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Communications February 1985
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Communications February 1985
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual
collections.
Collection: Deaver, Michael
Folder Title: Communications-February
1985
Box: 36
To see more digitized collections
visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories
visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives
Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 4, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER
MICHAEL A. McMANUS,
JR.MOMM
FROM:
SUBJECT:
1985 State of the Union
Communications Plan Update
As you requested this morning, attached is an updated
communications plan for the 1985 State of the Union
Address.
You'll notice that the only unconfirmed action item is
the 4 p.m. White House press briefing with Regan and
McFarlane. We're told that Speakes wants to talk with
Regan about this.
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
1985 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6
0
10:00 a.m.
RR meets with GOP congressional leaders.
Oglesby
Discusses themes of speech.
0
11:30 a.m.
Network anchors.
Mathis
Luncheon in Roosevelt Room for network anchors with briefing
on SOTU themes by Regan, Svahn, and McFarlane. RR drop by.
o
3:00 p.m.
Foreign Press.
Small
Ken Dam or Mike Armacost briefs foreign news media on foreign
policy themes and foreign impact of domestic policy
initiatives. Foreign press center.
o
Columnists and Weekend Commentators.
Mathis
3:00 p.m.
Roosevelt Room briefing for major columnists and t.v.
weekend commentators on SOTU themes by Regan, Svahn and
McFarlane.
White House Press Corps.
Speakes
O
4:00 p.m.
Briefing in White House Briefing Room by McFarlane and
Regan on content and themes of SOTU. Embargoed fact
sheet released. Authorized quotes released for evening
news. (T)
0
4:00 p.m.
Cabinet briefing by Craig Fuller.
Fuller
O
4:30 p.m.
Core group of surrogates.
Ryan
Surrogates are briefed by Fuller in Roosevelt Room
on budget and SOTU themes.
5:00 p.m.
Administration Appointees Briefing.
Fuller
Presidential appointees are briefed by Fuller on major
themes of speech. Talking points and fact sheets are
provided. Room 450 (Includes Public Affairs Officers.)
6:00 p.m.
Congressional Television Tapings.
Oglesby
Supportive Senators -- with talking points and fact sheet --
videotape reaction to Senate Republican Conference for
feeds to local stations on nationwide basis. Senate
Television Studio.
0
9:00 p.m.
The President delivers the State of the Union
Address -- Capitol Hill.
0
10:30 p.m.
Congressional Reaction.
Oglesby
Favorable Members of Congress, armed with fact sheets and
talking points (provided by the White House), hold press
conferences, television interviews and issue statements
supportive of RR's address. Statuary Hall.
O
10:30 p.m.
Mayors and Governors Reaction.
Verstandig
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs briefs key supportive
Mayors and Governors throughout the day; encourages them
to hold news conferences in home towns following Address
to show support.
SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIVITIES
ACTION
-
Speech summary, talking points and fact sheets are prepared Baroody
for early distribution.
---
Speech materials provided to entire press list, editorial
Mathis
page editors, specialized press nationwide.
---
Speech materials sent out to all Administration spokesmen
Baroody
in all agencies.
--
Speech materials provided through the Republican National
Baroody
Committee to State Chairmen and other supporters nationwide.
- -
Fact sheets and talking points provided to key
Oglesby
congressional supporters.
--
Op-ed pieces are written, signed by Adminstration
Baroody
officials and placed for late week and weekend use across
the country.
Public Liaison special briefings for relevant interest
Donatelli
--
groups to be arranged in days following SOTU.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
PAM BAILEY PUB
SUBJECT:
COMMUNICATIONS PLAN FEBRUARY 11 through APRIL 5
We may want to break the communications plan between
February 19 and April 5 into two distinct but complementary
phases.
The first, February 19 to March 18 could follow a strategy of
presenting RR as an activist leader in selling his program and
inspiring the Nation to respond to the challenge of a Second
American Revolution. Through events, travel and meetings he
could reinforce the major themes of his State of the Union
Address. (Freedom and peace; opportunity, growth and jobs;
traditional values; and the future.) Spotlighting a particular
theme would coincide with the timing and strategy of related
legislative initiatives.
At the same time, surrogates and external supporters could be
utilized to get the facts out on the budget and to develop
broad-based support for RR's proposals. The Citizens for
America initiative is one example. Each Cabinet member could
be asked to develop and implement his/her own communications
plan for his/her budget to key groups, regions and the media.
From March 19 to Easter RR could travel (to 30-40 swing
Congressional districts or however Legislative Affairs
recommends) leading up to date-certain for the budget
vote. The effort would be intensive and unprecedented,
hitting several stops each day. A detailed plan including
relevant interest groups, surrogates, and media relations
activity would be tied into and complementary to RR's efforts.
Attached for review and discussion at our February 11
Communications Planning Group meeting are a proposed agenda
(TAB A); SOTU themes and related policy initiatives for
which we need guidance on anticipated timing (TAB B) ; and a
February 11 to March 19 communications plan showing those
events currently scheduled (TAB C).
COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING MEETING
February 11, 1985
I.
Discuss General Strategic Approach:
February 19 - March 18
March 19 - Easter recess
II.
Review Key Themes and Legislative Timetable
III.
Develop Approach to Coordinate Themes, Scheduling
and Legislative Strategy (i.e. select key themes,
ask Ryan to propose events and schedule consistent
with legislative strategy and timing).
THEMES
LEGISLATION
I. OPPORTUNITY, GROWTH, JOBS
budget vote
(deficit reduction, reduce
tax reform
role of government, create
line item veto
new businesses, tax reform,
balanced budget
deregulation)
amendment
enterprise zones
trade talks
trade policy
JTPA
Youth Wage
eliminate govt.
subsidies (farm,
Amtrak, etc.)
