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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
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Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
Folder Title: Specter, Senator (1 of 2)
Box: 51
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- 5/16/83
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO: John Roberts
FROM: Richard A. Hauser
Deputy Counsel to the President
FYI:
COMMENT:
ACTION:
THE
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C. 20052 / The National Law Center
April 29, 1983
Paul Michel
c/o Senator Arlen Specter
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Michel:
This is in response to Senator Specter's letter of
April 15th, inviting comment on his proposed comprehen-
sive national program to attack violent crime.
My reaction is mixed. I am enthusiastic about the
sharp focus on violent crime reduction. The proposal
is in this respect superior to others. And I admire
your courage in proposing money for construction of
prison facilities. As unpleasant a prospect as this
may be, I believe construction is a necessity.
On the negative side, the proposal calls for much
too much money for too many projects. We don't have
the know-how to spend so much money wisely.
Second, the advocacy on behalf of the proposal is
excessive. The use of statistics -- e.g., 1% of the
national budget for domestic defense; 50% reduction in
violent crime -- is not a sophisticated way of analyzing
the crime problem. It has a wild flavor. It is enough
to say that crime is a continuing problem and that this
proposal offers a better way of responding to it. This
eliminates the promotional tone and the utopian aspect.
But my primary objection remains budgetary. Despite
your intentions, this much of an outlay is likely to
result in another LEAA.
I hope these comments are of some use to you. Thank
you for giving me the opportunity to comment.
Sincerely,
Gerald M. Caplan
Professor of Law
JC,
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 11, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD A. HAUSER
FROM:
JOHN G. ROBERTS
asi
SUBJECT:
Senator Specter's "White Paper" on a
National Program to Cut Violent Crime
You have asked for my comments on the above-referenced White
Paper, which was sent to you by Paul R. Michel of Senator
Specter's staff. The paper details a series of criminal
justice proposals costing $8 billion per year over a 5-10
year period which allegedly will reduce violent crime by 50
percent. Mr. Michel indicates that they are considering
introducing legislation to implement this program early in
the 98th Congress.
The proposals in the White Paper would increase Federal law
enforcement expenditures by $2 billion, primarily by increas-
ing resources available to DEA, FBI, USMS, and the U.S.
Attorneys. Training, laboratory, and research resources
would be doubled; the Bureau of Prisons would receive $500
million for new construction.
State and local law enforcement would receive an additional
$6 billion. The biggest ticket items comprising the $6
billion include $1 billion for state prisons, $700 million
for juvenile delinquent programs, and $500 million each for
special detective squads, compensation for victims and
witnesses, school police and counselors, neighborhood crime
prevention programs, commercial crime prevention programs,
and drug treatment programs.
At a time when a very modest increase in narcotics law
enforcement resources requires an all-out effort by the
Department of Justice and the Attorney General, it is
unlikely that the major increases called for by this White
Paper will receive any serious consideration. The proposals
are the epitome of the "throw money at the problem" approach
repeatedly rejected by Administration spokesmen. I have
talked with Marshall Cain, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
in the Office of Legislative Affairs, who did not recall a
copy of the package being delivered to Justice. Cain
advised that Michel often tries to obtain White House
-2-
approval of legislative proposals rather than dealing with
Justice, and recommended that the package be forwarded to
Justice for appropriate handling. I have prepared a letter
to Michel for your signature, thanking him for the package
and advising that you have transmitted it to Justice for
appropriate consideration. A transmittal memorandum to Stan
Morris is also attached.
Attachments
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 11, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR STANLEY E. MORRIS
ASSOCIATE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
RICHARD A. HAUSER
DEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Senator Specter's "White Paper" on a
National Program to Cut Violent Crime
Attached for whatever consideration and handling you deem
appropriate is a "white paper" describing a legislative
proposal prepared by Paul R. Michel of Senator Specter's
staff.
Attachment
RAH:JGR:aw 3/11/83
CC: RAHauser
JGRoberts
Subj.
Chron
not sent
THE WHITE HOUSE
WABHINGTON
March 11, 1983
Dear Paul:
Thank you for providing me with a copy of your draft "white
paper" on a national program to cut violent crime. Please
be assured that the package will be reviewed with interest.
I have also taken the liberty of forwarding a copy to the
Department of Justice for appropriate consideration. As you
know, that Department is responsible for preparing Administra-
tion legislative proposals in this area, and for developing
Administration responses to other legislative proposals.
Thank you for advising us concerning your efforts.
Sincerely,
Richard A. Hauser
Deputy Counsel
to the President
Mr. Paul R. Michel
c/o The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
RAH: JGR:aw 3/11/83
CC: RAHauser
JGRoberts
Subj.
Chron
COMMITTEES:
ARLEN SPECTER
JUDICIARY
PENNSYLVANIA
APPROPRIATIONS
VETERANS' AFFAIRS
United States Senate
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
January 25, 1983
The Honorable Richard A. Hauser
Deputy Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Hauser:
Enclosed is a draft "white paper" outlining a major new
Federal law enforcement effort aimed at substantially reducing
violent crime and drug trafficking.
The paper proposes a comprehensive program based on Senator
Specter's experience as District Attorney of Philadelphia,
Judiciary Committee hearings of the past two years, the Report
of the Attorney General's Violent Crime Task Force, and the
conclusion of the 1973 National Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals on which Senator Specter served.
With such a comprehensive program, we believe violent
crime could be reduced by 50%. The program will cost money,
but there is no other way to end the crime epidemic. We
believe the American people will support the program as essen-
tial "domestic defense". We are suggesting an additional 1%
of the federal budget be directed to this effort for a period
of 5-10 years. The annual cost would be about $8 billion. In
our view, this expenditure will save many times that amount.
We are confident the program will succeed and be cost-
effective, because, as the paper explains in great detail, the
money would be applied to very specific and critical needs of
the American criminal justice system. This program is, there-
fore, very different from LEAA or other prior efforts.
We are considering introducing legislation to implement
such a program early in the 98th Congress. We would appre-
ciate receiving your reaction and any suggestions you or your
staff may have.
Please send your comments to me at 342 Russell Senate
Office Building or call me at 224-9017. Thank you.
Sincerely,
Paul
Paul R. Michel
PRM: wmw
Enclosure:
DRAFT
Paul R. michel
Executive Summary: National Program to Cut Violent Crime
1/19/83
The United States now suffers four times more violent
crime than in your youth and 20 to 100 times more than other
industrial democracies. Random violence afflicts 1 in 10
American households every year, serious crime, 1 in every 3.
The total loss to our society reaches $100 billion a year.
Domestic criminals have succeeded where foreign armies
failed: They have terrorized not only the millions victimized,
but all Americans, denying our Constitutional rights and our
inalienable birthright to the pursuit of happiness. According
to repeated polls of public opinion, Americans worry more
about crime than anything other than economic distress. Not
even the Soviet threat is viewed as more serious.
Most violent felonies are premeditated crimes for profit,
committed, without passion or provocation, against strangers
by repeat offenders whose chosen livelihood is to prey on
persons who appear vulnerable. Although an arrest is made
in only 1 felony in 5, most of these "career criminals" are
ultimately arrested repeatedly, even if for only a tiny
fraction of the scores or hundreds of crimes they commit.
Once taken into our criminal justice system, however, they
often evade justice as effectively as they did arrest in
other cases. Dismissals, delays, plea bargains, judge-
shopping, unrealistic bail, lenient sentencing, early parole,
crowded prisons, lack of job training, idleness and many
other problems all help nullify laws, blunt deterrence and
undermine public safety. Usually, the career criminals are
back on the street soon, if not immediately. Even career
robbers who are sent to prison serve, on the average, less
than four years. Many serve only a few months.
In short, as the President has said, the problem is a
"breakdown" in the system. The solution is simply to reorient
it; treat serious defendants seriously. Since career criminals,
though comprising less than 10% of all arrested commit more
than 70% of all offenses, they warrant our greatest efforts.
From investigation to release, violent career criminals
should be singled out for highly concentrated attention and:
rapid, realistic disposition by all concerned. That is not
improper "selective prosecution", just common sense, if
uncommon practice.
