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Matlock Chron April 1984 (1)
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135840544
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Matlock Chron April 1984 (1)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron April 1984 (1)
Box: 4
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Archivist: smf
File Folder: Matlock Chron April 1984 (1) Box 90887.
Date: 5/30/97
Box 4
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
1. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Talks (3 pp.)
4/17/84
P1/P5
(90307)
R 1/7/11 M02-010
2. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Talks(1 p.)
nd
P1
(90307)
R 11/16/99 NLSF95-074
#23
3. memo
Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re Talks (1 p.)
3/19/84
P1
(90307)
P 7/17/00 NLSF95-074*24,
Part. 7/15/10
m02-010#12
4. paper
re US-Soviet Talks (2 pp.)
n.d.
P1/P5
Part. 9/27/10 M02-10#13
5. paper
re Soviet position (1 p.)
n.d.
P1/P5
Part. 7/15/10 moa- 14
6. paper
re Talks (3 pp.)
P 7/17/00 NLSF95-074# 25
n.d.
P1
7 memo
Diane Dornan to Robert MeP Farlane re Talks and
4/13/84
P1/P5
(90307)
Agreements (2 pp.)
R 1/7/11 M02 #16
8. memo
Edward O'Malley to Ken deGraffenreid re Talks
4/3/84
P1
(2 pp.)
11/16/99 NLSF96 #26
D
10/17/05 M02-010 # 17
9. paper
re Talks (3 pp.) 11/16/99 NCSF95-074 #27
n.d.
P1
10. memo
to Ken Degraffenreid re USSR (2 pp.)
n.d.
P1
(90307)
D 7/10/01 F95-074 # 28
11. memo
John Poindexter to Ken Degraffenreid/Diane Dornan
4/6/84
P1
(90307)
re Review p.) P 11/16/99 NLSF95-074 29;R 1/7/11 M02-010#19
12. memo
Diane Dornan and Ken Degraffenreid to Robert
4/3/84
P1/P5
(90307)
McFarlane re Talks (4 pp.)
Part. 7/15/10 mo2-010#20
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information {(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRAJ.
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Archivist: smf
File Folder: Matlock Chron April 1984 (1)
Date: 5/30/97
Box 4
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
13. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re Response to
4/12/84
P1/P5
(90448)
Chernenko Letter (1 p.)
14. memo
Robert McFarlane to the President re Response to
n.d.
P1/P5
(90448)
Chernenko's letter (2 pp.)
15. letter
President Reagan to Chairman Chernenko (7.pp.)
nd
P1
R 11/16/99 NLSF95
-074#30
16. memo
George Shultz to the President TC Response to
4/6/84
P1/P3
(90448)
Chernenko's letter (3 pp.)
R
10/17/05 MOZOID # 23
17. letter
draft reply to Chernenko letter (7 pp.)
nd
P1
R 11/16/99 NLSF95-
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer CAS
Box Number
4
FOIA M02-010
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON APRIL 1984 (1)
DATE 3/22/2007
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
16 MEMO
SHUL TZ TO THE PRESIDENT MVH RE 3/17/08 3 4/6/1984
RESPONSE (#23)
SYSTEM II
90307
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
April 17, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
Am
SUBJECT:
Consular Review Talks with the USSR
State has submitted, in the memorandum at Tab II, a report with
recommendations for next steps in the Consular Review Talks with
the USSR. The one point in dispute is the refusal of the FBI to
agree to an offer to expand entry/exit points allowed on visas
for our respective officials to include Baltimore and San
Francisco in return for Brest and Nakhodka. State considers such
expansion in the U.S. interest, and the provision for reciprocal
expansion of entry/exit points integral to our negotiating
package. Without this provision, State sees no merit in
continuing the Consular Review Talks.
Discussion
The Consular Review Talks under discussion actually began in 1976
and have been carried on sporadically over the years without
conclusion. From the outset, one principal U.S. objective was to
secure an expansion of entry/exit points available to U.S.
diplomats and officials in the Soviet Union. This is important
to us both to facilitate travel relevant to intelligence
gathering, and also to provide more efficient access by highway
and rail to Western Europe and by ship to the Far East. The
Soviets have been in a position, by denying a visa amendment to
enter or exit the Soviet Union at points such as Brest and
Nakhodka, to prevent important travel without risking retaliation
for a travel denial as such. (In 1981, for example, the Soviets
routinely refused the Brest entry/exit point to our military
attaches, at a time when observation of possible Soviet
mobilization on the Polish border was a high-priority objective.)
The Soviets hardly ever apply for an additional entry/exit point
for their personnel, since they routinely use New York as the
port of entry, even for their personnel in San Francisco.
Therefore, we have had no means of forcing a more forthcoming
policy in this area by retaliation in kind.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M02-010
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
1/7/11
SECRET
- 2 -
During past negotiations, the Soviets showed no interest in
expanding the number of entry/exit points, but were eager to
obtain diplomatic visas for members of the Supreme Soviet and
certain other senior Soviet officials not normally eligible for
such visas. Since this is a purely symbolic issue (diplomatic
visas not conferring diplomatic immunities under U.S. law), it
was decided to use Soviet interest in this issue to obtain their
agreement on the expansion of entry/exit points. Prior to April,
1983, the FBI had approved this arrangement, but withdrew its
approval at that time, and its position on the matter is
unchanged now.
The FBI rests its objection primarily on the problem of handling
Soviet ship visits to Baltimore. This, however, is not relevant
to the entry/exit visa question, since issuing visas valid for
entry and exit in Baltimore does not constitute permission for
Soviet ships to use the port. The latter is an entirely separate
issue, and permission for each visit is decided on its own
merits, without regard to the visa question. When consulted on
the issue, DIA expressed doubts about the intelligence collection
value of the Brest/Nakhodka entry exit points and suggested a
thorough study of the intelligence trade-offs relating to this
question. These views, and Diane Dornan's covering memorandum,
are at TAB IV.
In my opinion, the FBI has not made a strong case that the
inclusion of Baltimore and San Francisco as entry/exit points
will add importantly to their burdens. As regards the need to
give further study to the intelligence trade-offs, I do not
believe the relatively trivial magnitude of the changes proposed
justify a formal study. The arguments on both sides are readily
apparent to those familiar with the issues and procedures, and
intelligence trade-offs are only one consideration relevant to
the package. There is no question that service attaches in
Moscow favor additional entry/exit points, since it does in fact
facilitate their ability to perform travel. The additional
entry/exit points are also important to staff morale and the
Embassy's operational needs.
Inasmuch as the Consular Review Talks represent one of the very
few areas where it appears that a quick agreement might be
possible, and the addition of Brest and Nakhodka would be of
substantial benefit to U.S. installations in the Soviet Union, I
believe that State should be authorized to renew negotiations on
the basis it proposes. However, I believe that we should be
cognizant of the counterintelligence community's concerns by
making it clear that approval to proceed with the consular review
talks does not imply approval of Soviet ship calls, that any
arrangements must meet the test of reciprocity, and that
implementation should be conducted in close coordination with the
FBI and other appropriate counterintelligence organizations.
Diane Dornan does not concur, and recommends a further study of
the intelligence implications.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
Recommendation:
That you approve transmission of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at
Tab I, which authorizes State to proceed with the Consular Review
Talks on the basis it recommends, but with the caveats noted
above.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of March 19, 1984
Tab III - "Consular Review Talks": Background paper from State
Tab IV - Dornan Memo of April 13 with comments by FBI and DIA
SECRET
SYSTEM II
90307
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Consular Review Talks with the USSR
(S)
The report transmitted with your memorandum to Mr. McFarlane of
March 19, 1984, containing recommendations for next steps on the
Consular Review Talks with the Soviet Union, has been reviewed.
