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Iran/Arms Transaction: 12/07/1985, Meeting (3)
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Iran/Arms Transaction: 12/07/1985, Meeting (3)
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Arthur Culvahouse's Office Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
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Collection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files
Folder Title: Iran/Arms Transaction: 12/07/1985,
Meeting (3)
Box: CFOA 1131
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B. FILES
Withdrawer
DLB
4/1/2014
File Folder
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DECEMBER 7, 1985
FOIA
MEETING (3 OF 3)
S643
Box Number
CFOA 1131
SYSTEMATIC
118
ID
Doc Type
Document Description
No of
Doc Date
Restrictions
Pages
164661
PAPER
TOWER BOARD INTERVIEW OF
4 12/18/1986 B1
RICHARD ARMITAGE P. 5-7
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
12
2
STENOGRAPHIC MINUTES
Unrevised and Unedited
Not for Quotation or
Duplication
JOINT HEARINGS ON THE
IRAN-CONTRA INVESTIGATION
Testimony of John M. Poindexter
Wednesday, July 15, 1987
House Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran
and
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance
to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition
Washington, D.C.
Joint Hearings
of the
Select Committee to
Select Committee on
Investigate Covert Arms
Secret Military Assistance
Transactions with Iran
to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
UNITED STATES SENATE
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Office of Official Reporters
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 57
1304
Mr. LIMAN. Let's go to the on December 7, 1985, after
1305
finding had been signed by the President, there was a
1306
meeting, was there not, between the principals of the
1307
National Security Council?
1308
Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, there was.
1309
Mr. LIMAN. And do you recall Mr. Weinberger was there an
1310
Secretary Shultz was there, Don Regan was there, Mr. McMahon
1311
of the CIA was there; do you recall that?
1312
Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I do.
1313
Mr. LIMAN. There has been testimony about this. The only
1314
reason I am going to ask you about this is because there
1315
were certain perceptions in the Tower Report as to whether
1316
the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense really
1317
expressed their views forcefully.
1318
Would you tell us, Admiral, will the--at that meeting,
1319
there was a discussion again or there was a discussion of
1320
the Iran initiative, is that so? You have to say yes or no.
1321
Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, there was.
1322
This December 7th meeting was the first opportunity that I
1323
can recall that I had to hear the President personally, the
1324
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense talk about
1325
their feelings about this initiative that had been proposed
1326
by the Israelis.
1327
Mr. LIMAN. And the subject on the table was an Israeli
1328
initiative under which the Israelis would ship arms to the
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 58
1329
Iranians and we would replenish the arms, hopefully there
1330
would be better relations with Iran, and as a token of good
1331
faith, the American hostages would be released; is that a
1332
fair summary?
1333
Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I think it is a partial summary.
1334
Mr. LIMAN. Why don't you complete it.
1335
[Counse] conferring with witness. ]
1336
Mr. POINDEXTER. We had been concerned in the National
1337
Security Council for some period of time with the situation
1338
in Iran. Unfortunately, we have very poor intelligence on
1339
what is happening in Iran.
1340
The National Security Council staff had prepared a draft
1341
finding earlier in '85 to try to get the government focused
1342
on what we saw as a very significant, looming problem in
1343
Iran as Ayatollah Khomeini eventually passed from the scene
1344
and it was some sort of succession. We didn't want a repeat
1345
of the '70s when things were happening in Iran that we
1346
weren't aware of, and eventually went out of our control and
1347
out of the control of the government there. We wanted to
1348
preclude the possibility in the future, and we felt that we
1349
needed to take an initiative to get closer to people in the
1350
Iranian government so that we could find out what is
1351
happening and hopefully have some influence in the future,
1352
or at least have information on which to base the United
1353
States policy.
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 59
1354
Mr. LIMAN. Admiral, see if this part is correct, that
1355
currency for trying to get that influence that was being
1356
demanded, as reported by the Israelis, involved arms?
1357
Mr. POINDEXTER. That is often the currency of any sort of
1358
business in the Middle East.
1359
Mr. LIMAN. And in this case, that was the currency being
1360
demanded?
