Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "118567708",
    "label": "[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (8 of 17)",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/118567708"
}

{
    "id": "118567708",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/118567708",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "[JGR/Carter Briefing Book for Presidential Debate] (8 of 17)",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/118567708",
    "identifierLocal": "485",
    "collections": [
        "Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)",
        "John Roberts' Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/6908381/40-485-6908381-007-013-2017.pdf",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/6908381/40-485-6908381-007-013-2017.pdf",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/6908381/40-485-6908381-007-013-2017.pdf",
    "imageCount": 1,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/118567708",
    "naId": 118567708,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1986-12-31",
        "year": 1986
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1982-01-01",
        "year": 1982
    },
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/6908381/40-485-6908381-007-013-2017.pdf",
    "mediaId": "083706e953690a32",
    "ocrText": "Ronald Reagan Presidential Library\nDigital Library Collections\nThis is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.\nCollection: Roberts, John G.: Files\nFolder Title: [JGR/Carter Briefing Book for\nPresidential Debate] (8 of 17)\nBox: 7\nTo see more digitized collections visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library\nTo see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection\nContact a reference archivist at: [email protected]\nCitation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing\nNational Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/\nSeptember 26, 1980\nMilitary Balance\nQ. Your Administration has been accused of allowing the\nmilitary balance with the Soviet Union to deteriorate\nto a position of US inferiority and ushering in a period\nof grave danger to US interests around the world. The\nSecretary of Defense has said that even with the post-\nAfghanistan defense spending increases, it would\nrequire 40 years to catch up to Soviet expenditures.\nHow do you view the trends -- and the implications of\nthese trends -- in the military balance? Are we,\nin fact, number two today in military strength as\nGovernor Reagan has charged?\nAnd, ão you believe that our security over the next\nseveral years would have been helped or hurt if your\nAdministration had moved more aggressively on\nproduction of such weapons as the neutron bomb,\nB-I, MX and Trident II?\nResponse\nThe charge that the United States has fallen into a\nposition of military inferiority is false. Those who\n0\nclaim that the United States is weak, that the United\nStates cannot carry out its objectives, that the United\nStates cannot deter conflict, and it cannot win a\nconflict -- I think they do a disservice. We have very\nsubstantial capabilities. The Soviets are aware of it.\nOver the past 20 years, the military forces of the\nSoviets have grown substantially, both in absolute numbers\nand relative to our own. Discounting inflation, since 1960,\nSoviet military spending has doubled, rising steadily in\nreal terms by three or four percent a year.\nThese Soviet efforts would put the USSR in a most\nadvantageous military position if we do not counter their\nprograms with force improvements of our own. We will not\nallow any other nation to gain military superiority over us.\n2\nIn the strategic area, the Soviets have reached parity\nwith us. By some measures, we are ahead; by others, the\nSoviets are ahead. We have, for example, thousands more\nwarheads than the Soviets do. They have more intercontinental\nballistic missile payload. We have more submarine-launched\nballistic missile payload. We have a better balanced\nstrategic capability because we have bombers on alert.\nWe have roughly half of our submarine-launch ballistic\nmissiles deployed at all times. They have an edge in\nland-based ICBMs. So, the balance in these terms is\nreasonably even.\nWhat is also clear, however, is that in strategic\nnuclear forces, the Soviets have come from a position of\nsubstantial inferiority 15 years ago to one of parity today.\nTheir forces have improved in quality as well as numbers.\nThe Soviets have a potential for strategic advantage, if we\nfail to respond with adequate programs of our own.\nWe are responding. Today the United States is engaged\nin the most comprehensive military modernization program\nsince the early 1960s.\nIn the strategic area, we are moving ahead on\nstrengthening all three legs of our Triad of land-based\nmissiles, submarine-launched missiles and bombers. Four\nyears ago there was no program for a survivable mobile\nICBM. Four years ago the Trident missile submarine\nprogram was bogged down in contractor disputes and way\nbehind schedule. Four years ago there was no long-range,\n3\nair-launched cruise missile program. Four years ago,\nthe only major proposal to modernize our bomber force\nwas the B-1. We cancelled this program because it was\nclear then -- and it is even clearer today -- that it would\nhave been dangerously vulnerable to improving Soviet\nair defenses. Quite simply, the B-1 was obsolete and\na waste of money.\nMy Administration has also taken steps to reverse a\ndecade of decline in the military strength of the\nAtlantic Alliance.\n-- When I first began to meet with Atlantic Alliance\nleaders almost four years ago, I found them very troubled\nby the state of our military strength in the Atlantic\nAlliance. I promised to raise our own level of defense\nspending in real terms by some three percent per year and\nour NATO Allies responded by making the same pledge.\n-- With American leadership, NATO also took the crucial\nstep of adopting a bold Long-Term Defense Program which\nwill extend over 15 years. That program is helping us\nto increase our capacity to deter or defeat any surprise\nattack that may be launched against our European Allies\nand therefore against ourselves.\n-- Last year, the Alliance agreed to respond to Soviet\nnuclear missile and bomber deployments by modernizing\nand upgrading our long-range theater nuclear forces with\n572 PERSHING II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.\nToday, this program is underway and on schedule.\n4\nNATO is responding in a determined and coordinated\nfashion to the military competition posed by the Warsaw\nPact. Never in the history of the Alliance has its military\nsolidarity been greater than it is today.\nThe recent chaos in Iran and the Soviet invasion of\nAfghanistan have emphasized that the challenges to our\nvital interests and our security are not confined to one\ngeographic area. It has also demonstrated that we need\nto correct deficiences in our conventional power projection\ncapabilities. The United States must be able to respond\nquickly and effectively to military challenges anywhere\nin the world.\nPower projection is not new for the United States, but\nthe demands change over time. That is why we are engaged\nin a systematic and significant enhancement of our\ncapabilities to move forces rapidly to distant trouble\nspots.\nFour years ago, we did not have adequate capability\nto respond to threats in far way places such as the\nPersian Gulf region as quickly and effectively as our\ninterests required. Our intensified effort involves a\nnumber of different programs, including creation of RDF,\nprepositioning the weapons and supplies for Marine troops\nand Air Force tactical fighters in the region, increasing\nour naval presence in the Indian Ocean, gaining access\nto key port and airfield facilities in the area.\n5\nWe all hope and work and pray that we will see a\nworld in which the weapons of war are no longer necessary,\nbut now we must deal with the hard facts, with the world\nas it is. In the dangerous and uncertain world of today,\nthe keystone of our national security is still military\nstrength -- strength that is clearly recognized by\nAmericans, by our Allies, and by any potential adversary.\nAs long as I am President, I am determined to maintain\nthat strength.\nGov. Reagan on the Military Balance\n\"\nin military strength we are already second to one:\nnamely, the Soviet Union. \"\nChicago Council on\nForeign Relations\nMarch 17, 1980\n\"At the time (1965) we led the Soviet Union in about 40\nstrategic military categories. Today, they lead us in all\nbut 6 or 8 and may well surpass us in those if present trends\ncontinue. \"\nVeterans of Foreign Wars\nAugust 18, 1980\nSeptember 26, 1980\nDefense Spending\nQ: The Republican platform accuses your Administration\nof \"massive cuts in US defense spending.\" They\ncharge that you have reduced defense spending by\nover $38 billion from President Ford's last Five\nYear Defense Plan and have underfunded a great\nnumber of unglamorous Defense activities such as\nresearch and development, manpower, the reserves,\njust to name a few areas.\nHow do you respond to these charges?\nAlso, how will it be possible to maintain 3-5%\nreal growth through 1985 in the defense budget,\nas you have promised, in light of growing public\nsupport for stemming public spending and the great\ndifficulties in cutting back domestic programs?\nResponse:\nI am eager to compare my defense record of steady,\nsustained increase over the last four years with the\nrecord of underinvestment and decline during the\nprevious eight years of two Republican Administrations.