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[Public Mail File Congratulations: 03/18/1987]
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66330694
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[Public Mail File Congratulations: 03/18/1987]
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Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Howard Baker's Congratulations Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
Folder Title: [Public Mail File
Congratulations: 03/18/1987]
Box: 13
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
March 18, 1987
Dear Mr. Doreian:
Thank you for your kind message. I
appreciate your warm words of support
and confidence.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Chief of Staff to the President
Mr. Raymond W. Doreian
533 Stenwyck Circle
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
HHB/SW/WJB/ptf2
HHB-1
65
HAB-1
RAYMOND W. DOREIAN
533 STENWYCK CIRCLE
March 3, 1987
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406
(215) 265-6016
Senator Howard Baker, Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20006
Dear Senator Baker,
Thank you very much for "taking the reins" as Chief of Staff for
Mr. Reagan. As "an American by choice" - former foreign national -
I also believe this to be an "historic presidency".
In fact, it was following "my campaign" for Mr. Reagan's election
in 1980 that I became determined to be an American citizen. Again,
please accept my sincerest thanks for accepting this new responsi-
bility. Would that I could, I would be a patriot in yours, or our
President Reagan's footsteps. I consider it a great honor to have
even the privilege of expressing myself to you on this matter.
Thank you.
Respectfully Doreian
Raymond Rem
RWD/cal
P.S.
which you may find interesting.
I have enclosed a copy of a recent Q letter to Senator Heinz
February 9, 1987
Raymond W. Doreian
533 Stenwyck Circle"
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Senator John Heinz
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Heinz:
Thank you for your most welcome response to my December 30, 1986
letter.
In response to your request pertaining to SDI, I am glad to mention
the following:
SDI is a"martialling point" - one which provides for contem-
porary debate relating to technology, the economy and the common
defense. I believe this is healthy since the proposal's critics
use these very issues in attempting to align the American public
opinion (and the world's) against SDI. (c.f. "the Space Debates" of
the 1960's) we do well to review our commitment to progress honestly
and as openly as is prudently possible, and proceed for the common
good.
SDI provides us, the United States of America, to focus on
a single "international" issue and demonstrate our willingness to
provide the leadership with the necessary commitment of resources
to establish "western democracy" as the leading system of world
government - for the people and by the people - via the representative
republic form that we enjoy.
Also, I have attached a copy of a recent article appearing in the
February 2, 1987 issue of "Defense News". I believe this article
provides additional insight to the value of SDI.
Finally, while recognizing the need to provide help for the indigent,
assistance to the poor to escape the cycle, and an "absolute" directive/
direction relating to the increasing strains being placed on all of us
via a health-care burden crisis of unacceptable social blights,
particularly AIDS and out-of-wedlock pregnancy - read "promiscuous
sexual activities/irresponsible fathering" - these arguments are not
contrary to SDI and its potential for achievable worldwide (social)
benefit. LIFE!
-2-
February 9, 1987
Raymond W. Doreian
533 Stenwyck Circle
King of Prussia, PA 19406
In very fact, our failure to provide both moral and responsible
leadership in the social, economic and defense arenas for the whole
world will be of no value if the world's stability is challenged at
every turn by a thrust from one quarter or another.
In this constitution year, 1987, let us resolve to determine a
national agenda for communication to the world - one of morally
responsible leadership - with the desire for the benefits of our
system of government to flow peacefully to all men in all lands.
Respectfully, yours sincerely
Raymond W. Doreian
RWD/cal
CC: Mr. Lawrence A. Coughlin, M.C.
COMMENTARY
OPINION
LETTERS
INSIDE VIEW
dicating any lack of commitment to
long-term goals.
There is little sense in debating
whether 20 or 30 years from now the
instruments for long-range nuclear
Consider What SDI Might Accomplish
bombardment will have gone the way of
the horse cavalry. Only time well
spent can provide the answer. It is far
If America Does Not Pursue Project, No One Will Ever Know
more useful to consider what SDI
By COLIN GRAY
might accomplish in this century to de-
For all the doctrinal refinement of
feat Soviet military strategy and
In the 1960s the U.S. government
U.S. and NATO nuclear strategy over
hence provide some major near-term
made a virtue of necessity when it de-
the past 15 years, the keystone in the
gains for deterrence.
