
there is a serious question whether $5 Billion
could be spent wisely. Acid rain research
programs now funded at various Federal agencies
already address virtually all the subjects
recommended by the Envoys.
We will review specific regulatory changes and
legislative measures designed to encourage
implementation of more cost-effective and
innovative control approaches.
-3-
OPTION 2.
Support the Report without reservation (including the
$5 Billion program).
Acid rain is the primary irritant in our relationship
with Canada, our major trading partner and closest ally.
The Report is the political judgment of Drew Lewis on
what is needed at a minimum to manage this bilateral
problem. Anything less than an endorsement of the
Report by the Administration will be seen in Canada
as a failure in U.S.-Canada relations. Acceptance
is likely to assure a successful March 18 Summit.
The Report is in the nature of an arbitrator's finding,
which we implicitly bound ourselves to accept when the
Envoys were appointed. Even full endorsement of the
$5 Billion program does not mean that it would
ultimately be adopted through the budget process.
OPTION 3.
Significantly qualify our response to the Report,
strongly reiterating current policy. (Note negative
foreign policy implications of this Option, contained
in Option 1.)
There is considerable scientific uncertainty as to
the nature and severity of the problem. The current
CCTP research program may be a candidate for rescission.
Support of the Report, even if only general, would
commit us unnecessarily to pay for solutions to
problems we may not have, now or ever.
The Report does not consider the fact that this
Administration has already taken certain regulatory
actions, and is pursuing a control technology RD&D
program whose scope goes beyond the recommendations
of the Envoys.
RECOMMENDATION AND SUGGESTED U.S. RESPONSE:
The majority of the Domestic Policy Council supports Option 1,
generally endorsing the Report.
This would make clear that the "U.S. perspective" as presented
in the Report is consistent with current U.S. policy, and that
we have always recognized that acid rain is both serious, and
transboundary, as shown by our large research program and our
careful attention to Canadian concerns.
-4-
We should also announce the following steps to implement the Report.
i.
Support An Emission Control Technology Demonstration Program
The Clean Coal Technologies Program is a new, three-year
government/private sector program of $800 million
(at 50/50 cost-sharing) to $1.5 Billion (at 25/75).
This program is in addition to significant private
and federally cost-shared RD&D programs.
Direct the Secretary of Energy to reexamine the CCTP
and, to the extent possible within the legislation
and published selection criteria, administer the
program as recommended in the Report.
2.
Strengthen Cooperative Activities
Direct agencies to identify and assess cost-effective
and innovative approaches to emission reductions,
including:
A) Direct EPA to review opportunities to consider
transboundary air pollution in planned regulatory
and legislative activities, ensuring that
Canadian officials receive adequate notice of
proposed rulemaking.
B) Direct EPA, in consultation with other Federal
agencies, to review the regulatory opportunities
within existing law for encouraging innovative
and cost-effective approaches leading to
near-term acid rain reduction.
C) Request the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) to conduct a similar review and to propose
(as appropriate) regulations to stimulate the
development and deployment of innovative and
cost-effective control technologies.
D) Direct the Secretary of the Interior to identify
and reduce impediments to the use of low-sulfur
western coal.
Also direct agencies to strengthen bilateral consultation and
information exchange, namely:
A) Direct the Secretary of State to establish a
bilateral advisory and consultative group on
transboundary air pollution, consisting of
diplomatic and environmental management officials.
-5-
B) Direct the Secretary of Energy to establish a panel
to review and provide advice concerning innovative
control technology programs.
C) Direct the Joint Chairs Council of NAPAP to establish
an increased level of liaison with Canadian acid rain
research programs.
D) Direct the Secretary of Energy to establish U.S.
representation at Canadian control technology
demonstration program reviews.
3.
Reappraise Federal Acid Rain Research Activities
Direct the Joint Chairs Council of NAPAP to
conduct a coordinated interagency review of
relevant research in light of the recommendations
in the Report.
4. Establish Continuing Acid Rain Agenda for President
and Prime Minister
Acknowledge acid rain to be a continuing agenda
item for meetings with the Prime Minister of
Canada. You will periodically review progress
toward addressing transboundary acid rain concerns.
CAVEAT:
There remain some differences of opinion on the exact import
of Option 1. Some see it as being "very strong support" or
"embrace" of the Report, with no hint of interpretation.
Others see it as "general support" or "acceptance" of the
Report, keyed to continuation of current planned programs
and policies.
All members of the Council agreed that our attitude toward
the Report did not constitute a reversal of current policy.
However, some felt that this meant explicit endorsement of
the view that acid rain is "a serious environmental problem"
and "a serious transboundary problem"; while others feared
that our position would be so taken.
