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Iran-Contra Hearings-June [May 1987-November 1987] (2)
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Iran-Contra Hearings-June [May 1987-November 1987] (2)
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr: Files
Folder Title: Iran-Contra Hearings-June [May 1987-
November 1987] (2)
Box: 3
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at:
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Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name BAKER, HOWARD: FILES
Withdrawer
CAS
1/4/2012
File Folder
IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS - JUNE [MAY-NOVEMBER
FOIA
1987] (2)
M11-391
Box Number
3
BYRNE
4
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
127214 MEMO
ARTHUR CULVAHOUSE TO WILLIAM
3 7/13/1987
LYTTON RE MCFARLANE TESTIMONY
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
127250 MEMO
LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE
11 7/13/1987 B1
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF ADM
POINDEXTER
R 10/28/2010 NLSF97-066/6 #43
127251 MEMO
LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE 7/30/87
3 7/30/1987 B1
TESTIMONY OF DONALD REGAN
R
2/2/2012
F1997-066/6
127252 MEMO
LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE
2 7/28/1987 B1
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF REGAN
R 10/28/2010 NLSF97-066/6 #45
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
Archivist: kdb
OA/Box:
Box 3
FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
File Folder: Iran-Contra Hearings - June [May-November 1987] Date: 08/18/2004
(2)
DOCUMENT NO. &
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
TYPE
1. memo
Arthur B. Culvahouse to William Lytton re McFarlane testimony, 3p
7/13/87
[Item is still under review under the provisions of EO 13233]
2 memo
Lytton to Culvahouse re anticipated testimony of Adm. John
7/13/87
B1
Poindexter, 11p
R 10/28/10 F97-066/6#43
3 memo
Lytton to Culvahouse re 7/30/87 testimony of Donald Regan, 3p
7/30/87
B1
R2/2/12/ F77066/6 # 127251
4. memo
Lytton to Culvahouse re anticipated testimony of Regan, 2p
7/28/87
B1
R 10/28/10 F97-066/6#45
RESTRICTIONS
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOLA].
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOLA].
B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA]
B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOLA].
B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
AB
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 14, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
Be
SUBJECT:
Testimony of Robert McFarlane
Attached is a memorandum prepared by Counsel's office
indicating the possible issues of address by Robert
McFarlane's at his reappearance at the Iran/Contra hearings.
Mr. McFarlane is being recalled, at his request, in order to
clarify his statements during his prior testimony at the
hearings on May 11-14. Mr. McFarlane is expected to begin
testifying on Wednesday morning, July 15, immediately
following LtCol Oliver North.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
w
SUBJECT:
MCFARLANE TESTIMONY
This memorandum highlights those issues expected to be
addressed during tomorrow's hearings of the Select Committees
when Robert C. McFarlane, at his request, is recalled to follow
the appearance of LtCol Oliver North. Though McFarlane could
speak on any of a number of issues, he will most likely attempt
to clarify discrepancies between his earlier testimony and that
of North on Contra aid, the Iran initiative, and post-disclosure
activities. Specifically, McFarlane may wish to describe in
detail the guidelines he gave North in approaching Third
Countries and private benefactors given the Boland Amendment
restrictions. In addition, McFarlane may also wish to clarify
his prior testimony concerning the May 1986 trip to Tehran.
Finally, McFarlane may wish to again describe his participation
in the preparation of the November 1986 chronologies and to
underscore his recollection of events during the November 21-25
time frame.
I. Contra aid
McFarlane may want to clear the air on what instructions he
gave North and with what frequency North briefed him on North's
activities. McFarlane has testified that after passage of the
October 1984 Boland Amendment the President directed him to help
the Contras "hold body and soul together" (McFarlane's term)
until the Congress would again agree to support them. Further,
McFarlane testified that to carry out the President's wishes, he
relied on Donald Fortier and North. McFarlane said he told North
that he [North] was to serve as a "visible sign" of the
President's strong personal support and help the Contras in their
efforts to become a "real political movement". According to
McFarlane, he stressed to his staff that they were to operate "at
all times within the law, and that in particular we were not to
solicit, encourage, coerce or otherwise broker financial
contributions to the Contras." Indeed, McFarlane testified that
he did not know North was involved with Spitz Channell or Richard
Miller. Also, he denied giving North authority to approach third
countries.
In contrast, North testified that he always kept his
superiors fully informed of his activities. Specifically, North
said that McFarlane knew he (North) had established an
operational account for the Contras which contained traveller's
checks from Adolfo Calero and cash from Richard Secord's
"enterprise". More generally, North asserted that McFarlane was
regularly briefed on his resupply efforts and on his association
with Secord.
II. Letters Prepared for Congressmen Hamilton and Barnes
McFarlane may want to challenge North's testimony that he
was instructed by McFarlane to alter documents used in preparing
responses to inquiries levied by the Congressmen. McFarlane
testified that he told North at the time of Congressman Barnes'
investigation, that it was inappropriate to alter six NSC file
documents to reflect what North "actually" intended to express.
North testified, however, that he altered documents in completing
his NSC work, pursuant to outstanding McFarlane instructions, in
the days before he was relieved of duty.
III. May 1986 Tehran Trip
The respective testimonies of McFarlane and North are
inconsistent on whether North was authorized to allow the second
plane load of arms to leave Tel Aviv for Tehran. McFarlane has
testified that North committed an act of insubordination in
giving the take-off order without McFarlane's knowledge.
According to McFarlane, North woke him after the plane was
airborne, forcing him to order North to turn the plane around.
On the contrary. North testified that he gave the order pursuant
to a plan agreed to by Poindexter and McFarlane.
IV. November 1986 Chronologies
McFarlane may want to recount his participation in the
preparation of the November chronologies. McFarlane has
testified that he genuinely did not remember in November 1986
that the November 1985 shipment from Israel to Tehran contained
HAWKS rather than oil-drilling equipment. In contrast, North
testified that McFarlane led the effort to falsify the November
chronologies.
V. Post-Disclosure Activities
McFarlane may want to expound on his series of conversations
with North over the November 21-25 time frame, including their
car ride from Michael Ledeen's house on the 21st and their
meeting on the 23rd before North met with the Attorney General.
VI. "Plausible Deniability"
McFarlane has testified that "deniability" was not built
into the Iran initiative. In contrast, North has testified that
he (North) was designated the "fall guy" in the event the
initiative was disclosed and that McFarlane knew of this.
