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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: JGR/Libel Law
Box: 31
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 28, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS 822
SUBJECT:
Libel Laws
Congressman Schumer (D/Lib.-NY) has written the Office of
Media Relations, seeking views on revision of libel laws.
The Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Judiciary Committee will soon hold hearings on public
figure libel, at Schumer's suggestion, and Schumer has
introduced H.R. 2846 as a "study bill." H.R. 2848 would bar
punitive damages in media libel cases and permit media
defendants in public figure libel cases to convert damage
suits to suits for a declaratory judgment, with no possibility
of damage awards.
I do not think the White House as an institution should
enter the raging debate about whether the current state of
libel law threatens the media (because of the cost of
defense and the rare large verdict) or public figures
(because of the near-impossibility of prevailing under the
New York Times V. Sullivan standard). My own personal view
is that a legislative trade-off relaxing the requirements
for public figures to prevail (a return to the pre-Sullivan
standards) in exchange for eliminating punitive damages
would strike the balance about right, and would satisfy the
First Amendment concerns of Sullivan. In any event, libel
is a private cause of action, a common law tort, of only
indirect interest to the Executive branch. I do not know if
the Administration would want to take a formal position on
possible revision of the libel laws. The question should
probably be referred to Justice for review.
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAEHINGTON
August 28, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR D. LOWELL JENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Orig. signed by FFF
FROM:
FRED F. FIELDING
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Libel Laws
The attached correspondence from Congressman Schumer to the
White House Office of Media Relations is referred to you for
whatever direct reply and other action you consider appro-
priate. A copy of my interim reply to Congressman Schumer
is attached. The Congressman is considering reform of libel
law. I do not know if the Administration will want to
become involved in this issue, but concluded that any
involvement should come from the Department of Justice.
Many thanks.
Attachment
FFF:JGR:aea 8/28/85
CC: FFFielding
JGRoberts
Subj
Chron
Dear Congressmat Schumer:
This is Written 15 reply TC your letter c : August c to the
Office of Media Relations. That letter and the accompanying
material raised several issues concerning the current state
of libel law.
In light of the nature of the issues raised in your letter,
I have referred It tc the Department of Justice for further
review. Thank you for sharing your concerns on this matter
with us. You may be assured that the issues you raised will
be carefully reviewed within the Department of Justice.
Sincerely,
Orig. signed by FFF
Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
bcc: Thomas Donnelly
FFF:JGR:aea 8/28/85
bcc: FFFielding
JGRoberts
Subj
Chron
333911
ID #
CU
WHITE HOUSE
J2002
JV
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
o * OUTGOING
H . INTERNAL
I . INCOMING
gor
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent: Charles chumes
MI Mall Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: Libel Carus
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
cursuse
ORIGINATOR
85,08,15 WS
/
/
Referral Note:
cuat 18
I 85.08.16
S 85,08,26
Referral Note:
WS
/ /
/ /
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/ /
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A Appropriate Action
I . Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C . Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D Draft Response
S. For Signature
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
W Kisrinterim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
L
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments: augs Waller 85 Tom Ponnetly memo to Davrl
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 15, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID WALLER
FROM:
THOMAS R. DONNELLY, JR. Jour
SUBJECT:
Attached package from Congressman Charles Schumer
(D-NY)
The attached package was sent to Media Relations on August 9th.
Ann Brackbill directed it to our office. It seems we should
craft a careful answer that protects appropriate information
and puts Department of Justice on the point. We'll be glad to
move on any guidance you may offer.
Many thanks.
CHARLES E. SCHUMER
(26 CANNON HOUSE DEFICE BURDING
WASHINGTON DE 20515
N/A YORK
(202)225-8618
COMMITTEES
1628 KINCS HIGHWAY
BANKING FINANCE
BROOKLYN NY 11229
AND URBAN ASSAIRS
Congress of the United States
718-963-5400
BUDGET
JUDICIARY
house of Representatives
1683 FOTH AVENUE
BROOKLYN NY 11215
NEW YORK CITY
DEMOCRATIC WHIP
(718) 965-5051
Washington, DC 20515
August 9, 1985
323911ar
Ms. Merrie Spaeth
Dir. of Media Relations
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Ms. Spaeth:
I am very concerned about the use of our current libel laws. There
is widespread agreement that they are not working well for defendant news
organizations, for plaintiffs or for the public. In particular, the high
costs of litigation have a great potential for chilling the imperatives
of a free press on the one hand, and often unduly restrict an aggrieved
plaintiff's opportunity for redress on the other hand.
I, and many other members of Congress, think that this issue should
be examined. We believe that there must be workable alternatives to the
current situation. Certainly thoughtful inquiry is merited.
At my urging, Congressman Don Edwards, chairman of the Civil and
Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, has agreed to hold hearings on
current libel law and alternatives to it. In planning hearings, the
Subcommittee is mindful of the interests and requirements of the First
Amendment.
I am writing you to ask your opinion on two things. First, do you
agree with the approach to the hearings? I have enclosed the hearing
proposal and a list of questions, not intended to be inclusive, that
would be asked of witnesses. Second, I have introduced a study bill, a
copy of which is enclosed. It is tentative, intended to provoke
discussion. I invite your comment on it.
In addition to your comments and suggestions on the hearings and
legislation, I am also interested in names of other people who should
be consulted on this.
I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
Charles &. School
CHARLES E. SCHUMER
Member of Congress
THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS
Proposal for Hearing on Public Figure Libel
Hearings are being planned in the House Judiciary Committee on public
figure libel law. The hearings are intended to generate discussion about
American libel law and to explore various alternatives to it.
Since the 1964 Supreme Court decision in New York Times V. Sullivan,
First Amendment values have played a key part in analysis of virtually all
issues relating to libel law. In considering the status of libel law and
alternatives or modifications to it, it is essential to understand the interests
and requirements of the First Amendment. As a nation we are committed to
the basic principle that debate on public issues should be. "uninhibited,
robust and wide-open." A free press is a cornertone of our democratic
society. Libel is considered a threat to these fundamental values. On the
other hand, we consider the reputation and worth of an individual to be
vital as well. There is a general consensus expressed in the common law of
libel that people have the right to protect their reputation. The hearings
will explore all possible ways to best accommodate these sometimes
conflicting interests.
