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Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/25/1983-10/31/1983]
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135840512
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Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/25/1983-10/31/1983]
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351
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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1986-12-31
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1983-01-01
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock CHRON October 1983
[10/25/1983 - 10/31/1983]
Box: 2
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: lov
File Folder: Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/11-10/24]
Date: July 29, 1999
Box 90888 2
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
+. Memcon
Matlock and Sergei Vishnevsky meeting on October
nd
P1/F1
11. 1983 [91201], 3p
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2 #93
2. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re urgent items: Europe, 1p
10/17/83
P1/F1
P 9/13/00 NLSF95-07412 #94
3. Memo
Charles Hill to McFarlane, re meeting between the
10/19/83
P1/F1
Embassy Pentecostals, 1p R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2
#95
4. Memo
Charles Hill to Clark, re travel of the last Embassy
7/29/83
P1/F1
Pentecostals, 1p R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2*96
5. Memo
Hill to Clark, re recommended USG posture on the
nd
P1/F1
emigration of the Embassy Pentecostals, 1p
R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2 #97
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
[(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of
the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
ID 8306643
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
8328947
PAGE E01
REFERRAL
DATE 21 SEP 83
MEMORANDUM FOR STATE
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
TO PRESIDENT
SOURCE BYRD, ROBERT C
DATE 07 SEP 83
KEYWORDS USSR
KAL FLIGHT 007
CO
SUBJ LTR TO PRES FM SEN RE RESPONSE RE SOVIET ATTACK ON KAL
REQUIRED ACTION DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG
DUEDATE: 24 SEP 83
COMMENTS
Jennifer
FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
need S/S-I
9/21/83 2300 CHS
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: lov
File Folder: Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/25-10/31]
Date: July 29, 1999
Box 90888
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
1. Memo
Kenneth Tomlinson to McFarlane, re cultural
10/26/83
P1/F1
program [7733], 1p R 11/5/99 NLSF95-074/2 #98
2. Memo
Marlin Remick to Mr. Hedges, 3p
10/16/83
P1/F1
R 11/5/99 NLSF95-074/2 # 99
3. Memo
Matlock to McFarlane, re Hartman meeting [91311],
10/28/83
P1/F1
1p-
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-074/2#100
4. Cable
191245Z OCT 83, 6p R 7/7/00 NLSF95074/2 #101
10/19/83
P1/F1
5. Memo
Matlock to Poindexter, re Eagleburger conversation
10/31/83
P1/F1
[91320], 1p
R 9/13/00 NLSF95-07412 #102
6. Cable
131518Z OCT 83, 5p
10/13/83
P1/F1
R 7/7/00 NLSF95-074/2#103
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
[(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(8) of
the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
TRAVEL WORK SHEET
DATE: October 25, 1983
MAIL CHECK TO: NAME
Jack F. Matlock
ADDRESS c/o Administrative Office, Room 397, Old Executive Office Bldg
Washington, D.C. 20506
OFFICIAL DUTY DATES:
October 20 - 24, 1983
ADVANCE RECEIVED: $200.00
EXCHANGE RATE(S): ± 1.00 = $1.56
FORM OF PAYMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CASH OR GTR):
LODGING WAS PROVIDED/PAID FOR BY: Ditchley
(If paid by traveler, receipt must accompany claim.)
TRAVEL SCHEDULE
(PLACE)
(PLACE)
TAXI/POV/
NO.
DATE/TIME
DEPARTED FROM
DATE/TIME
ARRIVED AT
MISC EXPENSES
MILES
AMOUNT
10/20 1915
Residence
10/20 2000
Dulles
Taxi
$34.00
10/20 2115
Dulles
10/21 0930
London
10/21 1030
London
10/21 1200
Ditchley
10/23 1615
Ditchley Park
10/23 1745
London
10/23 2115
London
10/23 2245
NY, NY
10/23 2300
JFK
10/23 2345
Laguardia
Taxi
$25.00
Sheraton Inn
EXPENSES
MEALS
DATE
LODGING
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
OTHER
10/21-23
(Ditchley expenses)
$23.40
10/21-24
(Miscellaneous)
10.00
10/23-24
$56.13
10/21&23
(Baggage Handling)
3.12
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
1. Attach copy of GTR, ticket stubs, pullman stubs, etc. Return used tickets to Admin
Office for refund from carrier when GTR is used.
2. All expenses incurred MUST be itemized. Receipts for hotels/motels must be submitted.
Receipts must be submitted for all other expenses (i.e., taxis, meals, etc.) that are
$15.00 and over), or the claim will not be paid.
USE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL SPACE.
TRAVEL SCHEDULE (cont'd.)
(PLACE)
(PLACE)
TAXI/POV/
NO.
DATE/TIME
DEPARTED FROM
DATE/TIME
ARRIVED AT
MISC EXPENSES
MILES
AMOUNT
10/24 0600
Sheraton Inn
10/24 0630
EAL Shuttle
10/24 0700
NY LaGuardia
10/24 0800
Natl Airport
10/24 0830
Residence
Taxi
$11.00
EXPENSES (cont'd.)
MEALS
DATE
LODGING
Breakfast
Lunch
Dinner
OTHER
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
1. TYPE OF AUTHORIZATION
(read the Privacy Act statement
and instructions on back)
TDY
Relocation
Blanket
Amendment
2. Traveler (First name, middle initial, last name)
(show item no(s) amended)
Invitational
Jack F. Matlock
3. Title
4. Organization
Staff Member
5. Office Phone
6. Official Duty Station
395-5112
Washington, D.C.
National Security Council
7. Purpose of Travel
Attend conference sponsored by the Ditchley Foundation.
8. Itinerary (Point of origin and places to be visited)
From Washington, D.C. to London, England and return to Washington, D.C.
9(a) Travel begin on or about
10.
Per Diem
10/20/83
Actual Subsistence (High Rate Area)
9(b) Travel end on or about
XX
Actual Subsistence (Unusual Circumstances)*
10/24/83
Rate(s):
MODE OF TRAVEL
11(a)
Commercial Transportation
11(b) Privately owned vehicle
Rail
Air
Auto
Plane
Rate auth
Determined more advantageous
Coach
Extra Fare*
Coach/Tourist
First Class #
In lieu of train
per mile
to Government*
in N.E. corridor*
For convenience of traveler
X
NTE common carrier cost
+ First Class must have approval of Agency Head or Deputy
11(c)
Gov't Owned
11(d) Other (specify)
Vehicle
12. SPECIAL EXPENSES AUTHORIZED
13. ESTIMATED COST
AMOUNT
Registration Fees (meetings, training, etc.)
Per Diem/Actual Subsistence
$
X
Taxi fares between lodging and/or place of business
136.00
Commercial Rental Car
Transportation
Excess Baggage not to exceed
895.00
X
Other taxi to/from residence/airport Miscellaneous
14. ADVANCE REQUESTED $200.00
TOTAL
$ 1,439.00
*15. Special Provisions/Remarks (Justification for first class travel, utilization of plane in N.E. corridor, actual subsistence, annual leave enroute, etc.)
Authorize actual subsistence not to exceed: London-$103.00 + $33.00 - $136.00.
16(a) Requested by
17. Accounting data
Jack Matlock
1142000
16(b) I certify that the travel herein was reviewed and
18. Funds are available to defray travel costs specified above
determined to be essential for the accomplishment
Funds Manager's Certification (Signature)
of agency programs and missions
Approval Official (Signature and title)
Thomas c. Shull, Dep. Exec. Secy
19. Date
20. Travel Authorization No.
Patricia Blauth
4
Administrative Assistant
10/17/83
XS4E02
OA FORM 22
MARCH 1980
TRAVELER'S COPY
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
The information requested is required to document the authorization
and reimbursement of the individuals who travel at government expense on official business. Its routine use is
restricted to officers and employees of Executive Office of the President agencies for performance of their official
duties. Disclosure is voluntary, but failure to provide all or part of the information may delay or prevent
authorization of travel. This information is collected under the authority of 31 U.S.C. 66a, 41 U.S.C. 3101, 3102,
3309; and General Accounting Office and General Services Administration policies and procedures.
Instructions for Completing Travel Authorization
ITEM 1-Check:
TDY block if travel is of routine nature by an employee of your agency
Blanket block if authorization is for more than one trip.
Invitational block if travel is to be performed by a person who is not
employed by your agency.
Relocation block if authorization is for a person being transferred from
or to another geographical locality.
Amendment block if making change to existing Travel Authorization.
ITEMS 2 Through 9 are Self Explanatory.
ITEM 10 - Check appropriate box for the type of reimbursement authorized.
List rate or rates applicable.
ITEM 11 - Check mode of travel authorized.
ITEM 12 - Check appropriate box for any special expenses authorized.
ITEM 13 - Compute cost of per diem or actual subsistence utilizing the
information in Item 10.
Transportation is cost of airline ticket, privately owned vehicle mileage
or other transportation cost.
Miscellaneous could include rental car, registration fees, taxi cabs, etc.
ITEM 14 - Complete only if an advance of funds is requested.
ITEM 15 - Space provided for justifications and other miscellaneous information.
ITEM 16(a) - Signature of Traveler.
16(b) - Signature of Approving Official.
ITEMS 17 & 18 - Self Explanatory.
ITEMS 19 & 20 - To be completed by personnel assigning T/A numbers.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICIAL TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
1. TYPE OF AUTHORIZATION
(read the Privacy Act statement
and instructions on back)
TDY
Relocation
Blanket
X
Amendment
2. Traveler (First name, middle initial, last name)
(show item no(s) amended)
Invitational
#13, 20
JACK F. MATLOCK
3. Title
4. Organization
5. Office Phone
6. Official Duty Station
7. Purpose of Travel
8. Itinerary (Point of origin and places to be visited)
9(a) Travel begin on or about
10.