VII. Bipartisanship, etc.
Given the number of disparaging statements North has made
towards the Congress, McFarlane may want to underscore the need
for bipartisanship in the development of foreign policy and
greater Executive-Legislative cooperation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
HAB
WASHINGTON
July 14, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
Ase
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Testimony of LtCol Oliver North
Tuesday Morning, July 14, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of LtCol Oliver North at this morning's session of
the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 14, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
we
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF LTCOL NORTH
JULY 14, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)
I.
Overview
After a protracted debate, the Committee permitted LtCol
North to give a presentation demonstrating the danger of Soviet
influence in the Western Hemisphere and the importance of
supporting the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. This was apparently
a version of the presentation which North gave on many occasions
to potential contributors to "Spitz" Channell's organization or
other groups.
Representative Courter noted that at times members of
Congress have threatened to leak classified information in order
to frustrate some planned activity relating to the President's
foreign policy. North described how leaks by members of Congress
before the U.S. raid on Libya may have contributed to the very
high volume of anti-aircraft fire faced by U.S. pilots during
that raid.
Senator McClure suggested that Israel contrived to get and
keep the U.S. involved in arms sales to Iran to further its own
interests in the continuation of the war between Iran and Iraq
and in providing weapons to Iran which would destroy Iraqi
armored vehicles.
Rep. Stokes asserted that the concept of "plausible
deniability" no longer has any validity in the era following the
Church and Pike Committees' investigation of the mid-1970's which
led to the requirements that covert operations be supported by
Presidential findings and that Congress be notified
appropriately.
Senator Nunn asked several questions about specific
conflicts between North's and McFarlane's testimony. North
testified that he enjoyed authorization for several specific acts
which McFarlane has denied having authorized, including
travelling to Miami in July 1985 to meet Adolfo Calero, telling
2
Ambassador Tambs to open a southern front, requesting General
Secord to become involved in the Contra airlift operation, and
giving speeches in connection with "Spitz" Channell's
fundraising.
Nunn also asked North whether Ghorbanifar, in an effort to
stimulate North's interest in arms sales to Iran, had offered
incentives other than the use of residuals from these sales for
the Contras. North stated that Ghorbanifar had offered him a $1
million bribe which he refused. North did not report
Ghorbanifar's offer to anyone.
II.
The President's Involvement
A.
Diversion
North testified that, after a period of
discouragement, he became enthused about continuing the Iran
initiative because of two proposals made in early 1986: that
residual profits be used to fund the Contras and that a meeting
take place with Iranian officials in February. Senator Nunn
stated that Poindexter had an "imperative obligation" to convey
to the President the reasons North felt the initiative should be
pursued in view of the fact that those were not the same goals
stated in the finding which originally authorized the sale of
arms to Iran.
B.
Boland Amendment
Nothing to report.
C.
Iran Operation
Nothing to report.
D.
Third Country Aid to Contras
Nothing to report.
E.
Private Support to Contras
Nothing to report.
III. Continuation of Hearing
North's testimony will resume at 2:00 p.m.
UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
AB
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
13c
SUBJECT:
Anticipated Testimony
of Vice Admiral John Poindexter
Attached is an in-depth summary prepared by Counsel's office
of the anticipated testimony of Admiral Poindexter. Admiral
Poindexter is expected to testify in public session
beginning on Wednesday, July 15.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF
ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER
I.
Introduction
Admiral Poindexter, a career Naval Officer who graduated
first in his Naval Academy class in 1958, began his tenure at the
NSC in June 1981 as military aide to National Security Advisor
Richard Allen. He succeeded McFarlane as National Security
Advisor to the President in December 1985, having served as
McFarlane's principal₁ deputy since the latter's elevation to that
post in October 1983. His role in the Iran/Contra matter was
pivotal. Aside from the issue of Presidential knowledge, the
congressional inquiry will focus on 1) his participation in the
Iran arms sales, and the diversion to the Contras (and for other
operations) of the proceeds therefrom;
2) his knowledge of NSC solicitation of private and third country
funds for support of the Contras; 3) his supervision of LtCol
North's operational activities in support of the Contras, as well
as other policy initiatives; and 4) his role in the period prior
to and following exposure of the Contra diversion.
II. Iranian Arms Sales/Diversion
On November 24, 1986, the date that he resigned as NSC
advisor, Admiral Poindexter was asked by Attorney General Edwin
Meese if he had been aware of a diversion to the Contras of
proceeds from the arms sales to the Iranians. He responded that
North had given him, according to Meese, "enough hints that he
knew, 2 what was going on but he didn't want to look further into
it.
"
The evidence available supports something more than this
admission to Meese. Aside from North's testimony, however, the
1
New York Times (January 12, 1987) at A-6.
2
Meese Tower Board Tr. 40.
87-TF-0080
Copy No.
1
Derived from Multiple
DECLASSIFIED
Classified by DSC
TOP SECRET
Declassify on OADR
NLRR F97-066/6#43
BY RW NARA DATE 10/28/10
TOP SECRET
2
documentary evidence does not conclusively demonstrate that North
gave him much more than "hints" about diversion.
A.
January - February 1986
LtCol North told Meese on November 23, 1986, that the
diversion concept "came out of a discussion
early in January"
with Amiran Nir, at that time an advisor on Terrorism to the
Prime Minister of Israel. North has testified that the idea
came from the arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar, and that he passed
it on, first to DCI William Casey then to Poindexter, both of
whom endorsed it.
North told Meese that $3-4 million in proceeds were
4
diverted to the Contras from the February 1986 arms transaction.
Secord has testified that some $2.6 million surplus was generated
by this transaction. He also stated that "North's position [had
been] consistent throughout in February [1986] and later that he
wanted me 5 to use all available surpluses to support the Contra
project.
We have seen no documentary evidence to corroborate
North's testimony that Poindexter was directly told in advance by
North that such a diversion would occur. However, North's
correspondence with Poindexter in mid-January 1986 sets forth the
proposed financing of the February 1986 transaction and shows
over $7 million in excess funds without setting forth to what use
these excess funds would be put. 6 And a memorandum from North
to Poindexter later in the month setting forth the operational
mechanics of the proposed transaction revealed enough
information to enable its reader to deduce, assuming that the
Iranians were to be charged the same price for each of the 1000
TOWs being sold as that North had stipulated in his prior
correspondence with Poindexter, that the transaction would
generate a maximum of $4 million in excess funds. Again, the
application of this $4 million--ostensibly to remain in the Swiss
bank account of General Secord--was left unstated. This same
memorandum went on to describe a follow-on sale of 3000 TOWs
which, assuming the same price, would generate more than $8
million 7 in excess funds, with no accounting of the application
thereof.