The public debate on this issue has been particularly intense since the
recent Sharon, Westmoreland and Tavoulareas trials. This discussion has
revealed great dissatisfaction with the present system. While the press,
public figures, constitutional experts and the general public have different
specific concerns, there is widespread agreement that the system isn't
working.
First, trying a libel case has become too costly and complex for plain-
tiffs and defendants alike. News organizations must divert scarce resources
to defend against libel suits whether or not the claim ultimately has merit
(and most judgments against news organizations are reversed on appeal).
Libel suits now cost an average of $150,000 to try, with 3/4 of the cost
going for attorneys' fees. In addition, defendants who publish contro-
versial allegations may face millions of dollars in damages if they are sued
and lose. This is especially worrisome to small publishers who can be
bankrupted defending against a single lawsuit. Thus, the cost of pro-
tracted litigation and the risk of damages could deter many news organ-
izations from aggressive reporting.
These are precisely the concerns raised recently in the annual
convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. Many
publishers said that the cost of libel suits might create a chilling effect on
a newspaper's eagerness to tackle controversial subjects. Evidence of this
threat is provided in a recent article by Michael Massing in the Columbia
Journalism Review (Vol. 24, May/June 1985). Mr. Massing's study
documents many instances where the press has been chilled or is
increasingly feeling threatened.
At the same time, the high costs of litigation effectively limit an
aggrieved plaintiff's opportunity for redress. Under the present system
the only way a plaintiff can vindicate his or her reputation is to bring an
action for damages. Many public officials and figures cannot afford the
costs of bringing a lawsuit with its attendant pre-trial discovery and motion
practice, let alone a long and costly trial. Thus, a public figure who is
the subject of a single false news report may find a life's work destroyed,
with no redress. This is particularly ironic because most plaintiffs claim
that what they are interested in is not financial redress but simply a
determination of truth or falsity by an independent forum.
In addition to the extraordinary costs, many commentators are con-
cerned that current libel law also damages other important, First Amendment
interests. For example, news organizations are subjected to intrusive
inquiries into their editorial process both during the discovery and trial
phases of a case. Moreover, the recent decision by a panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reinstating a verdict that the
Washington Post had libeled the president of Mobil Oil is likely to increase
the risk that investigative reporting may be chilled because of the court's
holding that a newspaper's general orientation toward "hard-hitting
investigative stories" could, together with other evidence, support an
inference that it was inclined to publish reckless falsehoods.
Finally, the public has lost confidence in the news media. A recent
poll commissioned by the American Society of Newspaper Editors disclosed
that 3/4 of American adults do not trust the credibility of those--in print
or on television--who report the news. A senior vice-president for
Knight-Ridder Newspapers has said that the nation's press has a "serious
credibility problem" fueled by "three sins: inaccuracy, unfairness and
arrogance.
"
Despite this awareness of public disapproval by the press, it engages
in very little self-criticism. Many commentators have observed that if news
organizations covered themselves as diligently as they do other institutions,
there would be far fewer libel suits. First Amendment interests might well
be best served by such a First Amendment solution--encouraging more
debate rather than ignoring the problem. In addition, news organizations
could regulate themselves in the same manner that the ABA or AMA oversee
the practice of law or medicine. An earlier attempt to do this failed--the
National News Council--but the idea still seems to have potential.
The hearing is designed to explore these and other approaches for
resolving libel disputes. If we could design a new system today for
resolving libel disputes, what would it ideally look like? What scenario
would we like to see 10 years from now? One scenario could be
self-regulation or self-scrutiny by the press. Another possibility could be
mandatory arbitration. Others include changes in the law or authorizing
public funds to pay for equal time or space. Finally, we could embrace the
current system as the best possible choice.
The goal is to bring adverse parties together to arrive at an approach
or approaches that would be helpful to both sides, and ultimately enhance
the enormous public interest in the free flow of accurate information and
debate on public issues.
Issues to be addressed at libel hearings:
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the current system for
resolving libel suits brought by public figures against news organizations?
How are the interests of plaintiffs met or not met by it? The interests of
defendants? What improvements can be made?
2. What are the First Amendment limitations on changes in the libel law? Can
an accommodation be made to protect both First Amendment values and require-
ments and an individual's reputation and worth?
3. Is there an ideal system for balancing these values? What would be the
best possible scenario for the future?
4. What are the constitutional limitations of federal legislation on libel law?
Can and should Congress legislate in this area traditionally governed by state
law?
5. What can be done to reduce transaction costs for both parties?
--How can the length of time it takes to try a case be reduced?
--Should express limitations be imposed on scope of discovery?
--How can settlement be encouraged?
--Should punitive damages be abolished to reduce news organizations'
liability? presumed actual damages abolished?
6. Why did the National News Council fail and what did it accomplish while it
lasted? Can some revision of it serve as a mechanism for resolving libel suits?
7. Is there a role for alternative dispute mechanisms, such as arbitration, in
resolving libel suits, and if so, how could this work?
8. How can news organizations be encouraged to engage in public
self-criticism? Is some form of self-regulation by new organizations possible or
appropriate, perhaps comparable to the ABA or AMA oversight of the practice
of law or medicine?
9. If changes are made in libel law, should they be extended to similar kinds
of tort claims, such as infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy
(false light, disclosure of private facts), prima facie tort theories, product
disparagement or trade libel, etc.?
10. Does the threat of libel litigation actually deter the publication or broad-
cast of meritorious news stories? What evidence is there of this chilling effect?
What are the most appropriate ways to ameliorate any chilling effect?
11. Should corporations have the right to sue for libel, and if so, under what
terms? Should high government officials be denied the right to sue on claims
relating to the performance of their official responsibilities?
12. Should different rules of liability or standard of proof apply when the
issue being discussed is a matter of public interest, and if so, how should a
"matter of public interest" be defined?
13. Are there procedural changes in the handling of libel suits that would be
appropriate?
--Should the standard for obtaining summary judgment be clarified to
encourage a more liberal grant of summary judgment in weak cases?
--Should the standard of appellate review of libel cases be amended to
conform with Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring
the court of appeals to accept a district court's findings unless clearly
erroneous?
--Should a three-part verdict, like that which Judge Sofaer used in
the Sharon case, be mandated in all public figure libel cases?