II. TRADITIONAL VALUES
tuition tax credit
(faith, family, education,
education
work, compassion, volunteerism,
abortion
neighborhood, courage)
school prayer
crime
III. FREEDOM, PEACE
SDI
Defense Budget
U.S. -Soviet Talks
MX missile
Defense of Freedom
(3rd world econ.
dev., CentralAm. ,
Afghanistan)
IV. FUTURE, YOUTH, CHALLENGE
space station
(high tech, space,
commercialization
entrepreneur)
of space
Monday, February 11
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
King Fahd State Visit
o
10:00 a.m.
RR welcomes King Fahd.
o
2:45 p.m.
RR interview with New York Times
o
7:15 p.m.
Fahd State Dinner.
Tuesday, February 12 (Lincoln's Birthday)
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Hosts New Pioneers Luncheon.
O
12:00 noon
RR hosts lunch for New Pioneers (includes
award-winning scientists, engineers and
inventors).
00
Trade press notified for coverage and follow-up
interviews.
00
Morning news shows alerted. Segment possible?
00
One-on-one interviews arranged following lunch.
Wednesday, February 13
MAJOR EVENT:
RR to ranch.
0
TBD
RR interview with Santa Barbara Daily News.
Press
Thursday, February 14 (Valentine's Day)
RANCH
Friday, February 15
ACTION
RANCH
Saturday, February 16
MAJOR EVENT:
Radio Talk.
Topic?
Monday, February 18 (Washington's Birthday)
Tuesday, February 19
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Presents High Tech Awards.
O
(T) 9:30 a.m. Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership.
O
1:00 p.m.
RR drop-by briefing for high tech press.
00
Media Relations day-long briefing for high
tech and business press.
0
1:30 p.m.
RR presents National Technology awards to
11 individuals.
00
Local media and trade press alerted for coverage
and follow-up interviews.
00
Media Relations does day-long briefing for
high tech and business press.
O
4:00 p.m.
RR meeting with Senate Armed Services and
appropriations committees.
00
News coverage?
Wednesday, February 20
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
Prime Minister Thatcher Visit.
O
12:00 noon
RR meeting and lunch with PM Thatcher.
O
1:15 p.m.
RR seminar meeting with Thatcher.
O
2:30 p.m.
Press Conference preparation.
Thursday, February 21
MAJOR EVENT:
News Conference.
0
11:00 a.m.
RR drop-by Room 450 for Leadership of
National Conference of State Legislators.
O
8:00 p.m.
RR News Conference.
Friday, February 22
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Meeting with Commission on
Excellence in Education.
o
11:00 a.m.
RR meets with Excellence on Education
Commission
00
Secretary Bennett and Gardner brief press
following meeting.
00
Fact sheet released on progress in education.
00
Satellite interviews set up with Gardner
and Bennett.
ACTION
O
1:15 p.m.
RR interview with Business Week.
00
Key points? RR looks ahead to next four years.
Key points could include prospects for growth,
opportunity and the future through high tech,
entrepreneurs, American "pioneer" spirit as
exemplified at lunch.
Saturday, February 23
MAJOR EVENT:
Radio Talk: Topic?
Sunday, February 24
O
7:30 p.m.
RR hosts Nation's Governors for dinner.
00
Remarks focus?
Monday, February 25
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Address to Governors.
0
11:30 a.m.
RR speech to Nation's Governors.
00
Remarks topic?
00
Remarks distributed to editorial boards, columnists
and major media nationwide.
O
2:00 p.m.
RR drop-by 450 briefing for Grace Commission
O
2:45 p.m.
RR interview with Germond and Witcover
Tuesday, February 26
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
RR meeting with Joint Chiefs of Staff (?)
0
9:30 a.m. (T)
RR meeting with GOP Leadership
o
11:00 a.m.
RR meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
O
1:30 p.m.
RR drop-by briefing of ALEC.
Wednesday, February 27
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Presents Medal of Science.
o
9:00 a.m.
RR breakfast with GOP Senators class of '80.
O
11:30 a.m.
RR presents Medal of Science to 19 U.S.
scientists and engineers
00
Local media and trade press alerted. Follow-up
and home town interviews arranged.
Thursday, February 28
MAJOR EVENT:
?
Friday, March 1
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
?
O
9:45 a.m.
RR meeting with President of Sudan.
O
Evening
RR address to CPAC dinner.
Saturday, March 2
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Radio Talk.
Topic?
Monday, March 4
MAJOR EVENT:
?
o
11:30 a.m.
RR presents Adult Literacy Awards.
Tuesday, March 5
MAJOR EVENT:
RR meets with P. M. Craxi.
O
11:30 a.m.
RR meets with P.M. Craxi of Italy.
Wednesday, March 6
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
?
Thursday, March 7
MAJOR EVENT:
?
o
11:45 a.m.
RR drops-by briefing for National
Newspapers Association.
Friday, March 8
MAJOR EVENT:
?
Saturday, March 9
MAJOR EVENT:
Radio Talk.
Topic?
Monday, March 11
MAJOR EVENT:
?
Tuesday, March 12
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
RR meets with President Muborak.
O
11:30 a.m.
RR meets with President Muborak of Egypt.
Wednesday, March 13
MAJOR EVENT:
?
0
1:15 p.m.
RR drops-by briefing for American
Business Conference.
Thursday, March 14
MAJOR EVENT:
?
Friday, March 15
MAJOR EVENT:
?
0
10:45 a.m.
RR presentation of shamrocks.
Saturday, March 16
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Radio Talk.
Topic?
Sunday, March 17
(St. Patrick's Day)
MAJOR EVENT:
RR to Quebec.
RR in Quebec.
Monday, March 18
RR in Quebec.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)
By NARA ARJ
Date 10/20/04 February 11, 1985
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
PgB
any to chil vocte to JJ must to
Just talked for fifteen minutes with Jesse Jackson; he will
be out of the hospital Wednesday; had it pretty rough he
said, but improving now. Suggest holding off on the telephone
call; because the first thing Jackson will say is to ask for
a personal meeting with the President to discuss "enterprize
zones," and we don't want to commit to that right now.