(8)
The Department is authorized to renew the Consular Review Talks
with the USSR on the basis it recommends. It should be noted,
however, that this does not constitute approval for Soviet ship
visits to the Ports of Baltimore or San Francisco, which should
be treated as a separate issue. Any future recommendations in
regard to such requests should be submitted following
coordination with the FBI and other interested U.S. agencies. 1st
If the Soviets should accept the expansion of entry/exit points
as a part of the package of U.S. proposals, the Department should
insure that any arrangements made pursuant to the agreement meet
the test of strict reciprocity, and that close coordination be
maintained with the FBI and other counterintelligence agencies so
that appropriate measures can be taken to minimize any potential
intelligence benefits to the Soviet Union. 1st
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLS F95-074 # 23
Declassify on: OADR
BY souf NARA, DATE 11/16/99
SYSTEM 11
8408365
90307 add-on
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
March 19, 1984
84 MAR 20 A : 28
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Consular Review Talks with the USSR
In response to your March 12 request, we are attaching a
report with recommendations for next steps on the Consular
Review Talks with the Soviet Union. The Department would like
to proceed with the Consular Review Talks using the agenda to
which the FBI agreed prior to the April, 1983 meeting with the
Soviets. The FBI subequently withdrew its concurrence to one
item of the package -- an increase of entry/exit points -- an
item which we feel is central to a balanced package. The
entry/exit issue was placed on the agenda to counterbalance the
Soviet request for diplomatic visas for high-level Soviet
Amended
officials and to address Embassy Moscow's request for improved
travel
a/
12958
long-standing goal of the U.S. Government.
Bmekuling Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Enclosures:
As stated.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M02-010#12
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10
SECRET
U.S.-Soviet Consular Review Talks
The Consular Review Talks (CRT) are part of our effort to
find areas in the bilateral relationship in which we can make
progress in solving specific problems. We are having particular
problems now on a series of consular and visa matters that the
talks could help resolve. Successful talks could also provide a
demonstration that realistic negotiations can produce agreements
that serve the interests of both countries. A round of talks in
Washington last spring came close to producing an agreement that
we thought was attractive, but the FBI withdrew its consent on
one important element. As a result, we had to stall and the
Soviets eventually went home. The shootdown of the KAL aircraft
delayed a resumption of the talks.
We believe now is the time to resume the talks. The USG
must decide, however, whether or not we can agree to a
reciprocal increase in the number of entry/exit points in each
country from three to five. This is the issue that caused us
the problem last spring, when the FBI withdrew its concurrence.
Increasing the number of Soviet exit/entry points has long been
a U.S. goal. It would greatly increase our ability to enter and
depart the country, particularly by the overland routes
12958
As Amended
Sec.
We would obtain entry/exit at
Brest, on the Polish border, and Nakhodka, on the Soviet Pacific
coast near Vladivostok. The Soviets would obtain entry/exit at
San Francisco, where they have a consulate, and at Baltimore (by
sea only, to parallel our entry/exit possibilities at Nakhodka).
The FBI opposes this expansion of entry/exit points. The
attached statement of its position (Tab A) lists the following
objections: "The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I
addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign
officials and nonofficials in the U.S. proposed in part
limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific
entry/exit points;
had as its thrust the reduction of
entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet
officials"; and, "The presence of Soviet passenger ships for
extended periods of time in this port facility (of Baltimore)
would afford the Soviets a prolonged period of time to
accomplish disembarkment
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR
SECRET
- 2 -
The Department does not share the FBI's view that the SIG-I
agreed to reduce the number of entry/exit points; rather, it
merely agreed to add exit controls to the previously existing
entry controls. Earlier, the Soviets had been restricted to
specific entry points, but could exit from any open city. The
SIG/I decision restricted the Soviets to the same exit points as
entry points.
The Soviets cannot
bring any more ships into Baltimore than we authorize. Making
Baltimore an exit/entry point will not change that. In some
past years, they already have been permitted to have one ship
visit. In 1983 and again this year the Department turned down
their yearly ship-visit request because the Soviets were not
sufficiently forthcoming on our needs in Moscow.
Given the convenience of Brest as an entry point
(particularly if we open a consulate in Kiev)
the United States will get considerably more out of
this expansion of exit/entry points than the Soviets and our
interests are served by going ahead with it on its own merits.
In addition, this was a key element in the draft "package" that
we worked on with the Soviets last spring. To withdraw it would
unbalance the package in the Soviets' favor, leaving us several
unpalatable alternatives: 1) reach an agreement in which we
will give more than we get; 2) withdraw a bargaining item of
major interest to the Soviets, i.e. diplomatic visas for
high-level U.S. and Soviet officials, leaving a package of
rather minor visa concessions which they would probably reject;
or, 3) decline to resume the talks, thus giving up the
opportunity for progress that they represent and possibly
stimulating a worsened tit-for-tat situation on these irritating
visa and consular issues.
The State Department recommends that the entry/exit points
be included in the next round of talks and we will then inform
the Soviets that the U.S. proposes to reconvene the talks in May.
SECRET
SECRET/WNINTEL
RE: SOVIET SECTION INTD'S POSITION ON BALTIMORE
AS THE ENTRY/EXIT POINT FOR SOVIET OFFICIALS
The agreed upon proposals approved by the SIG-I
addressing limiting the presence and travel of hostile foreign
officials and nonofficials in the U.S., proposed in part
"
limiting Soviet officials and tourists to specific
entry/exit points; ..." had as its thrust the reduction of
entry/exit points available for utilization by Soviet officials.
Therefore, the FBI opposes the Port of Baltimore
being designated as an entry/exit point for the convenience
of Soviet travelers. The presence of Soviet passenger ships
for extended periods of time in this port facility would afford
the Soviets a prolonged period of time to accomplish disembarkment
and boarding of passengers and large cargo items. In addition,
members of the crew would also be afforded the opportunity to
disembark.
3.3(b)(1)
As Amended
E.O. 12958
While opposing opening the Port of Baltimore, the
FBI would not oppose the resumption of weekly Aeroflot flights
into JFK Airport, New York, if such an offer would afford
adequate negotiating leverage to gain the additional entry/exit
points desired by State in the USSR. Such resumption of flights
would be permitted and contingent upon simultaneous access to
the desired entry/exit points in the USSR and their continued
availability to U.S. officials and tourists.
-SECRET/WNINTEL
Classified by: 4193
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR M02-010#14
BY RW NARA DATE 7/15/10
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6-7
LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9+10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
Re: 90307
WASHINGTON
Add on
SECRET
April 6, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR KEN DeGRAFFENREID DIANE DORNAN
FROM:
JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT:
Consular Review
I have reviewed this package and discussed it with Bud. This has
to be considered from two aspects. First the President has
already authorized Secretary Shultz to proceed ahead with the
CRT's and secondly the CI community should have an opportunity to
review and have their comments taken into account.
We need to insist on
reciprocity and insure we do not take unnecessary risks that can
not be adequately covered.
CC: Jack Matlock (as discussed)
Bob Kimmitt
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F95-074#29
By smp NARA, Date 11/16/99
SYSTEM II
90307 (add-on)
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
April 3, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
DIANE DORNAN DD
KENNETH E. deGRAFFENREID Difor
SUBJECT:
Nonconcurrence on Authorization for Consular
Review Talks with the USSR
Basis of Nonconcurrence
We are unable to concur on this package because, despite
requests by us and the FBI, the full negotiating terms of
reference are not revealed, and because FBI has pointed out
counterintelligence concerns which merit further study. Lack
of information on the negotiating package reflects the deeper
problem of failure to consider carefully whether the proposed
terms would in fact secure net benefits for the US or at least
avoid overall harm. We recommend that the package be remanded
without prejudice for more careful study and that the precedent
be established for orderly review of intelligence collection
and counterintelligence issues in preparing negotiating packages.
The process should include full participation of the FBI and
OFM. OFM has been excluded from these discussions although it
is authorized and required by the Foreign Missions Act to
ensure reciprocity of benefits with the USSR. For your con-
venience we have summarized below the pros and cons expressed
regarding the known negotiating terms of reference.
