Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
118565156
label
[Polling Information - 1982] (3)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
118565156
contentType
document
title
[Polling Information - 1982] (3)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
137
collections
Records of the White House Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Reagan Administration)
Michael Deaver's Political Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
118565156
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1985-12-31
year
1985
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1981-01-01
year
1981
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
14cdca2a779ddbe3
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Deaver, Michael: Files
Folder Title: [Polling Information-1982] (3 of 6)
Box: 65
To see more digitized collections
visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
60
Strategic Objective 2:
Undertake policy that will send a clear signal that this
administration does intend to work toward balancing the
budget and thereby take the basic fuel away from the
engine of inflation. This message should be sent to the
people, to Congress and to those in the money markets
who, through their collective buy and sell decisions,
set the structure of interest rates.
Budgets, as the President stated in addressing the Union, cannot
be accurately projected. Yet, people must make decisions now on what
they expect will happen in the future. At this juncture, it is
clearly evident that many individuals who can, and do, influence the
rates of interest -- the Damocles Sword overhanging this
administration's economic recovery efforts -- do believe that the
potential is very real that President Ronald Reagan in four years
could run up far more red ink than any president in history.
Deficits are not unknown to Americans. In point of fact, in the
22 years between John F. Kennedy's 1962 budget and Ronald Reagan's
projected 1984 budget, this country has had only one surplus budget --
under President Johnson.
Our concern about the size of our projected deficit should focus
on the fact that even as a stand-alone issue it would cast a very
somber tone over the possibilities of Republicans winning seats in the
Congress in the fall election this year. Even more importantly, it is
also clear that failure to cope effectively with budget deficits, high
interest rates and high unemployment this year could be as devastating
for Republicans as it was for the Democrats in 1980. It is also
evident that when a party appears to have walked away from what its
loyalists considered to be its first principles, the foundations are
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
61
shaken to the detriment of the whole structure. Hence, politically
the present projected 91 billion dollar deficit is not acceptable.
Neither is balancing the budget somewhere beyond the sunset.
This adminstration must reaffirm its commitment to fiscal
responsibility. It must make that commitment to get maximum political
leverage, both in the policy and the political arenas, by being bold,
consistent, and proposing something that has a good chance of working.
The President, we feel, should reaffirm explicitly his personal
commitment to a balanced budget amendment by indicating he would
certify (if Congress would pass) a Constitutional amendment to balance
the budget starting in some specific year in the very near future.
Critics could claim that Reagan's support of the balanced budget
amendment reflects cynical manipulation and nothing beyond. To
undercut such outcries, other concrete steps must be taken
simultaneously to drive home the depth and strength of this
administration's commitment to bring run-away deficits under control.
It is essential that we propose budget, tax and/or spending changes
that would reduce the now-projected deficits.
A wide variety of options exist to satisfy this objective. Three
possible options are imposing taxes that hit consumption harder than
investment moderating the rate of increase in defense spending to the
3-7% range the President committed to during the campaign and then let
Congress itself suggest cuts in areas that we have not touched in, for
example, some of the entitlements outside of the Social Security
package. To get the projected deficits in the "out years" under
control, it may be necessary to adjust the COLA's and tax indexing.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
62
As a linking element, it would be advisable to keep the pressure
on Congress to pass budget reductions in the fiscal years between now
and the year the budget would be balanced under the balanced budget
amendment. This would lay a firm foundation for on-going budget
balancing.
Guidelines would also have to be provided to the Congress
concerning the amount of funds the administration felt was needed for
national defense, welfare, and Social Security, as well as what
spending reforms would be acceptable.
Strategic Objective 3:
Signal our support of the balanced budget amendment
along with other elements to give immediate force to our
commitment to bring down the deficits. Do this in
conjunction with the vote to increase the national debt
limit in a fashion to unify our Republican support in
the Congress.
The balanced budget amendment gives us the opportunity to:
put the President back in control of the budgetary procress,
re-synchronize the President's program with his principle of
establishing vision and direction for the current government
activities, and
put back into force the single driving element of our 1981
legislative successes: namely, a unified Republican effort.
The President should seize the opportunity of the vote to raise
the ceiling on the national debt to remind the people that he does not
favor such action. Further, he should emphasize that it is now time
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
63
to do something to stop this mockery of fiscal responsibility -- an
unhealthy legacy brought on over several decades. There may have been
some advantage in letting Congress dissect our budget over the past
several weeks, allowing them to wrestle with some of the intractable
"Hobson's choices" that must be made to bring the budget into proper
alignment; however, we should not let that particular stew boil for
too many more weeks.