On the radio speech, an excellent idea; however, my view is
that we should treat it as a "presidential" subject, and
thus do it in the Camp David Series, rather than go down to
the Black Radio Stations, which has to me a connotation of
patronizing. If you think it advised, I can get the speech
shop working up a draft on the successes, achievements and
OK
enduring problems of Black America, and how the President
thinks the country should best proceed with its "unfinished
agenda," etc.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Pat Buchanan
TO:
FROM:
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff
Information
XX
Action
Can I have you thoughts on
this please.
Thanks.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1985
Pat B.
I have on you
MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE DEAVER
FROM:
PETE ROUSSEL R
SUBJECT: Our Black Effort
the pls. mike
In connection with Black History Month and in view of such
negative articles as the attached, here are some suggestions
for your consideration.
1.
Call Jesse Jackson. He's in Howard University Hospital
suffering from exhaustion and possible pneumonia. This
would be certain to generate coverage, and, if confined
to extending wishes for a prompt recovery, would seem to
have no downside.
2.
It was in the USA TODAY interview (January 17, 1985) that
PSB
the President first talked about the black populace not
being informed by their leaders as to the
Administration's efforts on such things as Enterprise
annual
Zones, aid to black colleges, fair housing, inflation
reduction, etc. The implication was left, as in the case
of the budget, that the President might like to take this
12
message directly to the rank-and-file without it being
diluted by the black leadership.
In this regard, why not consider having the RNC buy time
on key black radio stations throughout the country and
have a series of 5-minute messages by the President
broadcast on these issues. Perhaps a trip could be con-
sidered to a predominantly black area (maybe a black
radio station within a potential Enterprise Zone) from
Not
where one one of the broadcasts could eminate and, thus,
further highlight the effort.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 12, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
PAMELA G. BAILEY PaB
SUBJECT:
Communications Plan
February through April
We agreed at the February 11 communications meeting that
our basic strategy over the next several weeks should be to
emphasize positive, forward-looking events, enabling RR to
continue stressing the major themes of his State of the
Union Address. (Tab A) As an activist, future oriented
leader, RR would maintain and build upon the enormous
popular support for his overall program -- calling upon
this support when needed in specific, major legislative
battles. Senate budget floor action would be the week of
March 18 and MX votes during the week of March 18 and 25.
Fred Ryan's memo presents scheduling options consistent
with this strategy over the long-term. Once we've agreed
on events and/or additional travel, a detailed
communications plan supplementing that schedule can be
developed.
For the short-term, we should review the attached two-week
communications plan (Tab B) for the time period immediately
after California. While this schedule has news events
nearly every day, it lacks any consistent or sustained
theme. Should we make additions? If so, what? Does
Legislative Affairs have any special need during this time?
Also, looking ahead to the first 10 days of March, do we
want to build in some travel to specific Congressional
areas?
Finally, do you want to discuss ideas for a communications
plan leading up the Geneva talks, March 12?
CC: Michael A. McManus
THEMES
LEGISLATION
I. OPPORTUNITY, GROWTH, JOBS
budget vote
(deficit reduction, reduce
tax reform
role of government, create
line item veto
new businesses, tax reform,
balanced budget
deregulation)
amendment
enterprise zones
trade talks
trade policy
JTPA
Youth Wage
eliminate govt.
subsidies (farm,
Amtrak, etc.)
II. TRADITIONAL VALUES
tuition tax credit
(faith, family, education,
education
work, compassion, volunteerism,
vouchers
neighborhood, courage)
abortion
school prayer
crime
III. FREEDOM, PEACE
SDI
Defense Budget
U.S. -Soviet Talks
MX missile
Defense of Freedom
(3rd world econ.
dev., CentralAm.,
Afghanistan)
IV. FUTURE, YOUTH, CHALLENGE
space station
(high tech, space,
commercialization
entrepreneur)
of space
Monday, February 18 (Washington's Birthday)
ACTION
Tuesday, February 19
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Presents High Tech Awards.
O
(T) 9:30 a.m. Bi-Partisan Congressional Leadership.
0
1:00 p.m.
RR drop-by briefing for high tech press.
00
Media Relations day-long briefing for high
tech and business press.
0
1:30 p.m.
RR presents National Technology awards to
11 individuals.
00
Local media and trade press alerted for coverage
and follow-up interviews.
00
Media Relations does day-long briefing for
high tech and business press.
0
4:00 p.m.
RR meeting with Senate Armed Services and
appropriations committees.
00
News coverage?
Wednesday, February 20
MAJOR EVENT:
Prime Minister Thatcher Visit.
O
12:00 noon
RR meeting and lunch with PM Thatcher.
O
1:15 p.m.
RR seminar meeting with Thatcher.
O
2:30 p.m.
Press Conference preparation.
Thursday, February 21
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
News Conference.
o
11:00 a.m.
RR drop-by Room 450 for Leadership of
National Conference of State Legislators.
O
8:00 p.m.
RR News Conference.
Opening Statement?
Friday, February 22
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Meeting with Commission on
Excellence in Education.
0
11:00 a.m.
RR meets with Excellence on Education
Commission
00
Secretary Bennett and Gardner brief press
following meeting.
00
Fact sheet released on progress in education.
00
Satellite interviews set up with Gardner
and Bennett.
0
1:15 p.m.
RR interview with Business Week.
00
Key points? RR looks ahead to next four years.
Key points could include prospects for growth,
opportunity and the future through high tech,
entrepreneurs, American "pioneer" spirit as
exemplified at lunch.
Saturday, February 23
MAJOR EVENT:
Radio Talk: Topic?
Sunday, February 24
ACTION
o
7:30 p.m.
RR hosts Nation's Governors for dinner.
00
Remarks focus?
Monday, February 25
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Address to Governors.
O
11:30 a.m.
RR speech to Nation's Governors.
00
Remarks topic?
00
Remarks distributed to editorial boards, columnists
and major media nationwide.
00
Supportive Governors scheduled for follow-up
interviews.
0
2:00 p.m.
RR drop-by 450 briefing for Grace Commission
0
2:45 p.m.
RR interview with Germond and Witcover
Tuesday, February 26
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
RR meeting with Joint Chiefs of Staff (?)
0
9:30 a.m. (T)
RR meeting with GOP Leadership
O
11:00 a.m.