Summary of Issues Under Contention:
Those who advocate the wisdom of negotiating such terms contend
that an agreement will demonstrate that we can negotiate
successfully with the Soviets and that the addition of two
entry/exit points will make the entire package more favorable
to the US than to the Soviets; without these additional
entry/exit points, the terms of reference would favor the USSR.
You are asked to authorize State to negotiate "on the basis it
recommends." This basis, and the arguments pro and con, are
presented as follows:
- Diplomatic visas would be given to high-level US and
Soviet government officials not normally eligible for
them. This is said to be the primary Soviet incentive to
accept the package, although it is said that these persons
still will have to go through the normal visa authoriza-
tion process and their primary gain will be one of prestige
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
NLRRM02-010#20
SECRET
Declassifv on: OADR
BY NARA DATE 7/15/10
SECRET
SECRET
and, to a minor extent, of convenience. FBI was not
informed of this proposal or asked to comment on it.
- "A package of rather minor visa concessions" to the
Soviets which have not been specified would be negotiated.
FBI was told these were irrelevant to the Bureau's concerns
and its comments were not desired.
- Entry/Exit points would be expanded from three to five.
Arguments that this would be more advantageous to the US
than to the USSR include the following:
--
The Soviets do not need or want additional such
sites.
-- Opening of Brest on the Polish border would be a
major convenience for diplomats and their
families traveling to and from Europe, since it
is a shorter and less expensive trip than
through Finland and since it would facilitate
access to the proposed consulate in Kiev.
--
Overland access through Brest and Nahodka (on
the Pacific coast near Vladivostok) would
provide an "opportunity to penetrate Soviet
E.O. 12958
society" and to "spread our ideas."
As Amended
3.3(b)(1)
-- FBI claims regarding CI problems and burdens are
exaggerated and center primarily on the issue of
Soviet ship visitation rights, which will be
unaffected.
--
FBI arguments in other areas misunderstand
actual practices and exaggerate the meaning of
entry/exist points authorization.
--
By removing the need to obtain special permission
to enter and exit from these two additional
cities and making it a normal right, we will
restrict Soviet ability, against which we have
no strictly reciprocal retaliation options, to
deny travel requests by US personnel, especially
military attaches who have wished to use Brest.
- The FBI, however, argues that additional entry/exit
points may benefit the Soviets more than us in that:
-- This would run counter to recent policy initiatives
ameliorating the CI problem, including the
drastic reduction in allowable Soviet exit
points which recently was imposed.
SECRET
GEODET
SECRET
SECRET
Already strained CI resources would be spread
thinner. Prolonged boarding procedures would
make surveillance difficult in the ports of
Baltimore and San Francisco; these port problems
would be exacerbated if visa holders came on
Soviet-owned ships,
Although we have denied
Soviet ship visits to Baltimore in 1983 and 1984
to retaliate for problems in the USSR, this is
the preferred Soviet method for rotating
Washington embassy staff; the Soviets may accuse
the US or reneging on the spirit, if not the
letter, of the agreement if we deny such ship
visitations and require that they book vessels
from other countries, and may deny US travel
rights through Brest or Nahodka in retaliation.
We can anticipate internal and external pressure
to allow Soviet ship visitation and in practice
we are likely to lose the ability to deny these
rights, thus sacrificing current retaliatory
leverage over the USSR and incurring additional
CI problems. In addition, access to San
Francisco by air would provide easy contact with
the large Soviet intelligence organization at
their embassy in Mexico City, which conducts
intelligence operations against the US.
benefits accruing to the
US from adding two more entry/exit points may be
overstated since:
The extent to which we have been able to
influence opinions
by digressing into the countryside from
access routes is questionable.
Travel from Nahodka would be by train only,
which eases Soviet surveillance tasks and
does not facilitate digression from the
approved route.
Allies
already have access to these
cities.
-- Since we do not know whether we can negotiate
acceptable terms for opening a Kiev consulate, it is
premature to arrange easier access to such a site.
-- The merits of convenience should be weighed
against expected CI problems.
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
SECRET
RECOMMENDATION
That you return the package to agencies for further and fuller
regarding its overall
consideration of its net benefits, without prejudice to judgments
Approve of desirability. see my Disapprove note.
That FBI and OFM be included in such deliberations and that
counterintelligence and intelligence collection issues be more
carefully weighed
Approve of
Disapprove
had to also involve DIA to get
better assessment on intelligence gains,
again me need to proced with dispoted
and prepare an options memo.
SECRET
SECRET
3055
C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 13, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK W
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from the
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee
I recommend that you sign the attached memorandum to
Sally Kelley.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to Sally Kelley
:
3055
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 13, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Letter to the President from the
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee
We have reviewed and concur, with slight change as noted,
with the Department of State's proposed response to the
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED
3055
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
s/s 8409990
Date April 11, 1984
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To: President Reagan
From: Mrs. Vera Romuk
Date: March 26, 1984
Subject: Concern for the
Bielarusian/Byelorussian people in occupied Bielarus
WH Referral Dated: .. - 4/4/84 -
NSC ID# 205116
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
Action Taken:
XX
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Executive Charles Secretary Hill
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
Department of State
Suggested Response
Dear Mrs. Romuk:
Thank you for your letter of March 26 to President Reagan
concerning the people of Bielarus
The position of the U.S. Government and the Department of
State has been and remains that the United States fully
supports the principle of national self-determination for all
people, including the Bielarusian people. We also strongly
support the struggle of all peoples to establish freedom and
democracy in their own lands.
In taking these positions, however, it is necessary to
point out that the United States equally strongly subscribes to
the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
foreign states, and does not as a matter of policy advocate the
dissolution of sovereign states recognized as such by the
United States. As Vice President Bush noted in his September
21, 1983 address in Vienna: "Let me stress here that the
United States does not seek to destabilize or undermine any
Mrs. Vera Romuk, Secretary,
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee
of Chicago, Illinois,
3348 North Oleander Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.
-2-
government, but our attitude toward the (Eastern and Central
European) region is informed by a sense of history -- of
European history. For this reason, we support and will
encourage all movement toward the social, humanitarian, and
democratic ideals which have characterized the historical
development of Europe."
We understand the concern of Bielarusian-Americans for
their compatriots in the Soviet Union and will continue to
speak out for the right of all nations to self-determination.
Sincerely,
8409990
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
APRIL 4, 1984
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
205116
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 26, 1984
TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
MRS. VERA ROMUK
SECRETARY
BIELARUSIAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE
OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
3348 NORTH OLEANDER AVENUE
CHICAGO IL 60634
SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE
BIELARUSIAN/BYELORUSSIAN PEOPLE IN THE
SOVIET RUSSIAN OCCUPIED BIELARUS
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL - IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
Received 5/57
ID# 205116
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
INCOMING
DATE RECEIVED: MARCH 29, 1984
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MRS. VERA ROMUK
SUBJECT WRITES REGARDING THE FUTURE OF THE
BIELARUSIAN/BYELORUSSIAN PEOPLE IN THE
SOVIET RUSSIAN OCCUPIED BIELARUS
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT DATE TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS
ORG 84/03/29
/ /
V99 DOS
REFERRAL NOTE:
-
D 84/03/20
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:
MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES
PL MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION CODES:
*OUTGOING
*
*
*
* CORRESPONDENCE:
*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
*TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
*
OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
*
CODE = A
*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET
*S-SUSPENDED
*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
*
OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*
*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
*
*
*
*X-INTERIM REPLY
*
*
*
REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
205116
37
8409990
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee
MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS:
of Chicago, Illinois
Byelorussian American National
Council of Chicago
March 26, 1984
Whiteruthenian (Byelorussian)
American Ass'n in Illinois
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
Bielarusian American Youth
President of the United States
The White House
Organization Kojelis Illinois
Washington, D. C. 20500
finas
Dear Mr. President:
Yesterday, March 25, marked the 66th Anniversary of the
Declaration of Independence of Bielarus/Byelorussia. Biela-
rusian-American Communities in the United States, including
Chicago, solemnly observed this jubilee with appropriate com-
memorative programs.
