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[Iran/Arms Transaction: Dean McGrath Files: Williams & Connolly] Documents Removed By North (5)
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[Iran/Arms Transaction: Dean McGrath Files: Williams & Connolly] Documents Removed By North (5)
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Culvahouse, Arthur B.: Files
Folder Title: [Iran/Arms Transaction: Dean McGrath Files:
Williams & Connolly] Documents Removed By North (5)
Box: CFOA 1132
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
Withdrawer
DLB
9/25/2014
File Folder
[IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DEAN MCGRATH'S
FOIA
FILES]: WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY DOCUMENTS
S643
REMOVED BY NORTH (5 OF 5)
Box Number
CFOA 1132
SYSTEMATIC
179
ID
Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
165802
REPORT
RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN
5
ND
B1
BEIRUT
165803
PAPER
DUPLICATE OF #108469; TERMS OF
3
4/4/1986
B1
REFERENCE U.S.-IRAN DIALOGUE
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
DLB 9/25/2014
File Folder
FOIA
[IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DEAN MCGRATH'S FILES]:
S643
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY DOCUMENTS REMOVED BY
SYSTEMATIC
NORTH (5 OF 5)
Box Number
CFOA 1132
179
ID
Document Type
No of Doc Date
Restric-
Document Description
pages
tions
165802 REPORT
5
ND
B1
RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN BEIRUT
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name
Withdrawer
CULVAHOUSE, ARTHUR B.:FILES
DLB 9/25/2014
File Folder
FOIA
[IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DEAN MCGRATH'S FILES]:
S643
WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY DOCUMENTS REMOVED BY
SYSTEMATIC
NORTH (5 OF 5)
Box Number
CFOA 1132
179
ID
Document Type
No of
Doc Date
Restric-
pages
tions
Document Description
165803 PAPER
3
4/4/1986
B1
DUPLICATE OF #108469; TERMS OF REFERENCE
U.S.-IRAN DIALOGUE
The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
North
8346
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
November 20, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL
FROM:
OLIVER L. NORTH
ROBERT L. EARL x
CRAIG P. COYC
SUBJECT:
Washington Post Questions
Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to David Chew forwarding the
responses to the Washington Post questions (Tab A) requested by
Tom Gibson (see Tab II).
Howard Teicher, Bob Linhard, Dennis Ross, and Peter 7H Rodman
74
7H
3H
concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you initial and forward the memo along with the Q&As at
Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I - - McDaniel Memo to Chew
Tab A - - Questions & Answers
Tab II - - Gibson Memo to McDaniel dated November 19, 1986
147
8346
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW
FROM:
RODNEY B. McDANIEL
SUBJECT:
Washington Post Questions
Attached at Tab A are NSC answers to the Washington Post
questions that were forwarded by Tom Gibson.
CC:
Tom Gibson
Pat Buchanan
Attachment
Tab A - Questions & Answers
148
November 20, 1986
1800
Q:
DO YOU REALLY BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE MODERATE ELEMENTS
WITHIN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT? AND IF THERE ARE, CAN THERE
BE ANY DOUBT THAT OUR ASSOCIATION WITH THEM WILL DIMINISH
THEIR INFLUENCE IF NOT ELIMINATE THEIR PRESENCE IN THE
POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IRAN?
HOW DO YOU EVER AGAIN GO TO OUR ALLIES AND ASK THEM TO BE
TOUGH ON TERRORISTS OR HOLD UP SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO OTHERS
AFTER THE DISCLOSURE OF THIS KIND OF INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN?
A:
From the earliest months following the Islamic Revolution in
Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish
official contact with that country. Even before I took
office, the Carter Administration determined that it was
necessary to expand security, economic, and political
relationships. These attempts included secret meetings
between high-level government officials.
Numerous individuals and private parties have attempted to
be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran
or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of the
hostages held in Lebanon. These efforts have included
attempts by members of Congress on both sides of the aisle.
149
2
After many disappointments, about 18 months ago we were
approached by a third party. He indicated that a group of
influential Iranian officials had determined the need to
reorient Iran's policy toward the West and the United
States. After extensive work to verify the bona fides of
the officials I decided to proceed. We viewed these
officials as being pragmatic, guided by their own
understanding of Iran's need and the importance of ending
Iran's international isolation.