On February 18, 1986, North in a formal memorandum
3
Id. at 35.
4
Notes of John Richardson on interview of North (November
23, 1986)
5 Joint Cong. Hearings Tr. (May 6, 1987) 66-68.
6
Bates # 1201.
7
Memorandum (North to Poindexter, January 24, 1986).
TOP SECRET
87-TF-0080
TOP SECRET
3
briefed Poindexter on the successful conclusion of the
transaction without any mention of diversion.
B.
April - May 1986
On April 7, 1986, North sent a note to former NSC advisor
Robert McFarlane mentioning that at Poindexter's request, he had
"prepared a paper for our boss" which contained the plans for the
upcoming McFarlane mission to Iran. North suggested that
McFarlane read it. A document fitting this description was found
by Justice Department officials in North's files. A copy of the
same document was found in the files of Poindexter's secretary
with a note attached to it from Poindexter instructing his
secretary to file it. Entitled "Release of American Hostages In
Beirut,' the undated memorandum (hereinafter, "Undated
Memorandum") lists neither its author nor its intended recipient.
Attached to it is a set of talking points for the proposed
McFarlane mission to Iran. Explicit mention is made on the last
page of the document (excluding its attachment) that $12 million
of the "residual funds from this transaction
will be used to
purchase
supplies for the Nicaraguan Resistance Forces. On
the same page there is a sentence recommending that Poindexter
secure approval from the President but only for matters raised in
a section of the memorandum which did not mention diversion. The
memorandum did not suggest that Presidential approval for the
diversion be obtained. North told Meese on November 23, 1986,
with respect to the Undated Memorandum that "he didn't think it
had gone any place. " 10 North also asked Meese whether he had
found a cover sheet to that memorandum. Meese responded in the
negative and asked North whether he should have, to which North
said "No." North testified that he sent at least five such
memoranda up to Poindexter mentioning the use of residuals. He
also testified that he attempted to shred those of them remaining
in his files before leaving the NSC, believed he had done so, and
could not recall whether any of them had been annotated by
Poindexter in such a manner as to indicate Presidential approval.
On May 1, 1986, according to a PROFS note sent the
following day by Poindexter to Fortier (with copies to a host of
other NSC personnel, including North), Poindexter met in Bali (on
the way to Japan) with the President who said at the outset of
their meeting that he was "really serious" about aiding the
Contras, that he wanted to "figure out a way to take action
uni-laterally" to provide them aid if the Congress did not
approve aid by June 9, 1986, and that he was ready to "confront
8
Memorandum (North to Poindexter, February 13, 1986).
9
Bates # 3891.
10
Meese Tower Board Tr. 35A.
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87-TF-0080
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4
the Congress" on 11 the Constitutional question of "who controls
foreign policy.
"
After meeting with the Iranian intermediary Ghorbanifar in
London in early May 1986, North by PROFS note dated May 9, 1986,
advised Poindexter of the arrangements he had successfully I2
negotiated in London for a May 1986 arms transaction.
In
marked contrast to the operational timeline he submitted to
Poindexter before the February transaction, North completely
omitted any mention of the financing of the transaction.
Poindexter, however, had been advised sometime on or after May 9,
1986, that the amount 13 the Iranians were going to pay Ghorbanifar
was $20.5 million.
This transaction was negotiated during a time of dire need
for the Contras. The President himself, after being briefed on
the Contras' financial problems at a National Security Planning
Group ("NSPG") meeting on May 16, 1986, commented that "the only
hope" for a peaceful settlement in Central America was "if the
Contras are a viable force. " The President went on to ask
whether "the private groups 14 who pay for ads for the Contras"
could "do more than ads.
The financing of the May 1986 transaction began with the
deposit on May 14, 1986, by Adnan Khashoggi of $15 million I5 into
General Secord's Swiss account (for "Lake Resources")
North
informed Poindexter by means of a PROFS note dated May 16, 1986,
that the Nicaraguan Resistance "now has more than $6M available
for immediate disbursement" reducing "the need to go to third
countries for help. " 16 North added that "we will have a
considerable amount in a few more days, " without identifying a
source. In testimony, North has acknowledged that the source of
these funds was revenues from the May 1986 arms sale to the
Iranians.
North submitted a memorandum dated May 22, 1986, to
Poindexter giving a thorough description of the operational
11
Bates # 8725.
12
Bates # 9177.
13
Cave Tower Board (codeword) Tr. 9-10.
14
Minutes of May 16, 1986, NSPG meeting.
15
Ghorbanifar Tower Board Tr. 155-156.
16
Bates # 9183. Secord testified that this May 1986
transaction generated a surplus of approximately $6.5 million.
Joint Cong. Hearings Tr. (May 6, 1987) 90, 96.
TOP SECRET
87-TF-0080
TOP SECRET
5
details of the upcoming McFarlane mission to Iran including the
movement of the arms being sold. An attachment to this
memorandum was the same document containing the talking points
for the McFarlane mission which had earlier been dated April 4,
1986, and attached as part of the Undated Memorandum.
Conspicuously missing from the May 22, 1986, memorandum (as
compared with the earlier memoranda that North had sent to
Poindexter on the arms transaction arrangements) is any mention
of financing except 17 for a tasking of the Israelis to provide
"funding for TOWS. "
Poindexter remained in communication 18 with the McFarlane
mission during its failed trip to Iran.
When, on May 29,
1986, the McFarlane team (McFarlane, North, Howard Teicher)
reported to the President on their trip (in Poindexter's
presence), available evidence indicates I9 that no mention of
surplus funds or a diversion was made.
North has testified
generally that he never heard residuals discussed with the
President.
C.
June - September 1986
At the end of June 1986, Congress authorized $100 million 20
for the Contras, thus relieving their financial pressures.
But the Iranian intermediary Ghorbanifar still owed more than $15
million and was "under threat of death from his creditors." The
Iranian government reportedly paid him $4 million on July 24,
1986, in "partial payment" for the HAWK missile parts 21 removed
from the McFarlane mission's aircraft in Tehran.
Apparently
as a result of Ghorbanifar's pressure on his Tehran contact to
get the Iranians to "come forward with a humanitarian gesture", 22
a
hostage (Lawrence Jenco) was released on July 29, 1986.
