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135840536
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Matlock Chron March 1984 (1)
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135840536
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Matlock Chron March 1984 (1)
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351
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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1986-12-31
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1986
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1983-01-01
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron March 1984 (1)
Box: 3
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
DOCUMENT
NO. AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
letter case
(8401723)
T. memo
from Matlock to Robert McFarlane re: Gromyko speech (1p)
3/1/84
R1 BY
R 5/23/03 MD2-009 #1
P-5
2. memo
from Charles Hill to McFarlane re: Gromyko speech (2pp)
2/29/84
R-1 BI
P-5,
letter case
(8401701)
3. memo
from Matlock to McFarlane re: Sen. Baker's comments (1p)
3/1/84
R-1 BI
R 5/23/03 M02-009 #2
P-5
4. tracking
re: Howard Baker (1p, partial)
2/17/84
P-5 open
worksheet
5. letter
from Howard Baker to the President re: Chernenko (1p)
2/17/84
P-5 open
letter case
(8401578)
6. memo
from Matlock to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet press officials (1p)
3/1/84
P-1 BI
R 5/23/03 M02-009 #3
P-5.
7. memo
from Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re: visit of Soviet press
n.d.
P+ 31
officials (1p)
CCTS 12/4/00
COLLECTION:
MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
dlb
FILE FOLDER:
Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] OA 90887 Box 3
10/19/95
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors,
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6)
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6)
of the FOIA]
of the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7)
of the FOIA].
C.
Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial
institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
DOCUMENT
NO. AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
8. memo
from Hill to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet press officials (1p)
2/24/84
P-1 BI
P-5
9. memo
copy of item #6 (1p)
3/1/84
P-1 BI
R MOZ-009 # 63 5/25/13 (Dupe)
P-5,
10. memo
copy of item # 7 (1p)
n.d.
PT BI
11. memo
copy of item # 8 (1p)
2/24/84
P-1 BI
P-5\
letter case
(8402505)
12. memo
from Matlock to McFarlane re: Memcon President's meeting with
3/27/84
P+ BI
Chancellor R 5/23/03 Kohl (1p) MOZ-009 # &
13. memcon
re: meeting with Chancellor Kohl (8pp, partial)
3/5/84
P-1 BI
PARt.
-
-
#5
14. memo
from Kimmitt to Hill re: mecon (1p)
n.d.
PT B)
R
~
- #6
15. memo
from Matlock to McP Farlane re: conference on Soviet strategy in
3/5/84
P1 BI
(8401859)
Tokyo (1p)
R
-
- #1
letter case
(8490307)
16. memo
from Matlock to McFarlane re: bilateral issues with Soviets (3pp)
3/8/84
P-1
BI
PArt. 9/7/07 NLRRM0Z-009 #8
P-5.
COLLECTION:
MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
dlb
FILE FOLDER:
Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] OA 90887 Box 3
10/19/95
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors,
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6)
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6)
of the FOIA]
of the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7)
of the FOIA].
C.
Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial
institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
DOCUMENT
NO. AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
17. memo
from Matlock to William Clark re: strategy paper (3pp)
8/8/83
R-1
PArt 9/7/07 NUMBDZ-009 #9
P-5,
18. memo
from Hill to Clark re: strategy paper (1p)
8/5/83
P-1 BI
19. strategy
(6pp)
n.d.
R-1
BI
paper
PArt 9/7/07 NIRRM02-009 #10
P-5
20. briefing
n.d.
P-1 BI
(2pp) PART. 5/23/03 MUZ-009 # 11
26
paper
21. memo
from Kimmitt to Hill re: strategy paper (2pp)
8/8/83
R-1
BI
P-5
22. memo
from Kimmitt to Hill (1p)
n.d.
P+1 131
23. memo
from Kimmitt to Hill (1p)
n.d.
PT BI
24. memo
from Kimmitt to Hill re: strategy paper
n.d.
P-1
BI
letter case
(8401831)
25. memo
from Matlock to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet TV commentator
3/12/84
P1
BI
(2pp) R 5/23/03 M07-009 #12
P-5
26. memo
from Kimmitt to Hill re: visit of Soviet TV commentator (1p)
n.d.
P-1
BI
P-5.
27. draft memo
from Kimmitt to Hill re: visit of Soviet TV commentator (1p)
n.d.
P-1
BI
reply
P-5
COLLECTION:
MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
dlb
FILE FOLDER:
Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] OA 90887 Box 3
10/19/95
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors,
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6)
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6)
of the FOIA]
of the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7)
of the FOIA].
c.
Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial
institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
DOCUMENT
NO. AND TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
28. memo
from Hill to McFarlane re: visit of Soviet TV commentantor (1p)
3/3/84
R-1
B
P-5
COLLECTION:
MATLOCK, JACK F.: Files
dlb
FILE FOLDER:
Matlock Chron March 1984 [1 of 4] OA 90887 Box 3
10/19/95
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors,
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(B)(6)
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6)
of the FOIA]
of the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7)
of the FOIA].
C.
Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial
institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer CAS
Box Number
3
FOIA M02-009
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1984 (1)
DATE 3/22/2007
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARI ANE RE MVH 3/17/08
1 3/1/1984
GROMYKO SPEECH (#1)
3 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARI ANE RE MVH 3/17/08 3/1/1984
SENATOR BAKER'S COMMENTS (#2)
6 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARL ANE RE VISIT MVH OF 3/17/08
1 3/1/1984
SOVIET PRESS OFFICIALS (#3)
9 MEMO
DUPE OF ITEM 6
MV H 3/17/08 3/1/1984
25 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE VISIT MVH OF 3/17/08 2 3/12/1984
SOVIET COMMENTATOR (#12)
C
1723
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
March 1, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK from
SUBJECT:
Gromyko Speech on Foreign Policy
State has sent a memorandum (TAB I) which analyzes Gromyko's
February 27 speech on foreign policy.
According to State, Gromyko's condemnation of U.S. policy
combined with expressions of interest in improving East-West
relations suggests an effort to keep the U.S. on the defensive
while the Soviets work through the problem internally of how and
when to engage the U.S. in a serious dialogue. I concur with
this analysis, and would note that it will be interesting to
compare the tone on Chernenko's "election" speech -- scheduled
for tomorrow -- with Gromyko's.
Attachment:
Tab I - - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of February 29, 1984
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLS MOZ-009#1
BY as NARA, DATE 5/23/03
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
2
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER NA LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
1701
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 1, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT:
Senator Baker's Comments on Chernenko
You may be interested in Howard Bakers impressions of Chernenko,
conveyed in a letter to the President (TAB I).
Baker feels that Chernenko enters office "without the burden of
deeply seated personal animosity against the United States," and
that he seems his own man and very much in charge.
I believe Baker's impressions veer to the optimistic on both
points, but I find them interesting because they indicate that,
in private, Chernenko comes across as more forceful and able than
some of the press reports (and comments of Soviet intellectuals)
would lead one to believe.
Oglesby's reply to Baker seems adequate, but you might wish to
mention to Baker that the President appreciated his letter the
next time you talk to him.
Attachment:
Tab I - Letter to President from Senator Baker
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLS M02-009 #2
Declassify on: OADR
BY CH NARA, DATE 5/23/03
WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
O OUTGOING
H INTERNAL
I INCOMING
Received Date Correspondence (YY/MM/DD) 84,02,17
Name of Correspondent:
Howard Baker
MI Mail Report
User Codes: (A) PRES (B)
(C)
States
it was an honor to serve with
Subject:
Vice President Bush as your representative
to Yuri Andropov's funeral. Relates that
"based on only a brief visit and my own
political instincts General Secretary
Chernenko is a man with who we can deal, (and)
his health is such that we will have him to
deal with for some time to come. It is my
ROUTE TO: own hope that you will take the earliest
DISPOSITION
possible opportunity to get acquainted with him"
Tracking
Type
Completion
Action
Date
of
Date
Office/Agency
(Staff Name)
Code
YY/MM/DD
Response
Code
YY/MM
WS
LAOGLE
ORIGINATOR
84,02A/
ms
A84,02,24
ReferrahNote:
A
84,02,27
/ /
Referral Note:
/ /
/ /
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/ /
-
Referral Note:
/
/
/
/
-
Referral Note:
ACTION CODES:
DISPOSITION CODES:
A Appropriate Action
I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
A Answered
C Completed
C - Comment/Recommendation
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
B - - Non-Special Referral
S Suspended
D Draft Response
S For Signature
F Furnish Fact Sheet
X Interim Reply
to be used as Enclosure
FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:
Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing
Comments:
Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.