-2-
Violent crime for profit truly can be cut in half in
five years as proposed in 1973 by the National Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. What is required is a
crash effort to focus far greater resources far more narrowly
on correcting the specific deficiencies in the system that
prevent it from incapacitating the truly dangerous.
The program proposes spending 1% of the federal budget
on strengthening "domestic defense" against violent crime by
increasing federal manpower and improving state criminal
justice systems which would still handle 90% of the violent
crime caseload. The budget allocation for criminal justice
would rise from $5 to $13 billion (out of 800). The $13
billion comprises a small fraction of the projected Pentagon
budget of $300 billion for the same years. Indeed, an increase
of $8 billion over a period of years compares with the addition
in 1982 alone of $50 billion for defense.
Cutting serious crime in half would cut the annual cost
of crime in half, saving $50 billion. Adding a few billion
per year would not only save $50 billion per year, but would
also make the other 99% of the federal budget- buy billions
more value. In short, the program, which requires modest
investment "up front", would more than pay for itself within
a few years.
The most serious difficulty is not whether our country
can find and afford the funds, but whether we now know enough
about preventing violent career crime to pinpoint the new
expenditures like laser beams rather than, as in the past,
disperse them like a light bulb and whether doing so would,
in fact, produce so large a reduction. The answer, in a
word, is "yes". The attached chart shows in a page how this
goal can be accomplished.
Really, the country cannot afford not to undertake this
program.
The full cost of crime is incalculable. Property damage
just from reported robberies and burglaries amounts to $5
billion annually. The unreported losses may well equal that
figure.
Applying the legal concept of pain and suffering and
psychological distress, which are measurable and compensable
damages under U. S. law, crime victims probably sustain an
additional $100 billion.
-3-
The full psychological impact, however, cannot be
quantified; because it is suffered not by actual victims,
but by potential victims -- all of us:
What dollar amount can be attributed to the fright
Americans experience when they hear an unexpected
noise at 3:00 a.m. wondering if a burglar is in
the house?
What dollar amount can be attributed to the fear
women experience as they walk home at night and a
sudden movement toward them suggests a rape or
assault or worse?
What losses are sustained when business oppor-
tunities are ignored because of the risk of crime?
What dollar amount can be attributed to cancella-
tions and reschedulings to avoid events which
conclude after dark?
Conservatively, the economically measurable cost of
crime in this country approximates $100 billion *and the
total cost, including the psychological effect on the entire
population, reaches $500 billion.
Adding to the anguish above the estimated dollar loss,
crime is an intentional act unlike damages resulting from
accidents or natural disasters beyond man's control. Com-
pounding the agony, much crime is preventable -- if only the
murderer had not been paroled, the robber had not been placed
on probation, the burglar had not been acquitted because the
policeman erroneously filled out a search warrant, or the
rapist had not been on bail for 6 months, without being
tried!
Government at all levels -- Federal, state and local --
now spends $25 billion on crime control covering police,
prosecutors, defenders, courts, prison and parole.
This program proposes an increased expenditure of $8
billion per year, constituting 1% of the Federal budget with
the realistic prospect of reducing violent crime by 50%.
/
The figure $100 billion is based on calculations by Dr.
Mark Cannon, Administrative Aide to the Chief Justice of the
United States. Based on figures supplied by the National
Institute of Justice, this total has been used by Dr. Cannon
in various speeches and articles.
SUMMARY OF ANNUAL INCREASES BY FUNCTION
INCREASE
USE
RESULT
(Thousands)
$8,000
National attack on violent
Reduce violent crime
crime.
by 50% in five years.
FEDERAL
200
Fugitive programs.
Triple arrest rate.
300
Federal robbery prosecutions.
Triple arrests.
500
Drug enforcement.
Triple the number of
major arrests, seizures
and forfeitures.
250
Training and support services
Expand training and
to states.
speed up support.
250
Research and development.
E.g., weapons detectors
and computerization.
200
Construction of federal
Accommodate increased
prisons.
federal population.
300
Temporary detention facilities End state overcrowding.
for state inmate "overflow"
and permanent prisons for
state habitual offenders sen-
tenced to life.
$2,000
STATE
500
Special detective squads.
Double arrest rate to 40%.
100
Case screening and diversion.
Cut minor and non-violent
trials in half.
100
Career criminal units.
End plea bargains.
300
Diagnosis classification, and
Cut adult crime cycle.
correctional programming.
1,000
Prison construction.
End overcrowding that
causes short sentences.
300
Job and literacy training.
Make convicts employable.
700
Juvenile delinquent inter-
Cut off escalating crime
vention.
cycle.
300
Housing for Runaways.
Keep them out of prisons.
500
Victim/Witness assistance.
Compensation.
500
Crime prevention -- schools.
Cut violence and drugs in hal:
500
Crime " -- neighborhoods.
Cut burglaries in half.
500
Crime " -- commercial.
Cut robberies in half.
500
Drug treatment.
End addiction.
200
Calendar control.
End delays.
$6.000
SUMMARY OF ANNUAL INCREASES BY FUNCTION
NCREASE
THOUSANDS)
USE
AGENCY
RESULT
millions
8.000
National attack on Violent Crime -
Reduce violent crime
"SAVE" - Safety Against Violent Events
by 50% in five years
ederal
200
Fugitive programs
USMS 80; FBI:60;
Increase arrests from
DEA:40; others 20
40% to 90% of 80,000
Quadruple resources.
warrants per year for
federal and state vio-
lent and drug offenders
300
New Federal prosecutions for violent
FBI 250 (4.000
Increase federal arrests
crimes, such as bank and commer-
slots) and US
from 3 to 13,000 per year,
cial robbery
Attorneys 50 (500
for robberies, especially
prosecutors).
armed career robbers.
500
Drug Enforcement
200 to double DEA
Triple the number of
(1900) investigators
major arrests, seizures
100 for accountants,
and forfeitures. Focus
(1,000 CPA Corps)
action on financing as
100 for FBI, 50 for
much as on commodities
Customs, 50 for
to take profit away. Im-
additional 500 Assi-
mobilize major organiza-
stant US Attorneys
tions.
(20% increase).
S
250
Training, lab, identification, and
FBI, Treasury, DEA,
Expand training and speed
other support services and tech-
NIC, DOJ, NIJ
up support to respond to
nical assistance to states by
Double resources.
all state requests in
Federal agencies
timely fashion.
250
Research and Development. Design
BJS, NIJ, FBI
Urgent violent crime pro-
means to end plea-bargaining and
LEAA, others
jects, including weapons
cut trial delays in half.
Double resources.
detectors and computeri-
zation of fingerprints, modi
operandi weapons, prior
records, stolen property,
co-conspirators, and case
management and court
calendars.
200
Construction of correctional facilities
BOP starts 4 new
Build new prisons for in-
for federal inmates and operating
prisons and 4 new
creased federal population
costs.
camps each year.
to prevent crowding and
decreased security.
300
Temporary detention facilities for
BOP starts 8 camps
Build new prison camps
state inmate "overflow" and perma-
and 2 prisons per
and maximum security
nent prisons for confinement of all
year.
penitentiaries to end all
state habitual offenders sentenced to
state overcrowding.
life.
-2-
CREASE
THOUSANDS)
USE
AGENCY
RESULT
State
m
llions
500
Improve investigations with special
Local police depart-
Double violent crime
detective squads
ments - 100 cities
arrest rate to 40%
per year.
100
Improve case screening and diversion
Local prosecution,
Cut minor and non-
courts, and probation
violent trials in half and
agencies in 100 metro-
increase violent crime
politan jurisdictions
trials so plea bargains
per year.
can be reduced, then
eliminated
100
Improve violent crime prosecutions
Police, prosecution,
End plea bargains
by forming career criminal units
court administration
100 cities per year.
