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Records of the White House Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Michael Deaver's Political Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Deaver, Michael: Files
Folder Title: [Polling Information-1982] (2 of 6)
Box: 65
To see more digitized collections
visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
27
Coalitional Change: Swing Support
Our support eroded considerably among the swing coalitions that
provided the incremental muscle to defeat Jimmy Carter.
Changes in Swing Support
September 1981 to February 1982
September
February
1981
1982
Change
Blue Collar
Approve
60%
46%
-14%
Disapprove
33
46
+13
Hispanics
Approve
51
42
- 9
Disapprove
40
55
+ 5
Voters in South
Approve
61
50
-11
Disapprove
33
43
+10
Ideological Moderates
Approve
56
46
-10
Disapprove
33
46
+13
Union
Approve
55
41
-14
Disapprove
40
52
+12
It is not accidental that the biggest losses in our swing
coalition are seen in blue-collar and union support, but the fact that
we have lost 23 points from the moderates comes as a surprise and rude
political shock.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
28
If we hope to generate anything approaching the political parity
that we enjoyed in the fall of 1980, steps must be taken now not only
to increase support for President Reagan across the board, but to give
particular and quick attention to our base and critical swing groups.
Four other coalitions deserve special focus. These are women,
Midwesterners, older voters, and the Democrats who crossed over and
voted for Reagan in the 1980 election.
Coalitional Change: Women, the Midwest and Older Voters
Women voters deserve special attention because they are:
less sanguine about the President's ability to turn the economy
around,
more concerned about the possibility that President Reagan will
get us into a war, and
to a slight degree, more sensitive to women-related issues,
e.g., E.R.A. and abortion.
Woman have, from the beginning of the administration, been less
enthused about our policies than men.
Not unexpectedly, the Midwest, buffeted by layoffs in the
automobile industry and bashed by the economic squeeze on the farms,
must be considered very soft for us in 1982.
Anything that might threaten retirement -- whether real or only
perceived -- impacts older voters.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
29
Change in Special Group Support
September 1981 to February 1982
September
February
1981
1982
Change
Women
Approve
50%
45%
- 8%
Disapprove
40
49
+ 9
Midwest
Approve
60
53
- 7
Disapprove
32
41
+ 9
Older Voters
Approve
50
51
+ 1
Disapprove
40
43
+ 3
There was relatively little change in support for the President
from September 1981 to February 1982 among older voters, but as the
following table reflects, in September when there was considerable
discussion about Social Security, the seniors' support for the
Administration dropped within weeks of the President's defense of our
Social Security position. Also, in November and December, approval
ratings of the President among the seniors increased into the low 60's
with disapprovals falling below 30, but the presentation of our fiscal
1983 budget and the renewed discussions about "further cuts" in
"social programs" hit the oldsters like a thunderclap. All of the
latent fears apparently came back to haunt the retirees and the
President's support has currently eroded to a low 51% approval, 43%
disapproval level.
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
30
Reagan Job Rating: Older Voters
March 1981 to February 1982
Mar
May
Jul
Sep
Nov
Dec
Feb
Approve
76%
78%
74%
50%
56%
62%
51%
Disapprove
19
21
23
40
38
31
43
Reagan Democrats
A constituency that played a major role in the Reagan victory in
1980 were the crossover Democrats. We now have large enough samples
from our 1981 tracking to identify the characteristics of Reagan
Democrats who constitute about eight percent of the total electorate.
They tend to:
be more conservative (even though they are Democrats) than the
population at large,
be middle-aged (a large share are between the ages of 39 and
49),
be disproportionately high school graduates,
be union members, and
have higher average incomes than the general population.
Throughout 1981, they were more strongly supportive of Reagan than
the average American. The sharpest comparative difference emerged
from their responses to the question, "What is the most important
problem our country faces today?" A very significantly larger portion
tagged social problems: Twenty-seven percent (27%) of the Reagan
Democratic voters listed social problems as the key issue; only 7% of
Political Action Plan 1982: Where We Stand Today
31
the national population did so. They were less concerned than the
total population about unemployment, taxes, and other economic
problems.
The specific trait they liked most about Reagan was his strong
leadership. A full third of this group are Roman Catholics. They
still rank the Democratic party more favorably than the national
population; one-third now disapprove of the job Ronald Reagan is doing
as President.
Not only is it important that we bring a large segment of those
straying Reagan Democrats back into the Republican fold, it is
imperative that we solidify our base Republican strength.
Political Action Plan 1982
32
SECTION IV
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT MAY THROUGH OCTOBER 1982?
