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135838814
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Pershing II
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135838814
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Pershing II
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Records of the Office of Counsel to the President (Reagan Administration)
John Roberts' Subject Files
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1986-12-31
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1982-01-01
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: Pershing II
Box: 36
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 1, 1984
John:
I called the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency for some information on the attached
letter. A woman in the public affairs
office told me that the way they normally
handle letters like this one is for
us to refer it over to a Mr. Joseph
Lehman in that office.
You asked me to get inofrmation sent
here for this letter. Fred's not to you
seems to indicate that he wants the letter
referred out for a draft response. Let
me know whether referring this out to
Mr. Lehman is all right, and I will proceed
accordingly.
Claudia
O.K.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
\
Date
2.28.84
Suspense Date
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John
FROM:
DIANNA G. HOLLAND
ACTION
Approved
Please handle/review
For your information
For your recommendation
For the files
Please see me
Please prepare response for
signature
As we discussed
Return to me for filing
COMMENT
Sorry My memory
is good but not
that good.
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS
SUBJECT:
Correspondence Concerning Deployment of Pershing II
and Cruise Missiles
Attached for your review and signature is a memorandum to Joseph
Lehman, Director of Public Affairs, United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. The memorandum requests that Lehman's office
draft for your signature a response to a letter from Lloyd Ard
of Austin, Texas, who has written to express his opposition to
the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Western
Europe.
Rm. 5840
320 21xt St. N.W.
Hashington D.C.
2045'
(U.S.ACDA- - Lehman)
MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH LEHMAN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
FROM:
FRED F. FIELDING
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Correspondence Concerning Deployment of Pershing II
and Cruise Missiles
Attached is a letter I have received from Lloyd Ard of Austin,
Texas. Mr. Ard writes to express his opposition to the deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Western Europe.
I would appreciate your office drafting a response to Mr. Ard
for my signature, and returning the letter and the response at
your earliest convenience.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 28, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH LEHMAN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS DER
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Correspondence Concerning Deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles
I am advised by your office that you might be able to guide
us in preparing a response to the attached letter, which was
sent to Counsel to the President Fred F. Fielding. We would
prefer a draft response for Mr. Fielding's signature rather
than a direct response from your office. If you have any
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 456-7953.
Many thanks.
ID #.
198532
CU
WHITE HOUSE
ND018
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
JV
0 OUTGOING
JR- to
H INTERNAL
I
I . INCOMING
Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)
/
/
Name of Correspondent: Lloyd S. ARD
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A)
(B)
(C)
Subject: Expresses concern about nucleas was
and asks what is being done about it.
ROUTE TO:
ACTION
DISPOSITION
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM/DD
CNHOLL
ORIGINATOR 84/01/13
/ /
Referral Note: please call DGH
CUAT 18
A/D 84/01/13 /
$ 84,01123
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
I
Referral Note:
/
/
/ /
/
/
PGH -
This is the "please call DGH"
ACTIO
A - A
C Completed
C. C
item of called you about
S Suspended
D - D
F - F
last much. what does it
DNDENCE:
als of Signer
e of Outgoing
all mean?
Comments:
John
Keep this worksheet
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 28, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH LEHMAN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS
&R
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Correspondence Concerning Deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles
I am advised by your office that you might be able to guide
us in preparing a response to the attached letter, which was
sent to Counsel to the President Fred F. Fielding. We would
prefer a draft response for Mr. Fielding's signature rather
than a direct response from your office. If you have any
questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 456-7953.
Many thanks.
$
PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISER
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
April 2, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN G. ROBERTS
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOSEPH D. LEHMAN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SUBJECT:
Correspondence Concerning Deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles
Attached as requested is a draft letter for the signature
of Counsel to the President Fred F. Fielding, in response
to a letter from a Mr. Floyd Ard. Please advise if there
is any more that we can do to be of assistance in this or
any other matter.
Attachment:
As stated
DRAFT
Dear Mr. Ard:
This is in response to your January 6 letter and the
enclosure on thermonuclear war.
We fully share your concern about the risk of nuclear
war and are committed to doing everything possible to reduce
that risk. Since the invention of nuclear weapons every
American President has sought to prevent conflict, reduce
the risk of war and ensure a lasting peace with freedom.