The
very next day, Poindexter briefed the President and secured 23 his
approval for sending the remaining HAWK parts to Iran.
17
Memorandum (North to Poindexter, May 22, 1986).
18
Joint Cong. Hearings (May 6, 1987) Tr. 75-77.
19
Notes of Rodney McDaniel (May 29, 1986) ; McFarlane Tower
Board Tr. (December 11, 1986) 44-45.
20
Tower Board Report at B-125.
21
Memorandum (North to Poindexter, July 26, 1986) at Tab I.
22
Ghorbanifar Tower Board Tr. 122, 176, 178.
23
Memorandum (North to Poindexter, July 29, 1986) (annotated
by Poindexter).
TOP SECRET
87-TF-0080
TOP SECRET
6
The Iranians, upon inspecting the shipment of the remaining
HAWK parts, declared that some items received were defective and
others were missing. Then, upon consulting a 1985 manufacturer's
price list, the Iranians learned that they had been overcharged
for the HAWK spare parts, for example, by 500% in the case of at
least one item. 24 Ghorbanifar prevailed upon them to pay $4-5
25
million more for the parts they received that were acceptable.
Poindexter met with North on the evening of September 9,
1986, and instructed him that the "new channel" to Iran would be
pursued. Earlier that day, Poindexter had briefed the President
on this "new channel" that had been developed through General
Secord. Poindexter told North during the evening meeting that
Ghorbanifar was to be "cut out" as a future intermediary. North
told Allen that he (North) 26 was tasked with raising a minimum of
$4 million to cut him out.
North conducted meetings in Washington over a weekend in
mid-September 1986 with Secord's contact on the "new channel",
who was the relative ("Relative") of a very senior Iranian
figure. Since the Relative had asked for time to see how his
discussions in Tehran would go, North told Poindexter by PROFS
note dated September 22, 1986, that the decision had been made
"to stall" on the old channel. Four days later, North advised
Poindexter that the Relative had deposited $7 million 27 in the
"numbered Swiss account we gave him last week.
"
North has
testified that this transaction also resulted in residuals for
the Contras.
D.
October - November 1986
In October, the Iranian initiative began to unravel. The
old channel that the NSC was shutting down 28 was described by
Charles Allen of CIA as "a running sore.
While strides were
being made in arranging a transaction in the new channel, North,
on October 2, 1986, advised Poindexter that Secord should be
instructed in his upcoming meeting with Nir to tell him that,
owing to "repetitive financial difficulties" with Ghorbanifar
and suspicions that his Tehran contact was instrumental in the
24
Ghorbanifar Tower Board Tr. 178-180.
25
Id. at 183; Allen Tower Board Tr. (codeword - December 30,
1986) 27.
26
Memorandum (Allen to Casey, September 10, 1986) ; Notes of
Rodney McDaniel (September 9, 1986).
27
Bates #'s 3613, 9226, 976, 5586.
28
Allen Tower Board Tr. (codeword - December 30, 1986) 30.
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seizure of the second new hostage in Beirut, the U.S. would "not
proceed" 29 long the Ghorbanifar channel "until we resolve these
issues.
On October 10, 1986, North informed Poindexter that
the latest proposal of the Relative involved, 30' among other things,
two Iranian payments of $3.6 million each.
Meanwhile, on October 7, 1986, DCI Casey met with a friend,
arms merchant Roy Furmark, who told him that "some Canadian
investors" whom Khashoggi had gotten to invest $15 million on May
15, 1986, in "Lake Resources" on a loan which was repayable in 30
days "have been waiting five months for their money and are very
close to doing something" to recover it. 3I Casey met with
Poindexter about this on October 32 15, 1986, and Poindexter
promised to "look into it.
While the last arms sale to Iran was being carried out (now
through the "new channel"), and one day after the hostage
Jacobsen was released on November 2, 1986, an account of
McFarlane! 33 May 1986 trip to Tehran appeared in a Beirut
magazine.
On November 6, 1986, Donald Regan and Poindexter
reportedly engaged in a "shouting match" in front of the
President in the Oval Office, with Regan demanding that details
on the Iran initiative be made public and Poindexter insisting
that all be kept secret. 34 This same day, Poindexter met with
DDCI Gates and DCI Casey. The latter advised him to "have the
White House counsel look at the thing, " to which Poindexter
responded: 35 "I don't trust [White House Counsel Wallison] to keep
this quiet.
North has testified that both Casey and
Poindexter were fully apprised of his expenditures of residuals
on the Contras. It is unclear, however, whether Poindexter knew
that Casey knew.
After learning on November 22 and 23, 1986, that there had
been a diversion to the Contras, Meese met with the President and
Donald Regan a little after 11:00 a.m. on November 24, 1986, and
29
Memorandum (North to Poindexter, October 2, 1986) Tab IV
(emphasis in original).
30
Bates # 984.
31
Memorandum (Casey to C/NE, October 8, 1986).
32
Allen Tower Board Tr. (codeword - December 30, 1986) 32.
33
Ghorbanifar Tower Board Tr. 186; Bates #'s 2291, 8793.
34
Washington Post (November 13, 1986) at A-1.
35
Gates Senate Committee on Intelligence (December 4, 1986)
Tr. 102-103.
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8
36
informed them about the "money going to the Contras.
"
That
afternoon, Meese "grabbed" Poindexter and asked if he had been
aware of the diversion. As stated above, Poindexter talked of
the "hints" he had gotten from North. He also admitted that he
"in fact did generally know" of the diversion. In a comment
that could be read as corroborative of North's testimony about
Casey's "fall guy" plan, Poindexter further told Meese that he
knew that when the issue "surfaced" that he was "going to have to
resign. " Poindexter also stated that no one else knew about the
diversion, and specificall 37 that he "had not reported it to the
President or Don Regan.
"
The next morning (November 25, 1986), Donald Regan told
Poindexter that Meese had informed the President of North's
involvement with Contra funding, and asked him: "What the hell
happened?" Poindexter responded that he had "had a feeling that
something bad was going on, " but "didn't investigate it" and
"didn't do a thing about it. " Poindexter added that he was "so
damned mad at Tip O'Neill for the way he was dragging the Contras
around" that he "didn't want to know what, if anything, was going
on." He admitted that he "should have, but
didn't.
"
Regan
then told Poindexter that he had better have his resignation with
him at his regular morning meeting with the President. 38
Poindexter resigned at that 9:30 a.m. meeting. The Vice
President was present in the Oval Office when he heard Poindexter
admit to the President that he 39 Poindexter, had not told the
President about the diversion.