1361
Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. That is correct.
1362
Mr. LIMAN. And it is also true that we did not want to
1363
authorize arms shipments to the Iranians unless we were
1364
assured of getting our hostages back; is that so?
1365
[Counsel conferring with witness. ]
1366
Mr. POINDEXTER. As I was trying to lay out a moment ago,
1367
what our concerns were, what our major objective was, the
1368
President was clearly also concerned about the hostages.
1369
The President is a very sensitive person, and he is
1370
concerned about individuals when they are in difficulty.
1371
And 50 he, just as a human being, was concerned about the
1372
hostages.
1373
I don't think that the President was overly concerned
1374
about them, but he recognized that we did have an
1375
opportunity here to try to get the hostages back, and there
1376
was no way that we could carry on discussions with Iranian
1377
officials about broader objectives until we got over the
1378
first obstacle and the first obstacle was to get the
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 60
1379
hostages back. And the President felt that that it was
1380
worth taking some risk here.
1381
Mr. LIMAN. Did the Secretary of State and the Secretary
1382
of Defense express objections?
1383
Mr. POINDEXTER. They expressed, as opposed to some
1384
reports, very strong, vociferous objection, and clearly laid
1385
out for the President the other side of the issue.
1386
Mr. LIMAN. And without going into undue detail, could you
1387
just tick off the points they made?
1388
Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, they are the obvious points that
1389
have been made since this all has become public. Secretary
1390
Shultz was concerned about our operation to staunch the flow
1391
of arms into Iran, which is one of the methods that we are
1392
using to try to stop the war between Iran and Iraq.
1393
After all, our policy objective there is to stop the war.
1394
The policy objective is not to have an arms embargo. You
1395
don't just go out and have an arms embargo for nothing. The
1396
reason we have an arms embargo against Iran is because we
1397
want to try to influence the end of the war, but in its
1398
simplest terms, what was being proposed here was not in
1399
accordance with that particular method that we were using.
1400
He was concerned that if the European countries found out
1401
about it, that it would lessen their willingness to
1402
cooperate. In reality, though, in my opinion, we have never
1403
had good cooperation from anybody on Operation Staunch. The
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 61
1404
European countries continued to send military equipment and
1405
supplies into Iran. Iran has been able to carry on a war
1406
for six, going on seven years now, I guess.
1407
Other objections were that it was contrary to the Arms
1408
Export Control Aot. Secretary Weinberger had slightly
1409
different reasons, but they are generally along the same
1410
lines.
1411
Mr. LIMAN. And there is no doubt in your mind that the
1412
President listened to and understood those objections?
1413
Mr. POINDEXTER. I have a very vivid recollection of that
1414
meeting, and it was in the residence. The President pulled
1415
a footstool up to the coffee table and sat there very
1416
quietly, as is his nature, listening to all of the
1417
discussion up to that point, listening to Secretary Shultz,
1418
to Secretary Weinberger, Mr. McFarlane. I had very little
1419
comment. And I don't recall the Chief of Staff saying very
1420
much.
1421
Mr. McMahon was there and commented a little bit about
1422
some of the technical aspects of the initiative. I had
1423
spoken to Director Casey about the meeting before it took
1424
place, and knew at that point that Director Casey was in
1425
favor of the idea.
1426
And the President listened to all this very carefully, and
1427
at the end of the discussion, at least the first round, he
1428
sat back and he said something to the effect-and this is not
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 62
1429
a direct quote, but it was something to the effect that "I
1430
don't feel we can leave any stone unturned in trying to get
1431
the hostages back. We clearly have a situation here where
1432
there are larger strategic interests, but it is also an
1433
opportunity to get the hostages back, and I think that we
1434
ought to at least take the next step. "
1435
Chairman HAMILTON. Counsel, is this an appropriate time
1436
for recess?
1437
Mr. LIMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
1438
Chairman HAMILTON. The joint committees will stand in
1439
recess.
1440
[Recess. ]
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 63
1441
DCMN MILTON
1442
1443
Chairman HAMILTON. The select committees will resume
1444
sitting.
1445
Mr. Liman, you may proceed.