The future holds uncertain ground. Given the rather significant
unknowns overhanging both the economy and the way Congress may
ultimately deal with the proposed budget, we have chosen to block out
three possible economic scenarios for consideration. We then draw
some assumptions about possible Congressional action to help frame the
sections that follow.
The Economic Scenarios
The first scenario assumes that mixed economic news would prevail
through October. The rise in the Consumer Price Index would hover in
the high single digits, the unemployment rate would range between 8%
and 9%, but would be coming down from its summer highs of above 9.5%.
The leading indicators would be positive in August, September and
October, but interest rates would remain sticky with a prime rate of
14% to 15%.
The second scenario assumes a rather sharp but short-lived early
spring recovery followed by a collapse in the bond markets, with
unemployment pushing into the depressionary levels above 10%, and the
CPI creeping above 11%. Real per capita disposal income, in spite of
the tax rebates that come on stream July 1, 1982, would drop
substantially from the previous year.
The third scenario assumes a strong recovery beginning slowly in
the latter part of April, but building up steam through the summer and
into the fall. Even though unemployment would drop below 7% in
October, the CPI would be held to single-digit and the prime would run
12% through both September and October.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Can We Expect?
33
If the economy assumes the characteristics of the third scenario,
we can expect clear Republican victories at all levels, including,
most important of all, solid Republican control of the House of
Representatives. We have chosen to exclude the third scenario from
our consideration because:
the political tasks associated with this scenario would be so
clear-cut and easy, and
the action steps themselves will not differ greatly between the
first scenario or the third.
The second scenario, perhaps triggering riots in the urban centers and
some other unraveling of the social system, holds the potential for a
major political and economic collapse. For the purposes of this
report, we will also reject this extreme case and concentrate on the
first, or "mixed economy" scenario.
Some Assumptions About Congressional Action
We assume that the major battles to be fought between now and
early summer will relate to the budget. It is doubtful that we will
get the budget resolution due May 14th. Nevertheless, key political
and policy issues such as reductions in spending for social programs,
appropriations, student loans, and reduction in employment services
will be imbedded in the budget debate.
The major legislative action-forcing event this spring will be the
vote to boost the debt limit further beyond the trillion dollar mark.
For a wide spectrum of legislators this vote offers the last
opportunity to take a run at revenue increases, defense or entitlement
cuts, and a myriad of other issues.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Can We Expect?
34
For us, this vote could be used to consolidate significantly our
legislative position and take a good deal of the venom out of the
sniping from the press and the Hill that has stung us recently.
We also assume that the social issues will be hotly debated in
this session of Congress with the action centering on busing, prayer
in the schools, and abortion.
We now turn to our partisan antagonists, the Democrats, and the
kinds of themes we can expect them to use in 1982.
Political Action Plan 1982
35
SECTION V
THE LIKELY DEMOCRATIC ATTACK THEMES
The thrust and intensity of the Democratic attack themes will be
entirely contingent on the economic changes that will occur over the
next eight months. If a sour economy overhangs the summer and fall of
1982 then the Democrats could have a cakewalk. On the other hand, a
buoyant and sustained recovery will offer our opponents limited attack
opportunities.
It is likely that the Democrats' attack, given a strong recovery,
will not differ greatly from what they will mount if the economy sends
mixed signals over the next critical period. For the purposes of our
own planning, we will assume in this section a mild but not clear-cut
economic recovery.
Given a mild recovery we should expect the Democrats to:
1. Focus on the fairness issue. Few opportunities will be lost
by the Democrats to show how the Reagan administration induced
unnecessary suffering. They will come back again and again to
the questions: "Who has been hurt?" and "Who's getting fat
because of Ronald Reagan's policies?"
Republicans generally would be cast in the role of
insensitive, intolerant advocates of the wealthy and powerful.
That lineage stretches back to the opening years of Franklin
D. Roosevelt's administration. But more dangerous for us is
the fact that a rather large segment of Americans are now
buying the "unfair" charge. A year ago they rejected it.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
36
They will use our "treatment" of two groups to make the charge
that Republican social insensibilities breed inequities:
the old, sick and the unemployed have been bruised by
Reagan economics, and
the "harshness" of this administration's record on civil
rights.
2. Link the charge of this administration's inequities to its
inefficiencies. The most likely target for the Democrats to
use to make this argument is a bloated defense budget. They
will claim that our defense choices have not only been unwise
in the guns and butter trade-off, but also that the Reagan
defense policies waste billions on highly sophisticated but
logistically cumbersome new tanks and billions on heat-seeking
missiles which have not even proven to be battle-worthy.