On this occasion, I am writing to you, Mr. President,
to bring to your attention the destiny of the Bielarusian/Byelo-
russian people in the Soviet-Russian occupied Bielarus and to
ask your support in their quest for freedom and independence. I
plead with you to remember the Bielarusian people and their needs
in your talks with the leaders of the Soviet Union.
The Bielarusians today are the group most deprived of their
rights within their own territory--the Byelorussian Soviet Social-
ist Republic. Bielarus has become a colony of Moscow. The Biela-
rusian language and Bielarusian culture have been replaced with
the Russian language and the Russian culture. Moscow has isolated
the Bielarusian land and the Bielarusian people from the rest of
the world. Moscow exploits the Bielarusian natural resources, the
Bielarusian labor and talents and the Bielarusian products to her
own advantage. Moscow replaced the Bielarusian native name BIELARUS
with Byelorussia and is making all-out efforts to assimilate the
Bielarusians into the Russian culture.
The Bielarusian Americans are greatly concerned about the
destiny of our compatriots in Soviet Bielarus and ask you,
Mr. President, to speak on their behalf and their freedoms,
demanding from Moscow to end their colonial rule over Bielarus
and other Captive Nations in the Soviet Union.
Thank you and God bless you, Mr. President.
Respectfully yours,
Vera Romuk
Mrs. Vera Romuk, Secretary
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee
of Chicago, Illinois
3348 North Oleander Avenue
Enclosures
Chicago, Illinois 60634
LATVIA
Korsovka
STATE
MOSCOW
LITHUANIA
KAUNAS
EAST
PRUSSIA
MINIK
BIELARUS
RUSSIA
Briansk
POLAND
"WARSAW
0
so
100
150
UKRAINE
Miles
KIEV
THE NAME: BIELARUS* is the original, true and correct name of the country. Bielarus
is known to the outside world today as Byelorussia. This name comes from
the Russian language--Belorooseeya. It was imposed by Moscow without the
approval of the Bielarusian people and the Bielarusian government. The
Bielarusians feel that the name of their country should be presented to
the outside world from their native language. If translated, Bielarus
means Whiteruchenia. Bielarusians are not Russians but a Slav people.
IOCATION: BIELARUS is not in Russia but in the western part of the Soviet Union,
bordering with Poland in the west, Ukraine in the south, Russia in the
east and north and the Baltic States in the northwest. Its present-day
territory extends for 560 kilometers from north to south and 650 kilometers
from west to east and covers a total area of 207,600 square kilometers.
Its ethnographic territory extends to 380,000 square kilometers. It is
larger than such European countries as Czechoslovaria, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Greece and Portugal, and exceeds the combined area of Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Switzerland and Luxembourg.
POLITICAL STATUS: BIELARUS is a republic of the Soviet Union and Communist controlled
from Moscow. Bielarus is also a founding member of the United
Nations. Bielarus regained independence from Russia on March 25,
1918 but was forcibly incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (the U.S.S.R.) in 1922. The Bielarusian people have since
struggled for freedom and independence of their country, hoping that
someday their dream will come true.
MAJOR CITIES: MIENSK (Minsk) is the capital of Bielarus, population 1,300,000. Other
cities are: Hrodna (Grodno), Viciebsk (Vitebsk), Folacak (Polock), Pinsk,
Bierascie (Brest), Homiel (Gomel), Mahilou (Mogilev) and Babrujsk (Bob-
ruysk).
POPULATION: Present Bielarusian population numbers 10,200,000. There are 2,000,000
Bielarusians living within the boundaries of other Soviet Republics and
another 8,000,000 are dispersed throughout the entire world.
* BIELARUS is pronounced Bye-la -roos.
Bielarusian is pronounced Bye-lah-roo-see-yan.
PREPARED BY: THE BIELARUSIAN COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
P. 0. BOX 30079
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60630
Bielarusian Coordinating Committee
MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS:
of Chicago, Illinois
Byelorussion American National
Council of Chicago
March 8, 1984
Whiteruthenian (Byelorussian)
PRESS RELEASE
American Ass'n in Illinois
Bielarusian American Youth
Sunday, March 25, is the 66th Anniversary of the Declaration
Organization in Illinois
of Independence of Bielarus. It will be observed by Bielarusian
Americans throughtout the United States and those living in other
parts of the Free World.
The solemn observance in Chicago will take place at 12:30 p.m.
at Robert and Allen's Regency Inn, 5319 West Diversey Avenue.
The observance is being sponsored by the Bielarusian Coordinating
Committee of Chicago, Illinois and will feature a luncheon and
commemorative program with speakers and musical and singing rendi-
tions. Proclamations from Governor James Thompson and Mayor Harold
Washington will also be read as well as the remarks made by members
of the U. S. Congress.
The Bielarusian Coordinating Committee of Chicago, Illinois is
also sponsoring an exhibit at the Richard J. Daley Center from
March 19th through 31st in conjunction with the 66th Anniversary
of the Bielarusian Independence. There will be various memorabilia,
craft and art items, a collection of stamps, objects made of clay,
straw inlaid plaques and boxes, cross-stitch embroidery, dolls
and Easter eggs on display as well as pictures portraying the
Bielarusian folk and land. The exhibit can be viewed daily from
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. except Saturday and Sunday. It will be in
the southwest corner of the center, facing the plaza.
By observing the Bielarusian independence day, the Bielarusian
Americans will focus their attention on their compatriots in the
Soviet-Russian controlled Bielarus, which is known to the outside
world under the Russian-impossed name of Byelorussia. We want the
whole world to know that Moscow has subjected the Bielarusian people
to harsh slavery and the lowest kind of indignity. The Bielarusian
people are forbidden by Moscow in their homeland the use of their
Bielarusian language in their national government and their schools.
Moscow gives no permission to print Bielarusian-foreign language
dictionaries and has even banned the appearance of greeting cards
with the Bielarusian texts and motifs. The Russianization is at its
highest level today.
We cannot remain indifferent to these and other abuses and to the
harsh treatment that is carried out by Moscow against the Bielarusian
people in their Russian-occupied homeland. We want the world to
remember their sufferings and speak on their behalf. We want the
Bielarusian dissidents and prisoners of conscience to be freed from
Soviet prisons, psychiatric asylums, and concentration camps.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT MRS. VERA ROMUK, 3348 North
Oleander Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60634; telephone: 745-8216
AND, SAY, WHO GOES THERE?
And, say, who goes there? And, say, who goes there?
In such a mighty throng assembled, O declare?
Byelorussians!
And what do those lean shoulders bear as load,
Those hands stained dark with blood, those feet bast-sandal shod?
All their grievance!
And to what place do they this grievance bear,
And whither do they take it to declare?
To the whole world!
And who schooled them thus, many million strong,
Bear their grievance forth, roused them from slumbers long?
Want and suffering!
And what is it, then, for which so long they pined,
Scorned throughout the years, they, the deaf, the blind?
To be called human!
|1905-1907]
This poem was written by Janka Kupala, bard of Bielarusian literature, and trans-
lated into English by English poetess Vera Rich. To date the poem was translated
into 85 languages of the world. It portrays the Bielarusian struggle for freedom
and human dignity. The Bielarusians are still marching on to bring their grievance
to the world against their subjugators-the red czars of Moscow, who rule BIELARUS
today.