Description of the Schumer libel bill
SECTION 1
SUBSECTION (a)
--a public official or figure who its the subject of d publication or breadcast
may bring the new action alleging that the publication or broadcast is false
and defamatory
--the new cause of action is limited to claims based on a publication or
broadcast in the print or electronic media
--no proof of the defendant's state of mind is required (i.e. negligence,
recklessness, etc.)
--no damages, actual or punitive, may be awarded
--the remedy is a declaratory judgment that the publication or broadcast is
false and defamatory
--the action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction
SUBSECTION (b)
--the plaintiff must prove every element of the action by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence (in between "preponderance" of the evidence and "beyond
a reasonable doubt")
SUBSECTION (c)
--a plaintiff who brings this action may not bring another action (i.e. for
damages) arising out of the same publication or broadcast
SUBSECTION (d)
--a defendant may "convert" an action brought against it for damages under
current law to this new cause of action for a declaratory judgment
--the action must arise out of a publication or broadcast in the print or
electronic media which the plaintiff alleges to be false and defamatory
--the plaintiff must be a public official or figure
--the defendant must designate the action as the new action for a
declaratory judgment at the time it files its answer or within 90 days from
the commencement of the action, whichever comes first
--once an action is designated by a defendant as the new action for a
declaratory judgment, this new action is treated as if it had been filed
originally by the plaintiff and the plaintiff is barred from bringing another
action arising out of the same publication or broadcast
[NOTE: SECTIONS 2-4 APPLY TO ALL DEFAMATION ACTIONS IN ANY
COURT RELATING TO ALL PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS]
SECTION 2
--a 1 year statute of limitations is established for all actions based on a
publication or broadcast alleged to be false and defamatory
I
99TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H.R.2846
To protect the constitutional right to freedom of speech by establishing a new
cause of action for defamation, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 24, 1985
Mr. SCHUMER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary
A
BILL
To protect the constitutional right to freedom of speech by
establishing a new cause of action for defamation, and for
other purposes.
1
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT
4
STATEMENT IS FALSE AND DEFAMATORY.
5
(a) CAUSE OF ACTION.-
6
(1) A public official or public figure who is the
7
subject of a publication or broadcast which is published
8
or broadcast in the print or electronic media may bring
9
an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for a
2
1
declaratory judgment that such publication or broadcast
2
was false and defamatory.
3
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to require
4
proof of the state of mind of the defendant.
5
(3) No damages shall be awarded in such an
6
action.
7
(b) BURDEN OF PROOF.-The plaintiff seeking a declar-
8 atory judgment under subsection (a) shall bear the burden of
9 proving by clear and convincing evidence each element of the
10 cause of action described in subsection (a).
11
(c) BAR TO CERTAIN CLAIMS.-A plaintiff who brings
12 an action for a declaratory judgment under subsection (a)
13 shall be forever barred from asserting any other claim or
14 cause of action arising out of a publication or broadcast which
15 is the subject of such action.
16
(d) ELECTION BY DEFENDANT.-
17
(1) A defendant in an action brought by a public
18
official or public figure arising out of a publication or
19
broadcast in the print or electronic media which is al-
20
leged to be false and defamatory shall have the right,
21
at the time of filing its answer or within 90 days from
22
the commencement of the action, whichever comes
23
first, to designate the action as an action for a declara-
24
tory judgment pursuant to subsection (a).
HR 2846 III
3
1
(2) Any action designated as an action for a de-
2
claratory judgment pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be
3
treated for all purposes as if it had been filed originally
4
as an action for a declaratory judgment under subsec-
5
tion (a), and the plaintiff shall be forever barred from
6
asserting or recovering for any other claim or cause of
-1
action arising out of a publication or broadcast which is
8
the subject of such action.
9 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON ACTION.
10
Any action arising out of a publication or broadcast
11 which is alleged to be false and defamatory must be com-
12 menced not later than one year after the first date of such
13 publication or broadcast.
14 SEC. 3. PUNITIVE DAMAGES PROHIBITED.
15
Punitive damages may not be awarded in any action
16 arising out of a publication or broadcast which is alleged to
17 be false and defamatory.
18 SEC. 4. ATTORNEY'S FEES.
19
In any action arising out of a publication or broadcast
20 which is alleged to be false and defamatory, the court shall
21 award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, except
22 that-
23
(1) the court may reduce or disallow the award of
24
attorney's fees if it determines that there is an overrid-
25
ing reason to do so; and
HR 2846 III
I
4
1
(2) the court shall not award attorney's fees
2
against a defendant which proves that it exercised -rea-
3
sonable efforts to ascertain that the publication or
4
broadcast was not false and defamatory or that it pub-
5
lished or broadcast a retraction not later than 10 days
6
after the action was filed.
-1
SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.
8
This Act shall apply to any cause of action which arises
9 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
10
o
HR 2846 IH
tabel law
May 29, 1984
CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL
Page 47
193 Conn 313
MAY, 1984
313
Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
defendant could rely to pay the debt owed to the ain-
tiff. The defendant further testified that he did not
know whether the plaintiff's promissory notes would
have been included in a wash sale. The trial court was
entitled to determine, on this record, that the defend-
ant's stock holdings in the corporation were not of
sufficient value to enable the defendant to pay his con-
tinuing debt to the plaintiff after the transfer of his
interest in the family home.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
WILLIAM E. STRADA, JR. v. CONNECTICUT
NEWSPAPERS, INC., ET AL.
(11731)
SPEZIALE, C. J., PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY and GRILLO, Js.
The plaintiff, a former state senator who was concededly a public figure,
sought damages from the defendants, the owner of a newspaper, its
president and publisher, its editor, and one of its reporters, alleging
that he had been libeled in an article published by them. The trial court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered
judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed. He claimed that
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were
genuine issues as to material facts relating to the claimed falsity and
malicious intent of statements in the article and in determining that
"there can be no libel by innuendo if the challenged communication is
true and concerns public officers and public affairs even though a false
implication may reasonably be drawn by the public." Held:
1. The record supported the factual bases for the article and the trial court
did not err in concluding that each claimed falsehood was either true
or substantially true.
2. Under the circumstances here, the trial court did not err in concluding
as a matter of law that there could be no libel by innuendo of a public
figure where the challenged communication is true.
