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Arbatov Meeting, Notes on-01/14/1988
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Arbatov Meeting, Notes on-01/14/1988
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Howard Baker's Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
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This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Baker, Howard H.
Folder Title: Arbatov Meeting, Notes on-
01/14/1988
Box: 1
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Ronald Reagan Library
Case: 1078
Archivist: Kelly Barton
DOC
TYPE
DATE
PAGES
CLASS.
CLOSED
4
Memorandum
01/20/1988
4
01-14-2003
NSC #:
WHORM Subject #:
R 3/20/06 D15K97-066/4 #35
To: For the File
From: Arthur Culvahouse
Subject: re Baker-Powell meeting with Dr. Georgi Arbatov on 1/14/88
Restriction : FOIA(b)1
COLLECTION:
Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
SERIES:
I. Subject File
TITLE:
Arbatov Meeting, Notes on - January 14, 1988
OA/ID NUMBER: 1
BOX NUMBER: 1
Folder #: 4 of 17
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Page 1
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-06614 #35
THE WHITE HOUSE di
us
NARA, DATE 3/4/06
WASHINGTON
January 20, 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
Am
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Baker-Powell Meeting with Dr. Georgi Arbatov
on Thursday, January 14, 1988
Dr. Georgi Arbatov visited with Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.,
General Colin L. Powell and Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., for
approximately 30 minutes beginning at 3:00 p.m. on Thursday,
January 14, 1988. Dr. Arbatov is the director of the
Institute for the U.S. and Canada Studies of the Academy of
Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and was accompanied by Vlidimir
Pechatnov, who was on the staff of the Institute and on
assignment with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Culvahouse
had met Arbatov in Moscow the previous week, and was asked by
Baker to participate in the meeting.)
Dr. Arbatov began the meeting by noting that during the
December 1987 Washington Summit there had been two visa
problems involving (i) a General who was an advisor to
General Secretary Gorbachev and (ii) Arbatov's "new deputy."
Dr. Arbatov commented upon the START negotiations by
expressing the hope that the negotiators "do not lose the
feeling of urgency." Senator Baker stated that he
respectfully disagreed and had the sense that things were
moving too fast. Arbatov responded that matters could move
too fast and generate ill will toward the talks, but that we
should not fall into the trap of the 15 years of MBFR
negotiations where there was "insufficient urgency.' Arbatov
stated that General Secretary Gorbachev wants to proceed
"resolutely and quickly" and that "time is short.
"
Asked about the possible times for a Moscow Summit (from a
purely practical point of view), Arbatov stated that the end
of May or beginning of June were good times and noted that at
the end of June (June 28) there was the large Party
conference which had been scheduled for the first time since
the 1930s. Arbatov further volunteered there is no reason
the Summit could not occur in July. When asked about early
May, he stated that the weather was unstable. Arbatov
volunteered that June 10 or 12 would be an interesting time
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
for the President since those would be the dates upon which
the Soviets were celebrating their Millenium.
In response to Arbatov's questions as to what were the
problems impeding the Moscow Summit, Colin Powell noted that
in the area of arms control there were substantial testing
issues which may or may not have solutions by May or June.
With respect to a START Treaty, Colin Powell stated that a
treaty was "still possible" but that we were still apart on
mobile missiles and other issues and had made progress on
verification regimes. With respect to defense in space,
Powell reemphasized that the U.S. position was focused upon
the words "as required" in the 1972 Treaty as signed. Powell
emphasized that there should be no doubt that the President's
position on SDI was unchanged, that the President had lost
none of his enthusiasm for SDI and that his conviction
remains strong. General Powell emphasized that it was
important the each party understand defense in space the
"same way" and that each party comprehend and agree to each
other's understanding. Powell stated that "we had begun
something" in the conventional and chemical areas and those
beginnings should be pursued. Powell concluded that there
was a meeting next month on regional conflicts and that
Afghanistan was very important.