For example, one of the advantages of handling the balanced budget
amendment as described is that this procedure pulls the teeth from a
series of steps that could not only embarass the administration
severely, but also damage it politically through the year. If the
conservative Senate Republicans (who have run against deficits for
many elections) agree that they just cannot swallow voting for an
increase in the ceiling this time, given projected deficits, they
could defeat the debt ceiling vote. Once again, government would
close down and clearly the loser this time -- as opposed to last
fall's reconciliation vote -- would be the Reagan Administration. To
have government grind to a halt because the Reagan Administration
could not get the Congress to approve an increase in the debt ceiling
sends the wrong message to the wrong people at the wrong time. A
burgeoning federal debt is inconsistent with our policies. It pits
Republicans against Republicans. The Democrats would have a heyday by
once again focusing on the consequences of "no government" for a
period of time and blaming it on the inability of this administration
to govern in the most basic fashion: simply to keep its doors open.
By starting now to put our ducks in line, and to fashion actively
this program, we can turn that dark scenario clearly to our advantage.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
64
Strategic Objective 4:
Win, lose, or draw on the economic recovery, we must do
all we can to position the Reagan Administration more
firmly on the side of equity than we did in 1981.
In point of fact, if our economic program generates a strong and
sustained recovery through the fall and benefits everyone, then the
only major issue with any substance left for the Democrats would be
the issue of fairness. They could agree that everyone did benefit
from the Reagan recovery but yet make the statement "not everyone
benefited equally," and use that to badly bruise some of our
candidates in the fall.
We can be very sure, regardless of what the economic circumstances
will be, that fairness will rank high on the Democratic strategy
options. They will use with a vengeance the Congressional Budget
Office report of February 28 which showed that 86% of all the federal
income tax benefits enacted by Congress in 1981, at President Reagan's
request, will go to families with incomes over $20,000 a year, while
two-thirds of all the cuts in benefits will be taken from families
with incomes below $20,000.
These are some of the things that we might do to take the edge off
that charge:
We should push and support legislation which will close tax
loopholes now being used by large and profitable corporations.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
65
We must not get locked into battles over nickel and dimes on
social programs that will provide grist for the mill of the
Democrats and the media to tag us with the label of "scrooge."
As many of these battles as can be deferred to another day
should be.
We should encourage policies that hit the power and undue
privilege of affluent individuals and businesses.
If Deputy Secretary Carlucchi really has a program underway
aimed at assuring wiser expenditure of defense dollars, let's
get it out front with hard examples of the savings that have
been made through his programs and the specifics on boondoggles
that have been eliminated.
We should subject the Pentagon to even more skeptical scrutiny
on their budgets than the rest of government.
When the E.R.A. ratification process expires in June there will
be another amendment putting it back on the docket. We should
quickly assess how much leverage our Task Force on Legal Equity
for Women really has and encourage that Task Force to be ready
with recommendations to be presented just prior to or after the
E.R.A. surfaces again. While it is evident that this area has
been mined before, hopefully we can find enough ore to position
this administration clearly on the side of opposing unequal
treatment because of sex.
While we have lost considerable credibility with the Black and
minority communities because we have been perceived as
vacillating on the Voting Rights Act, we should now put no road
blocks in the congressional extension of the Act (which
contains language that may cause some slight discomfort) and
support even the House bill. There is virtually no downside
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
66
with our southern base, and further wrangling and hauling will
likely neither change the course of Congress nor help us in any
way politically.
Review our programs such as employment training, the enterprise
zones, and crime control to see if we can find pieces of those
programs that help the poor and the needy in the urban cities
and highlight those elements publicly. While there is little
we can do to strip away the support the Democrats now get in
the Black community, there is some evidence that our
"perceived" insensitivity to Blacks is spilling over and
hurting us among moderate suburban ticket-splitters. This we
can staunch.
Strategic Objective 5:
Jimmy Carter demonstrated that you cannot build positive
support for an administration through the use of
"symbols" alone. On the other hand, we should recognize
explicitly that symbols can, do, and have done damage to
this administration, especially on the dimensions of
fairness and sensitivity.
Any presidential actions that evoke the images of luxury,
privilege or power should be most carefully scrutinized and
eliminated. Although the President must and should get away from
Washington to relax, when he visits the island of Barbados over the
Easter weekend the emphasis must be on the working tasks accomplished
prior to Saturday and Sunday.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
67
Strategic Objective 6:
Just because we are now "the Administration," we should
not feel obligated to defend every single on-going
program, especially those that have their roots in the
Carter Administration.