300
Improve convict diagnosis, classifica-
State prison systems;
Cut adult crime cycle,
tion, and correctional programming
all states
isolate hardened offenders
1,000
Prison and other construction
State prison systems;
End short sentences and
all states with over-
other problems resulting
crowding about 40.
from overcrowding
300
Job training/prison industry/functional
All state prison
End pressure of economic
literacy training
systems.
need as a cause of
recidivism for unhardened
convicts
700
Juvenile delinquent intervention
State and local
Cut off escalating crime
authorities.
cycle
300
Runaways and missing children
State authorities.
Create homes so these
youth are not mingled
with juvenile offenders
or placed in prison-like
facilities
500
Victim/witness
State authorities.
Aid and Compensation,
where none other is
available, for medical
costs and lost wages
500
Crime prevention - Schools
School police and
Cut violence and drug
counselors.
sales by or to students
in half
500
Crime prevention - Neighborhoods
Volunteer observers.
Cut burglaries in half
500
Crime prevention Commercial
Security devices.
Cut robberies in half
500
Drug treatment
Local courts.
End addiction whenever
possible
200
Calendar control applying Research
Local courts.
End delays and judge
and Development results to specific
shopping
localities
6,000
A REALISTIC PROGRAM TO REDUCE VIOLENT CRIME BY 50%
I.
Introduction
Nearly ten years ago, after a decade of increasing crime
and violence, the National Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals recommended steps for reducing violent
crime in America by 50%. Unfortunately, many of its key
recommendations, such as abolition of plea-bargaining, were
never implemented. Now, after another decade of escalating
street crime, Americans are still waiting for the "crime
control" and "safe streets" promised by Congress in a 1968
statute. In fact, the streets have gotten even more dangerous
and crime more out of control.
Instead of being decreased 50%, as the Commission urged
in 1973, violent crime increased 100%. Just since 1978, the
violent crime rate has increased 30%. America's serious crime
rate has risen 200% since 1960 and 400% since World War II.
Year. in and year out, increases in the crime rate exceeded
increases in inflation. And, crime costs citizens even more
than inflation and hurts them even worse.
Not only has crime continually increased for decades, but it
is vastly worse in America than in any comparable country.
The United States suffers much more crime per person than
other industrial democracies -- 20 times more than England and
100 times more than Japan.
-2-
Our crime wave has grown so powerful that now it is
destroying whole neighborhoods, bankrupting businesses,
shrinking tax revenues, subverting schools and terrorizing
senior citizens. The only bigger problem in America today is
unemployment. Unemployment has numerous causes as many people
realize, but few realize that crime is one of them. In fact,
crime is cited by businesses at 3 the most common cause for
closings --- not taxes, not government regulation, not foreign
competition, but crime.
Nor is violent crime a disaster limited, like a tornado,
to some narrow swath. Once the scourge mainly of inner city
slums, it now reaches everywhere -- cities, suburbs, towns and
rural areas; its devastating impact hurts people at all economic
levels; it condemns all Americans to living in fear. One in
every three American households suffers from crime each year.
No epidemic disease or natural disaster has ever ravaged so
many Americans. Nor, in the past decade, has war. More Ameri-
cans are killed each year by criminals than by enemy soldiers.
As one witness wryly noted in a hearing before a Judiciary
Subcommittee, the "score is: Americans killed by Russians --
0; Americans killed by criminals -- 23,000 every year."
The psychological harm from our crime epidemic is immeasur-
able; the economic harm is not. More economic loss results
from crime than from all natural disasters and disease epidemics
-3-
put together. Each year, crime costs Americans an astonishing
125 billion dollars. Property stolen just in burglaries
accounts for $4 billion. The total price of crime, however,
is paid not just by the hapless victims, but by all of us --
in the form of higher prices, higher insurance rates and
higher taxes.
Our national tolerance for the intolerable dismays
America's allies and convinces critics that we are a stupid,
suicidal, "sick" society. Tolerating crime breeds disrespect
for law. Allowing so many to become actual victims and
everyone else to become potential victims threatens to
sabotage the social compact. When the law abiding see the
lawless getting away with it, and sometimes getting rich, too,
what happens to their own willingness to serve in the military,
support their community, assist their schools, and pay their
taxes? Crime threatens not only the safety of individuals,
but the security of society. Yet, we still have not resolved
to reduce it!
Eliminating crime must await utopia, but reducing violent
crime cannot wait any longer. Strangely, we rarely even talk
anymore about "reducing" crime. We talk, sometimes, about
"crime control". That merely means stopping further increases!
That) concedes defeat! We talk, often, about the "causes of
crime", as a mystery which, once understood, would magically
-4-
end our national nightmare of random, anonymous criminal
violence -- the muggings and murders, the rapes and robberies,
the break-ins and burglaries.
We are, I suspect, resigned to this much crime because we
have come to believe that we have no alternative. This conclu-
sion has been corroborated each year by relentlessly rising
crime rates.
Some social commentators argue that we cannot begin reducing
crime until we finish eliminating poverty. Others urge minor
adjustments in the criminal process as if it were an end in
itself. They imply that further refinements in what is already
by far the most complex, costly and cumbersome justice system
in the world will somehow reduce crime. Still others minimize
the role of the judicial process, arguing that decreasing the
number of offenses requires increasing the number of policemen.
Almost no one anymore believes that hardened criminals can be
rehabilitated at will by correctional programs. For humanitarian
reasons, prison reform is still championed by concerned persons.
But, few believe that reducing prison overcrowding will reduce
recidivism.
Our criminal justice system exists primarily to secure
safety for citizens -- in our streets, schools and homes. It
must be fair, but also effective. Judged by its results, our
system is failing. As President Reagan said, our criminal
-5-
justice system has suffered a "breakdown". Actually, the
breakdown is in the state courts, which have been overwhelmed
by the volume of cases. State enforcement efforts need federal
help.
Combatting violent crime has traditionally been, and I
believe should remain, primarily a local responsibility.
Primarily, but not exclusively. Indeed, the Constitution of
the United States makes clear that crime control is also a
federal responsibility. It obligates our national government
to secure "the general welfare", and the Executive "to see
that the laws are faithfully executed." In taking their oaths
of office, federal officials swear to defend the Constitution
and the country from "all enemies, foreign and domestic." And
violent criminals are our most harmful domestic enemies.
More protection from crime means more resources. Our
Chief Justice asserts that "domestic defense" is no less
urgent than national defense. I believe the Justice Department
needs sufficient resources as much as the Pentagon. Yet, we
spent more than 35% of our federal budget on national defense,
and less than 1/2 of 1% on domestic defense. Recently, we
have -- I think properly -- increased the defense budget sharply,
even after accounting for inflation, to compensate for years
of neglect. But, we have neglected to raise our Justice budget
enough to offset inflation. Few Americans realize that since
1975, while the number of soldiers increased, the number of
FBI agents decreased.
-6-
Other ironies abound in this comparison.
For years, we heard of the "missile gap", but not of the
"sentencing gap". Legislatures make robbery a crime punishable
by 10 to 20 years imprisonment, but many courts regularly give
first time robbers probation or short jail sentences; even
repeaters, on the average, serve less than four years.
We worry, properly, about foreign adversaries having "a
definite margin of superiority" in strategic arms. What
about the "inferiority" of the law abiding citizen to the
career criminal? The criminal goes about freely; the citizen
changes his lifestyle. Or the "inferiority" of the manpower
and equipment -- planes, boats, radios -- of the drug enforcers,
compared to the drug traffickers.
We are concerned, correctly, that imbalance in military
forces has opened a "window of vulnerability." With three
million burglaries a year in our country, one for every 14
American households, another "window of vulnerability" we need
to be concerned about is every window in our homes.
We believe instinctively in deterrence against the Soviets.
We take it on faith that potential adversaries are deterred by
the threat of retaliation. Yet, we lack faith that criminals
too can be deterred. Instead, some scholars demand massive
empirical proof of this obvious fact. Some then declare the
evidence unreliable and the results inconclusive. Always,
however, they recommend further research. More studies are
not needed, more action is.
-7-
In the past 15 years, we have created five national
commissions to make recommendations on combatting crime and
violence, and spent more than $7 billion on federal financial
assistance. The money, by and large, was not wisely spent.
The recommendations, were, by and large, ignored. Now we are
doing it once again.