5/81
3
February 24, 1984
Dear Senator Baker:
President Reagan very much appreciated
talking with you about your meeting with
General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, and
he asked me to reiterate his gratitude for
your participation in the funeral services
for Yuri Andropov.
The President welcomes your counsel on
the issue of an early meeting with General
Secretary Chernenko, and was pleased to
have the additional observations in your
February 17 letter. Let me assure you that
your advice, as always, will be given most
careful consideration.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President
The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
MBO/KRJ/tjr
CC: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - for
appropriate action
United States Senate
207434
OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY LEADER
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
February 17, 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
It was both a pleasure and an honor to serve with Vice President Bush as
your representative at the State funeral of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
Yuri Andropov. As I mentioned during our brief telephone conversation
Wednesday, I came away from our 30 minute meeting with General Secretary
Konstantin Chernenko with some definite impressions.
The first is that George Bush, as head of the delegation, was an excellent
representative of the United States for this important and delicate mission.
He was, in all respects, a skilled and able diplomat and I am grateful that
I had the opportunity to serve with him.
The second is that I feel General Secretary Chernenko has entered his
important office without the burden of deeply seated personal animosity
against the United States. Although I did not meet with Chairman Andropov,
I twice met with Chairman Brezhnev and anticipated that the new Soviet
Leader would have the same personal dislike and mistrust for the United
States that I sensed from Brezhnev. With Chernenko, that was not the
case.
Third, Chernenko seemed very much his own man--very much in charge.
He was sure of himself, perfectly willing to engage in spontaneous conversation,
and not intimidated by the presence of Foreign Minister Gromyko. In fact,
Gromyko's only words were in response to your letter to Chernenko and
they were muttered as an aside and not so that Chernenko could hear
them.
Finally, despite the various reports on his health, Chernenko seemed well
and robust. He was quick, alert and animated in his conversation.
Mr. President, based on only a brief visit and my own political instincts, I
have two basic conclusions. First, General Secretary Chernenko is a man
with whom we can deal. Secondly, his health is such that we will have
him to deal with for some time to come. It is my own hope that you will
take the earliest possible opportunity to get acquainted with him.
Sincerely,
Hand Howard H. Baker, Jr.
HHBJr:rdt
C
1578
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 1, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT:
Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials
State reports that two Soviet press agency officials have applied
for visas to tape an interview with the Cable News Network and to
contact two American publishers regarding some translation
agreements with Novosti Press Agency. Although State is
disturbed by the lack of reciprocity in TV appearances, it
recommends that we allow the visit to proceed. Otherwise, the
U.S. media may create a stir, and the Department is already
involved in lawsuits challenging past visa refusals.
I consider State's judgment correct in this instance,
particularly since visa refusal would not prevent CNN from taping
them in another country.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize the attached Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
Tab II - - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLS MOZ-009 R3
Declassify on: OADR
BY as NARA, DATE 5/23/03
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
7-8
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER SAM LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
1578
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 1, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 4m
SUBJECT:
Visit of Soviet Press Agency Officials
State reports that two Soviet press agency officials have applied
for visas to tape an interview with the Cable News Network and to
contact two American publishers regarding some translation
agreements with Novosti Press Agency. Although State is
disturbed by the lack of reciprocity in TV appearances, it
recommends that we allow the visit to proceed. Otherwise, the
U.S. media may create a stir, and the Department is already
involved in lawsuits challenging past visa refusals.
I consider State's judgment correct in this instance,
particularly since visa refusal would not prevent CNN from taping
them in another country.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize the attached Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum.
Approve
¥
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum
DECLASSIFIED
NLS MOZ-009 </3
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
BY CH
NARA, DATE 5/23/03
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER VAL 1011
LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
March 5, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON
Office of Assistant Director for Legislative
Reference
Office of Management and Budget
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
H.J. Res. 435, Resolving That the U.S. Should
formally Renounce the Yalta Agreement
We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's
draft report on H.J. Resolution, resolving that the U.S.
should formally renounce the Yalta Agreement.
1760
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Attachment
March 2, 1984
FOR BOB KIMMITT:
attached I recommend that you sign
Peterson. memorandum PT to Ronald the K.
PRS
C. Robinson OOT and
JACK Job F. MATLOCK
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
1760
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
February 28, 1984
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM
TO:
Legíslative Liaison Officer-
National Secruity Council
SUBJECT:
State draft report on H.J.Res. 435, resolving that the
U.S. should formally renounce the Yalta Agreement.
The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to
the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.
A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1984.
Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler
(395-4710 )
the legislative analyst in this office.
RONALD RonaldK.Peterson K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference
Enclosures
CC: John Eisenhour
l nited States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Secretary has asked me to respond to your request for
Executive Branch comments on H. J. Res. 435, resolving that the
United States should formally renounce the Yalta Agreement. The
Department of State opposes this resolution.
The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe clearly embodied the
principle that each nation should be free to decide for itself the
form of its own government. The problem of Soviet expansion
springs not from the Yalta Declaration, but from the failure of
the Soviet Union to implement the provisions of the Yalta
Declaration. It is the policy of the United States to support the
right of national self-determination, and it is our view that the
action proposed by the resolution -- renunciation of the Yalta
agreements -- would actually undercut, rather than further, this
policy.
As Vice President Bush noted on September 21, 1983 in an
address at Vienna: "In approaching the problems of the [Eastern
and Central European] region, United States policy is guided by
certain constants: First, we recognize no lawful division of
Europe. There is much misunderstanding about the substance of the
Yalta conference. Let me state as clearly as I can: there was no
agreement at that time to divide Europe up into 'spheres of
influence;' on the contrary, the powers agreed on the principle of
the common responsibility of the three allies for all the
liberated territories. The Soviet Union pledged itself to grant
full independence to Poland and to all other states in Eastern
Europe, and to hold free elections there. The Soviet violation of
these obligations is the primary root of East-West tensions
today
Let me stress here that the United States does not
seek to destabilize or undermine any government, but our attitude
toward the region is informed by a sense of history--of European
history. For this reason we support and will encourage all
movement toward the social, humanitarian and democratic ideals
which have characterized the historical development of Europe."
The Honorable
Dante B. Fascell,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.
- 2 -
Secretary Shultz, speaking in Stockholm on January 17 at the
opening of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe, also put forth clearly the
American view on this subject. He noted that since 1945 "an
artificial barrier has cruelly divided this continent -- and indeed
heartlessly divided one of its great nations. This barrier was not
placed there by the West. It is not maintained by the West. It is
not the West that prevents its citizens free movement, or cuts them
off from competing ideas. Let me be very clear: the United States
does not recognize the legitimacy of the artificially imposed
division of Europe."
The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the
standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to
the submission of this report.
Sincerely,
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs
2505
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET SENSITIVE
March 27, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
mody
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Conversation of the President's
Meeting with Chancellor Kohl, March 5, 1984
Attached for your review and approval is the Memorandum of
Conversation of the President's meeting with FRG Chancellor
Helmut Kohl on March 5, 1984 (Tab I).