Later in the day, the President
and Meese conducted the press conference during which the
possibility of a Contra diversion was announced.
III. Fundraising for the Contras
A. From Third Countries
McFarlane testified that he informed Poindexter about the
Saudi decision to assist the Contras, but there has been no
evidence that Poindexter played an active role in inducing that
contribution. Poindexter will likely be asked to provide his
understanding of the events surrounding the Saudi contribution,
particularly regarding who in the Administration knew about the
36
Meese Tower Board Tr. 39.
37
Meese Tower Board Tr. 40, 47.
38
Regan Tower Board Tr. 57-58.
39
Memorandum (McFadden to File, December 29, 1986) (AOD
1064) at 1.
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Saudi role and whether the Saudis asked for, or were offered, any
quid pro quos.
Poindexter played a larger role in the solicitation of
Brunei. He asked Secretary Shultz at the conclusion of a May
1986 NSPG meeting to prepare a list of countries that might be
solicited under the provision in the FY-86 Intelligence
Authorization Act that recognized State Department authority to
solicit humanitarian assistance. When North later expressed
concern that State Department involvement would "bifurcate the
efforts" that previously had induced Saudi and Taiwanese
contributions, Poindexter apparently asked McFarlane to inform
Shultz, for the first time, about these efforts.
B.
From Private Benefactors
Little is known about Poindexter's involvement in North's
private fund-raising network. There is no evidence that
Poindexter was directly involved in direct solicitation of U.S.
citizens or that he had any direct involvement with Spitz
Channell or Richard Miller. In fact, when North recommended that
Poindexter accompany the President in a January 30, 1986 drop-by
briefing for Spitz Channell's National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty and American Conservative Trust,
Poindexter declined.
Aside from North's testimony, there is documentary evidence
that Poindexter was aware of North's activities. In a May 16,
1986 PROFS note, North stated:
I have no idea what Don Regan does or does
not know re my private U.S. operation but the
President obviously knows why he has been
meeting with several select people to thank
them for their "support for Democracy" in
Cent Am.
Poindexter replied on the same day that "Don Regan knows
very little of your operation and that is just as well."
IV. Involvement in North's Operational Activities
LtCol North conducted an array of operational activities for
which his authority is in question. To cite just a few, he
engaged in tactical discussions with Contra leader Adolfo Calero
on attacking Soviet-made helicopters in Nicaragua
and on the interdiction of weapons shipments to the Sandinistas.
He provided Calero with tactical maps and intelligence, and
facilitated disbursements of funds to other Contra leaders. He
oversaw the clandestine aerial Contra resupply effort and
supplied classified encryption devices (KL-43s) to personnel
involved in that effort. And he purchased the "Erria, a ship
which was reportedly used to facilitate a U.S. hostage release
attempt and agit/prop operations planned against Libya.
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Poindexter's role in all this is opaque. Clearly North kept
him advised to some extent. On November 22, 1985, for example,
in informing Poindexter that a Secord aircraft would be used in
the Israeli shipment of arms to Iran, he regretted how this would
delay "our first direct flight [delivering ammunition] to the
resistance field inside Nicaragua." And on other occasions,
the documents show Poindexter's direct involvement in such
matters as his proposal to McFarlane on interdiction of a
seaborne shipment of arms to the Sandinistas brought to his
attention in February 1985 by North. In the main, however,
Poindexter's participation in and authorization for North's
operational activities are not well-documented and will surely be
a topic of examination.
V.
Poindexter's Role in the Period Prior to and Following
Exposure of the Diversion
A. Preparation of NSC Chronologies
Sometime in mid-November 1986, Poindexter tasked North with
putting together an accurate chronology of the events of the
Iranian initiative. The Tower Report and subsequent testimony
have established McFarlane's key role in changing the
chronologies to blur the President's association with the arms
sales. Poindexter was the official who requested McFarlane to
review the chronologies being prepared by North, Earl, Coy and
Teicher for accuracy. Although Poindexter is known to have
received McFarlane's recommended changes to the chronologies (as
well as to the draft opening statement for the President's
November 19, 1986 news conference), there is little to establish
Poindexter's actual involvement in the writing or editing of the
chronologies.
B. Preparation of DCI Casey's November Testimony
On November 20, 1986, a meeting was held in the West Wing to
prepare DCI Casey for his testimony the next day before the
Congressional Intelligence Committees and to prepare Poindexter
for his briefing of those Committees. Present at the meeting
were North, Casey, Poindexter, Attorney General Meese, Assistant
Attorney General Cooper, NSC General Counsel Paul Thompson and an
aide to Casey (perhaps Robert Gates). The participants worked
from an NSC "chronology," a draft of Casey's proposed testimony
and an insert entitled "CIA Airline Involvement. " The insert
originally read, in part: "we in CIA did not find out that our
airline had hauled HAWK missiles into Iran until mid-January when
we were told by the Iranians." According to Cooper's testimony,
North argued that the language should be changed to state
unequivocally that "no one in the USG" found out the true cargo
of the shipment until mid-January. North also insisted that the
HAWK missiles were returned to Iran because the U.S. Government
was displeased with the Israeli shipment. North is said to have
been the only one in the room to assert personal knowledge on the
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11
topic and no one, including Poindexter, is said to have
contradicted his account.
PROFS notes from North to Poindexter, however, show that
Poindexter knew that North's statements were not accurate. In a
note dated November 20, 1985, North told Poindexter that the
"Israelis will deliver 80 mod. HAWKS
at noon on Friday 22 Nov. "
Poindexter should also have been aware that the shipment was
returned not because of U.S. displeasure, but, as North advised
Poindexter on December 20, 1985, because Schwimmer and Ledeen
agreed to ship weapons "that were totally inadequate to meet the
rqmts established by the Iranians. "
IV. Conclusion
Poindexter's deposition testimony before the Committee has
not been made available to this Office. His public testimony is
likely to commence on July 15, 1987.
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HS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
ABC
SUBJECT:
Testimony of LtCol Oliver North
Monday Morning, July 13, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of LtCol Oliver North at this morning's session of
the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 13, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
w
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF LTCOL NORTH
JULY 13, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)
I.
Overview
Senator McClure and Representative Cheney challenged
Chairman Inouye's statement on Face the Nation Sunday about a
memorandum that supposedly indicates the President was briefed
about use of residuals from the Iran arms sales to finance other
covert operations (see Section II.A, below).