The report of the most recent commission, the Attorney
General's Violent Crime Task Force, was presented well over a
year ago -- on August 17, 1981. It contained 64 principal
recommendations and scores of subsidiary ones on actions the
federal government should take. Most would entail increased
expenditures; nearly all of these have been silently shunned.
While, indiscriminate spending would produce as little progress
as in the past, these recommendations are practical, proven
and cost-effective. Their vigorous implementation is needed
desperately. The required actions are affordable. In fact,
what we cannot afford is inaction.
The total cost of implementing these and other necessary
steps would be $8 billion a year. If our country can afford
to increase defense spending by more than $50 billion this
year alone, we can certainly afford 1/6 of that increase to
reduce violent crime.
I spent fifteen years in law enforcement, served two
terms as District Attorney of Philadelphia and was a member of
the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and
-8-
Goals. From my personal experience, I am convinced that a
practical program for this price can, in fact, cut violent
crime in this country in half in five years.
The basic outlines of the program can be found in the
reports of the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals: eliminate plea bargaining, concentrate on career
criminals, make punishment swift, sure and sufficient, assure
speedy trials and appeals, teach short-term prisoners marketable
job skills, incarcerate unrehabilitatable repeat violent felons
for lengthy periods. On specifics, some of the necessary
actions were set forth in the Violent Crime Task Force Report
-- reform bail laws for dangerous offenders, eliminate early
release on parole, and, most importantly, increase federal law
enforcement, prosecutive, and correctional personnel and facilities,
and provide the states with the financial assistance they need
to curtail crime.
The rest of the actions needed are set forth in my Program
for Violent Crime.
In truth, we have as much know-how for crime curtailment
as for national defense or space exploration. We can find the
funds. We lack only the will.
II. The Program
It is a program, not just a set of goals and guidelines.
In essence, it targets specific "program activities" in the
federal budget for increases that will reduce crime.
-9-
1. Fugitives
There were more than 40,000 violent crime fugitives whom
the federal government was responsible for locating and appre-
hending as of 1981. In all, there were 180,000 fugitives
being sought, a very large portion of the non-violent offenders
being drug traffickers. The vast majority have fled from
local authorities. They are a federal resonsibility because
they are thought to have fled across state lines. Federal
warrants have been issued for their arrest. Federal agents
must find them.
The Marshals Service is the principal federal agency
responsible for finding them. It is a most difficult investi-
gative task since by definition fugitives are specifically
trying to avoid being found and therefore avoid former homes,
work places and friends. They often have many months "head
start" on the Marshals who seldom receive productive investiga-
tive leads when they receive the warrants. Despite these
difficulties, because of other essential duties and insufficient
manpower, the Marshals Service is able to devote only 400
employees to criminal fugitive warrants in the entire country.
Nor are all ої them Deputy Marshals. Some are cierks and
other support personnel.
As a result, only a small fraction of these violent and
drug fugitive cases can be actively investigated on an on-going
-10-
basis. In most cases, the warrant is merely kept on file
should the person be arrested again. Paradoxically, if they
are later arrested for a serious crime, execution of the
warrant will be both too late -- since the further offense
will already have been committed -- and unnecessary -- since
the new offense itself will probably lead to incarceration.
The Marshals' fugitive manpower should be at least
doubled over the next two and a half years and redoubled by
the end of five years. The cost of increasing the warrant
manpower from 400 to 1600 would be about $80 million per year.
The result would be to prevent tens of thousands of
violent felonies. The program would result in far faster
apprehensions as well as apprehensions of many fugitives who
otherwise would never be found at all. Most of these offenders
are recidivists who fled precisely because they feared long
jail sentences. Many are true "career criminals" -- offenders
who commit scores or even hundreds of offenses each year.
Some average a felony a day. Apprehending just one such vio-
lent fugitive a year earlier, would thus prevent more than 300
serious crimes, save 300 people from being victims, avoid many
thousands or tens of thousands of dollars in losses. Each
such arrest would measurably reduce violent crime.
At present, the Marshals receive twice as many warrants
as they can serve each year and now have a backlog of about
-11-
40,000 warrants. They receive 63,000 warrants of t he total
of about 77,000 issued each year. They serve about 40%. The
warrant program consumes about $18 million per year. Raising
the investment to $80 million would double and redouble the
manpower and increase the clearance rate from 40% to 90%,
eliminate the backlog, allow the Marshals to stay current and
enable them to catch more major fugitives.
Proportional increases in the fugitive personnel of: the
FBI; (2) DEA; and (3) all the other agencies would also be
required, costing $120 million a year. These increases are
important too, for often the agency that originally investigated
the fugitive from federal court will be best equipped to find
him. Thus, when a federal drug defendant jumps bail before
trial, the Drug Enforcement Administration, which is the respons-
ible agency, is best prepared to succeed. (The Marshals are
responsible after trial, regardless of offense.) The same
reasoning applies to the FBI for bank robbers, terrorists and
organized crime goons and other agencies for other offenders.
The FBI currently devotes about 300 positions and $14
million to fugitive work and has primary responsibility for
about 2500 federal violent crime warrants. The clearance rate
is 40%. Therefore, $60 million would be added to its fugitive
program, allowing a doubling of manpower in 2 1/2 years and a
redoubling in 5 years. DEA would receive $40 million. The
balance of $20 million would be divided among ATF, Customs,
IRS, Secret Service, et al.
-12-
2.
The FBI Bank Robbery Program
Another manpower increase which would surely be cost-
effective against violent offenders would be in the FBI
Personal Crimes Program. The major offense in this program is
bank robbery. While every bank robbery is a federal felony
and nearly all bank robberies were once investigated entirely
by the FBI, today the majority of these cases are turned over
to local police and prosecutors shortly after an initial FBI
response team rushes to the scene of the robbery. Many of
these transfers are justified. For example, where a sole,
unarmed robber is caught in the bank or trying to escape, the
nationwide capabilities and expertise of the FBI are hardly
needed. However, insufficient manpower in the FBI requires
transfer of many cases in which apprehension by FBI would be
more likely and faster.
Moreover, federal prosecutions are far faster and federal
sentences far longer than in most urban state courts. Federal
robbery trials are nearly always held within two months of
indictment, whereas in many state courts such cases remain
untried 6-9-12 months after indictment. State robbery sentences
(all types) actually served averaged less than four years,
even for offenders with prior convictions. Federal sentences
imposed on bank robbers average more than 12 years. There-
fore, federal handling vastly reduces the chances for the bank
robber to escape arrest or to continue to commit violent felonies
-13-
before trial or upon early release from prison. Nor do bank
robberies constitute an unmanageable burden since there are
about 9000 per year in the entire country. They represent a
small, stable and clearly defined sub category of all robberies,
comprising well under 2%. At present, the FBI handles less
than 4,000, making arrests in about 2,000 cases.
The FBI manpower allocated tc the Personal Crimes (bank
robbery) Program has been greatly reduced in recent years and
now stands at about 1000 and $45 million. Meanwhile, bank
robberies rose 70% since 1977. Thus, FBI now handles a smaller
percentage of the cases that need FBI handling. In order to
handle all the bank robberies that can be better handled at
the federal level, the FBI's allocation to this program should
be doubled and redoubled over the next five years. The cost
would be about $200 million per year. The FBI could then
handle 6-7,000 cases.
3. The Commercial Robbery Program
Under the Hobbs Act, any robbery that "interferes with"
or "in any degree affects interstate commerce" is a federal
felony. The policy of the Justice Department, however, has
been not to prosecute such robberies, except in rare cases
involving "wide-ranging schemes" or "organized crime" groups.
The statute itself contains no such restrictions. Nor does it
require that a firearm was used, that the perpetrators abused
-14-
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as the mails
or that they travelled in interstate commerce in connection
with the robbery. In fact, court opinions on the coverage of
the Hobbs Act have made plain that the Act applies even to
"local" robberies where the effect on interstate commerce is
"indirect" and "minimal". Indirect effects have been found
whenever the taking depleted the inventory or assets of a
business which buys goods in interstate commerce. There is
little doubt therefore, that the Hobbs Act applies to vir-
tually every robbery of a store, business office, factory,
restaurant, hotel or other place of public accommodation.