The question of credibility with our allies is easy. They
know the United States has not tilted toward Iran and away
from neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. They know that the
small amount of arms I authorized is insignificant to the
outcome of the war and insignificant compared to the volume
of arms supplied via Communist bloc countries or even
Western Europe. Finally, they know that I have acted in the
best interests of world peace, regional stability, and the
safety of innocent hostages. Finally, our terrorism policy
is clear and unequivocal -- we have not made concessions to
terrorists and will not. What we will do is act in our own
interests to maintain influence in a vital part of the
world.
Q:
WHAT PROVISION HAVE YOU MADE IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH IRAN TO
ENSURE THAT NO MORE HOSTAGES WILL BE TAKEN?
150
3
A:
Throughout our contact we have reiterated our steadfast
opposition to Iran's support for terrorism and subversion.
We repeatedly emphasized the importance of removing the
obstacle to improving the dialogue between our two
countries, namely the freeing of the hostages held in
Lebanon. Iran expressed its opposition to terror and
clearly understands the consequences of resorting to
terrorism. We clearly stated our policy of neutrality in
the Iran-Iraq war and our belief that the war should end
honorably with both sides maintaining their territorial
integrity.
Q:
AMONG ALL OF THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS YOUR ADMINISTRATION
FACES IN DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, IN WHAT ORDER OF
PRIORITY WOULD YOU RANK THE FREEDOM OF THE HOSTAGES IN
LEBANON?
A:
From the outset, my objectives in our dealings with Iran
were exactly as I have indicated. They were first to
replace a relationship of total hostility with one of mutual
understanding and respect. Next, we have consistently
sought a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war which is one of
the most important reasons for our arms embargo. Iraq, for
some time, has expressed its readiness to pursue a mediated
settlement of the war. We have also firmly told the Iranians
151
4
their continued support for terrorism and subversion in the
region is unacceptable and must stop. Finally, at every
meeting, we said that the continued holding of hostages by
groups influenced by Iran constituted an obstacle to any
future improved relations.
Q: IN TERMS OF INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, IT WOULD APPEAR
THE NSC (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) HAS PREEMPTED THE
TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND CIA IN
CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN IRAN. WHAT
CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGAL AUTHORITY HAS THE NSC TO AID AND
ABET THE PROSECUTION OF WAR WITHOUT A DECLARATION THEREOF BY
CONGRESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AND TO AUTHORIZE THE SHIPMENT
OF ARMS IN VIOLATION OF EMBARGO STATUTES TO BELLIGERENTS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST?
A:
As with any sensitive intelligence or diplomatic initiative,
participation by departments and agencies, as well as
individuals, must be based on their need to know. All of my
national security advisors were consulted and they in turn
advised those officials within their departments who had a
need to know. Involvement of the NSC staff was limited to a
few individuals. This initiative was handled just like any
other classified covert intelligence operation. The NSC
staff, working with the CIA, was simply fulfilling its
152
5
function of advising me on national security issues, as well
as carrying out my instructions. Under the law, I told CIA
Director Casey to refrain from informing Congress because of
the extreme sensitivity and the high risk to individual
lives. We also intended and planned to fully inform the
relevant committees of Congress when the time was appropriate.
To remove any doubt as to our intentions and our actions, I
have directed that all information relating to our initiative
be provided to the appropriate members of Congress. Of
course, some of the information will have to remain classified
and not be made public in order to protect individual lives.
It is absolutely false that we were "aiding and abetting the
prosecution of war without a declaration thereof by Congress."
We have not declared war on Nicaragua -- nor do we intend
to. What we have been doing is supporting the Nicaraguan
democratic resistance forces in their efforts to restore
democracy to Nicaragua. That support has always been with:
the terms of the relevant laws at the time.
Q:
SINCE YOU PERMIT (VICE) ADMIRAL (JOHN M.) POINDEXTER TO
APPEAR ON "MEET THE PRESS" AND "THE TODAY SHOW" TO ANSWER
QUESTIONS, WILL YOU PERMIT HIM TO GO AND ANSWER QUESTIONS
FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN A HEARING?