Attached at Tab II is a memorandum to Mr. Charles Hill,
Department of State, forwarding a copy of the Memorandum
of Conversation.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve forwarding the memorandum to Mr. Hill.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum of Conversation
Tab II
Memorandum to Mr. Hill
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the
Federal Republic of Germany (U)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Burt
Ambassador Burns
Jack Matlock, NSC
Harry Obst, Interpreter
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
MFA State Secretary Andreas Meyer-Landrut
Ambassador to the U.S., Peter Hermes
Dr. Horst Teltschik, Director General,
Foreign and Security Affairs, Federal
Chancellery
Heinz Weber, Interpreter
Dr. Juergen Sudhoff, Acting Chief, Federal
Press and Information Center (lunch only)
Dr. Edouard Ackermann, Director General,
Communications and Public Relations,
Federal Chancellery (lunch only)
Dr. Franz Pfeffer, MFA Director General for
Political Affairs (lunch only)
Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, FRG Commissioner
for Disarmament and Security Affairs (lunch
only)
DATE, TIME
March 5, 1984
AND PLACE:
11:15 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., Oval Office, and
12:15 p.m. - 1:30 p.m., Working Lunch,
Family Dining Room
The President greeted Chancellor Kohl and they exchanged
greetings to Mrs. Kohl and the First Lady. Kohl also mentioned
that his eldest son was with him and was on his way to study at
Harvard. (U)
The President then asked Kohl what was on his agenda (U)
Kohl replied that he had in mind a tour d'horizon, and that the
President should interrupt and comment as he went along. Kohl
then began with a review of the domestic situation in the Federal
Republic. (U)
Turning first to the economic situation, Kohl said that economic
recovery was under way and that he felt that the recovery would
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be stronger than the experts were predicting. Inflation was
being controlled and would be in the 2.8-3% range. Unemployment
continues to be a problem, with two million Germans out of work.
Basically, the problem resulted from too little investment for
too long. The FRG must put more investment in industries of the
future. (C)
There is also, Kohl noted, a potential future problem with the
trade unions. They are proposing a shorter work week -- 36 hours
-- with the same pay.
Kohl also noted that the FRG has a problem with exports and
protectionist pressures are growing, but that he will oppose them
firmly. He feels that they must compete with the Japanese in
efficiency, and he is not pessimistic regarding their ability to
do so. But it is clear that protectionism hurts everyone in the
long run. (c)
In this regard, he added that he was strongly opposed to the
proposed Common Market tax on fats and oils, and that he could
assure the President that it will not be adopted. He had
discussed this issue with Prime Minister Thatcher and she is not
willing to support it either. (C)
Kohl noted the European criticism of high U.S. interest rates,
and said that they are indeed annoying. But, as he had told his
colleagues, it would be even more annoying if the President is
not reelected, and he realized that perhaps it is not the best
policy to bring them down this year. He hoped, however, that the
problem could be addressed next year. (C)
Secretary Shultz observed that the Chancellor's statement
regarding his firm position against the special tax on fats and
oils is very important to us. He was pleased that Kohl stated it
so unequivocally. An agricultural trade war would be the worst
thing that could happen to all of us. (C)
Kohl said that he would make this point when he meets with the
Senate, but we should understand that the resistance to
protectionism must be a two-way street.
(C)
Secretary Shultz suggested that he make this point to the Senate
as well. (II)
Turning to political topics, Kohl observed that the opposition to
LRINF deployments had not disappeared,
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Regarding conditions in the European Community, Kohl noted that
the Community was going through a difficult period arranging its
finances. All the members need to make sacrifices, but Thatcher
has not reached the point of recognizing this fully. In the end
he believed that an arrangement would be reached, but that care
must be taken to make sure that the arrangement devised would not
lead to a trade war. This question is also linked to Spain and
Portugal; the other members must increase their contributions.
They need another two billion on top of the four agreed to. (C)
So far as the EC is concerned, he hoped that the current problems
would be solved, but noted that this would be a long process,
since any agreements would have to be ratified by national
parliaments, and this could take two years or so. With the
elections to the European Parliament, however, a new and more
informal phase of negotiations will begin. (U)
Kohl then turned to Henry Kissinger's recent analysis of the
alliance, and noted that it contained some good proposals. He
felt, however, that Kissinger was wrong on two points: that
there should be a European supreme commander, and that the U.S.
troop presence should be lowered. These steps would be
interpreted in Europe as a diminishing U.S. commitment to the
alliance and would lead to an unraveling of the alliance. He
agreed, however, that the Europeans should do more for
themselves. (C)
Regarding the GDR, Kohl said that "seismographic" developments
are taking place. Pressures are building up, and it is clear
that the ideological basis for communism has gone to pieces. The
GDR is letting more people leave than before -- 4,000 were
allowed out in January and February, more than in ten years.
This is an attempt to reduce the pressures on the regime in the
hope that an explosion can be prevented. It is not in our
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interest, Kohl added, that an explosion occur. He has the
feeling that Honecker is on better terms with Chernenko than he
was with Andropov, and this may give him a little more elbow
room. Basically, Kohl expressed optimism about the direction of
current trends. YEL
Regarding LRINF deployments, Kohl noted that the most important
decisions have been made,
He suggested, however, that we could help by pursuing
a policy of negotiation with the Soviets. (C)
Turning to the Soviet Union, Kohl observed that it was stupid to
ridicule Chernenko's age or health, as the media had done. He
believed Chernenko could stay in office and that he should be
treated with courtesy. His position is, however, not as strong
as Andropov's, and his successor may already have been chosen.
It would be a good idea to try to establish contacts with the
successor, but this of course should not be done behind
Chernenko's back, but by using normal channels. tst
Kohl added that he thought the President's decision not to go to
the Andropov funeral was correct. The Soviet Union continues to
have a collective leadership. They misread the situation in
regard to NATO LRINF deployments, and it is important now for us
to keep the initiative. (S)
Kohl then reviewed some specific issues as follows:
(C)
Kohl then turned to Poland, where he felt the situation continues
to be bad. The Soviets have not mastered the ideological
situation. He felt the Catholic Church initiative to provide
support for private agriculture has great promise, and noted that
it is the Pope's idea. The Polish regime would have to make a
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very difficult decision to allow it, but it deserves our support
if it is approved. (8)
Kohl then apologized for talking so long. (U)
The President said that he had not at all talked too long, and
noted that we seem to be very close on the issues. Regarding
protectionism, he felt very strongly that it should be opposed.
However, he has problems with Congress. He then suggested that
the conversation be continued at lunch. (e)
******
Kohl initiated the conversation at lunch by saying that he was
trying to do his part in supporting democratic forces in El
Salvador. His ambassador is now there, and he was asking
everyone to stand up for Duarte and assist him. (C)
The President said that these actions were most helpful. (U)
The topic then shifted to East-West relations, and Secretary
Shultz referred to Kohl's earlier comments on the Polish Church
initiative to assist private agriculture. (E)
Kohl reiterated the importance he attached to supporting this
initiative, and observed that the President's personal support
must be clear -- this will be very important for Catholics. (C)
The President noted that we have moved on some of our sanctions
and will be prepared to move on others if the Polish government
takes appropriate steps. As for the Soviets, he is making clear
that we are ready to negotiate. (8)
Kohl said that it would be useful if the President could arrange
a meeting with Chernenko. Personal contact is important, and
Gromyko is a problem. A way must be found to get around him and
contact other policy makers directly. He had talked to Mrs.
Thatcher, and she agrees that a summit meeting would be
desirable. (8)
The President replied that he was interested in preparing for a
meeting, but it was important that we not talk about this
publicly, since the Soviets could use it for propaganda purposes.
(S)
Kohl said that he had told the Soviets that the President was
going to be reelected whatever they did. They should believe
him, since he had told them last June that the missiles would be
deployed, and he had been proven right. So he had told the
Soviets that if they hesitated to deal with President Reagan
because 1984 is an election year, they would lose again. (S)
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Secretary Shultz asked if Chernenko could stand up to Gromyko.
His speeches seem a bit milder, but Gromyko seems to act as the
gatekeeper to the outside world. (8)
Kohl thought it would be possible to arrange a summit, and noted
that a 30-minute meeting would not be enough. It should provide
enough time to discuss subjects thoroughly.
But he felt the
President should probe, and it would surprise him if Chernenko
did not react positively. The East Europeans, at any rate, want
a meeting, and Chernenko himself may feel that he doesn't have a
lot of time to lose. (S)
The President said he was reminded of the story of the man who
had just had a physical, and who asked his doctor for a report.
The doctor advised, "Just eat the best part of the chicken
first." (U)
The Vice President asked how Kohl would view the development of
U.S.-GDR ties. (S)
Kohl said that it depends. If greater prestige of the GDR regime
helps the people, this is all right. But the question should be
examined carefully to make sure that any moves do help the
people. Honecker does seem to have an interest in improving his
relations with the U.S. Kohl met with him at a Soviet guest
house in Moscow during the Andropov funeral. Honecker said at
that time that he had an invitation to speak in San Francisco,
and asked some questions about Americans and the United States.