-6-
In like manner, some would interpret Option 1 as meaning
silence on the issue of a $5 Billion program, with no
commitment to seek additional funding. Others believe
that, at a minimum, a commitment to some new funding is
essential to the credibility of this option. Still others
wanted it to be clear that support of the Report does not
imply commitment to seek additional funding.
These nuances need to be addressed frankly in the DPC
discussions.
Edurn Meese III
Edwin Meese III
Chairman Pro Tempore
Domestic Policy Council
DECISION:
Approve: Option 1
Option 2
RR
Option 3
Further Work Needed
This dociment is indified - me will
have to exprain that me cannot go
forward with the spending fant a of
man.
-7-
A. Origin and Objectives of the BACG
On March 17, 1985, the President and Prime Minister
appointed Special Envoys to assess the international
environmental problems associated with transboundary air
pollution and to recommend actions that would help solve them.
On March 19, 1986, the President and Prime Minister fully
endorsed the Envoys' Report and agreed to keep the acid rain
issue on the agenda of their annual summit meetings.
In their report, the Special Envoys recommended that
"Our two governments should establish a bilateral
advisory and consultative group on transboundary air
pollution. Such a group, comprising both diplomatic
and environmental management officials, should provide
the forum for discussions and first-level
consultations on issues related to transboundary
pollution. It should also provide advice to the
directors of each country's environmental programs and
to the Secretary of State and Secretary of State for
External Affairs."
The Bilateral Advisory and Consultative Group (BACG) was
established pursuant to this recommendation.
The two governments agreed that the BACG would be chaired
by officials of their foreign affairs departments and include
representatives of government entities in each country with
acid rain responsibilities. The U.S. section of the BACG was
established under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary
of State for Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs. Members of the U.S. section include
representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Energy,
Interior, Justice and State and the Council on Environmental
Quality, the Domestic Policy Council, the Environmental
Protection Agency, The National Acid Precipitation Assessment
Program, National Oceans and Atmospheric Administration,
National Security Council and Office of Management and Budget.
The Canadian section was organized under the chairmanship of
the Assistant Deputy Minister, United States Branch, Department
of External Affairs and includes representatives from the
Departments of External Affairs and Energy, Mines and
Resources, Environment Canada and the Provinces of Ontario and
Quebec.
B. First Year Work Program
The BAGC has met three times: first in Ottawa on June 18,
1986, second in Washington on December 17 and third in Ottawa
on February 25, 1987. During this period, the BAGC has
concentrated its efforts on monitoring and facilitating
implementation of the Envoys' Report as the agreed framework
for bilateral acid rain cooperation. The meetings have
reviewed progress in each area recommended by the Special
Envoys and have provided the forum for the two sides to air
concerns, address differences and resolve problems. Between
the meetings of the BACG the chairmen have maintained contact
to monitor progress, and active interchanges initiated or
underway between counterpart agencies in the two countries have
been maintained. Aspects of the acid rain issue have also been
discussed and been the subject of correspondence on several
occasions at the political level and between the respective
Secretaries of State and heads of environmental agencies.
Succeeding sections of this report review the status of each of
the Envoys' recommendations in more detail.
STATE DEPT UES/E
02
U.S. Section Bilateral Advisory and Consultative Group
(BACG)
Principals and Support Staff
STATE
John D. Negroponte
647-1554
Chairman
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Oceans and International
and Scientific Affairs (OES)
William A. Nitze
647-2232
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Environment, Health and Natural Resources
(OES/ENH)
Fredrick J. Hall
647-2461
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Canadian Affairs (EUR)
Robert Homme
647-2107
Director
Office of Canadian Affairs
(EUR/CAN)
Ed Keaton
647-1097
(EUR/CAN)
David A. Colson
647-9169
Assistant Legal Advisor
Oceans, International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs (L/OES)
Andrew D. Sens
647-9266
Director
Office of Environmental Policy
(OES/ENV)
John F. Fitzgerald
647-9169
(OES/ENV)
Deborah Kennedy
647-1370
(L/OES)
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Ms. Mary L. Walker
252-6151
Assistant Secretary for Environment,
Safety and Health
Dept. of Energy
Rm. 7A097
1000 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C.