Despite this broad statute that potentially could result
in many thousands of federal robbery prosecutions (in addition
to those for bank robbery), in fact fewer than 50 cases a year
are brought for these "commercial robberies" in the entire
country. The lack of resources and the declination policy
have virtually nullified this Congressional enactment.
The justification has been that commercial robberies are
adequately handled in the state system. Yet, it is indi-
sputable that in many cities, the backlogs in state court
combined with plea-bargaining result in short "misdemeanor"
sentences, if not probation, for these serious felonies. Rob-
bery, after all, is one of the five violent felonies historically
regarded as so serious as to warrant application of the "felony
-15-
murder rule" whereby a killing in the course of such a felony
is automatically first degree murder, even where the felon(s)
originally had no plan or intent to kill.
Although recent Congresses have considered bills to make
it a federal offense to rob a pharmacy, no efforts have been
made to compel, encourage or enable the Attorney General to
enforce the Hobbs Act and use it in such cases. Two strong
arguments in favor of the pharmacy bill were that very often
the perpetrators are narcotics addicts and carry firearms.
Thus, pharmacy robberies tend to be rather aggravated and
dangerous and to involve serious offenders with narcotics
habits and long criminal records. Pharmacy robberies thus
share some of the characteristics of bank robberies that
helped make the latter appropriate for federal action. Many
robberies of business offices, hotels and restaurants also
share these characteristics.
Federal resources currently allocated to these "commer-
cial robberies" are negligible. To be capable of handling all
commercial robberies that are highly complicated or conspiratorial,
plainly interstate, or in which guns are discharged, the FBI
would have to be expanded by about 1000 persons over a five
year period. The cost would be about $50 million. Estimates
are that 10,000 robberies per year fit one or more of these
three criteria. With 1,000 persons, the FBI could handle at
least half these cases.
-16-
Corresponding increases in prosecutors would be necessary.
For $50 million, 500 prosecutors could be added to the existing
corps of nearly 2,000 and could handle the additional bank
robbery and commercial robbery cases.
4. DEA and the Drug Enforcement Program
Interstate drug trafficking, unlike bank robbery or commer-
cial robbery, is primarily, if not exclusively, a federal
enforcement responsibility. Yet, DEA has only about 1500
investigative agents to cover all the cities that serve as
distribution points in the trafficking networks. There are at
least twenty cities that are major hubs and dozens more that
are minor hubs. In addition, DEA has regulatory, training,
overseas and intelligence responsibilities that are critical
and divert personnel. Thus, only about 1500 agents of a total
of 1900 actually investigate in U.S. cities. Therefore, there
are fewer than 100 agents on the average to cover each major
hub city. In the other hubs, DEA offices typically have fewer
than a dozen agents. That is not even enough manpower to
staff even one wiretap! Clearly, two to four times as many
agents are needed.
DEA's annual budget is about $227 million. To double its
manpower would cost $200 million a year. Since a high percentage
of robberies and violent crimes are committed by narcotics ad-
dicts and since addicts commit offenses six times more frequently
-17-
when taking drugs than in periods of abstinence, reducing the
availability of narcotics will help reduce violent crime.
According to testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Juvenile Justice by Dr. John Ball and other experts, these
addict/criminals each commit multiple crimes nearly everyday
of the year. They are thus the very worst of the career criminals
who as a group comprise less than 10% of all persons arrested
but are responsible for more than 70% of all violent offenses
committed.
In addition, DEA should hire, train and integrate with
its investigators, financial analysts with CPA credentials. A
corps of 500 such accountants should be gradually built up
over a five year period. They must be supported by "accounting
assistants" on a one-for-one basis, as well as, secretaries
and clerks. The total cost would be about $100 million per
year. It should soon result in additional forfeitures of many
times that amount. Until the vast profits are taken out of
drug trafficking, there will always be ample replacements for
those imprisoned. Adequate deterrence against drug traffickers
requires that the government capture the profits too.
Corresponding increases in FBI and prosecution manpower
devoted to drug enforcement would be required. To pay for
the 2,000 FBI personnel would cost $100 million per year.
Another $50 million would be needed for 500 additional prosecutors.
The U. S. Customs Service would get $50 million for 1,000
additional personnel to improve enforcement at the borders
and the country's air and sea ports.
-18-
With these additional resources, we could triple the
9,000 drug arrests and the major seizures and forfeitures
per year.
5. The Emergency Corrections Program
The federal manpower increases called for above will, of
course, produce more federal prison inmates. Adding investi-
gators will produce predictable increases in arrests, prosecu-
tions and convictions in each of four categories: fugitives,
bank robbers, commercial robbers and drug traffickers. Once
convicted, nearly all of these felons will be sentenced to
prison, most of them for substantial terms. Indeed, the bulk
of the present federal prison population consists of bank
robbers and drug traffickers. Consequently, substantial
increases will be needed in federal prison capacity to accom-
modate these additional convicts. The state prison systems
certainly cannot help, for most of them are severely overcrowded
already.
a. Start New Federal Prisons
The solutions are, first, to build new permanent federal
facilities, for federal inmates, starting four medium or maximum
security institutions (capacity 500) per year for the next five
years and four prison camps. The cost to build and operate
them will be about $200-230 million per year.
-19-
The camps could be opened in about one year of the start
and the prisons in about four years of the start of site acquisition.
In the meanwhile, increases in the medium to maximum security
population could and would be absorbed by existing institutions.
b. Open Temporary Prison Camps For State Convicts
Second, in the meanwhile, extensive use should be made,
on a temporary basis, of military barracks on abandoned military
bases or unused portions of bases, for state inmates. Existing
buildings can be renovated within 6-18 months at modest cost.
Since there is no need for the military to charge rent for the
buildings and grounds, most of the cost will be for renovation,
upkeep and staff. For 200 million dollars per year, the U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, within 1-2 years, could open 8 minimum
security prison camps per year that could house some 4 thousand
inmates for up to three years. These facilities would be used
primarily to relieve state overcrowding pending completion of
permanent state prison buildings. They could also handle any
federal "overflow" of minimum security inmates.
This temporary program is essential since it takes nearly
five years to build a prison--from the initial decision to the
entry of inmates. Thus, the states cannot eliminate their
overcrowding fast enough to meet court orders (usually federal)
to release inmates, even those who have not served their sentences
or are unready for release, in order for the remaining inmates
-20-
to "fit" in the prison buildings under constitutionally per-
mitted circumstances. More than half the states presently
face such a situation. So that the federal government is
assured that necessary state prison space will be made avail-
able as soon as possible, it could pre-condition a state's
eligibility for the federal emergency program for state inmates
on the state's beginning construction of prisons for the same
number of inmates the federal government is being asked to
house temporarily.
Although such temporary "barracks style" facilities would
be unsuitable for robbers and for some of the drug traffickers,
the Federal Prison System's three next largest population sub-
groups are immigration violators, theft defendants and fraud
convicts, most of whom could safely be placed there. Among
state prison populations, about 1/3 are "property offenders",
most of whom probably are suitable for such facilities.
Changing prosecution policies and increasing manpower for
offenses like "commercial robbery" will itself relieve state
prison overcrowding, as will using temporary federal prison
camps to house state "property" inmates. Nevertheless, more
than 95% of violent criminals are now in the state systems and
these changes will not alter the division by about more than
10%. Therefore, the long range needs of public safety cannot
-21-
be met in any other way than by expanding the capacity of the
jails in nearly every major city and the prisons in nearly
every populous state. This step, strongly advocated by the
Attorney General's Task Force, will require large and continu-
ing expenditures. Billions of dollars must be spent over a
five to ten year period to build more state prisons. There is
no way to avoid it and still reduce violent and major crime.
However, an additional way the Federal Government could
help relieve overcrowding in state prisons would be to house
state inmates sentenced to life imprisonment under the habitual
criminal statutes in force in some 45 states. These inmates
are unusually costly to house both because of the high level
of security required and the length of their incarceration.