BIELARUSIAN
COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Member Organizations
Byelorussian-American National Council
of Chicago, Illinois
66 th ANNIVERSARY
Whiteruthenian (Byelorussian) American
Association in Illinois
OF THE
Bielarusian-American Youth Organization
Declaration of
in Illinois
Independence
OF
LATVIA
Korsovks
*
BIELARUS
MOSCOW
LITHUANIA
KAUNAS
EAST
PRUSSIA
MINIK
BIELARUS
RUSSIA
March 25
Briansk
POLAND
©WARSAW
1918
1984
so
100
150
UKRAINE
KIEV
Miles
Sunday, March 25, 1984
REGENCY INN
5319 WEST DIVERSEY AVENUE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
COMME MORATIVE PROGRAM
1. The American Anthem
Miss Avis Pramshafer
The Star Spangled Banner
Acc. Miss Susie Skeppsdron
Oh!- say, can you see, by the dawn's early light,
What so proudly we hailed at the twilights last gleaming?
2. Invocation
The Most Rev. Madimir Tarasevitch
Whose broad stripes and bright stars, thro the perilous fight,
Over the ramparts we watched where so galantly streaming?
3. A Minute of Silence
And the rockets red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof thro the night that our flag was still there.
4. Welcome Address
Mr. Leo Sidorewicz, Chairman
Oh! - say, does that Star Spangled Banner yet wave,
O'er the land of the free, and the home of the brave.
5. Dinner
6. Introduction of Guests
M.C.
The Bielarusian Anthem
7. Reading of Proclamations and Greetings
My vyjdziem "dylnymi radami
8. Commemorative Address in English
...
Miss Irena Romuk
Na volny rodny svoj prastor;
Chai vola vieëna budzie Z na mi
9. Poem
Mr. Michael Bujlau
A hvaltu my damo adpor!
10. Solo Renditions
Mrs. Pola Breschnev
Acc. Mr. Henry Janczewski
Niachaj Zyvie mahutny, śmiely
Naš bieXaruski volny duch;
11. Greetings from Guests
Standar naš bie%-¿yrvona-biexy
Pakryd saboj narodny ruch.
12. Duets
Mrs. Pola Breschnev
Mrs. Ole Shukin
Na boj! za Edascie i za volu
Acc. Mr. Henry Janczewski
Narodu sladnaha svajho!
Braty, ciarpieli my da voli
13. Poem
Mr. George Bujlau
Na boj!- usie da adnaho!
14. Commemorative Address in Bielarusian
Dr. W. Romuk
Imia i sixu bielarusa
Niachaj pačuje i badyc toj,
15. Piano Solo
Mr. Henry Janczewski
Chto šmieje nam niaści prymusy
I pierSy vykliča na boj.
1 6. Benediction
Rev. Oleksa Harbuziuk
Braty, da ¿dašcia my padchodzim;
:
17. The Bielarusian Anthem
All Present
Chai hrom hrymið jašče macniej!
U kryvavych mukach my narodzim
18. A Thank-You Word from the Chairman
Sidorewicz
Zyccio Respubliki svajej!
M.C. Nick Zyznieuski
2962
J
Add-on 1
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 13, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK As
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with European Democratic Students
April 13, 1984; 3:15 P.M.; Ward Room
You have agreed to meet with representatives of the European
Democratic Student Group for not more than 15 minutes this
afternoon. This group is strong supportive of our policies in
Europe and the primary purpose of the meeting is to indicate our
interest and support. Their comments on the attitudes of
European youth will also be of interest.
Suggested talking points and a list of visitors are at Tabs I and
II. I will attend the meeting and will be prepared to stay with
them after your departure to continue the dialogue.
Attachments:
Tab I - Talking points
Tab II - List of Participants
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
1. Describe in general terms the current state of U.S. - -Soviet
relations, including:
a. Our desire to negotiate real issues;
b. Soviet intransigence, stimulated by hope that they
can split the Alliance by influencing Western public opinion;
C. Pressures on Soviet regime to change policies;
d. Difficulties they face in making basic decisions
while in a transition period; and
e. The need for the West to follow a steady, concerted
policy and not to allow Soviet intimidation to work.
2. Solicit the views of the group regarding attitudes among young
people in Europe.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 13, 1984
MEMORANDUM TO ROBERT McFARLANE
JACK MATLOCK
FROM:
Frank J. Donatelli
SUBJECT:
European Democratic Students Delegation
DATE AND TIME: Friday, April 13, 1984 - 3:15 p.m.
LOCATION: The Ward Room - West Wing
PARTICIPANTS:
National Security Council
Robert McFarlane
Jack Matlock
Peter Sommer
Office of Public Liaison
Frank Lavin
European Democratic Students
Joelle Labbez
France
Member, Executive Committee, Union Nationale
Universitaire
Deborah Anne Artingstall
United Kingdom
Leader, Federation of Conservative Students
Hubertus Hoffman
FRG
Member, CDU Federal Defense Commission
Brian Monteith
United Kingdom
Vice Chairman, EDS
Stephen Morrison
United Kingdom
Executive Director, EDS
Cecilia Stego
Sweden
Member Board, Democratic Students International
Americans
Michael Boos (Rhymes with hose)
Program Director, Young America's Foundation
Ron Robinson
President, Young America's Foundation
James Taylor
Executive Director, Young America's Foundation
2
SCHEDULE:
3:15 - 3:30 p.m. Presentation of Ambassador McFarlane
3:30 - 4:00 p.m. Presentation and discussion with
Jack Matlock and Peter Sommer
SYSTEM 11
90307 Add-On #3
SECRET
J. MATLOCK
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
April 13, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
DIANE DORNAN
DD
SUBJECT:
Counterintelligence Implications of Proposals
for (a) Consular Review Talks, (b) Cultural
Exchange Agreement and (c) Review of Agreement
on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation
In accordance with John Poindexter's instructions, IG (CI)
members were asked Tuesday to comment on the CI implications of
proposed negotiating terms for the above agreements by COB
Thursday. They and the COMEX Staff were given previous State
and FBI comments for reference, and some of them later received
a State summary (Tab I) of the complete terms of reference for
the Consular Review Talks (CRT). Due to the shortage of time,
agencies responded individually and mostly by telephone. As
instructed, DIA also submitted a written assessment of poten-
tial collection opportunities under the CRT.
My summary of previous views regarding the merits and liabili-
ties of the CRT and the official State and FBI papers present-
ing there respective positions, and Jack Matlock's evaluation
are at Tab II. Most agencies agreed with the FBI assessment of
CI concerns regarding the CRT and highlighted the need for a
net assessment of collection benefits vs probable CI difficul-
ties. They focused on the entry/exit issue, endorsing all FBI
views previously expressed, including the expectation that this
would further strain CI resources. NSA elaborated on the
problems which might be caused if this agreement effectively
undercut out ability to deny entry at San Francisco and
Baltimore to either ships or planes of Soviet or Soviet Bloc
nationality. These could be fitted with ELINT collection gear
and planes could also carry PHOTINT equipment. The problem
would be particularly acute in Baltimore, where a ship would
have a very extensive radio horizon and a perfect spot to
intercept high-volume intergovernmental and defense contractor
communications. Should Bloc ships be allowed to dock there, it
would be necessary to establish a protected communications zone
between the current two encompassing New York and Washington,
an extremely expensive and complicated undertaking. The
exception was OFM, which foresaw no significant CI problems
with the proposed terms.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M02-010#16
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET
BY
NARA
DATE
1/7/11
SECRET
SECRET
Agencies responsible for collection, on the other hand,
disputed the belief that the expansion of entry/exit points
would provide the US with a net benefit because of its
advantages for intelligence collection. The DIA analysis at
Tab III discusses in detail why it would be doubtful that
essential data would be collected -- partly because the Soviets
would continue to minimize collection opportunities and partly
because we already have normal access to the nonessential
information we might secure. CIA also said regularization of
access to Brest and Nakhodka would not affect its collection
program.
Regarding the Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation
(Cultural Exchanges), FBI has submitted a memorandum (Tab IV)
advocating that technology transfer losses be minimized by
requiring that the ratio of exchange personnel and groups in
scientific/technical programs be the same for both countries
and that there be direct reciprocity in number of groups and
participants, types of groups and relative geographical access.
