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Iran-Contra Hearings – June [May 1987-November 1987] (3)
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Iran-Contra Hearings – June [May 1987-November 1987] (3)
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Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Howard Baker's Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr: Files
Folder Title: Iran-Contra Hearings-June [May 1987-
November 1987] (3)
Box: 3
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at:
[email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name BAKER, HOWARD: FILES
Withdrawer
CAS
1/4/2012
File Folder
IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS - JUNE [MAY-NOVEMBER
FOIA
1987] (3)
M11-391
Box Number
3
BYRNE
5
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
127216 MEMO
WILLIAM LYTTON TO ARTHUR
4 7/21/1987 B6 B7(C)
CULVAHOUSE RE ANTICIPATED
TESTIMONY OF EDWIN MEESE
127217 MEMO
LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE EXPECTED
3 7/22/1987 B1
TESTIMONY OF CASPAR WEINBERGER
PAR 3/17/2006 NLSF97-066/6 #46
127218 MEMO
LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE 7/23/87
4 7/23/1987 B1
TESTIMONY OF GEORGE SHULTZ
R
2/2/2012
F1997-066/6
127219 MEMO
LYTTON TO BAKER RE PRESIDENT'S 7/22/87
1 7/22/1987
MEETING WITH SHULTZ
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
127220 MEMO
LYTTON TO CULVAHOUSE RE
5 7/22/1987 B1
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF SHULTZ
R
5/24/2011
NLSF97-066/6 #48
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
Archivist: kdb
OA/Box:
Box 3
FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
File Folder: Iran-Contra Hearings - - June [May-November 1987]
Date:
08/18/2004
(3)
DOCUMENT NO. &
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
TYPE
1. memo
William Lytton to Arthur Culvahouse re anticipated testimony of
7/21/87
B6
Edwin Meese III, 4p
B7c
2. memo
Lytton to Culvahouse re expected testimony of Caspar Weinberger,
7/22/87
B1
3p PART. 3/17/06 F97-066/6 # 46
3. memo
Lytton to Culvahouse re 7/23/87 testimony of George Shultz, 4p
7/23/87
B1
R 2/2/12 F97-066/6 #127218
4. memo
Lytton to H. Baker re President's 7/22/87 meeting w/Shultz, 1p
7/22/87
[Item is still under review under the provisions of EO 13233]
5.memo
Lytton to Culvahouse re anticipated testimony of Shultz, 5p
7/22/87
B1
R F97-066/6 5/24/11 #48
RESTRICTIONS
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA]
B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOLA].
B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 28, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOP. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
Are
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Testimony of Attorney General Meese
Tuesday Morning, July 28, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of Attorney General Fdwin Meese III at this
morning's session of the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 28, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF EDWIN MEESE III
JULY 28, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)
I.
Overview
Meese gave an opening statement pointing out that he played
three roles as Attorney General: the United States chief law
enforcement officer, legal advisor to the President, and a member
of the Cabinet. His exposure to the Iran-Contra matter touched
on all three roles. As the President's principal legal advisor
he developed over one weekend a factual overview that has been
essentially validated by the past eight months of investigation.
Factual Testimony
As anticipated, Meese stated that his best recollection of
his first involvement in the Iran Contra matter began on January
7, 1986. He described the proposal of the Iranian initiative as
a close call, but that he approved it. He also stated that he
remained unaware of the earlier shipments at that time and that
he first learned of the 1985 shipments in November 1986. He
believes he met one or two times later that month to discuss the
initiative and eventually concurred with the advice given by
Casey and Sporkin that the arms could be shipped pursuant to a
Finding and that notification to Congress of that Finding could
be delayed. At the time, those present at the meeting expected
the release of the hostages would occur or abort within 30-60
days, and that notification would be given at that time.
Meese was pressed briefly concerning the legislative history
of Section 501 of the National Security Act, and he pointed out
that the length of the delay in notification had been an
unsettled matter of debate in Congress.
Meese testified that he was next involved in early November
1986, as press reports became widespread. He told Charles Cooper
to prepare to give legal advice on the Iran initiative. Meese
attended a meeting on November 10, 1986 with several members of
the NSC. He recalls that the President and the others at the
2
meeting were concerned that the lives of the hostages and the
second channel could be jeopardized by undue disclosure, but that
some public statement should be made. Meese testified that he
understood negotiations were continuing with the Iranians and
that, according to North, two hostages might be released that
weekend. Although Meese cannot specifically recall the matters
addressed in Keel's notes of the meeting, he believed that all
present thought that no one should be too specific in public
statements for fear of endangering the hostages and the moderate
Iranians.