\nGovernor Reagan is fond of comparing the real\naccomplishments of my Administration with President\nFord's FY 1978 budget, submitted after his defeat at\nthe polls left Republican officials free to propose\na budget that would neither have to be defended before\nConcress nor executed; that would not have to meet the\ntests of affordability and consistency. For example,\nthat bogus lame-duck document proposed twice as many\nships per year as the average number authorized during\nthe previous seven years.\nIn contrast the real Republican record, from\nfiscal years 1970 through 1977, shows that outlays for\n2\ndefense in constant dollars -- the measure of how much\nwe are actually spending for defense -- declined every\nyear. During the eight years prior to my Administration\ndefense spending declined in real terms -- after\ninflation -- about 35%. Again, in real terms, Republican\nrequests to Congress declined over $30 billion in the\neight years before FY 1978.\nEight consecutive vears of decline cannot be\nreversed overnight. We are now taking corrective action\nto reverse the shrinking size of our Navy, the increasing\nvulnerability of our intercontinental ballistic missile\nforce, the growing obsolescence of our tanks and\narmored personnel carriers.\nWhen my commitment to national security is evaluated\nunder the appropriate measure of defense expenditures --\noutlays -- the record reveals that outlays rose steadily\nfrom just over $134 billion in FY 1978 to almost $147 billi\nin FY 1981 -- over 10% real growth in constant 1981\ndollars over the four-vear period. As projected in my\ncurrent Five-Year Defense Program, defense spending will\nhave increased, over the eight years of my Administration,\nby 27%. By 1985, the defense programs and plans I will\nhave sent to Congress will involve a cumulative real\nincrease of almost $150 billion above the last budget\nyeat of the Ford Administration.\n3\nMoreover, my Administration is the first Administration\nto commit itself to protecting the level of real growth in\ndefense spending from the effects of inflation. This\ncommitment underscores my determination to preserve the\nDefense program in the face of unforeseen events such as\noil price rises and the cost of expanded military\noperations in the Indian Ocean.\nI intend to carry out my current five-year plan.\nThe most wasteful and self-defeating thing that we\ncould do would be to start this necessary program, then\nalter it or cut it back after a year or two when such an\naction might become politically attractive. It would also be\nharmful for the Commander-in-Chief to attempt to justify\nto the American people billions of dollars in unnecessary\nand unneeded programs. Although Governor Reagan has been\nvery imprecise about how much his defense program would\ncost, the plans outlined in the Republican Platform would\ncost this nation over $50 billion annually by 1985 above\nthe substantial increases I have planned.\nThe defense program I have proposed for the next five\nyears will require some sacrifice -- but sacrifice that\nwe must afford. I am confident that the American people\nunderstand the threats our country faces, and-will support\nthis program.\nGov. Reagan on Defense Spending\nReagan has never wavered from his strong support of\nincreased defense spending. Reagan and the Republican\nparty call for a military buildup to attain military\nsuperiority. By engaging in an arms race with the Soviets,\nReagan believes that we can use our economic might to\ndefeat the Russians.\n\"They (the Soviets) know they can't match our\nindustrial capacity.'\nNew York Post\nMay 29, 1979\nHowever, neither Reagan nor the Republican party has\nmade it clear how they would fund this build-up.\n\"\nI've always believed that defense is something in\nwhich you do not make the determination (of a budget) --\nit's made for you by your possible opponent.\"\nWashington Post\nApril 20, 1980\nIt would appear that Reagan would rely on Reagan-Kemp-\nRoth to provide the needed revenues for the military build-up:\n\"We would use the increased revenues the federal\ngovernment would get from this tax decrease to rebuild our\ndefense capabilities.\"\nFlint Journal\nMay 18, 1980\nWhen pressed for figures on how much would be necessary to\nachieve military supperiority, Reagan avoids specifics.\n\"Well, I've never gone by the figures. In fact, I think\nit's wrong to say we're safe because we're spending 5 percent\nmore or 3 percent more or anything. No, go by the weapons.\nNow, I have outlined a number of weapon shortages that we\nhave, but I don't have access to the high command. Just ask\nthese men who would have to fight the war what are the\nessential weapons, the top priority that we must have now to\nrestore our ability to deter the Soviet Union. I tell you,\nI think we're talking about the next few years that we must\nchange the situation, not eventually down the road.\"\nNational Journal Interview\nMarch 9, 1980\n2\nGov. Reagan on Defense Spending\nRecently, Reagan spelled out his case against the Carter\nAdministration record on defense spending:\n\" (Secretary Brown) argues that defense spending dropped\nmore than 35% between 1969 and 1976 under Republic adminis-\ntrations, and it has risen 10% under (the Carter) administration.\nThe truth is that defense spending did go down between 1969\nand 1975--and may I point out for the record that it went down\nby six percent not 35 percent as Mr. Carter erroneously\ncharges. But the fundamental problem I have with Mr. Carter's\nrewriting of history is its sheer, blatant hypocrisy. Who\nwas it who was principally responsible for the decline in\ndefense spending in those years? You and I know the answer\nvery well: The Democrats who controlled the Congress--men\nlike Walter Mondale and Teddy Kennedy. Those Democrats in\nCongress cut more than $40 billion from the Republican\ndefense budget, and they block or delay almost every new\nweapons systems but even more incredibly, let me ask: Who\nwas it in 1976 who campaigned up and down the land against\nGerald Ford's attempts to restore those defense cuts? Who\nsaid the military budget had to be slashed even more? You\nknow and I know that it was Jimmy Carter.\nPresident Ford had begun the restoration of our margin of\nsafety in 1975 with a five-year program for increasing our\ndefensive capability. In these last three years, President\nCarter has cut that program by $38 billion. His defense\nbudget authorization requests reverted to the annual decline\nthat had been halted by the Ford Administration.\nHe has since lobbied steadily against congressional\nefforts to increase defense spending.\nNow, by such untruthful devices as manipulating inflation\nfactors, shifting the base from authority to outlays, changing\nbase years, and even ordering planned defense spending this\nyear reduced SO it would look as if he had met his promised\npercentage increase for next year, the Carter Administration\ntries to manufacture increases that in fact are largely phony. \"\nAmerican Legion\nAugust 20, 1980\nSuptember 26, 1980\nStratecic Program Cancellations\nQ:\nYour critics have claimed that your Administration\nhas scaled down, cancelled or delayed every strategic\nweapon program proposed by your Republican predecessor,\nincluding production of Minuteman missiles, the B-1,\nground-, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, the M-X,\nthe Trident submarine and the Trident II missile.\nDuring this time, the Soviets have not shown similar\nrestraint, continuing to deploy several new types of\nICBMs and SLBMs with multiple warheads, and\ndeveloping a new generation of even more threatening\nmissiles.\nHow do you respond to the charge that your Administration\nhas failed to recognize the importance of maintaining\nthe strategic balance and that only in the past year have\nyou moved to fully fund necessary strategic programs?\nResponse:\nThat list of charges made by Governor Reagan is a\ncombination of half truths, falsehoods and misleading\nstatements. Let me summarize the strategic programs as\nI found them when I entered the White House four years\nago and where we are today.\nIn 1977 there was no program for a mobile ICBM.\nNo final decisions had been made on the M-X missile, nor\non how to deploy it. There was no program for long-range,\nair-launched cruise missiles; no program for ground-\nlaunched cruise missiles; no program for sea-launched\ncruise missiles. There were no plans to deploy additional\nMinuteman III ICBMs, SO a continuing production line would\nhave been a useless, senseless waste of $300 million\nper year.\nThe Trident ballistic missile submarine program was\nbogged down in contractor disputes and way behind schedule.\nThere was no Trident II ballistic missile. In the past\n2\nthree years I have resolved these disputes and gotten\nthe Trident program back on schedule. The first Trident\nsubmarine went to sea last summer. The 4,000-mile\nrange Trident I missile is now being deployed on 12 Poseidon\nsubmarines and will be deployed on all Trident submarines.\nLooking further into the future, my Administration is\ncommitted to developing the Trident II missile, with even\nlonger range and greater accuracy.\nWhen I entered office, the only long-range bomber\nprogram was the B-1. It had been on the drawing board SO\nlong =- in part because Presidents Nixon and Ford were\ndoubtful it would work -- that it was growing obsolete\nbefore it could be put in the hands of the Strategic Air\nCommand. I cancelled the B-1 in 1977 because it had\nvery doubtful prospects of being able to penetrate\nanticipated Soviet defenses. In the three years since then,\nit has become even clearer that this was the correct\ndecision because the Soviets have gone ahead and improved\ntheir air defenses and have programs in the works that\nwill improve them further.