Remember that many of the programs that we administer were
Carter's programs. We must not tie ourselves to his legacy.
Contrarily, when a Carter program is wrong (especially any defense
programs), we should tag them as his and as wrong.
Further, we should carefully sort out the spending and tax
elements that were passed last year and identify which were really
"ours" and which were "theirs" -- and then defend ours and cut
ourselves loose from some of theirs in the budgetary battles this
year.
Strategic Objective 7:
Reinforce the notion that this administration is both
future-oriented and forward-looking.
The single most dramatic perceptual change the Reagan victory
induced was to position the Republican party as the party of
innovation and change. That perception is an asset and we should
build upon it, especially if. by the end of the year the economy gives
us some breathing room so that we can refocus some resources on space
technology. Further we should seek out, define, and force some votes
on the Hill that can be construed as votes for the future, hope, and
opportunity and against continuation of government as Americans have
experienced it (under the Democrats) over the last 40 years.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
68
Strategic Objective 8:
Remember that both political and governing coalitions
are based upon the strength of their individual pieces
-- the voting constituents.
We must pay much closer attention to both our base coalition and
to our swing coalitions and examine every policy and every action
against this criterion: "Does our action build or destroy support
among that unique group of Americans who were responsible for our
election?" This should be done not simply because we owe them, but
rather because this group is the easiest one to keep in our corner to
maintain our grass roots strength, especially among small businessmen,
farmers, southern conservatives, Hispanics, blue-collar ethnics, and
Reagan Democrats.
Strategic Objective 9:
Take more visible positions on some of the social
issues. Select at least one such issue that the
Congress is wrestling with this year and give it strong
presidential support.
Democrats who voted for Reagan are primarily drawn to us not only
because of the economic issues, but also because of the Reagan
position on social issues. Given the profile that we have recently
developed on who these individuals are and what issues they are
concerned about, we would strongly recommend that the administration
go out front this year on the issue of voluntary prayer in the
schools. Busing must be handled very carefully because of its civil
rights overtones.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
69
Strategic Objective 10:
Set in place a series of communication options that will
increase Ronald Reagan's opportunities to speak directly
to the people on the subject of his choosing, timed at
his discretion, and through the media best designed to
give us maximum impact with the groups with whom we want
to communicate.
Remember that the most unreliable and ineffective communication
vehicle for us or any president to use is the press conference. We
should consider setting into motion as quickly as we possibly can a
communications plan that would rely upon:
distributing directly to local TV stations a two-minute message
from the President with mini video tape cassettes. They could
slot these into their own news programs. Topic matter should
relate to specific regional interests and be distributed in
those particular areas to 400 or so major television stations;
blocking out five- to ten-minute radio speeches for the
President to give twice or three times a month. These should
not be scheduled every week. We need the flexibility;
following through on the idea that was proposed at Camp David
that the networks themselves will give us two- to three-minute
segments on national television news if we permit them to ask
one or two questions on the topic that we choose to discuss;
crafting "op-ed" pieces, specifically designed to drive home
our positions among the opinion leaders;
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
70
looking at the press not as a monolithic mass but as composed
of a variety of individuals and segments that we can deal with
more effectively in smaller, more homogeneous blocs by the way
we dissiminate information through the President and others;
preparing to address the nation with at least two "political"
talks between now and the fall election and having the RNC fund
that time through television;
launching a group of "presidential forums." These would
consist of a series of meetings with key constituent groups at
geographically dispersed locations. The forums will have
specific labels reflecting their purpose to avoid association
with President Carter's Town Meetings. For example:
President's Auto Worker Forum
President's Teacher Forum
President's Agri Forum
President's Small Businessman Forum
President's Steel Worker Forum
President's Retiree Forum
President's Urban Forum
The time, place and type of forum would be directly contingent
on the message we want to communicate.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
71
The purpose of these forums would be:
To break the stereotypical setting of the President's
"speeches" by bringing him closer to the people to address a
subject (group) of our choosing.
To reinforce confidence that only President Reagan's
programs and values constitute the leadership that will meet
the country's needs.
To deal to the personality strengths of the President --
he's sincere, he cares, he's candid, he's committed. The
bottom line: he is a leader in whose hands you can place
your trust and your hopes for the future.
The format of the forum should be informal. The site selection
might be a high school gym rather than a hotel ballroom. The
President is with his people on their territory. He's there to
listen. He didn't come to lecture. He came because he cares.