North testified that he recalled no discussions with the
Vice President about proposals for him eventually to meet with a
high ranking Iranian official. North said, however, that he
thought the Vice President would be an excellent choice for such
a meeting, and said he based this belief on the Vice President's
bravery in meeting with armed Salvadoran military officials--men
who violently opposed U.S. support of Salvadoran moderates-- a
1983 meeting that North attended.
Representative Broomfield and Senator Hatch both stated
that they did not want to see North prosecuted based on the
information adduced to this point, but both found fault in the
use of the NSC to conduct covert operations. Several members
recognized the need for an accommodation between secrecy and
Congressional consultation in the conduct of covert operations.
Broomfield pointed out that the development of the atomic bomb
was carried out both in secret and with knowledge of
Congressional leaders. He pointed out that President Reagan
consulted with Congressional leaders before the U.S. bombing raid
on Libya in 1986.
North testified that his first conversation with Casey
about the so-called "fall-guy plan" occurred in the early spring
of 1984. He also discussed the plan, at times that were not
specified, with Poindexter and McFarlane. Although Casey said in
the first week of November 1986 that Poindexter might have to be
the fall-guy, no one, North said, told Poindexter he was under
consideration to be the fall-guy, though North discussed with
Poindexter that both men might have to leave their NSC positions.
Senator Trible noted that the operations undertaken through
Secord were not subject to the same oversight and accountability
as those undertaken by the CIA. North testified that he had no
discussions with Casey about how the "off-the-shelf" covert
capability would be used after Casey and North had moved on.
II.
The President's Involvement
A.
Diversion
Representative Cheney stated that he had carefully read
the memorandum discussed by Inouye on television Sunday, and that
it contained no reference to profits generated by the Iran arms
sale, and that the President could have read the memorandum from
cover-to-cover without gaining any knowledge of diversion.
Senator McClure agreed and stated that Poindexter's briefing
would only have made the President aware of diversion if it went
beyond the information contained in the memorandum. Chairman
Inouye seemed to back off his Sunday statement, and said that
Poindexter would have to be questioned about what he told the
President. The Chairman stated that he made his statement to let
the Administration know that it would need to respond, and that
he thought he was being "quite fair" with the Administration by
giving it time to do so.
B. Boland Amendment
Nothing to report.
C. Iran Operation
Senator Mitchell spoke extensively about the failure to
notify Congress about the Iran initiative. He concluded that--in
view of the fact that Israelis, Iranians (in two channels) and
even a Saudi Arabian knew about the operation--informing Congress
would not significantly increase the chance of a leak and put the
operation in greater jeopardy. Mitchell opined that Congress
would have advised the President not to proceed if informed at
the outset.
Mitchell noted that if (as North testified last week) it
was bad to have vacillations in our Nicaragua policy, then it was
even worse to pursue simultaneously two different Iran
policies--one publicly, the other privately.
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
Nothing to report.
E. Private Support to Contras
North testified that, in his view, the President was
not obligated to notify Congress about covert operations funded
by non-appropriated funds, and that the President would be
accountable to the people for such actions. Senator Mitchell
noted that the President told the Tower Board that he had not
known the NSC staff was involved in assisting the Contras. In
response, North reiterated that he kept his superiors apprised
and that, in fact, the President has stated that he was aware of
what was being done and that it was, at least partially, "his
idea. "
III. Continuation of Hearing
The hearings will resume at 2:00 p.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 10, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
Ase
SUBJECT:
Testimony of LtCol Oliver North
Friday Morning, July 10, 1987
-
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of LtCol Oliver North at this morning's session of
the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 10, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
w
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF LTCOL NORTH
JULY 10, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)
I.
Overview
There was extensive questioning by Senate Counsel Arthur
Liman apparently intended to build a circumstantial case that the
President had been informed about the diversion (see Section
II.A, below).
North testified that he recognized the need to have a
give-and-take with the Iranians, and that the U.S. never had
evidence that Iran enjoyed sufficient control over Hizbollah to
effect the immediate release of all the U.S. hostages. Liman
noted that, in planning for the McFarlane trip, Poindexter
insisted that the only acceptable sequence of events was a
meeting with McFarlane, release of the hostages and--only
then--an arms delivery. North testified that he told Poindexter
that this would be the sequence, but realized when he arrived in
Tehran that Ghorbanifar had lied to both sides to make the
meeting occur. Liman -- perhaps insinuating that North had
misled his superiors about the prospects for release of the
hostages--pointed out that North knew Ghorbanifar was a liar, but
North countered that he had not anticipated the extent to which
Ghorbanifar was lying on this occasion. Liman also suggested
that North continued to press for arms sales to Iran despite the
misgivings of his superiors because of the need to use the
proceeds for the Contras.
Liman questioned whether the Iran arms sales degenerated
into, or were originally conceived as, arms-for-hostages
transactions. North stated that the broader purposes of the
sales were articulated to North by Michael Ledeen as early as the
summer of 1985, and that the November 1985 Finding unduly
minimized those broader purposes.
North again testified that Casey wanted an overseas entity
independent of appropriated funds to support U.S. foreign policy
objectives. He testified that one such covert project undertaken
by this entity--the purchase of a ship for broadcasting into a
foreign country--was not (unlike CIA covert operations) briefed
to Congress or covered by a Finding, and North did not know
whether the President had been informed about it.
II.
The President's Involvement
A.
Diversion
North again testified that he recalled no discussion
with the President about the use of residuals from the Iran arms
sales for the Contras.
North confirmed that an attachment to the April
"diversion" memorandum--the "terms of reference" with negotiating
instructions for the Tehran trip--was eventually approved by the
President. He stated that a memorandum covering the May 1986
transaction and mentioning diversion went up the line with these
same "terms of reference" attached. The insinuation was that the
President thus may have approved a memorandum that discussed
diversion to the Contras.
North testified that, in early discussions with
Poindexter about use of the proceeds from the Iran arms sales for
the Contras, Poindexter said, "This had better never come out. "
He testified that Poindexter was ordinarily a cautious man who
"played by the book, " but that he was willing to take risks.
North sometimes showed Casey important memoranda before
submitting them to Poindexter. North again testified that Casey
did not advise him to delete recommendations that Poindexter
brief the President when reviewing memoranda prepared by North
which described the diversion.