1446
Mr. LIMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1447
Admiral, at the December 7th meeting, was there any
1448
discussion of the November Hawk shipment?
1449
Mr. POINDEXTER. Mr. Liman, I can't recall that. I would
1450
be surprised if there weren't, but frankly I'm not sure.
1451
Mr. LIMAN. Is the same thing true with respect to the TOW
1452
shipment that took place in September by the Israelis?
1453
Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes. I'm reasonably sure in hindsight
1454
that it was probably covered, but my recollection of Mr.
1455
McFarlane's introduction to the issue was that he probably
1456
provided a review of what had happened up to that point.
1457
But frankly I can't remember that review very well.
1458
Mr. LIMAN. As I understand your testimony, the bottom
1459
line of the December 7th meeting was that the President
1460
listened to the objections, listened to the arguments for
1461
this, recognized the risk, said he was prepared to take that
1462
risk, and made a decision that at the very least Mr.
1463
McFarlane should go to London. Fair?
1464
Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, that is fair.
1465
[Counsel conferring with witness. ]
NAME: HIR196000
PAGE 04
1466
Mr. POINDEXTER. And I don't want to leave the impression
1467
that this was a stilted meeting. In other words, it wasn't
1468
a situation where, as you probably have seen from some of
1469
the agenda for NSC or NSPG meetings, where each Cabinet
1470
officer had so much time and Mr. McFarlane provided a
1471
summary. This was a very free-wheeling discussion, and
1472
frankly my experience is that if you want to have a
1473
discussion like that, which was what you wanted, you have it
1474
at the residence in a less formal setting where everybody
1475
could be comfortable. You only have principals in
1476
attendance, not a lot of staff around, and everybody feels
1477
free to express their view without it being published in the
1478
Washington Post the following day.
1479
So this was a very free-wheeling discussion. Everybody
1480
spoke very frankly. Secretary Shultz and Secretary
1481
Weinberger spoke more than once. There was a lot of give
1482
and take in the discussion.
1483
But in the end, the President decided that Mr. McFarlane
1484
should make the trip to London to check out this Israeli
1485
channel so that we could, the President could take a
1486
decision based on firsthand information.
13
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR .:FILES
DLB 4/1/2014
File Folder
FOIA
IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DECEMBER 7, 1985 MEETING
S643
(3 OF 3)
SYSTEMATIC
Box Number
CFOA 1131
118
ID
Document Type
No of Doc Date Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
164661 PAPER
4 12/18/1986 B1
TOWER BOARD INTERVIEW OF RICHARD
ARMITAGE P. 5-7
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
14
SRB report
Next Steps: The Iranians, the Israelis, and
the longer range goals. Additional meet-
our U.S. businessman plan to meet in
ings with the Iranians would be arranged
London on Saturday, December 6 to dis-
to further our objectives without requiring
cuss whether or not to proceed with the
such large scale sales/deliveries by the Is-
sale of the TOWs and HAWKs. The Israeli
raelis.
government has informally told us that if
they can be assured of "prompt" resupply,
Approval is now required for us to take the
they will sell the quantities requested from
next steps on Saturday. After carefully con-
their prepositioned war reserve. 3,300
sidering the liabilities inherent in this plan,
TOWs represents [sic] [a significant pro-
it would appear that we must make one
portion] their available supplies.
last try or we will risk condemning some or
all of the hostages to death and undergo-
The U.S. businessman has arranged for the
ing a renewed wave of Islamic Jihad terror-
charter of two non-U.S. registered aircraft
ism. While the risks of proceeding are sig-
for use in the deliveries. The total delivery
nificant, the risks of not trying are even
would be conducted in 5 flights from Tel
greater.
Aviv to Tabriz, Iran via interim airfields in
Europe.