3. Attack the President personally. Add "uninformed" and "naive"
to the phrases "unwise," "insensitive" and "unfair." While
this may be a political mistake for them, they likely will
succumb to the partisan temptations.
The single most unified and coherent strategic initiative
taken by the Democrats so far was launched late January on the
basis of a Democratic National Committee sponsored poll. The
message the Democrats attempted to convey to their
spokespersons was expressed by Pat Caddell: "Likeability is
only important if it translates into political support. If
the economy does not recover in the second quarter, the first
thing Democrats must do is get over their fear of Ronald
Reagan's favored personality -- the notion that he is such a
'nice guy;' he is (not) immune to criticism."
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
37
That personal attack, if launched, will extend the same
attacks on the administration, as described above, to the
President and assume the following tone:
The President's personal management style is inopportune
and ineffective. Given the grave difficulties Americans
face at home and abroad, the Democrats may argue, it is not
right that the President work such short days and that he
delegate so much authority and responsibility to a
not-always-efficient staff.
President Reagan is too passive. He frequently cannot
identify problems before they become acute. He is too slow
to recognize the long term implications of issues.
We know that many of these charges do not now hit their mark.
Even the December Democratic poll, designed explicitly to give
credibility to the "attack Reagan personally" strategy,
indicates that seventy-three percent of all Americans like the
President personally. However, there has been some erosion in
the President's image strength since then and if the mixed
economy scenario should take on just a slightly more somber
shade, these kinds of personal charges would begin to cut us.
4. Reinforce all attack thrusts with a multitude of specific
examples. This may be typical:
"Five out of every six households on food stamps will have
those benefits reduced or wiped out under the Reagan budget
proposal according to the Congressional Budget Office."
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
38
"If the Reagan proposals go through, the cuts for the
working poor would provide a clear disincentive to work; in
24 states, a welfare mother with two children would end up
getting more disposable income if she depended solely on
welfare than if she went out and took (or kept) an average
job. In other states, the increased income from working
would be almost inconsequential.'
(Washington Post,
February 25, 1982)
"The new welfare budget cuts President Reagan has proposed
to Congress this year would affect not just the working
poor, as last year's did, but for the first time would
reach "truly needy" households with no other income, claims
a study done by the Center for the Study of Social Policy."
(Washington Post, February 25, 1982)
"Alcoholic and penniless, Albert Pierpoint expects to die
in the streets of the nation's capitol. In Manhatten, an
elderly 'bag lady' known only as Diane scrapes by on
handouts. In the boomtown of Houston, a young job seeker
from New Jersey has ended up on skid row, broke and without
hope. Men and women, young and old, broken down or just
broke, thousands of vagabonds are barely scratching out an
existence on the fringes of society The drifters keep
dying in distressing numbers. Outlook: as times get
tougher, misery and cost will grow." (U.S. News & World
Report, February. 1982)
"The moral meanness of the Reagan Administration has been
evidenced constantly in its indifference to civil rights or
Blacks or equal rights for women; in its attack on legal
services for the poor; in the President's own cruel remark
that those who cannot find good jobs or schools or services
where they live should 'vote with their feet' and move on.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
39
What is hard to accept is that at the same time Ronald
Reagan was deliberately tilting economic policy toward the
rich and powerful, through massively regressive tax cuts,
he was systematically removing government assistance from
some of the most needy and powerless." (David Broder,
Washington Post, January 20, 1982)
"Tip O'Neill concedes that Ronald Reagan may capitalize on
a 'dislike for the poor' that he thinks is running across
the land. He (O'Neill) says the country will move more in
the direction of hatred for the poor, 'unless we stop the
programs of Reagan.' (Washington Post, January 31, 1982)
"Former Secretary of Education Shirley M. Hufstedler. in an
emotional blast against the Reagan Administration, said
Friday, the President is 'declaring war on America's
children by destroying nearly every one of the
(federal) education programs built up over the past 30
years. (Los Angeles Times, March 6, 1982)
"Thousands of college students found allies in both parties
as they converged on Congress today to protest sharp cuts
in federal grants and loans. Capitol police estimated that
there were more than 5,000 students, perhaps as many as
7,000, making one of the largest lobbying efforts mounted
so far this year against President Reagan's proposed budget
reductions in key social areas. Numbers underscore
mounting concern around the nation, principally among
middle-income families, over what critics view as
devestating reductions in aid to college students."