Consider family attendance. The President opens the forum with
informal remarks and brief statements on key national issues
and particularly those most relevant to the specific audience
with a warm-up with a message.
Progress on inflation
Importance of tax cuts
May vote on budget ceiling -- diffuse the issue
Housing
Unemployment
E1 Salvador -- why it is critical and why it isn't Vietnam.
Allay fears but help them understand it is a real threat.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
72
Audience questions should be directed to the President. The
bulk of questions would likely be concentrated within the
framework provided by his opening comments. Firm, direct, but
informal answers would be ideal. The audience is "real folks,"
not the press corps. Informality might be assisted if the
President were to ask each questioner to preface question with
some personal background (e.g., name, where grew up, family
size, employment status, etc.).
Impromptu closing by President reflective of question/answer
session and his values/patriotism.
Some suggestions as to the organization of the forums could
include having them set up by local gropus (e.g. UAW Local for
Auto Worker Forum). People who would like to attend forum sign
up and then are selected by lottery. Advantages of lottery are
threefold: 1) The President cannot be accused of loading the
audience; 2) it reduces likelihood of extreme dissident groups
organizing demonstrations in the forum; and 3) it would allow
Secret Service opportunity to screen attendees.
Press corps coverage can be allowed but they would not be
permitted to ask questions. The session could be taped for
distribution to local TV news outlets.
As for timing -- as soon as possible.
The President would be comfortable and effective in this type
of environment, but we must recognize that questions will come
from various directions and some might be hostile. On the
other hand, the ability to anticipate questions is enhanced by
the facts that: 1) the bulk of the audience for each forum
will be of a common background and therefore have common
interests and questions, 2) questions will tend to fall into
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
73
the framework of the President's opening remarks, and 3) if
deemed necessary, research could be done in each city prior to
a forum to identify key interests and issues among the subject
audience.
We need not be concerned about "over-exposure." Our concern
should focus on what we must do to get the right kind of exposure.
We should also accept the fact that the Washington media are what
they are. Their interpretational program is never going to be
supportive no matter how hard we try to WOO them. Therefore, we must
concentrate on the strengths of Ronald Reagan himself and on the non-
Washington-based media.
Additionally, we should look at non-conventional media-
communications channels. For example, targeted direct mail is
something that a president has never used. Given, however, the kind
of response that the various Republican committees are generating from
virtually any mail list -- good or bad -- in raising funds using the
president's name, we should carefully examine the possibility of using
direct Presidential mail from lists of responders to the RNC, NRCC, or
NRSC to recommit our friends and marshal specific opinion leader
support to impact the Congress or generate support from some of our
institutional allies.
Voices other than Ronald Reagan's should be consciously used to
test major initiatives we may be considering and to prepare the
political-media environments prior to our major announcements. Once
the President goes out in front with a position, then surrogate
support should be significantly heightened. Some of the resources
that can provide this kind of support for the President are: friendly
governors, members of the cabinet, the Vice President, and other
private but well-known individuals who through experience or position
are in a unique position to comment favorably on our policies. But
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
74
this takes planning and coordination to insure a broad range of voices
on a wide spectrum of the media giving precisely the message that we
want communicated.
Lastly, serious consideration should be given to the suggestions
of Mike Deaver to provide a more reasoned set of rules to govern the
White House Press core.
Strategic Objective 11:
Do not use Ronald Reagan as a tourist this fall.
Presidents who go out on the stump are often of limited help to
most candidates; additionally, they almost invariably fritter away
some of their own perceptual strength as national leaders when they
don the hat of what the press portrays as a political huckster. The
President should, however, make some very carefully planned symbolic
personal stops that will give us broad-based media coverage. Also, he
should be available to all Republican candidates in D.C. to help them
personalize their campaign with mini TV cuts with the President when,
and if, they so choose.
The political stops that the President does make this fall should
be carefully targeted. Given the nature of this year's elections,
where the President travels should not be decided until the last two
or three weeks of the campaign. President Reagan's schedule should be
kept as flexible as possible in October.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
75
Strategic Objective 12:
If the mixed economic results hold, we can make a good
case for our successes and systematically prepare the
way those successes are explained by the Republican
committees and candidates.
As Republicans, we have been out of power so long that we have
been conditioned to always craft our messages against a program or a
policy. We must now create two or at most three positive defenses of
our programs and policies to take to the electorate in the fall. All
Republicans must answer the question: "Why do Republicans deserve to
be reelected this fall?" If we answer that question in a unified
fashion, we triple our impact.