Per Diem
Actual Subsistence (High Rate Area)
9(b) Travel end on or about
Actual Subsistence (Unusual Circumstances)*
Rate(s):
MODE OF TRAVEL
11(a)
Commercial Transportation
11(b) Privately owned vehicle
Rail
Air
Auto
Plane
Rate auth
Determined more advantageous
Coach
Extra Fare*
Coach/Tourist
First Class T
In lieu of train
per mile
to Government*
in N.E. corridor*
For convenience of traveler
NTE common carrier cost
+ First Class must have approval of Agency Head or Deputy
11(c)
Gov't Owned
11(d) Other (specify)
Vehicle
12. SPECIAL EXPENSES AUTHORIZED
13. ESTIMATED COST
AMOUNT
Registration Fees (meetings, training, etc.)
Per Diem/Actual Subsistence
$
Taxi fares between lodging and/or place of business
544.00
Commercial Rental Car
Transportation
Excess Baggage not to exceed
895.00
Other
Miscellaneous
14. ADVANCE REQUESTED $
TOTAL
$1,439.00
*15. Special Provisions/Remarks (Justification for first class travel, utilization of plane in N.E. corridor, actual subsistence, annual leave enroute, etc.)
16(a) Requested by
17. Accounting data
16(b) I certify that the travel herein was reviewed and
18. Funds are available to defray travel costs specified above
determined to be essential for the accomplishment
Funds Manager's Certification (Signature)
of agency programs and missions
Approval Official (Signature and title)
Thomas C. Shull, Dep. Exec. Secy
Mm will
19. Date
20. Travel Authorization No.
Patricia Blauth
Administrative Assistant
XS4E04
OA FORM 22
MARCH 1980
TRAVELER'S COPY
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
The information requested is required to document the authorization
and reimbursement of the individuals who travel at government expense on official business. Its routine use is
restricted to officers and employees of Executive Office of the President agencies for performance of their official
duties. Disclosure is voluntary, but failure to provide all or part of the information may delay or prevent
authorization of travel. This information is collected under the authority of 31 U.S.C. 66a, 41 U.S.C. 3101, 3102,
3309; and General Accounting Office and General Services Administration policies and procedures.
Instructions for Completing Travel Authorization
ITEM 1-Check:
TDY block if travel is of routine nature by an employee of your agency
Blanket block if authorization is for more than one trip.
Invitational block if travel is to be performed by a person who is not
employed by your agency.
Relocation block if authorization is for a person being transferred from
or to another geographical locality.
Amendment block if making change to existing Travel Authorization.
ITEMS 2 Through 9 are Self Explanatory.
ITEM 10 - Check appropriate box for the type of reimbursement authorized.
List rate or rates applicable.
ITEM 11 - Check mode of travel authorized.
ITEM 12 - Check appropriate box for any special expenses authorized.
ITEM 13 - Compute cost of per diem or actual subsistence utilizing the
information in Item 10.
Transportation is cost of airline ticket, privately owned vehicle mileage,
or other transportation cost.
Miscellaneous could include rental car, registration fees, taxi cabs, etc.
ITEM 14 - Complete only if an advance of funds is requested.
ITEM 15 - Space provided for justifications and other miscellaneous information.
ITEM 16(a) - Signature of Traveler.
16(b) - Signature of Approving Official.
ITEMS 17 & 18 - Self Explanatory.
ITEMS 19 & 20 - To be completed by personnel assigning T/A numbers.
10/26/83
CELEBRATION OF 65TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Remarks by Jack F. Matlock
Washington, D.C., October 26, 1983
I appreciate the opportunity to mark the 65th anniversary of
the independence of Czechoslovakia with you. Most of you trace
your heritage to that beautiful land; the rest of us have ties of
experience, interest and friendship. But whatever the precise
nature of our tie, we all share a profound personal commitment to
the freedom, welfare and prosperity of our relatives and friends
in Czechoslovakia.
There is no need to recount the details of the historical
experience of the Czechs and Slovaks in this century. We know
them, not just in our minds, but in our hearts. But on this
occasion I think it is proper--indeed necessary--to ponder the
meaning of these events. What lessons can we draw, we friends of
Czechoslovakia, we Americans, and, yes, we human beings dedicated
to the proposition that mankind has an inalienable right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness?
First, the event itself--the establishment of a free and
independent Czechoslovak state. When we think of this momentous
event, we think first of all of two men, Tomas Masaryk and Milan
Stefanik. To honor them is not to denigrate all the others who
worked with them, but simply to say that they were both effective
leaders of their peoples with the practical diplomatic skills to
bring to fruition a difficult objective. With all the
differences in their personalities and background, these two men
shared a vision, a vision of an independent, democratic
Czechoslovak state, and had the skill and leadership qualities
to shape the national will to practical ends. The Pittsburg
Declaration and and the subsequent diplomatic efforts made the
Czechoslovak Declaration of Independance possible. Nevertheless,
a viable stat could not have been created in 1918 if Masaryk and
Stefanik had not been preceded by a national awakening. Their
achievement was possible only as the result of the efforts of
countless people in the nineteenth century who led the national
awakening of their people. They stood directly on the shoulders
of the Palackys, the Smetanas, the Sturs and the Hviezdoslavs.
10/26/83
OUTLINE
1. Importance of National tradition
2. Democratic basis
3. Association with U.S.
-ties of blood and history
Masaryk in U.S. and WWII
Czechs and Slovaks in U.S.
4. Subsequent events: 1938, 1948, 1968
Chamberlain statement
-postwar occupation zones
5 Lessons for us
maintain hope
maintain cultural identity
maintain personal ties
-broader lesson: hazardous course to abandon friends--
even when they seem far away
6. What we can do
7. Faith: immediate outlook gloomy, but we must persist. Must
be confident that, in end, pravda vitezi.
C
7705
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
October 27, 1983
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK few
SUBJECT:
Draft Speech by Deputy Secretary Dam
I have no problems with the draft speech (Tab I) prepared for
delivery by Deputy Secretary Dam on October 31, except that the
references to the Helsinki Final Act on page 12 should be
consistent with the fact that the Final Act is not a treaty
(i.e., is not legally binding).
For your information, I believe it will be useful for the
President to make a major speech on U.S. -Soviet relations in a
month or so, and would not want this speech to preempt some of
the things the President might say. However, it seems
sufficiently general and retrospective that there should be no
potential conflict, and indeed, it could serve as a useful
prelude to what the President might say, explaining some useful
background points in greater detail than would be possible in a
Presidential statement.
Therefore, I recommend clearance with the caveat that the
language on page 12 be vetted by a lawyer familiar with our
position regarding the legal status of the Helsinki Final Act.
(Memorandum to State at Tab II.)
2ns
John Lenczowski and Bob Sims concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab II.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Draft Speech
Tab II
Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
for
7/28/99
S/S 8332819
1105
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
October 26, 1983
URGENT
MEMORANDUM
B/M
TO:
S/S - Mr. Hill
FROM:
D - James P. Timbie
It.
SUBJECT:
Draft Speech by the Deputy Secretary
Attached is a draft speech on US-Soviet relations
for the Deputy Secretary to present tc the International
House at the University of Chicago on October 31. Please
circulate this draft to the following distribution,
requesting comments or concurrence to James Timbie
(632-8930) by COB Thursday, October 27:
Outside State
Within State
NSC
S
OSD
P
CIA
T
ACDA
C
H
PA
PM
S/P
EA
AF
ARA
HA
NEA
LIMITED
bolade
International House Speech
DRAFT - EUR #3- 10/25/83
Challenges of U.S.-Soviet Relations
At the Fifty Year Mark
I
The commemoration today of International House's five
decades appropriately coincides with the eve of another 50th
anniversary -- that of the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It
was, of course, in November of 1933 that the Roosevelt-Litvinov
Agreement was concluded, giving us one of our first
opportunities to undergo the rigors of the classic Soviet
negotiating style.
In the following years, every American administration since
FDR's has had to wrestle with the increasingly complex problems
posed by this evolving relationship: How does the United
States deal with the reality of a country that is both
assertive and insecure in its dealings with the rest of the
world? How do we build a constructive relationship with the
Soviet Union, whose interests and values are SO different from
ours? How do we sustain a coherent policy in the face of wide
swings in American popular opinion from euphoria to bitter}
- 2 -
hostility? In one way or another, U.S.-Soviet relations have
been the central issue in postwar American foreign policy and,
not surprisingly, have been the source of much political
debate. Honest men.and women can have different views about
that relationship both because the Soviet Union is far more
complex than it was 50 years ago and because we still know far
too little about it.
It is especially fitting, then, that we have come together
at International House to take a fresh look at the issues
involved in U.S.-Soviet relations of the 1980's -- examining
some problems that are familiar after fifty years and others
that are quite new.
As the keynote speaker to a conference entitled "The Search
for Solutions," I should not pre-empt the rest of the field by
providing all of the definitive answers this early in the
morning. Do not fear. If this Administration or those that
recently preceded it had the final answers, you would not be
having this conference. I can, however, aspire to setting the
stage for the discussions to follow by reviewing with you those
aspects of Soviet policy of the past decade that directly
affect American interests. They are the facts of life, if you
will, that any U.S. decision-maker will have to face in
considering the future course of Soviet-American relations.
- 3 -
II
Let me begin by reviewing the steady increase in Soviet
military strength during the past two decades, extending
through periods of both tension and détente. I do SO because
it is the Soviet military establishment that provides the basis
for the Soviet Union's super-power status. in the world of the
1980's. It is this dramatic expansion of Soviet military
power, both nuclear and conventional, that gives an obvious
immediacy to our need to manage Soviet-American frictions
carefully.