Argued February 1-decision released May 29, 1984
Action for libel, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, where the
Page 48
CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL
May 29, 1984
314
MAY, 1984
193 Conn 313
Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted
by the court, Jacobson, J.; from the judgment rendered
thereon the plaintiff appealed to this court. No error.
James A. Wade, with whom was Timothy F. Bannon,
for the appellant (plaintiff).
Francis J. McNamara, Jr., with whom was Robert
P. Dolian, for the appellees (defendants).
SPEZIALE, C.J. The plaintiff, William E. Strada, Jr.,
brought this libel action because of an allegedly libel-
ous newspaper article published by the defendants.¹
This issue on the plaintiff's appeal is whether the trial
court erred in granting the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. We find no error.
In 1970, the plaintiff was elected to the state Sen-
ate for the 27th Senatorial District. The plaintiff was
reelected by substantial margins of votes for three con-
secutive terms and during the last two terms of office
he was deputy majority leader of the state Senate. In
1978, the plaintiff was defeated in his bid for a fifth
term of office. On October 31, 1978, seven days before
that election, the allegedly libelous article that is the
subject of this action appeared in a Stamford newspa-
per, The Advocate.2 The plaintiff believes that this arti-
cle caused his defeat in the 1978 election and contends
that the article caused him to suffer substantial pecu-
niary loss, injured his name and reputation, diminished
his ability to practice law and his effectiveness as an
elected public official, and caused his family great emo-
tional distress and embarrassment.
1 The defendants in this action are Connecticut Newspapers, Inc., which
publishes The Advocate, Jay A. Shaw, President of Connecticut News-
papers, Inc. and publisher of The Advocate, Roland E. Blais, editor of The
Advocate, and Anthony R. Dolan, the news reporter who authored the
article.
2 The article is set forth as an appendix to this opinion.
May 29, 1984
CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL
Page 49
193 Conn 313
MAY, 1984
315
Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that the article
contained many false statements of fact, instances of
innuendo that "reflected adversely on the reputation
of the Plaintiff," and incorrect attributions of quota-
tions. After the close of pleadings and two and one half
years of discovery, the defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment. On September 28, 1982, the trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants after
concluding that there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact in the complaint and that the defendants
were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The
court found that "each claimed falsehood is either true,
substantially true or a privileged opinion" and that
"there can be no libel by innuendo if the challenged
communication is true and concerns public officers and
public affairs even though a false implication may rea-
sonably be drawn by the public."
The plaintiff has appealed from this judgment claim-
ing error: (1) in the trial court's granting of summary
judgment when there were genuine disputes as to mate-
rial facts relating to the falsity and malicious intent
of statements made in the article; and (2) in the trial
court's holding that "there can be no libel by innuendo
if the challenged communication is true and concerns
public officers and public affairs even though a false
implication may reasonably be drawn by the public.'
3 It was conceded that the plaintiff is a public figure and therefore that
he had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants pub-
lished defamatory falsehoods with actual malice. See New York Times Co.
V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).
4 The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that some
of the statements alleged by the plaintiff to be false were "privileged opin-
ion." We do not reach this issue because of our holding that the statements
were either true or substantially true.
The plaintiff also contends that summary judgment was inappropriate
because the defendants invoked a qualified evidentiary privilege not to iden-
tify sources relied upon in the article. Although the plaintiff is not challeng-
ing the right of a newspaper to claim a reporter's privilege not to identify
confidential sources, the plaintiff argues that this qualified privilege cannot
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
I
Before a party will be held liable for libel, there must
be an unprivileged publication of a false and defama-
tory statement. Letter Carriers V. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 284, 94 S. Ct. 2770, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1974). Truth
is an absolute defense to an allegation of libel. Goodrich
V. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn.
107, 112, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). The plaintiff has alleged
that certain passages in the article are false or give rise
to false innuendo. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the statements in the arti-
cle were substantially true, privileged opinion, and priv-
ileged statements concerning a public official and public
events SO that "there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact."
Summary judgment is a method of resolving litiga-
tion when "the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof
submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
be invoked without the defendants' incurring some kind of penalty. The
plaintiff claims that "the appropriate penalty should have been a denial
of defendants' summary judgment motion." The plaintiff has cited no
authority that supports this position.
The plaintiff has failed to show a need for those sources. The plaintiff's
request for identity of sources was denied by the trial court, Henebry, J.,
on three different occasions upon a finding by the trial court that the plaintiff
did not need the requested information. The plaintiff has not appealed from
any of these rulings.
The plaintiff also argues that summary judgment is particularly inap-
propriate in libel actions. In Hutchinson V. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120
n.9, 99 S. Ct. 2675, 61 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court cautioned against the use of summary judgment in determining actual
malice, which involves a state of mind. Because in the instant case the trial
court found that the article was either true or substantially true, it had
no occasion to inquire into the defendants' state of mind. Thus, "the
Supreme Court's admonition against precipitous summary judgments
is inapplicable." Rinsley V. Brandt, 6 Med. L. Rptr. 1222, 1232 (D. Kan.
1980), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983); see Simonson V. United Press
International, Inc., 654 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1981).
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judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book S 384;
Burns V. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 455,
A.2d
(1984). Although the party seeking summary
judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence
of any material fact; D.H.R. Construction Co., V.
Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980); a
party opposing summary judgment must substantiate
its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine
issue of material fact together with the evidence dis-
closing the existence of such an issue. Burns V. Hart-
ford Hospital, supra; Practice Book ss 380, 381. In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial
court must view the evidence in the light most favora-
ble to the nonmoving party. Town Bank & Trust Co.
V. Benson, 176 Conn. 304, 309, 407 A.2d 971 (1978).
In support of its motion for summary judgment the
defendants submitted to the trial court the deposition
testimony of the plaintiff and other persons. The affi-
davits, depositions, and exhibits submitted by both par-
ties showed that the statements of fact and quotations
in the article were true or substantially true.
The first half of the article dealt with the applica-
tion of attorney James Guarnieri for the job of assist-
ant prosecutor. See Appendix. The article states that
the plaintiff, in an "attempt" to secure the job for
Guarnieri, "first" proposed Guarnieri's name and asked
a local judge to "intervene" on Guarnieri's behalf as
a "favor" to the plaintiff. The plaintiff challenges the
truth of those statements. Our examination of the rec-
ord, and particularly the plaintiff's own deposition,
shows that the article is substantially true. " 'Facts do
not cease to be facts because they are mixed with the
fair and expectant comment of the story teller, who
adds to the recital a little touch by his piquant pen.'
Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. V. Citizen-Sentinal Pub-
lishers, Inc., 260 N.Y. 106, 118-19, 183 N.E. 193 (1932);
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
accord, Miller V. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356,
358 (2d Cir. 1971)." Goodrich V. Waterbury Republican-
American, Inc., supra, 123-24.
The plaintiff testified in his deposition that he did
meet with a local judge who the plaintiff knew would
be involved in the selection process and did ask whether
that judge could support Guarnieri for the position of
Stamford assistant prosecutor. The plaintiff stated that
he had the intention of assisting Guarnieri. Although
Guarnieri had submitted his application prior to the
plaintiff's contact with the local judge, the local judge
first heard Guarnieri's name from the plaintiff. In fact,
the plaintiff did not even know at the time he met with
the local judge whether Guarnieri had formally applied
for the position. The trial court did not err in finding
that it was substantially true that the plaintiff "first"
proposed Guarnieri's name.
The plaintiff contends that he did not ask the local
judge "to intervene on behalf of Guarnieri." The plain-
tiff was present to assist Guarnieri if he could and when
the local judge offered to contact the chief prosecutor
the plaintiff agreed. It would be absurd not to under-
stand that exchange as the plaintiff seeking support
for Guarnieri and the local judge calling the chief pros-
ecutor as a "favor" to the plaintiff, as the defendants
stated. The trial court was correct in finding that the
report of the events concerning the plaintiff's meet-
ing with the local judge was substantially true.
The plaintiff also contends that certain statements
of fact and quotations relating to events subsequent
to his discussion with the local judge are false. On the
basis of the evidence submitted by both parties, the trial
court did not err in finding that the defendants' descrip-
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
tion of the events subsequent to the plaintiff's discus-
sion with the local judge was substantially true. 5
The remainder of the article concerned the plaintiff's
relationship with reputed criminals, their businesses,
or associates. The factual basis of the remainder of the
5 In its memorandum of decision, the trial court found inter alia:
"After the conversation with the judge, the Chief Prosecutor mentioned
Guarnieri's candidacy to members of his staff one of whom reminded him
of Guarnieri's heart condition. Shortly thereafter, Lt. George Mayer of the
Stamford Police Department informed the Chief Prosecutor that Guarnieri
was John DePoli's close personal friend and attorney. DePoli was reputed
to be involved in gambling and to have connections with organized crime.
Indeed, he is 'reported to be with Carlo Gambino and Vig Genovese.' State
Deposition, p. 87.
"Aware that Mayer had a 'hangup' about DePoli, the Chief Prosecutor
directed him to reexamine his suspicions about Guarnieri. Mayer returned
later stating that Guarnieri was often seen with known gamblers and report-
ing that there was a gambling office in the apartment house where Guarnieri
lived. Accompanying Mayer during this second report to the Chief Prose-
cutor was a state police officer who corroborated Mayer's allegations. The
Chief Prosecutor accepted the information, but did not view it at that time
as verifiable. Meanwhile, an assistant prosecutor also reported to the Chief
Prosecutor that 'Hatch' Pete, a reputed gambler, had told him that Guarnieri
would be appointed assistant prosecutor.
"Relying on the information provided by Mayer, his assistant and per-
haps the state police, the Chief Prosecutor sent a letter to [Deputy] State's
Attorney John Mulcahy in which he summarized the objections to Guarnieri's
appointment concluding that he should not be recommended for the posi-
tion. His objections were Guarnieri's connection with DePoli; his alleged
association with gambling, Mayer's strong opposition; the 'Hatch' Pete inci-
dent; and Guarnieri's health. Mulcahy forwarded the Chief Prosecutor's
letter to Judge Lexton, Chief Judge of the Court of Common Pleas. Accom-
panying that letter was Mulcahy's own letter which expressed his and Chief
State's Attorney Gormley's objections to Guarnieri's appointment similar
to those raised by the Chief Prosecutor. Mulcahy's letter further stated
that it was his understanding that Judge Lexton would discuss those objec-
tions with the resident judges making the appointment. Mulcahy's official
letter to the resident judges, however, only referred to Guarnieri's medi-
cal problems. Judge Lexton suggested this procedure wishing to be con-
siderate of Guarnieri because the official letter would be a public document.
Floran J. Bolan was ultimately appointed assistant prosecutor."
Our review of the record indicates that the trial court was correct in con-
cluding, contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, that there was no genuine
dispute as to any material fact as to the events subsequent to the meeting
with the local judge.
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article, with the exception of one factual error con-
cerning a Superbowl trip, is likewise supported by the
evidence, in large part by the plaintiff's own deposi-
tion: John DePoli is a "reputed gangster," and the
plaintiff has visited his restaurant and been on trips
with DePoli.⁶ The plaintiff admits that he has been ques-
tioned by government agents about DePoli's activities.
The plaintiff objects to the article's characterization of
his relationship with DePoli as "friendly," yet repeat-
edly characterizes that relationship himself as "he's a
friend as opposed to an enemy." The plaintiff's law
firm represented a company owned in part by an alleged
racketeer in a legal dispute with a state agency and
the plaintiff personally called the agency in an attempt
to resolve the matter. The plaintiff did appear at the
sentencing of an alleged major racketeer to give emo-
tional support to the family.
"[A]ny 'deviations from or embellishments upon' the
information obtained from the primary sources relied
upon were minuscule and can be attributed to the lee-
way afforded an author who attempts to recount and
popularize an
event." Meeropol V. Nizer, 381 F.
Supp. 29, 35 (S.D. N.Y. 1974), aff'd 560 F.2d 1061 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013, 98 S. Ct. 727,
54 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1978). The author's job is not simply
to copy statements verbatim, "but to interpret and
6 The plaintiff alleges that although he has been in the presence of DePoli
on certain trips, he was not "with" DePoli. On certain trips to the Super-
bowl, which first stopped at Las Vegas, that included the plaintiff and Stam-
ford city officials, DePoli stayed at the same hotel as the Stamford groups;
he took the same plane as the Stamford group from Las Vegas to the Super-
bowl game; and he was the only other Stamford person on the Superbowl
flight. On at least one of these Las Vegas/Superbowl trips, DePoli was also
on the same flight from New York to Las Vegas as the Stamford group.