So he may be interested, and Kohl himself would give a qualified
yes to an improved U.S.-GDR relationship. (8)
The President asked if Kohl could estimate how many East Germans
would choose the FRG over the Communist ideology. (c)
Kohl said 90 percent. Of course, he added, not all really want
our system; they have grown up under a socialist system and may
not want to give up some of the social benefits. But the
influence of the Church is growing and there is no support at all
for revolution. (C)
Secretary Shultz recalled that in Bonn they had spoken of the
importance of military to military contacts with the Soviets. (6)
Kohl said yes, he thought they were potentially useful. At
present, he observed, the Soviets have only two channels of
information from the outside world, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the KGB. Soviet marshals know little of the
personalities in the West, and direct contact could broaden their
horizons.
(C)
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The President remarked that it is easy for us to see the Soviets
as aggressive. He wondered whether they could possibly view us
as aggressive.
(C)
Kohl said that he thought they could, but not because they fear
we will attack their borders, but because they feel they need a
buffer zone. And then dictatorships always need an enemy. (c)
The President asked rhetorically how they could think that we
would want to go to war. They have emphasized their
determination to impose Communism, and should recognize that the
rest of us are merely being defensive.
(C)
Kohl observed that Communist ideology is becoming more flaccid.
He noted at the Andropov funeral that the symbols and procedures
were as if a pope or emperor or tsar were being buried. And he
himself was witness to the fact that when Mrs. Andropov paid her
final farewell to the corpse, she made the sign of the cross over
the casket.
(C)
The President observed that the Soviets seem to have created an
aristocracy such as the one they overthrew.
(C)
Kohl remarked that whereas Americans have found their place in
the world and in history under the President's leadership, time
is not working to the Soviet advantage. He noted that Mitterrand
agrees with this, and he believes that it gives the United States
an opportunity. The idea of Communism has lost much of its
force. One can see this in the decline of the French and Italian
Communist Parties. The idea of freedom is stronger everywhere.
While the Soviet regime will not collapse overnight, it is
brittle. (C)
The President said that he understood there was a turn to
religion among the young. (e)
Kohl confirmed that he believed this was the case and noted that
the Patriarch was allowed to read a public mass during the
funeral period for Andropov. He wondered why the regime
permitted it, and thought they might need it for insurance. He
then asked Meyer-Landrut (until recently FRG Ambassador in
Moscow) if he had any observations. (C)
Meyer-Landrut agreed that there is a growth of interest in
religion, and noted that the Russians must cope with many
problems for which the ideology gives them no help. They need
better information regarding the West. (c)
Shultz wondered if Western tourists have an impact on the Soviet
population. (U)
Meyer-Landrut thought that they definitely have an impact.
Soviets are very interested in life in the West. They draw
conclusions from the way Western tourists are dressed and act,
and when they can, question the foreigners about their life. (U)
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Kohl thought that we should not forget what it means to live in a
country sealed from the outside. Distortions are great, and
thirst for information is great. (C)
The lunch terminated with both the President and Chancellor Kohl
agreeing on the usefulness of their conversation and on the
importance of maintaining close consultations on the various
issues that confront us. (U)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET SENSITIVE Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Memorandum of Conversation of FRG Chancellor Kohl's
Visit, March 5, 1984
Attached is the memorandum of conversation from the President's
meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl on March 5, 1984.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
Attachment
SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachment
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1859
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 5, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Jan
SUBJECT:
Conference on Soviet Strategy in Tokyo
Ray Cline of CSIS, Georgetown, has written me and Gaston Sigur
regarding a conference on Soviet strategy in Asia which his
organization, the World Strategy Network, is organizing in Tokyo
March 13-14. The conference is funded by DOD.
Ray had hoped to have a participant from the NSC, but we were
able to locate no one with an appropriate background who could
get away next week. I managed to arrange, however, for Jack
Scanlan of State, who is familiar with the issues, to go.
Stillwell's deputy will go from Defense.
Ray's second request was for a letter from you endorsing the
conference. Since I believe that this is a laudable effort, I
attach a letter which I believe would be appropriate for the
occasion.
Gaston Sigur concurs.
Recommendation:
That you sign the letter at TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I - Letter to Dr. Ray S. Cline
Tab II - Cline-Matlock letter of Feb. 14, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
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BY as NARA, DATE 5/23/03
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Ray:
I am very pleased to learn of the plans for a
conference in Tokyo on Soviet Strategy in Asia,
sponsored by the World Strategy Network and the World
Strategy Council of Japan.
The subject is obviously of great importance both for
the United States and for our Japanese Allies. I
commend the initiative taken by both your organizations
to provide an opportunity for government officials and
prominent specialists from both countries to meet and
discuss the strategic questions which arise from
increasing Soviet activity in Asia.
You have my best wishes for a successful conference and
I look forward to seeing your report on the views
expressed there.
Sincerely,
Dr. Ray S. Cline
World Strategy Network
1015 Eighteenth Street N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
WSN
World Strategy Network
1015 EIGHTEENTH STREET, N.W.
SUITE 805
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036
202-775-3212
CHAIRMEN:
February 24, 1984
Hon. Clare Boothe Luce
Morris I. Leibman, ABA
DIRECTOR:
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Dr. Ray S. Cline
Special Assistant to the President
EXECUTIVE
National Security Council
SECRETARY:
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dr. James Arnold Miller
MILITARY
Dear Jack:
COUNSELORS:
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Herewith is a brief description of the project in research-
U.S.A. (Ret.)
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
ing and conferring abroad with scholars and officials interested
U.S.N. (Ret.)
in Soviet strategy. This specific conference plan is for Japan.
General Maxwell Taylor
U.S.A. (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer
We expect to hold a number of conferences this year but have
U.S.A. (Ret.)
scheduled only two: Tokyo, 13-14 March 1984 and Rome, 15-16 May
TASK GROUP
1984.
CHAIRMEN:
Legislation:
I am very anxious to have the NSC involved in and supportive
Hon. John J. Rhodes
of the whole project. Right now, however, it is urgent to
Hon. Mickey Edwards. M.C.
John Norton Moore, ABA
demonstrate high-level enthusiasm for what we are doing in Tokyo.
Disinformation:
This means an NSC staff member should attend the Tokyo conference ---
Arnaud de Borchgrave
no paper necessary, just participation in discussions on Washing-
Phillip Nicolaides
ton's view of Soviet strategy in Asia.
International Terrorism:
Dr. Yonah Alexander
Geopolitical Issues:
We also need a brief note of encouragement and endorsement
Dr. Frank Barnett
from Bud McFarlane, or, if he thinks it appropriate, the
Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis
President. Such a note would simply say White House officials
Dr. Richard B. Foster
Dr. William R. Kintner
concerned with strategic planning have been briefed on the Tokyo
Dr. Edward N. Luttwak
Conference on Soviet Strategy in Asia. This conference is
Soviet Union:
sponsored by the World Strategy Network in Washington, whose
Dr. Richard Pipes
Director Ray S. Cline will attend the Tokyo meetings. It is
Dr. Leon Gouré
hosted by the World Strategy Council, Japan, an association of
China:
Hon. Walter H. Judd
distinguished Japanese scholars and experts on Asian strategic
Dr. Franz Michael
issues.
Latin America:
Dr. Roger Fontaine
Please help us get a name promptly for an NSC representative
Mideast:
participating (unofficially and informally) at the Tokyo scholars'
Dr. Joyce R. Starr
conference and also clear a letter endorsing the concept of the
Economic Strategy:
Dr. Norman Bailey
conference prior to 10 March 1984. Both the Defense Department
Dr. Stefan Halper
and the State Department have approved the Tokyo project and are
Air & Space:
supporting it. Two officers from General Stilwell's staff will
Maj. Gen. Michael Collins
attend. Speedy action on a letter should be easy.
U.S.A.F. (Ret.)
Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham
U.S.A. (Ret.)
Science & Technology:
Dr. Edward Teller
Dr. Miles Costick
SPONSORING INSTITUTIONS
Center for Strategic & International
Interaction
The John Davis Lodge
Studies,
Systems
Center
Georgetown University
Incorporated
for International Studies
Ambassador Jack Matlock
February 24, 1984
Page Two
Sorry to trouble you, but we want these discussions to
be successful in improving understanding of the American
view of the Soviet threat to world security.