Arbatov then asked whether there was a "consensus in
Washington" that it was "not in the U.S. interests for a
political settlement in Afghanistan or for the Soviets to
withdraw from Afghanistan." Arbatov stated that he
understood that "fundamentalists" might prefer that the
Soviet Union remain stuck in Afghanistan. Baker and Powell
responded that there was a clear consensus in the U.S.
Government that Soviet withdrawal with Afghanistan becoming
an independent state, was in the U.S. interest. Arbatov
stated again that he understood that some in the U.S. said
that it was good that the U.S.S.R. was "stuck there. Powell
emphasized again that we need withdrawal and that was the
U.S. position. Arbatov agreed, stating that the war in
Afghanistan would destabilize Pakistan, be a source for
terrorist arms throughout the world and would impede
U.S. -Soviet relationships.
Arbatov, in response to a question regarding whether
Secretary Gorbachev was tired of summiting, stated that he,
Arbatov, had seen Gorbachev twice recently, first three or
four days before the New Year and then again on January 6.
In the first meeting, Gorbachev stated that he was not ready
to travel abroad again, but that on January 6, Gorbachev
already "felt better.' Arbatov noted that domestic internal
matters were now the major current priority as the major
foreign policy relationship with the U.S. was "being served"
and that with respect to Afghanistan it had already been
ascertained that "there can be movement."
-3-
Arbatov noted that with respect to Gorbachev's policy of
restructuring ("perestroika"), it was clear that "resistance
is there" and that the program was seen by some as demanding
too much. Arbatov said it was too much to expect that people
could agree that "they had become redundant" and that many
people simply "don't know how to work in this new situation."
Arbatov said that there were outstanding examples of success,
that those were the exception as the program had only just
started and there was much to learn. Arbatov noted that
Gorbachev was a quick learner himself and had changed a lot
in three years and that Gorbachev's "vision was much broader"
although his vision was "good before."
Baker noted that he had never met Gorbachev in his many
visits with Soviet delegations while in the Senate (1967-84).
Arbatov stated that Gorbachev had some prominence during the
Chernenko period and participated effectively in a visit to
Great Britain and in a 1985 trip to Canada as head of a
parliamentary delegation. Arbatov stated that Gorbachev
assiduously avoided the situation of being a "crown prince."
Arbatov stated that "honestly" the Soviet Union "was lucky
now," but had been unlucky for quite some time with respect
to its leadership. Gorbachev said that the "demands of
society for change" were not recognized by the leadership in
certain periods and that "history works in subtle ways. He
specifically stated that the Soviets were "very unlucky" and
"discouraged" during the Chernenko period and that Gorbachev
had "incorporated that body of change before becoming General
Secretary.
When asked about future travels by Gorbachev, including a
trip to the Peoples' Republic of China, Arbatov stated that
the Soviets and the Chinese repeat their proposals from time
to time but that they were not nervous and not angry with the
Chinese at the present time. He did not foresee a trip to
South America, although there were some trips planned to
"Europe," including Poland. When asked if the Chinese had
responded to the Soviets' proposals, Arbatov stated that the
Chinese needed all the support they could get from any
country, including West Germany, Japan, the U.S., to resolve
China's major problems and the Chinese were "cautious not to
tip the bell. Arbatov said that there had been a great
change in the bilateral U.S.S.R.-PRC relationship and that
the two countries were "no longer afraid of attack by the
other," that the troops had been reduced "some more" and
"could be reduced much more." Arbatov stated that it was
difficult to get the troops out once the military had
stationed them "in the desert," constructed barracks and
prepared an infrastructure. He noted that General Powell
should understand that.
-4-
I
The meeting concluded with Arbatov reviewing his plans for
meetings during his visit to the U.S., including meetings
with William Colby, George Ball, Brent Scowcroft, General
David Jones, and meetings at Brown University. Arbatov would
then be flying to Stockholm.
CC: Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Colin L. Powell