Often they are confined in the most severely overcrowded
facility in the state.
At present, the habitual criminal statutes are rarely
used to impose life sentences even for convicts with four,
six or eight prior felony convictions. One of the main
deterrents is the overcrowding. Another may be the cost.
With current knowledge about the realities of recidivism and
rehabilitation for this limited group of repeat offenders,
the logical policy is incapacitation by imprisonment for
life or an equivalent term. While for less hardened offenders,
greatly increased efforts at rehabilitation are justified,
for this group they are not.
-22-
Therefore, to encourage state authorities, in appropriate
cases in accordance with existing state law, to impose life
sentences on career criminals it is proposed that the Federal
Government offer to house such inmates on behalf of the states.
Each year, two maximum security federal prisons would be
started for this purpose, costing $70 million per year to
build and operate. Their capacity when completed would be
4-5,000, enough to accommodate all the anticipated cases.
Current estimates are that there are only 300 to 1,000
inmates now serving life sentences under habitual criminal
statutes.
Since the prisons started in the first year of the
program would not open until the fourth year, there would be
a delay in accepting any of these state inmates. While the
federal prison system has enough flexibility to absorb medium
security inmates, whether federal or state, life sentence
violent criminals would require the highest security level
and the few federal facilities suitable for these offenders
are presently filled to their safe capacity.
The total cost of the camps and prisons for state inmates
would be $270-300 million per year, including construction
and operating costs.
-23-
C. Federal Financial Assistance for State
Prison Construction
Like construction of the Interstate Highway System, this
endeavor can appropriately be a joint one. The proper federal
role is to meet emergency needs by opening temporary prison
camps and to help meet long term needs by securing financing,
e.g., by guaranteeing loans. In the mid-term, the federal
government should at least contribute toward construction
costs in proportion to the inmates it could have, but did not
prosecute in federal court. In other words, there should be a
presumption that in enacting the various statutes that created
concurrent federal jurisdiction for drug trafficking and certain
violent crimes, even though plenary state jurisdiction was
already in existence, Congress intended substantial federal
participation in one form or other. Generally, that means
federal prosecution leading to incarceration in federal prisons.
Where, however, state prosecution is initiated, the federal
role should be to help pay for the prisons to house the persons
so convicted.
Surely, an equitable and empirically sound formula could
be worked out. By rough estimate, perhaps 1/3 of all robbers
(and all bank and store robbers) involve federal responsibility.
Drug traffickers require a more arbitrary determination. Tech-
nically, all sellers are a federal problem for all sales are a
-24-
federal offense. Besides, even the lowest level dealer is
nearly always connected to an interstate network. Often he is
a "soldier" in an established organization. Yet a "street
seller" who sells in quantities of one bag of heroin or a
"user's" amount of a dangerous drug seems too small an operator
to be considered truly a federal responsibility. For simplicity,
perhaps all possession cases, except those rare cases involving
very large quantities, should be deemed state cases and all.
sale cases, except of "single user" quantities, federal cases.
In any event, the federal government would pay for a
proportional part of the cost of all new prisons constructed
by various states in the next five years. The federal share
of the cost can be calculated with data available to the
National Institute of Corrections. It would be about $5 billion,
depending on how fast the states started new prisons. Since
most states failed to build any new prisons in recent decades,
the financial incentive of "matching federal grants" is apparent-
ly needed. It can be expected to work because the states now
recognize the urgency. In order to control and limit such
federal grants and fix the total annual appropriation for
budgetary purposes, Congress could put a cap of $1 billion per
year on the prison fund. Generally, it might be operated much
like the highway construction trust fund, making grants avail-
able to qualifying states on a first come, first served basis.
-25-
This procedure might further increase the incentive for states
to begin a serious building program promptly. Indeed, the
Congress could stipulate that the funds could only be used in
the year appropriated, if still stronger incentives are needed
to get the states started on a crash building program.
Research and Development and Support
The balance of $500 million of the $2 billion appropriated
for federal activity would go to federal agencies to double
the resources presently available for research and development
and for training and support of state and local criminal justice
agencies. The objectives would include developing means to
end plea bargaining and trial delays. Computer technology
would be adapted both to investigative and calendar control
tasks. Training would be greatly expanded and identification
and lab support speeded up.
6. State Assistance
Some $6 billion per year would be given to state and
local authorities for new and augmentation programs for police,
courts and corrections specifically for career criminals and
violent offenders. The goal would be to assure swifter apprehension,
sufficient evidencefor for conviction of the major charge,
greatly expedited trial and sentencing, and corrections programs
designed to rehabilitate first or second offenders convicted
of violent felonies-with the emphasis on training in marketable
job skills and basic English reading and writing, and incapacitate
-26-
third offenders with lengthy sentences of between 15 years and
life. Thus, the program, described below, to improve rehabil-
itation programs complements the approach of S. 1688, The
Armed Career Criminal Act, which was passed by the Senate on
September 30, 1982 by vote of 92 to 1. The Act requires a
mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years up to life for a third
conviction of robbery or burglary when a gun is used in the
new offense. The approach for these hardened violent offenders
is "to throw away the key."
a. Special Police Squads
The theory is that at every stage from the commission of
the offense through service of sentence, violent offenders and
career criminals would be singled out for special attention,
handling and treatment. The first goal would be to: double
the apprehension rate (15% to 30% for professional burglars);
(19% to 40% for professional robbers, etc.). This would mean
creating or expanding special police squads of highly trained
investigators who would respond immediately and in force to
the scene of every violent felony and conduct full-scale investi-
gations there, including intensive interviews of all witnesses,
and who would follow-up on all leads, vigorously and continuously.
It would require greater use of undercover operations like
"stings" and "decoys", greater use of forensic laboratory
services, more extensive efforts to trace firearms and stolen
property and many other steps. The results would be:
-27-
1. More career criminals would get caught;
2. they would be arrested sooner;
3. the evidence would be stronger; and
4. a higher percentage would be convicted of the
main crime and sentenced to appropriate terms.
The ultimate consequences would be a sharp increase in
deterrence which should substantially lower the rate of violent
felonies for profit. Those not deterred would be incapacitated
with strong cases, fast trials and long sentences. This would
further lower the violent crime rate.
In many cities, the Police Department would have to create
special detective squads for rape, robbery, burglary, narcotics
trafficking, etc. Most cities already have a Homicide Squad.
Its operations and techniques could provide a very useful
general model for the new squads.
The federal role would be to stimulate the creation of
these squads, paying full costs for one year. If further
federal funding were thought essential, starting in the second
year, states could be required to assume costs in 25% annual
increments. Thus, in its first "transitional" year the squad
would be paid for 75% with federal funds. Federal support
would decrease to 50% in the second year and to 25% in the
third year. In the fourth year, local authorities would pay
-28-
the full cost. Under the first approach, 100 cities per year
could be given $5 million for one year. Thus, 500 cities
could be helped. Under the second approach, 100 cities could
be helped in the first year and an additional 50 cities in
each succeeding year for a total of 300 cities.
In specific terms, formation of such squads in a typical
city would mean hiring and training (or retraining), on the
average, about 100 detectives. In cities which already have
such units, the goal would be to double their size. The cost
per city would be average about $5 million per year, including
costs of training, salaries, support personnel, space (where
needed) and other such costs.
The total cost to thus assist police departments in
cities would be $500 million per year.
b. Career Criminal Units
In similar fashion, money should be spent to create or
double the size of the Career Criminal Units or specialized
prosecution units for rape, robbery, burglary and drug
trafficking in the U.S. Attorney and district attorney's
offices in the 500 largest counties in the U.S. These units
assign a prosecutor to stay with each case from start to
finish for thorough preparation and aggressive handling
without plea-bargaining. The results are significantly higher
conviction rates and far longer sentences for career criminals
-29-
and violent felons. Such programs, which were started in
district attorneys offices in 25 major cities (counties)
between 1975-80, proved to have high impact and, at an average
of only $1 million per city, to be highly cost-effective. The
program would cost $100 million per year. It would provide $1
million for one year only to 100 cities per year for a total
of 500 jurisdictions.