As time went by in November, Meese became increasingly
concerned that, because the initiative was so compartmentalized,
confusion existed in trying to piece together what had happened.
After the President's press conference, Meese became involved in
the preparation of Casey's testimony and Poindexter's
congressional briefing. That night, he was advised by Charles
Cooper that the State Department had certain information
concerning Shultz's knowledge of the November 1985 shipment that
indicated that Casey's proposed testimony was inaccurate. Meese
returned the next morning from West Point, met with the
President, and suggested that someone should attempt to piece the
facts together. The President seemed aware of Shultz's concerns
about U.S. government knowledge of the November 1985 shipment and
agreed an inquiry should take place.
Meese interviewed McFarlane on November 21; Meese stressed to
McFarlane that he should be sure to tell the truth and not to try
to shade it to protect the President. Meese did not recall using
the term "mental finding" with McFarlane or of being relieved by
anything McFarlane told him.
Meese stressed that he still thought there was nothing more
to the discrepencies in testimony than simple confusion.
Meese met at lunch with Cooper and Reynolds on November 22,
1986 where he was told of the diversion memo. They scheduled an
interview the next day with Oliver North. He later talked to
Casey and arranged a meeting with him for that evening. They met
for 30-60 minutes during which Casey told Meese of his
conversation with Roy Furmark. Casey might have mentioned that
the Iranian investors may claim that money from the sales went to
other United States and Israeli projects, but Meese did not
relate this to the diversion of funds to the Contras.
The next day, Meese met with North. Meese recalls trying to
exhaust North's memory concerning the Iran initiative before
confronting him with the diversion memo. Meese testified that
North was shocked at seeing the diversion memo. North then
acknowledged to Meese that the diversion had occurred. Meese
stated that North had told him repeatedly that only Poindexter,
McFarlane and North knew of the diversion. Meese commented that
North appeared to be forthright in his answers and that he
believed what North had said. Meese also stated that, although
3
the diversion memo made it clear that this was not simply a
confusion of testimony, it was still uncertain that any
criminality had taken place.
II.
The President's Knowledge
A. Diversion
Meese testified that the President first learned of the
diversion on November 24, 1986, and decided immediately that
Congress should be briefed and the public told.
B. Boland Amendment
Nothing to report.
C. Iran Operations
See above.
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
Nothing to report.
E. Private Support to Contras
Nothing to report.
F. November 1986 Chronologies
Meese saw a two page NSC chronology at the November 20,
1986 meeting in preparing for Casey's testimony and Poindexter's
briefing. He found the chronology informative, but it led him to
recognize the confusion in various officials' contemporaneous
knowledge of the 1985 shipments.
III. Continuation of Hearing
Meese will resume testifying at 2:00 p.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 27, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
ABR
SUBJECT:
Anticipated Testimony of Attorney General
Edwin Meese III on Tuesday, July 28, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
anticipated testimony of Attorney General Meese at the
Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER
LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
Are
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Anticipated Testimony of Secretary of
Defense Weirberger at the Iran/Contra Hearings
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
anticipated testimony of Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger at the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
EXPECTED TESTIMONY OF CASPAR WEINBERGER
Overview
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, argued against the
proposal to sell arms to Iran in meetings in August and December,
1985, and January, 1986. However, he was criticized by the
Special Review Board for distancing himself from the march of
events and for not being energetic in attempting to protect the
President from the consequences of his personal commitment to
freeing the hostages. Although Weinberger's opposition to the
initiative is well known, he will probably be asked to restate
his arguments to the President for the record, and in particular,
FOIA(b)(1)
to recount what was said in the meeting of December 7, 1985.