(New York Times, March 2, 1982)
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
40
The Democrats will avoid the historical framing of our present
economic challenges like the plague and conversely will point
to the "horror" of what will happen to people if Reaganomics
is not blocked this fall.
5. Someone said, "A Democrat denouncing a budget deficit is like
a hog with wings. When you see one you know either nature has
gone crazy or somebody thinks you were born yesterday."
Nevertheless, this will not dissuade the Democrats from doing
everything possible to highlight the magnitude of the Reagan
projected budget deficits.
Such a strategy likely will have considerable impact on
conservative Democrats who supported Reagan in 1980. However,
even more damaging (if we do not reach some kind of an accord
with the Republican Senate on this issue), the Democrats can
charge that the Republicans have a house divided, and severely
undercut what in 1981 proved to be one of our principal
political assets -- the belief that the Reagan Administration
does what it says it will do and gets things done.
6. The Democrats, even given a mixed economy over the next few
months, have a good opportunity to put back together their
historical coalition which was rather badly shaken by the 1980
election. This coalition includes Blacks, Hispanics,
blue-collar Democrats, liberal and somewhat liberal voters,
middle- and lower-middle-class working families and especially
those families who reside in the upper Northeast and upper
Midwest.
7. Our opponents will attempt to use both issues and allies to
stitch the Democratic coalition back together. The Democrats
correctly believe that high unemployment will bring a large
block of those blue-collar Democrats who voted for Reagan in
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
41
1980 back into their column. The same source of dissaffection
also impacts middle-class working families in the Northeast
and upper Midwest most hard hit by the sluggish automobile
industry and its ancillary industries.
Furthermore, high interest rates cut against middle- and
lower-middle-class working families who desire to buy a car
and/or a home.
But even more damaging, high interest rates severely erode our
base with small businessmen, the construction industry, and
young semi-affluents who want to buy a home.
The Reagan Administration's civil rights record will be
distorted shamelessly to motivate the Blacks. We should
accept the fact that the Democrats will likely be successful
in turning out minority voters in considerably larger numbers
than ever before in past off-year elections. This held true
for the November special elections in Virginia, New Jersey and
Mississippi. Even if we get a mixed economy in 1982 we should
expect more efforts to activate and turn out the core
Democratic base against us.
8. Additionally, the Democratic party has strong institutional
allies that can and will make every attempt to bring more
Democratic voters to the polls in the fall of 1982.
The position of civil rights organizations is well known.
Their spokesmen now reference the Reagan policies as based on
a "cave man ethic that seeks to turn back twenty years of
progress toward racial equality." They will claim that we
have no interest in Blacks, no sensitivity to their concerns
and that our "phenomenal" unpopularity with Black America
generates directly from this administration's "savaging the
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
42
programs calculated to help the poor" and therefore
disproportionately harmful to Blacks. Even some civil rights
groups within the administration will carry that message as
evidenced by the lawyers in the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division who drafted a letter of protest to our
"restoring" tax-exempt status to private schools that
discriminate.
An institutional vehicle that will undoubtedly play a large
role in implementing the Democratic strategy in the 1982 fall
election will be organized labor. Clearly, labor intends to
cement its ties with the Democratic party to insure labor's
leverage in the pick of a Democratic presidential nominee in
1984 and to gore Republican candidates who are not friendly to
labor. We can expect the following:
COPE will massively finance sophisticated political
technology that will assist in targeting vulnerable
districts, generating voting lists for friendly candidates,
recruiting candidates and in turning out labor's vote.
They will be at the forefront in attacking the
administration. The "Jamestown Economics" tag is only the
first arrow that we can expect to come from organized
labor's political quiver over the next nine months.
They will increase lobbying efforts not only to minimize
any "anti-labor legislation" but also to expose the
inequities of the Reagan program as far as the poor, sick,
old and unemployed are concerned.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
43
In sum, labor clearly is ready, willing and able to assist
the Democratic party in 1982, and it is very evident that
the Democrats are going to accept that assistance with open
arms.
9. The Democrats will also expend time and effort to put together
swing coalitions consisting of women, older voters, those who
are interest-rate sensitive, and younger voters.
Women will represent a major target for the Democrats
because they feel that women are more "compassionate" and
thus more likely to respond to the "inequities" of
Reaganomics.
They will also target older voters who fear budgetary
changes will impact their Social Security payments. (Even
now 54% of all Americans believe that Ronald Reagan has
reduced Social Security benefits.)
Prime voter targets for the Democrats will also be those
bruised by high interest rates. This group includes
farmers, those in the housing industry, the automobile
industry and its ancillary industries.