But keeping the peace and preventing war require more than
good intentions. They require a concerted effort to maintain
our own strength and to seek, wherever possible, to reduce
nuclear and conventional arsenals and resolve international
differences peacefully. This dual policy of deterrence and
dialogue has helped to prevent major war for almost forty years.
In addition to maintaining our military strength, the
US has proposed a number of new initiatives to substantially
reduce nuclear and conventional arsenals and to reduce the
risk of war accruing by accident or miscalculation.
For example, in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks,
the US proposed substantial reductions in ballistic missile
warheads, deployed missiles, and in other measures of
strategic capability. These proposals would reduce the
number of deployed warheads by more than one-third; of their
current levels; the bulk of reductions would be in the most
dangerous and destabilizing type of warheads. In October 1983,
President Reagan outlined a new US initiative for a mutual
guaranteed build-down of nuclear forces whereby a larger
number of old nuclear weapons would be removed for each
new weapon introduced in a manner that would encourage
movement to smaller and more stabilizing nuclear forces.
Ambassador Nitze, our Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
(INF) negotiator, and his team worked very long and hard at
Geneva in an effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union
on either global elimination or deep reductions of land-based,
intermediate-range nuclear missiles of the US and Soviet Union.
The delivery/deployment of the Pershing II and Ground-launched
Cruise Missile (GLCM) to Europe is designed to counterbalance
a Soviet monopoly in this missile class. (Since 1976, the
Soviets have deployed over 370 new SS-20 missiles -- each
with three separate nuclear warheads -- for a total of over
1000 new warheads in this class alone.) However, we are
prepared to resume the Geneva Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces (INF) negotiations with the Soviets at any time and
to halt, reduce or reverse our deployments in accordance
with an eventual agreement.
DRAFT
-2-
In addition, the US has also proposed a series of
confidence-building measures -- such as advance notification
of ballistic missile tests, expanded exchange of information
and improvements in communication -- to stimulate greater
mutual understanding and thus reduce the risk of war by
accident or miscalculation.
We recognize that the nuclear freeze proposal represents
a desire to achieve rapid progress in arms control, and we
share that goal. However, a freeze at current levels is
not an effective or sound approach to arms control. Such a
freeze would seriously handicap our efforts to negotiate
major arms reductions because it would perpetuate existing
Soviet military advantages, while preventing us from carrying
out necessary modernization of our nuclear forces. It
would thus reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously
on the proposals for substantial cuts in nuclear arsenals
that we have offered in the START and INF negotiations.
Although a freeze appears simple, it would require
extensive and lengthy negotiations to agree on the terms
and guarantees, particularly verification measures, thus
detracting from the more important and immediate task of
seeking reductions. In addition, important aspects of a
freeze would be virtually impossible to verify.
We can and must do better than a freeze, and in some
ways we have already gone beyond the concept of a freeze in
persuading the Soviet Union of the merits of negotiating
for actual reductions in nuclear arsenals. In the START
negotiations, for example, the Soviets publicly indicated a
willingness to consider reductions of 25 percent in strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles below the SALT II levels. Although
this is still not as far as we believe both sides can go,
it is nevertheless a step in the right direction.
We are determined to spare no effort to reach equitable,
stabilizing and effectively verifiable agreements with the
Soviet Union to reduce nuclear arsenals and the risk of
war. However, it takes two to reach an agreement, and the
Soviet Union has SO far not shown comparable flexibility at
the negotiating table. In fact, the Soviets have chosen to
interrupt the arms reduction negotiations in Geneva and
on
have SO far been unwilling to agree to a date for their
resumption. We remain ready to resume the negotiations at
any time, and we hope the Soviet Union will reconsider its
actions and decide to return to the negotiating table as
soon as possible.
DRAFT
-3-
Our far-reaching arms reduction proposals, coupled
with a firm resolve to maintain America's deterrent strength,
have provided incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate
for arms reductions. Achieving agreements on such reductions
will not be easy. It requires patience and determination.
It also requires the understanding and unity of the US and
our Allies behind the goals we all share -- to reduce the
risk of war, and the growth in nuclear arsenals.
Thank you for sharing your views with us.
Sincerely,
Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President