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Opposition to the Iran Initiative
When the idea of providing selected military equipment to Iran
surfaced in a draft NSDD dated June 11, 1985, Secretary
Weinberger objected in writing to the proposal. "Under no
circumstances, he wrote on July 16, 1985, "should we now ease
our restriction on arms sales to Iran." He argued that a
reversal of U.S. policy would likely encourage increased arms
sales by other countries to Iran, and possibly alter the
strategic balance in favor of Iran while Khomeini was still the
controlling influence. Weinberger made his arguments vigorously
in the "pajama meeting" of August 1985, and in a meeting on
December 7, 1985. Among the arguments he raised against the plan
were (1) the problems such sales could cause in our relationships
87-TF-0095
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-066/6#46
Copy No. /
LOS , NARA, Date 3/17/06
CLASSIFIED BY DSC
By
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED ON OADR
TOP SECRET
with other countries; (2) the untrustworthiness of the Iranians;
(3) the difficulty in maintaining secrecy given; (4) the legal
requirement of Congressional notice; and (5) the potential
appearance that the U.S. was willing to ransom hostages with
weapons. He told the Special Review Board that, while the
hostage question was discussed each time, so also was the aspect
of securing a better permanent relationship with Iran and the
aspect of preparing for the end of Khomeini's reign. Weinberger
confesses to an "enormous antipathy to the Iranians, " and he
thought the proposal to sell the arms was killed on December 7,
1985. Although the President did not say much at that meeting,
Weinberger received a strong impression that the President agreed
with the arguments against the idea. He was irritated in January
1986 when he saw the issue was again before the President, and
suspected that additional arguments had been. made to the
President in his absence.
In the meeting of January 7, 1986, Secretary Weinberger saw that
his arguments had lost, and that the President was in favor of
the initiative. Weinberger told the Special Review Board that
the President had been fully aware that there were risks in this
transaction. Once the President made the decision, Weinberger
did not revisit the issue with him. However, from time to time
thereafter Weinberger pointed out to Admiral Poindexter that all
of the most dire predictions about the initiative seemed to be
coming true.
(TS)
Weinberger may be invited to comment on the effect of secrecy and
compartmentalization at the policy-making level. Aside from his
suspicion, expressed to the Special Review Board, that arguments
in favor of the initiative were presented to the President in his
absence, Weinberger pointed out that he did not receive the
January 17, 1986 Finding until late 1986. As late as December,
1986, Weinberger complained in writing that he was not being
consulted about ongoing contacts with Iranian elements. "[I]t
seems to me incredibly wrong," he wrote, "that the precise
mechanisms of secrecy and attempts to exclude advisors who, it is
feared may have different views, which helped cause so many of
our present difficulties, are apparently being pursued by the
State Department at this time. " (TS)
Irregularities in the Transfer of TOWs
FOIA(b)(1)
Weinberger insisted that any weapons transfers would have to be
done under the Economy Act. From his testimony, it appears that
Weinberger was not concerned with sidestepping reporting
requirements to Congress when he made this recommendation,
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Other Possible Items of Discussion
In the NSPG meeting of May 16, 1986, Secretary Weinberger
stressed that the U.S. take steps to see that a bad Contradora
agreement not be signed, because Congress would have cut off aid
to the Contras once any treaty were signed. Secretary Weinberger
also urged that monies be found to support the Contras: "We
should try every country we can find, the committees, and the
people of the United States. If the Contras are out of business
in July, " Weinberger said, "we will have to fight there ourselves
some day " He may be challenged to defend or explain his
position. He may also be asked to comment on memos written by
LtCol North to McFarlane that suggest that military aid to
Guatemala and Honduras had been designed to entice those
countries to support the Contras.
(TS)
3
87-TF-0095
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR, Asc
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Testimony of Secretary of State Shultz
Thursday Morning, July 23, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of at this morning's session of the Iran/Cortra
hearings.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
SECRET
127218
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
Wame
B.gt
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF GEORGE SHULTZ
JULY 23, 1987
I.
Overview
Shultz testified that he was not contemporaneously informed
of numerous events regarding the Iran initiative. He first
learned about the January 16 Finding at a November 10, 1986,
meeting of principal advisors in the Oval office (and about the
other Findings even later) ; first learned of direct arms sales
by the USG to Iran in authoritative press reports in November;
first learned of the McFarlane trip to Tehran after it occurred;
first learned of [Saudi] support for the Contras in a June 16,
1986, telephone call from McFarlane that came "out of the clear
blue sky"; and first learned about assistance from [Taiwan] and
the solicitation of [the PRC] for lethal assistance during the
current hearings. (S)
According to Shultz, his desire not to be blamed for leaks
(during a period in which he was opposing lie detector tests as a
means to deal with the problem of leaks) led him to ask
Poindexter to provide only that information about the Iran
initiative that Shultz needed to know to perform his job. Shultz
intended only that "operational details" be kept from him and
testified it was "ridiculous" to consider his statement as a
request not to be told about matters as important as those
mentioned above. (U)
II.