Younger voters now entering the job market who are more
vulnerable to layoffs will also be targeted by the
Democrats.
And lastly, students -- who no longer can acquire loans
with the same government help -- will represent a useful
swing coalition to the Democrats. We can count on the
charge that emanated from the Action Committee on Education
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
44
being used on campus with a vengeance: "The Reagan budget
is a disaster that will put college beyond the reach of
hundreds of thousands of the nation's students."
10. Depending on developments in Europe, Africa, and Central
America, the Democrats may also attempt in the fall election
to charge that our inconsistent foreign policy has lost
allies, strengthened the Soviet hand, led this country too
close to the edge of another Vietnam, and led us closer to the
brink of a nuclear holocaust.
In the subsection that follows, we have placed the above attack
themes in a more tactical frame of reference by outlining what a key
member of the Democratic National Committee might write under the
heading, "What Should the Democrats Do in 1982?"
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
45
A Possible National Democratic Strategy
as Written From the Perspective of the DNC
Our Democratic party can come roaring back in the fall campaign.
How difficult or easy that may be hinges on the unanswered and
unanswerable question: "What will the condition of the economy be on
election day?"
No one, except the "win-at-any-costs" types among us, wants the
economy to suffer. But the fact is, high unemployment and interest
rates will generate a political bonanza for us on election day almost
regardless of how we plan and execute.
Our challenge is to define here how we win -- and win decisively
-- in what might be called a "mixed" economic environment, which our
economists say will mean that the economy will be better in the fall
than it is now. This would allow the Republicans to point to mixed
but positive trends. Should the economy experience a strong boom in
the early fall, then our entire strategy would have to be reevaluated.
While it may be hard to believe now, in February, that the
Republicans could run a positive campaign on the economy, we must be
careful not to overreach our position by getting people to recall now
how bad it was a year ago. The Republicans can counter and say
"Remember double-digit inflation? We fixed it just like we said we
would."
The fact is, when the problem has gone away, it is no longer a
problem. To try to run on the economic problems of February, with a
better or improving economy in November, would be futile for all
Democrats and there are other juicy targets available to us.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
46
Another fact we must accept, for better or worse, is this: Reagan
has changed the course of government in this country. No longer is
anyone but a few unreconstructed liberals in our Democratic party
advocating unlimited spending on the part of government to solve the
problems of mankind.
There will be cuts in the social programs. The rate of growth in
the federal government will be slowed. Existing programs and new
programs will be held to much higher levels of accountability. These
changes have altered the whole frame of the partisan debate.
We must not debate the Republicans this premise. We must provide
a positive rationale for how we would do it differently to alleviate
unnecessary human suffering.
This does not mean that we need the Democrat equivalent of
Reaganomics. It does mean that to win the election this fall, we use
every opportunity in every single budget battle to drive the point
home that Republicans hurt people and simultaneously help those who
are already rich and fat. Thus, we can build our case against the
Republicans on particular alternatives that arise. Remember, we
Democrats are not in control. We can win not by proposing, but by
attacking. In sum, it is not necessary for us to have an "overall,"
"coherent" and "balanced" program. We can pick and choose our issues
based on their vulnerability -- not on our general wisdom or our world
view.
Let's talk about our coalitional goals.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
47
Coalitions. Our primary Democratic target audience in 1982 must
begin with our historical coalition. Our primary political goal:
motivate them to vote.
This coalition includes:
Blacks,
Hispanics,
Blue-collar Democrats,
Liberal and somewhat liberal voters,
Middle- and lower-middle-class working families, especially in
the Northeast and upper Midwest.
Secondary targets are also available -- the moderate "do-gooders"
and women voters. The most important political task for Democrats is
to use the issues and the image faults of the Republicans to persuade
these swing groups to vote for us. In the context of achieving our
Democratic coalitional goals, we need to consider two other points:
1. The working press: No one can dispute the fact that to date,
they have done a masterful job reporting all the gory details
of the recent Reagan budget. Not only have they focused on
the numerous examples of pain and suffering that have been
caused, but they have highlighted many examples of where
budget cuts have been, could be, or will be
counter-productive. For example, we Democrats clearly gain
when the press focuses on the working poor who lose their
benefits and are forced to quit their jobs in order to be able
to feed their families on welfare or to qualify for Medicaid,
or when they use the example of the closure of offices that
helped the unemployed find jobs just when unemployment is
going up.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
48
The press will remain allies of our Democratic party because
of two simple facts: We have a left-of-center working press
and, frankly, pain and suffering make news. Contentment is
dead space.