RR meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
0
1:30 p.m.
RR drop-by briefing of ALEC.
Wednesday, February 27
ACTION
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Presents Medal of Science.
O
9:00 a.m.
RR breakfast with GOP Senators class of '80.
O
11:30 a.m.
RR presents Medal of Science to 19 U.S.
scientists and engineers
00
Local media and trade press alerted. Follow-up
and home town interviews arranged.
Thursday, February 28
MAJOR EVENT:
?
Friday, March 1
MAJOR EVENT:
?
0
9:45 a.m.
RR meeting with President of Sudan.
0
Evening
RR address to CPAC dinner.
Saturday, March 2
MAJOR EVENT:
RR Radio Talk.
Topic?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 13, 1985
pents for comeets
MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL DEAVER
before week
FROM:
MAX FRIEDERSDORF M-G
Comm
SUBJECT:
Comments on Presidential Themes and Events
through May 1985
Per your request, my comments on Fred Ryan's memorandum:
I generally agree with taking the high road, i.e., "The
Future, and "Education, " and "High Tech.
"
However, these commendable and altruistic goals must be
based on a foundation of economic growth at home and stabil-
ity in the world.
We need the underpinning of less government, lower taxes and
a strong national security to come thru, in all of these
events, despite the somewhat escoterie approach to the "Future," "
"Education," and "High Tech."
Fred's excellent proposed events for February thru May, all
present opportunities, albeit subtle in some cases, for our
economic growth and national defense themes necessary for
prodding the Congress.
Your April 15 suggestion for an introduction of the tax
reform bill is a natural, and could be orchestrated with
full fanfare.
Your imagination is more fertile than mine, but I could
envision the President delivering the bill personally to the
Congressional leadership, accompanied by some representative
tax payers or he could go to Boston (another tea party?); to
Independence Hall; to the I.R.S., visit some H. & R. Block
offices to soothe harried tax payers; the options are limit-
less.
I'm a little nervous about the space shuttle launching event.
Public reaction to Garn's participation has been skeptical.
I have a gut feeling about this one and would rather see the
President attend the landing rather than take off.
- -2-
All of the other suggestions seem to be tried and true
forums for the President and offer excellent opportunities
to promote his themes.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 20, 1985
MEMORANDUM TO MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
PAMELA G. BAILEY PuB
SUBJECT:
Thoughts on Black Strategy Follow-up Memo
You asked for my thoughts on the attached memo.
Summary Points
1. The memo is a collection of comments and ideas on how
to deal with the "black problem." It is not a
strategy.
2. The paper has no clear objective. It assumes that we
should be appealing to blacks in general without
stating a purpose (i.e., is the purpose to have more
blacks of all ages and economic group "approve" of RR;
or do we want more young blacks to vote Republican; or
do we want to reach those over 50 in the South, etc?)
3.
It wrongly promotes the need to develop new policies
rather than new communication strategies.
Recommendations
1. Survey data should be analyzed in order to determine
objectives for a black initiative. Careful thought
should be given to attitudes as broken down by age,
economic status and region. I would assume blacks are
no more monolithic in their views, concerns and
priorities than whites.
Page 2
2.
Once objectives are set, a detailed plan can be
developed to achieve them. This plan would probably be
much more based in the communications area than in
policy. I disagree with the need to "develop a policy
package that addresses the very real problems of black
Americans from a conservative standpoint." RR doesn't
develop policy "packages" for particular special
interests -- he argued against such an approach in the
last election. RR's policies over the last four years
have worked "to address the very real problems of black
Americans" and, indeed, of all Americans. The
challenge now seems to be how to better explain to
minorities the benefits of his policies --- not how to
design new ones.
3.
Symbolic visual actions should not be lightly
dismissed. Events such as RR's ceremony signing the
MLK legislation, welcoming home Lt. Goodwin, and
honoring Mother Hale have gone a long way toward
visually demonstrating that RR is truly President of
all the people. Public Liasion, the Political Office
and Congressional Liasion should be encouraged to
continue recommending such events - not only for
blacks but for all minority groups. There are a host
of events we could undertake to show how RR's policies
have benefitted blacks - (i.e., job training,
education reforms, crime bill, etc.).
4.
Is a special strategy needed only for blacks or - if
we're talking about communication initiatives - should
various White House offices be asked to work with
Public Liaison to develop targetted communications
plans for several minority groups? For instance, how
can we justify a special initiative for blacks but not
Hispanics?
General Comments
The basic points of the paper are uncomfortably similar to the
special interest pandering we so criticized the Democrats for
during the campaign.
I would find it hard to justify a reexamination of our policies
to see what more we can do to respond to the concerns of blacks
-- unless we want to undertake a similar review of policies to
help Hispanics, women, labor, Asian-Americans, etc.
Page 3
This approach is not RR's way. He and his policies for economic
Americans. growth, freedom, opportunity and jobs are right for all
Suggestions that we foster a "public debate" on the problems of
black Americans are misguided, too. It would be a contradiction
of all that RR has stood for to push for a debate on policies as
they affect a particular segment of the population.
Finally, I would recommend that before any major RR policy
statement be made on civil rights that careful analysis be done
on why. The paper is accurate in stating we face a "perceptual"
problem in civil rights and that the civil rights lobby's vested
interests is a major cause of the problem. But, again, who would
we be trying to reach? Blacks, whites, black leaders? One or
all? This may be an area where actions can speak louder than
words. I'm not sure that a war of words will do anything other
than provoke the traditional leaders to debate and criticize.
Our purposes may be better served by not dealing with the issue
on their terms. I suspect civil rights and other basic
terminology will always mean something different to Brad Reynolds
compared to Vernon Jordan -- even though our end result may be
the same. This may be an area where action, events, and visuals
can convey RR's strong civil rights commitments better than
speeches and new policy packages.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 12, 1985
Pain
MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
give your we thoylits
FROM:
JAMES CICCONI Jwe
on
SUBJECT:
Follow-Up on Black Strategy
In a previous memo, I outlined a possible strategy for reaching
out to black Americans. Assuming agreement on the need for such
an effort, it is perhaps useful at this point to provide a more
detailed discussion of certain elements.