153
6
A:
I have pledged that we will offer the fullest possible
report to the appropriate members and committees of the
Congress. Since this was largely an intelligence operation,
I have asked CIA Director Casey to report fully to the
intelligence committees, which are the most appropriate
forums for discussing the aspects of this policy that remain
highly sensitive.
My Assistant for National Security Affairs is a member of my
Presidential staff and it would be unprecedented and
inappropriate for him to be summoned to appear at a formal
Congressional hearing. However, Admiral Poindexter has
regularly engaged in informal consultations and briefings
with members of Congress on a variety of issues since he
took over his present position. I have asked him to make
himself available for consultations on this issue as well,
and he will do so.
Q:
WHAT EFFECT DID THE UNITED STATES' PROVIDING SOME MILITARY
EQUIPMENT HAVE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT?
HAS IRAN CHANGED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR WITH IRAQ,
TOWARD TERRORISM, OR TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING THE
SOVIET UNION?
154
7
A:
Although it is too soon to give a complete assessment, we
have indeed seen a number of positive effects. It is a fact
that there has been a marked reduction in Iranian-sponsored
terrorism over the last 18 months. Several Iranians
responsible for instigating international terrorist acts
have been arrested and are now jailed in Iran. Iran has
also been helpful in both the TWA hijacking in Beirut in
June 1985, as well as the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in
Karachi last September. The comments of Iran's ambassador
to the United Nations acknowledge the improvement in
U.S. Iranian relations.
Another positive result of our initiative is the release of
three of the Americans held hostage in Lebanon. It is true
that three more Americans were taken recently, but our
information has been ambiguous whether this was Iranian-
sponsored.
Q:
YOU SAID THIS TRADE WAS TO HELP START A DIALOGUE WITH
MODERATE POLITICAL FACTIONS IN IRAN. HOW DOES GIVING
WEAPONS TO THE (AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH) KHOMEINI ESTABLISHMENT
HELP THIS?
A:
That is a question that I asked myself. I can only say that
I grappled with this decision for a long time. The Iranians
themselves asked to purchase this equipment. After careful
155
8
consideration, our assessment was that the dialogue would
only move forward if our Iranian interlocutors became
convinced that our negotiators genuinely represented me.
The Iranians believed that the authorization to purchase
some military materiel was the only gesture that would
demonstrate my involvement and commitment to this
initiative. We were very explicit in our sale of this
equipment to make sure that, first, it could not be used for
offensive purposes and, second, that it could in no way
affect the outcome of the war with Iraq.
In doing this, we were well aware of the risk and we
understood this was a limited deviation from our arms
embargo policy. Nevertheless, we proceeded because we saw a
potential opening that could, if probed and cultivated
successfully, have had long-term stabilizing effects on the
regime and could have contributed to ending the war -- the
very objective of the arms embargo.
Q:
IF THE KHOMEINI AND (LIBYAN LEADER MOAMMAR) QADHAFI ROLES
WERE REVERSED so THAT QADHAFI WAS IN CHARGE OF THE MORE
STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT COUNTRY OF IRAN, WOULD WE BOMB
KHOMEINI AND ARM QADHAFI?
A:
Questions like this are pure speculation and avoid the heart
of the issue. There is no debate over the strategic
156
9
importance of Iran. In this regard, it is notable that only
a few major countries do not have relations with Iran --
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United
States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic relations
with Iran. The Iranians came to us threatened with growing
Soviet military power and political influence along its
borders and inside its territory. They also face increasing
desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq war and
a deteriorating economic situation. It is neither in our
interest nor the interest of any of our regional freinds for
Iran to unravel and descend into chaos. The more pragmatic
Iranian leadership, the more Iran is likely to remain
intact, to sustain its position as a strategic buffer to the
Soviet Union, to end its practice of exporting revolution
and threatening its neighbors.
When making my decisions in the Oval Office, I must deal
with the world as it is and make judgments on what best
serves the interest of our country, our people, and world
peace. I cannot speculate nor can I compare two totally
different sets of theoretical circumstances. In the case of
our military actions against Libya on April 15, we had
extraordinarily clear and unambiguous evidence of Libyan
government involvement in a recent act of international
terrorism against Americans in West Berlin. For the past 18
months, we have not had any such similar evidence of Iranian
government involvement in terrorism against Americans.