Each delivery is to result in
([North], "Special Project Re Iran," 12/5/85)
the release of a specified number of hos-
The President met his principal national se-
tages. Arrangements for the interim air-
curity advisors on December 7 in his residence.
fields, overflight rights, and flight plans
The President, Secretaries of State and De-
have been made, some with the help of the
fense, Deputy Director of the CIA, McFarlane,
CIA. A communications code to preserve
Poindexter, and the President's Chief of Staff
operational security is available for use by
attended. (Ellen M. Jones, Presidential Diarist,
all parties. All aircraft would be inspected
to Jay M. Stephens, 1/24/87 (information from
by an Iranian at one of the transient loca-
the Presidential Calender, which apparently is
tions between Tel Aviv and Tabriz. The
called a Diary))
entire evolution is designed to be complet-
Recollections of the meeting vary. In his
ed in a 24 hour period. It can be stopped
meeting with the Board on January 26, 1987,
at any point if the Iranians fail to deliver.
the President said he recalled discussing a com-
The greatest operational security concern
plex Iranian proposal for weapons delivered by
is that of replenishing Israeli stocks. The
the Israelis in installments prior to the release
Israelis have identified a means of transfer-
of the hostages. The President said that Secre-
ring the Iranian provided funds to an Is-
tary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger objected
raeli Defense Force (IDF) account, which
to the plan, and that this was the first time he
will be used for purchasing items not nec-
"noted down" their opposition. The President
essarily covered by FMS. They will have to
said that the discussion at the meeting pro-
purchase the replenishment items from the
duced a stalemate.
U.S. in FMS transaction from U.S. stocks.
The Attorney General remembered attend-
[sic] Both the number of weapons and the
ing; he did not think McFarlane was present,
size of the cash transfer could draw atten-
and thought that Fortier probably attended.
tion. If a single transaction is more than
(Meese 4) The subject of the meeting-the Iran
$14.9 M, we would normally have to notify
transactions-was announced in advance, and
Congress. The Israelis are prepared to jus-
the principals had time to prepare. (Shultz,
tify the large quantity and urgency based
SRB, 31; Armitage, 5) According to the Secre-
on damage caused to the equipment in
tary of State,
storage.
Poindexter suggested that Mr. McFarlane
could contact the Iranians in London to
If this process achieves the release of the
ask them to release the hostages without
hostages and proves the credibility of the
getting equipment. If they would do so,
Iranian contacts in Europe, Bud McFarlane
we, then, would be prepared for a better
would then step in to supervise achieving
relationship with them.
-42
I fully supported this proposal.
nians involved, I think Ghorbanifar or
Vice Admiral Poindexter suggested that
some such name, but a more formal pres-
Mr. McFarlane should be authorized to ask
entation was now made by McFarlane
the British to sell arms to Israel [?Iran] if
about what could be accomplished with
the Iranians rejected his first proposal. I
this and points with respect to getting a
opposed this idea. I said it was still U.S.
better relationship with Iran as well as
arms, that it was a more complicated deal
hopes that they might have a favorable
that would make us even more vulnerable.
effect on the release of the hostages.
Other views were expressed.
Again, I opposed it very strongly and said
No decision was made, however, at that
I thought really it was a terrible idea and
meeting, as far as I could see.
that the transfer of arms which was part of
On December 7, Vice Admiral Poindexter
the plan which was to be done to establish
told me privately that the project had
the good faith of the negotiators-I think I
made some comment about what about the
fallen apart during Thanksgiving week.
That is thinking back to that period. He
good faith of the Iranian negotiators, and
said he had recommended to the President
why-went through a whole catalogue of
that we disengage, but that the President
things which didn't require any gift of
did not want to.
prophecy as to what would happen if this
became public.
[T]he advice I gave in
I felt in the meeting that there were views
this case was as firm as I could do it, obvi-
opposed, some in favor, and the President
ously not persuasive enough but as persua-
didn't really take a position, but he seemed
sive as I could do it, that all kinds of very
to, he was in favor of this project somehow
unfortunate effects would result if this took
or other. And, of course, by now he has
place, that we were pleading with a large
said publicly that he was in favor of work-
number of countries not to do this, that
ing at the Iranian operation and being will-
Jordan and Egypt regarded Iran as at least
ing to sell arms as a signal, as he has now
as much of a great Satan as they regarded
put it.