While the press support may perhaps moderate, its
anti-administration cant will not stop. There is absolutely
nothing the Republicans can do about this.
2. The vulnerability of Republican incumbents. For openers, I
would say that there is virtually no Republican who can't be
beaten by us this year with the possible exception of ten or
fifteen Republican congressmen and a couple of senators. As
we all know, for the last several campaigns our Democratic
candidates have been the victims of vicious attacks on the
basis of individual votes that were construed as unpopular or
unwise. Now it's our turn.
As a consequence of the Republican support for the Budget
Reconciliation Act last year, our media people can paint
almost every Republican incumbent as a hard-hearted scrooge,
based on specific and localized examples of the impact of the
Act.
Motivating the Democrats to Turn Out. With this as background,
let's now consider how we can motivate our voters. It is indeed
possible that, contrary to "normal" off-year elections, we may have
less of a problem in getting our voters to vote in 1982 than the
Republicans.
While the Republicans' normal constituency has suffered because of
the economic situation, they generally have not been personally hurt
by any specific budget cuts.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
49
Conversely, many of our base Democratic constituencies have been
specifically hurt and know exactly who to blame for it -- Reagan and
the Republicans.
I do not believe it will require great effort on our part to
encourage these people to go to the polls and cast a vote for the
straight Democratic ticket. Contrarily, the typical Republican has
seen little, if any, personal payoff and may be very squishy about his
commitment to Reaganomics.
Finally, the type of media campaigns just discussed that our
Democratic candidates can run will both stimulate our core
constituents to vote and persuade the fence-sitters to come over to
our side. Both groups rely heavily on television for news and
entertainment.
A National Democratic Effort. The local dimensions of Reagan's
outrageous acts must also be meshed with a more sophisticated version
at the national level, keyed to expanding our coalition in the face of
a "better" economic situation.
While insensitivity will continue to be our primary Democratic
theme, we must also mount a broader attack aimed at an economic policy
producing the biggest budget deficits in history, destroying any hope
for a balanced budget, assuring near constant recessions, and
inevitably generating the highest interest and inflation rates this
country has ever experienced.
Such a message need not be keyed to the past but should be cast as
a likely vision of the future with the sub-theme that it is all going
to happen because the Republican party favors big business, not the
average guy.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
50
This message will not only be effective in motivating our core
constituency, but also must be equally effective in persuading the
moderate ticket-splitting types to be won over to our side of the
ballot.
Beyond this, we must constantly remind women of this
administration's insensitivity to their issues, and raise doubts about
the foreign policy/defense issues.
Women. In regards to women, we all know the record of this
administration when it comes to women's rights and appointments.
Fortunately, so do most women in the country. This lack of Republican
sensitivity to women's issues can be reinforced by our raising doubts
about Reagan's conduct of foreign policy. Women by nature tend to be
doves, and a hawkish foreign policy triggers concerns with this group
in a far more fundamental way than with men.
While even our Democratic data clearly show that the general theme
of a stronger America evokes support, the Reagan Administration pushes
that theme too far. Democrats can say:
A strong America does not have to be a threatening,
meddling bully getting into everybody's squabbles all
over the face of the globe. Such posturing puts us in
situations where our sons and loved ones may have to end
up in combat.
Further, there is considerable room for disagreement on just how much
money needs to be spent to have a secure America. As Democrats, we
should resist some of the new sophisticated weapons systems and
generally favor fairly simple, and less expensive, alternatives. With
the high level of visibility Secretary Weinberger has achieved, we
should tie every expensive boondoggle that is revealed by the press
right around the Republicans' neck. Force them to defend it.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
51
Foreign Policy.
Foreign policy failures provide us with
ammunition that can be used with the moderate ticket-splitters. Who
tend to be more prone to consider broad-brushed policy. Therefore,
our Democratic message should be extended into the attack theme that
generally Reagan's foreign policy is an incoherent, inconsistent,
mismanaged farce.
A Word of Warning. Finally, a cautionary note. Our people should
be urged to avoid any over-wrought personal attacks on Reagan. Maybe
his personal popularity will drop off and this will change, but for
the moment, the American people tend to like him and could well resent
any personal attacks. In any event, the press will do our job for us
in this area quite well.
Democratic Congressional Strategy. With this as a broad umbrella,
we should attempt through our Congressional leadership the following:
Force a series of votes on defense, similar to the ones in the
Senate last summer when Republicans were muscled to vote for
their esoteric, budget-busting weapons systems rather than for
more supplies and better maintenance.