SINIC DEFT UES/E
03
-2-
Mr. J. Allen Wampler
586-4695
Assistant Secretary, Fossil Energy
Dept. of Energy
1000 Independence Ave, S.W.
Room 4G-084
Washington, D.C. 20585
Mr. Donald L. Bauer
586-6660
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Fossil Energy
Dept. of Energy
Rm. 4G-084
1000 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Ted Williams
586-2061
Director
Office of Environment and Health
Dept. of Energy
Forrestal Bldg, 4G-036, EH-22
1000 Independence Ave, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
Environmental Protection Agency
J. Craig Potter
382-7400
Assistant Administrator
for Air and Radiation
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M. Street, S.W., Rm. 937
West Tower
Washington, D.C. 20460
Eileen Clausen
382-4896
Director
Office of Program Development
of Air and Radiation
Environmental Protection Agency
Mr. Bill L. Long
382-74001 TiTo
Environmental Protection Agency
EPA/OIA, West Tower, Rm 811
401 M. st., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
Mr. Conrad Kleveno
382-4896
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W., Rm. 805
West Tower
Washington, D.C. 20460
C 0470947 STATE veri UES/C
X 04
-3-
Department of Interior
Mr. Martin Smith
343-1632
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Budget and Administration
Department of Interior
ROOM 5124
18th and C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Indur Goklany
343-2151
Department of Justice
Mr. Thomas E. Hookano
633-3237
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Land and Natural Resources
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution Aves., N.W.
Room 2609
Washington, D.C. 20530
Peggy Strand
633-2219
Attorney
Environmental Defense Division
Department of Agriculture
Orville Bentley
Assistant Secretary
Science and Education
Dr. Charles Philpot
447-4507
Assistant Deputy Chief for Research
Dept. of Agriculture
Rm. 3007
14th & Independence Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
David Radloff
235-1071
U.S. Forest Service
Council on Environmental Quality
Ms. Jacqueline E. Schafer
395-5750
Council on Environmental Quality
722 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503
Coleman Nee
395-5750
vor CLUI C
EST US
-4-
Domestic Policy Council
Ralph Bledsoe
Bob Johnson
456-6640
Domestic Policy Council (DPC)
Old Executive Office Bldg. (OEOB)
Rm. 200
Washington, D.C. 20500
Office of Management and Budget
Robert Dawson
Associate Director
Office of Management and Budget
Mr. David Gibbons
395-6827
Deputy Associate Director
for Natural Resources
Office of Management and Budget
New Executive Office Building (NEOB)
726 Jackson Place, N.W., Suite 8222
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
Beverly J. Berger
395-3902
Assistant Director for Life Sciences
Office of Science & Tecnology Policy (OSTP)
Executive Office of the President
New Executive Office Building (NEOB)
Rm. 5026
Washington, DC 20506
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
Anthony Calio
Administrator
Mr. J.R. Spradley
377-2977
Assistant to Administrator
of NOAA
Department of Commerce
Herbert C. Hoover Building (HCHB)
14th and Constitution Aves., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230
Candyce Clark
443-8845
International Affairs
VA 00
- 5 -
National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program
Dr. Larry Kulp
395-5771
NAPAP
722 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20503
Paul Ringold
395-5771
National Security Council
Mr. Ty Cobb
395-5076
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Bldg. (OEOB)
Room 361
Washington, D.C. 20506
Wang No. 4132T
Canadian Embassy
Ambassade du Canada
1746 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
January 7, 1988
General Colin Powell
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear General Powell,
Enclosed is an advance text of a letter from
Prime Minister Mulroney to President Reagan concerning
acid rain and Canada's proposal that the United States
and Canada negotiate an acid rain accord. The signed
original of the letter will be forwarded to you as
soon as possible.
Yours sincerely,
Original by
A: = 0.03
a signé Foriginal
Allan Gotlieb
Ambassador
CC. Col. Ty Cobb
Case : 1078
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Ronald Reagan Library
Document
Number: 4
Date: 03/09/1987
Classification:
Type: Letter
Total Pages: 1
Closed: 01-14-2003
NSC #:
WHORM Subject #:
To: President
From: Brian Mulroney
Subject: (advance copy)
Folder
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
Series: I. Subject File
Title: Acid Rain (2)
OA ID: 1
Box Number: 1
Folder #: 2 OF 17
Restrictions
FOIA(b)1 FOIA(b)1
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.
FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules
PRA-3 Release would violate a Federal statute.
and practices of an agency.
PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
FOIA(b)(3) -Release would violate a Federal statute.
commercial or financial information.
FOIA(b)(4)
-Release would disclose trade secrets
PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the
or confidential or financial information.
President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
FOIA(b)(6)
-Release would constitute a clearly
PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
personal privacy.
FOIA(b)(7)
-Release would disclose information
C.
-Closed in accordance with restrictions contained
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
in donors' deed of gift.
FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning
PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.
the regulation of financial institutions.
FOIA(b)(9) -Release would disclose geological of
geophysical information concerning wells.
CONFIDENTIAL
8617
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
November 20, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY J. RISQUE
FROM:
GRANT S. GREEN,
JR.