\nInstead, because the existing cruise missile program\nat that time was inadequate, I initiated the long-range,\nair-launched cruise missile program. These missiles are\ndesigned to be launched from outside the Soviet Union,\nthus the B-52 or other aircraft may be used. These cruise\n3\nmissiles are smaller and harder to detect and defend\nagainst than the B-1. They will be able to penetrate\nSoviet air defense system at the end of the 1980s and\ninto the 1990s when the B-1, as I said, would have had\nvery doubtful capability to penetrate. At the same time,\nwe are studying a number of different advance manned\nbombers -- including Stealth -- for possible deployment\nin the 1990s.\nWith respect to the growing vulnerability of our\nMinuteman ICBM force, in 1976 there was indeed an M-X\nprogram, but there was no program to solve our strategic\nproblem -- ICBM survivability -- the ability to survive a\nmassive Soviet attack of high accuracy intercontinental\nballistic missile warheads in large numbers. The preferred\nM-X basing plan on the part of the officials at that time --\n1976 -- was to put tham in Minuteman silos. The other scheme\nin 1976 was one of underground tunnels, which at least\nrecognized the need for a different deployment system in orde\nfor the M-X missiles to survive. Neither of these proposals\nwas workable. Neither would have solved the problem of\nsurvivability. We then spent about two years trying to find\na survivable system and we did. It's not inexpensive. But\nit will cost no more than the Minuteman system or the B-52s.\nAnd it will be able to survive. So, yes, we cancelled a\nbasing system for the M-X that wouldn't work and we\nsubstituted a system that would.\nGovernor Reacanon Strategic Programs\nReagan has been a constant supporter of all weapon programs.\nIn fact, he has never publicly opposed any major weapon system\nin the last 15 years.\nThe Republican platform calls for development of virtually\nevery weapon system under consideration:\n\"o the earliest possible deployment of the MX missile\nin a prudent survivable configuration;\naccelerated development and deployment of a new manned\nstrategic penetrating bomber that will exploit the\n$5.5 billion already invested in the B-1, while\nemploying the most advanced technology available;\ndeployment of an air defense system comprised of\ndedicated modern interceptor aircraft and early warning\nsupport systems;\nacceleration of development and deployment of strategic\ncruise missiles deployed on aircraft, on land, and on\nships and submarines;\nmodernization of the military command and control system\nto assure the responsiveness of U.S. strategic nuclear\nforces to presidential command in peace or war; and\n0\nvigorous research and development of an effective\nanti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at\nhand in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM\ntechnologies.\n\"\n1980 Republican Platform\nSeptember 23, 1980\nM-X (including ABM)\nQ:\nThere have been a number of reports that the M-X is\nlosing support as a result of its high cost, concern\nabout its impact on the states where it would be\ndeployed, and its viability in the absence of SALT.\nIn light of these problems, do you think M-X is\nstill a viable weapon? If, as seems likely, M-X is\ndelayed, what harm do you see to the national security?\nShould the Administration be pursuing alternatives,\nin the event of an extended delay in M-X? And,\nwhat is your position on an ABM system to protect MX?\nResponse:\nThe M-X system is viable, and it is necessary for\nthe security of our nation. Our land-based Minuteman\nICBM force is becoming vulnerable and we must act\npromptly to restore its invulnerability.\nWhen I entered office in 1977 there was no program\nfor a survivable M-X. One alternative under consideration\nwould have put the M-X missile into Minuteman silos -- and\nthe M-X would have been just as vulnerable to a Soviet\nattack as the Minutemen are now. Another alternative\nat least recognized the need for improved survivability,\nbut detailed analysis of this alternative -- the trench\nor tunnel system -- showed that it would not work either.\nDuring the next two years I directed the Defense\nDepartment to pursue a determined search for a M-X basing\nsystem which would be able to survive and retaliate\nafter receiving the most devastating Soviet attack possible,\nand allow the Soviets to verify how many missiles were\ndeployed.\n2\nAfter studying dozens of options, we found a\ndeployment system for the M-X which meets these criteria.\nGovernor Reagan has criticized my decision. I would\nchallenge him to be more specific about the alternative\nhe favors. Does he want to build a missile and have no\nplace to put it? Does he want to put it in the Minuteman\nsilos where they will be vulnerable to a nuclear Pearl\nHarbor? Perhaps he wants to build thousands and thousands\nof M-Xs and proliferate them all over the country, as\nsome of his advisors have stated, at a cost of untold\nbillions and a highly dangerous arms race.\nThe missile deployment I have approved will protect\nus from a Soviet surprise attack and yet be consistent\nwith trying to curb arms and not engage in an arms race.\nI am confident we have made the right decision.\nStrategic nuclear forces necessary for our nation's\nsecurity are costly, but it is a burden we must bear to\nprotect our freedoms. The Defense Department cost estimate\nfor the M-X of about $33 billion in FY '80 dollars was\nworked out with care, and not artificially squeezed to\nmake the M-X more saleable -- a tactic that has been used\nto sell military programs in the past. Even at this cost,\nM-X will be no more expensive than the Minuteman or the\nPolaris missile systems, or the B-52 bombers.\n3\nWhile we have focused on the strategic and security\nnecessity for M-X, I have carefully reviewed the Air\nForce's plans to ensure that the M-X will not place an\nunfair burden on any of our citizens. I have met with\nthe Governors of Utah and Nevada to assure them that,\nin deploying the M-X, we will respect all state water\nlaws and will do everything possible to deal with the\nother economic impacts on the states. I am determined\nto see that these issues are resolved to the satisfaction\nof the residents around the deployment areas. I believe\nthis can be done while planning to have the first missiles\nin service by 1986.\nFinally, many Republican critics of my Administration\nfavor abrogating the ABM Treaty and deploying ABMs to pro-\ntect M-X. I believe that would be a gross mistake at this\ntime. The ABM Treaty is a very important achievement, the\nmost important achivement of SALT I, and one which holds\ndown the arms competition. A decision to deploy ABMs should\nnot be made lightly. But if in the absence of the con-\nstraints of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets deployed\ntremendous numbers of warheads capable of attacking M-X\nshelters, perhaps as high as 20,000 or 30,000 warheads,\nthen we might consider other responses, such as an anti-\nballistic missile system. We have a vigorous long-standing\ntechnology program to develop ABMs and we would consider\ndeploying such a system if that becomes necessary in the\nfuture.\nGovernor Reacan on MX\n\"To prevent the ultimate catastrophe of a massive nuclear\nattack, we urgently need a program to preserve and restore our\nstrategic deterrent. The Administration proposes a costly and\ncomplex new missile system. But we can't complete that until\nthe end of this decade. Given the rapidly growing vulnerability\nof our land-based missile force, a faster remedy is needed.\"\nAddress to Chicago Council\non Foreign Relations\nMarch 17, 1980\nThe race-track deployment proposed by the Carter Administra-\ntion is enormously expensive and complicated, and will require\nyears to build. This proposed mode of deploying the MX should\nbe scrapped, because it is unworkable.\nResponse to question posed by\nArms Control Today, May 1980\nRepresentative Anderson on the MX\nI have opposed development and deployment of the MX missile\nsystem as currently planned. Not only will this system be out-\nrageously expensive and environmentally unsound, it will fail to\naddress the fundamental need to enhance American security. We\nshould not add thousands of new targets for Soviet military\nplanners to contemplate, but should instead take advantage of\ntechnological advances in guidance, propulsion systems, command\nand control systems, and platforms to develop a secure and\ninvulnerable system before the end of the decade. While the\nneed for prompt counter-silo capability has not been completely\nresolved in my own mind, any such capability should not be\ndeployed in a manner that invites attack on the United States.\nResponse to question posed by\nArms Control Today, May 1980\nSeptember 18, 1980\nNew Strategic Bomber\n(Including Stealth Controversy)\nQ:\nThree years ago you cancelled the B-1 bomber in favor of\nless expensive cruise missiles. Now your Administration\nis apparently on the verge of agreeing with the Air Force\nthat a new bomber may be needed for conventional missions\nas well as for a strategic role.\nGiven the increasing anxiety over the effectiveness of\nthe aging B-52, do you still believe your 1977 decision\nto cancel the B-1 was justified?\nAlso, your Administration has recently come under attack\nfor alledgedly leaking the so-called \"Stealth\" technology\nfor election year political purposes. Even if the original\nleaks did not come from the Administration, Defense\nDepartment officials seemed most eager to brief reporters\nand draw attention to the once-secret technology which,\nin Secretary Brown's words, \"alters the military balance\nsignificantly.