Sit back and refuse to provide any votes for increasing the
debt limit, and, thereby, force a confrontation between
Congressional Republicans and Reagan. Reagan can't win such a
confrontation if we Democrats withhold our votes. This
conceivably might result in some changes in the economic
program we would prefer, but more importantly, it is entirely
possible that their most valuable asset -- the personal
strength of Reagan -- may come out of that confrontation
significantly tarnished if he is forced to retreat and
compromise.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
52
Continue an active program of committee and sub-committee
hearings by the House (scattered throughout the country) to
provide constant national attention as well as material for the
press.
Identify high payoff social safety net programs that are being
cut and make highly publicized efforts to protect them.
Continually question foreign policy goals and call attention to
inconsistencies as they occur. This is made particularly easy
by focusing on the different philosophies of Secretary
Weinberger and Secretary Haig.
This list can easily be expanded as opportunities occur but in
doing so, two things should always be remembered:
1. We do not need to create new policy. We do need to -- and can
-- win an election.
2. We should only act when we have the broadest possible support
in our own ranks so that our candidates can take full
advantage of what is happening here in Washington.
How Can We Break the Republican Coalition? Finally, we should
examine what we can do to de-stabilize the Republican coalition.
As we know, they have already shattered part of it themselves by
losing one of their historically strongest groups, the older voter.
Since nothing new will be happening on the Social Security issues
in the next seven or eight months (if we can sidestep the COLA issue
in the budget debates), our Democratic mission is to simply remind
senior voters that Reagan and the Republicans can't be trusted. They
may have backed down in an election year, but come 1983 when they need
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
53
to make more cuts in the budget to pay for their war machine, Social
Security is right where they are going to have to cut. Besides, a lot
of the senior citizens already believe that Reagan has cut Social
Security benefits.
The New Right. Despite the New Right's grumbling, they generally
can be expected to be back on the line against most of our Democratic
candidates come the fall. It is possible, though, that we can help
precipitate a major crisis within one element of this coalition: the
conservative Christian and right-to-life groups.
The Republicans' leadership has made no secret of the fact that
they want to avoid the right-to-life issue at all costs this year.
Why don't we recruit some of our people who are in agreement with them
on that issue and try to develop a legislative strategy that will
force an up or down vote on that issue? This needs to be carefully
analyzed but, by and large, our Democratic members are compatible with
the pro-choice majority in their districts, whereas the right-to-life
minority can decimate our Republican opponents.
Summary.
Don't talk about economic issues against what has
happened in the past, but talk about the present and
future pain of Reagonomics instead.
Highlight every instance of pain and human suffering
and tie it directly to Reagan and the Republicans.
Cite local examples where possible in our state and
congressional races.
Political Action Plan 1982: The Democratic Attack Themes
54
Attack the Defense Department as wasteful and
inefficient. Advocate basic systems as opposed to
the esoteric.
Point out the dangers and inconsistencies of Reagan's
foreign policies. Raise the horros of the nuclear
arms race.
Highlight examples of Republican insensitivity to
women's rights.
Point out that next year's cuts have to come from
Social Security if the Republicans are still cutting
the budget.
Create some rumbling in their ranks by using the
social issues -- in particular the right-to-life
issue -- to our advantage.
The year 1980 belonged to the Republicans. We can own politically
1982 and erase almost every gain the Republicans made in 1980, even if
the economy improves.
Political Action Plan 1982
55
SECTION VI
WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
Given what's at stake in 1982, where we stand today, what
circumstances we might face now through the end of the year, and the
likely Democratic attack themes, "What should we do?"
Before addressing this question, we must first probe the more
generic query, "For what purpose?" Hence, we will begin this section
by first articulating the single most general objective and then
proceed to outline strategic objectives and some specific action
steps.
Many of the action steps reviewed here -- and especially those
that fall under the rubrics of communication, scheduling and targeting
-- were generated at our Camp David meeting February 5. Clearly,
given the expertise of the White House units responsible for many of
these areas, the action steps described here should be considered as
only suggestive. It is hoped, however, that the strategic objectives
themselves will generate interest in the proposed action steps which
the White House may want to expand upon and implement solely or in
conjunction with some highly selective non-White House resources.
Goal: 1982
Our goal in 1982 is to govern in such a fashion that we merit the
respect and support of Americans, thereby strengthening our governing
coalitions. This will enable us to set in motion the long-term
political changes envisioned and articulated by Ronald Reagan in the
1980 election.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
56
Outlined below are some strategic objectives that seem to be
consistent with this goal given our present status and the possible
range of circumstances we can expect May through October, as well as
the attack themes our opponents, the Democrats, will likely mount
against us in the same period.