cided to elevate the contemporary
arch of deterrence remains the common
New missile and augmented air de-
military incapacity to protect the home-
sense proposition that events could
DRAWING BY MARGARET KING
fense deployments could, if we seize the
land to the status of a high principle
escape rational strategic control and
gress. The SDI could lead to a deter-
opportunity, make the difference be-
of statecraft. Vulnerability, we were
produce a nuclear holocaust so be
rence that is superior to that which we
tween NATO holding in Europe and
told, is not only inevitable, it is desir-
exceedingly careful. The following
know today in its robustness under
NATO not holding in Europe. Long
able. Stability, would prosper if societ-
needs to be said about nuclear strate-
pressure.SDI may not, in fact, lead to
before we could place an impenetrable,
ies were unambiguously vulnerable
gy and vulnerable societies:
weapon products that could accom-
thoroughly reliable lid over the Soviet
and weapons were unambiguously
First, while the prospect of a nu-
plish these desirable ends. But if we do
Union and its missile submarines at sea,
invulnerable.
clear holocaust is in principle profound-
not pursue it we can never know.
we could drastically reduce the ex-
Mutual vulnerability of societies
ly deterring, in practice the prospect
Fifth, President Reagan has stat-
pected military returns from strikes
was held to provide an existential deter-
of a bilateral - even a general - holo-
ed on many occasions that the United
against NATO's infrastructure in Eu-
rence. Acceptance of such vulnerabil-
caust, is even more self-deterring.
States does not seek unilateral advan-
rope and the logistic train back to the
ity would be the key to the negotiability
Second, heavy reliance upon nu-
tage through the development of new
United States. The most substantial
of arms control regimes and the mini-
clear threats in one' strategy is far
strategic defences. It is my belief that
and potentially deterring assets of the
mization of incentives to race after the
more debilitating politically for a de-
unless the Soviets judge that they will be
Western alliance are placed at a se-
illusion of military advantage in the
mocracy than for a dictatorship.
placed at a considerable military,
vere discount by NATO's persisting
nuclear arms competition. If unaccept-
Third, even very unlikely events
hence political, disadvantage, they will
overreliance upon hopefully con-
able damage is identified with some
can occur. A nuclear-heavy strategy
not negotiate seriously with respect
trolled and probably early nuclear
"magic fraction" of society destroyed,
would be prone to fail us. It is indeed
to a partially cooperative defensive
escalation.
the size and quality of a strategic ar-
essential that our strategy should raise
transition. Furthermore, I find the
Strictly speaking, strategic defense
senal can be determined with reference
very healthy anxieties in Moscow.
admittedly distant prospect of a U.S. ad-
is strategy neutral. We could seek to
to the finite number of targets, the
But it is no less essential that our strate-
vantage in strategic forces to be at-
confine it to roles entirely supportive
character of those targets, the reliability
gy be one which an American presi-
tractive. In fact, if an unmistakable U.S.
of existing military policy - increasing
and readiness of weapons and the
dent, soberly and responsibly, would
advantage could be regained in stra-
Soviet military uncertainties at the
scale of attrition that might be suffered
judge it to be in the U.S. interest actu-
tegic forces, it would pump some new
margin, though still usefully, but not
as a consequence of offensive or de-
ally to implement. Those who criticize
vitality back into the idea of deliber-
asking ourselves whether strategic
fensive counterforce on the part of the
the idea of an offense-defense bal-
ate and controlled escalation that is cen-
defense perhaps could alter the very
enemy.
ance in our strategy should not be per-
tral to NATO strategy.
terms of deterrence. Given the enor-
The logic of mutual assured vulner-
mitted to escape facing up to the al-
Critics of SDI have not been slow to
mous economic and political strengths
ability is almost elegant in it simplicity
ternative. At the present time it is U.S.
notice that at different times senior
of the Western alliance, I suggest that
The arms race is driven, allegedly, by
policy that we do not rule out the first
members of the administration have
we should endeavor in the near term to
the hope for counterforce success and
use of nuclear weapons. The only theory
emphasized different missions for stra-
develop active defenses that would
anxiety over the counterforce poten-
that we have, extant, for the limita-
tegic defense. It seems to me that we
enable us to relegate all nuclear weap-
tial of the enemy. Both very accurate
tion of damage to North America, is the
should deploy strategically useful de-
ons to counterdeterrent roles; and in
strategic offensive weapons, and
hope that the Soviets would exercise
fenses when we are able to do so,
the long term to build very formidable
strategic defensive weapons intended to:
a great measure of self-restraint in the
even though we anticipate being able to
physical barriers against offensive
protect society are destabilizing, be-
weight and kind of their nuclear tar-
deploy far more useful defenses in
nuclear action, so that if we misread So-
cause they could threaten the effective-
geting. I suspect that a restrained coun-
later years. It is extremely important
viet determination or capacity for fol-
ness of the deterrent of the enemy.