The President's Knowledge
A. Diversion
The Attorney General interviewed Shultz on November 22,
at which time Shultz expressed fear that the Iran initiative
would become "wrapped up" with the Contras. The source of this
fear was the realization that Southern Air Transport had been
involved in both efforts. (U)
B. Boland Amendment
Nothing to report.
87-TF-0097
Copy No.
CLASSIFIED BY DSC
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED ON OADR
NLRR F97-066/4+127218
SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 2/2/12
SECRET
2
C. Iran Operations
Shultz attended the August 6, 1985, meeting which
discussed Israeli proposals for an opening to Iran and the
possibility that delivery of TOWs would lead to release of
hostages. Shultz opposed this idea as a direct arms-for-hostage
swap. The President listened but expressed no view. McFarlane
did not subsequently inform Shultz that the President had
approved the deal. (U)
Shultz (and Weinberger) again opposed the initiative at
a December 7, 1985, meeting; Shultz described the President as
"on the fence. " Shultz said the President was very much involved
in the discussion and deeply concerned with getting the hostages
out, and "you could feel his sense of frustration." In response
to Weinberger's comments about legal problems with arms sales,
the President quipped at one point that "visiting days were
Thursday" but that "the American people will never forgive me if
I fail to get those hostages out over this legal question."
Shultz stated that there was no tone in these comments that the
President advocated violating the law and that they were merely
"the kind of statement that I'm sure we all make sometimes when we
are frustrated." (U)
Shultz and Weinberger again opposed the initiative at a
January 7 meeting, but it was clear this time that they were the
only ones in the room in opposition. The President wanted to
push in the direction of arms sales. Shultz was "puzzled and
distressed" but did not later seek to discuss the matter
privately with President because there could have been no doubt
in the President's mind of his position. (U)
Shultz testified that the President consistently
disagreed that the Iran initiative constituted arms-for-hostages
transactions. In Shultz's view, however, the details to the
program reveal it as constituting arms-for-hostages, and Shultz's
fear of this result was a major reason he opposed the program
throughout. (U)
Shultz continued to voice legal objections to arms
sales at a January 17 "Family Group" lunch at the White House.
No one mentioned the previous day's Finding to Shultz, which
Shultz testified would have mooted his legal concerns. (U)
Shultz testified that he confronted Donald Regan, when
he learned during the May 1986 Tokyo Economic Summit, about a
possible arms transaction involving British entrepreneur Tiny
Rowlands. Regan was upset and said later the President was also
upset. Poindexter told Shultz that the USG was not involved in
this deal, but did not mention pending plans for the McFarlane
delegation's trip to Iran. Later, when North suggested a
high-level meeting to precede the McFarlane trip, Poindexter
replied "I don't want a meeting with [the President], Shultz and
Weinberger. "
(U)
SECRET
SECRET
3
After the Attorney General's November 25 press
conference, Shultz moved to use the Second Channel as an
intelligence channel (rather than a policy channel), and Under
Secretary Armacost and DCI Casey made an agreement to this
effect. Nevertheless, the State Department was later informed
that Casey had, through Donald Regan, been successful in having
the President change this decision and have the second channel
continue to be used for "policy" purposes. Shultz criticized
Casey for appealing to the President to reneg on the agreement he
had reached with the State Department. (U)
Shultz learned about the so-called Nine-Point Plan on
December 13, 1986, and immediately contacted the President about
it, to discuss, most importantly, the provision concerning the
DaWa prisoners. Shultz described the President as "astonished"
when he learned about this, and said, "I have never seen him [the
President] so mad." " (U)
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
Shultz advised at a June 25, 1984, NSPG meeting, that a
formal Attorney General opinion should be obtained before
soliciting third countries. McFarlane agreed at that meeting not
to solicit pending obtaining that opinion, but Shultz was not
told during this time that McFarlane had already been meeting
with [Saudi] officials in connection with a possible
contribution. (S)
E. Private Support to Contras
Nothing to report.