Strategic Objectives: Overview
There are only two issues that require our undivided attention in
1982: economic recovery and the perceived fairness of our program.
If the recovery occurs, the bite will clearly be taken away from the
charge that our administration is insensitive and unfair. However,
that will not happen automatically, and we must view every
presidential action and every presidential policy -- economic,
domestic, and foreign -- against this criterion:
Does this action/policy say to Americans that we are
fair, especially to the least fortunate members of our
society?
Hence, while we list several disparate strategic objectives below,
the single most critical ones in terms of satisfying the above general
goal relate directly to those things that will impact the economy
favorably.
This holds not only because most Americans' greatest concern still
focuses on the economy, but also because the economy itself will
greatly condition the fall elections of 1982. Press and media
judgments are like personal judgments -- frequently self-fulfilling.
The media will imprint failure or success on the Reagan Administration
at the end of this year as a direct consequence of our successes or
failures in the November elections.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
57
Thus, the economic issue takes on added importance in light of the
fact that changes in real per capita disposable income are the single
most critical determinant of how many seats are lost in the House in
an off-year election by the party that controls the White House. Two
elements of that economic measure will move favorably for us:
(1) inflation will likely be considerably more moderate in 1982 than
it was in 1980 and 1981, and (2) the rebate of tax dollars will
directly boost disposable income.
The unknown element, which will perhaps condition the level of
real per capita disposable income even more than moderation of
inflation or the Reagan tax rebate, will be total income. Total
income, in turn, and its growth will be contingent on the timing, the
depth and the speed of the economic recovery.
Aside from this somewhat mechanistic measure of our economic
political fortunes in the fall, it is clear on a number of grounds
that if a positive economic climate exists in August, September and
October, then almost all the wind goes out of the sails of the
Democrats.
Hence, our first and clearly most important strategic objective
over the near term relates to the economy.
Strategic Objective 1:
To put into place all the elements we can to facilitate
a strong, broad-based, durable economic recovery.
To date, Americans have exercised considerable patience in waiting
for the economic program to work. While inflation has moderated, both
unemployment and interest rates have increased dramatically since
Reagan became President. Americans at this juncture, however, do not
feel that the Reagan Administration can be blamed for the current
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
58
recession. Contrarily, most believe that it will take at least a year
before the impact of Reaganomics will be fully felt. While this
perception is now clearly measured, the reservoir of patience could
quickly run very dry if the economic pain and suffering experienced by
Americans should intensify and/or if Americans should lose faith in
the Reagan economic program. As long as large numbers of Americans
believe that our programs will eventually redound to their economic
benefit, we will not inherit the political whirlwind born of economic
frustration.
There are some action steps that can be taken to assist in this
regard. First, to encourage Americans to be both patient and hopeful,
it is essential that we come back to the basic principle of speaking
of the program generically and not get involved in defending alone the
individual of the program. The focus must remain on these six points:
The Reagan Administration will continue to exert pressure to
reduce total government spending.
It will stand behind its 10% across-the-board tax cut for
individuals.
It will persist in eliminating undue and cumbersome regulations
that smother initiative without sufficient offsetting benefits
to society at large.
Pressure will be increased on all federal agencies to reduce
waste and fraud.
The administration will encourage the Federal Reserve Board to
increase the supply of money consistently to assure a steady
rate in the growth of the money supply of around 5%.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
59
This administration intends to begin transferring functions
that it has performed in the past back to the local and state
governments who can perform those services more efficiently,
responsively and sensitively.
If there is one lesson that comes out of the experience of 1981,
it is that our program has greater impact than the sum of its parts.
Whenever the President or others spoke of the economic recovery
program in total, the response was much more favorable than when only
one element, such as the reduction in goverment spending or taxes, was
singled out.
There is, however, another economic objective we cannot ignore
that the President addressed on many occasions which was not an
explicit part of his economic program -- the deficit. President
Reagan said we could accomplish our economic goal of stimulating
economic growth (through the above steps) and at the same time move
toward a balanced budget by 1983 or 1984.
This implicit assumption we must deal with directly. There is
evidence, from our own economists, that the fear of huge and growing
deficits as projected in our own budgets through 1985-86, directly
impacts the concerns extant in the money markets and keeps interest
rates unduly high. Such rates could very possibly choke off the
beginnings of a late spring or early summer recovery. It is this
issue that our second strategic objective addresses.