The allocation of Soviet resources for military purposes
has been persistent and substantial. The burden of defense
within the Soviet Union -- the share of the GNP devoted to the
military - -- remained at 13 - 14 percent through the past
decade. By contrast, defense spending within the United States
during this period averaged only 5.9 percent. Even with our
planned increases, U.S. defense spending in 1984 will increase
just one percent more -- to 6.8 percent of our GNP in 1984.
According to our estimates, the real growth in Soviet military
spending has averaged 4 percent a year since 1970, though this
may have declined somewhat in recent years. The high level
already achieved, however, is being maintained.
- 4 -
The Soviet military sector continues to be accorded the
number one priority in resource allocation -- including
capital, people and bureaucratic precedence. More than
one-third of all Soviet machinery output now goes to the
military. Substantial amounts of metallurgical products,
electrical power, coal, gas, and chemicals are either directly
sent to the military or embodied in the goods it receives.
Almost one-half of all research and development expenditures
goes for military applications.
In human terms, the Soviet military sector takes about one.
seventh of total manpower and a substantially higher proportion
of the best qualified scientific and technical personnel. The
military sector is truly the fast-track of a bifurcated
economy, absorbing the best talents and the greatest energy
while demanding a high degree of efficiency. In its
administration, large parts of military production are
separated from the civilian sector by not only secrecy, but
different organizational rules and procedures as well. The
resulting burdens of this separate military economy weigh
heavily on the quality of life for the average citizen.
- 5 -
In view of the pervasive secrecy in the Soviet Union and
the formidable intellectual issues involved, debates recur both
within and outside the U.S. government regarding our ruble and
dollar estimates of Soviet defense spending. The concrete
results of such spending programs, however, are clear. There
is nothing hypothetical about the overall size and growth of
the Soviet military establishment.
Over the past decade, for instance, the Soviets have
manufactured approximately 2000 new ICBMs; by comparison, the
United States built approximately 350 during the same time.
The Soviets built 54,000 new tanks and armored vehicles; U.S.
production was 11,000. The Soviet Union turned out 6000
tactical combat aircraft; the U.S., 3000. The Soviets launched
61 attack submarines; the United States, 27.
It is not just a question of numbers. Qualitatively, much
of this growing Soviet arsenal is comparable to U.S. systems.
Within the last two years, we have seen:
-- The first tests of two new Soviet land-based ICBMs -- the
MIRVed SS-X-24 and the single warhead SS-X-25 -- and the
continued improvement of their already deployed force
consisting of over 800 SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 modern ICBMs.
- 6 -
-- Flight-tests of a new generation of strategic heavy bomber,
which we call the BLACKJACK, and of an entirely new generation
of Soviet cruise missiles.
-- The launching of the 25,000 ton TYPHOON class strategic
ballistic missile submarine and of two new KIEV-class aircraft
carriers to join the two Soviet carriers already in operation.
-- Deployment of some 100 new SS-20's carrying three nuclear
warheads each, for a total of more than 350 of these mobile
intermediate-range missiles targeted on Europe and East Asia.
-- In space, an increase in the Soviet Union's military-related
programs -- involving manned missions, reconnaissance/
surveillance/ targetting satellites, and the world's only
operational anti-satellite system.
Inevitably, in any such overview our attention is drawn to
the new weapons systems. Yet, the steady pursuit of
long-standing programs, combined with the Soviet practice of
keeping older but capable models in inventory much longer than
in the West, has resulted over the years in a tremendous
military inventory for the Soviet Union. The results are
- 7 -
readily apparent from NATO/Warsaw Pact force comparisons: the
East now fields some 42,500 main battle tanks as compared to
13,000 by the West, and over 31,000 artillery pieces and heavy
mortars to less than 11,000 comparable Western weapons.
This inventory has also provided a reservoir for the ready
supply of Soviet weaponry at concessional rates to an
increasing number of countries. Since 1969, Sovie: military
aid to the Third World has increased tenfold. As a result, the
Soviet Union has become the largest arms exporter to the Third
World and the principal supplier of over 34 states, twice as
many a decade ago.
The Soviet military machine is not without flaws. In
addition to the disadvantages posed by a highly-centralized
command structure, Soviet strategists in the 1980's will be
have to consider the military implications of the Soviet
Union's longer-term economic and demographic problems. The
West, moreover, can bring to bear powerful advantages of its
own in maintaining a common defense. In recent years, we have
done much to redress past inadequacies in this area.
Nonetheless, the scope and persistence of the Soviet
Union's efforts to create an instrument of military power
- 8 -
beyond reasonable estimates of their defense requirements is
troubling. This quest for military superiority has been made
in the face of mounting domestic economic difficulties. Our
concerns over this Soviet preoccupation with power have been
heightened by their increasingly disruptive international
behaviour over the past decade.
That record of increased Soviet activism and influence,
particularly in the Third World, is already familiar to you.
The wide range and diversity in the Soviet Union's ties with
various client states of the Third World defies any simple
categorization. The methods and degree of Soviet involvement
vary from country to country. In addition to the Soviet
Union's expanded role as an arms supplier, we have also seen in
recent years:
-- the Soviet Union's direct military intervention into
Afghanistan;
-- its strengthened economic and military involvement with
such regional powers as Cuba and Viet Nam;
- 9 -
-- its deployment of over 20,000 of their own or East Bloc
military personnel located in more than 30 Third World
countries, including sophisticated Soviet air-defense missiles
and their crews in Syria; and
-- its innovative and extensive use of surrogate forces --
some 40,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, and Central America.
However, Soviet-Third World relations are not without
friction. At times, the conflicting interests of the Soviet
Union and a Third World nation or group have resulted in twists
and turns for Soviet diplomacy. The PLO's Arafat has recently
discovered this to his misfortune, now that he is opposed by
Syria and has as a result become a non-person in Moscow's
eyes. Nor is it a game without risks for the Soviets. Their
failures in Egypt and Somalia in the 1970's are well-known.
Nonetheless, it is possible for us to identify two broad
benefits that the Soviet Union has gained through its Third
World relationships over this past decade. First of all, these
relationships have permitted the Soviet Union to project power
into regions not immediately on their borders. Looking at
today's geopolitical map, we can see -- for the first time --
- 10 -
Soviet military bases on or adjoining strategically sensitive
points throughout the world: Cam Ranh on the South China Sea
approaches to the Straits of Malacca; Asmara, Aden and the
Dahlak Islands at the access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal;
Luanda in Southern Africa; and a variety of installations in
Cuba on the Caribbean approaches to the Panama Canal and
American Gulf Coast.
Secondly, these Third World relationships have now enabled
the Soviet Union to involve itself in regional politics to a
much greater degree than before. The origin and basic causes
of instability in the Third World are predominantly local in
origin. But all too often, the Soviets have used the
opportunities provided by local instability to expand their
power and influence. To that end, their policies have
frequently hindered efforts to resolve existing tensions. The
difficulties, for instance, of securing peace in Lebanon in the
face of Soviet efforts to encourage Syrian obstruction are
obvious and immediate.
Ironically, at the same time that the Soviets are playing
this increasingly active, if unconstructive role throughout the
world, their basic behavior continues to be rooted in an
excessive insularity. Recent events illustrate three different
aspects of this problem.
- 11 -
If nothing else, the Soviet Union's destruction of KAL 007,
its subsequent attempts to deny any wrong-doing on its part in
this tragedy, and its assertion that it is prepared to act
again in a similar matter as their interests require underscore
the Soviet search for absolute security. The Soviet conduct in
the KAL 007 incident does not stand in isolation. Rather, it
is consistent with a concept of security under which the Soviet
Union has claimed the right to intervene in neighboring states
(which was demonstrated in Afghanistan) and to maintain levels
of weaponry greater than those. of many other states combined
(which we now see in the INF talks).
In the name of absolute security the Soviet leadership
continues to be unwilling to countenance either meaningful
national autonomy for Eastern bloc countries or free expression
and initiative for its own peoples. In recent years, a general
internal crackdown has occurred within the Soviet Union.
Jewish, German, Armenian and other emigration are at the lowest
level since the 1960's and officially-sponsored anti-Semitism
is on the rise. The oppression of such prominent dissidents as
Sakharov and Shcharanskiy continues unabated. Unfortunately,
just in the past month a series of new trials has been held,
resulting in the convictions of:
- 12 -
Iosif Begun [Yo-siff Bay-goon], a noted Jewish activist;
Oleg Radzinskiy [Ah-lyeg Rad-zeen-ski], a leader in the
unofficial Soviet peace movement; and
Father Sigitas Tamkevicius [Seeg-it-tass Tom-kay-veech-us],
at prominent Lithuanian Catholic leader;
-- all for the crime of disseminating anti-Soviet material.
promised
Soviet infringements of the rights guaranteed under the
Helsinki Final Act are representative of the Soviet Union's
ersistent violations of both the spirit and the letter of
nternational obligations. In recent years, apparent Soviet
nfractions of various agreements have increased with troubling
Againts
irequency -- the suppression of human rights
employment that I just of iethel biologimal Inthis the
entioned; evidence of "yellow rain" and biological warfare in
fghanistan and Indochina; and most recently, a series of
oviet activities involving ICBM testing and radar construction
hat has raised serious questions about Soviet compliance with
Storategic offensive
he SALT II and ABM agreements. These Soviet efforts to
tretch treaties and obligations to their very brink and
ometimes beyond have disturbing implications for the future of
he arms control process.
Point: SAL II not Signed
- 13 -
III
Occasionally, we hear the argument that the patterns of
oviet behavior that I have described are at least in part a
esponse to recent U.S. policies. It is asserted that Soviet
ctions, however disproportionate in final result, have arisen
ut of deep-seated fears exacerbated by a perceived U.S.
ostility. While this circular action-reaction model of
.S.-Soviet relations has a simplicity and symmetry that may
ppeal to those so inclined, the evidence available does not
upport it.