F. November 1986 Chronologies
Shultz became concerned that the President's advisers
were misleading him about the initiative and were seeking to use
his skills as a communicator to bail them out. In Shultz's view,
he was the one who remained loyal to the President because he was
battling to make sure the President had the facts. (Shultz
testified that Poindexter and Casey were "on the other side" in
this battle). Shultz explained that his televised comment on
November 15 that he was not speaking for the Administration when
he said there should be no more arms sales resulted from his
inability to clear that position with the White House the
previous day. (U)
Shultz met with the President before his November 19
news conference and said the President was not being furnished
the information be needed. Shultz argued it was dangerous to say
the operation had not involved arms for hostages, and mentioned
specifically McFarlane's statements in November 1985 about arms
that would be shipped to Iran to effect release of the hostages.
The President said he had known about that. (U)
SECRET
SECRET
4
Shultz called the President after the press conference
and said, although the conference was courageous, many statements
had been wrong or misleading. He had a "long and tough" meeting
with the President the next day reviewing the statements made.
Shultz testified that the President firmly had in his mind that
he had authorized an effort to get an opening to Iran, and that
arms and hostages were ancillary to that effort. Shultz again
expressed concern that the President's advisers were ill-serving
him. (U)
III. Continuation of Hearing
Shultz will resume testifying at 2:30 p.m.
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JP.
FROM:
DEPUTY SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE 3.14 PRESIDENT
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
William
SUBJECT:
The President's Meeting with
Secretary of State George Shultz,
Wednesday, July 22, 1987, 1:30 p.m.
1.
Secretary Shultz will testify before the Select
Committees tomorrow and Friday.
2.
Secretary Shultz could be asked whether he has
discussed with the President or anyone else at the
White House his testimony or the events under
investigation.
3.
Any discussion today between the President and
Secretary Shultz about his testimony or those events
could be inaccurately construed as an attempt to "get
their stories straight".
4.
Therefore, the President should not raise with
Secretary Shultz the facts about which Secretary Shultz
will testify.
5.
If Secretary Shultz raises the issue, the President
should not compare his recollection of events to that
of Secretary Shultz.
6.
At mcst, the President should limit his comments to his
belief that Secretary Shultz will do his best to
testify as truthfully and accurately as possible.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
Ase
SUBJECT:
Anticipated Testimony
of Secretary of State George Shultz,
July 23-24, 1987
Attached is a memorandum prepared by Counsel's office
of the anticipated testimony of Secretary of State George
Shultz at the Iran/Contra hearings on July 23-24, 1987.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
William
bit
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
ANTICIPATED TESTIMONY OF GEORGE SHULTZ
Secretary Shultz is scheduled to testify on July 23-24. He
will be questioned about his opposition to the Iran initiative
and whether the NSC misled him about it at key points. He will
also be questioned about support for the Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance during the Boland prohibitions.
I. Iran Initiative
(A) Background
Shultz will testify about the importance of Iran to USG
overall strategic interests, USG interests in ending the
Iran-Iraq war, efforts to persuade other nations to cease selling
arms to Iran (Operation Staunch), differences between Israeli and
American interests with respect to Iran, and the policy against
making concessions to hostage-takers.
(B) Shultz's Role in the Initiative
The Tower Board criticized Shultz for distancing
himself from the issues raised by the Iran initiative rather than
energetically "attempting to protect the President from the
consequences of his personal commitment to freeing the hostages."
In this connection, Admiral Poindexter testified last week that
Shultz requested to be informed only as necessary to do his job.
Shultz conceded to the Tower Board that this request was probably
a mistake because it was taken as "license to proceed without
telling me anything," but that he nevertheless consistently
opposed selling arms to Iran. The President stated last March 14
that Shultz (and Defense Secretary Weinberger) strongly advised
against the initiative and thus "discharged their
responsibilities as my advisers and my subordinates."
(C) Shultz's Version of Events
In his interview with the Tower Board, Shultz divided
his knowledge of, and participation in, the Iran initiative into
three periods:
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F97-066/6#48
BY RW
NARA
DATE
5/24/11
(i) June - November 1985
Shultz told the Tower Board that there were debates
during this period whether to transfer arms as part of an effort
to improve relations with Iran and secure the release of the U.S.
hostages in Iran. He learned of two proposed arms sales during
this period, but was not informed that either was consummated.