Indeed, the plaintiff himself testified that on one trip DePoli was part of
the Stamford group.
7 The plaintiff emphasizes that DePoli has never been to his home, nor
the plaintiff to DePoli's home. The plaintiff's remarks go toward the degree
of friendship rather than to the absence of it.
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rework them into the whole." Ryan V. Brooks, 634 F.2d
726, 733 (4th Cir. 1980). "A fussy insistence upon literal
accuracy 'would condemn the press to an arid, dessi-
cated recital of bare facts.' Loeb V. Globe Newspaper
Co., 489 F. Sup. 481, 486 (D. Mass. 1980), quoting Time,
Inc. V. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1971).
In this article comprising in excess of 1000 words, the
one factual error is contained in the following excerpt:
"
Strada and Fusaro have reportedly taken vaca-
tion trips with DePoli or been on trips arranged by
DePoli associates, one of which attracted an FBI inves-
tigation.
"On this occasion, Sen. Strada and a number of city
officials took a trip to Las Vegas and then to New
Orleans for the Superbowl. The trip
was inves-
tigated by the FBI.
"8
The undisputed evidence shows, and the defendants
concede, that the plaintiff never "took a trip to Las
Vegas and then to New Orleans for the Superbowl."
The sting of this excerpt, however, does not arise from
the trip location or purpose, but rather from the fact
that the plaintiff had taken a trip in some way con-
nected with DePoli9 "which was investigated by the
FBI." The plaintiff was questioned by a government
agent about the trip to Reno where the plaintiff saw
DePoli. 10 Because this statement would have had no
less impact on the reader had the correct locus been
8 We note that in his complaint the plaintiff does not directly contest the
truth of this excerpt; rather, he claims it gives rise to an adverse innuendo
or inference.
9 See footnote 6, supra.
10 The plaintiff also testified in his deposition that "at some point, because
of the tremendous publicity, where [DePoli] was reputed to be this, that
and the other thing, that I ceased attending the golf outings because I'm
a public servant and I had heard rumors that the FBI were in the trees
taking pictures and they are investigating.
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
given, the statement was substantially true. Where the
"main charge, or gist, of the libel" is true, minor errors
that do not change a reader's perception of the state-
ment do not make the statement actionable. Goodrich
V. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 113.
"The issue is whether the libel, as published, would have
a different effect on the reader than the pleaded truth
would have produced." Id.
The record substantiates the factual bases for the
defendants' article and the trial court did not err in con-
cluding that each claimed falsehood of fact or quota-
tion was either true or substantially true.
II
The plaintiff's next claim of error goes to "numerous
stylistic and journalistic innuendos and inferences
which reflected adversely on the reputation of the Plain-
tiff." We have already concluded that the trial court
was correct in its finding that the article was composed
of true or substantially true statements. The trial court
did not decide whether a reasonable reader might draw
a false inference from certain statements as alleged by
the plaintiff. Rather, the trial court held that "there
can be no libel by innuendo if the challenged communi-
cation is true and concerns public officers and public
affairs even though a false implication may reasonably
be drawn by the public."
Innuendo or inference may result merely from the
tone or "slant" of an article, or innuendo or inference
may also result from the failure to present the whole
picture. In Memphis Publishing Co. V. Nichols, 569
S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978), a newspaper article correctly
stated that the plaintiff had been shot when she had
been found with another woman's husband. The arti-
cle neglected to report, however, the additional fact
that the plaintiff and the other woman's husband were
at a social gathering, the several members of which
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
included the plaintiff's husband. The clear inference
from the article was an adulterous affair; the additional
fact clarified the plaintiff's position as an innocent
bystander. But in the instant case, the plaintiff seeks
to recover from a publication where all the underlying
and stated facts have been proved to be true, or sub-
stantially true, claiming that the "slant" of the article
gives rise to allegedly false and defamatory implica-
tions. Unlike Memphis Publishing Co. V. Nichols, supra,
the plaintiff here has not alleged, nor has our exami-
nation of the record disclosed, the existence of addi-
tional material facts which, if reported, would have
changed the tone of the article.¹¹ In the absence of such
undisclosed facts, first amendment considerations dic-
tate that an article concerning a public figure composed
of true or substantially true statements is not defama-
tory regardless of the tone or innuendo evident.
The goal of nurturing a free and active press in the
political arena mandates denial of recovery by a pub-
lic figure where the allegation of defamation "depends
fundamentally on an interpretation of various aspects
of the broadcast, not on anything directly said in it."
Pierce V. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d
495, 500 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861, 99 S. Ct.
181, 58 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1978).
The cases in other jurisdictions that have considered
this issue support this view. Recovery was denied in
Loeb V. New Times Communications Corporation, 497
F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court specifi-
cally found that "[t]he authors' clear intent was to por-
tray an overwhelmingly negative picture of Loeb by
presenting purported examples of his ridiculous idiosyn-
11 The only possibly relevant factor that the article neglected to report
was the plaintiff's offer to withdraw his support of Guarnieri if the chief
prosecutor thought Guarnieri's candidacy was presenting a problem. The
trial court was correct in not finding the defendants' ommission of this fact
to be material as its inclusion would not have changed the slant of the article.
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
cracies and prejudices, shady political maneuverings,
and dishonest reporting practices." Id., 88-89. In spite
of the "suggestive context," the article was constitu-
tionally protected because the "defendants have
reported the facts accurately and carefully, avoiding
the defamatory conclusion which Loeb claims they
intended the reader to draw." Id., 91.
In Mihalik V. Duprey, 11 Mass. App. 602, 417 N.E.2d
1238 (1981), each individual statement published in a
"riddle" about a public figure was true. The court held
that recovery could not be had "merely because in the
aggregate they have an insinuating overtone." Id.
In a Louisiana case the public official plaintiff admit-
ted "there was nothing factually incorrect in the arti-
cle. However, 'the way people looked at the thing' he
was accused of misusing state funds for personal bene-
fit." Schaefer V. Lynch, 406 So. 2d 185, 188 (La. 1981).