In considering Soviet actions over the past decade --
ether in terms of military spending, expanded Third World
ivolvement, or tightened domestic suppression -- I am struck
$ much by the sense of continuity as of change. Obvious
ifts in tempo and tactical emphasis have occurred, but the
sic direction of the Soviet Union has remained much the same
roughout its dealings with the Nixon, Ford, Carter and now
agan Administrations. The Soviets themselves say that their
licies have not changed.
- 14 -
Scholars, for example, differ over the degree to which
particular American policies have affected Soviet emigration
rates in the 1970's. The sustained crack-down on dissidents
over the past years, however, has clearly been driven by Soviet
leadership decisions based primarily on internal
considerations. Similarly, Soviet activism in various Third
World areas during this same period appears to be far more
opportunistic than defensive in the face of any supposed
American provocation.
The Soviet military build-up occurred well before the
United States began devoting increased attention to defense in
the last three to four years. The large, MIRVed ICBMs that
form the core of the Soviet strategic forces, for instance,
have no counterpart in U.S. forces, and certainly cannot be
considered a response to any U.S. program. Soviet SS-20
deployments in Europe and Asia since the mid-1970's cannot be
seen as a counter to U.S. actions, The number of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe has in fact declined during this period.
Since the u.s. has NA theatee
nuclem weapons n Emaple,
Similarly, it is questionable that U.S. statements about
the advantages of democracy over the Soviet system are
themselves responsible for Soviet-American frictions. I recall
that on one of his visits to Moscow, Giscard D'Estaing proposed
- 15 -
to then-Soviet leader Brezhnev that détente in the diplomatic
and economic sphere should be accompanied by a relaxation of
ideological competition. Giscard was firmly rebuffed with the
Soviet rejoinder that ideological coexistence was totally
impossible. The Soviet reaction to our efforts to assist and
support those who seek to build democracy within the Third
World shows that this policy has not changed.
IV
This is not to say that we cannot influence the Soviets.
On the contrary, U.S. policy can be a major factor in shaping
the degree, if not the direction, of Soviet policies. We
should be wary, however, of any illusion about the possibility
of quick or dramatic breakthroughs in our relations with the
Soviet Union, no matter how earnestly we might desire such an
easy solution.
In considering how we might respond to the Soviet actions
that I outlined earlier, this Administration concluded that we
should strive to create an international environment in which
the Soviet Union is faced
- 16 -
-- first, with tangible evidence of a renewed determination
by the United States and its allies to strengthen both our
common defenses and Western political and economic
cohesion, and
-- secondly, with drastically reduced opportunities and
incentives for adventurism and intimidation.
In pursuing this general strategy, we have sought to be
prudent and realistic. In such an environment we expect that
over time the Soviet leadership will see greater restraint on
their part as the most attractive option -- not out of any
sudden conversion to our values, but out of sober calculation
of how best to serve Soviet interests.
To that end, we have pursued policies intended to restore
the military balance. Our preference is to do SO through
verifiable agreements that will reduce arms on both sides.
But, if necessary, we will restore the balance through our own
and allied defense programs. Because of our concern about the
Soviet readiness to use force and promote instability, that we
will resist any encroachments on our vital interests and those
of our allies. At the same time, however, we have stated that
- 17 -
we will respect legitimate Soviet security interests and are
ready to negotiate equitable solutions to outstanding problems.
Such a strategy, of course, is more than just a question of
solely U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union. Rather, it
touches upon the much larger issue of how the West as a whole
manages its dealings with the Communist East. This is a
subject beyond the scope of my speech today. This morning, I
would only note one important point. There is some validity to
the view that a lack of both firmness on the part of the United
States and of cohesion within the Western Alliance has
encouraged the Soviet Union in its lack of restraint. The
Administration believes that the converse is also true -- that
strengthened consultation and cooperation with our various
allies and friends can serve to discourage unconstructive
Soviet actions.
By last spring, we were beginning to see signs that the
Administration's efforts in the economic, defense, and
diplomatic fields were paying off. Domestically, economic
recovery was underway. Various defense programs were already
showing results.
Diplomatically, along with the successful Williamsburg
- 18 -
Summit, a series of productive meetings in NATO and other
international organizations provided a useful benchmark by
which to measure our progress in strengthening the Western
Alliance in terms of our common trade and security policies.
Through this process, the United States reached agreement with
our allies at the Williamsburg Summit and later at the June
meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council in Paris that
economic relations with the Soviet Union should be conducted on
a strict balance of nutual advantage and should nct directly
contribute to Soviet military strength. At the same time, the
Western governments reaffirmed their support of the 1979 "Dual
Track" decision relating to the restoration of a balance in
land-based intermediate nuclear missile forces -- either
through negotiations or Western deployments.
Earlier this year, the United States began to step up the
pace of our dialogue with the Soviets in a variety of channels
and levels -- in both Washington and Moscow as well as in
Geneva, Vienna and Madrid. Our contacts included extensive
sessions on the part of the Secretary and myself with
Ambassador Dobrynin. We pressed a comprehensive agenda in
these exchanges -- covering arms control, regional issues,
human rights, and bilateral questions involving trade and
exchanges. We were expecting no breakthroughs. Rather, we
- 19 -
sought to discover where some progress might be made in
resolving particular problems with the Soviets.
A number of modest, but nonetheless encouraging
developments occurred. In the summer rounds of the START and
MBFR negotiations, the Soviets showed tentative willingness to
contribute to making progress. In Moscow, the Soviet
authorities allowed the emigration of the Pentecostalist
families that had been living at our Embassy for so many
years. After rapid negotiations, a Long Term Grains Agreement
was signed. In response to our proposal, there was a meeting
of U.S. and Soviet experts in Moscow to discuss upgrading the
Hotline and other crisis communications improvements. We were
beginning to discuss the possibility of both a new cultural
exchanges agreement and the opening of new consulates in both
countries.
I do not want to make too much of these modest steps.
Contrary to some press speculation, they did not constitute a
sudden warming in the relationship nor were they necessarily a
prelude to an early Summit. Nonetheless, by late August we
were viewing the Secretary's scheduled meeting with Foreign
Minister Gromyko at the concluding session of the Madrid CSCE
meeting as an opportunity to see whether Soviets were willing
- 20 - -
to follow up these first steps. The Soviets had already
indicated that they were prepared to take actions which would
cool U.S.-Soviet relations should an INF agreement not be
reached before U.S. dęployments of INF missiles i.n Europe were
scheduled to begin late this year. We were interested in
testing these suggestions that cautious progress with the
Soviets might nevertheless be possible late this year and into
the next.
Then, on September 1, the Soviet air-defense forces shot
down KAL 007 and its 269 passengers just as the Korean airliner
was leaving Soviet airspace over Sakhalin. The manner in which
the Soviets mishandled the KAL tragedy throughout and how these
events inevitably set back any hopes for early progress in our
relations with the Soviets are well-known.
The necessity of a firm American response to these Soviet
actions was clearcut. We promptly took a number of steps on
our own and in concert with other nations. We pressed for the
international condemnation of the Soviet actions. We were
active in supporting the aviation boycott of the Soviet Union.
Foreign Minister Gromyko's performance in Madrid -- before the
assembled CSCE participants and in his private meeting with
Secretary Shultz -- made clear that the Soviet Union was
- 21 -
determined to persist in its stonewalling on this issue. The
Soviet Union was not interested in finding a way to limit the
damage this tragedy would cause on the state of East-West
relations.
The domestic calls for a harsh and across-the-board
reaction on our part were understandably strong and came from
both a liberal and conservative direction. However, the
Administration believed that our basic approach in dealing with
the Soviet Union was still valid. We were shocked, but not
surprised. This use of Soviet force merely confirmed what we
had been saying all along about the Soviet Union and reaffirmed
the need for realism and strength on our part.
Similarly, we concluded that however justifiably strained
our relations with the Soviets might become over the KAL
shootdown, we should not be the ones to foreclose serious
dialogue -- particularly on those important issues where a
meaningful resolution would be as much in our interests as in
the Soviets'.
This balance of firm resistance to unacceptable Soviet
actions with a readiness to pursue a meaningful dialogue was a
central theme of the President's address before the United
- 22 -
Nations General Assembly on September 26. The President gave
substance to that message by announcing a threefold initiative
in the INF talks in Geneva. Within a week of his UN address,
he followed this with a.major new initiative in the START
negotiations.
I urge you to look closely at what we are proposing in
those negotiations. In both cases, we are making a serious
effort to address Soviet concerns and achieve equitable and
mutually-acceptable agreements. In INF, for example, we are
moving on an issue -- that of the so-called U.S. "forward-based"
systems aircraft that the Soviets have been raising back to
the beginning of the SALT I process. Similarly, in START, we
have now explicitly committed ourselves to tradeoffs between
our bombers and their missiles.
For their part, the Soviets have not yet responded in any
way as to reduce tensions. They have sought to maintain a pose
of apparent moderation and reason toward the Europeans, while
adopting an increasingly shrill tone toward the United States.
Indeed, the intemperate language of Mr. Andropov's statement of
September 28 was designed to suggest that they have given up
altogether on dealing with the Reagan Administration. This is,
of course, not born out by daily realities. Our channels to
- 23 -
the Soviets are open and working. We continue to talk; they
continue to talk. In some instances, it is tough talk on both
sides. It is not yet clear, however, how the Soviets will
proceed from here.
We are now in a period of uncertainty as to the immediate
future of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviets are facing a
major foreign policy embarrassment. Should we not reach
agreement this fall in Geneva on an effective and equitable INF
solution, U.S. deployments will go forward -- an event the
Soviet Union has invested considerable political capital to
block. Earlier this week, the Soviet Ministry of Defense
announced intentions to emplace modern, short-range missiles in
both East Germany and Czechoslovakia as a counter-measure to
the potential U.S. deployments. It is clear, however, that
these are improvements to Soviet military capabilities in
Eastern Europe that already had been planned to be underway in
this time period.