SUBJECT:
Letter from PM Mulroney re: Acid Rain Accord
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney has written the President (Tab B)
expressing the hope that the United States has decided to enter
substantive negotiations on the acid rain accord we agreed to
consider. As the PM notes the GOC provided the USG with their
draft proposal in May and we promised a timely response.
Unfortunately, as State's covering memorandum (Tab A) points out,
we have delayed responding to the Canadian proposal (we have set
at least four dates, which subsequently have slipped). There
have been good reasons for this -- we wanted to make a reasoned
and considered response, and we did not want to entangle the acid
rain accord with the FTA negotiations. However, based on DPC
guidance we have made a firm commitment to provide the GOC with a
response by November 30, and this date cannot be allowed to slip
again.
Given that the PM's letter addresses a domestic policy issue we
would appreciate it if the DPC would draft a reply for the
President to send to Mulroney. We believe we should have the
letter to the President prior to his departure for the Ranch.
Thank you.
Attachments
Tab A
State memo 11/20/87
Tab B
Mulroney letter 11/16/87
CONFIDENTIAL
NLS DECLASSIFIED 197-06614*26
Declassify on: OADR
as NARA, DATE 3/21/06
CONFIDENTIAL
8733643
8617
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
November 20, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Prime Minister Mulroney on Acid Rain
The Embassy of Canada has delivered the attached advance
copy of a letter to the President from Prime Minister Mulroney,
with a request that it be brought immediately to the
President's attention. The NSC staff has asked that we forward
the advance copy of the Prime Minister's letter without a
proposed response.
The Prime Minister's letter underscores the importance he
attaches to the acid rain issue and his expectation that we
will respond shortly to his April proposal to enter into
negotiations on a bilateral accord. In this connection, and as
the Prime Minister is aware, we have indicated that the U.S.
would provide its response at the November 30, 1987 meeting in
Ottawa of the Bilateral Advisory and Consultative Group.
In view of the Prime Minister's personal demarche, the
Department believes that the Domestic Policy Council discussion
of acid rain policy options for the President's consideration,
originally scheduled for November 10, should be added to the
agenda of the November 24 DPC meeting.
Melogn Lintry Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
As stated
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EKSED)
NLS 697-06614-427
BY a NARA, DATE 3/21/06
Case : 1078
Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Ronald Reagan Library
Document
Number: 7
Date: 11/16/1987
Classification:
Type: Letter
Total Pages: 1
Closed: 01-14-2003
NSC #:
WHORM Subject #:
To: Reagan
From: Brian Mulroney
Subject: re acid rain
Folder
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
Series: I. Subject File
Title: Acid Rain (2)
OA ID: 1
Box Number: 1
Folder #: 2 OF 17
Restrictions
FOIA(b)1 FOIA(b)1
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
PRA-1 -National Security Classified Information.
FOIA(b)(1) -National security classified information.
PRA-2 -Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
FOIA(b)(2) -Release would disclose internal personnel rules
PRA-3 -Release would violate a Federal statute.
and practices of an agency.
PRA-4 -Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
FOIA(b)(3) -Release would violate a Federal statute.
commercial or financial information.
FOIA(b)(4)
-Release would disclose trade secrets
PRA-5 -Release would disclose confidential advice between the
or confidential or financial information.
President and his advisors, or between such advisors.
FOIA(b)(6) -Release would constitute a clearly
PRA-6 -Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
personal privacy.
FOIA(b)(7)
-Release would disclose information
-Closed in accordance with restrictions contained
compiled for law enforcement purposes.
C.
in donors' deed of gift.
FOIA(b)(8) -Release would disclose information concerning
PRM. -Closed as a personal record misfile.
the regulation of financial institutions.
FOIA(b)(9) -Release would disclose geological of
geophysical information concerning wells.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Santa Barbara
November 25, 1987
Dear Brian:
Thank you for your letter of November 16th
concerning your hopes for a timely discussion
of the Canadian acid rain accord proposal. I
share your hope that a mutually acceptable way
of handling this issue can soon be found.
Along these lines, I am instructing the United
States section of the Bilateral Advisory and
Consultative Group to discuss the Canadian
proposal for an acid rain accord at their next
meeting on November 30th. This will be a step
forward in the process of jointly exploring
the possibility of signing an effective acid
rain accord.
As we continue to seek to find a common
understanding between our countries on this
contentious issue, I am reminded of the
leadership, wisdom and courage you demonstra-
ted during the Free Trade area negotiations.
I hope we again can find the strength to take
actions that will enable agreement on a sound
policy to protect our environment and
industries.