Strategic Objective 13:
Unless we encounter severe setbacks in our economic
programs by mid-summer, we should look seriously at
undertaking some bold, imaginative step in the foreign
policy area late September/early October.
Strategic Objective 14:
Continue to use the Reagan Federalism program as a
platform to drive home our objective of making
government more responsive to. the people.
The Federalism theme can be used by the President in the 1982
elections to fulfill his 1980 promise to get government off the
people's backs. His visits to states, meetings with governors and
local government officials, and frequent public communication via
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
76
radio and television should stress these points. These interactions
must be coordinated, followed up by members of the administration with
a single voice, and reported to Congress.
During the educational and legislative phases, the President's
proposal will come under considerable attack. It is essential to
advance Reagan Federalism as:
a philosophy of governance and a perennial issue of
Constitutional government;
a set of themes and not a cluster of programs;
an approach to governance compatible with the President's
Economic Recovery Program, and consistent with the President's
commitment to reduce the level of government;
a strategy aimed at a significant contributor to the nation's
economic problems -- big, unresponsive government distant from
the people; and,
a strategy for reducing the governmental bureaucratic complex
that has circumvented state legislatures.
The President can use Federalism to further propel his agenda at
all levels of government and among all people. There is a strong
public desire to move power out of Washington and back to the states.
The public debate on Federalism will, however, be lost if the
arguments are made at the programmatic level, but won if it is
presented thematically.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
77
Strategic Objective 15:
There will be great pressure brought to bear on the
administration late spring and early summer by those who
want to generate political gain out of the peace and
anti-nuclear movement. We should co-opt the peace
marchers' positions whenever possible.
The zero base option for Europe proposed by the President last
fall provides the ideal model for us to follow this spring. While the
Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze may have some serious pitfalls, we
should develop soon proposals for strategic arms talks that call for a
reduction in nuclear weapons with verification on our terms. The key
response that the President made to Brezhnev's call for a freeze was
just right: "It doesn't go far enough."
Strategic Objective 16:
Recognize that the most powerful and unpredictable
political shocks to our administration this year will
come from our foreign relations.
In 1981 we were fortunate. We did not face a major foreign
crisis. We may not be so lucky in 1982. E1 Salvador, China, the
Mideast, the NATO Alliance each and all could trigger some major hot
spots for us this year. Prioritizing the likelihood of a breakout in
these areas against their political impacts should be an ongoing and
closely-monitored activity for us.
Political Action Plan 1982: What Should We Do?
78
Strategic Objective 17:
We must keep our Republican leadership base squarely
behind us by rewarding openly those Republican leaders
who support us and punishing those who don't.
Given the difficulty of the tasks that we face this next year, it
is imperative that we solidify the resolve of our political allies to
stand behind and openly support our positions and policies. Further
we must dampen and contain the criticism in our own ranks. We should
not hesitate to move strongly and quickly against high profile
Republicans who damage the credibility of President Reagan by
attacking him publicly.
In sum, we are now at the most critical political juncture this
Administration will ever face. None of the key decisions to be made
are easy. But clearly what we do or fail to do in the next four
months will tag this presidency as a failure or a success.
We cannot tolerate with impunity the kind of attacks on the
President mounted by our "own" Senators Packwood and Mathias and
Congressman Marks. If Packwood persists in his destructive sniping we
should remove him from his Republican leadership position. His
dissonant voice encourages others, like Representative Marc Lincoln
Marks. Not only do their comments provide ammunition for the media
and the Democrats, but they directly erode our base Republican
support.
7.19
Decision/Making/Information ®
Intelligent alternatives
for today's decision makers
1050 Seventeenth Street N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 822-9010
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Edwin Meese, James Baker and Michael Deaver
FROM:
Richard B. Wirthlin
DATE:
June 22, 1982
SUBJECT:
The Public's Attitudes toward Eleven Potential Tax
Increases
Our half sample (N=739) reflects broad differences of support for
eleven proposed changes to increase federal tax revenues. (See
following table.) The most strongly supported tax change: "Requiring
all corporations that make a profit to pay a minimum corporate tax." =
The most strongly opposed tax change: "Imposing a tax on oil that
would raise the price of gasoline by about eight cents."
Be careful about the "Safe Harbor" revision. I am uncertain whether
the description that was applied -"Repealing the present law that
lets one company sell tax benefits it cannot use to another company
which can take these benefits to reduce its taxes. = cast the issue
properly. I believe the abuses of the Safe Harbor tax provisions can
very clearly be applied against us politically.