us, and that it would be a very bad thing in
(Shultz, SRB, 31-32)
every way to do, and that it wouldn't ac-
When the Secretary of State returned to his
complish anything, and that they would un-
office, he told his staff that Secretary Wein-
doubtedly continue to milk us.
berger and Regan also strongly opposed the
At this time again, the Israeli connection
initiative. The Secretary of Defense spoke for
or the Israeli support of such a transaction
thirty minutes. The Secretary told his staff he
I guess is the better way to put it, was ad-
felt that he perhaps should have barged in ear-
vanced by McFarlane. And I said that an-
lier and confronted the President. The prob-
other of the problems that I thought with
lem, he felt, was that McFarland did not tell
it was that doing anything of this kind and
him the whole story.
attempting to keep it on a clandestine basis
The Secretary of Defense had a different
would leave us open to blackmail of the
recollection of the meeting, which he remem-
very most elementary kind by the people
bered as taking place in the Oval Office.
who knew about it, that is, the Israelis and
[T]here was a quite specific, more detailed
also Iranians, and that any time they
proposal that there had indeed been nego-
weren't getting what they wanted, they
tiations and discussions between somebody
could in one way or another, in Mideast
representing McFarlane's office and some
fashion, go public with it and cause all
Iranians who were reported to be moder-
kinds of problems with it, that there was
ates. I think at that meeting John McMa-
no way that I ever felt I could talk with
hon was there. I'm not sure. Bill Casey
[moderate Arab States] again if we were
may have been, or they both may have
supplying arms to [a] bitter enemy when
been. But there were some adverse com-
we wouldn't supply arms to him et cetera,
ments passed about the veracity of the Ira-
et cetera, just a whole series of arguments.
B-4
George Shultz made some very strong ar-
through how things had gone, and they
guments along the same line
A very
hadn't gone very well.
strong, very persuasive argument. And
again, my impression pretty clearly was
The idea originally of us getting in direct
communication with Iranian officials hadn't
that the President agreed that this couldn't
be done, that it might be a good thing to
happened, and instead this imperfect dem-
achieve these objectives but it wouldn't
onstration of bona fides had been imper-
work, and that this was not a good way to
fect, rather dramatically, and had become
do it.
their priority, with a very clear lack of good
faith, I thought. And I said to the Presi-
(Weinberger 9-12) Armitage remembered the
dent after thinking about it, and I went
Secretary of Defense saying that he and Secre-
down to Santa Barbara and we talked, both
tary Shultz "thought they had 'strangled the
about my resignation but then about the
baby in the cradle' (Armitage 6)
results of this program. And I believe it oc-
In his first interview with the Board, McFar-
curred in the Century Plaza Hotel on a
lane recalled suggesting to the President on
morning.
December 1 that the negotiations with the Ira-
And I said that it seems to me that we
nians "seemed to be getting skewed towards
arms going that way and hostages coming this
ought to try to reorient it to its original
way.
I thought we ought to seek a meet-
purpose. Mr. President, and that is for us
ing directly with the Iranians and discontinue
to avoid dealing through intermediaries
any kind of sponsorship of arms transfers."
and to talk to Iranians directly, and he
(McFarlane (1) 25) In this interview, McFarlane
agreed with that. And he said convene the
remembered the President's suggesting an NSC
NSC-the Secretary of State and Defense-
meeting to consider it. (Id.) At the meeting.
and let's talk it over when we get back. So
that is what led me to then do two things-
we went through the record of what had
convene a meeting and tentatively ask Ad-
occurred since August in terms of Israeli
miral Poindexter, I believe, to have a meet-
transfers and the absence of meetings, and
ing with the Iranian intermediary set up in
at consensus, the unanimous view of all of
London.
his advisors, the President decided: All
right, you go to London, McFarlane, and
So with that prelude a meeting was con-
you meet with the Iranians and make clear
vened on December 7 of the NSC, and I
that we remain open to the political dis-
would, I believe, have presided because I
course, and here it is. And there were
was still sitting in the chair. What I am
about four generic areas that we wanted to
saying now is based upon routine and not
talk to Iran about, our disagreements and
notes from it. But I always started off by
so forth.
briefing the issue. Here we are today con-
vened to talk about the Iranian program.