Sincerely,
Ron
His Excellency
Martin Brian Mulroney
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EASED
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ORIG LTR TO WH:BAKER
5,2 8733637
DISTTO:
CONFIDENTIAL
D
87 NW 21 P6:42
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
C
WASHINGTON
S/S
S/S-S-DIR
TMA
TMB
November 23, 1987
EUR
OES
Dear Howard:
RF/tlc
As you are aware, we are committed to respond to Prime
Minister Mulroney's April proposal for an acid cain accord on
November 30 in Ottawa. We discussed the proposal with the
Canadians in June, but delayed our actual response until
September, then October, to permit completion of a domestic
policy review. The Prime Minister has now written to the
President (copy attached) urging a positive response that will
allow negotiations to begin soon. Clearly, any further delay
in our response will only lead to additional pressure on the
President.
The options paper developed by the DPC Working Group on
Energy, Natural Resources and Environment has developed to the
point where it will serve as a good basis for a DPC
discussion. From that paper the DPC should be able. to focus
options to permit a decision by the President or even by the
DPC itself. However, also as you know, the DPC meeting to
address acid rain scheduled for November 10 was postponed and
the November 24 DPC session does not now include acid rain on
its agenda.
Given the President's commitment to the Prime Minister,
the long delay already in responding to the Canadians, and now
the Prime Minister's letter, I strongly urge that you agree to
take up acid rain at the November 24 DPC session so that we can
respond to the Prime Minister very soon.
Sincerely,
John d. Whitehead
Actine In Secretary
Attachment:
As stated.
DECLASSIFIED
The Nonorable
NLS F97-066-4-30
Howard Baker,
Chief of Staff,
The White House.
CH NARA, DATE 3/20/06
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 25, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
NANCY J. RISQUE
SUBJECT:
Acid Rain Policy Guidance
ISSUE: The initial response to the Canadian proposal for an acid
rain bilateral accord.
DISCUSSION: You have requested an acid rain policy review in
order to respond to Prime Minister Mulroney's request that the
United States enter into an acid rain bilateral accord with
Canada. The Domestic Policy Council has been conducting a
thorough review of U.S. acid rain policy that is near completion
and should be presented to you before Christmas. In working with
the Canadians we agreed that the Bilateral Advisory and
Consultative Group (BACG) would meet on November 30th to provide
a response to the Canadian proposal.
We are not prepared to provide a U.S. proposal at this time. The
Domestic Policy Council review process has been halted due to the
concerns of key members of Congress who requested that the
Council delay its discussions on acid rain until the current
debate about extending the ozone nonattainment deadline of the
Clean Air Act is resolved in Congress. These members of
Congress, as well as a number of representatives of major
industries, are fearful that an acid rain control program could
be added to legislation to extend the ozone nonattainment
deadline. Such an amendment would be contrary to your position
that additional legislated acid rain controls are unnecessary. A
resolution of this issue is not likely until shortly before
Congress adjourns for the Christmas recess around December 15th
or 16th.
Although the Council has not completed its review process, there
is unanimous agreement that the Canadian proposal is not
acceptable in its current form. The central elements of the
Canadian proposal are:
O
Ceilings on transboundary flows of sulfur dioxide (SO,) from
one country to the other -- to include a two million ton
reduction of transboundary flows of annual so₂ emissions into
Canada;
An agreed timetable and periodic review of compliance;
DECLASSIFIED
NLS +97-066/4731
W NARA, DATE 3/21/06
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Performance auditing by an independent body; and,
Binding disputes settlement.
The problems with this proposal are numerous and include:
Scientific research analyzed by the National Acidic
Percipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) strongly suggests
that an additional so, 2 emissions reduction program is
unnecessary, and that other sources of acid rain, such as
nitrogen oxides and oxidants, are important in controlling
this phenomenon.
To reduce transboundary flows by two million tons of so,
would require a major national emissions reduction progfam
that would ignore our scientific analysis of this issue, and
cost at least seven to nine billion dollars per year.
Targetting emission reductions in specific regions (as
implied by a reduction of transboundary flows) is not
legislatively viable. Additionally, current models to
measure transboundary flows are not scientifically proven --
making the measurements highly uncertain.
Thus, it is recommended that instructions be issued to the U.S.
section of the BACG to guide these initial discussions with the
Canadians about the proposed accord. These instructions would
enable us to respond to the Canadians on November 30th.
The U.S. position conveyed in these instructions will not be
acceptable to the Canadians. However, they represent a beginning
of the discussion process and allow the Domestic Policy Council
to finish its review of United States acid rain policy options,
and Congress to finish the debate on extending Clean Air Act
deadlines. This will enable you to decide upon a U.S. policy on
acid rain with the full scope of advice from the Domestic Policy
Council and without adversely affecting the congressional debate.