Cordially Rays. Cline
Ray S. Cline
Director
Encs.
CC: Dr. Gaston Sigur, NSC
interaction systems incorporated
James Arnold Miller, Ph.D., Chairman
Ray S. Cline, Ph.D., Director, Advisory Council
SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY AGAINST ASIA
POSSIBLE PARTICIPANTS
CONFERENCE IN TOKYO, JAPAN, MARCH 14, 1984
The Japan host for the conference effort will be the Japan
World Strategy Council (JWSC) whose leaders include:
Gen. Ichiji Sugita (Ret.) (JWSC Chairman)
Honorary President, Japan Veterans Association
Amb. Shinsaku Hogen (JWSC Co-Chairman)
Former Vice Foreign Minister
Prof. Osamu Miyoshi (JWSC Executive Director)
Prof. Kenzo Kiga
Keio University, and President of the Association for
Soviet-East European Studies
Adm. Kenichi Kitamura (Ret.)
Former Commander, Self-Defense Fleet
Dr. Koh Maruyama
Former Vice Minister of State for Defense
Gen. Shigeto Nagano (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, Ground Self-Defense Force
Prof. Haraki Niwa
Kyoto Sangyo University
The JWSC tentatively plans to invite to the March 14, 1984, conference
in Tokyo the following persons, all of whom were met by Drs. Cline
and Miller at various meetings during a planning trip to Tokyo,
December 11-16, 1983:
Adm. Hirosato Asonuma (Ret.)
Former Deputy Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet
6861 Elm Street, McLean, Virginia 22101
(703) 734-8924
Page 2
Amb. Ryuichi Ando
Former Ambassador to Athens
Mr. Yukiyasu Harano
Secretary, Kangaku-in Foundation
Gen. Iiichi Hirose (Ret.)
President, Japan Veterans Association
Mr. Hajime Iki
Executive Director, Japan Veterans Association
Mr. Toyokazu Isaka
Monthly Magazine "JIYU"
Mr. Hideaki Kase
Chairman, Japan Center for the Study of Security Issues (JCSSI)
Mr. Hiroshi Kimura
Critic
Mr. Nobutane Kiuchi
Chairman, Institute of the World Economy
Mr. Yoshihisa Komori
Senior Correspondent, Mainichi Newspapers
Mr. Hiroshi Komoto
Director, RF-RADIO NIPPON Inc.
Gen. Hiroomi Kurisu (Ret.)
Former Chairman, JSC
Gen. Hisatomo Matsukane (Ret.)
Former North-Eastern Army Commander
Dr. Akishige Matsumoto
Vice President, Defense Association
Mr. Masahiro Miyazaki
Secretary General, JCSSI
Mr. Masahiko Motoki
Deputy Chief, Monthly Magazine "GENDAI"
Prof. Yatsuhiro Nakagawa
Tsukuba University
Mr. Toshio Nakajima
Director, U.S. Affairs, Cabinet Research Office
Page 3
Ms. Kaoru Nakamaru
Director, International Affairs Institute
Mr. Toyoo Nobori
Director, Sogo Security Service Corporation
Adm. Ryohei Ohga (Ret.)
Former Chief of Staff, Self-Defense Fleet
Mr. Hisahiko Okazaki
Director General, Research and Planning Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Tomoya Okumura
President, Ohsaka Riki-Knives Mfg. Co., Ltd.
Amb. Shizuo Saitoh
Former Ambassador to the United Nations;
Chairman, The Foreign Press Center
Mr. Tomohisa Sakanaka
Senior Correspondent, Asahi Newspapers
Mr. Norimitsu Sasagawa
President, The Nippon Times
Prof. Yoshiaki Sasaki
Lecturer, Takusyoku University
Dr. Hideo Sekino
Director, Historical Research Institute
Prof. Yasunobu Somura
Tokyo Scientific University
Mr. Yasutoh Takada
The Star & Stripe Association
Mr. Minoru Tamba
Director, Soviet Union Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Dr. Jun Tsunoda
Executive Director, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies
Mr. Takehiko Ueda
Director, Office of Total Produce, News Track Japan, Inc.
Mr. Sanji Ueki
Secretary, Kangaku-in Foundation
Page 4
Prof. Kazuro Umezu
Ohsaka Foreign Policy University
Prof. Tetsuji Yasuhira
Soka University
Prof. Yasuhiko Yoshida
Aoyama Gakuin University
Mr. Joji Yoshihara
Senior Staff, Cabinet Research Office
Other Japanese, not met by Drs. Cline and Miller, yet
perhaps suitable for invitation include:
Mr. Masamichi Inoki
President, Research Institute for Peace and Security
Prof. Hiroshi Kimura
Hokkaido University
Prof. Masataka Kosaka
Kyoto University
Prof. Masamori Sasse
Japan Defense College
Prof. Seizaburo Sato
University of Tokyo
Prof. Hayao Shimizu
Tokyo Gaiko University
Most of these are believed to be Soviet specialists, or at least
specialists on foreign policy and defense matters.
interaction systems incorporated
James Arnold Miller, Ph.D., Chairman
Ray S. Cline, Ph.D., Director, Advisory Council
SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY AGAINST ASIA
FACT SHEET
The nature, objectives, intensity, and modus operandi of
Soviet global strategy against Asia are being treated in a major
research effort being undertaken by Interaction Systems Incorpora-
ted (ISI) of McLean, Virginia. Located near Washington, D.C., ISI
is a research firm which concentrates on international political,
military, and economic issues. As part of its Soviet Global
Strategy Project, ISI is preparing a study entitled Soviet Global
Strategy Against Asia.
Global strategy can be viewed as a systematic process involving
the employment of the political, economic, technological, military,
diplomatic, psychological, ideological, and moral elements of
national power to promote national goals and objectives. Many
analysts in the free world believe that the Soviet Union has a multi-
faceted global strategy which consciously and, with the exception
of occasional, relatively minor setbacks, effectively promotes
Moscow's long-term expansionistic aims. Full understanding of the
essence of Soviet global strategy is essential to policymakers in
the free world.
Contributing to the project will be dozens of recognized Asian
and American specialists on Soviet affairs. Relying whenever pos-
sible on primary Soviet sources of information, these Soviet
specialists are being asked to document the existence of and the
Asia-oriented manifestations of Soviet global strategy. A major
element of the research process is extensive interviewing, panel
discussions, and library-type research in the United States.
But in order to obtain the essential Asian perspective on
Soviet global strategy, Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia will
also be based heavily on the results of several conferences to be
held in Japan. These conferences in Japan will be hosted by the
Japan World Strategy Council and assisted by three American organi-
zations based in the Washington, D.C. area: the World Strategy
Network, the Center for Strategic and International Studies of
Georgetown University, and Interaction Systems Incorporated. At
these meetings, Asian and American specialists on the Soviet Union
will meet and, in a structured manner, exchange facts and insights
on Soviet global strategy as applied to Asia. In addition, a
select audience of Asians, who are not necessarily Soviet specialists
6861 Llm Street. McLean, Virginia 22101
(703) 734-8924
Page 2
but who have concerns and expertise about international affairs,
will be invited to participate in each meeting so that their
perceptions of Soviet global strategy against Asia might be noted.
Each conference will also include keynote and other special pre-
sentations by distinguished guests.
As Director of ISI's Soviet Global Strategy Project and
Chairman of the firm's Advisory Council, Dr. Ray S. Cline serves
as the Senior Editor for Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia. Dr.
Cline is the former Deputy Director for Intelligence of the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency. He is also Director of the World
Strategy Network, Washington, D.C., and Senior Associate at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C. A prolific commentator and writer on
strategic matters, Dr. Cline is the author of World Power Trends
and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s (1980). His most recent book,
written with Dr. Yonah Alexander, is Terrorism: The Soviet Connec-
tion (1984), which reports on the increasing use by the Soviets of
terrorism and other forms of low-intensity conflict to implement
their global strategy.
Co-Editors of Soviet Global Strategy Against Asia will be Dr.