DIA (Tab V) has suggested that "young" scholars, and visitors
be defined in the treaty as those under 28 years of age, in
order to limit access to those who are prime intelligence
collectors. Two agencies also insisted that the agreement must
drop one sentence (p. 27, para. 8) allowing Soviet scholars to
change their course of study after the beginning of the year
(when their programs normally are reviewed for technology
transfer concerns), since this provides an effective loophole
which they may exploit to target programs most desirable from a
collection standpoint. CIA indicated that such exchange
agreements have not been useful to the US from an intelligence
collection standpoint.
Most agencies had no comment on the desirability of renewing
Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation. They were
largely unfamiliar with its terms and past operation (lack of
familiarity was also a problem on the Cultural Exchanges issue,
especially given time constraints), but most said they did not
see obvious and major CI problems. DIA (Tab III, p. 2)
objected, as has DOD generally, that the agreement as written
offers opportunities for technology acquisition in the US; CIA
said it does not affect our collection program in the USSR.
DOD's general position is that it should be allowed to lapse
but that if eventually revived it should be rewritten more
carefully and specifically that it should give priority to
Export Administration Act controls. FBI did not comment on
this issue.
SECRET
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
Re: 90307
WASHINGTON
Add on
SECRET
April 6, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR KEN DeGRAFFENREID DIANE DORNAN
FROM:
JOHN POINDEXTER
x
SUBJECT:
Consular Review
I have reviewed this package and discussed it with Bud. This has
to be considered from two aspects. First the President has
already authorized Secretary Shultz to proceed ahead with the
CRT's and secondly the CI community should have an opportunity to
review and have their comments taken into account. I would like
for you to go back to FBI with a copy of our proposed approval
memo to assure the FBI that we are not approving ship visits and
it would perfectly understandable if they caveated their position
now that they would be opposed to approving ship visits to these
ports. I also want you to go to DIA and get their assessment of
the intelligence value of the two entry/exit points that we would
get. I would like to have the package returned by the end of
next week. Clearly the CI effort would be simpler if we did not
have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but we do and the
President wants to improve them. We need to insist on
reciprocity and insure we do not take unnecessary risks that can
not be adequately covered.
CC: Jack Matlock (as discussed)
Bob Kimmitt
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 102-010#19
BY RW NARA DATE 1/7/11
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13414 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 19,
together with the views expressed by Foreign
Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin in recent
discussions with Ambassador Hartman and Secretary
Shultz. I welcome the fact that you too recognize
the value of direct exchanges of views on the
important issues in U.S. -Soviet relations.
First of all, I would like to reiterate my
congratulations upon your assumption of the new
and responsible position of Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I look forward
to productive working relations with you in your
new capacity, to the mutual benefit of our
peoples.
In looking at the present state of affairs between
our two countries, I believe it will be useful to
reflect upon our differing perceptions of one
another. You have expressed concern about U.S.
actions and military programs which you see as
threatening to the Soviet Union. I fully
appreciate the priority you attach to the security
of the Soviet state, particularly in light of the
enormous costs shouldered by your people in
helping to defeat Nazi Germany, but I cannot
understand why our programs can be considered
threatening. On the contrary, in our view there
are many Soviet actions and military programs
which we and our Allies consider to be threatening
to our own vital security interests.
For example, the Soviet Union continues to ship
massive quantities of arms to sensitive areas near
our borders, and appears bent on promoting insta-
bility rather than peaceful change in many areas
of the developing world. Your country's large-
scale and sustained use of force in Afghanistan,
DECLASSIFIED / Released
NLS F95-074 #30
BY snf NARA, DATE 11/16/99
2
in close proximity to one of our closest friends,
Pakistan, makes less reassuring your government's
frequent avowals of peaceful intent.
Perhaps of greatest concern to us is the enormous
increase in recent years in Soviet nuclear forces
targeted against the United States and our Allies.
This build-up may initially have been designed to
attain parity with the United States, yet at some
point in the last decade that goal was achieved;
we have good reason to question, therefore, why
the growth in Soviet nuclear forces has none-
theless continued unabated.
Take strategic offensive forces as an example.
Since 1970, the Soviet Union has deployed three
new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
five new types of submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, and at least thirteen modernized
versions of existing missiles. As you well know,
the USSR is now flight-testing two new ICBMs, plus
another new type of SLBM. As we see it, you claim
to be responding to U.S. programs, yet your new
missiles have been deployed years ahead of their
U.S. counterparts, not to mention in greater
numbers.
In the area of ballistic missile defense, your
country has been engaged for many years in a
research effort similar to that recently initiated
in the United States and, indeed, is the only
nation to deploy an active anti-ballistic missile
system; moreover, your deployment of a network of
advanced radars gives us legitimate grounds to
question whether the USSR is laying the basis for
a nationwide ABM defense of the USSR. And there
are, of course, other aspects of existing arms
control agreements where the concerns we have
raised with you have not been alleviated.
As you know, your country's deployment of the
SS-20 has been of especially grave concern both to
the United States and our Allies. Since NATO's
December 1979 decision, when your country asserted
that a "balance" existed in intermediate-range
nuclear forces, the Soviet Union has deployed 238
additional SS-20's with over 700 additional
warheads. These missiles constitute a far greater
threat to the security of the western alliance --
3
both in quantitative and qualitative terms -- than
previous Soviet missiles, which had fewer warheads
and lower accuracy.
These are some of the realities of the interna-
tional situation as we see it. I recognize that
neither of us will be able to persuade the other
as to who is to blame for the present poor state
of our relations. Nor would it be productive for
the two of us to engage in a lengthy debate on
this subject. I doubt, however, that we can make
progress in reducing the tensions between our
countries, or in reducing the high levels of
armaments, if either of us is unwilling to take
into account the concerns of the other.
As for myself, I am prepared to consider your
concerns seriously, even when I have difficulty
understanding why they are held. I am willing to
explore possible ways to alleviate them. But
solutions will elude us if you are unable to
approach our discussions in the same spirit, or if
you demand concessions as an entry fee for the
discussions themselves.
As for the negotiations now underway, I believe
the Stockholm conference provides an opportunity
for both our countries to take steps to reduce
some of the apprehensions about each other's
military activities. I was encouraged by your
expression of hope for positive results at
Stockholm and your support for measures aimed at
building confidence between East and West. As you
know, we and our Allies have presented a package
of specific measures which, if implemented, could
substantially reduce the dangers of misunder-
standing and miscalculation in Europe.
If the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate
seriously on such concrete confidence-building
measures, the United States will be prepared to
discuss the question of reciprocal assurances
against the use of force and the context in which
such an agreement can be reached. You have asked
for a "concrete signal" in the area of arms
control, and your representatives have specified
that U.S. willingness to agree on non-use of force
would be considered such a signal. In this
connection let me add that I am pleased that our
4
Ambassadors to the Stockholm conference have
agreed to get together soon. This will provide an
opportunity to discuss an arrangement that would
meet both countries' concerns.
There are many other arms control topics where we
hope to move forward in the weeks and months
ahead. As I said in my previous letter, the
Western countries plan to present new proposals at
the Vienna negotiations which will provide a solid
basis for progress on the related issues of data
and verification. In the Conference on Disarma-
ment, the Vice President will table a draft treaty
to ban chemical weapons on April 18. In addition
to this step in the multilateral forum, perhaps
the time has come when bilateral consultations on
the issue could advance the prospects for an
effective and verifiable ban.
While the foregoing issues are important, and
while there may be other arms control areas --
including those raised in your letter -- where
steps forward could be made, we have always
considered the central element of our dialogue on
arms control to be the limitation and reduction of
nuclear weapons. The United States has advanced
proposals that would substantially reduce the most
threatening nuclear weapons systems on both sides.
We have demonstrated considerable flexibility in
an effort to respond to the concerns your negoti-
ators have expressed. I must state frankly that I
am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet
shown such flexibility, or taken advantage of the
opportunity for private discussions on ways to
make progress in the START and INF negotiations.