The court there held that "truthful statements which
carry a defamatory implication can be actionable. How-
ever, that is only true in the case of private citizens
and private affairs. Even false statements about pub-
lic officials are constitutionally protected unless known
to be false or printed with a reckless disregard for the
truth. New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, [376 U.S. 254,
84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964)]. It surely fol-
lows that all truthful statements are also constitution-
ally protected. Even though a false implication may be
drawn by the public, there is no redress for its servant.
Where public officers and public affairs are concerned,
there can be no libel by innuendo. "12 Id.
12 The cases cited by the plaintiff are not to the contrary. There is dicta
in the case of Dunlap V. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 301 Pa. Super. 475,
448 A.2d 6 (1982), that true facts leading to a false inference are actiona-
ble. In that case, however, where the article correctly reported that the
plaintiff acknowledged that he was "more than likely" the officer pho-
tographed for a story concerning police corruption, the evidence showed
that the plaintiff was not in fact the officer in the photograph. Thus, Dunlap
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
Still another court held that: "Unless he can success-
fully identify particular false statements that, taken in
context, create the impression he is a 'throwback to
the middle ages,' [the plaintiff doctor] cannot complain."
Rinsley V. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1983).
A publisher cannot be responsible for every strained
interpretation that a plaintiff might attribute to its
words. See Lewis V. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553-56
(9th Cir. 1983); Cibenko V. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510
F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.J. 1981).
"The Court is aware that any article replete with
snide innuendos can be hurtful to a subject, and indeed
may damage him in his business reputation. But if he
is a public figure, then he must bear the risk of such
publicity as the price he pays for conducting activities
or business in the public arena." Reliance Ins. Co. V.
Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"An individual who decides to seek governmental office
must accept certain necessary consequences of that
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And
society's interest in the officers or government is not
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official
duties." Gertz V. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344,
94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974); see Garrison
V. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed.
2d 125 (1964). The defendants have no obligation to
place the plaintiff in the most favorable light. Rinsley V.
is an example of innuendo resulting from the failure to print all the rele-
vant and true facts. See Memphis Publishing Co. V. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d
412 (Tenn. 1978).
Another case heavily relied upon by the plaintiff; Cianci V. New Times
Publishing, 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980); holds only that specific accusations
of criminal conduct (in that case, rape and obstruction of justice) are not
protected as statements of opinion nor protected by the privilege of neu-
tral reportage or the common law privilege of fair report. Because the truth
of the article remained an issue in that case, the court never reached the
question of whether false innuendo from true facts would be actionable.
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
Brandt, 6 Med. L. Rptr. 1222 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 700
F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1983); McIntire V. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 479 F. Supp. 808 (D. Mass. 1979).
When any inference or innuendo does not arise from
the omission of material facts, but rather from the
editorial choice of layout, the plaintiff may not recover
for libel by innuendo. The media would be unduly bur-
dened if, in addition to reporting facts about public
officers and public affairs correctly, it had to be vigi-
lant for any possibly defamatory implication arising
from the report of those true facts. "[T]he pall of fear
and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice
to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First
Amendment freedoms cannot survive." New York
Times Co. V. Sullivan, supra, 278; see Washington Post
Co. V. Keough, 365 F. 2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The result we reach in this case, which undeniably
may have a harsh impact on those persons who are pub-
lic figures, is a corollary to the privilege accorded false
statements concerning public officials published without
malice. Just as the goal of a free and active press pro-
tects false statements of fact regarding public figures
published without malice, SO too must the law protect
truthful facts that may give rise to false innuendo or
inference. " 'It is of the utmost consequence that the
people should discuss the character and qualifications
of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to
the state and to society of such discussions is so vast,
and the advantages derived are SO great, that they more
than counterbalance the inconvenience of [candidates]
whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury
to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great.' "
New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, supra, 281, quoting
Coleman V. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 98 P. 281
(1908).
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court
did not err in concluding as a matter of law that there
could be no libel by innuendo of a public figure where
the challenged communication is true.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Appendix
The alleged libelous article was printed in the Stam-
ford Advocate newspaper on October 31, 1978:
"Strada's court post role revealed
by Anthony R. Dolan
Advocate Staff Reporter
"State Sen. William E. Strada Jr.'s, D-27th, attempt
to win a prosecutor's job for a Stamford attorney failed
after a local prosecutor and police official objected to
the lawyer's close relationship with an important organ--
ized crime figure here, an Advocate investigation
shows.
"According to sources close to the controversy over
the 1976 appointment, the possible naming of the local
lawyer, James Guarnieri, now deceased, to an assistant
prosecutor's post caused consternation among police
and prosecutors because of Guarnieri's close ties to
John 'Stoogie' DePoli-a well known organized crime
figure here. Friendly with Strada and the senator's
law partner, John Fusaro, DePoli is believed by state
and federal law enforcement sources to run Stam-
ford's largest gambling syndicate and is listed in num-
erous law enforcements reports as an associate of the
Gambino crime family of New York.
"In an off-the-record conversation Monday, Sen.
Strada discussed the contents of this story and said
he would prepare a statement for release today. This
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
morning, however, Strada declined comment. He said
that he had met with his campaign advisors who were
'shocked' that an article would be written about a local
citizen who is now deceased.
" 'Believe me, if the article is printed, there will be
plenty of comment.' Strada added.
"The senator also said he could not write a response
to an article he had not yet seen. When asked if he
would like a fully detailed description of the contents
of the story, Strada said this would not influence his
decision to refrain from commenting at the present
time.
"At the time of the proposed Guarnieri appointment,
the police officers and prosecutors were concerned that
a close personal friend and counsel to the city's most
important gambling boss would be placed, through
political influence-peddling, into a sensitive judicial
post-one with plea bargaining powers as well as access
to search warrant information.
"Described by associates as 'deeply concerned' about
the matter, Martin L. Nigro, chief prosecutor in Stam-
ford at the time of the proposed appointment, wrote
a letter to the chief administrative judge of the Common
Pleas Court listing police objections to the appointment
as well as his own misgivings, according to reliable
sources.
"Nigro reportedly decided to write the letter shortly
after one of his assistants was approached by a well-
known gambler who boasted that the appointment of
the attorney had been arranged.
"The local police official, Lt. George Mayer, head of
the Stamford Police Department's gambling and nar-
cotics squad, was a prime mover in assembling the case
against Guarnieri and complained directly to Chief
State's Attorney Joseph Gormley about the proposed
appointment.