Basics of a New Approach
1. Any new approach to blacks must be rooted in substance, not
just atmospherics: the latter should showcase the former.
This is admittedly different from our past efforts, but it is
a difference born of necessity. Efforts based largely on
scheduling and symbolism have worked with groups where our
policy disagreements are minimal. Blacks, however, perceive
themselves to be at odds with most policy priorities of this
Administration. The resulting gap can only be closed by
affirmatively seeking common ground with a significant
segment of black Americans.
2. We must be prepared to sustain any new effort over the long
term. Gains from an issue-oriented approach will be
incremental, and perhaps barely noticeable in the short run.
3. We must walk before we can run. Any initial gains will be
among upwardly-mobile blacks who are part of, or
entering, the middle class; broader targeting would be
premature. Upwardly-mobile blacks should be inclined toward
this Administration's policies, but for a number of reasons
have not been supportive. In effect, we must package our
policy message for them and, at the same time, minimize
other obstacles to their support.
4. We must prevent major goofs. The biggest single obstacle to
increasing our black support in the first term was our own
inability to foresee the perceptual consequences of certain
decisions, some of which were considered to be minor at the
time. While most of the Administration has grown more
sensitive in the wake of Bob Jones, such misjudgments still
represent a danger which, unless avoided, can undo any
political gains from our new strategy.
Page 2
5.
For the immediate future, we must avoid the "established"
black leadership. As stated previously, such leaders are
unremittingly hostile to this President and cannot be
expected to take a constructive approach. The current black
leadership seems, quite frankly, more interested in personal
publicity and enhancing their influence within the Democratic
Party than they are in new approaches to black problems. In
fact, they are personally and rhetorically linked to a
philosophy which cannot be reconciled with our own. Thus,
meetings would not only be unproductive, but would serve to
strengthen the position of such hostile leaders within their
own organizations, and among blacks generally. Instead of
allowing ourselves to be pressured into such old, no-win
patterns, we should seek out other blacks with whom there is
a chance of reaching common ground.
6. We should make clear that favoritism on grants and contracts
is out-of-bounds, and will not be considered as an aspect of
our strategy. Too often, political support by certain voter
group members is viewed as a license to demand favoritism on
grants or contracts. Our resistance to this pattern has led
to criticism from some of our black supporters; however, it
is absolutely essential that we not fall into this "spoils
system" trap in the same way that previous Administrations
have. As part of our Hispanic strategy, we made clear that
no one in the White House, including the Hispanic liaison,
would discuss grants or contracts, and we must be similarly
adamant with our black supporters. The political base we
build among blacks must rest on common policy ground, and not
on hope of personal financial benefit.
Shaping our Alternative
1. We should work to develop a policy package that addresses the
very real problems of black Americans from a conservative
standpoint. This can include new ideas, as well as
established Administration policies (e.g., enterprise zones,
youth opportunity wage) that would be re-packaged to
highlight their appeal to black Americans.
2. Such a package need not be confined to economic issues, but
could also include criminal justice and social policy issues.
Blacks, for example, are victimized disproportionately by
crime, yet black politicians are the most ardent foes of
tougher criminal laws. Similarly, the break-up of the black
family has been an increasing and alarming trend for over
twenty years, and has arguably been exacerbated by federal
policies. Such issues, often ignored by the Democrats, have
good potential for attracting blacks to the Republican Party
if our solutions make sense.
Page 3
3. Our main emphasis should be on the overall philosophical
difference between our policies and those of the liberal
Democrats. In effect, we would stress the concept of
providing incentives for self-reliance, versus the failed
course of increased dependence on government. Current policy
dynamics favor our approach for several reasons. First, our
policies are largely untried, and therefore hold some
prospect for success, while the liberal methods have been
tried on a massive scale and, for the most part, have failed.
Second, decreasing government resources make the liberal
approach impossible to sustain financially, and dictate that
alternatives be tried. Third, there is no longer a national
consensus in support of the liberal approach; in fact, the
opposite is now true. Fourth, there is a significant
intellectual trend, manifested in a continuing series of
books and articles, toward questioning the social policies of
the past twenty years. Given such developments, we stand a
decent chance of attracting more adherents to our philosophy
among black Americans.
Fostering Public Debate
1.
We should attempt to foster, and fuel, a public debate on
policies aimed at addressing the problems of black Americans.
This is in our interest because, as noted above, the policy
dynamics favor our argument. Our insurgent ideas will be
pitted against a liberal philosophy that has not yet been
questioned on a national scale, and which will be difficult
to defend. In short, we should foster a public debate
because we can have every expectation of winning it.
2.
We should encourage Republican elected officials to
participate in the debate, even if their policy prescriptions
differ somewhat from ours. For example, it is to our
advantage that some GOP Congressmen are publicly pushing a
black legislative package, because such actions add to the
debate without an appearance of White House orchestration.
3. Relatively minor items on the President's schedule can also
add to the public debate. These could include, for example,
wire photos with the author of a new book, a publicized phone
conversation with someone like Thomas Sowell, or a
Presidential message to a conference that might otherwise go
unnoticed.
4.
Administration and Republican Party officials can begin
publicly referring to the fact that "a national debate is now
occurring" on the social policy of the past twenty years,
with hints that a change is needed. The President can also
acknowledge the debate in passing public references.
Page 4
5. We must be prepared to give access, and, thereby,
credibility, to black groups that show interest in publicly
espousing new approaches to black problems, even if we differ
on particulars. One example is the new Council for a Black
Economic Agenda, which met with the President last month in a
session that drew a surprising amount of press attention
(along with criticism from black leaders that was based
transparently on egotism). We should not, however, tie
ourselves to only one group: our interest in fostering
debate is better served by a variety of groups, all of which
are competing for public (and White House) attention.
6. Once the ground has been prepared through ample public
discussion, the President should raise it to a higher level
of prominence by publicly laying out our policy package, and
then engaging fully in the philosophical discussion. (The
President's personal involvement will increase the level of
public attention to such an extent that our policy
alternative must be ready, and capable of withstanding
scrutiny.)