It remains much less certain how long and how widely they
are prepared to chill East-West relations over INF. We do
know, as the Soviets have said to us and others in private,
that they do not want a confrontation leading to war. We are
therefore dealing with one of the many crises in our relations
- 24 -
with the Soviets -- with all the attendant uncertainties -- but
it is not one which either side will push too far.
V
These uncertainties and as yet unanswerable questions
return me to my beginning point -- that despite fifty years of
intense preoccupation with our Soviet relationship, we still
know and understand far too little about the Soviet Union.
In the Administration and the State Department in
particular, we are acutely aware of the need to rebuild and to
strengthen Soviet and East European studies within the United
States. That is a resource we cannot afford to neglect any
longer.
For those reasons, the Administration fully supports the
goals expressed in the "Soviet-East European Research and
Training Act of 1983,' a bill now before the Congress sponsored
by Senator Richard Lugar and Representative Lee Hamilton. This
legislation would help to provide a stable base for the
mprovement of our professional Soviet and East European
esearch. The State Department has taken the lead in the
dministration's efforts to obtain a separate annual
- 25 - -
propriation to administer the programs envisioned in this
ill. This financial and administrative mechanism would give
5 the means to achieve the objectives which all parties -- the
ongress, the Executive, and the academic community -- agree
:e essential to strengthening our understanding of the Soviet
ion.
We still have far to so in both furthering that
derstanding of the Soviet Union and in the development of a
re stable and constructive relationship with that country. I
!lieve we have laid the groundwork for important and
!aningful progress in both regards.
I fear that I have already talked far too long and regret
at I will not be able to remain with you for all of your
scussions. I look forward, however, to hearing of your
liberations and would welcome the constructive suggestions
u might wish to send on to me in Washington. Thank you again
I inviting me.
7705
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 27, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Draft Speech by Deputy Secretary Dam
We have reviewed the attached draft speech to be given by
Deputy Secretary Dam and recommend that the language on
page 12 be vetted by a lawyer familiar with our position
regarding the legal status of the Helsinki Final Act.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
Attachment
7733
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TO:
BOB KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Asm
SUBJECT:
Brubeck at SPASO
I attach a memo along the lines of our
discussion earlier today.
M Bob Sims concurs.
DECLASSIFIED
By R.Vitt NARA, Date 7/28/99
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
7733
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SUCRET
October 27, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR TERESA COLLINS
Chief, Secretariat Staff
Executive Secretariat
U.S. Information Agency
SUBJECT:
Cultural Presentations at Ambassador's Residence
Moscow
In reference to the memorandum of October 26 from Mr. Tomlinson
to Mr. McFarlane, the NSC staff endorses the recommendation of
the Department of State.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
By L.Vit NARA, Date 7/28/99
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
United States
Office of the Director
Information
Agency
SECRET
7733
Washington, D,C 20547
USIA
03 001 20 P8: 07
October 26, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Honorable
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
FROM:
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson
Acting Director
Director Wick would appreciate your guidance regarding a cultural program
planned by Ambassador Hartman for his residence in Moscow next month.
As the attached memorandum indicates (Remick-Hedges, 10/16/83) the program
featuring the Dave Brubeck Quartet would be the first such event since the KAL
incident. Other previously scheduled events have been postponed or cancelled.
Mr. Leslie Lenkowsky, who will be nominated shortly to be USIA Deputy
Director, last week concluded, after consultation with Robert Sims and
Dave Gergen, that this event should be postponed until after the end of 1983
due to domestic and other considerations.
I understand that Ambassador Hartman and the State Department wish to proceed
with the Brubeck event. Since Mr. Lenkowsky is new here, we want to ensure
that all proper procedures for deciding the issue are followed. Director
Wick, in a phone call from Paris today, directed me to seek your guidance
urgently on this matter. Please let me know the NSC decision at your earliest
convenience. Thank you.
SECRET
Classified by:
Kenneth Y. Tomlinson
DECLASSIFIED
Acting Director
NLS F95-074/2 #98
GDS: OADR
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 7/18/00
CONFIDENTIAL
October 16, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: C - Mr. Hedges
FROM:
EU - - Marlin W. Remick xH
SUBJECT:
Dave Brubeck and Ambassador Hartman's
Spaso House Cultural Program
Over the course of several months before the Soviets shot down
the KAL 007 airliner (August 31), Ambassador Hartman, our PAO
and CAO in Moscow and EU have been working jointly on
arranging a number of cultural programs to take place in the
Ambassador's residence in Moscow and in the Consul General's
residence in Leningrad. Several artists had been lined up to
participate in this program, beginning this past September and
continuing into 1984. (Ambassador Hartman started doing
similar cultural programming at Spaso House for especially
invited Soviet elites from the time of his presentation of
credentials as Ambassador.) The Dave Brubeck Quartet was one
of the programs that have been under negotiation for several
months, which, along with Pearl Bailey and Ben Vereen, were
planned to take place in November, the 50th anniversary of
diplomatic relations between the US and the USSR.
The schedule, as it was shaping up before the KAL tragedy, was
as follows:
1983
September - Major film showings
October - Johnny Cash
October Actors Theater of Louisville group
Each of the above events was cancelled as inappropriate
after the KAL airliner was shot down.
November - Dave Brubeck Quartet
November - Pearl Bailey (postponed until March 1984)
November - Ben Vereen group (postponed into 1984)
1984
January Ware/McKenzie Duo
February - Opera singer Phyllis Curtin
March - New York Arts Ensemble
April - Muir String Quartet (possibly June)
April - Ruff-Mitchell Jazz Duo
May Composer and Pianist Leo Smit
Indefinite - Weekley/Arganbright (4-hand piano duo)
CONTIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
CLASSIFIED BY: Charles E. Courtney
OFFICE SYMBOL: EU
NLS F95-074/2#99
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
BY LOT NARA, DATE 7/18/00
CONFIDENTIAL
[2]
The Soviets may refuse to issue Guest-of-the-Ambassador visas
to Brubeck and the other groups. The Soviet Embassy here had
told us that they would not issue such visas to the Actors
Theatre of Louisville group and that they would have to go to
the Soviet Union under Intourist auspices.
In our negotiations with Mr. Gloyd, Dave Brubeck's manager,
our understanding was that Brubeck was more than willing to
forego performance fees for his group. Mr. and Mrs. Brubeck
must fly first class, the rest of the group, including two
other spouses would fly economy fare. The estimated total
cost is on the order of $30,000. Costs attributable to the
spouses were to be covered by Ambassador Hartman's special
private fund (from private sector contributions).
The following is also noted for your information, with no
implications intended in respect to any decision being made on
the Brubeck program. Mr. Gloyd is fully aware of the
possible, ultimate visa problem; he has been informed of the
negative decision to date; and he has indicated that the group
has not made other commitments in the meantime and would still
be willing to go if requested. Mr. Gloyd also clearly
indicated, as he had earlier, that they would be willing to
consider another date sometime in 1984, but that the
mid-November beginning of tour had worked out nicely for them.
When the Ambassador met with the Director on September 1, in
the immediate aftermath of the KAL tragedy neither the
Ambassador nor we focused on the question of the cultural
programs being arranged for Spaso (Memcon attached).
Subsequently, however, the Ambassador cancelled the film
showing planned for September and he also cancelled the
planned October visit of the Actors Theatre of Louisville. In
the meantime Johnny Cash also cancelled in the wake of KAL.
While Sam was travelling in Europe, I telephoned PAO Benson,
who was in Helsinki at the time hoping to rendezvous with Sam
at that point. I told Ray that I thought that none of us,
including the Mission in Moscow, in the immediate rush of
events after KAL, had re-addressed ourselves to what it was
appropriate to continue to plan for Spaso cultural programming
in November and December. I asked Ray to sit down with the
Ambassador and the DCM in Moscow to address that situation in
terms of the domestic considerations here, and most
particularly that Brubeck, Pearl Bailey and Ben Vereen had all
been scheduled months earlier to coalesce in November for
programs at Spaso in Moscow and with the Consul General in
Leningrad. The Embassy subsequently indicated that the
Ambassador and the Mission wanted to go ahead with scheduling
Brubeck for mid-November. When Sam returned from his European
travel he pointed out that the question of Brubeck should be
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
[3]
raised with Mr. Lenkowsky and that the White House also should
be asked to make a decision. Sam then raised the question
with Mr. Lenkowsky.
CONFIDENTIAL
System II
91320
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
October 31, 1983
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK from
SUBJECT:
Eagleburger-Dobrynin Conversation
Following my request last week, State finally sent over today the
copy of a cable reporting on the Eagleburger-Dobrynin conversa-
tion which had been mentioned earlier in a night reading item.
The short report in the night reading covered the highlights.
Perhaps the most interesting items are Dobrynin's harping on the
need to re-establish communications (including his broad hint
that he would like to see the President again), and his comments
regarding the need to notify the Soviets of proposals privately
in advance of going public, if we want the proposals to be taken
seriously (paragraph 6). This is, in fact, the Soviet attitude,
since they do not expect us to take seriously Soviet proposals
which have not been discussed with us in advance.
A copy of the cable/memcon is attached at Tab I.
Attachment:
Tab I
State cable/memcon
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS F95-074/2*102
BY not NARA, DATE 11/6/00
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
SYSTEM II
C
91311
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
October 28, 1983
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F.MATLOCK Ism
SUBJECT:
Hartman-Gromyko Meeting
You may want to take a look at the report (Tab I) of Hartman's
meeting with Gromyko on October 19. The major thrust of
Gromyko's comment was that the Soviet leaders are convinced that
the Reagan Administration does not accept their legitimacy, and
that therefore it is not prepared to negotiate seriously with the
USSR, but is actually dedicated to bringing down the system.