And the second point is that we will not
transfer nor encourage any other govern-
Here is what has happened since the be-
ment to transfer weapons to them.
ginning and here is the return, the benefits
and the liabilities of it, and the decision is
(Id. at 26)
what should we do or what should we do
McFarlane gave the Board a fuller account in
henceforth-continue as we have, change,
his second interview.
or something else.
[R]ight after the summit, after I got back
And then invite the comments of every-
from debriefing the Holy Father and Mit-
body around the table, usually start with
terand and Prime Minister Thatcher, we
the Secretary of State, then the Secretary
had some time to look at other things, and
of Defense, and around the table, and that
I didn't even come to the office. I went di-
would have led to the Director of the CIA,
rectly from London to Washington to Cali-
and any one of the other ad hoc members
fornia but had two days before the Presi-
that happened to be present. Usually it was
dent got there to just kind of think
Mr. Regan.
B-44
And it was unanimous in the meeting that
So I am not certain, but I think I probably
this really had gone badly off course and
also reflect for the most part the Presi-
that we should yes, still be open to talking
dent's view on that.
to Iranian officials, authorities, and have a
concrete political agenda to describe. And
(Regan 14-15)
we talked a little bit about that-our view
John McMahon, who represented the CIA,
of our interests in the area, how they were
recalled that [t]here was no decision. We didn't
threatened by Iran, disagreements we had
walk away with any marching orders or any de-
with them over terrorism and fundamental-
cision at that moment." The President asked
ists' crusade in the Middle East, and ulti-
questions about strengthening moderates in
mately perhaps even some common inter-
Iran by selling weapons. McMahon "pointed
est-Afghanistan and elsewhere.
out that we had no knowledge of any moder-
ates in Iran, that most of the moderates had
But because of how things had gone up
until then we ought to also tell them that
been slaughtered when Khomeini took over."
we were not going to transfer U.S. weap-
(J. McMahon 11-12) He noted that any weap-
ons, sell U.S. weapons. We were not going
ons sold "would end up in the front, and that
to allow or encourage anybody else to do
would be to the detriment of the Iran-Iraq bal-
ance." (Id. at 12) He did not know that McFar-
so. And I don't recall anybody disagreeing
with that at all.
lane was about to leave for London. (Id.)
After the meeting, McFarlane went to
The President wasn't terribly-didn't inter-
London, where he joined North. North had
vene in the meeting, as I recall, very much
traveled on December 6 to meet Kimche,
on one side or the other, but at the end
Secord, and Schwimmer "LO review all the ar-
said well, okay. That's what you should
rangements" in connection with the plan North
say. And I left that evening and was in
set forth in his note to Poindexter of December
London the next morning, and we took off
4. (North PROF note to Poindexter, 12/4/85,
from there.
02:02:55) On December 8, before meeting with
(McFarlane (2) 45-47)
Ghorbanifar, and Nimrodi, McFarlane privately
reported his instructions to Kimche. Kimche
Regan's recollection is somewhat different.
He recalled that, although McMahan, for exam-
was upset and he said: I think you're miss-
ple, was informally dressed,
ing a big opportunity; that you have to
have some patience; that these movements
the December meeting got to be more
take time to consolidate; and these people
formal because McMahon, among others,
are delivering to us important items, infor-
raised the question of, you know, what the
mation basically; and that we see signs
hell are we doing here. Arms are being
from our intelligence that they're making
sent. Where is the formal authority? You
headway and beginning to lock up and
know, what are we doing here? Is this
arrest radical elements and put their own
going to be policy?
people in more responsible positions, and
And as a result of that meeting and people
the gradual evidence of their growing in-
expressing views which now are commonly
fluence and ability to act.
known, such as State Department and De-
And I said: Well, we don't see that; and
fense opposed to this. CIA was in favor.
further, we think it is being skewed off in
NSC was in favor. And I must say that I fa-
the wrong direction. So he said: Well, we
vored it. I won't deny that I favored keep-
disagree.
ing the channel open, if necessary selling a
modest amount of arms, in order to make
And we went ahead and met with this Mr.
certain that we were having contacts with
Ghorbanifar, and in the course of about
Iran and at the same time, if as a result of
three hours I covered my instructions. And
this they could influence the Hizballah, as
he said: Well, I understand the political
they had in the case of Benjamin Weir,
dialogue, and our people in Iran are very
why not.
much open to that; and so, the point is
B-4!