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329
Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
"Guarnieri's name was first proposed when Sen.
Strada, a deputy majority leader of the state senate
and former chairman of the legislature's general law
committee, appeared in the office of a local judge and
asked him to intervene on behalf of Guarnieri. The
judge then called prosecutor Nigro and asked that
Guarnieri be considered for the post as a favor to
Strada.
"Shortly after the call, Nigro learned from Mayer
that Guarnieri was frequently observed by local police
at meetings between DePoli and some of DePoli's sub-
ordinates who run illegal gambling outlets throughout
the city, according to police sources.
"DePoli is known to be under investigation by state
and federal law enforcement agencies. In addition to
four gambling arrests as well as one recent arrest on
fraud charges, DePoli is frequently identified as an
important local mob figure in federal and state orga-
nized crime reports to which The Advocate has obtained
access.
"The effort to appoint Guarnieri failed after Gormley,
who has an informal veto power in such appointments,
was approached in Bridgeport by Lt. Mayer with the
information about Guarnieri's relationship with DePoli.
Prosecutor Nigro also wrote his letter to Judge Roman
Lexton, chief administrative judge of the Common
Pleas Court, in which Nigro outlined police objections
as well as his own concern about the fragile health of
Guarnieri who suffered from a heart condition.
"The attempt by Sen. Strada to have Guarnieri
appointed is one of several incidents, according to fed-
eral and state law enforcement sources, in which the
senator and Fusaro have allegedly tried to influence
state or federal agencies on behalf of businesses or close
associates of reputed organized crime figures. Most of
these attempts have apparently sprung from social and
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
professional relationships that Strada and Fusaro had
with these individuals, The Advocate investigation also
shows.
"These relationships have raised questions in the
minds of law enforcement officials who doubt the pro-
priety of such associations between a major state offi-
cial and the organized crime figures-their associates
or their businesses.
"In addition to the controversy over the prosecutor's
appointment, these questions stem from the Strada &
Fusaro law firm's representation of a trucking com-
pany-owned in part by a local racketeer-in a legal
battle with a state agency and, in another case, the
senator's appearance in a New Haven federal court-
room for purposes of 'emotional support' at the sen-
tencing hearing of a major racketeer prosecuted by the
U.S. Department of Justice's Organized Crime Strike
Force.
"Several sources with first-hand information of Sen.
Strada's dealings with mob figures or their close associ-
ates agreed to talk to The Advocate following the
Fusaro's indictment by a federal grand jury that heard
evidence presented by the federal organized crime
strike force in Rhode Island. Fusaro was found inno-
cent last week in a Rhode Island trial on the charges.
"The indictment charged that Fusaro attempted to
hide from IRS investigators a $25,000 payment to his
law firm from a dog racing and jai lai promoter shortly
after Strada introduced the bill that legalized those
gaming activities in Connecticut. The government has
not charged that Strada introduced the legislation as
a direct result of payments to his law firm from the
Rhode Island promoter.
"Among other incidents that law enforcement sources
said disturbed them about the propriety of Strada and
Fusaro's actions are:
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331
Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
"Besides the attempted Guarnieri appointment,
Strada and Fusaro have also had a social relation-
ship with DePoli. In addition to frequent visits to
the Regnecy [sic] Restaurant in Shippan, which is
owned and operated by DePoli, Strada and Fusaro have
reportedly taken vacation trips with DePoli or been
on trips arranged by DePoli associates, one of which
attacted [sic] an FBI investigation.
"On this occasion, Sen. Strada and a number of city
officials took a trip to Las Vegas and then to New
Orleans for the Superbowl. The trip, which was inves-
tigated by the FBI, was arranged by a travel agency
in Bridgeport which is used as a part-time office and run
by close relatives of a racketeer who has been described
by federal sources as a 'made' or officially inducted
member of the Gambino crime family and who fre-
quently has been seen meeting with DePoli.
"It was also learned that federal investigators have
questioned Strada and others about DiPoli's [sic] activi-
ties during at least one of the gambling junkets.
"In addition to the vacation trips, Fusaro became so
familiar a figure at the Regency that an impromptu
party was held for him on the night of his indictment.
"Strada, on Jan. 17, 1976, sat for more than two-
and-a-half hours in a federal courtroom in New Haven
at a sentencing hearing for Anthony Michael 'Ginzo'
Zezima, a local Stamford racketeer. Zezima was prose-
cuted by attorneys with the Northeast Organized Crime
Strike Force after an FBI wiretap showed Zezima was
running a major gambling operation here. Federal
sources believe Zezima and DePoli had split the gam-
bling action in Stamford, with Zezima maintaining ties
with the Genovese crime family in New York City.
"Asked why a prominent state senator would spend
a morning at the sentencing hearing of a well-known
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Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.
racketeer, Strada said at the time that a member of
the family works in his law office and said he was there
'to give the family some emotional support.'
"When this comment was published the senator
reacted angrily, calling a reporter and arguing that his
presence at the hearing was neither relevant nor news-
worthy.
"Strada intervened in 1976 with a state agency on
behalf of MST trucking company, a firm owned in part
by the late Joseph Tamburri, a member of the Stam-
ford underworld with a long criminal record. The MST
firm, two of whose vice presidents (including Tamburri)
were arrested and convicted in 1973 on charges of
defrauding the City of Stamford, was charged by state
Department of Environmental Protection investigators
in 1975 with dumping ash on two North Stamford prop-
erties. The agency filed charges against the firm, alleg-
ing that it had engaged in serious, illegal health and
environmental practices.
"A DEP source said, at the time, that Strada had
called the DEP and, in a move to have the charges
dropped, attempted to exert political presure [sic] on
the agency. Sen. Strada has denied, however, that his
law firm attempted to apply any political pressure but
merely made a call to the DEP as MST's legal repre-
sentative.
"A spokesman for the law firm also said, at the time,
that he saw no conflict of interest in a state senator's
law firm pleading for a third party against a state
agency whose programs and budgets the legislature
regulates and approves.
"When Strada attended Tamburri's funeral shortly
after the racketeer was shotgunned to death in Febru-
ary of 1976, he also objected to a news story that men-
tioned his presence at the racketeer's funeral."