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66330334
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Pakistan Nuclear Programs (Senator Glenn) 03/16/87-05/31/1987
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66330334
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Pakistan Nuclear Programs (Senator Glenn) 03/16/87-05/31/1987
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Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Howard Baker's Subject Files
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1988-12-31
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1988
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1987-01-01
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
Folder Title: Pakistan Nuclear Programs
(Senator Glenn) 03/16/87-05/31/1987
Box: 4
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at:
[email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
Archivist: kdb
OA/Box:
Box 4
FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
File Folder: Pakistan Nuclear Program (Sen. Glenn)
Date: 08/04/2004
03/16/1987-05/31/1987
DOCUMENT NO.
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
& TYPE
1. memo
William Graham to H. Baker, 1p
5/20/87
B1
2. memo (90493)
Frank Carlucci to Chief of Staff re 5/20/87 meeting with Pakistani
5/18/87
B1
Foreign Minister Khan (w/notations), 2p
3. letter
transmittal of message from Gen Zia to Reagan (w/notations), 3n
5/13/87
B1
R- 5/24/11 F97-066/6# 100
(w/NotAtions)
4. talking points
for 5/20/87 meeting between Khan and Chief of Staff), 2p
n.d.
B1
R 9/25/12 F97-066/4#101
5. note
SSS to Sue (w/note added), 1p
3/16/87
B1
/
R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 # 102
6. memo (1852)
Carlucei to Chief of Staff re the latter's call to Sen Glenn, 2p
3/16/87
B1
R 5/24/11 F97-066/6#103
RESTRICTIONS
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA]
B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER
LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
HAM I
MA:
Delivered goday.
Extremely thin on
EMBASSY OF FAKIS
23:5 MASSADHUSETTE AVENUE
nuclear - except
WASHINGTON 6120005
a strong plea for
May
1989
6.yr waiter
MAY 1987
AMBASSADOR OF FAKISTAN
H.H.A.
HAS SEEN
Mr. President, Sir,
see the covere to
I am commanded by General M.Zia-ul-Hag,
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to convey
you the following message:-
"Dear Mr. President,
is
It was a great pleasure to speak with
you on the telephone. I am writing this letter to
reiterate my deepest appreciation for the earnest
efforts being made by you personally and the high
officials of your Administration to secure Congres
ional approval of the post87 Aid Package. I am
particularly grateful for the most opportune and
forceful intercession with key members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee which averted a
set-back to the programme.
Having closely followed the trend of
the Congressional debate on the issue, so vital to
our interests, we draw satisfaction and encourage-
ment from the broad consensus that continues to
exist in support of the basic rationale for a
revitalized friendship between our two countries
which has undoubtedly been a great partnership for
peace and progress.
The current Aid Package, by providing
major support to our development efforts and by
strengthening our defence capabilities, has enable
DECLASSIFIED
us to withstand the dire consequences of the Sovie'
NLRR 066/6+ 100
BY
RUS
NARA
DATE
5/24/11
- 2 -
intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan has stood
firm in the face of Soviet pressures and intimi-
dation, in the secure knowledge of America's
continuing support. If the Soviet Union is indeed
reappraising its position in Afghanistan, the
steadfast resolve of our two countries to uphold
the legitimate rights of the heroic people of
Afghanistan has surely been a key factor.
As we look to the future, with the South
Asian region facing threats of instability, I see
no substitute for our constructive and cooperative
ties which, I am confident, will continue to be the
mainstay of peace and security in the region. I,
therefore, earnestly hope that the Congress will in
the long-term strategic interests of our two
countries, endorse the programme of economic and
military cooperation that was worked out by the two
governments last year for the 1987-93 period.
Mr. President, we are not oblivious to
proliferation concerns in the United States. In
fact, we are allies of all those who wish to avert
the spread of nuclear weapons. In respect of our ow
region, Pakistan has put forward a set of six
proposals to India to solemnise our separate
declarations of non-nuclear intent into a binding
international obligation. While a discriminatory
imposition would not be acceptable to our people,
I have no hestitation to reassure you that the
Government of Pakistan will honour its commitments
to the United States and will not produce any
nuclear weapon.
I would like also to share with Your
Excellency our concerns about the 2-year waiver
recommended by the Congressional Committees. Liable
to undermine confidence in the durability of our
HAB
II
SECRET
SECRET
90493
SYSTEM II
TALKING POINTS
for
The Chief of Staff
and
Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan
May 20, 1987, 10:00 - 10:20 a.m.
-- The President has successfully worked to strengthen
relations with Pakistan. For the past six years, including
the latest victories in HFAC and SFRC. Securing even the
two-year waiver of the Symington Amendment was difficult due
to continuation of certain activities by Pakistan in nuclear
weapons program, about which key members of Congress are
informed.
-- Final Congressional approval of the present package is going
to require more concrete, credible action than heretofore by
the GOP to limit its nuclear program. This will also be
necessary when the time comes for a decision on Presidential
certification.