\"\nHow do you answer the charge that your Administration's\nhandling of Stealth was politically motivated and has\ndamaged our national security?\nResponse:\nFour years ago, the only major proposal to modernize\nour bomber force was the B-1. In 1977, I cancelled this\nprogram because it was clear then -- and it is even clearer\ntoday -- that by the time the B-1 could have been off the\nassembly lines and deployed at our SAC bases, improved\nSoviet air defenses would have made this aircraft\ndangerously vulnerable. Quite simply, the B-1 was\nobsolete and a waste of money. Yet Governor Reagan has\ncontinued to cite the B-1 as a bomber that should have\nbeen built. The Republican program is a program of\nobsolescence. They want to resurrect decommissioned ships.\nThey want to revive the ABM system, which President\n2\nNixon discarded. With vulnerable bombers, mothballed\nships and obsolete missiles, they would waste billions\nof defense dollars.\nInstead of the B-1, I chose to modernize the bomber\nforce by exploiting some of the most advanced and\neffective military technology in the world -- the air-\nlaunched cruise missile. When I entered office four\nyears ago, no long-range, air-launched cruise missiles\nwere included in the defense program. Today, we are well\non our way to equipping our B-52s with over 3,000 of\nthese very highly accurate, long-range cruise missiles.\nThey will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses not only\nin 1982, when the first full squadron will be ready,\nbut through the 1980s and beyond.\nAt the same time we are studying a new bomber\nto meet any requirements for the 1990s -- the Stealth\naircraft is part of this study. This is a major\ntechnological achievement that will affect the military\nbalance in the coming years. Programs to make aircraft\nless visible to radar -- to give them a so-called Stealth\ncapability -- have existed for 20 years. When this\nAdministration came into office, Stealth was a low-\nlevel technology program and its existence was not\nclassified as secret. The program had been dealt\nwith in open testimony and in open contracts. In the\nspring of 1977, I turned Stealth into a major develop-\nment and production program. The existence of this\n3\nnew program was classified at the highest level. The\nfunding level is now more than 100 times larger than\nit was in early 1977. There have been major achievements\nin the program.\nHundreds of contractor personnel are now working on\nStealth. Dozens of Members of Congress have been briefed\non the existence of the program. The increasing size of\nthe program and the increasing numbers of persons aware\nof it made certain that its existence would have come out\nin the near future.\nGovernor Reagan's charge that the information provided\nby Secretary Brown's press conference would be helpful\nto the Soviets is simply nonsense. The information\n0\ndoesn't tell them how to change their air defense. They\nare already developing and building the best air defenses\nthey can. Even if they could push their research harder\nto develop yet better air defenses, they have no idea of\nwhat characteristics to design against, or how much better\ntheir defenses must be. Secrecy of the details of the\nprogram, combined with our technological achievements,\nwill enable us to keep ahead of the Soviets in this program\nfor decades to come.\nStealth is one of a number of major technological\nadvantages that the U.S. possesses. These technological\nadvantages weigh heavily in the military balance and keep\n4\nus second to none. We have publicly discussed our\nadvantages in other technologies in the past, and will\ncontinue to do so in the future because it is important\nthat our potential enemies, our allies and the American\npeople understand our military strength. This is an\nessential factor in deterring war.\nGovernor Reagan on the B-1 and Cruise Missiles\n\"I don't think that the current administration (Carter) is\ndoing what should be done - not when it cancels the B-1 bomber,\nwhich is probably the foremost advance in aircraft that has ever\nbeen -- or has been presented since we went to the jet engines\n\"\nFace The Nation\nMay 14, 1978\n*\n*\n*\n\"We have an administration (Carter) that in three years has\ndone away with\nthe cruise missile\nand you could go on with\nweapon after weapon\n\"\nSan Jose News\nMarch 10, 1980\nSeptember 27, 1980\nNeutron Bomb\nQ:\nCritics of your Administration have cited your surprise\ndecision in April 1978 not to deploy the so-called\nneutron bomb as a prime example of inconsistency that\nhas seriously harmed our position of leadership in the\nNATO alliance. At that time you said the ultimate\ndecision on the neutron bomb would be made in light of\nSoviet restraint.\nWhat considerations led you to decide SO precipitously\nagainst deploying the neutron bomb in 1978? What is\nthe status of your decision to defer production? What\nsigns of Soviet restraint have, so far, prevented you\nfrom deciding to proceed with the neutron bomb?\nResponse:\nMy decision of April 7, 1978 to defer a deployment\ndecision still stands. I have directed that the Defense\nDepartment proceed with programs to modernize battlefield\nnuclear forces with improved weapons -- the LANCE missile\nand 8-inch nuclear artillery shell. I have further directed\nthat the new warheads for these weapons be SO designed that\nthey can accept enhanced radiation elements and thus be\nconverted to enhanced radiation warheads in the future,\nshould we and our Allies decide on the need for such systems.\nThe military need for enhanced radiation weapons is not\nclear. NATO is deploying highly sophisticated, conventional\n\"precision guided munitions\" in anti-armor roles that are so\naccurate that there is a high probability that each shot would\ndestroy an enemy tank. We and our NATO Allies are deploying\nthese precision guided munitions by the tens of thousands.\nThe question of enhanced radiation weapons remains a\nsensitive one for our European Allies, on whose soil such\nweapons would be stationed. Governor Reagan's bland assertion\nthat he would deploy enhanced radiation weapons in Europe\nbetravs an insensitivitv to European\n2\ncould cause serious strains in the Alliance. Governor\nReagan ignores one essential fact: NATO is an Alliance of\nsovereign states. We do not tell our Allies that we are\ngoing to deploy a weapon on their territory. we consult\nwith them, we examine the military requirements, we\nconsider the political implications, then we as an Alliance\ndecide.\nOn December 12, 1979, NATO adopted a plan for modernizing\nthe theater nuclear forces (TNF) through the deployment of\nPershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. This plan\nis focused on long-range TNF because of their special contribution\nto deterrence. This decision was the product of model political\nand military consultations with our Allies.\nGovernor Reagan on the Neutron Bomb\nReagan strongly opposed any funding cuts in the development\nof the neutron bomb. He views the neutron bomb as \"an offensive\nweapon that could bridge the gap for conventional weapons.\"\nNew York Times\nMay 6, 1980\nReagan has called the neutron bomb the closest thing to the\nideal weapon.\n\"Very simply it is the dream of death ray weapon of science\nfiction. It kills enemy soldiers but doesn't blow up the\nsurrounding countryside or destroy villages, towns and cities.\nIt won't destroy an enemy tank -- just kill the tank crew.\n\"Now some express horror at this and charging immortality,\nportray those who would use such a weapon as placing a\nhigher value on property than human life. This is sheer\nunadulterated nonsense. It is harsh sounding, but all war\nweapons back to the club, the sling and the arrow, are\ndesigned to kill the soldiers of the enemy. With gunpowder\nand artillery and later bombs and bombers, war could not be\nconfined to the battlefield. And so came total war and non-\ncombatants outnumbering soldiers in casualties.\"\nReagan Radio Transcript\nMarch 1978 - April 1978\nReagan supports deployment of the neutron bomb in almost every\navailable delivery system.\n\"I favor development and deployment of the neutron warhead\nfor U.S. theatre nuclear forces, including ballistic missiles,\ncruise missiles, artillery and bombs.\"\nWashington Post\nApril 24, 1980\nSeptember 26, 1980\nNuclear Strategy\nQ. The Republican Platform charges that your Administration\nrelies on a nuclear strategy known as mutual assured\ndestruction (or MAD) which would limit the President\nin a crisis to choose between mass mutual suicide or\nsurrender. Yet you have recently signed Presidential\nDirective 59, widely reported in the press to call for\ngiving the President greater flexibility to retaliate\nwith nuclear weapons against limited groups of targets.\nHow do you answer the charge that your directive was\ntimed to refute the Republican Platform statement?\nWhy was a Presidential Directive on this extremely\nimportant and sensitive subject undertaken during a\npolitical campaign?\nAlso, other critics claim that increasing the\nPresident's flexibility to order nuclear attacks\nwill only make nuclear war more thinkable, hence\nmore likely. How do you answer this concern?\nResponse\nI deeply regret the ill-informed attacks on our\nNation's nuclear deterrent strategy. There has been a\ngreat deal of exaggeration put out about Presidential\nDirective 59 in this campaign, and - welcome the\nopportunity to state once again the true facts about\nAmerica's deterrent doctrine.