Roger E. Kanet and Dr. James Arnold Miller. Dr. Kanet is Professor
of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Cham-
paign. A distinguished authority on Soviet foreign and military
policies, Dr. Kanet has written hundreds of articles and written
and edited a number of major books. Dr. Miller has written widely
on such topics as terrorism and insurgency, geopolitics, raw
materials availability, and Soviet global strategy in general. He
is the Executive Secretary of the World Strategy Network, Washington,
D.C. And in his capacity as Chairman of Interaction Systems Incor-
porated, Dr. Miller is responsible for the administrative aspects
of the Soviet Global Strategy Project and the preparation of Soviet
Global Strategy Against Asia.
C
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDDUM
90307
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
NLRR MO2009 #8
March 8, 1984
ACTION
BY as NARA DATE 9/7/07
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
from
SUBJECT:
Bilateral Issues with Soviets: Bureaucratic
Handling
During his meeting with Dobrynin March 7, Secretary Shultz
proposed the resumption of negotiations on several bilateral
issues. We now must decide how we handle the bureaucratic
preparations, since some have very short time fuses. The most
urgent questions involve the following:
Consulates: Shultz told Dobrynin that Burt would be in touch
with Sokolov on this question next week. This presumably does
not require us to have a negotiating position by then, but we
should be prepared to discuss the concrete issues involved as
soon as possible.
Interagency work on the question was completed last August,
without agreement on several points, which were forwarded to the
NSC for resolution. Attached at TAB I is a copy of a memorandum
I forwarded to Judge Clark at the time, which explains the agency
differences and my own view of them. You should also know that
when the question was considered on an interagency basis, DOD was
not included, since the matter was considered "close hold," and
Defense
does not have a
1.4d
direct interest in the matter. Subsequently, however, Richard
Perle complained that he was cut out, and requested, if the
matter comes alive again, that OSD be included in the staffing.
We therefore face two questions: (1) should the interagency group
be reconvened? and (2) if so, should OSD be included? Although I
doubt that Agency positions will change on the issues, I would
recommend that we request State to convene one more meeting and
to include OSD, but that a short deadline be set for a report.
Exchange Agreement: Shultz suggested to Dobrynin that we
negotiate this one in Moscow, and indicated that we would be
ready to talk about it again in a couple of weeks.
The interagency work on our negotiating position had not been
concluded when the question was put into suspense by KAL. We had
asked State to convene a close-hold meeting and State had
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Declassify on: OADR
USIA to do the initial draft. USIA has completed a
draft and Embassy Moscow has reviewed it and made informal
comments. State has the draft, but has not yet commented on it.
Since work is well advanced on the drafting, I believe that State
should be directed to complete work on a draft within two weeks.
Consular Review Talks: Shultz urged that these be concluded
expeditiously, but did not mention a date.
Most of the issues discussed with the Soviets are not contested
by other agencies. One, however, has been a stumbling block:
the FBI has been unwilling to agree to add Baltimore to a list of
ports of entry where Soviet diplomats can enter the U.S. (This
is in the context of trying to increase the number of entry and
exit points available to us in the Soviet Union; we would get
Brest and Nakhodka in return for Baltimore and San Francisco.)
In this case I would recommend that State be instructed to hold
one more meeting with the interested agencies and to refer any
remaining disagreement to us for resolution.
Maritime Boundary: The time pressure on this one comes primarily
from Interior's desire to put up some of the disputed territory
for leasing. Richard Levine has been working these complex
issues and has recommended a high-level meeting soon. Judge
Clark has a direct interest in the outcome, and Shultz has
delegated Ken Dam to coordinate State's position. I believe that
a meeting of you with the other senior officials involved will be
necessary soon if we are to bring a clear U.S. position out of
the welter of conflicting interests which are involved.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Consulates: That you approve the Kimmit to Hill Memorandum at
TAB II, directing State to convene an interagency meeting on a
close hold basis to review our negotiating position, and to
include OSD in the process.
Approve
Disapprove
OR, alternatively, that you approve a memorandum which directs
State to conduct the interagency review, without naming OSD as
one of the participants.
Approve
Disapprove
2. Exchanges Agreement: That you approve the Kimmitt to Hill
Memorandum at TAB III instructing State to convene an interagency
meeting on a close hold basis to finish work on the USG
negotiating position on a cultural exchange agreement, with a
report to the NSC due March 21.
Approve
Disapprove
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3. Consular Review Talks: That yes, approve the Kimmitt to Hill
Memorandum at TAB IV which directs State to consult the FBI and
other interested agencies regarding outstanding issues in the
consular review talks, and to refer any outstanding areas of
disagreement to the NSC for resolution.
Approve
Disapprove
4. Maritime Boundary: Covered in Richard Levine's memorandum.
Attachments:
Tab I
- Copy of Matlock-Clark Memorandum of August 8, 1983
Tab II
- Kimmitt to Hill Memo on Consulates
Tab III - Kimmitt to Hill Memo on Exchanges Agreement
Tab IV - Kimmitt to Hill Memo on Consular Review Talks
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:
90965
LEMORAKEUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
August 8, 1983
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Asm
SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Consulates in Kiev and New York
State's memorandum outlining recommended strategy for
negotiating an opening of consulates in Kiev and New York is
attached at TAB A.
Background: Following agreement at the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev
summit, steps were taken to open consulates general in Kiev
and New York. The Soviets had long resisted an American
office in Kiev, offering instead less advantageous
locations, but finally agreed to Kiev under the pressure of
reaching agreements for the 1974 summit. Subsequently, the
1.4d
Soviets were allowed to purchase a building in New York
for their
consulate general and we were offered the choice of several
properties in Kiev for rental (no sale of real estate is
permitted by Soviet law) We selected a large building,
1.4d
had American architects design the
reconfiguration for our use, and both sides sent small
"advance parties" to oversee preparations for formal open-
ings, which we insisted be simultaneous, so that the Soviets
could not open in New York before our building was ready in
Kiev.
We had invested $1.5 million in the renovation of the
building when we ordered the withdrawal of both advance
parties in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The Soviets still have title to their building in New York,
while we have continued to pay rent on three apartments
(previously occupied by our advance party) in Kiev. We have
not paid rent on the building we had selected for the office
and a number of staff apartments, and our understanding is
that, after holding it for us for more than a year, the
Soviets are now using it. Its status, therefore, is not
entirely clear.
This complicated background is relevant to some of the
questions raised in the strategy paper. Broadly speaking,
our options are to aim for an opening as quickly as
possible, and thus establish our presence in the capital of
the largest non-Russian republic, or to attempt to improve
on the arrangements already negotiated, which could entail
considerable delay with little prospect of significant
improvement.
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2
Issues: There is general interagency agreement on the
negotiating plan except for the following three points:
1.4d
A. Office Site: State
believe that we
should accept the old building if it is available. The FBI
believes that we should press for a new one.
B. Staffing: State
believe that the
staffing level should be set according to need; the FBI,
1.4d
believe that we should insist that the
Soviets staff their consulate from the current personnel
allowed them in Washington, or from their mission to the UN.
C. Status of Property: State
believe
that we should seek more advantageous rental arrangements
1.4d
(i.e., a long-term lease with guarantees on the rent), while
the FBI wants us to demand either the right to purchase the
building in Kiev, or divestiture of the building owned by
the Soviets in New York, followed by a rental arrangement.
Analysis: My judgment on the three issues above is as
follows:
A. Since the building already selected and
partially reconfigured for our use is acceptable, and we
already have a substantial sum invested in it, no useful
purpose would be served by demanding another one. The
1.4d
State
seems sound.
B. If we insisted that the Soviets staff their
consulate from their current quota in Washington and New
York, we would have to staff Kiev from our Embassy in
Moscow. The sixteen persons necessary for Kiev could not be
spared from Moscow without seriously impairing the Embassy's
ability to perform its functions. Therefore, it seems
preferable to set our staff at the level we need, and then
impose an identical quota on the Soviets in New York. This
would preserve reciprocity, and while the FBI's task in New
York would be increased, its additional problems would be no
greater than those faced by the KGB in Kiev.
C. Although it is unfortunate that the Soviets
were allowed to purchase their consulate building in New
York, it will be most difficult to turn the clock back on
this arrangement. In the interest of moving as rapidly as
possible to establish our presence in Kiev (a net gain for
us, since we have no one there now) in return for a small
incremental gain for the Soviets (they already have hundreds
of officials in New York), I would recommend using the
Soviet ownership of their building in New York as leverage
to insist upon favorable long-term rental arrangements in
Kiev.