The Civil Rights Problem
1. Any new approach to blacks cannot ignore the perceptual
problem we face on civil rights. Many black Americans feel,
quite simply, that this Administration has worked to reverse
the legal gains of the Sixties, and some even accept the
notion that this President is anti-civil rights. If we are
to move forward, we must "clear the decks" in this area.
2. Our difficulties on civil rights are rooted mainly in
inaccurate perceptions that have been propagated by
Washington's civil rights lobby. This group subsists on fear
that the days of state-sanctioned discrimination will return,
and it creates that fear through alarmist predictions,
misrepresentation of motives, exaggeration of current
problems, and by downplaying the progress that has been made.
3. With the objectives of the Sixties largely achieved through
legal and even attitudinal changes, we have seen the civil
rights movement of that era displaced by the civil rights
lobby of today. No longer seeking the moral goals of
equality, they are, like any other lobby, seeking to create,
defend, and extend special programs and status for the group
they represent. In this context, their vested interest in
creating misperceptions about our civil rights record is
understandable; indeed, it is to be expected in the same way
that the environmental lobby can be expected to distort our
actions in that area. We should, therefore, deal with them
accordingly.
Page 5
4. We should also recognize that we have unintentionally aided
such programmed misperceptions in two ways. First, we have
sometimes taken actions without considering the appearance
that would be created among blacks (e.g. Bob Jones, and our
delays regarding the Voting Rights Act). Second, we have
unnecessarily picked fights on issues that are tangential to
our Administration's civil rights policy goals (e.g. the Dade
County set-aside case). The first point has been taken care
of, to the extent it can be, by experience derived from our
past mistakes. The second point, however, is still a
concern. We dissipate our effectiveness and blur our message
if we allow ourselves to be drawn into legislative and legal
battles on even minor civil rights issues. Our energies and
political capital should instead be expended on those issues
that bear directly on our philosophy and on which we can set
forth a well-reasoned public argument (quotas and busing are
two such examples). Also, since such determinations involve
policy, there must be a high degree of coordination by the
White House. We must not allow our civil rights policy to be
made on an ad hoc basis by mid-level agency officials, as
often occurred in the past.
5. We can also address the "fear factor" by beginning to lay out
what we are for, as well as what we oppose, in the area of
civil rights. By outlining what we favor and support, we
draw implicit limits on our future actions, and negate
unspoken black concern about how far we are prepared to go.
This can be accomplished through a civil rights policy
statement, a Presidential speech, or both.
Pacing our Effort
1. Our effort to offer policy alternatives to black Americans
must be properly paced. We should not attempt to do
everything at once, nor should we move before the groundwork
has been properly laid.
2. For the next several months, we should concentrate on the
effort to foster a debate regarding U.S. social policy. As
noted previously, this should be done in a low-key manner,
building toward an eventual speech by the President.
However, such a speech (to lay out our philosophy and policy
alternatives) should not be given until the budget battles
are well on their way to resolution. To do otherwise would
risk both a conflict in our priorities, and accusations that
we were trying to distract attention from painful domestic
budget cuts.
3. A statement or speech on civil rights should also be held in
abeyance until spring, but should be delivered several weeks
in advance of the philosophy/policy alternatives speech.
Page 6
4. The specific policy points for each statement or speech
should be quietly developed by the White House, beginning
immediately, in order to be ready for a late spring target
date.
5. A senior White House official should be designated to
coordinate implementation of this strategy over an
extended period of time.
6. A suggested timetable would be as follows:
February to mid-May
:
measures to foster public debate
-- staff development of civil
rights policy statement
-- staff development of social and
economic policy package
-- designation of White House
coordinator
Mid-May to June
-- civil rights policy statement
and/or Presidential speech on civil
rights
Late May or
-- Presidential speech on
early June
economic/social policy package and
philosophy
The effort will, of course, need to extend well past June, but it
is preferable to delay further decisions until reaction to the
above steps has been assessed.
CC: John A. Svahn
Frank Donatelli
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 20, 1985
MEMORANDUM TO MICHAEL K. DEAVER
PuB
FROM:
PAMELA G. BAILEY
SUBJECT:
Thoughts on Black Strategy Follow-up Memo
You asked for my thoughts on the attached memo.
Summary Points
1.
The memo is a collection of comments and ideas on how
to deal with the "black problem." It is not a
strategy.
2.
The paper has no clear objective. It assumes that we
should be appealing to blacks in general without
stating a purpose (i.e., is the purpose to have more
blacks of all ages and economic group "approve" of RR;
or do we want more young blacks to vote Republican; or
do we want to reach those over 50 in the South, etc?)
3.
It wrongly promotes the need to develop new policies
rather than new communication strategies.
Recommendations
1.
Survey data should be analyzed in order to determine
objectives for a black initiative. Careful thought
should be given to attitudes as broken down by age,
economic status and region. I would assume blacks are
no more monolithic in their views, concerns and
priorities than whites.
Page 2
2.
Once objectives are set, a detailed plan can be
developed to achieve them. This plan would probably be
much more based in the communications area than in
policy. I disagree with the need to "develop a policy
package that addresses the very real problems of black
Americans from a conservative standpoint." RR doesn't
develop policy "packages" for particular special
interests --- he argued against such an approach in the
last election. RR's policies over the last four years
have worked "to address the very real problems of black
Americans" and, indeed, of all Americans. The
challenge now seems to be how to better explain to
minorities the benefits of his policies -- not how to
design new ones.
3.
Symbolic visual actions should not be lightly
dismissed. Events such as RR's ceremony signing the
MLK legislation, welcoming home Lt. Goodwin, and
honoring Mother Hale have gone a long way toward
visually demonstrating that RR is truly President of
all the people. Public Liasion, the Political Office
and Congressional Liasion should be encouraged to
continue recommending such events - - not only for
blacks but for all minority groups. There are a host
of events we could undertake to show how RR's policies
have benefitted blacks - (i.e., job training,
education reforms, crime bill, etc.).