I am well aware of your views regarding the
impasse in these negotiations. You are, I am
sure, equally aware of the fact that we and our
Allies do not agree with your analysis of the
balance in intermediate-range missiles or your
assessment of the "obstacles" that supposedly
stand in the way of further negotiations. For our
part, we are prepared to consider any equitable
outcome, and to halt, reverse or eliminate
entirely our deployments of Pershing and cruise
missiles in the context of an agreement between
the two sides.
5
Experience has shown that neither side can hope to
impose its view of the situation on the other as a
precondition for negotiations. Rather, what is
needed is for our representatives to sit down and
devise a formula for nuclear arms reductions that
is consistent with the security interests of both
our nations. So let us focus on the concrete task
of reaching agreements in this spirit, rather than
wasting our energies debating further the meaning
of "equality and equal security."
I would like to reaffirm once again the readiness
of the United States to explore with the Soviet
Union possible ways for moving forward on the
nuclear arms negotiations. As I have said
previously, we have a number of specific ideas to
present for overcoming some of the fundamental
differences that have divided us in the negotia-
tions. We are prepared to discuss these in
private diplomatic channels or between our
respective negotiators. If the Soviet side is
prepared to match U.S. flexibility, I would hope
that, by this means, the way could be cleared to
resumption of formal talks on nuclear arms
reductions. I would welcome any concrete
suggestions you might have on how to proceed.
I am pleased that we agree on the importance of
exchanges of views on regional problems. As you
state, such exchanges should be directed toward
the peaceful settlement of local disputes and the
strengthening of peace. Over the past three
years, the United States has taken the initiative
to discuss a number of regional problems in
precisely this spirit. For example, we have
initiated formal consultations with your country's
experts on Afghanistan and southern Africa. While
such exchanges have not been as fruitful as we had
hoped, I would like to pursue them, with the
objective of establishing a more productive
dialogue on regional issues. I believe it would
be useful for our experts to hold more detailed
discussions of developments in southern Africa --
as Foreign Minister Gromyko has suggested --
because there are promising signs of progress
toward a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement
would serve the interests of the states in the
area, and of all those who value stability and
prosperity there.
6
The Middle East and Persian Gulf is another area
where a further exchange of views would be
helpful. In this regard, I was pleased to read of
your personal commitment to seeking an end to the
Iran/Iraq conflict and to avoiding any actions
which might lead the parties to prolong or expand
it. I wish to assure you that the United States
shares these objectives, and that we will continue
making every effort to achieve them.
To improve mutual understanding on this issue,
Secretary Shultz has on several recent occasions
voiced to Ambassador Dobrynin our concerns about
any expansion of the war to other areas of the
Persian Gulf. In doing so, we have tried to
communicate the importance we attach to
maintaining freedom of navigation there for the
ships of all nations. We believe our interest in
supporting this principle of international law
serves all and threatens none, and we regret the
misrepresentations of our position which have
appeared in the official Soviet news media. Such
commentaries cannot serve to calm tensions in the
area.
With respect to our bilateral relations, I think
we agree that we should seek to enlarge the areas
of mutually beneficial cooperation and inject real
content into our bilateral agreements. My repre-
sentatives will continue to present specific
proposals in this regard, and I hope that the
Soviet side will not put any artificial barriers
in the way of progress.
I must add that I am disappointed that you did not
respond to the appeal in my March 6 letter
concerning humanitarian issues. Steps in this
area could have a substantial impact on other
aspects of our relations, and I hope that you will
continue to give them serious consideration.
To conclude, let me state once again that the
United States is ready for a turning point in our
relations with the Soviet Union. We have made a
concerted effort to put content into our dialogue.
We have a number of specific ideas to explore with
you on questions of vital importance to both our
peoples. We intend to continue our efforts in
this direction. Real progress, however, will
7
require similar efforts on the part of the Soviet
Union.
I look forward to receiving your comments on the
thoughts I have expressed.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko
Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow
SUPER SENSITIVE 8410256/8410255
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SYSTEM II
90448
WASHINGTON
SECRET SENSITIVE
April 6, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz
its
SUBJECT:
Response to Chernenko's March 19 Letter
We have drafted a response to Chernenko's March 19 letter
(attached), taking into account my meeting with Dobrynin last
Monday, Art Hartman's exchange with Gromyko last Tuesday, and
the guidance you provided in NSDD-137 on nuclear arms control
strategy.
The letter serves a number of the policy objectives you
stressed at the March 27 NSC meeting:
-- it counters the Soviets' arguments about an alleged U.S.
"threat" by describing some of the Soviet actions and military
programs which make them appear a threat to us;
-- it reaffirms the U.S. commitment to arms control and our
readiness to be flexible in the search for agreements; and
-- it attempts to reassure the Soviets we are not a threat,
and to "get Chernenko's attention," by expressing our readiness
to consider in the CDE a non-use of force undertaking if the
Soviets agree to some of the specific confidence-building
measures we have proposed.
On this last point, the Soviets at all levels have been
asking for just such a "concrete signal" from us. Although they
are now giving somewhat more attention to outer space arms
control, they also have been signalling for months that they
consider our attitude toward non-use of force as a kind of
litmus test of U.S. "seriousness" in the arms control field.
Chernenko's April 4 message to the Socialist International cited
non-use of force once again. By highlighting our willingness to
move in reciprocal fashion on this issue, therefore, our
proposed letter provides tangible evidence for Chernenko of your
commitment to moving the relationship forward.
The Soviets today invited Jim Goodby to Moscow for consulta-
tions with his Soviet counterpart; we are now working on the
dates. This would be an opportunity to begin exploring the idea.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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DECL: OADR
BY Cds
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
Jim Goodby is confident that our Allies will support our
pursuit of a trade between non-use of force and CBMs at the next
round of the CDE. In fact, the Allies and he have been planning
on the Western countries agreeing to a working group discussion
of non-use of force -- which would represent implicit acceptance
of it. Gromyko, however, may try to obscure the significance of
our willingness to have working group discussions unless we
broach the idea directly with Chernenko -- only through the
letter can we ensure that you will get credit for our move.
Without this language on CDE, there will be nothing in this
letter to get Chernenko's attention. Pending your approval of
the proposal, we have put the relevant language in brackets.
In addition to the above, our proposed reply reviews the rest
of our arms control agenda (our paramount interest in START and
INF; our disappointment that the Soviets have failed to take up
the offer of private exploratory exchanges; and our desire for
progress on CW and MBFR). The subsequent discussion of regional
problems takes into account Gromyko's interesting démarche on
southern Africa and my agreement with Dobrynin to more intensive
exchanges on regional issues, including the Mideast and Persian
Gulf. The letter concludes with paragraphs on bilateral issues
and human rights, noting in particular your regret at Chernenko's
failure to respond to your appeals for humanitarian gestures.
Bureaucratic Considerations: In NSDD-137, you requested a
letter to Chernenko be drafted focusing on START and INF -- the
flexibility we have shown to date, our readiness to reopen talks
anytime, anywhere, etc. -- and refuting Soviet allegations about
the U.S. threat. We believe our draft, while perhaps not going
into all the detail envisaged in the NSDD, fulfills its main
requirements without neglecting other areas of our agenda. For
this reason, we believe that this letter should be sent now, and
that it not be coordinated with the other agencies. Based on
previous experience, reaching consensus in the SACPG on anything
specific will take weeks if not months. Moreover, I believe
strongly that, as a general rule, the drafting of Presidential
correspondence should not become the province of the bureaucracy.
Of course, as constructive ideas develop from the process
launched by the NSDD, they can be incorporated into other letters
to Chernenko.
A Final Point: A Supreme Soviet session has been called for
early next week, and it is widely anticipated in Moscow that the
meeting will "elect" Chernenko as Chairman of the Presidium, the
titular Head of State. Thus our draft includes bracketed
language congratulating Chernenko on his new appointment, and
addressing him as "Mr. Chairman."