termilitary reply by the Soviet Union
that Soviet designers and planners of
ly, there would be very sharp limits to
In the heat of debate it is some-
to a relatively small-scale U.S. nuclear
offensive forces should face an open-
the worst that they could do.
times forgotten that (mutual) assured
initiative against their homeland most
ended SDI threat to all of the pur-
It seems that a great deal of the
destruction is not and has never been
likely would entail a strike back by sev-
poses to which they might apply their
anti-SDI case amounts to a rush of
the nuclear strategy of the United
eral thousands of nuclear weapons.
missiles and aircraft. Similarly, it is
grossly premature judgment by peo-
States. Indeed, unless you see some
Fourth, it is one thing to accept
critical to the scale of the potential suc-
ple who have learned their lines and are
merit in a Carthaginian peace, assured
the total vulnerability of one's society, if
cess of the SDI that Soviet weapon
operating wholly in an adversarial
destruction is not a concept of strate-
there is no practical choice; it is quite
designers should not know in the 1980s
mode. There is nothing technically out-
gy at all. Strategy is the guidance of mili-
another to choose to perpetuate that
or 1990s that they can rely on a free
rageous about the idea of strategic
tary power for the goals set by policy.
condition, as the inexorable conse-
ride in boost-phase or early mid-course.
defense - after all it is 42 years since
It is difficult to conceive of any U.S. pol-
quence of failing to support a research
While keeping an open mind on the
the German V-2 rockets flew in 1944.
icy purpose that could be served by
effort to see if strategic defenses that
possibility that one day multilayered de-
Finally, in all the nonsense that has
killing tens of millions of Soviet citizens.
could provide a useful level of protec-
fenses (including air defenses) may
been written about a possible "grand
But assured destruction is an awe-
tion are achievable. The Strategic De-
be able to reduce the vulnerability of
compromise" in arms control, there
some and awful possibility.
fense Initiative (SDI) is a moral impera-
U.S. society to the condition perhaps
has been scarcely any recognition of the
tive; the prospects for affordable
of the mid-1950s, which is to say a con-
fact that we have already been down
Colin S. Gray is president of the
technical success seem to be high
dition where catastrophic but far
the grand compromise path it was
National Institute for Public Policy in
enough that no responsible adminis-
from terminal damage should be ex-
called SALT I. I am still waiting for
Fairfax, Va., and is the author of
tration should do other than pay the for-
pected, the nearer-term benefits of
critics of SDI to propose interesting
many books on military strategy.
midable research and development
SDI for deterrence should be analyzed
schemes for the radical reduction of
entry price so the policy debate can pro-
on their merits and not treated as in-
Soviet air defenses.
Continuous Air Attacks Drop Bomb on Iranian Morale
only opposition appears to
sources finally agree that the re-
MIDDLETON, from Page 19
come from some anti-aircraft
cent heavy losses to the Irani-
to four timesa day from mid-
ters is likely to kill and wound
guns stationed at a barracks in
an army in its drive on Basra
steadily improving air and
night to early morning by forma-
many and leave hundreds of
the city.
have shaken popular support
ground defenses. The Iranians
tions of from three to six Iraqi
others homeless.
It would be foolish to believe
for the war.
have neither.
aircraft, which drop 10 to 15
The air defense appears to
that air attacks of this kind and
Continue such attacks and
Let me pass on some infor-
bombs on industrial and resi-
be weak and, on some raids, non-
others directed almost nightly
continue the bombing and you
mation received recently from a
dential areas. The local govern-
existent. The people of Isfahan
at Teheran, Tabriz and other cit-
raise questions even among
highly reliable Iranian source.
ment keeps the number of ca-
do not hear any interceptor air-
ies, can win the war for Iraq.
the most loyal of the utility of a
Isfahan, one of Iran's lead-
sualties secret, but bombing on
craft or surface-to-air missiles
But wars are also lost by breaks
war which cannot be won with-
ing cities, is being bombed three
this scale of a city without shel-
engaging their attackers. The
in civilian morale. Intelligence
out further heavy sacrifice.