4.
Is a special strategy needed only for blacks or ---- if
we're talking about communication initiatives -- should
various White House offices be asked to work with
Public Liaison to develop targetted communications
plans for several minority groups? For instance, how
can we justify a special initiative for blacks but not
Hispanics?
General Comments
The basic points of the paper are uncomfortably similar to the
special interest pandering we SO criticized the Democrats for
during the campaign.
I would find it hard to justify a reexamination of our policies
to see what more we can do to respond to the concerns of blacks
-- unless we want to undertake a similar review of policies to
help Hispanics, women, labor, Asian-Americans, etc.
Page 3
This approach is not RR's way. He and his policies for economic
growth, freedom, opportunity and jobs are right for all
Americans.
Suggestions that we foster a "public debate" on the problems of
black Americans are misguided, too. It would be a contradiction
of all that RR has stood for to push for a debate on policies as
they affect a particular segment of the population.
Finally, I would recommend that before any major RR policy
statement be made on civil rights that careful analysis be done
on why. The paper is accurate in stating we face a "perceptual"
problem in civil rights and that the civil rights lobby's vested
interests is a major cause of the problem. But, again, who would
we be trying to reach? Blacks, whites, black leaders? One or
all? This may be an area where actions can speak louder than
words. I'm not sure that a war of words will do anything other
than provoke the traditional leaders to debate and criticize.
Our purposes may be better served by not dealing with the issue
on their terms. I suspect civil rights and other basic
terminology will always mean something different to Brad Reynolds
compared to Vernon Jordan -- even though our end result may be
the same. This may be an area where action, events, and visuals
can convey RR's strong civil rights commitments better than
speeches and new policy packages.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 12, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD REGAN
Pain give your we thoughts
MICHAEL K. DEAVER
FROM:
JAMES CICCONI The
on
SUBJECT:
Follow-Up on Black Strategy
In a previous memo, I outlined a possible strategy for reaching
out to black Americans. Assuming agreement on the need for such
an effort, it is perhaps useful at this point to provide a more
detailed discussion of certain elements.
Basics of a New Approach
1. Any new approach to blacks must be rooted in substance, not
just atmospherics: the latter should showcase the former.
This is admittedly different from our past efforts, but it is
a difference born of necessity. Efforts based largely on
scheduling and symbolism have worked with groups where our
policy disagreements are minimal. Blacks, however, perceive
themselves to be at odds with most policy priorities of this
Administration. The resulting gap can only be closed by
affirmatively seeking common ground with a significant
segment of black Americans.
2. We must be prepared to sustain any new effort over the long
term. Gains from an issue-oriented approach will be
incremental, and perhaps barely noticeable in the short run.
3. We must walk before we can run. Any initial gains will be
among upwardly-mobile blacks who are part of, or
entering, the middle class; broader targeting would be
premature. Upwardly-mobile blacks should be inclined toward
this Administration's policies, but for a number of reasons
have not been supportive. In effect, we must package our
policy message for them and, at the same time, minimize
other obstacles to their support.
4. We must prevent major goofs. The biggest single obstacle to
increasing our black support in the first term was our own
inability to foresee the perceptual consequences of certain
decisions, some of which were considered to be minor at the
time. While most of the Administration has grown more
sensitive in the wake of Bob Jones, such misjudgments still
represent a danger which, unless avoided, can undo any
political gains from our new strategy.
Page 2
5. For the immediate future, we must avoid the "established"
black leadership. As stated previously, such leaders are
unremittingly hostile to this President and cannot be
expected to take a constructive approach. The current black
leadership seems, quite frankly, more interested in personal
publicity and enhancing their influence within the Democratic
Party than they are in new approaches to black problems. In
fact, they are personally and rhetorically linked to a
philosophy which cannot be reconciled with our own. Thus,
meetings would not only be unproductive, but would serve to
strengthen the position of such hostile leaders within their
own organizations, and among blacks generally. Instead of
allowing ourselves to be pressured into such old, no-win
patterns, we should seek out other blacks with whom there is
a chance of reaching common ground.
6. We should make clear that favoritism on grants and contracts
is out-of-bounds, and will not be considered as an aspect of
our strategy. Too often, political support by certain voter
group members is viewed as a license to demand favoritism on
grants or contracts. Our resistance to this pattern has led
to criticism from some of our black supporters; however, it
is absolutely essential that we not fall into this "spoils
system" trap in the same way that previous Administrations
have. As part of our Hispanic strategy, we made clear that
no one in the White House, including the Hispanic liaison,
would discuss grants or contracts, and we must be similarly
adamant with our black supporters. The political base we
build among blacks must rest on common policy ground, and not
on hope of personal financial benefit.
Shaping our Alternative
1. We should work to develop a policy package that addresses the
very real problems of black Americans from a conservative
standpoint. This can include new ideas, as well as
established Administration policies (e.g., enterprise zones,
youth opportunity wage) that would be re-packaged to
highlight their appeal to black Americans.
2. Such a package need not be confined to economic issues, but
could also include criminal justice and social policy issues.
Blacks, for example, are victimized disproportionately by
crime, yet black politicians are the most ardent foes of
tougher criminal laws. Similarly, the break-up of the black
family has been an increasing and alarming trend for over
twenty years, and has arguably been exacerbated by federal
policies. Such issues, often ignored by the Democrats, have
good potential for attracting blacks to the Republican Party
if our solutions make sense.
Page 3
3. Our main emphasis should be on the overall philosophical
difference between our policies and those of the liberal
Democrats. In effect, we would stress the concept of
providing incentives for self-reliance, versus the failed
course of increased dependence on government. Current policy
dynamics favor our approach for several reasons. First, our
policies are largely untried, and therefore hold some
prospect for success, while the liberal methods have been
tried on a massive scale and, for the most part, have failed.