Additional instructions can then be issued, allowing more
comprehensive discussions with the Canadians.
RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum that asks
Secretary Shultz to convey your instructions to the U.S. section
of the BACG. The instructions point out which portions of the
Canadian proposal are unacceptable, maintaining the flexibility
to explore ways in which a future accord can be signed. The
State Department and the NSC concur in this recommendation.
Approve
Approve as Amended
Disapproved
No Action
CONFIDENTIA
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 25, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
At the last bilateral summit with Prime Minister Mulroney, I
agreed to consider the Prime Minister's proposal for a bilateral
accord on acid rain. Pursuant to this, and after considering the
advice of the Domestic Policy Council and the Department of
State, I ask that you convey to the United States Section of the
Bilateral Advisory and Consultative Group the following guidance
for its initial discussions with the Canadian Section concerning
Canada's proposed bilateral accord.
The principles listed below will guide the United States Section
in their initial discussions with the Canadians. United States
acid rain policy:
Builds upon the Special Envoy's recommendations and measures
already underway to reduce emissions, and in particular
allows sufficient time for the Innovative Control
Technologies Program to encourage the deployment of new
technologies.
Considers the state of scientific understanding about the
acidic deposition phenomenon, to include the work of the
National Acidic Precipitation Assessment Program.
O
Will not target controls for specific geographical areas.
The United States Section should be prepared to discuss different
processes by which Canada and the United States could expand the
exchange of information, continue joint periodic reviews of the
transboundary air pollution problem, explore additional means of
encouraging joint demonstration projects of new emission control
technologies, and expand the conduct of joint research. The
United States Section should not agree to discuss an accord that
would set specified quantities of reductions within a specified
time frame. The principle of reciprocity should be fundamental
to any discussions in these areas.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS +97-066/4 32
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Ronali Rosegn
CONFIDENTIAL
United States Department of State
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520
December 2, 1987
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Mr. Ralph C. Bledsoe, Executive Secretary,
Domestic Policy Council
FROM:
Richard J. Smith, Acting
SUBJECT: Ottawa BACG Meeting
The meeting in Ottawa gave us some breathing room--
but not much.
It was a constructive development that the Canadians
agreed to shift the focus forward to January 25 in
Washington when a BACG Working Group will meet to carry
forward our discussion on an acid rain accord. But the
Canadians made clear their extreme disappointment that
we did not have a comprehensive response ready for them
to their proposal of last May or a well elaborated
proposal of our own.
In sum, we need the DPC meeting and subsequent
decision by the President on the option to form the
basis for our position very soon. We need time to staff
out a position reflecting that decision before the
January meeting. Also, we can be sure that Prime Minister
Mulroney will raise this with the President should they
meet on January 2.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS R97-066/4#33
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CONFIDENTIAL
Annotated Agenda
Item 1.
Opening Statements
--
Warm, fuzzy and brief remarks, stressing how
pleased you are that we are now able to get
together to respond to Canada's proposal for
an acid rain accord and review related
developments in the BACG context. You could
introduce your delegation at this point.
Item 2.
Acid Rain Accord
(A) American Response to the Canadian Proposal
-- You will want to begin with remarks based on
the President's instructions for the
meeting. Talking points at Tab B.
--
Then turn to Ted Williams (DOE) to explain
what we are doing to implement the
Lewis/Davis recommendations focussing on the
Clean Coal Technology Program and Innovative
Emissions Control Technologies Advisory
Panel.
--
Conclude the presentation by asking Bill
Nitze to review the efforts of the
President's Task Force on Regulatory
Reduction.
--
(If raised, you can ask Eileen Claussen to
speak to the SOx/NOx emissions reduction
costs/benefits study undertaken by EPA as
part of our domestic policy review.)
--
Conclude the U.S. presentation by proposing
a date for the next negotiating session in
Washington and suggesting that delegations
to that meeting be chaired at the DAS level.
(B) Canadian Comments
Item 3.
Recent Developments
(A) CANADA
--
You can turn to Craig Potter (EPA) or Ted
Williams (DOE) for comments if appropriate.
-2-
(B) U.S.
--
Ask Craig Potter to review additional EPA
regulatory activities since the last BACG
session.
--
If the Canadians have not already spoken to
this, ask about their current emissions
control research.
--
Turn to Eileen Claussen (EPA) for a comment
on how the NAPAP interium findings affect
our domestic policy -- propose a meeting of
experts if the Canadians argue with our
conclusions.
Item 4.
Other Business
None
Item 5.