I believe that two other points should be covered specif-
ically in the NSC response:
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3 -
(1) State should be instructed that any staffing
arrangement provide for strict reciprocity of numbers at the
two consulates. This need not be the subject of nego-
tiation, but simply a statement of U.S. policy, comparable
to that used in imposing personnel ceilings on the Soviet
Consulate General in San Francisco.
(2) Before proceeding to plan for 12 local
employees, a close study should be made of the feasibility
of staffing Kiev entirely with American citizens.
1:4d
The foregoing recommendations are incorporated in a memoran-
dum to State at TAB B.
Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the memorandum at TAB B.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab A State's Memo
Tab B Memo to State
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER
18
LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
SECRIT
Strategy Paper
Kiev and New York Consulates
Summary:
1. Initial Step: There is agreement that we should inquire
officially of the Soviets whether the previously designated office
site will be available to us in Kiev.
2. Issues for Decision:
A. Office Site. If the Soviets say the building is not
available, all agencies agree that we should press for a new and
1.4d
better site. If the Soviets tell us the old site is available,
State
believe we should accept it, and send an inspection
team to determine its adequacy and assess further work needed on
both apartments and office site. FBI believes we should press for
a new site, whether or not the old site is available.
B. Staffing. State
believe we should set staffing
patterns according to need, without imposing demands that the
1.4d
Soviets would counter with unacceptable reciprocal requirements.
FBI,
believes we should initially insist that the
Soviets staff New York under the present 320 ceiling in order to
maintain existing levels of coverage, recognizing that if the
Soviets refuse we will have to revert to the State
C. Purchase vs. Lease. State
believe we should
seek more advantageous long-term rent arrangements without
1.4d
insisting on purchase in Kiev, and hence on full reciprocity, which
Soviets certainly would turn down. (The legality of requiring
Soviets to sell their present building and lease it instead is
questionable. Legal action in any case would result in prolonged
delays if we adopted this course. ) FBI believes we should make the
demand despite the probability that the Soviets would turn it down,
forcing us to fall back on a demand for long-term leasing
arrangements.
Recommendation:
NSC concurrence with the interagency proposal to inquire
4d
officially of the Soviets as to the availability of the previous
site; and NSC concurrence with the State
on office
site, staffing and purchase vs. lease.
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BACKGROUND
Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin on June 18 that
the President had approved in principle the establishment of new
Consulates in Kiev and New York. Judge Clark subsequently
requested the State Department to convene an interagency meeting
to draft the terms of reference and develop a negotiating
1.4d
strategy. At the July 1 meeting called by the State Department,
representatives of
accepted the attached terms
of reference (Tab A) and agreed to reconvene with the objective of
forwarding an agreed negotiating strategy to the NSC. The group,
augmented by USIA representatives, met on July 26, and it did not
prove possible fully to reconcile agency views. Divergent views
are set forth, where appropriate, in this paper.
POLICY OBJECTIVES
In noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements which
"protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the
principle of strict reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental
isd
policy framework for establishing the new Consulates. A Consulate
in Kiev will provide
a major new US penetration in a key
geographical area, which contains the second largest Soviet
nationality group and significant numbers of religious
minorities. In addition, it will give us a unique vantage point
for economic and political reporting, a base in the Soviet
agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to provide
on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American
visitors in the area, and the opportunity to initiate new
cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby
heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region.
MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS
On July 15, Secretary Shultz received a positive Soviet
response on the Consulates from Ambassador Dobrynin. Assistant
Secretary Burt will work out with Chargé Sokolov the modalities of
the negotiations. The State Department will handle the actual
negotiations using normal diplomatic channels, in coordination
with interested agencies.
The Department anticipates opening the talks in Washington as
soon as is mutually convenient. Technical discussions may
subsequently take place in Moscow. Since our logistical problems
in Kiev may well prove greater than those of the Soviets in New
York, it might be advantageous to hold such talks at closer range.
SPECIFIC GOALS
1. Early Establishment of U.S. Presence: Our first agenda
item in negotiating with the Soviets will be to obtain agreement
on the terms under which we will send advance parties to the two
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consular sités. The fact that we and the Soviets have both had
previous advance teams in Kiev and New York, respectively, under
mutually agreed arrangements, should ease our negotiations with
them on this matter, but it would be unrealistic not to expect
problems. Nevertheless, our retention of three apartments in Kiev
from the time of the original Advance Party should enable us to
put an advance team into place rather quickly (within three
months). Having personnel on the spot will be a key to gaining
movement from the Soviets on housing and office facilities, as
well as support from the home front on logistics and funding.
r.42
2. Acquisition of Suitable Housing and Office Facilities:
Concurrently, we must ascertain whether the Soviets are still
holding for our use the previously designated office building and
Consul General residence.
tidd
State concurs in this approach.
State
agree that if the Soviets tell us they have kept
the building available, we should accept it. We have already
invested $1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we
refused the building. Moreover, the negotiations for a more
14d
desirable site would be long and the end result would not
necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have. If the
current site remains available, State
should send a team to Kiev as soon as possible for an inspection
and evaluation of the work and time that will be required to put
it into suitable condition. The FBI, on the other hand, would
prefer that we seek new facilities whether or not the Soviets are
willing to make the previously designated office site available,
in order not to set our sights too low at the outset.
Finally, with regard to terms of occupancy we should note that
the previous agreement on establishing Consulates permitted the
Soviets to purchase property in New York in return for short-term
leasing rights in Kiev. This situation was clearly not reciprocal
and cannot be allowed to recur. Further negotiations on the
reopening of our respective Consulates will include insistence on
greater reciprocity vis-a-vis our housing and office space
requirements. The FBI has suggested that we try to purchase
property in Kiev. Since, to the best of our knowledge, the
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Scviets have never permitted a foreign mission to own property and
there is no chance that they would reverse this long-standing
policy in this instance, State's view is that no purpose is served
by making such a demand. Although we could theoretically insist
that the Soviets divest themselves of their property and require a
lease arrangement, such an approach would be quite problematical.
The Office of Foreign Missions has indicated that a forced
divestiture of this type could be legally contested and if so
could involve legal proceedings.
We should instead concentrate on obtaining what is possible --
long-term leases at reasonable prices. The Soviets will have a
strong incentive to move on our requirements. We fully expect
them to seek immediate occupancy of the building that they
previously purchased in New York for their Consulate.
Consequently, State believes our approach should be to insist on
an agreement to the effect that the Soviets may only occupy their
building when we have obtained the following in Kiev: adequate
temporary offices for the Consulate, an official agreement on our
permanent facilities, and approved construction plans for
necessary renovations.
3. Reciprocal Agreement on Staffing Patterns: As soon as we
have decided on the number of persons we wish to send to Kiev both
as a TDY-Advance Team and as a permanent staff (recommendations on
these issues follow below), we will raise the issue of a
reciprocal staffing arrangement with the Soviets. We will need to
proceed cautiously on this point, with strict reciprocity as a
goal. The FBI, concerned about increases in the size of the
Soviet diplomatic establishment in New York, prefers that the
Consulate there be staffed by personnel transferred from the
Embassy or SMUN. State anticipates strong Soviet resistance to
such a proposal. Having frequently decried the existence of the
current ceilings, the Soviets will balk at a perceived attempt to
reduce staffing levels at existing posts as a precondition to an
agreement on opening Kiev and New York. If pressed, they would
probably demand a similar arrangement in Kiev, which would prove
extremely costly in terms of staffing at our Moscow Embassy. The
Department
that we should negotiate on the basis
of our requirements
in
1.4c
Kiev and insist on reciprocity in any final decision on staffing
patterns.
4. Resolution of Long-Range Issues and General Problems:
Although Kiev's location is ideal in certain respects, its
isolation, coupled with the absence of a large diplomatic
community, may produce a difficult work environment for consular
personnel, as well as create numerous logistical problems. In our
negotiations we shall also address these general issues and
attempt to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to both existing
and potential problems. Specifically, we shall strive to obtain
clearly defined privileges and immunities for American personnel;
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an expansion of exit/entry points to facilitate shipment of
requisite materials to put our facilities into shape for the final
opening (we are currently limited to entry at Moscow, Leningrad,
and Vyborg near Leningrad); a relaxation of travel controls in the
area; and a commitment to provide a suitable recreational facility
for the permanent staff.