157
10
Q:
OUT HERE, WE DON'T EXPECT THE PRESIDENT TO DO ONE THING AND
SAY QUITE ANOTHER. HOW DO YOU EXPECT TO LIE AND HAVE US
TRUST YOU AGAIN?
A:
Because I haven't lied, I do expect that the vast majority
of Americans will continue to believe and trust in what we
say. We have only now begun to present the information
concerning this sensitive initiative toward Iran. Although
many Americans may still not agree with some of the actions
taken, we expect that they will at least understand the
strategic dimension of those actions as we have explained
it. The choice may not have been easy, particularly given
the risks; but there are times when a President must be
prepared to run risks in the service of goals of great
importance.
Q:
WAS ANYTHING DONE (BY IRAN) AGAINST ITS OWN SELF-INTEREST IN
RETURN FOR WHAT WE DID? ARE THERE ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES TO GIVE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE ARMS (TO IRAN) THAN THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TOLD ABOUT?
A:
The officials in Iran who sought to reorient Iran's policy
toward the West and the United States clearly had Iran's --
not America's -- interests in mind. They saw both the
external threat to Iran from the Soviet Union and the
158
11
internal threat brought on by the exasperation with the war
and a deteriorating economy. They are aware of the dangers
of not dealing with Iran's growing internal problems and
divisions. They recognized the need to reduce Iran's
international isolation and improve relations with the West
in order to respond to those threats. At no time did they
act against Iran's self-interest nor would we expect them to
do so. The fact of the matter is that there is a gradual
congruence of interests between our two countries.
As I have said, our arms embargo remains intact and we have
not and will not acquiesce in the sale of arms to Iran. The
shipments I authorized were limited to defensive arms and
the total of all these shipments could fit in a single cargo
airplane.
a:
WHY NOT TREAT IRAN AS WE TREAT NICARAGUA, AS AN ENEMY?
A:
We continue to have diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. We
do so because it is my belief that we can help bring about a
democratic solution to the unrest in that country by
remaining there. It is important to remember that only a
few major countries do not have relations with Iran. Even
Iraq maintains relations with Iran.
159
12
Q:
MR PRESIDENT, WHY DON'T YOU MAKE A FULLER ACCOUNTING OF WHAT
YOU EXPECTED TO GET IN THIS TRANSACTION (WITH IRAN) ? WHAT
OTHER SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY US? THERE ARE
PEOPLE IN THE PENTAGON WHO CONTEND THAT SOME OF THE STUFF
WAS VERY SOPHISTICATED, "BLACK BOX" EQUIPMENT. ARE WE GOING
TO SHIP MORE OR DO WE INTEND TO ENCOURAGE OR ACQUIESCE IN
THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO IRAN BY OTHER COUNTRIES?
A:
We cannot and will not publicly go into the specific details
of this arrangement. As I have said, all information
pertaining to this operation will be provided to the
appropriate members of Congress. I will reiterate that the
sum total of all the equipment I authorized could fit in one
cargo airplane and that there will be no further transfers
of military equipment.
Q:
IN LIGHT OF THE FIASCO OF IRAN, THE SWAP OF A SOVIET SPY FOR
AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST, THE FAILURE OF REYKJAVIK TO MOVE
TOWARDS EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL, THE SKIRTING OF U.S. LAWS BY
SENDING AN AMERICAN ARMS-SUPPLY PLANE TO NICARAGUA, AND THE
CLUMSY DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST LIBYA, WHAT CHANGES
DO YOU PLAN TO RESTORE COMPETENCE AND CREDIBILITY TO THE
CONDUCT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?
160
13
A:
I do not plan any changes because of false perceptions
created by misinformation. First, the Soviets cannot
honestly conclude that they came out even in the aftermath
of their espionage activities at the UN. Second, we and the
Soviets agree that important progress was made at Reykjavik
and that our arms control negotiations should resume where
Reykjavik left off. Third, the downed aircraft that was
attempting to bring supplies to the democratic resistance in
Nicaragua was not a U.S. Government aircraft or involved in
any U.S. Government operation. Finally, our policy toward
Libya since April has been a policy of mobilizing a variety
of pressures in order to deter Qadhafi's continuing use of
terrorism; there was no policy of misleading or feeding
false information to the American press. The one article in
the Wall Street Journal that is charged with having been
used for purposes of a disinformation campaign turns out to
be about 90% accurate in its reporting of facts. The
remaining 10% did not come from any U.S. Government
officials or sources.