Shultz opposed the suggestion of arms sales in commenting on
a draft NSDD in June, but agreed that McFarlane should "make a
tentative show of interest without commitment" when the Israelis
raised the possibility in July of an initiative involving arms,
hostages and a strategic opening. Shultz strongly opposed sales
of arms to Iran in an August 6 meeting with the President and his
top advisers. Shultz knew that McFarlane thereafter continued to
pursue the initiative, but "assumed this was on the basis we had
discussed, with no commitments."
In November, while in Geneva for the Soviet summit,
McFarlane informed Shultz that the release of four hostages was
imminent and that Israel would ship 100 HAWK missiles to Iran.
Shultz complained that he had been informed SO late that it was
impossible to stop the operation, but expressed his hope that the
hostages would be released.
(ii) December 1985 - May 1986
Shultz told the Tower Board that he had "strong
evidence" during this period that we were trying to open a
dialogue with Iran but were unwilling to sell arms. After the
November HAWK shipment fell apart, in anticipation of the
December 7 top-level meeting with the President, Poindexter
briefed Shultz about the history of the Iran initiative.
Poindexter stated that the project's emphasis was on relations
with post-Khomeini Iran rather than on hostages, and that weapons
were being discussed. (Shultz also learned that the November
transaction had unravelled because Iran rejected a shipment of
HAWKS). According to Shultz, he became aware that NSC people
took credit for the September release of Reverend Weir, but was
not convinced that Weir's release was something other than it
appeared on the surface.
At the December 7 meeting, Shultz argued that the operation
should be stopped lest we signal that Iran "can kidnap people for
profit.' The President remained non-committal during this
meeting, and the decision was made to send McFarlane to London.
Privately, Poindexter told Shultz that he had recommended
disengaging, but that the President did not want to.
Shultz learned from his staff on December 10 that the
Iranians had rejected McFarlane's proposal in London to proceed
without including arms and that the operation "was completely
turned off." Poindexter told Shultz in January that Amiram Nir
had attempted to revive the initiative through a plan calling for
release of Hezbollah prisoners held in southern Lebanon and
shipment of 3000 TOWs in exchange for the American hostages.
Shultz again vigorously opposed arms sales in a January 7 meeting
with the President. Shultz received reports on January 22, which
he considered implausible, about a possible exchange of Shiite
prisoners in Lebanon for the American hostages. Shultz heard
nothing about the January 17 Finding or anything else of
substance until, on February 28, Poindexter informed him that a
hostage release was imminent, and that the Iranians sought a
high-level dialogue for which McFarlane would travel to
Frankfurt. Shultz recommended giving McFarlane instructions to
govern his talks, and Poindexter in the next few days showed him
"terms of reference" that did not mention arms sales. On March
11, however, Poindexter told Shultz that the arrangement had
fallen through.
(iii) May - November 1986
Shultz told the Tower Board that he received no
information from the White House during this period that an arms
transfer had occurred. Shultz complained to Poindexter after
learning on May 3 from Ambassador Price in London about an arms
deal involving British entrepreneur Tiny Rowlands. Poindexter
responded to Shultz that this "was not our deal" and told
Ambassador Price that there was no more than a "smidgeon" of
reality to the report. Poindexter and DCI Casey soon thereafter
told Shultz "that the operation had ended and the people involved
had been told to 'stand down. In the following months, Shultz
heard intermittent rumors, but nothing official, that the
operation may have resumed.
On November 4, when the press reported McFarlane's trip to
Tehran, Shultz recommended to Poindexter that the Administration
make the facts public "right away." Later in November, Shultz's
insistence that the the USG had known contemporaneously that the
November 1985 shipment contained HAWKs led to the decision that
Attorney General Meese should conduct a factfinding inquiry.
When a State Department representative attended a December
13 meeting with Iranian representatives, Shultz learned that the
Iranians had been offered assistance in connection with the Da'wa
prisoners in Kuwait as part of a nine-point plan discussed in
October. Shultz described the President as "stricken" when
notified of this.
II. Support for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
Shultz was unaware of the diversion of funds from the Iran
arms sales to the Contras, but will likely be questioned about
his knowledge of other efforts to assist them.
A. Relationship with Oliver North
Shultz will likely be questioned about Olvier North's
testimony that Shultz congratulated him for support of the
Contras at a September 1986 reception and that this reflected
Shultz's knowledge of North's activities. Shultz will also be
questioned about his instruction in September 1985 for Assistant
Secretary Abrams to "monitor Ollie" and whether Shultz later
followed up that instruction.