SECRET
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F97-066/16#101
RW
SECRET
BY
RUS
NARA DATE
5/24/11
9/25/12
SECRET
SECRET
-2-
--
All we've achieved together could be jeopardized by
continuing developments in Pakistan: (a) uranium enrichment
above five percent (5%) ; (b) illegal procurement in the U.S.
(and elsewhere) for the nuclear weapons program;
(c) high-explosives testing. Past actions are becoming
better known, here and abroad, and harming GOP credibility.
Urgent action needed before more revelations come out;
sanctions of some kind a possibility despite GOP support for
Afghan Resistance. (FYI: Our intelligence estimates that
Pakistan is not developing a hydrogen bomb but is working on
a fission device.)
--
President mentioned these in January letter to President
Zia, as in several earlier communications. No concrete,
credible action yet. Zia's May 13 letter is very
disappointing. President needs more when time comes to
certify again in October on Pak program. Illegal
procurement actions can be especially explosive with
Congress and public, yet they continue. Why?
SECRET
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
3/16/87
Sue:
In the safe is a secret: memo
DECLASSIFIED
dealing with a Congressionsl
phone call that Senator
Baker is going to make. Note
that this letter seems to be
related.
SSS
3/25 Sue reported that Ball
asked HHB not to place
this call. Related corres-
pendence from Achamma
C handerse Karan dated 3/12/87
blueshuted today to nsc.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F97-066/6#102
BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/1
SECRET
SECRET
1852
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1987
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF
FROM:
FRANK C. CARLUCCI
n
SUBJECT:
Your Call to Senator Glenn
The President will be responding to Senator Glenn's letter. Your
call will help clarify for the Senator how the Administration is
approaching the Pakistan nuclear program, overall
non-proliferation policy on the post-'87 security assistance
program for Pakistan, and our support for the Afghan Resistance.
The key point is that the Administration has not sacrificed
non-proliferation because of Afghanistan. We have made some
progress, despite the regional complications caused by Indian
nuclear program, and are currently trying even harder--as Glenn
knows from talking to Ambassador Hinton. However, a suspension
of military assistance would undo what has been gained, encourage
accelerated Pak (and Indian) nuclear development, and increase
risks of regional conflict. It would also seriously endanger
continued Pak support for the Resistance and call into question
U.S. reliability in tough situations.
Talking Points:
-- The President wants to reply to your personally. He has not
sacrificed U.S. policy on non-proliferation for the sake of
protecting our policy in Afghanistan.
-- Both non-proliferation and Afghanistan are important to this
Administration. Both have global implications. Our record
is a strong one on both issues.
For example, the President has personally laid down markers
on Pak nuclear restraint when President Zia came to
Washington in December 1982. These have been adhered to by
the Pakistanis. The GOP has not manufactured, tested or
transferred a nuclear weapon, nor has it gone in for
unsafeguarded reprocessing of plutonium, despite its
capability to do so.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRR
F97-066/6#103
BY
RW
5/24/11
SECRET
SECRET
-2-
As you know, Pak reactions on nuclear issues are partly
determined by what India does. We have had some success
with India but less than with Pakistan.
--
The President sent Under Secretary Armacost and Don Fortier
on a special mission to India and Pakistan in September 1985
to press the GOP and the GOI to prevent advent of nuclear
weapons in South Asia. The December 1985 verbal agreement
between Gandhi and Zia on non-attack on nuclear facilities
(which would mean another Indo-Pak war) was partly a direct
result of our effort.
As you know from talking to Armacost and Ambassador Hinton,
we are pressing Pakistan even harder--and in public--to come
to grips with the problems of credibility and controls. Our
focus is on enrichment and a cessation of non-nuclear
testing. The President has also sent a letter to PM Gandhi
urging cooperation and Armacost is talking to the Soviets
about the problem.
Stopping military assistance at this point when the Soviets
are increasing military pressure (296 violations of Pak
airspace between January 1 - February 28) will only cause
the Pakistanis to drop support for Afghanistan.
Furthermore, it will speed up Pak efforts to go to nuclear
weapons, as happened under Carter Administration cut-off in
1979.
We want to work with you on nuclear non-proliferation,
especially in South Asia. However, we do believe that a
suspension of current military assistance on holding up the
new six-year program for Pakistan would be a serious mistake
for non-proliferation and for Afghanistan.
SECRET
SECRET
strategic cooperation, it is likely also to be
exploited by our adversaries. Already Moscow is
alleging that the U.S. is applying pressure on
Pakistan. Furthermore, the Government would be
embarrassed because the short waiver would be
construed as a demonstration of lack of US support
for the democratic process in Pakistan.
The adverse impact of a 2-vear waiver would
also send the wrong signal to the Soviet which,
believing that the US commitment to present policy
to be liable to change, might decide to postpone
review of present policy.
I, therefore, request you, Mr. President, to
maintain the efforts of your Administration towards
seeking a full 6-year waiver in respect of the post-8:
programme. This would greatly reinforce growing public
confidence in the commitment of the United States to
Pakistan and further invigorate our quest for regional
harmony and stability.
With profound regards,
Yours sincerely,
General
M. Zia-ul-Haq"
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my
highest consideration.
(Jamsheed K.A. Marker)
Mr. Ronald W. Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C. 20500