Second, decreasing government resources make the liberal
approach impossible to sustain financially, and dictate that
alternatives be tried. Third, there is no longer a national
consensus in support of the liberal approach; in fact, the
opposite is now true. Fourth, there is a significant
intellectual trend, manifested in a continuing series of
books and articles, toward questioning the social policies of
the past twenty years. Given such developments, we stand a
decent chance of attracting more adherents to our philosophy
among black Americans.
Fostering Public Debate
1. We should attempt to foster, and fuel, a public debate on
policies aimed at addressing the problems of black Americans.
This is in our interest because, as noted above, the policy
dynamics favor our argument. Our insurgent ideas will be
pitted against a liberal philosophy that has not yet been
questioned on a national scale, and which will be difficult
to defend. In short, we should foster a public debate
because we can have every expectation of winning it.
2. We should encourage Republican elected officials to
participate in the debate, even if their policy prescriptions
differ somewhat from ours. For example, it is to our
advantage that some GOP Congressmen are publicly pushing a
black legislative package, because such actions add to the
debate without an appearance of White House orchestration.
3. Relatively minor items on the President's schedule can also
add to the public debate. These could include, for example,
wire photos with the author of a new book, a publicized phone
conversation with someone like Thomas Sowell, or a
Presidential message to a conference that might otherwise go
unnoticed.
4. Administration and Republican Party officials can begin
publicly referring to the fact that "a national debate is now
occurring" on the social policy of the past twenty years,
with hints that a change is needed. The President can also
acknowledge the debate in passing public references.
Page 4
5. We must be prepared to give access, and, thereby,
credibility, to black groups that show interest in publicly
espousing new approaches to black problems, even if we differ
on particulars. One example is the new Council for a Black
Economic Agenda, which met with the President last month in a
session that drew a surprising amount of press attention
(along with criticism from black leaders that was based
transparently on egotism). We should not, however, tie
ourselves to only one group: our interest in fostering
debate is better served by a variety of groups, all of which
are competing for public (and White House) attention.
6. Once the ground has been prepared through ample public
discussion, the President should raise it to a higher level
of prominence by publicly laying out our policy package, and
then engaging fully in the philosophical discussion. (The
President's personal involvement will increase the level of
public attention to such an extent that our policy
alternative must be ready, and capable of withstanding
scrutiny.)
The Civil Rights Problem
1. Any new approach to blacks cannot ignore the perceptual
problem we face on civil rights. Many black Americans feel,
quite simply, that this Administration has worked to reverse
the legal gains of the Sixties, and some even accept the
notion that this President is anti-civil rights. If we are
to move forward, we must "clear the decks" in this area.
2. Our difficulties on civil rights are rooted mainly in
inaccurate perceptions that have been propagated by
Washington's civil rights lobby. This group subsists on fear
that the days of state-sanctioned discrimination will return,
and it creates that fear through alarmist predictions,
misrepresentation of motives, exaggeration of current
problems, and by downplaying the progress that has been made.
3. With the objectives of the Sixties largely achieved through
legal and even attitudinal changes, we have seen the civil
rights movement of that era displaced by the civil rights
lobby of today. No longer seeking the moral goals of
equality, they are, like any other lobby, seeking to create,
defend, and extend special programs and status for the group
they represent. In this context, their vested interest in
creating misperceptions about our civil rights record is
understandable; indeed, it is to be expected in the same way
that the environmental lobby can be expected to distort our
actions in that area. We should, therefore, deal with them
accordingly.
Page 5
4. We should also recognize that we have unintentionally aided
such programmed misperceptions in two ways. First, we have
sometimes taken actions without considering the appearance
that would be created among blacks (e.g. Bob Jones, and our
delays regarding the Voting Rights Act). Second, we have
unnecessarily picked fights on issues that are tangential to
our Administration's civil rights policy goals (e.g. the Dade
County set-aside case). The first point has been taken care
of, to the extent it can be, by experience derived from our
past mistakes. The second point, however, is still a
concern. We dissipate our effectiveness and blur our message
if we allow ourselves to be drawn into legislative and legal
battles on even minor civil rights issues. Our energies and
political capital should instead be expended on those issues
that bear directly on our philosophy and on which we can set
forth a well-reasoned public argument (quotas and busing are
two such examples). Also, since such determinations involve
policy, there must be a high degree of coordination by the
White House. We must not allow our civil rights policy to be
made on an ad hoc basis by mid-level agency officials, as
often occurred in the past.
5. We can also address the "fear factor" by beginning to lay out
what we are for, as well as what we oppose, in the area of
civil rights. By outlining what we favor and support, we
draw implicit limits on our future actions, and negate
unspoken black concern about how far we are prepared to go.
This can be accomplished through a civil rights policy
statement, a Presidential speech, or both.
Pacing our Effort
1. Our effort to offer policy alternatives to black Americans
must be properly paced. We should not attempt to do
everything at once, nor should we move before the groundwork
has been properly laid.
2. For the next several months, we should concentrate on the
effort to foster a debate regarding U.S. social policy. As
noted previously, this should be done in a low-key manner,
building toward an eventual speech by the President.
However, such a speech (to lay out our philosophy and policy
alternatives) should not be given until the budget battles
are well on their way to resolution. To do otherwise would
risk both a conflict in our priorities, and accusations that
we were trying to distract attention from painful domestic
budget cuts.
3. A statement or speech on civil rights should also be held in
abeyance until spring, but should be delivered several weeks
in advance of the philosophy/policy alternatives speech.
Page 6
4. The specific policy points for each statement or speech
should be quietly developed by the White House, beginning
immediately, in order to be ready for a late spring target
date.
5. A senior White House official should be designated to
coordinate implementation of this strategy over an
extended period of time.
6. A suggested timetable would be as follows:
February to mid-May
:
measures to foster public debate
-- staff development of civil
rights policy statement
-- staff development of social and
economic policy package
-- designation of White House
coordinator
Mid-May to June
-- civil rights policy statement
and/or Presidential speech on civil
rights
Late May or
-- Presidential speech on
early June
economic/social policy package and
philosophy
The effort will, of course, need to extend well past June, but it
is preferable to delay further decisions until reaction to the
above steps has been assessed.
CC: John A. Svahn
Frank Donatelli