C. Case Screening and Diversion
The most crucial reform needed in U.S. criminal justice
is the elimination of plea-bargaining in violent crime cases.
More than any other cause, plea-bargaining results in dangerous
repeat offenders being released on probation or after serving
brief jail sentences. Although in most states, robbery, a
major felony, is punishable by 10-20 years imprisonment in the
state penitentiary, many defendants convicted of robbery
receive only misdemeanor sentences and serve less than two
years, often less than one year, in the county jail. In fact,
the average time served for robbery in the United States is
less than three years. Even defendants with prior felony
convictions serve, on the average, less than four years.
Such inadequate sentences result from plea-bargains made
under duress by prosecutors because the state courts in most
urban areas simply cannot try enough cases. Indeed, in many
cities, up to 80% of the cases, including violent felonies,
are disposed of not by trial but by guilty plea based on
-30-
concessions by the government on sentencing. Court congestion
and trial delays in combination with ever increasing caseloads
that reflect ever increasing crime create the pressure for
plea-bargaining. Overcrowded jails and prisons only increase
the pressure felt by judges to accept plea and sentence agree-
ments that do not reflect the seriousness of the crime or the
criminal.
To try more major cases requires trying fewer minor
cases. Diversion of minor and non-violent cases involving
defendants who can be rehabilitated is an essential step. It
has been tried and proven highly effective in many populous
jurisdictions, including Philadelphia where, as District
Attorney, I instituted a diversion program called Accelerated
Rehabilitative Disposition. Cases were carefully screened for
inclusion in the A.R.D. program which disposed of several
hundred cases a week despite using only one judge for one day.
Defendants were placed on probation without conviction. The
National Commission of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
recognized this program and recommended such diversion
programs as appropriated and essential to immediately reducing
and ultimately eliminating plea-bargaining, which the Commission
also recommended.
Similar diversion programs have been successfully utilized
in federal courts, particularly for drug offenders who were
-31-
essentially addicts as opposed to traffickers. Although such
programs are essential to relieving court congestion, they are
not as widely used as they should be. Federal "seed money" is
needed to help persuade additional jurisdictions to institute
diversion programs. Once authorities see the benefits demon-
strated in their own courts, they can be expected to continue
and expand the programs and to assume the costs.
Better screening of cases entering both misdemeanor and
felony courts is also needed. With their overwhelming case-
loads, courts cannot afford to waste scarce resources --
judges, prosecutors, defenders -- on cases that cannot realis-
tically be expected to lead to conviction. All possible
judicial time must be carefully husbanded to and applied to
disposing of major and violent cases. Intake programs have
proven effective in many different kinds of jurisdictions.
They should be implemented in all jurisdictions that face
crowded court dockets. Again, federal seed money is needed to
stimlulate the start of such programs in new places.
For $100 million per year, 100 cities each year can
institute these programs.
d. Diagnostic and Classification Improvements
for Prisoners
Just as better case screening will improve the results of
court efforts, better screening of convicts will improve the
-32-
odds of reducing recidivism. It is true that many convicted
persons are adversely influenced by their fellow inmates and
that, for them, prisons become schools for crime. But this
problem can be diminished although not eliminated by better
classification procedures so younger and less serious
offenders are not intermingled with career criminals and other
hardened or older offenders. In addition, better diagnosis of
the specific nature of any drug or alcohol addiction and
deficiencies in basic literacy and job skills can greatly
improve the chances of rehabilitation if coupled with resources
to provide more training, education, counselling, detoxification
and prison industry. Specific programs should be formulated
individually, for each inmate to encourage him to attain basic
English literacy, which most violent crime convicts lack, and
to acquire marketable job skills in order to have a realistic
chance of obtaining and keeping employment.
Resources for rehabilitation will always be less than the
need. Therefore, none can be wasted on inmates who are unlikely
to profit from them or misdirected to inmates who need some
other kind of training than what is provided to them. The
reality is that virtually all first offenders and most second
offenders convicted of violent crimes will be released within
a few years. Improving public safety requires reducing the
recidivism of these groups as much as it requires lengthy
incarceration of career criminals with three or more felony
convictions.
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The U. S. Bureau of Prisons and several state prison
systems have sufficiently perfected techniques for diagnostic
and classification services and for individualized correctional
programming to warrant the replication of these programs in
all state prison systems and county jails that do not already
have them. The emphasis, of course, should be on the state
prisons and on violent offenders.
For $300 million per year, all state systems could begin
or expand such programs. By the end of a five year period,
enough evidence of lower recidivism rates should have been
accumulated to convince the recipients to continue these
programs with state and local funding. Meanwhile, the public,
not to mention the inmates, would derive important benefits in
reduced crime rates.
The importance of these steps cannot be overestimated.
Recent studies show that a small percentage of offenders
commit the majority of all violent offenses. Accordingly, a
small reduction in the recidivism rate for these offenders
when released from prison following a first or second
conviction should produce a large reduction in the crime
rates.
e. Training in Job Skills and Basic Literacy
The evidence is overwhelming that most offenders convicted
of violent crimes are functionally illiterate and practically
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unemployable. Mandatory programs should be instituted in all
state prisons to teach 6th grade literacy and basic industrial
and commercial skills to all inmates, except the very few who
lack the ability or will to achieve even these modest goals.
Many state systems and the federal prison system have
developed various techniques, including prison industries, for
these purposes. Unfortunately, many state institutions do not
have adequate programs and some have none at all.
For $300 million a year, all state institutions could,
over a five year period, begin or expand such training. On
the average, each state would receive $6 million per year.
The realities of local and state politics, all the more
so in these times of economic distress, simply preclude
getting such funding from most state legislatures. Again, the
hope is that once started, the value to public safety of such
programs will ultimately be sufficiently recognized to warrant
their continuation with state funds.
f. Juvenile Delinquent Intervention
About one-third of all violent crime is committed by
young offenders. Nearly all these offenders have a long
history of escalating criminality, typically starting at about
age 9 or 10 with truancy and shoplifting, then burglary of
vacant premises at 12, burglary of residences at 14, followed
by robbery at 16 and armed robbery at 18. To control and
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reduce violent crime in this country, we must prevent adults
sent to prison from simply being replaced by such "graduating"
juveniles. Recent studies by Professor Marvin Wolfgang and
others reveal that only 6% of the juveniles who commit any
offense commit about 70% of all the crime committed by their
age group. Moreover, procedures have been developed by the
Rand Corporation for identifying this group, so the efforts to
cut off this escalating crime cycle can be concentrated on the
small percentage of juvenile offenders who are on this path
toward major violence.
It is proposed to grant to state and local authorities
$700 million per year to vastly increase counselling and other
efforts to intervene vigorously and early enough to divert the
juvenile from a life of felonious violence. Such intervention
should focus on juveniles in the 10-13 age group to have
optimal chances of success. The funds would enable 100 cities
to each spend $7 million each year to create or expand such
intervention capabilities to prevent development of future
career robbers. If local authorities are required to assume
the costs in 25% annual increments, starting in the second
year, an additional 200 jurisdictions could participate over a
five year period.
Two closely related programs are also recommended: (1)
crime prevention in schools -- $500 million per year; and (2)
3
runaways and missing children -- $700 million per year.
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g. Crime Prevention in Schools
The school program would focus on elementary and junior
high school students and apply counselling and other services
to potential juvenile delinquents upon the earliest signs of
trouble. According to studies and testimony before the Sub-
committee on Juvenile Justice, teachers often identify future
criminals even earlier than Juvenile Court authorities. For
those youth who do get taken to court, the schools must become
part of any correctional program for the individual that may
be ordered by the court and implemented primarily by probation
personnel.
Resources for such efforts are vastly inadequate. Poli-
tically, they are difficult to secure from state and local
legislative bodies. Any additional resources that might become
available to schools would ordinarily go to the instructional
program. The purpose of federal funding would be to replicate
proven successes from comparable school systems in all systems
with the need. The $500 million per year would pay for the
institution of such programs in several hundred school systems.
The programs would stress not so much services to individ-
ual youth, but improving the discipline in the school by preventing
classroom and hallway violence, drug trafficking and vandalism.