There is a large self-serving element in such argumentation, but
I believe that it is an argument used in policy debates among the
Soviet leadership. Given the present signs of uncertainty in the
Soviet leadership, and the indirect evidence of debate, it
probably serves our interest to do what we can (without changing
our policies) to undercut the force of this argument.
Attachment:
Tab I
Report of Hartman/Gromyko Meeting
DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED
NLS 595-074/2#100
BY LOJ , NARA, DATE 11/6/00
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON GROMYKO OCTOBER 19
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMAY: 1 CALLED ON GROMYKO TODAY TO GET A READYING
OF HIS VIEWS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP PRRIO TO MY
DEPARTURE TOMORROW. THE DISCUSSION VERY QUICKLY BECAME
A PHILOSOPHICAL ONE; IN FACT, HE HAD NOTHING NEW TO
SAY ON THE ONE SECIFIC ISSUE -- INF -- THAT WE TOUCHED
ON. BUT HE DID GO TO GREAT LENGTHS IN ARGUING THAT THE
MAJOR PROBLEM THE SOVIETS HAVE WITH THE REAGAN ADMINIS-
TRATION IS THAT THEY BELIEVE WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO
ACCEPT THEIR LEGITIMACY AND THEREFORE THAT WE CONSTANTLY
INTRUDE IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO ISSUES OF WAR
AND PEACE. EVEN ALLOWING FOR HIS WELL-KNOWN THESPIAN
OUALITIES, GROMYKO WAS PASSIONATE ON THE SUBJECT,
FREQUENTLY CORRECTING HIS INTERPRETER TO MAKE SURE THAT
EXACT NUANCES WERE BEING CONVEYED AND EVEN KEEPING ME
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FIFTEEN MINUTES BEYOND OUR ALLOTTED HOUR TO EMPHASIZE
HIS POINTS. WHILE A LOT OF THIS IS OBVIOUSLY SELF-
SERVING, AT LEAST IT'S A PROBLEM WE SHOOULD TALK ABOUT
IN-HOUSE; I HOPE WE CAN DISCUSS THE ISSUE WHEN I SEE
YOU NEXT WEEL END SUMMARY.
3. GROMYKO RECEIVED ME IN HIS MFA OFFICE. HE LOOKED
NONE THE WORST FOR WEAR FOLLOWING HIS RIGOROUS TRAVELS
AND CONVERSATIONS GROMYKO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY USA
DEPARTMENT CHIEF BESSMERTNYKH; I BROGUGHT WITH ME MY DCM,
ZIMMERMANN. WHILE GROMYKO HAD SOME HARD THINGS TO SAY,
HIS TONE WAS MORE REFLECTIVE THAN POLEMICAL A STRIKING
CONTRAST FROM THE PYROTECHNICS AT MADRID.
4. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I HAD COME PRIMARILY TO LISTEN,
AND WANTED TO GET HIS SENSE OF THE STATE OF RELATIONS
BEFORE MY CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON. BEGINNING WITH
INF, I WONDERED WHAT THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN.
IF IT HAS BEEN TO STOP DEPOLYMENT, IT WON'T SUCCEED.
IF IT HAS BEEN TO LIMIT OUR DEPLOYMENTS, OUR NEGOTIATIONS
SHOULD BE MORE SERIOUS. I TOLD GROMYKO I WAS PUZZLED.
5. GROMYKO RESPONDED BY NOTING THE LOW DEPTH TO WHICH
OUR RELATIONS HAVE SUNK AND SAY-ING THAT THIS WAS THE
PRODUCT OF THE POLICY OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION. HE
CLAIMED THAT IN INF THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEGOTIATING
POSITION WAS NOT SERIOUS AND THAT WE WERE JUST KILLING
TIME IN ORDER TO MISLEAD PEOPLE AND USE THE NEGOTIATIONS
AS A SORT OF SMOKE SCREEN FOR DEPLOYMENT. HE SAID THE
SOVIET UNION DOES NOT SEEK DOMINANCE, BUT WILL TAKE
MEASURES TO ASSURE THAT ITS POSITION IS NOT WEAKENED.
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS IN FAVOR OF PARITY AND EQUALITY.
IT HAS MADE PROPOLSASLS BASED ON PARITY. BUT PARITY CAN
BE ON VARIOUS LEVELS; IT IS ONE THING TO HAVE PARITY
AT A LOWER LEVEL BUT ANOTHER THING TO HAVE PARITY AT
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A HIGHER LEVEL LEADING TO MAJOR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.
6. AN UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION ENSUED REGARDING THE BRITISH
AND FRENCH FORCES. GROMYKO CALLED OUR ASSERTIONS THAT
THEY ARE NOT PART OF NATO SYSTEMS A "FAIRYTALE". IF
WE WANTED SOMEONE TO BELIEVE SUCH A FAIRYTALE, THEN
WE'LL HAVE TO LOOK FOR SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE SOVIT
UNION. I TRIED TO FULL GROMYKO BACK TO THE SITUATION
HE ENVISAGES FOLLOWING OUR DEPLOYMENTS. HE REFUSED TO
BE DRAWN ASSTRTING SIMPLY THAT OUR ACTION WOULD LEAD TO
NEW TWISTS IN THE ARMS SPIRAL. I STRESSED THE PRESIDENT'
WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ADDED THAT
IN DOING so WE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF
SUCH NON-NUCLEAR POWERS AS THE FRG. GROMYKO SAID THAT
OUR LATEST PROPOSAL WAS A MOCKERY OF COMMON SENSE AND
THAT NEITHER IN INF NOR IN START HAD OUR RECENT PROPOSALS
MOVED EVEN ONE SMALL STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF AGREEMENTS.
1. GROMYKO THEN MOVED ON TO HIS PRIMARY MESSAGE. HE
SAID THAT U.S. POLICIES AND STATEMENTS ARE BASED ON
DECEPTION AND ARE UNWORTHY OF TRUST. OUR WAYS OF DEALING
WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHOWED NO VESTIGE OF ELEMENTARY
PROPRIETY. IDEOLOGY WAS BEING MIXED INTO POLICIES
INVOLVING WORLED SECURITY AND ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE.
8. I ARGUED THAT SOVIETS, OF ALL PEOPLE, SHOULD NOT BE
SURPRISED AT IDEOLOGICAL COMBAT. 1 MYSELF HAD HEARD
BREZHNEV. AT THE HEIGHT OF DETENTE, SAY THAT THE
7DEOLOGICAL COMPETITION WOULD CONTINUE. AND I HEARD
ANDROPOV LESS THAN A YEAR AGO -- IN A SPEECH IN THE
KREMLIN -- DEVOTE THE FIRST HALF TO IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS AND THE SECOND HALF TO A DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL.
THE SOVIET UNION HAS A PARTY APARATUS AND NEWSPAPERS
THAT CAN MAKE THE IDEOLOGICAL CASE WHILE THE GOVERNMENT
LEADERS CAN CONCENTRATE ON STATE POLICY; THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE SUCH POSSIBILITIES.
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PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SRONG IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS; THE
FACT THAT HE HOLDS THEM DDOES NOT MEAN THAT HE DOES NOT
DESIRE TO PURSUE ARMS CONTROL OR TO DISCUSS REGIONAL
PROBLEMS SERIOUSLY WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
9. GROMYKO CLAIMED THAT IN NEGOTIATING WITH THREE U.S.
PRESIDENTS. BREZHNEV HAD NEVER PUT IEOLOGY ON THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE. IIF SAID IT WOULD BE ONE THING IF
PRESIDENT REAGAN WENT TO A CLUB AND GAVE A LECTURE ON
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIALIST AND CAPITALIST
IDEOLOGY. HE COULD OUTLINE THE ADVANTAGES OF CAPITALIST
IDEOLOGY; HE COULD ARGUE THE VIRTUES OF IDEALIST PHILOSOPHY
OVER MATERIAL PHILOSOPHT: AND, IN THE FIELD OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, HE COULD NOTE HIS PREFERENCE FOR ADAM SMITH
OVER KARL MARX. BUT IT'S SOMEETHING ELSE WHEN HE ATTACKS
THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR SOCIAL SYSTEM, OUR CONSTITUTION
OUR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT. AND OUR LEADERSHIP. WITH SUCH
RHETORIC BEING USED, GROMYKO CONTINUED, IT IS DIFFICULT
TO DISCUSS POLITICAL ISSUES. INDEED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING
AT ALL
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SECRETARY BURT
(
10. I COUNTERED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO DEFINE OUR
COMPETITION PURELY IN TERMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES.
THE COMPEITION GOES ON IN MANY AREAS. IN PART BECAUSE
BOTH OF US ARE FREE TO PROMOTE OUR COMPETING IDEOLOGIES
AND THIS IS BOUND TO BRING US INTO CONFLICT. WE HAVE TO
MAINTAIN A STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONSHIP, EXERCISE RESTRAINT,
AND TALK MORE. I DENIED THAT OUR MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE
SOVIETS WAS THE EXISTENCE OF THEIR SYSTEM; OUR MAJOR
PROBLEM WAS THAT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR
FRIENDS WERE AFFECTED BY SOVIET ACTIVITIES. I RECALLED
FOR GROMYKO THAT OUR CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION TOOK ROOT AT THE TIME OF A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT
AND A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS.