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
WILLIAM B. LYTTON III
DEPUTY SPECIAL COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Briefing of the President Concerning
the December 7, 1985, Meeting
I. Background
Meeting: December 7, 1985
Residence
10:00 a.m. - 11:58 a.m.
Present: President (in pajamas and a bathrobe)
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
DDCI John McMahon
Robert McFarlane
John Poindexter
Donald Regan
Subject: Status of strategic opening to Iran;
Focus was on U.S. supplying arms to Iran,
either directly or through Israel, to
obtain the release of the hostages.
Discussion: Strong opposition by Secretary Shultz,
Secretary Weinberger and Don Regan to
the transfer of U.S. weapons to Iran;
McFarlane, Poindexter and President
favored the arms transfers.
Legal Issue: Either Secretary Shultz or Secretary
Weinberger raised the legal issue that the
transfer of U.S. arms by Israel to Iran
violated the Arms Export Control Act.
Resolution: The President directed McFarlane to go
to London to meet with Ghorbanifar.
The President noted in his Diary for
that day that there was disagreement
among the group and that no decisions
were made; they were at "stalemate."
The diary entry does not discuss the
legal issue.
II. The Charles Hill Notes
While no contemporaneous notes were taken, to our
knowledge, at this meeting, Secretary Shultz followed
his usual pattern of "backbriefing" his close aide,
Charles Hill, who in turn made copious notes. In
addition, Secretary Weinberger discussed the meeting
with Richard Armitage, who passed along Weinberger's
recollection to a State Department aide, and these
recollections also were the subject of a note.
A. Charles Hill's notes reflect that Shultz,
Weinberger and Don Regan strongly opposed
the arms transfers, followed by the note,
"Against the law. McFarlane, Poindexter,
and the President are listed as "in favor.
There is a further note: "no decision yet."
There is then a discussion of McFarlane
going to London, followed by, "[the
President] said American people won't
understand if 4 hostages died because I did
not break the law."
B.
Chris Ross' notes reflect Arnie Rafel's
discussion with Armitage of Weinberger's
recollection:
On the legal issue, the President has said
that the American people would understand if
he broke the law to get the hostages back;
they would not understand it if four hostages
died because he refused to break the law.
The President said, "they" could impeach him
if they wanted; visiting hours in prison were
on Thursdays. Weinberger pointed out that,
in such a case, the President would not be
alone.
III. Context of Discussions
A.
This was an intensely candid and private exchange
of views by and among the President's closest
advisors.
B.
In this nearly two-hour conversation, positions
were stated very forcefully, and obviously
with hyperbole.
C.
Everyone knew that the lives of hostages were at
stake.
D.
No useful purpose was served by writing down the
rhetorical flourishes of the participants in such a
candid discussion.
IV. Potential Impact
A.
Partisans will try to take this comment out of
context -- ignoring the fact that no decision on
the arms transfers was made that day and that
thereafter the Attorney General's advice was
sought and the arms sales were carried out in
accordance with the law.
B.
The political impact could focus on a tone
allegedly set at that meeting.
C.
If the President and his advisers cannot speak
absolutely candidly in these types of meetings,
without the fear of selective words and phrases
being publicly disclosed months or years later,
then the quality of that type of debate will
deteriorate to merely posturing. The result will
be a dimunition in the value of the advice the
President receives. Both the substance and the
style in which it is given will be affected out
of a concern as to how it will be portrayed at
a later date.
D.
A lesson learned is that notes of candid con-
versations with the President, if made at all,
should not be passed around to subordinates
and should not be turned over to Congressional
Committees.
E.
Because of the potential impact, both the
President and the First Lady need to be
alerted to the full context of this matter
and its possible impact.