Our six-year record in foreign policy is a successful
record. We have restored the strategic position of the
United States in the world and have before us some
opportunities for important new achievements. I plan no
changes in the strong team of advisors who have served the
Nation tirelessly and well.
161
14
Q:
IS THERE AN ACCEPTABLE MIDDLE POINT BETWEEN YOUR POSITION ON
SDI (STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE) TESTING AND THAT OF
SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV? ARE THERE RESTRICTIONS ON
THE NUMBER, TYPE, OR CONDUCT OF SDI TESTS THAT WOULD ALLOW
RESEARCH TO CONTINUE AT AN ACCEPTABLE PACE AND ALSO ASSURE
THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. PLANS NO BREAKOUT FROM THE ABM
(ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE) ?
A:
We already have a signed agreement with the Soviets governing,
among other things, strategic defense testing -- the ABM
Treaty. In the context of our proposal to eliminate all
U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles, we are prepared
not to deploy advanced strategic defenses for a 10-year
period and to confine ourselves to a program of research,
development, and testing, which are permitted by the ABM
Treaty. What we are not prepared to do is to accept Soviet
attempts to kill the U.S. SDI program by directly or
indirectly amending the ABM Treaty by restrictively
redefining its terms.
SDI offers us the hope of a safer more stable world.
Moreover, the Soviets, who have the world's only operational
ABM system, also have a long-standing, active, and extensive
program of strategic defense research, development, and
testing. When the Soviets are prepared to drop their
162
15
propaganda attacks on SDI, this may give us the basis for an
agreement on a transition to deterrence increasingly based
on defenses.
Q:
YOU HAVE CALLED FOR A WORLDWIDE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION. WHY
HAVEN'T YOU PUSHED FOR SUCH A REVOLUTION WHERE YOU HAVE YOUR
STRONGEST INFLUENCE, IN SUCH AREAS AS SOUTH KOREA AND SOUTH
AFRICA?
A:
The democratic revolution around the world is not something
I have "called for;" it is an historical fact, vindicating
the fundamental principles that all Americans have always
held dear. In Central America, South America, Haiti, the
Philippines, and elsewhere, we see inspiring examples of
democratic advance. The United States has limited influence
to shape events in other countries; but we use the influence
we have, and we use it to further our goals of democracy,
freedom, and human rights. In the Republic of Korea, we see
an allied government, facing a grave security threat from
the North, committed to an unprecedented peaceful transition
to a civilian democratic government by 1988. In South
Africa, the United States has exerted great efforts to
promote black economic advances and a political negotiation
which leads to a rapid and peaceful end to the repugnant
apartheid system and its replacement by a system of constitu-
tional democracy, racial justice, and human rights.
163
8346
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 19, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR ROD McDANIEL
FROM:
TOM GIBSON
SUBJECT:
Washington Post Questions
The President has indicated his interest in replying to the 26
questions solicited by the Washington Post in their Federal
Report of today's paper. The bulk of them concern Iran.
I would like to coordinate the production of a draft response,
either in the form of letter or Op Ed. Brief one to two
paragraph answers should be all that is necessary for each
question, but respond with the length you deem necessary. I have
noted the questions for your attention. Can we try to have
drafts back to me by COB Thursday. We'll do an edit and then
Chew will staff.
Thanks very much.
CC: Pat Buchanan
David Chew
164
SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT
Q: In terms of institutional accountabil-
ity, it would appear the NSC [National
Security Council] has preempted the tra-
ditional role of the Defense Department
and CIA in Central America and the State
NSL
Nath
Department in Iran. What constitutional
or legal authority has the NSC to aid and
abet the prosecution of war without a dec-
laration thereof by Congress in Central
America. and to authorize the shipment of
arms in violation of embargo statutes to
belligerents in the Middle East?
-Rep. Jim Leach (R-lowa), Foreign
Affairs Committee member
Q:
Since you permit [Vice] Adm. [John
M.] Poindexter to appear on "Meet the
Press" and "The Today Show" to answer
NSC
1
questions, will you permit him to go and
answer questions from members of Con-
gress in a hearing?