We need to discuss the implications of our tax policies in depth and
soon.
No one likes to have their taxes increased; however, with the prospect of a
$100 billion dollar deficit next year, and perhaps larger deficits in the
future, taxes may have to be increased in order to raise more revenue. I'm
going to read you a list of tax options that have been proposed, and I'd
like you to rate each one on a scale where a minus 5 means you strongly
oppose that plan, while a plus 5 means you strongly favor the plan. A zero
therefore means that you neither favor nor oppose the plan, but are neutral
about it. Of course, you may use any number between minus 5 and plus 5 to
indicate how much you personally favor or oppose each proposed tax increase.
Average
Support
Response
Ratio
Requiring all corporations that make a profit
+2.41
5:1*
to pay a minimum corporate tax.
Raising the tax on a pack of cigarettes by 8 cents.
+2.36
4:1
Doubling the present tax on alcoholic beverages.
+2.08
3:1
Limiting the tax deductions companies get when
+0.22
1:1
they pay for employee health insurance
Increasing the enforcement of the present tax
-0.33
1:1
laws by hiring more IRS agents to see that taxes
owed to the government are actually paid.
Imposing a national sales tax of 1% on all items
-0.35
1:2
purchased in the United States.
Eliminating the 10% federal income tax cut that
-0.44
1:2
is scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1983.
Repealing the deductions given on federal income
-0.98
1:3
taxes for payment of state sales taxes.
Repealing the present law that lets one company
-1.34
1:3
sell tax benefits it cannot use to another
company who can take these benefits to reduce
its taxes.
Imposing a tax on oil that would raise the
-1.80
1:6
price of gasoline by 5 cents a gallon at the
pump.
Imposing a windfall profits tax on deregulated
-2.79
1:10
natural gas that would raise the cost of natural
gas to the consumer by 10%.
Imposing a tax on oil that would raise the price
-2.82
1:10**
of gasoline by about 8 cents a gallon.
*This ratio should be interpreted as: For every 5 persons who strongly
favor (+5) this policy, there is 1 person who strongly opposes (-5) this
same policy.
**This ratio should be interpreted as: For every 1 person who strongly
favors this policy, there are 10 people who strongly oppose this same policy.
Review
MIKE DEAVER
EYES ONLY
Decision/Making/Information
Intelligent alternatives
for today's decision makers
1050 Seventeenth Street N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 822-9010
741
FLASH RESULTS
File hue
RNC 10
JUNE 15 - 22, 1982
Decision/Making/Information
1
POLITICAL CLIMATE
RIGHT DIRECTION/WRONG TRACK
GENERALLY SPEAKING, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THINGS IN THIS COUNTRY
ARE GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, OR HAVE THEY PRETTY SERIOUSLY
PERCENT GOTTEN OFF ON THE WRONG TRACK ?
100
RIGHT
DIRECTION
90
WRONG TRACK
80
70
NO OPINION
2
62
60
50
40
30
32
20
10
6
0
3
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
9
10
10
11
12
12
12
1
1
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
1981
1982
Number One National Problem
(Rank order by frequency of mention on latest survey)
Sep
Oct
Oct
Nov
Nov
30-
Dec