B. Boland Amendment
Nothing to report
C. Iran Operation
North denied that, despite what he told Hakim, Koch and
others, the President said he wanted the hostages out by
Christmas, the State of the Union Message or the 1986 elections.
North testified that the President's concerns about the hostages
were purely humanitarian, and that he was willing to take great
political risk in pursuing the Iran initiative.
North said he assumed the President made the decision
not to notify Congress under the January 1986 Iran Finding. He
was not, however, present when the President made this decision.
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
Nothing to report.
E. Private Support to Contras
Liman read the PROFS note in which North stated that
"the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with
several select people to thank them for their support." North
testified that he did not recall having ever told the President
that the people with whom he was meeting were providing money
only for advertising.
F. November 1986 Chronologies
Nothing to report.
III. Procedural Matters
Several Republican members criticized committee counsel for
monopolizing the questioning. In a separate matter, Chairman
Inouye took under advisement a suggestion that North be allowed
to present to the committee the 20 minute pro-Contra briefing
that North used to present to potential contributors.
IV.
Continuation of Hearing
The hearings will resume at 2:00 p.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 31, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
PBR
SUBJECT:
Testimony of Donald T. Regan and
Caspar Weinberger at the Iran/Contra
Hearings, Friday Morning, July 31, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of Donald Regan and Caspar Weinberger at this
morning's session of the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 31, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
B.3H
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF DONALD T. REGAN AND
CASPAR WEINBERGER
JULY 31, 1987 (Morning Session)
I.
Overview
Regan testified that in December 1986, the President
emphatically rejected the idea of granting pardons to Poindexter
and North, on the grounds that it was premature to consider a
pardon when there was, as yet, no evidence that a crime had been
committed.
Senator Nunn attacked the President's position at the
November 10, 1986 meeting that Iran was at a disadvantage in the
war, pointing out that that official U.S. policy at the time was
that Iraq was the weaker party. Regan was hesitant to comment,
citing security reasons, and suggested Weinberger be asked the
question.
Regan testified that White House Counsel Peter Wallison had
expressed displeasure at "being cut out" of the process in
November 1986. Regan then urged Poindexter to include Wallison
in all meetings, but Poindexter refused, saying that the meetings
did not involve legal issues. In response to Senator Sarbanes'
characterization that Poindexter and his associates had created a
"junta" within the White House, Regan reiterated his position
that the danger of a "coup" can be avoided if the White House
legal counsel "guides policy" and if the NSC is not an
operational organization.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appeared as a strong
and consistent opponent of the Iran initiative who, after his
arguments lost, was kept in the dark about many of the details of
the operation. Weinberger was shown the memorandum written by
Admiral Poindexter to the President on January 17, 1986,
forwarding the January 17 Finding, which said in part that the
Israelis were very concerned about Iran's deteriorating position
2
in the Iran-Iraq war. Weinberger said he would have disagreed
with that statement, that that was not DOD's opinion about the
progress of the war, and that he had not been consulted on that
point. Weinberger's testimony reinforces Secretary Shultz'
allegation that the President was presented with intelligence
that had been skewed to support the Iran initiative.
II.
The President's Knowledge
A.
Diversion
Nothing to report.
B. Boland Amendment
Nothing to report.
C. Iran Operations
Weinberger attended a meeting in early August, 1985 in the
upstairs residence. The meeting was to discuss a proposed shift
in U.S. policy in favor of Iran, as set forth in a draft NSDD.
The sale of selected arms to Iran was one element in the proposed
policy. Weinberger and Shultz opposed this plan, while McFarlane
was in favor of it. Weinberger recalled no discussion of the
role of Israel in these plans. Weinberger at the close of the
meeting thought the President's views were "congruent" with his
own.
In the Fall of 1985, Weinberger received intelligence
reports which made references to negotiations between "high U.S.
officials" and Iranians regarding weapons sales. Weinberger was
surprised by this, and pressed for a meeting to discuss it. The
meeting of December 7, 1985, followed.
Weinberger had no contemporaneous knowledge of the shipment
of HAWKs by Israel in November 1985.
At the December 7 meeting, Weinberger argued "in every way
[that the Iran initiative] was a policy we should not engage in. "
Weinberger's impression was that the President had decided not to
do it. He thought this "baby had been strangled in its cradle."
Weinberger did not remember any discussion of the November HAWK
shipment or the December 5 Finding at this meeting. Weinberger
also did not remember any discussion on December 7 of McFarlane's
upcoming trip to London to meet Ghorbanifar.
Weinberger described the meeting on January 7, 1986 as a
"replay" of the December 7 meeting. The President's views,
however, had changed. The President this time favored the plan.
The Attorney General stated that the President was on sound legal
ground, citing the prior ruling by William French Smith and the
President's own inherent powers.
3
In a series of Profs note exchanges between January 7-17,
North and Poindexter noted that Weinberger was continuing to
voice objections to the initiative. It was on January 17,
however, that Poindexter called Weinberger to advise him that the
President had rendered his decision to proceed, and the issues
were no longer open for discussion.
Weinberger attended the meeting of November 10, 1986,
during which Poindexter briefed the President's principal
advisors on the Iranian initiative. Weinberger recalled that the
President was concerned that exposure of the operation would
endanger the lives of the hostages and the Iranian contacts.
Weinberger once again expressed his concern that the U.S. could
be blackmailed by selective exposure of parts of the operation.
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
Weinberger does not recall knowing of contributions to the
Contras by "country number 2." Weinberger was shown a memorandum
for the record written by Deputy Director of the CIA McMahon on
March 15, 1985. That exhibit recorded a conversation in which
Director Casey told Weinberger that "country number 2" was going
to contribute $25 million to the Contras in $5 million
increments. Weinberger does not remember that conversation.
E. Private Support to Contras
Nothing to report.
F. November 1986 Chronologies
Nothing to report.
III. Continuation of Hearing
Weinberger will resume testifying at 2:00 p.m.
UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
XXB
July 30, 1987
MEMOPANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
Are
SUBJECT:
Testimony of Donald T. Regan
Thursday Morning, July 30, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of Donald T. Regan at this morning's session of the
Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 30, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF DONALD T. REGAN
JULY 30, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)
I.