\nThe United States has never had a doctrine based\nsolely and simply on spasmodic, massive attacks on Soviet\ncities and populations, as Governor Reagan knows -- or\nat least he should know. The President is not faced with\na Hobson's choice between suicide and surrender if the\nSoviets launch a nuclear attack on military targets, while\nsparing our cities. Previous Administrations going back\nat least two decades recognized the danger of a strategic\ndoctrine that relied too heavily on the threat of attacking\n2\nSoviet cities to deter Soviet aggression. Therefore,\nsince the early 1960s, the United States has had the\ncapability to launch limited nuclear attacks on\nSoviet targets other than cities. This capability has\ngrown as our nuclear forces have become more accurate\nand sophisticated.\nOur strategy and our capability to inflict massive\ndestruction in retaliation provide the means of convincing\nthe Soviet leaders that there is no rational objective they\nmight gain by using or threatening to use nuclear weapons\nagainst the United States or our allies. The strategy\nset forth in Presidential Directive 59 directs our\nNation's military leaders to further develop our plans\nto carry out selective, limited attacks on those targets\nwe know the Soviet leaders value most. It restates and\nredefines our plans to respond to any level of Soviet\nnuclear attack by striking back in ways that damage\nthe political and military structure without hitting\nSoviet cities and population.\nTherefore, it should be clear to all that the\nstrategy contained in PD-59 is not a radical departure\nfrom previous policy of both Democratic and Republican\nAdministrations. It is the result of a gradual\nevolution of our doctrine over a number of years in\nresponse to growing Soviet strategic capabilities and\nto better understanding of Soviet military doctrine\nand operational planning. U.S. strategic forces are\nnow, and will continue to be, capable of implementing\nthis strategy.\n3\nI want to stress that the United States remains\nfully capable of devastating the Soviet Union under any\ncircumstances. Assured destruction of the Soviet Union\nas a modern industrial society remains the cornerstone\nof the strategy expressed in PD-59. It does not\nsignify a shift to a US plan to strike first at the\nSoviet Union with nuclear forces, nor does it mean the\nUnited States intends to use or threaten to use nuclear\nweapons to gain foreign policy objectives. The only\nsane purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use\nby the other side.\nI do not believe either side could \"win\" a limited\nnuclear war. In PD-59, I want to ensure as best I can\nthat the Soviets do not believe so either.\nRepresentative Anderson on Nuclear Strategy\nIn a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations in\nNew York on September 24, Anderson charged that both President\nCarter and Ronald Reagan \"have formed an alliance of folly\"\nin their positions on nuclear war strategy.\n\"Both seem to harbor the fatal illusion that nuclear wars\ncan be limited and perhaps even won. That conclusion is\nreflected in Mr. Reagan's platform and in Mr. Carter's twin\ncommitments to the MX counterforce missile and to the new\ntargeting doctrine formulated in Presidential Directive 59.\"\n\"Obviously, neither Mr. Carter now Mr. Reagan is advocating\nnuclear war. But I consider both of them to be seriously\nmisguided in their endorsement of the so-called nuclear war\nfighting thesis.\"\n\" [Both] would build super-accurate counterforce weapons\nto threaten Soviet missiles. Both would target weapons not\nonly on missile silos but on command centers as well. And\nboth insist that such weapons would be used only in a second\nstrike to disarm any Soviet missiles remaining after an\ninitial attack on the United States.\"\nAnderson then spelled out his views.\n\"Any missiles capable of destroying enemy silos in a\nsecond strike could obviously do SO in a first strike. The\ncreation of these weapons and plans would move both sides\ntoward a hair-trigger posture in which each would feel more\ninclined to launch its land-based missiles on warning of\nattack, lest they be destroyed on the ground.\"\n\"The futile pursuit of a capacity to wage limited nuclear\nwar may only make more likely the very event we dread.\"\nSeptember 23, 1980\nDefense Manpower\nQ:\nAccording to the GOP, Carter Administration \"mismanagement\"\nof the all-volunteer force concept has turned it into\na \"shambles\", a \"national scandal\" and \"disgrace.\"\nThe Party Platform blames your Administration as well\nfor a \"dramatic exodus\" of skilled military personnel\nfrom the services, a loss which is \"the direct result\nof neglect by the Commander-in-Chief.\" Additionally,\nthis year it became known that tens of thousands of\nmilitary families are eligible for food stamps.\nHow do you answer the charge that your Administration\npermitted this situation to deteriorate? What is\nyour assessment of the strength and morale in our armed\nservices? What measures have you proposed to solve\nthe problems that do exist?\nResponse:\nThe continuing ability of our Armed Forces to\nrecruit and retain sufficient numbers of qualified young\nmen and women is a matter of the highest national priority.\nI am keenly aware, from my own personal experience in\nthe Navy and from close attention to the subject as\nPresident, of the real sacrifices as well as satisfactions\ninvolved in military service. I greatly admire those\nwho are working SO hard to protect our country.\nI realize that many experienced men and women are\nleaving the Services because of a feeling that they are\nnot adequately compensated. I have taken several\nsteps to improve this situation and I will continue\nto look for ways to help our service people as long as\nI am President. In early September, I signed into law\nlegislation specifically targeted to the areas of most\nimmediate need. These included an increased subsistence\n2\nallowance, a 25% increase in aviation career incentive\npay, increased pay for enlisted personnel serving at\nsea, and reenlistment bonuses for persons with 10-14\nyears of prior service.\nI also signed into law a 11.7% pay increase for\nmilitary personnel effective October 1. Pay and benefits\nfor the Armed Forces will rise more than $4 billion in\n1981, the greatest increase in the history of our nation,\nin either war or peace.\nThese measures, by themselves, are only a first\nstep toward solving our manpower problems. In the past\nmy efforts have been complicated by a number of limiting\nfactors -- inadequate attention to the problem before\nI came to office, Congressional cuts in my defense budget,\nthe need for fiscal restraint in the fight on inflation.\nThis year we have been very successful in building\nsupport in the Congress for higher pay and benefits.\nOur continued success through the 1980s will depend on\nrecognition of the hard fact that sustained commitment\nof the American people will be required to pay the costs\nof retaining and supporting a voluntary military force.\nSeptember 26, 1980\nDefense Readiness\nQ. In recent years, increasing publicity has been given to\nthe low readiness of our military forces: shortages of\nspare parts, fuel and ammunition, growing backlogs of\ndeferred maintenance through inadequate facilities to\nmeet peacetime needs (let alone wartime requirements) and\nshrinking industrial capacity to supply defense goods.\nMore recently, Army Chief of Staff General Meyer has\nstated that we have \"a hollow Army\". Four years ago,\nall 10 Army divisions based in the US were rated fully\ncombat ready. Now 6 of these divisions are rated not\ncombat ready and the other 4 are rated marginally\ncombat ready.\nHow serious do you believe this problem is? Where do\nthe most critical problems exist and what steps has your\nAdministration taken to correct them?\nResponse\nToday our land, naval and air forces are fully capable\nof substantial and successful combat. My Administration\nhas made extrordinary efforts to maintain readiness in\nthe face of rapidly escalating costs -- such as the\ndramatic fuel price increase over the last year -- and\nthe shortfalls and inadequate programs when I entered\noffice.\nIn FY 81 we will spend over $52 billion to support\nthe maintenance and operations of our forces, an increase\nof almost $5 billion, or about 10%, in real terms over\nPresident Ford's last budget year. During the past four\nyears, one-third of total military spending has supported\nreadiness-related operations and maintenance. Expenditures\non procurement of munitions and spares -- another indicator\nof immediate combat readiness -- total another $16 billion\nduring this same 78-81 period.\n2\nFour years ago, munitions and spare parts inventories\nand production suffered from low baseline requirements\nestablished by previous Administrations. Immediately\nafter taking office I commissioned, and followed through\non a sustainability study of unprecedented detail and\ncomprehensiveness. In part as a result of this study,\nthe record of the past four years is of real improvement\nin munitions and war reserves. However, much work needs\nto be done and it will be several years before those\ninventories will be fully adequate to support all of our\ncombat forces at wartime sortie rates.\nLet me address some of the specific problems we have\nand the steps I have ordered to correct them.\nToday the Army has 16 divisions, of which 10 are combat\nready. The forward deployed dfvisions in Europe and the\nPacific represent 45 percent of the Army and are maintained\nat highest readiness status. The Army classifies divisions\nas fully-combat ready to not-combat ready according to\npersonnel, equipment and training conditions. A division\nrated low in one of these resource areas is capable of\noperating with two of its three brigades if required to\ndeploy immediately. But all Army units could not be\ntransported at the same time. While early deploying\nunits are moving, the later units are brought up to\nfull capacity.