B. Third Country Solicitation
Shultz strenuously opposed soliciting third countries to
assist the Contras at a June 25, 1984, NSPG meeting, arguing that
the USG "may raise and spend funds only through an appropriation
of the Congress." Committee members may cite these remarks in an
attempt to elicit criticism from Shultz of the Administration's
approach to fundraising for the Contras during the Boland
prohibitions.
Shultz was unaware of the Saudi contribution to the Contras
until informed by McFarlane in June 1986. McFarlane testified
that he told Shultz in 1984 that the Contra funding problem "had
been provided for through the end of the year." McFarlane could
not recall whether he told Shultz that a third country had
provided assistance and Shultz did not press the matter. Shultz
may be questioned whether he chose not to know.
Shultz advocated solicitation in a May 16, 1986, NSPG
meeting under the State Department's authority to solicit
humanitarian assistance contained in the FY-86 Intelligence
Authorization Act. He ultimately authorized Elliott Abrams to
solicit an official of the Government of Brunei. Shultz will
likely be questioned about Abrams' assertions that he withheld
information about this solicitation during a Senate Intelligence
Committee briefing because he lacked authority to discuss it, and
that he sought authorization from Shultz to discuss the matter
quickly after that briefing.
C. Knowledge of the Hasenfus Flight
Like numerous other Administration officials, Shultz
initially denied any USG connection with the Hasenfus flight.
Shultz will likely be questioned about the information upon which
he based these denials, and also about Elliott Abrams' testimony
that he raised the issue with Shultz promptly upon learning that
there was USG involvement.
D. Other Activities in Support of the Contras
Shultz may be questioned about what was reported to him
regarding a variety of other Contra support activies in which
North was involved. The topics may include Ambassador Tambs'
involvement in helping to "open the southern front" and the
construction (and later the closing) of the Santa Elena airstrip
in Costa Rica; General Singlaub's agreement for the "United
States" to provide military equipment and training in exchange
for Eden Pastora's moving his troops into Nicaragua; Singlaub's
discussions with Elliott Abrams concerning solicitation of Taiwan
and South Korea in the spring of 1986; the use, with the U.S.
Embassy's possible knowledge of Ilopango air base in El Salvador
as a resupply staging area; and whether the use of emergency
funding to support Honduras after a March 1986 Nicaraguan
incursion into Honduran territory amounted to indirect military
aid for the Contras.
Additional questioning may probe Elliott Abrams' credibility
and Shultz's decision to support Abrams despite recent
Congressional criticism of his role.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNFTH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
ARe
SUBJECT:
Testimony of Rear Admiral John Foindexter
Tuesday Morning, July 21, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of Admiral John Poindexter at this morning's
session of the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
RHETT B. DAWSON
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN
M. MARLIN FITZWATER
THOMAS C. GRISCOM
FROM:
ARTHUR E. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
ABC
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Testimony of Rear Admiral John Poindexter
Monday Morning, July 20, 1987
Attached is a summary prepared by Counsel's Office of the
testimony of Admiral John Poindexter at this morning's
session of the Iran/Contra hearings.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR.
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
SUBJECT:
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER
JULY 21, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)
I.
Overview
The testimony of Admiral Poindexter continued this morning
with questioning and statements by various members of the
Committees.
On questioning by Representative McCollum, Poindexter
testified that it is safe to assume that, during the period
Poindexter was National Security Advisor, Donald Regan knew
everything about the Iran initiative and Contra resupply effort
that the President knew.
Senator Nunn asked Poindexter about a November 20, 1985
interview of the President by Reverend Pat Robertson in which
Robertson asked the President whether it was true that a White
House staff member had been recently dispatched to Iran to try to
gain release of the hostages. Poindexter was unaware of the
interview.
Nunn also asked Poindexter about his lunch with DCI Casey
on Saturday, November 22, 1986. Poindexter could not recall
North being there. He stated that he was sure that diversion was
not discussed; he also testified that he was unaware Casey knew
of diversion. He cannot specifically recall the topic of
conversation, but said he thinks much of the luncheon was devoted
to Casey debriefing Poindexter on Casey's Congressional
appearances the previous day.
Poindexter reiterated that he does not recall McFarlane
ever saying that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC.
II. The President's Knowledge
A. Diversion
Poindexter testified that when he submitted his
resignation to the President on November 25, 1986, the President
did not ask Poindexter whether he had authorized the diversion
and did not express displeasure about not being told of the
diversion.