11. GROMYKO THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LONG PLEA FOR THE
SEPARATION OF IDEOLOGICAL AND SECURITY PROBLEMS, ARGUING
THAT IDEOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE A FACTOR WHEN ISSUES OF
WAR AND PEACE ARE BEING DISCUSSED. SAYING IN SPEECHES
ON NUCLEAR ARMAMANETS AND SECURITY THAT SOCIALIST
REPRESENTATIVES DON'T BELIEVE IN GOD OR IN LIFE
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AFTER DEAATH AND HAVE DIFFERENT MORAL VALUES IS NOT A
CORRECT APPROACH TO SECURITY PROBLEMS. WHETHER THIS IS
A CONSCIOUS APPROACH ON YOUR PART OR A CARELESS APPROACH,
IT'S EQUALLY BAD IN EITHER CASE. GROMYKO CITED THREE
EXAMPLES OF THE "CORRECT" APPROACH: THE OVERCOMING
OF EDIOLOGICAL DIFFERNCES TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS 5 ₫ YEARS AGO; THE COLLABORATION IN WORLD WAR 11;
AND THE SALT I AND 11 AGREEMENTS.
12. I TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE IDE OLOGICAL APPROACH OF
WHICH HE COMPLAINED HAD NOT BEEN PRESENT ON OUR SIDE IN
THE HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES WE HAVE HAD WITH THE SOVIT
LEADERSHIP. GROMYKO. SOMEWHAT ODDLY. SAID HE FOUND THIS
REMARK VERY INTERESTING. I FOLLOWED UP BY TELLING HIM
TO TAKE THESE PRIVATE EXCHANGES EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY
BECAUSE THEY SHOW WHAT THE PRESIDENT HOPES TO ACCOMPLISH
N THE RELATIONSHIP. HARTMAN
LERT COPY
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C
7825
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
October 31, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 972
SUBJECT:
Letter from Congressman Lowry Regarding Elbert
Family
Congressman Lowry has written you (Tab II) to inform you of a
petition he and a large number of other Members of Congress sent
to USSR Procurator General Rekunkov, urging that charges of drug
possession (apparently trumped-up) be dropped against Lev Elbert
of Kiev, and that he and his family be allowed to emigrate to
Israel, as they have sought to do for nine years.
A reply to Lowry's letter is attached for your signature at
Tab I.
Chris Cmt Lehman and John Lenczowski concur.
JL
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the attached letter to Congressman Lowry.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Proposed Letter to Congressman Lowry
Tab II
Letter from Congressman Lowry
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Congressman Lowry:
Thank you for your letter of October 28, 1983,
calling my attention to the petition you and your
colleagues sent to Soviet Procurator General Rekunkov
regarding Lev Elbert and his family.
I hope that Soviet authorities will drop the
charges against Mr. Elbert and allow him and his
family to emigrate as they have long desired.
Although we have very little influence over the
Soviets in these matters--particularly when our
relations are strained as they are now--I am asking
the Department of State to inform our Embassy in
Moscow of your appeal so that it can be supported in
all appropriate ways.
Sincerely,
Robert C. McFarlane
The Honorable Mike Lowry
United States Representative
Washington, D. C. 20515
1823
MIKE LOWRY
COMMITTEES:
SEVENTH DISTRICT
BUDGET
WASHINGTON
CHAIRMAN:
TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND TRADE
1206 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
Congress of the United States
BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN
(202) 225-3106
AFFAIRS
107 PREFONTAINE PLACE SOUTH
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104
house of Representatives
SUBCOMMITTEES:
HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
(206) 442-7170
DEVELOPMENT
Mashington, D.C. 20515
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT
AND MONETARY POLICY
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCE
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
(ON LEAVE)
October 28, 1983
The Honorable Robert McFarlane
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Mr. McFarlane:
I have enlosed a copy of a letter to Mr. Aleksandr Rekunkov, the Procurator
General of the Soviet Union, concerning the Elbert family of Kiev. My
colleaques and I wanted you to know of our concern about Lev and Inna Elbert
and their son Karmi, and our hope that Soviet officials will allow them to
emigrate to Israel.
Anything you can do to assist in this matter would be creatly appreciated.
Milafary
Enclosure
Congress of the United States
house of Representatives
Clashington, D.C. 20515
October 28, 1983
Aleksandr M. Rekunkov
Procurator General
ul. Pushkinskaya 15-A
Moscow 103009
RSFSR, USSR
Dear Mr. Rekunkov:
We are writing to you to express our deep concern about Lev Elbert and his
family. An investigation of Lev Elbert on charges of drug possession is
scheduled to end on November 4. We are also disturbed by the possibility that
similar charges might be brought against Mrs. Elbert.
We have followed the Elbert family's situation for several years; many of us
have met them, their relatives, or friends of the family. We find the
allegations against Lev and Inna Elbert to be totally inconsistent with their
character and integrity.
In addition, it is our understanding that Lev's parents have been questioned
by the authorities. These reports also concern us, especially since his
father, a decorated war hero, is in very poor health.
we urge you to personally intervene and drop these charges against Lev Elbert,
and to permit the family to emigrate. They have sought permission to emigrate
for nine years; during the last three years there has been no official reason
for refusal. The Elberts' case is a clear-cut instance of family reunification
and repatriation to the historic Jewish homeland of Israel, where Mrs. Elbert's
mother and brother now live. Failure to allow the Elberts to emiorate is
inconsistent with the consensus at Madrid to strengthen the Helsinki Final Act.
Again, we wish to express our deep interest in the Elberts, and to stress that
the resolution of this and similar human rights cases is a barometer of our
relations.
Sincerely,
Willim
William Lehman, M.C.
ThikeJoury Mike Lowry, M.C.
Parren J.Mitcheel
Oale E. Childer
Parren J. Mitchell, M.C.
Dale E. Kildee, M.C.
augustus Augustus F. Hawkins, 7. Hawkins M.C.
Jed Weiss
Ted Weiss, M.C.
Sidney Sidney Yates, R. yetrs M.C.
-
Usaalam Les AuCoin, M.C.
R DrC Jilman
Edward Edward Boland, M.C.
Boland
Ben jamin A. Gilman, M.C.
Norman Norman F. Lent, I M.C. Lew
Walse Facentrog
Walter E. Fauntroy, M.C.
James JaneLL L. Oberstar, Oheoston M.C.
Havin Jimps
Hamilton Fish Jr., M.C.
Jaych Joseph P. Addabbo, P.Addabbs M.C.
Doug
Dong Walgren, Walgram M.C.
Lawrence
Jany Coughlin, C M.C.
Jack/F. Juck Kemp Kemb, M.C.
James H. Scheuer, M.C.
Norman Y. Mineta, M.C.
Main Berig
Don Edwards
Mario Blaggi, M.C
Don Edwards, M.C.
Berkley Bably
Bedell, M/C. Bedell
Tom Corcoran, M.C.
Bob Edqar, M.G.
Dan Clickman, M.C.
PcHall Patricia Schroeder, M.C. Louis Stokes, M.C.
Dem Douglas H. Bosco, M.C.
Pat Williams
Pat Williams, M.C.
Lon Tom Vandergriff, Undergraph M.C
Babbi Fiedler
Bobbi Fiedler, M.C.
Tom Lantor
Gary L. Ackerman, ackenna M.C.
Tom Lantos, M.C.
Baneyfrand
Barney Frank, M.C.
William
William Carney, M.C.
P. Hill
Bill
M.C.
Tony P. Nall, M.C.
John Edward Porter, M.C.
Stephen J Solarz, M.A
Mike Synar, M.O.
John Seiberling, Subuling M.C.
Jam Sam mak Fm Ge jdenson, M.C.
Martin Frost, M.C.
Sala Burton, M.C.
Nicholas Mavroules, M.C.
Vii Vic Fazio, Fazio M.C.
Norman Sisisky, M.C.
Matthw Marting Matthew G. Martinez, M.C.
Barbare Barbara B. Kennelly, 3.Kennelly M.C.
Nancy Rancy L Johnson, L Johnson M.C.
Sandy M. herin
Sander M. Levin, M.C.
Ray Kogorse
Ray Kouovsek, M.C.
Julie Julian C. Dixon, CDF M.C.
Buan Brian J. Donnelly, Donnelly M.C.
Robert J. matsue
Robert T. Matsui, M.C.
Bruu A. Monison
Bruce A. Morrison, M.C.
Michael Michael J. D. Barnes, M.C. Barres
Raymond Ray J. McGrath, M.C. (lin Ken Kramer, aramer M.C.
Ed J. Markey Markey, M.C.
In Am
Edward
Thomas J. Downey, M.C.
Mark Mark D. Sil jander Siljarder M.C.
George My C Wortley, Clatley M.C.
William Lawrence J. Ratchford, Smith, Rn M.C. M.C.
Geraldine A. Ferraro, M.C.
My Major Owers, M.C. Roven
Dail Dubin
hel Lavine
Richard J. Durbin, M.C.
Mel Levine, M.C.
Jerry Jerry m Patterson, Batterson M.C.
Chales ESchume
Charles E. Schumer, M.C.
Marcy Kapter Marcy Kaptur, M.C
Barbara Poxer
Barbara Boxer, M.C.
Jom Thomas R. Carper, Carper .C.
Howards Howard L. Berman, Buman M.C.
CC: Yuri V. Andropov
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Secretary of State George Shultz
National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane.
7825
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 31, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Letter from Congressman Lowry Regarding Elbert
Family of Kiev
Attached, for appropriate action, are copies of an exchange of
correspondence between Congressman Lowry and Mr. McFarlane
concerning the desire of the Elbert family of Kiev to emigrate to
Israel and charges recently brought by Soviet authorities against
Mr. Elbert.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
Attachments
9132
DETOBER 31,1983
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER
5.
LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
OF STATE
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SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN MEETING WITH EAGLEBURGER
1. x - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, AMBASSADOR
DOBRYNIN CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TO
HAND HIM COPIES OF SOVIET UN INITIATIVES ON "CONDEMNATION
OF NUCLEAR WAR" AND A "NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE." THE UNDER
SECRETARY PROMISED A US RESPONSE, BUT NOTED HIS OWN OFF -
THE-CUFF VIEW THAT THEY RAISE MAJOR VERIFICATION PROBLEMS
AND THAT PROPOSALS WERE TOO GENERAL; WE PREFER SPECIFIC
APPROACHES. THE UNDER SECRETARY RAISED THE
BOMBING IN BURMA AND REITERATED THE NEED FOR ALL PARTIES
TO ACT WITH CAUTION. THE TWO THEN EXCHANGED VIEWS ON
US-SOVIET RELATIONS WITH EMPHASIS ON PROBLEMS IN
COMMUNICATION, ANDROPOV'S SPEECH, AND ARMS CONTROL.
END SUMMARY.
DECLASSIFIED
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3. UN INITIATIVES. DOBRYNIN HANDED OVER COPIES OF
LETTERS FROM ANDROPOV TO UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PEREZ DE
CUELLAR ON "CONDEMNATION OF NUCLEAR WAR" AND A "NUCLEAR
ARMS FREEZE." HE SAID THAT WE WERE BEING GIVEN COPIES
SINCE OUR TWO COUNTRIES WERE THE MOST CLOSELY INVOLVED
IN THESE MATTERS. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER SAID THAT
WE HAD NOT RASHLY REJECTED THE PROPOSALS, THAT WE WOULD
STUDY THEM AND GIVE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE. SPEAKING PER-
SONALLY AND AFTER ONLY A QUICK READING, HE SAW TWO IM-
MEDIATE PROBLEMS: FIRST, VERIFICATION WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM;
AND SECOND, -THE- PROPOSALS WERE BOTH EXTREMELY GENERAL --
WE PREFERRED SPECIFIC APPROACHES.
4. THE KOREAN PROBLEM. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE
SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM TO RAISE THE BOMBING IN BURMA WITH
THE AMBASSADOR. EMPHASIZING THAT THE INFORMATION WAS
FRAGMENTARY AND NOT CONCLUSIVE, HE SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE
SEEMS TO BE POINTING IN THE DIRECTION OF NORTH KOREAN IN-
VOLVEMENT. THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE BECOMING MORE CONVINCED
OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT AS TIME GOES ON. THE UNDER SECRETARY
SAID THAT THE USG WANTED THE SOVIETS TO KNOW THAT SECRETARY
WEINBERGER AND DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM, NOW TRAVELING TO SOUTH
KOREA FOR THE FUNERAL, HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REPEAT OUR
EARLIER CAUTIONS TO THE SOUTH KOREANS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT
AND TO KEEP ACTION IN THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL CHANNELS.
HE ADDED THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE UNDERSTANDABLY HYPER-
SENSITIVE NOW, BUT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO STOP THEM FROM
UNDERTAKING ANY RASH ACTS AND HOPEFULLY, THE SOVIETS WOULD
CONVEY THE SAME MESSAGE TO PYONG YANG. WE HAD URGED THE
CHINESE TO DO SO AS WELL. DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD REPORT
OUR VIEWS TO MOSCOW AND NOTED THAT THE CHINESE WERE CLOSER
THAN SOVIETS TO BOTH NORTH AND SOTH KOREA.
IMPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET
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OUTGOING
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5. ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT. THE TWO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE
MEANING OF ANDROPOV'S SPEECH. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
SAW IT AS TOTALLY CONFRONTATIONAL AND HARDLINE, LIKE
"SLAMMING A DOOR" ON DIALOGUE. MOREVOER, IT WAS VERY DIF-
FICULT FOR THE US TO MOVE IN POSITIVE DIRECTIONS WHEN THE
LEADER OF THE SOVIET UNION REPEATS STATEMENTS ALREADY MADE
BY LOWER LEVELS THAT THE SOVIETS SHOT DOWN KAL-007, THEY
WOULD DO IT AGAIN, AND IT IS NOT THEIR FAULT. FURTHER,
AT A TIME WHEN COMMUNICATION LINES ARE TENUOUS, IT IS UN-
FORTUNATE THAT THE SOVIETS REACTED SO QUICKLY AND SO NEGA-
TIVELY TO OUR INF PROPOSAL.. THE UNDER SECRETARY POINTED
OUT THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE SOVIET REACTION, PRESIDENT
REAGAN HAD CAREFULLY STATED THAT ARMS CONTROL AND CERTAIN
OTHER AREAS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE KAL-007 SHOOTDOWN.
DOBRYNIN RESPONDED THAT ANDROPOV WAS NOT TAKING THE
INITIATIVE TO PUT IN A NEW POLICY, BUT SIMPLY DRAWING CON-
CLUSIONS AS TO OUR POLICY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING
WITH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HE ADDED THAT ANDROPOV'S
REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT OUR DIS-
CUSSION COULD NOT BE CONTINUED.
6. ARMS CONTROL. WHI-E BLAMING THE US SIDE FOR
INITIATING AND CONTINUING THE PRACTICE OF "LEAKS" AND
ANNOUNCING INITIATIVES -IN THE PRESS, DOBRYNIN ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT BOTH SIDES WERE NOW GUILTY OF THIS PRACTICE. HE
SAID THAT IF WE BOTH WERE SERIOUS, THAT BEFORE A NEW
INITIATIVE WAS ANNOUNCED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE,
A
WARNING" OR "HEADS-UP" WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE OTHER
SIDE TO HELP THEM PREPARE. HE USED THE CURRENT US START
INITIATIVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW NOT TO PROCEED. NOT ONLY
WAS THE SOVIET SIDE NOT GIVEN ANY WARNING OF THE INITIA-
TIVE, BUT WHEN THEY SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE PROPOSAL
AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, GENERAL ROWNY - AT LEAST FOR
THE FIRST TWO OR THREE MEETINGS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S
ANNOUNCEMENT - COULD NOT GIVE IT TO THEM.
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TURNING TO THE US INF PROPOSAL, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT OUR
METHOD OF HANDLING THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS WELL AS OTHER
UNSPECIFIED "HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS" HAD TAKEN AWAY THE
FLEXIBILITY THAT KVITSINSKIY HAD.
HE WENT ON TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS SIMPLE FOR
THE SOVIETS TO TURN IT DOWN BECAUSE IT DID NOT DEAL WITH
THE TWO ISSUES CENTRAL TO THE SOVIETS:
(A) IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS.
(B) IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE US BUILD-UP OF MISSILES IN
EUROPE.
DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THESE ISSUES WERE THE BASIS OF THEIR
TURN DOWN AND THAT REGARDLESS OF CHANGES ON OTHER ISSUES,
THESE HAD TO BE ADDRESSED.
THE TWO THEN DISCUSSED THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
INCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES IN SOME DETAIL.
7. GENERAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. IN RESPONSE TO
DOBRYNIN'S REQUEST, UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER GAVE HIS
VIEW OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID THAT THIS
IS A TOUGH TIME THAT BOTH SIDES NEED TO MANAGE VERY.
CAREFULLY. WHILE OUR RELATIONSHIP IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT,
IT NOW HAS BECOME EVEN MORE SO - EVEN DANGEROUS.
DOBRYNIN AGREED AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN TERMS OF
ACTUAL COMMUNICATION, THIS WAS THE WORST TIME THAT HE CAN
RECALL. HE DID NOT MEAN FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
OUR GOVERNMENTS, BUT RATHER FRANK, OPEN CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN SENIOR OFFICIALS. HE DID RECALL THAT HIS MEETING
WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN VERY GOOD. HE SAID THAT WE
CURRENTLY DO NOT ATTEMPT TO HAVE A DIALOGUE, TO FXPLAIN
POSITIONS AND VIEWS TO EACH OTHER. THERE IS JUST TOO
MUCH MISUNDERSTANDING ON BOTH SIDES.
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UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER REPLIED THAT THERE WAS ONE
EXAMPLE HE KNEW OF A SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDING. THAT
WAS AT MADRID OVER THE QUESTION OF CERTAIN HUMAN RIGHTS
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OUR TWO SIDES. IN OUR VIEW, WE
WERE MISLED. DOBRYNIN STRONGLY AFFIRMED THAT THERE WAS
A MISUNDERSTANDING. UPON HEARING OUR VERSION, THE
SOVIETS HAD INTENSELY "GRILLED" THE SOVIET INVOLVED.
HE STRONGLY DENIED MAKING OR PROPOSING ANY SUCH DEAL.
DOBRYNIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT NATURALLY THE SOVIETS
BELIEVE THEIR MAN AND THE US SIDE WILL BELIEVE THEIRS.
WHAT HE CAN CONFIDENTLY SAY, HOWEVER, IS EVEN IN THE
EVENT THAT KONDRASHEV DID DISCUSS A DEAL WITH KAMPELMAN,
IT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS
SIMPLY DO NOT OPERATE THIS WAY. ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT
WOULD HAVE BEEN PROPOSED OR AT LEAST CONFIRMED AT A
HIGHER LEVEL. THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD HAVE CHECKED.
8. TEXT OF THE TWO SOVIET UN PROPOSALS WILL BE SENT
SEPARATELY.
SHULTZ
Oct. 31,1983
-Soviet and Soviet-backed Cuban penetration of Grenada is
just one more example of the Soviet policy of using local dis-
putes to penetrate a strategic area militarily.
--This, combined with the unrelenting Soviet military
build-up, presents us with a serious, world-wide challenge. We
must make it clear that we will not stand still and allow them to
spread their poison at will.
--At the same time, we know we must live on the same planet
with the Soviet Union. We are interested in finding negotiated
solutions to our differences.
--We are dedicated, in particular, to finding ways to
negotiate lower arms levels, on a fair, verifiable basis. We are
negotiating very seriously and with determination.
--But we have to recognize that the Soviets will not act
with restraint and negotiate seriously unless we make it clear
that we have the strength and will to deprive them of the bene-
fits of unrestrained competition.