Overview
Regan testified that, as the President's Chief of Staff, he
did control White House staff members' access to the President,
but that the National Security Advisor, the Vice President, and
the Secretary of State also enjoyed direct access. During the
9:30 briefings, the National Security Advisor would provide the
President and Regan with briefing books. Regan did not have
access to the President's book prior to its presentation to the
President and testified that on occasion the NSC staff would
insert material without his knowledge. (U)
According to Regan, Poindexter's briefings to the President
regarding the Contras were general and did not include specifics
about who was running the operations. Regarding McDaniel's notes
that in March 1986, the Contras had 60 days, and by June only 30
days of supplies remaining, Regan explained that the discussion
reflected the urgent need for prompt legislative action to
restore funding to the Contras. (U)
Regan testified that the President did not know in advance
of the September 1985 Israeli shipment of TOWs to Iran.
According to Regan, the President felt that "his hand was being
forced" regarding replenishment, but made no commitment. (U)
Prior to October 1986, Regan had no knowledge that the
President had signed any of the Findings related to the Iran arms
sales. Regan never saw and had no knowledge of the December 5,
1985 Finding. He claims that the January 6, 1986 Finding was not
in final form and was apparently signed by mistake. The
President was orally briefed regarding a Finding on January 17,
1986, but Regan did not recall the President signing it. (U)
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At the November 10, 1986 meeting, Regan urged the President
to "go public" with the Iran arms sales story, but was opposed by
Poindexter who voiced concern about the hostages. (U)
On November 24, 1986, Regan met with Casey and told him of
the diversion. Regan testified that Casey seemed surprised,
although Senator Cohen read Regan's deposition that said that
Casey did not appear surprised. (U)
The following day, Regan met with Poindexter and urged him
to resign after Poindexter admitted that he had failed to
properly supervise North's actions. (U)
II.
The President's Knowledge
A. Diversion
Regan testified that the President knew nothing of the
diversion and was completely surprised when he was told by Meese.
(U)
B. Boland Amendment
Nothing to report.
C. Iran Operations
Regan testified that the main objective of the Iran
initiative was to open "a dialogue" with Iran. In the December
7, 1985 meeting, Regan advocated "cutting losses" and aborting
the initiative. In January 1986, Regan changed his position
based on Poindexter's enthusiasm regarding the new channel. (U)
Regan described the August 1986 shipments as a "bait
and switch" on the part of the Iranians. The President's feeling
was that you sometimes have to deal with "unsavory characters."
The President would never have approved the Da'Wa prisoner plan
and never discussed an overthrow of the Iraqi government. (U)
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
The President was aware of the efforts by the State
Department to solicit funds, but was not informed of the specific
countries involved or the amounts contributed. Regan did not
know of the Saudi contributions or contributions of other
countries that were arranged by North. (TS)
E. Private Support to Contras
The President generally knew of the private
benefactors, including the medevac helicopter donated by Ms.
Garwood, but he
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was not aware of specific donations being used for lethal
purposes. (U)
F. November 1986 Chronologies
Regan obtained a chronology from Poindexter on November
20, 1986. Regan told the President that something was seriously
wrong with the chronology and that he should order the NSC to
correct it. (U)
III. Continuation of Hearing
Regan will resume testifying at 2:00 p.m.
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UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 29, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
PBC
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Anticipated Testimony of Donald T. Pegan
at the Iran/Contra Hearings
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
anticipated testimony of Donald T. Regan at the Iran/Contra
hearings.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 28, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
M
st-
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF DONALD T. REGAN
BACKGROUND
Donald Regan was appointed as the President's Chief of Staff on
January 8, 1985. His resignation on February 27, 1987, came amid
widespread reports that his management policies at the White
House had worsened, if not indirectly caused, the Iran-Contra
affair. Prior to his appointment as Chief of Staff, Regan served
for four years as Secretary of the Treasury. (U)
Regan has consistently maintained that neither he nor the
President were aware of the diversion of arms sales' profits to
the Nicaraguan resistance forces or of the private lethal aid
donations to the Contras. Although Regan admits to fostering a
reputation as a Chief of Staff who "controlled everything in the
White House," he has testified that he knew nothing of the
details of the Iran or Contra operations and that the National
Security Advisor had direct access to the President.
Regan's Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, December 16, 1986, 93-95). (U)
1. The August 1985 Arms Sale.
Regan is expected to maintain his position, despite conflicting
testimony by McFarlane, that the President did not grant advance
approval for the August arms shipment by Israel to Iran and the
President "was upset" to learn in September 1985 that the sale
had occurred. (Special Review Board Interview of Regan, January
7, 1987, 7-9). (U)
2. The December 5, 1985 Finding.
A December 7, 1985 memorandum for the record by DDCI John McMahon
(Bates No. 9002), states that the CIA had submitted a draft
Finding in November 1985 and that Casey spoke to Regan and
McFarlane to determine if the Finding met with Presidential
approval. According to Poindexter, this Finding expressly
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provided for an arms-for-hostages swap. Poindexter claimed,
however, that the Finding "did not in any way present a total,
accurate description of what Mr. McFarlane had in mind, what I
had in mind or what the President had in mind" since it failed to
state the strategic interests which the arms transfer sought to
advance. (Poindexter, July 15, 1987, 52-53). (S)
3. The Diversion Memos.
The Committee is expected to question Regan as to his knowledge
of the April 1986 diversion memorandum, and also as to the
diversion memos that North alleges he created and destroyed.
Regan will no doubt repeat his testimony that he did not learn of
the April diversion memo until November 1986, and that he is sure
that the President had no knowledge of any diversion or proposals
of diversion. (Regan's Testimony Before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, December 16, 1986, 66-73). (U)
4. The May 16, 1986 National Security Planning Group (NSPG)
meeting.
The Committee may question Regan on his role as a participant in
the May 16, 1986 NSPG meeting, which involved a lengthy
discussion of potential third-country support for the Contras by
the Saudis, Israelis, South Koreans or Taiwanese. In his March
3, 1987 deposition, Regan recanted his earlier testimony before
the SSCI that he knew in 1985 or 1986 that the Saudis were
providing humanitarian assistance. Regan claimed that to his
knowledge, the President never expressed a view on seeking
third-country aid and that he could not recall any discussion in
1985 or 1986 as to whether the Administration was free to seek
third-country military aid. (Regan's Deposition by the Senate
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, March 3, 1987, 44-45). (S)
5. November 1986 Actions.
Regan is expected to receive close questioning on the White House
actions following disclosure of the Iran-Contra affair;
specifically his involvement in the decision to fire North yet
accept Poindexter's resignation, his knowledge of the false
chronologies, and his participation in any other activities
designed to provide "damage control." These questions should
encompass the steps that led to Regan's resignation in February
1987. (U)
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