Dec
Jan
Feb 25
Mar
April
May
June
18-28
5-14
17-26
9-18
Dec 9
13-16
18-22
11-19
Mar 6
20-29
12-18
21-26
16-22
TRI
TRII
TRIII
TRIV
TRV
TRVI
TRVII
RNC1
RNC4
RNC5
RNC7
RNC9
RNC10
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
nemployment
7
6
8
12
17
13
17
17
23
29
28
28
27
nflation
30
25
25
26
21
21
22
24
17
17
13
15
15
conomy/General
17
12
16
16
15
19
14
16
10
6
19
6
6
3
igh interest rates
7
9
7
6
5
3
3
5
6
5
5
7
7
orld peace
4
7
6
6
6
10
10
5
5
5
9
7
7
overnment spending
3
5
3
4
3
5
4
3
5
3
3
3
2
ecline in morals
3
4
5
5
4
3
4
5
5
4
4
6
6
ocial Security
6
3
2
3
4
5
3
3
3
3
5
4
3
rime
3
5
4
3
3
2
2
4
3
2
3
3
3
preign policy
1
2
2
1
1
3
3
2
2
3
2
1
2
axes
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
ational defense
2
3
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
abor unions
1
-
1
1
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
Government Hopeless to Solve Problems
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Track
Track
RNC
RNC
RNC
RNC
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
XI
I
II
1
4
5
10
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
54
53
Agree
50
52
52
55
48
44
57
56
46
41
40
48
47
Disagree
47
45
45
41
50
53
42
42
52
57
58
51
51
43
43
No opinion
3
2
4
3
3
3
2
2
3
1
1
1
2
3
4
4
Average Man Getting Worse
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Eagle
Track
Track
RNC
RNC
RNC
RNC
RNC
II
III
IV
V
VI
IX
I
II
1
2
3
4
10
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Agree
66
74
72
67
70
62
65
64
67
64
66
67
67
Disagree
32
24
25
29
30
36
33
34
32
34
31
31
31
No opinion
2
2
3
3
1
2
2
2
1
2
3
2
2
5
Decision/Making/Information
6
PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE
REAGAN JOB RATING
GENERAL
PERCENT
100
APPROVE
90
DISAPPROVE
80
70
NO OPINION
7
60
52
50
40
40
30
20
10
8
0
3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 12 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6
1981
1982
REAGAN JOB RATING
(ECONOMY)
PERCENT
100
APPROVE
90
DISAPPROVE
80
70
NO OPINION
8
60
50
51
45
40
30
20
10
4
0
3 3 4 5 7 8 10 10 11 12 12 12 1 3 3 4 4 5 5 6
1981
1982
REAGAN JOB RATING
(FOREIGN AFFAIRS)
PERCENT
100
APPROVE
90
DISAPPROVE
80
70
NO OPINION
6
60
56
50
40
34
30
20
10
10
0
3 3 4 5 7 8 10 10 11 12 12 12 1 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6
1981
1982
REAGAN JOB RATING
(UNEMPLOYMENT)
PERCENT
100
APPROVE
90
DISAPPROVE
80
70
NO OPINION
64
10
60
50
40
30
30
20
10
6
0
DEC
DEC
JAN
MARCH
MARCH
APRIL
JUNE
1981
1982
REAGAN JOB RATING
(INFLATION)
PERCENT
100
APPROVE
90
DISAPPROVE
80
70
NO OPINION
11
60
53
50
41
40
30
20
10
6
0
DEC
DEC
JAN
MARCH
MARCH
APRIL
JUNE
1981
1982
JOB RATINGS: JUNE 15-23, 1982
RONALD REAGAN AND THE CONGRESS
PERCENT
100
REAGAN
APPROVE
90
CONGRESS:
80
APPROVE
70
12
60
50
45
42
41
40
30
30
24
21
19
20
16
10
0
ECONOMY
UNEMPLOYMENT
INFLATION
FED BUDGET
HAS REAGAN CUT SPENDING ENOUGH?
FROM WHAT YOU'VE HEARD AND READ, HAS RONALD REAGAN CUT GOVERNMENT
SPENDING ENOUGH, MORE THAN ENOUGH, OR NOT ENOUGH DURING HIS FIRST
YEAR AS PRESIDENT ?:
PERCENT
100
CUT ENOUGH
90
MORE THAN
80
ENOUGH
70
NOT ENOUGH
60
13
50
45
44
NO OPINION
41
40
39
38
37
35
34
34
36
35
31
30
24
26
21
20
18
17
16
10
7
4
4
4
5
5
0
JAN 19
JAN 31
FEB 14
MARCH 6
MARCH 29
JUNE 22
REAGAN DONE TO SOCIAL SECURITY?