-Kirk O'Donnell. former counsel to
House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip)
BY
O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) and president of
the Center for National Policy
T
oday at 8 p.m., President Reagan
will give his first news
a:
What effect did the United States'
conference in three months-his
providing some military equipment have
on the behavior of the Iranian govern-
seventh this year. The Federal Page
NSC
North
ment? Has Iran changed its attitude to-
asked dozens of Americans in public
ward the war with Iraq, toward terrorism
life to suggest questions that they
or toward its neighbors, including the So-
would like to see the president
viet Union?
answer; these are some of the
-John C. West. former Democratic
questions we received.
governor of South Carolina and
ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Do you really believe that there are
moderate elements within the Iranian gov-
You said this trade was to help start a
ernment? And if there are. can there be
diaiogue with moderate political factions
Naith
any doubt that our association with them
in Iran. How does giving weapons to the
NSC
will diminish their influence if not elimi-
[Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini establish-
New
nate their presence in the political struc-
ment help this?
ture of Iran?
-Michael (Mickey) Kantor. Los
How do you ever again go to our allies
Angeles lawyer (partner of former
and ask them to be tough on terrorists or
Democratic National Committee
hold up shipment of arms to others after
chairman Charles Manatt and former
the disclosure of this kind of involvement
senator John Tunney) and Democratic
North
in Iran?
activist
-Walter F. Mondale. former vice
president and Democratic presidential
Q:
If the Khomeini and [Libyan leader
nominee in 1984
Moammar] Gadhafi roles were reversed so
that Gadhari was in charge of the more stra-
is...
Q:
What provision have you made in your
tegically important country of Iran. would
North
NSC
dealings with Iran to ensure that no more
we bomb Khomeini and arm Gadhafi?
hostages will be taken?
point
-John Steinbruner. director of the
-Senate Appropriations Committee
foreign policy studies program at the
Chairman Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Ore.) -
Brookings Institution
Q:
Out here. we don't expect the pres-
ä
Among all of the issues and problems
ident to do one thing and say quite anoth-
your administration faces in defining the
er. How do you expect to lie and have us
Nath
NSC
national interest. in what order of priority
trust you again?
would you rank the freedom of the hos-
-Deborah Howell. executive editor of
tages in Lebanon?
the St. Paul Pioneer Press and
-Norman Ornstein. political scientist
Dispatch
165
Was anything done [by Iran] against
Do you think you have changed the
its own self-interest in return for what we
thinking of the American people and have
opened up a lasting trend toward reducing
did? Are there arrangements with other
NSL
the presence of government in our daily
Naith
countries to give substantially more arms
lives?
[to Iran] than the American people have
-George Reedy, press secretary to
been told about?
President Lyndon B. Johnson, now
-Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice
journalism professor at Marquette
chairman of the Senate Select
University
Committee on Intelligence
What are your plans for reducing the
Q
Why not treat Iran as we treat Nic-
trade and budget deficits? And when are
aragua. as an enemy?
you going to stop kidding the American
North
public and start talking about raising
-Dinesh D'Souza. managing editor of
taxes?
Policy Review, the Heritage
-Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.),
Foundation journal
Appropriations Committee member
Mr. President. why don't you make a
Given your reluctance to increase
fuller accounting of what you expected to
taxes and your reluctance and Congress'
wath
get in this transaction [with Iran]? What
reluctance to breathe the words "Social
other shipments have been authorized by
Security," how in the world do you think
us? There are people in the Pentagon who
you will ever cut the deficit much below
Not NSC specifics discuss
contend that some of the stuff was very
$200 billion a year? And is that [large det-
sophisticated. "black box" equipment. Are
icit] the legacy you want to leave?
we going to ship more or do we intend to
-Carol Cox. president of the
encourage or acquiesce in the shipment of
Committee for a Responsible Budget
arms to Iran by other countries?
-Jody Powell. press secretary to
You insist that budget deficits are the
President Jimmy Carter
fauit of Congress. yet in the last six years
Congress has appropriated less than you
have requested and you have vetoed only
Looking back over the past six years.
two appropriations bills. How do you ex-
what are the foreign policy achievements
plain these inconsistencies?
of your administration to date?