Press Guidance
"We have met today to discuss Canada's proposal
for an acid rain accord. Our meeting was an
extremely useful step in our joint exploration of
the possibility of concluding an effective
agreement.
Talking Points
Agenda Item 2
-- I know you are anxious to hear our response to the Prime
Minister's proposal for an acid rain accord;
-- As you know, the Administration is just now completing
an in-depth review of its acidic deposition policy.
wilk
-- While the Domestic Policy Council and the President have
(crimg
not yet had time to make final policy decisions based on the
findings of this review, the President has instructed us to
explore a possible acid rain accord on the basis of the
following general principles:
That we seek to build on the Special Envoys'
recommendations and measures already underway to
reduce precursor emissions, and in particular
allow sufficient time for our Innovative Control
Technologies Program to encourage the deployment
of new technologies;
That we take into account the science relative to
acidic deposition as we now understand it,
including the work of the National Acidic
Precipitation Assessment Program; and
That the principle of reciprocity is understood
to be fundamental to our discussion.
-- Within this framework, we are prepared to begin la
process
One that could, for example, consider ways by which
Canada and the U.S. could expand the exchange of information on
acidic deposition, continue joint periodic reviews of precursor
emission problems, explore additional means of encouraging
joint demonstration projects of new emission control
technologies, and expand the conduct of joint research.
-- At least until decisions have been made based on our
policy review, LACE are not in a position to discuss an accord
that would set further precursor emission reductions within a
specified time project frame.
-- You should be aware as well that it is unlikely that the
Administration in any circumstances will conclude that a new
legislated emission reductions program is justified.
DECLASSIFIED (RE/EASO)
NLS F97-06614434
to Cis NARA, DATE 3/20/66
-2-
-- I believe, nevertheless, that we now have a basis for
seeking a common understanding between our countries on this
difficult issue. We should be able to find a way to take
actions that will produce agreement on a sound policy to
protect our environment and industries.
-- I suggest, if you agree, that we turn now to a more
detailed discussion of where we now stand in the U.S. in terms
of efforts already underway to reduce acid rain precursor
emissions.
-- As part of our policy review, for example, concerned
agencies have looked hard at regulatory approaches that could
bring about early additional emissions reductions, We have
also pressed the Congress hard for full funding of the $2.5
billion clean coal program envisioned in the Envoys' Report, a
program that is producing new technologies that will lead to
significant emissions reductions.
-- I would like Ted Williams of the Department of Energy to
lead off.
-- (After Ted's intervention) I would also like Bill Nitze
of the Department of State to review the work of the
President's task force on regulatory relief.
Harry Kopyto
CANADA
fears law-career
still jeopardized
MONTREAL TUESDAY, DECEMBER
Page B-6
1967
U.S. fails to move
on acid-rain dispute
Canada
efforts
accord.
to segotiate an rain treaty with
hasa broken down yet
the United States are stilling hold
MeMilian used
The meetings did not 89 partical
The Canadian Coalition on Acid
faely well, Environment Minister
Rain, a Toronto-based anti-pollation
Tom MeMiDan told reporters yester
Lobby group, says the meeting de-
day after officials from the two gov.
monstrated the futility of Ottews's
emments met.
hopes form treaty
McMillan said Canada had hoped
There is cause for despair, said
to have s specific response" yester-
coalition official Adela Hurley. The
day to the call for an accord that sets
process has broken down.'
out a specific schedule for reduc-
Canada's reaction to yesterday's
tions of U.S. acid-rain emissions
meeting should have beed to send &
within a set time.
diplomatic note of protest to Wash-
We have not had such a specific
ington, Hurley said; because of the
McMillan said
Americans' refusal to address the to-
Instead we have a commitment
sue of whether they are prepared B
B meet again in January at which
negotiate a bilateral accord.
time we definitely expect the U.S.
U.S. President Ronald Reagan
administration to give as something
promised to consider negotisting an
fairly detailed by way of B response
accord in his address last spring to
to what Canada's calling for,",
both houses of Parliament after his
Canada has started programs that
last meeting with Prime Minister
will cut domestic emissions to half of
Brian Malroney,
their 1980 levels by 1994. It wants
Crities have since dismissed the
Washington to reduce emissions
president's statement as meaning-
enough to cut in half the amount of
less, noting that promisting to consid
acid rain that originates in the Unit-
er negotiating a treaty does not
ed States bet talls in Canada.
mean the United States will ta fact
McMillan said the Lack of progress
agree to formal negotiations.
Brunswick
frustrating
U.S. Environmental Protection
"It brings disappointment. to me
Agency officials said last week they
and to the government of Canada
consider the current round of talks
dians will carry the torch in an 18,000
but not despair," he told reparters.
exploratory and & recent U.S. scien-
lometre journey across Canada for the
Ottawa still believes the United
Hos report concluded acid rain is not
1988 Winter Olympics starting Feb
133
States wants B talk about & possible
as serious as Canadians believe.