IN REGARD TO SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS, IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION
THAT RONALD REAGAN HAS INCREASED OR REDUCED SOCIAL SECURITY
PERCENT BENEFITS ? :
100
INCREASED
BENEFITS
90
REDUCED
80
BENEFITS
70
14
NO CHANGE
60
54
50
48
49
NO OPINION
40
34
30
26
21
20
20
17
12
11
10
8
0
MARCH 6, 1982
MAY 26
JUNE 22
Like Most About Reagan
(Rank order by frequency of mention)
Jul
Aug
Sep 9
Sep
Oct
Oct
Nov
Nov
30-
Jan
Feb 25-
Mar
April
May
June
1981
1981
1981
18-28
4-14
17-27
9-18
Dec 12
11-19
Mar 6
20-29
12-18
21-26
16-20
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%
Strong leadership capability
15
24
23
20
20
19
19
20
18
16
14
13
14
14
)o a good job
10
8
10
10
9
10
10
10
9
8
10
9
10
11
Appearance/Personality
10
5
6
4
4
5
6
6
6
8
6
7
5
7
Honest/Sincere
9
7
6
6
5
5
7
9
9
7
5
7
3
5
Dutspoken/Straightforward
5
7
5
4
5
4
5
4
4
5
3
4
6
4
Stand on government spending
2
1
6
7
5
6
5
6
6
4
5
4
3
4
Stand on economy
4
3
3
3
5
3
3
3
4
3
3
2
2
2
Help the people
4
4
2
2
3
3
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
Qualified/Capable
2
2
2
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Campaign promises
2
3
3
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
Stand on labor unions
4
2
1
2
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
General positive
5
3
1
-
3
3
4
4
3
4
3
6
6
7
Too soon to judge/Neutral
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
No opinion
5
5
3
4
3
4
5
6
7
9
9
11
8
7
Specific positive responses
83
83
86
77
84
82
80
79
77
72
68
69
66
66
Negative
11
11
10
14
12
13
14
15
16
19
23
20
19
20
Like Least About Reagan
(Rank order by frequency of mention)
Jul
Aug
Sep 9
Sep
Oct
Oct
Nov
Nov
30-
Jan
Feb 25-
Mar
April
May
June
1981
1981
1981
18-28
4-14
17-27
9-18
Dec 12
11-19
Mar 6
20-29
12-18
21-26
16-2
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
tand on cutback in
ocial programs
6
4
8
9
9
8
8
7
9
8
7
7
6
6
ill not represent the people
4
3
3
4
4
5
5
5
4
6
6
5
4
5
tand on aid to the elderly
6
5
7
8
6
6
5
6
5
3
4
5
7
5
ppearance
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
3
avors rich
2
4
3
4
4
4
5
4
5
5
4
4
5
3
tand on foreign policy
3
2
3
3
4
5
5
3
5
3
4
3
2
3
is age/Health
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
1
2
1
3
1
2
ctor
3
3
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
-
2
2
abinet/Aides
3
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
1
2
1
2
tand on labor unions
-
3
2
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
eneral negative
3
1
2
2
1
1
2
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
00 soon to judge/Neutral
2
2
3
13
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
lo opinion
14
13
9
10
10
0
11
14
11
14
13
13
14
14
ositive
26
28
23
18
24
24
21
21
20
18
18
18
19
20
esistance Ratio
24:10
25:10
23:10
13:10
20:10
19:10
15:10
14:10
13:10
9:10
8:10
9:10
10:10
10:1
How Well Do These Characteristics Describe President Reagan?
(Percentage of people choosing "excellent" or "good")
Dec
Dec
Jan
Feb
Feb 25-
Mar
April
April
April
30-
May
June
13-16
18-22
11-19
13-14
Mar 6
20-29
1-2
12-18
May 3
21-26
16-22
TRVI
TRVII
RNC1
RNC3
RNC4
RNC5
RNC6
RNC7
RNC8
RNC9
RNC10
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Cares about the needs
of the elderly and poor
NA
NA
40
32
33
29
32
32
-
-
37
Would be likely to
23
start an unnecessary war
26
26
25
23
26
30
25
27
26
23
Effective in
getting things done
64
64
69
NA
59
55
54
52
48
52
51
Really knows what he
is doing
-
-
-
-
43
44
43
44
44
45
-
Fights too much with Congress
-
-
-
-
40
39
40
-
-
-
-
I
-
-
-
-
Strong leadership
54
69
63
66
-
-
How Well Do These Characteristics Describe President Reagan?
(Percentage of people choosing "fair" or "poor")
Dec
Dec
Jan
Feb
Feb 25-
Mar
April
April
April
30-
May
June
13-16
18-22
11-19
13-14
Mar 6
20-29
1-2
12-18
May 3
21-26
16-22
TRVI
TRVII
RNC1
RNC3
RNC4
RNC5
RNC6
RNC7
RNC8
RNC9
RNC10
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Cares about the needs
of the elderly and poor
NA
NA
59
57
66
70
66
65
-
-
62
Would be likely to start
an unnecessary war
73
70
73
74
69
65
68
68
68
72
72
Effective in getting
things done
34
34
30
NA
40
43
44
46
50
46
47
Really knows what he
is doing
-
-
-
-
-
55
55
53
54
54
53
Fights too much with Congress
-
-
-
-
-
I
-
-
54
53
54
Strong leadership
30
36
34
-
-
-
-
-
I
-
44