\nOur current efforts to improve Army readiness are\nshowing results:\n3\nFirst, recruiting for the past year has fully\nmet objectives and those soldiers are now beginning to\narrive in units.\nSecond, non-commissioned officer shortages will\nbe improved through reducing unneeded personnel in\nforward deployed forces.\nThird, in recruiting, I am expanding bonus\nprograms that are keyed toward critical skills. I have\nalso supported legislation to improve educational benefits,\nincluding provisions that pass on unused educational\nbenefits to dependents. To alleviate the shortage of\nmiddle-grade NCOs, I am expanding bonus programs to\ninclude mid-range NCOs (6-10 years' service) in infantry,\narmor, field artillery, and other selected skills. (By\ncomparison only a third of Soviet divisions are combat\nready. The remaining two-thirds are at reduced or\ncadre strength, having varying percentages of active\nduty personnel and equipment assigned to them, and would\nhave to be filled out in an emergency with reservists.)\nThere has also been much attention focused on the\nreadiness of our tactical air forces. It is untrue that\na significant percentage of our aircraft can't fly. The\nindex used by the Air Force is a measure of the peacetime\nlogistic support system, not of how the air forces would\nperform in war. If we were to make a transition to war\nfrom our normal day-to-day peacetime posture, we would\nselectively defer non-urgent inspections and preventive\nmaintenance; we would also, of course, have unlimited\n4\naccess to our war reserve spares and would, as necessary,\nuse serviceable components from out-of-commission and\ndamaged aircraft to maximize our wartime capability.\nToday, our armed forces stand ready to fight, if\nthat should become necessary. In response to events in\nSouthwest Asia, I ordered the rapid deployment of two\naircraft carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean. Since\nthe beginning of this year, we have deployed two aircraft\ncarriers; over 25 other ships and more than 150 combat\naircraft in one of the areas of the world most remote\nfrom the United States. To be sure, there have been\nsacrifices and hardships on the crews and their families.\nBut we accomplished this deployment rapidly and smoothly,\nand can sustain it in the Indian Ocean as long as it is\nneeded. No other Navy in the world could have performed\nas well.\nSeptember 26, 1980\nMilitary Draft\nQ.\nCritics on your left have attacked your reinstitution of\ndraft registration as the first step to resuming the\npeacetime draft. Critics on your right have claimed that\nthe draft registration program is an empty, symbolic\ngesture and would do nothing to speed mobilization in\na crisis.\nWhat were your objectives in ordering draft registration?\nHow can you claim draft registration will expedite\nmobilization in a crisis when a Selective Service report\nearly this year concluded that it would have no effect?\nResponse\nI have repeatedly stated my opposition to the\npeacetime draft. With the personnel initiatives I have\ntaken to raise military pay and benefits closer to\ncompensate civilian occupations, I believe that a peacetime\ndraft will not be necessary.\nBut it is important for us all to realize that the\nU.S. is committed to a sustained response to a long-term\nstrategic challenge. We should be prepared to make the\nnecessary sacrifices and that these sacrifices be borne\nby all. We should be prepared to reinstitute the draft\non very short notice, if that becomes necessary.\nWhat is the argument against registration? That we\nshould not be prepared? I for one do not believe this is\nthe case. I feel it is a fundamental matter of patriotism\nthat Americans support. Symbolically, we would also be\nsaying to the Soviet Union that the simple act of\nregistration was too high a price to pay to enhance our\nsecurity -- certainly a reckless notion to impart.\n2\nMoreover, our allies continue to look to us for\nleadership of the Atlantic Alliance. They rightly\nrequire of us wisdom and strength -- political, economic\nand military -- to properly manage the changing international\nsecurity environment.\nDraft registration is a tangible demonstration to\nour allies and potential adversaries of our national\nstrength and will. It also assists our planning for\nnational emergencies in which an actual draft could\nbe necessary.\nGovernor Reagan on the Military Draft\nReagan opposes both the President's move to reinstate\ndraft registration and any peacetime draft.\n\"I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration. \"\nAcceptance Speech\nJuly 17, 1980\nHe also challenges the underlying premise for registration.\n\"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our\nmilitary preparedness, by making people think we have solved\nour defense problem\n\"\nQuoted by Senator Hatfield\nCongressional Record\nJune 4, 1980\nAsked for an alternative to the peacetime draft, Reagan calls\nfor a buildup of reserves. (It is not clear if he favors the\nsame buildup as an alternative to registration.)\n\"There is a need for a million-man active reserve, a\nreserve that is equipped with the latest weapons, trained\nin them and combat ready. We've allowed (our reserve force)\nto deteriorate very badly. It is much too small, it is not\nequipped with the latest weapons and it doesn't have the\ntraining. \"\nNational Journal\nMarch 8, 1980\nTo finance this force, Reagan would rely on pay incentives.\nQ: So you believe we can have a million-man reserve\nstrictly on a volunteer basis?\nReagan: Yes.\nQ: How, with pay incentives?\nReagan: Yes, it could be pay incentives.\nNational Journal\nMarch 8, 1980\nSeptember 26, 1980\nRapid Deployment Force\nQ:\nThe Administration's critics have charged that the RDF\nis just a paper organization, a political gimmick\ndesigned to draw attention away from four years of\nneglect. They also charge that since all of the military\nforces assigned to the RDF are already in existence,\nthe main value of the Administration's initiative is\nmore political than military. Would you comment on\nthese charges.\nAlso, since our existing forces are stretched so thin,\nhow can they be drawn down to take on new commitments\nelsewhere? What will the RDF be able to accomplish\nthat could not be done before? If the challenges to\nour security worldwide are really on the rise, don't we\nneed to increase the size of our armed forces and step\nup purchases of new equipment? Finally, does the\nformation of the RDF signify an increased willingness\nof the US to intervene militarily in regional disputes?\nResponse:\nThose who charge that the RDF is a political gimmick\nare demonstrating their lack of understanding of military\nforces. The present international challenges we face\nand the interests we must be prepared to defend require us\nenhance our capabilities, not add to our current force\nstructure.\nForce structure aside, we are dramatically improving\nour capability to engage and support more of our forces at\ngreater distances from the United States. This is the\nessence of the Rapid Deployment Force. Having Rapid\nDeployment Forces does not increase the probability that\nwe will use them. On the contrary, we intend for their\nexistence to deter the very developments that would\notherwise invoke their use.\n2\nThe Rapid Deployment Force draws its forces from Army;\nNavy; Air Force; and Marine units which are oriented\ntoward non-NATO contingencies and that can respond quickly\nto crises, primarily in areas in which we have no permanent\nmilitary presence. The specific composition of the Rapid\nDeployment Force is not fixed -- the forces employed by the\nRapid Deployment Force would be dependent upon the situation\nwe faced. A company of 200 men might be sufficient to\nrespond to requests by friendly countries to provide a\nnatural disaster assistance team or communications-and-\ncommand support teams; a Marine Amphibious Force of 50,000\nmen or a mechanized Army Corps of over 100,000 men might be\nrequired to provide sufficient warfighting capability to\nregain territory overrun by the enemy or to hold critical\n0\nobjectives until reinforcements could reach the area.\nAlthough the forces for the Rapid Deployment Force\ncurrently exist, we are buying selected items to improve\nsignificantlyits mobility and responsiveness. We are\ndeveloping special ships for prepositioning several brigades\nof Marine Corps heavy equipment -- tanks and artillery.\nWe are buying additional KC-10 cargo/tanker aircraft to\nsupport our long-range airlift, and we are developing\na new transport aircraft, the C-X, for hauling outsized\ncargo, like tanks. Our 1981 shipbuilding program has\nbeen increased to 95 units over the next five years.\n3\nWe have already deployed a seven-ship, prepositioned\nsupport force afloat at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean.\nThe seven-ship group is composed of chartered Roll-on/\nroll-off ships, cargo ships and tankers. This group of\nships stores Marine Corps armored equipment, artillery\nand other large items of rolling stock that place the\nlargest demand on airlift.\nToday, the RDF is ready to respond to a broad range\nof military contingencies in defense of our vital national\ninterests. Through carefully selected procurement\nprograms we are improving significantly that capability.\nIt is important that our potential adversaries understand\nthat we have the ability and the will to defend our\ninterests and that any miscalculation on their part\nwould be extremely costly to them.