5. Implementation of USG Scenario: An interagency group will
have to make some immediate decisions with regard to timing,
personnel, and funding. It will also have to address questions of
logistical support and the acquisition of financial and other
resources, For preliminary planning purposes, we propose the
following timetable and base our discussion of estimated costs and
resource requirements on this opening scenario, which assumes that
we will obtain the previously designated office building.
1. Fall 1983 - Initial TDY Advance Team takes up residence
in Kiev;
2. Summer 1984 or earlier - Permanent Advance Staff arrives
in Kiev;
3. Summer 1985 - Consulate is officially opened.
A. Funding:
State has already presented to Congress its FY-84 budget
submission, which does not include a request for funds or
positions for the opening of Kiev. Therefore, the estimated
$200,000 operating costs needed to support the initial TDY
presence in Kiev would have to be secured either by amendment to
the FY-84 budget, or reprogrammed from within State's existing
budget.
State anticipates an additional outlay of $2.5 million
annually (for two years) to prepare for the opening of the
Consulate (total estimated cost of $5.2 million). Not included in
this estimate is the cost of a suitable recreational facility for
the permanent staff assigned to Kiev, which would contribute
substantially to improving morale and the quality of life at an
extremely isolated post (roughly another $1.0 million).
Ultimately, any decision to move ahead on establishing a
Consulate in Kiev is conditioned on our ability to secure
supplemental funding from Congress. In view of budgetary
stringencies, we should anticipate questions from Congress as to
why we are taking this step at the present time. We should be
prepared to brief key members whose support will be necessary in
order to obtain the requisite funds.
B. Personnel:
In selecting an Advance Team, we will try to identify
personnel for permanent assignment, but may initially have to use
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personnel from Embassy Moscow and appropriate Washington offices
on a 1-3 month TDY basis. The initial Advance Team should include
a Team Leader, an Administrative Officer, and a Political/Consular
Officer with reporting responsibilities.
In tandem with these arrangements, we need a prompt decision
on the size of our permanent advance team. Language training and
the vagaries of the assignment process will make it difficult to
assign people to Kiev for regular tours prior to the summer of
1984. Even meeting that deadline will require speedy action to
obtain positions, identify individuals for particular slots, and
secure funding. We believe that with the addition to the advance
team of a General Services Officer and a secretary we will have
the personnel necessary to prepare for the official opening of the
Consulates.
We suggest that the consular staff consist of 16 Americans
plus 12 Soviet National employees. In the past, this was
considered the right size to advance our interests in Kiev and it
still appears to meet our needs. We intend, however, to schedule
interagency meetings as soon as feasible to determine whether
their personnel requirements for the Consulate warrant a larger or
smaller staff. We will also solicit Embassy Moscow's views on
both the question of timing and its ability to provide personnel
and logistical support. The following are the proposed permanent
positions for Kiev:
Principal Officer
Deputy Principal Officer
Consular Officer
Administrative Officer
Agricultural Officer
Press and Culture Officer
Communications Program Officers (2)
Secretaries (2)
Marine Security Guards (6)
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State
and NEW York Consulates: Terms of Reference
Basic Policy Considerations
-- The President has approved in principle the desirability of
establishing new Consulates in Kiev and New York, and
Secretrary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this on June
18.
-- NSDD 75 provides the policy framework for this move, noting in
particular that the USG should seek "to reach agreements which
protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the
principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest." Also
relevant is the original Consulates Agreement (Aide-Memoire of
July 3, 1974) and the subsequent exchange of notes between the
US and USSR of September 1976,
-- At the time of the suspension in January 1980, we were
approximately six months away from completion of the work on
the Consulate office building and officially opening our
Consulate in Kiev. The absence of a Consulate has deprived us
of
continuing contacts with important nationality and religious
groups in the area. Establishing the Consulate will mark a
major new U.S. penetration into this geographically key area
which contains the second largest Soviet nationality group.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
By CI C15 NARA, Date 5/73/13
NLS MUZ-009
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Suistance di 1.1. Postach
-- An interagency group, chaired by State
has been formed to develop our negotiating
strategy. State has undertaken to produce by July 20 the first
draft of a strategy paper, incorporating the positions of other
interested parties, which will form the basis of our
negotiations with the Soviets.
-- The paper will include both long-term issues requiring
resolution and the following immediate problems associated with
sending an Advance Team to Kiev:
Personnel - number and source of positions required.
Timing - target date and time needed for training and other
preparation;
Funding - estimation of costs, acquisition of funds, and
congressional involvement;
Technical considerations - housing and office space,
logistical support, security factors, and coordination of
interagency requirments.
Negotiating Modalities
-- State Department will handle the negotiations through
diplomatic channels backstopped by the interagency group.
Next Steps
--State will forward to the NSC an interagency-cleared strategy
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 12, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
Assur
SUBJECT:
Visit of Soviet TV Commentator Pozner
The memorandum from State at TAB III describes plans developed by
Jim Dabakis, a TV talk show announcer from Salt Lake City, to
invite Moscow TV commentator Vladimir Pozner to the U.S. for at
least seven national TV programs, in return for which Pozner
would arrange for Dabakis and a Brigham Young University
professor to appear on four national TV programs in the Soviet
Union, and to tour the fifteen Soviet republics. Dabakis and the
professor would go to the Soviet Union in August and September,
and Dabakis has agreed to spend a week in Washington before his
departure to be briefed on U.S. positions on the issues. Senator
Orrin Hatch has expressed support for the project, and State
recommends that a visa for Pozner be approved.
Although it can be argued that a Soviet commitment to arrange for
TV appearances in the Soviet Union by Americans is a step
forward in achieving more reciprocity in the area of information
exchange, in fact this proposal falls far short of real
reciprocity. First, the Soviets would be sending an experienced
propagandist, while the Americans (even with extensive briefing)
are likely to be much less well prepared to defend U.S. positions
than he is to present Soviet views. Second, by arranging
Pozner's appearances here first, we have no assurance that the
promised programs in the USSR will in fact materialize, and if
they do, that they will not be "doctored" after taping.
For these reasons, my preference would be to deny the visa unless
and until one of two conditions are met: (1) the exchange is
pursuant to an exchange agreement in force which guarantees
effective reciprocity; or (2) the exchange is arranged so that
the Americans go first, that a USG official familiar with the
issues accompany Dabakis, and that Pozner be granted reciprocity
for the treatment actually offered the Americans.
If we follow this course, we can expect a certain degree of
public criticism, including -- perhaps -- by Senator Hatch. We
also cannot prevent Pozner from appearing on U.S. television in
feeds from Moscow, and the visa denial could be legally
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLS
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BY CN NARA, DATE 5/23/03
CONFIDENTIAL
challenged by the American sponsors -- as some past refusals have
been. If the visa denial should become a public issue, we would
doubtless be charged with acting contrary to our current policy
of dialogue, and rejecting an arrangement which provides more
potential reciprocity than we have obtained in the past.
Our decision, therefore, is essentially whether 1) to accept an
arrangement which offers some, but inadequate, reciprocity in
order to avoid a public controversy at this time and to provide
some possibility of U.S. citizens appearing on Soviet TV, or 2)
to hold firm on the principle of full reciprocity, while
recognizing that we cannot prevent U.S. networks from using
Soviet spokesmen by feeds outside the U.S.
I have prepared alternate Kimmitt to Hill memos for you to
choose.
JL
I concur only with the first recommendation.
John Lenczowski concurs.
"Dialogne" requires reciprocity. Otherwise it is
RECOMMENDATION
"monologne." -John L.
1. That you authorize the memorandum at TAB I which directs State
to refuse a visa to Pozner unless and until one of the conditions
set forth above is filled (in which case State or I would call
Senator Hatch to explain in advance).
Approve
Disapprove
OR, ALTERNATELY,
2. That you authorize the memorandum at TAB II, which concurs in
issuance of the visa, if you feel that it is unwise at this time
to stimulate public controversy on the issue.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Kimmitt to Hill
Tab II
Kimmitt to Hill
Tab III Incoming Memo from State
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
26-20
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER
15
LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.