Poindexter testified that he does not think Casey told
the President about diversion.
B. Boland Amendment
Nothing to report.
C. Iran Operations
Nothing to report.
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
Nothing to report.
E. Private Support to Contras
Nothing to report.
F. November 1986 Chronologies
Nothing to report.
III. Continuation of Hearing
The questioning of Admiral Poindexter will continue at
2:00 p.m. and is expected to conclude this afternoon. Chairman
Hamilton announced that the Committees will be in recess tomorrow
and will hear the testimony of Secretary Schultz on Thursday and
Friday. The hearings will resume on Tuesday, July 28. The
remaining witnesses are expected to be Attorney General Meese,
Donald Regan and Secretary Weinberger.
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
William
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER
JULY 20, 1987 (MORNING SESSION)
I.
Overview
Much of this morning's questioning of Admiral Poindexter
amounted to a rehash of parts of his prior testimony. At one
point, Senator William Cohen (R-Maine) asked Poindexter if he
would be willing in executive session to describe other ongoing
NSC-sponsored covert operations about which the President had
withheld notification and to detail other instances of covert
operations for which retroactive findings had been prepared.
This issue was left unresolved.
After lengthy examination by Rep. Thomas Foley (D-Wash.),
Poindexter finally conceded that, stripped to its essentials, the
attempt to establish bona fides with the Iranians resulted in a
trade of "arms for hostages."
Speaking to the Boland Amendment, Rep. Dick Cheney
(R-Wyoming) offered his view that it did not apply to either the
President or his staff. He complained that he along with some
other Administration supporters were undermined by incorrect
White House guidance supplied to them in the wake of the initial
disclosures of the Iran initiative. He also offered his
conclusion that whatever might be said about misleading Congress,
it was ultimately "stupid" for an administration to do so.
II.
The President's Involvement
A.
Diversion
Admiral Poindexter reiterated that he did not inform
the President of the diversion to protect him. He described the
diversion as a mere "technical aspect" of the Iran operation
rather than a substantive decision. He said that the President's
current credibility on this issue, which he rates as high, "was
part of my plan." He further stated that he never asked North to
be the "fall guy" and also never discussed the operation's
plausible deniability with anyone. On Senator Baker's statement
that the President would not have approved the diversion,
Poindexter stated simply that the contradiction of this position
with his own would have to stand.
B. Boland Amendment
Admiral Poindexter testified that in briefing the
President on his (Poindexter's) trip to Central America in
December 1985, he told the President of the Santa Elena airstrip
in Costa Rica being built to recover private aircraft involved in
Contra resupply. Although his primary purpose in briefing the
President on this matter was to demonstrate the high degree of
Costa Rican cooperation, he did not believe that he told the
President of any of the details of either Ambassador Tambs' or
LtCol North's involvement in securing Costa Rican cooperation in
the effort. Poindexter did acknowledge that the President had
not been left with the impression that the effort on the airstrip
was purely private. He did not recall covering with the
President North's request of General Secord to manage the
resupply effort. Poindexter recalled having been advised by
North that a photo-album on the Contra aerial resupply effort was
available for the President to peruse, but Poindexter neither saw
it himself nor showed it to the President.
C. Iran Operation
Admiral Poindexter reaffirmed that the President had
approved the so-called "nine point plan" worked out with the
second channel which provided for sequential release of hostages
and deliveries of arms to Iran, but stated that the briefing of
this issue to the President, which was conducted during the 1986
campaign, was "probably very short. " When the Iran arms sales
started to become exposed, Poindexter testified that the
President felt that the Administration had to "continue to
withhold as much as possible" to attempt to keep the ongoing
initiative to Iran intact notwithstanding the prior disclosures.
D. Third Country Aid to Contras
Nothing to report.
E. Private Support to Contras
Admiral Poindexter testified that he did not recall
telling the President specifically about the NSC's coordination
of private Contra support efforts, but stated that the President
knew North was the chief liaison with the Contra leadership. He
testified unequivocally that the President was unaware of North's
efforts to get the Contra leadership in touch with David Walker,
the former British SAS officer. When asked whether the President
authorized North's support of the aerial Contra resupply
operation, Poindexter stated that the President's authorization
of it was "not that specific."
2
III. Continuation of the Hearings
Examination of Admiral Poindexter will continue at 2:00
p.m.
3