\nSeptember 12, 1980\nNaval Strength\nQ: In comparing your defense record with that of President\nFord, the most dramatic area of cuts is naval ship-\nbuilding. During the last four years, the naval\nshare of the DOD budget has shrunk from 40 percent\nto 33 percent. President Ford's last five-year\nship contruction plan was cut from 157 ships to 83.\nYour shipbuilding proposals since then have gone up\nand down, showing no consistent pattern. In 1979,\nyou vetoed the Defense bill because it contained a\nnuclear-powered aircraft carrier. And you have\nrequested only about one-third the Marine amphibious\nships needed to maintain the current force level.\nHave you downgraded the Navy's role in our national\ndefense? How do you answer the charge that you have\nbeen dismantling the nation's naval and marine forces?\nResponse\nI am glad to compare the record of my Administration\nwith those of the previous Republican Administrations\noften quoted by Governor Reagan. During the decade\nbefore I entered office, the size of our Navy was cut in\nhalf as older ships were retired and the Republicans\ndebated the future role of the Navy. Shipbuilding during\nthose years was actually significantly less than the\nprogram we are now following.\nLike President Ford's defense budget for fiscal year\n1978, submitted after his defeat at the polls left Republican\nofficals free to propose a budget that would neither have\nto be defended before Congress nor executed, the Ford 1977,\n156-ship five-year plan was a lame-duck document that did\nnot have to meet the tests of affordability and consistency.\nThe program proposed twice as many ships per year as the\naverage number authorized during the previous seven years\nof Republican Administration.\n2\nIn contrast, the program I have followed is based on\na policy to structure a realistic, executable five-year\nshipbuilding program within available resources, rather\nthan 'to continue to delude ourselves with unrealistic\nshipbuilding plans or to resurrect old mothballed ships.\nMy Administration's five-year shipbuilding plan pro-\nvides for the construction of 97 new ships, and for major\nmodernization of five other ships, including three aircraft\ncarriers. Two-thirds of these new ships are combatants,\nthe rest are support vessels. My shipbuilding plan\nreflects two deliberate decisions to increase our strength\nand military flexibility: the construction of highly\ncapable combatant ships (as exemplified by the construction\nof sixteen CG-47 class, AEGIS-equipped guided missile\ncruisers), and support for our Rapid Deployment Forces.\nthrough the procurement of 14 newly designed maritime\nprepositioning ships.\nI am determined to keep our naval forces more powerful\nthan those of any other nation on earth. Our shipbuilding\nprogram will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s; and we\nwill continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Sea-\npower is indispensable to our global strategy -- in peace\nand also in war.\nGovernor Reagan on Naval. Strength\nReagan has criticized the Carter Administration for slashing\nNavy programs.\n\"In 1969, Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations,\ntold Congress that a Navy of 850 ships should be attained by\n1980. By the end of this fiscal year, only 5 or 6 weeks away,\nour conventional Navy will consist of only 415 active ships.\nCarter has slashed the Navy shipbuilding program in half, and\nhas provided for -- at the very best -- a one-and-a-half\nocean Navy for a three-ocean global requirement.\nReagan Speech to American Legion\nAugust 20, 1980\nReagan calls for a reversal in this trend.\n\"We must immediately reverse the deterioration of our\nnaval strength, and provide all of the armed services with\nthe equipment and spare parts they need.\"\nReagan Speech to American Legion\nAugust 20, 1980\nThe Republican Platform calls for building more aircraft\ncarriers, submarines and amphibious ships:\n\"Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of\nU.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to\n600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by\nPresident Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, sub-\nmarines, and amphibious ships. We will restore naval and\nMarine aircraft procurement to economical rates enabling\nrapid modernization of the current forces, and expansion to\nmeet the requirements of additional aircraft carriers.\n1980 Republican Platform\nSeptember, 18, 1980\nArms Control: Role in US Security\nQ: What is your concept of the role of arms control in pro-\ntecting US security? Do we pursue arms control in and\nof itself, or as a means of advancing specific foreign\npolicy or national security objectives? Do you have a\nstrategy which guides your Administration and ties our\ndefense planning and arms control negotiations together?\nWhy do you think there is SO much suspicion of arms con-\ntrol in the last few years? Does arms control have any\nplace in the present international atmosphere?\nResponse\nI remain deeply committed to the process of mutual\nand verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort\nto prevent the spread and further development of nuclear\nweapons.\nPreventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility\nof the two superpowers. That is why we have negotiated the\nstrategic arms limitation talks, treaties -- SALT I AND SALT\nII. Especially now in a time of great tension, observing the\nmutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will\nbe in the best interest of both countries. My decision to\ndefer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of\nthe SALT II Treaty reflects my firm conviction that the\nUnited States has a profound national security interest in\nthe constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that\ntreaty can provide.\nGovernor Reagan denounces the SALT II treaty. He would\nturn away from that treaty to a fruitless pursuit of an\nunachievable military superiority. Then, he says, he would\n- 2 -\nnegotiate with the Soviets. There are two problems with\nGovernor Reagan's strategy: One, the Soviets will no more\nlet us build to nuclear superiority over them than we will\nthem over us; two, the Soviets are not going to negotiate\nunder the conditions Governor Reagan describes. So, the\nAmerican people would be left with an all-out -- and\nunwinnable -- arms race and no chance for negotiating limits\non Soviet forces, as we have done in the SALT II Treaty.\nCareful, balanced and verifiable arms control agreements\ncan complement our defense programs in maintaining the\nmilitary balance of power and preserving international peace\nand stability. Let there be no mistake: I believe the SALT\nTreaty is in the security interests of the United States.\nWhen conditions permit, I will seek its ratification, and\na\npress on to SALT III.\nMy Administration will continue to pursue arms control\nagreements where these clearly can contribute to the security\nof the United States and its allies and friends. Unlike\nGovernor Reagan, I do not regard balanced, verifiable arms\nlimitations, such as the SALT II treaty, as \"appeasement.\"\nSeptember 27, 1980\nArms Control: Administration Record\nQ:\nYour Administration began with a great emphasis on\narms control. You sought agreements on strategic weapons,\non anti-satellite weapons, on military forces in the\nIndian Ocean, on restraining conventional arms transfers,\non chemical weapons, on force reductions in Europe,\nand others. With the exception of the SALT Treaty, which\nhas not been ratified, none of these other arms control\nnegotiations have come to anything.\nHow do you assess your Administration's arms control\nrecord after four years? What reason is there to\nbelieve you will be any more successful in negotiating\nwith the Soviets in a second term?\nResponse:\nSignificant progress in arms control -- particularly\nin controlling and reducing strategic nuclear weapons -- has\nbeen one of the basic goals of my Administration from the\noutset.\nExcept for concluding the SALT II Treaty, not nearly\nas much has been accomplished as I had hoped. But, I am not\ngoing to turn away from my deep commitment to the pursuit\nof mutual arms control agreements which enhance the security\nof the United States and its allies, and which strengthen\ninternational stability and the hopes for peace.\nThe SALT Treaty\nThe most prominent arms control achievement of my\nAdministration is, of course, SALT II. The SALT process, and\nthe SALT II Treaty, which Governor Reagan would abandon in\nfavor of an impossible pursuit of military superiority, is\nthe product of three Republican and Democratic Administrations\n- 2 -\nall of which were convinced that limiting Soviet strategic\narms strengthens U.S. security and reduces the risk of\nnuclear war.\nBecause SALT II limits competition between the United\nStates and the Soviet Union in the most dangerous arena,\nthis Treaty is the single most important bilateral agreement\nof the decade:\n-- SALT II will permit us better to maintain strategic\nequivalence in nuclear weapons and devote our\ndefense spending more on our highest priority\nneeds for conventional force improvements;\n-- Without it, the Soviets can add more power to their\nforces and better conceal from us what they are\ndoing;\n-- Without SALT II, and the beginning of SALT III,\ndeeper cuts would take many more years to achieve;\nand\n-- Without SALT II, our efforts to control the\nproliferation of nuclear weapons will be more\ndifficult.\nI believe that the Senate will ratify SALT II because\nthe Treaty is, in its simplest terms, in the interest of\nour Nation's security.