-Rep. Marvin Leath (D-Tex.),
-Stansfield Turner. Central
member of the Budget Committee and
Intelligence Agency director, 1977-81
challenger to Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.)
for chairmanship of the Armed
Q:
Have you looked at the election re-
Services Committee
suits in the Upper Midwest-North Da-
kota. South Dakota, Minnesota-and con-
Mr. President. under the Reagan ad-
cluded that you need to change your ad-
ministration, the federal-city partnership
ministration's policy toward rural Amer-
has deteriorated from its historically sup-
ica?
portive role to an adversarial relationship.
-Rep. Vin Weber (R-Minn.), a leader
When you were last in Chicago. you
of the Conservative Opportunity
ducked a question about federal funding
Society and narrow reelection winner
for Chicago, by citing the release of fed-
eral transit funds. which had been com-
in an economically depressed farm
mitted long ago and had nothing to do with
district
the real issue facing the cities. On another
occasion, you suggested that urban Amer-
How in God's name can you go to
icans should "vote with their feet."
sleep at night as a conservative with a
My question is: What do you advise ur-
$200 billion |annual federal budget] deficit
ban Americans, caught between the rock
looking at you every year-as the biggest
and the hard place. between the conse-
deficit spender in American history?
quence of your added trillion-dollar deficit
-George McGovern. former senator
and the new tax policies on one hand, and
(D-S.D.) and Democratic nominee for
the loss of social programs formerly
president in 1972
funded by the federal government on the
other? That is, are you still suggesting
#
Mr. President, you came into office
that we just mosey along somewhere else,
on a conservative platform and offered a
or do you have a policy for the cities?
number of measures to cut down govern-
-Harold Washington. Democratic
mental activity.
mayor of Chicago
166
In light of the fiasco of Iran, the swap
of a Soviet spy for an American journalist,
the failure of Reykjavik to move towards
effective arms control, the skirting of U.S.
laws by sending an American arms-supply
Rodman
plane to Nicaragua and the clumsy disin-
formation campaign against Libya, what
changes do you plan to restore compe-
tence and credibility to the conduct of
U.S. foreign policy?
-John Brademas, president of New
York University and former
congressman (D-Ind.)
The GOP lost the Senate. Republican
candidates lost 13 of 16 races you cam-
paigned in. the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff apparently disagrees with the po-
sition you took in Iceland. and only 14 per-
cent of the American public believes that
your statement about not trading arms for
hostages is essentially true. Haven't you
lost a little zip off of your fast ball?
-Harrison Hickman. Democratic
pollster
Is there an acceptable middle point
between your position on SDI [Strategic
Defense Initiative] testing and that of So-
viet leader Mikhail Gorbachev? Are there
restrictions on the number, type or con-
duct of SDI tests that would allow re-
search to continue at an acceptable pace
and also assure the Soviets that the U.S.
plans no breakout from the ABM [Anti-
ballistic Missile] Treaty?
-William E. Colby, CIA director.
1973-76
You have called for a policy of
SD:
DONE
strength. saying this was the only way to
get the Russians to behave. Can you point
NSC
to one example where your military build-
up and your rhetoric have succeeded in
making the Russians behave better?
-Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.)
You have called for a worldwide dem-
ocratic revolution. Why haven't you
pushed for such a revolution where you
Rodman
have your strongest influence. in such ar-
eas as South Korea and South Africa?
NS<
-Andrew Young, Democratic mayor
of Atlanta and former U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations
Do you intend to support Vice Pres-
ident Bush or someone eise for the GOP
nomination in 1988?
THE WASHINGTON POST
-Richard Nathan. professor at
Princeton. former assistant budget
director and deputy undersecretary of
WEDNESDAY. NOVEMBER 19. 1986
health. education and weifare in the
Nixon administration
167
A NAME PASSPORT NUMBER AND COUNTRY HAVE BEEN
BLOCKED OUT ON THIS DOCUMENT WHICH CONTAINS
THE TRUE NAME IDENTITY OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL
DOMACHER OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. I BELIEVE
THAT DISCLOSURE of THIS INFORMATION, KNOWN ONLY TO we
WORLD RESULT IN THE DEATH of THIS Reeson.
Travel Document
DOB: 1941
New ETA 1830
168