Thus, in addition to special counselling, the programs could
include additional security personnel and devices.
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h. Runaways and Missing Children
The program for runaways would provide funds to maintain,
expand or build suitable facilities for homeless youth so they
are not intermingled with juvenile offenders or placed in
prison-like facilities. One of the great successes of the
federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
was the de-institutionalization of runaways and other youth
who had committed no crime.
On the average, each state would receive $6 million per
year for a total national investment of $300 million.
The money would also help pay for computerized and other
information services so important to the families of missing
children. Often these children have been the subject of
"parental kidnapping". The spouse with whom they had been
living have no knowledge of the child's whereabouts or welfare.
i. Adult Crime Prevention
Programs at $500 million per year each are also proposed
for Neighborhood and Commercial Crime Prevention. Numerous
well-proven models exist and would be replicated in hundreds
of new cities and thousands of new neighborhoods. An example
of the former is the neighborhood watch programs in which
volunteer residents patrol their area with radio and other
equipment provided by the government. They report suspicious
persons and events to police who exclusively handle
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all investigative or enforcement actions. An example of the
latter is the installation in stores of cameras and other
security devices to help deter crime as well as assist in the
identification and apprehension of criminals. For instance,
money marked with a strong dye might be furnished to store
tellers and clerks to be given to any robbers.
The funding level would allow 500 cities per year to
participate in these two programs. Funding would be for a
singlę year. Thus, over five years, 2,500 cities and towns
would benefit.
j. Drug Treatment
One of the best possible crime prevention measures would
be improved efforts to detoxify drug addicts and habitual
abusers of controlled substances. Studies show that a high
percentage of crime, including violent crime, is committed by
addicts. One study showed that of 243 randomly selected addicts,
238 committed crimes. Moreover, they committed an astonishing
500,000 crimes over an 11 year period. They averaged 2,000
major and minor offenses for every year on the street and
committed one or more crimes on nearly 350 days of the year.
Another study showed that a group of robbers serving state
prison sentences were mostly addicts and committed six drug
sales for every robbery.
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The proposal is to add $500 million per year to the
treatment efforts of state and local authorities, concentrating
on addicts who are violent offenders. The money would be for
starting or expanding treatment programs and would benefit
several hundred jurisdictions over a five year period. If
spent in $1 million amounts, on the average, it could help
500 cities and towns per year. Better results might be obtained
by giving larger amounts to 1 or 200 cities and continuing the
grants for several years.
k. Victim Witness Assistance
Studies and experience show that monetary and other assistance
is often needed by victims and witnesses whose willing cooperation
is crucial to securing convictions of violent offenders and
career criminals. Medical bills and wages lost on days in
court are the greatest financial problems. Information to
keep witnesses abreast of developments as their cases proceed
through the court system is also important to assuring the
availability and attitude of cooperation of witnesses.
For the $500 million per year that is proposed, programs
copying well-established models could be started in up to 500
communities a year.
While compensation to victims for injuries is somewhat
controversial, our society should not tolerate the anomaly
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that if accidentally injured on the job, a worker is compen-
sated while if intentionally beaten and robbed going home, he
is not. It is just unacceptable for the victim to have to pay
his own medical bills. Thus, the program proposes that if
compensation is not available from state, local or private
sources, as a last resort the federal government should pay
medical bills of the victims of violent crime.
1.
Court Calendar Control
Nothing is more important in improving criminal justice
than assuring speedy trial. All states should, as a pre-
requisite of federal justice assistance, require that all
criminal trials be concluded in six months or less. The
standard for violent offenses should be three months with the
average being six weeks.
Reducing delays also requires implementing reforms in the
administration of criminal case dockets. Computers can play
an important role in large jurisdictions. In many situations,
adoption of the Individual Judge Calendars used so successfully
in federal courts would greatly speed trial dispositions.
Reforms of discovery rules can also play an important role.
To end plea bargaining, more cases must be disposed of by
trial and trials must be conducted more efficiently. Causes
of delay are numerous and vary greatly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. In some, delays in obtaining trial transcripts
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can delay disposition of post-trial motions and imposition of
sentence for many, many months. In others, different problems
plague the system.
The National Center for State Courts and other similar.
institutions have developed and refined analytical techniques
to pinpoint the problems and solutions in a particular jurisdiction.
The proposed $200 million per year would support analysis
in hundreds of jurisdictions by these institutions that can
dispatch teams to work closely with responsible local officials.
It would also support application of computer technology to
management of the criminal caseload in these jurisdictions.
Improvement in case management is essential to improving public
safety.
Dispersal of State Assistance Funds
No new federal bureaucracy would be created. Little
discretion is entrusted to federal Executive Branch officials and
employees because Congress will have decided, as it does for
national defense, how much will be spent for what, in each
functional area.
This proposal is no LEAA program. There would be no
layers of government through which funds would filter to the
user. Instead, the money would go directly from the Justice
Department to the state or local agency that will spend it.
Nor would there be complicated application forms or extended
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processing time. If a jurisdiction will use money from a
specific budget line item for the purpose stipulated, it will
get the money.
Where more jurisdictions apply than the funds can accommodate,
a "first come, first served" approach would be utilized. As
to the size of a grant to a particular agency, for example, a
metropolitan court administrator's office, a few simple formulas
based on population and/or violent crime rate could be readily
devised.
To avoid creating an excessive dependency on federal
financing, matching state funds could be required. To give
the program maximum immediate impact, however, the first year's
grant would not require a match.
Pacing The Program
The increase of $8 billion could not all be absorbed in
the first year of this program, but most of it could. The
increases for federal programs mostly concern on-going
operations of agencies like FBI which would hire, train and
integrate new personnel. Doing this efficiently and without
major disruption would require starting slowly and then
increasing the rate. The annual expenditures will be rela-
tively low in the first year and grow sharply in succeeding
years, as the money is nearly all used for salaries of new
personnel. Thus, the total of $1 billion for federal person-
nel would not be reached until the fourth or fifth year.
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By contrast, the funds for most state programs such as
prison construction can and should be allocated in full
right from the start. They can be committed under contract
very quickly. Even money earmarked for local police depart-
ments could be spent quickly since creating a new squad of
50 or 100 detectives is best accomplished in a short time
frame. Moreover, adding 100 new employees in departments
with thousands represents a small enough percentage increase
that no significant disruption is expected.
Most of the funds for state programs should be appro-
priated as "no year money", meaning that it may be obligated
and expended in years subsequent to the year appropriated.
Money for all federal programs should be appropriated in due
course. Even the funds for federal prison construction can
be normal appropriations. since for these facilities, unlike
state facilities, Congress has both the obligation and the
capability to manage the money on an annual basis.
If, as might be expected in the first year, the states
do not obligate all funds available for construction, these
funds would accumulate. Therefore, in the third year, for
example, the fund might contain twice the annual appro-
priation. However, since the large construction bills would
come due in that period, the larger amounts would be needed
then. Thus, the full amount for state assistance should be
appropriated in the first year of the program.
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Adjusting the Funding
If the construction fund ever grew larger, even than
anticipated needs, in later years of the program the annual
appropriation could be decreased. The program is flexible.
Reducing and Ending the Program
The increased appropriations for federal enforcement
operations would probably be continued in large part even
beyond the period of the program, but the money for new
state construction and new units and operations is intended
as a one-time boost to state justice systems in a period of
emergency. It could be largely discontinued after about
five years, if the 50% decrease is achieved before the end
of 10 years. In any event, it would end after 10 years.
It could be predicted that at least half of the $1
billion for federal investigative operations would become
part of the permanent budget base. Cut-backs would be appro-
priate for example in the fugitive programs once the backlogs
of unserved warrants are eliminated.
The $500 million for construction of new federal pri-
sons could be also largely discontinued after a few years.
Even the $500 million for training and research could be
greatly reduced if not totally eliminated.
Therefore, the $8 billion program would not become a
permanent part of the federal budget. Less than $1 billion
would remain. That a large assistance program can be term-
inated without significant political cost was proven by the
abolition of LEAA.