\nThe successful negotiation of the SALT Treaty, of\ncourse, represents only one step -- although an enormously\nimportant one -- toward a very long-term goal. The short-\n3\nterm milestone is a reflection of the treaty itself and\nI know that milestone seems to be getting farther and\nfarther away instead of closer. I am determined to press\non for greater reductions and tighter controls over\nstrategic weapons in SALT III.\nOther Arms Control Accomplishments\nMore broadly in the area of arms control, my\nAdministration has made every effort -- against continuing\nadverse trends -- to reduce the international traffic in\narmaments and in that way to turn the funds which are\nspent in the Third World for swords into outlays for\ngreatly needed plough shares. My Administration has also\ninitiated the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive\ntest ban and is pursuing negotiations on controlling\nchemical, biological, and radiological weapons. We have\nalso established a negotiating forum for limiting Soviet\nanti-satellite capabilities.\nProgress has been slow. But my determination to\npursue the goal of arms control is undiluted.\nSeptember 26, 1980\nArms Control - SALT Treaty\nQ: What are the prospects for the SALT Treaty? Is it\ndead, or do you intend to seek its ratification if\nyou are reelected? If this Treaty cannot be ratified,\nwill you withdraw it from the Senate and try to\nrenegotiate it with the Soviets? Why is a SALT Treaty\nthat does nothing to reduce the Soviet threat or the\nlevels of nuclear weapons worth so much effort? Might\nit be better to forget the treaty and start fresh\nnegotiations for a real arms reduction treaty, as your\nRepublican challenger says he wants?\nResponse\nThe SALT II Treaty is a major accomplishment of my\nAdministration. It is not a favor we are doing the\nSoviet Union. It contributes directly and significantly\nto the security of the United Stated and our Allies.\nIt is a fundamental element of political and strategic\nstability in a turbulent and dangerous world.\nWhile the SALT Treaty is pending ratification, my\nAdministration will observe its basic terms SO long as\nthe Soviet Union complies with those terms as well --\nas monitored by us. I am determined to seek ratification\nof the Treaty at the earliest opportune time. I asked\nthe Senate to delay voting on the Treaty not to kill it,\nbut because I recognized that it lacked sufficient\npolitical support to win.\nGovernor Reagan and the Republican Party would\nabandon SALT and the arms control process built up by\nevery President since Eisenhower. Instead, he would put\noff negotiations with the Soviet Union until the US\nhad achieved military superiority -- which in the real\nworld means never.\nI remain committed to the mutual, negotiated\nreduction and control of nuclear weapons. SALT II is\nsuch an agreement. The benefits of this Treaty to the\nsecurity interests of the US are clear:\nUnder the Treaty, the United States will not\nhave to reduce any strategic systems, while\nthe Soviets will have to reduce 250.\nUnder the Treaty, the United States will be\nable to carry out all our planned strategic\nmodernization programs, including the Trident I\nmissile, the air-launched cruise missile, and\nthe M-X land-based missile. The Soviets will\nbe limited to deploying only one new land-based\nmissile, instead of the four that they have been\ndeveloping.\nO\nThe Soviets will be limited to a maximum of ten\nwarheads on their large land-based missiles,\nwhile the US will be able to place ten on the\nM-X when it replaces the current Minuteman missile\nwhich carries only three.\nThese are the benefits of the SALT Treaty. I want\nthe American people to understand clearly what the conse-\nquences of a world without the SALT Treaty, a world which\nGovernor Reagan apparently wants, would be like:\nWithout SALT, the Soviets could deploy over\n3,000\nbombers and missiles, instead of the\n2,400 they are allowed under the Treaty.\nWithout SALT, the Soviets could deploy as many\nwarheads on their large missiles as they are\ncapable of carrying, fifteen or twenty or even\nmore on each missile instead of ten.\nWithout SALT, the Soviets could target an\nadditional three to six thousand more warheads\non American cities and military targets than\nthey would under the Treaty.\nWithout the predictability of SALT, defense\nplanning by our military leaders would be much\nmore difficult. The M-X programs, a central\nelement in our planned strategic modernization,\nwould be harder to design and to build, and\nmore costly, because we could not know what\nthe size of Soviet forces would be and would\nhave to predict the worst.\nWithout SALT, our ability to monitor Soviet\nforces -- and thus to evaluate Soviet capabili-\nties -- would be reduced, because the Soviets\nwould be freed from the SALT constraints on\ndeliberate concealment of strategic forces.\nWithout SALT, the likely increase in Soviet\nstrategic capabilities would require us to spend\nevent more on defense, perhaps on the order of\nan additional $30 billion over a 10 year\nperiod. This would compound our already\ndifficult budget choices. We would of course\nspend what is necessary for our security, but\nwith SALT, it would be less.\nWe did not negotiate this Treaty to make friends\nwith the Soviet Union. We negotiated it because we are\nadversaries, and it is in our security interest to have\nreliable, effective and verifiable limits on Soviet\nforces. In a period of heightened tension, it is all\nthe more necessary to have reliable constraints on the\ncompetition in strategic weapons.\nAfter the SALT Treaty is ratified, I am determined\nto proceed in SALT III to more comprehensive and deep\nreductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons and to more\n0\nstringent qualitative controls on weapons development.\nSALT III must also bring in new categories of nuclear\nweapons, such as long-range theater nuclear systems in\nEurope.\nSALT I marked the first step towards slowing the\narms race. SALT II will bring actual reductions and\nqualitative limits on Soviet forces. SALT III must go\non to produce even more drastic reductions and tigher\ncontrols over weapons development.\nGovernor Reagan on SALT\nReagan opposed the SALT II Treaty as it was negotiated by\nboth the Ford and Carter administrations. His objections, even\nbefore the details of the Treaty were known, were on the grounds\nit would allow the Soviets to achieve nuclear parity.\n\"We should be far more aware of our bargaining strength\nthan we seem to be. The Soviet Union seems most anxious to\nenter a SALT II agreement. They have reason to be worried\nabout a defense weapons system in which we hold a huge\ntechnological lead, a bright spot for us called the cruise\nmissile\nThe best way to have an equitable SALT II agreement\nis to negotiate from a firmly established position. We\nshould not be SO eager for an agreement that we make unneces-\nsary concessions, for to grant such concessions is to whet\nthe Soviet appetite- for more. \"\nNew York Times\nFebruary 11, 1976\nReagan then changed his objections. He no longer objected to\nSoviet parity but rather he claimed the Soviets would become\nsuperior to the United States.\n\"President Carter and his supporters in the Congress\nare\nnegotiating a SALT II treaty that could very well make this\nnation NUMBER TWO behind the Soviet Union in defense and\noffense capability.\"\nRonald Reagan Letter\nFebruary, 1979\nReagan did not change this latter objection and used it as a\nstandard campaign line.\n\"SALT II is not strategic arms limitation. It is strategic\narms buildup, with the Soviets adding a minimum of 3,000\nnuclear warheads to their inventory\nIf\nNew York Times\nSeptember 16, 1979\nIn late 1979, Reagan began to add his own SALT proposals to\nhis criticism of SALT II. Where at first he had objected to the\nSoviets achieving nuclear parity, in 1979 he began to advocate a\nnew policy.\n\"\n(an) arms limitation agreement that legitimately reduces\nnuclear armaments to the point that neither country represents\na threat to the other.\"\nSan Jose Mercury\nSeptember 16, 1979\n-2-\nGovernor Reagan on SALT\nBy early 1980, Reagan was joining his standard criticism of\nSALT II with his proposal of first achieving military superiority,\nand then negotiating a nuclear arms reduction treaty.\n\"We also should have learned the lesson that we cannot\nnegotiate arms control agreements that will slow down the\nSoviets move ahead of us in every category of armaments.\nOnce we clearly demonstrate to the Soviet leadership that\nwe are determined to compete, arms control negotiations will\nagain have a chance. On such a basis, I would be prepared\nto negotiate vigorously for verifiable reductions in\narmaments, since only on such a basis could reductions be\nequitable.\"\nChicago Council on Foreign Relations\nMarch 17, 1980\nReagan also believes that the United States should not abide\nby the provisions of SALT II prior to its ratification:\n\"I believe the SALT II Treaty should be withdrawn, and I\nespecially believe that the U.S. should not abide by its\nterms prior to ratification. To abide by the terms of the\nproposed agreement would violate Article XXXIII of the Arms\nControl and Disarmament Act of 1961.\n\"SALT II is not Strategic Arms Limitation; it is Strategic\nArms Build-up, with the Soviet Union authorized to add a\nminimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their arsenal, and the\nU.S. embarking on a $35 billion catch-up program which will\nnot be complete until 1990, if then, and there will be ten\nvery dangerous years in between.\"\nResponse to question posed by\nArms Control Today, May 1980\nFinally, in August, he stated:\nI cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II\ntreaty, which, in effect, legitimizes the continuation of a\none-sided nuclear arms buildup.\nVeterans of Foreign Wars\nAugust 18, 1980"
}