ФОД
Teen killed
clash as free trade
grandparents
rolls into Montreal
in blind rage
profis from the agreement
vantages to the deal, Sears told the
MOOSE JAW, Sask. (CP) - A mo-
Montreal to the sixth city
the
committee
yesterday.
"It'll
do
X
ment of blind rage caused a year
committee has visited in as many
in," be forecast
old mas to will his olderly grandpar
days of hearings since It began its Deckelbaum said while Tex-21
ects, Court of Queen's Bench was
west to east tour in Vancoiver last turoa produces 90,730 kDograms
told yesterday
of texturized polyester tabrie a
who lived on
Moddaya
At
each
stop,
the
Progressive
just
one
of
the
big
U.S.
grandparents' farm to the Paaqua
RADE
of
Mood
WAS
Conservative matority has
At,
san
Lidit
The
WORKS
condations were relatively
tercourse; the involvement, either
like to see the bill go further.
CO proposed that Mr. Wil.
as observer or participant, of a
"Specifically, I believe that there
d benefits and other tax
person "who is, or is depicted as
being or appears to be, under the
are too many ways out by proving
tanges would reduce the
artistic merit or aducational, scies.
group by $225-million from
age of 18 "in visual matter defined
USe or medical purpose," be said,
paper.
as pernography or erotics;
arguing that this leaves too much 9
oversial change recom-
A requirement that all erotics be
interpretation. 'Artistic merit'
nittee was a new mini-
displayed so it is not visible to the
will become the gateway for permo-
panies and life Insurance
public, either in a special section
graphic material to enter Canada
argued that such & tax
marked with 2 warning sign, behind
and be circulated."
ar In revenue while the
institutions in the white
payers.
o the Idea of a minimum
Acid rain deal stalled
art was released but has
any of the details of the
so called for changes to
as U.S. laws reviewed
ir taxing sutamabile and
P.A10
completely rejected the
BY ROSS HOWARD
The Globe and Mail
12/1/87
at least a month, and offered B
or a new tax accounting
suggestion of what might be
als produced the same
OTTAWA
achieved.
The two sides met in what had
ral treasury as the white
Canadian requests for a bilateral
been advertised as a significant test
recommended a tempo-
acid-rain treaty have been put on
of a long-standing U.S. commitment
nufacturers' sales tax. It
hold undi the United States com-
to curb the northward Gow of emis-
u until the sales tax is
pieras a review of Its pollution prior-
sions that cause acid rain. Yester-
Lax reform.
itles.
day, however, Canadian environ-
nal meeting with provin-
Serior officials of the U.S. Envi-
mentalists were privately pessimis-
ntu on Dec. 10 and will
ronmental Protection Agency told
tic after EPA officials announced
present his final tax.re.
their Canadian counterparts in Otts.
that a review of the U.S. Clean Air
before tabling it in the
wa yesterday that discussion of the
Act, which governs much U.S. air-
Canadian proposal will have to wait
pollution policy, must be completed
first.
In April, President Ronald Res.
gan agreed to consider Prime Min-
ister Brian Mulroney's call far a
common courtesy.
treaty on acid rain. In the same
month, Canadian officials detailed
the minimum cutbacks needed a
end the U.S. impact on Canada.
Acid rain is produced by sulphur
and nitrogen order, smitted by
coal-fired power plants, smelters
and automobiles. The Canadian
proposal calls for the United States
to halve its 1980 transboundary How
of tour million tannes by 1994. About
3.2 million tarmes & year are depos-
THE
ited.
WESTBURY
Environment Minister Thomas
McMillan said yesterday he is dis-'
appointed with the delay. but that
HOTEL
TORONTO
completion of the U.S review will
475 YONGE ST., TORONTO.
enable Washington 9 respond clear-
ONTARIO MAY IX7
ly and quickly to Canada's propos-
als.
REFRESENTATIVE UNFORMATIONAL
Commitments by both countries
to study and reduce acid rain were
We make it our
made as far back as 1979, but the
Reagan Administration has argued
business to treat
more research ta needed before
you right.
imposing multi-billion-dollar pollu-
tion controls on coal-fired power
plants in the eastern states.
Call 416-924-0611 or
The federal Government and the
coll-free 1-800-387-0647.
eastern provinces have agreed to
cut emissions by 50 per cent by 1984.
TO: - Please pass to OES/ENV:Sens.
FROM:
SCI:FMKinnelly/Amembassy Ottawa.