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
If you approve our proposed reply, I would envisage having
Art Hartman deliver it in Moscow next week. I would at the same
time call in Dobrynin to give him a copy, as well as to continue
our discussions of last Monday.
Recommendation
That you approve the attached reply to Chernenko's March 19
letter.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DRAFT REPLY TO CHERNENKO'S MARCH 19 LETTER
Dear Mr. General Secretary [Mr. Chairman]:
I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 19, together
with the views expressed by Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Ambassador Dobrynin in recent discussions with Ambassador Hartman
and Secretary Shultz. I welcome the fact that you too recognize
the value of direct exchanges of views on the important issues
in US-Soviet relations. Because of my earnest desire to move
our relationship forward, I wanted to provide an early response.
[First of all, I would like to add my voice to those of the
many other heads of state and government who are congratulating
you on assuming the new and responsible position of Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. As one who appreciates
both the challenges and the opportunities of high office in the
public service, I look forward to productive working relations
with you in your new capacity, to the mutual benefit of our two
countries.]
In looking at the present state of affairs between our two
countries, I believe it would be useful to reflect upon our
differing perceptions of one another. You have expressed
concern about U.S. actions and military programs which you see
as threatening to the Soviet Union. I fully appreciate the
priority you attach to the security of the Soviet state,
particularly in light of the enormous costs shouldered by the
Soviet people in helping to defeat Nazi Germany. I hope,
however, that you will recognize that there are many Soviet
actions and military programs that we and our Allies consider to
be no less threatening to our own vital security interests.
For example, the Soviet Union continues to ship massive
quantities of arms to sensitive areas near America's borders,
and appears bent on promoting instability rather than peaceful
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NLS F95-074
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
change in many areas of the developing world. Your country's
large-scale and sustained use of force in Afghanistan, in close
proximity to one of our closest friends, Pakistan, makes less
reassuring your government's frequent avowals of peaceful intent.
Perhaps of greatest concern to us is the enormous increase
in recent years in Soviet nuclear forces targeted against the
United States and our allies. This build-up may have been
designed to attain parity with the United States, yet at some
point in the last decade that goal was achieved; we have good
reason to question, therefore, why the growth in Soviet nuclear
forces has nonetheless continued unabated.
Take strategic offensive forces as an example. Since 1970,
the Soviet Union has deployed three new types of ICBMs, five new
types of SLBMs, and at least thirteen modernized versions of
existing missiles. As you well know, the USSR is now flight-
testing two new ICBMs, plus another new type of SLBM. As we see
it, you claim to be responding to U.S. programs, yet your new
missiles have been deployed years ahead of their U.S. counter-
parts, not to mention in greater numbers.
In the area of ballistic missile defense, your country has
been engaged for many years in a research effort similar to that
recently initiated in the United States and, indeed, is the only
nation to deploy an active ABM system; moreover, your deployment
of a network of advanced radars gives us legitimate grounds to
question whether the USSR is laying the basis for a nationwide
ABM defense of the USSR. And there are, of course, other
aspects of existing arms control agreements where the concerns
we have raised with you have not been alleviated.
As you know, your country's deployment of the SS-20 has been
of especially grave concern both to the United States and our
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
allies. Since NATO's December 1979 decision, when your country
asserted that a "balance" existed in intermediate-range nuclear
forces, the Soviet Union has deployed 238 additional SS-20's
with over 700 additional warheads. These missiles constitute a
far greater threat to the security of the western alliance --
both in quantitative and qualitative terms -- than previous
Soviet missiles, which had fewer warheads and lower accuracy.
These are some of the realities of the international situa-
tion as we see it. I recognize that neither of us will be able
to persuade the other as to who is to blame for the present poor
state of our relations. Nor would it be productive for the two
of us to engage in a lengthy debate on this subject. I do want
to reassure you that the United States has not, does not and will
not threaten the Soviet Union. We have never fought each other.
We must never do so. Let us work together toward this end.
In this regard, I believe the Stockholm conference provides
an opportunity for both our nations to take steps to reduce some
of the apprehensions about each other's military activities. I
was encouraged by your expression of hope for positive results
at Stockholm and your support for measures aimed at building
confidence between East and West. As you know, we and our
Allies have presented a package of specific measures which, if
implemented, could substantially reduce the dangers of
misunderstanding and miscalculation in Europe.
[If the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously on
such concrete confidence-building measures, the United States
will be prepared to discuss the question of reciprocal assurances
against the use of force. You have asked for a "concrete signal"
in the area of arms control, and your representatives have speci-
fied that U.S. willingness to agree on non-use of force would be
considered such a signal. In this connection let me add that I
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 4 -
am pleased that our Ambassadors to the Stockholm conference have
agreed to get together soon. This will provide an opportunity to
discuss an arrangement that would meet both countries' concerns.]
There are many other arms control topics where we hope to
move forward in the weeks and months ahead. As I said in my
previous letter, the Western countries plan to present new
proposals at the Vienna negotiations which will provide a solid
basis for progress on the related issues of data and verifica-
tion. In the Conference on Disarmament, we will be tabling this
month a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. In addition to
this step in the multilateral forum, perhaps the time has come
when bilateral consultations on the issue could advance the
prospects for an effective and verifiable ban.
While the foregoing issues are important, and while there
may be other arms control areas -- including those raised in
your letter -- where steps forward could be made, we have always
considered the central element of our dialogue on arms control
to be the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. The
United States has advanced proposals that would substantially
reduce the most threatening nuclear weapons system on both sides.
We have demonstrated considerable flexibility in an effort to
respond to the concerns your negotiators have expressed. I must
state frankly that I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has
not yet shown similar flexibility, or taken advantage of the
opportunity for private discussions on ways to make progress in
the START and INF negotiations.
I am well aware of your views regarding the impasse in these
negotiations. You are, I am sure, equally aware of the fact
that we and our Allies do not agree with your analysis of the
balance in intermediate-range missiles or your assessment of the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 5 -
"obstacles" that supposedly stand in the way of further
negotiations. For our part, we are prepared to consider any
equitable outcome, and to halt, reverse or eliminate entirely
our deployments of Pershing and cruise missiles in the context
of an agreement between the two sides. It is simply unrealistic
for you to ask us to remove our missiles without an agreement.
Experience has shown that neither side can hope to impose
its view of the situation on the other as a precondition for
negotiations. Rather, what is needed is for our diplomats to
sit down and devise a formula for nuclear arms reductions that
is consistent with the security interests of both our nations.
So let us focus on the concrete task of reaching agreements in
this spirit, rather than wasting our energies debating the
meaning of "equality and equal security."
Therefore, I would like to reaffirm once again the readiness
of the United States to explore with the Soviet Union possible
ways for moving forward on the nuclear arms negotiations. As I
have said previously, we have a number of specific ideas to
present for overcoming some of the fundamental differences that
have divided us in the negotiations. We are prepared to discuss
these in private diplomatic channels or between our respective
negotiators. If the Soviet side is prepared to match U.S.
flexibility, I would hope that, by this means, the way could be
cleared to resumption of formal talks on nuclear arms
reductions. I would welcome any concrete suggestions you might
have on how to proceed.
I am pleased that we agree on the importance of exchanges of
views on regional problems. As you state, such exchanges should
be directed toward the peaceful settlement of local disputes and
the strengthening of peace. Over the past three years, the
United States has taken the initiative to discuss a number of
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 6 -
regional problems in precisely this spirit. For example, we
have initiated formal consultations with your country's experts
on Afghanistan and southern Africa. While such exchanges have
not been as fruitful as we had hoped, I would like to pursue
them, with the objective of establishing a more productive
dialogue on regional issues. I was pleased to note that Foreign
Minister Gromyko raised southern Africa with Ambassador Hartman.
I believe it would be useful for our experts to hold more
detailed discussions of developments in that region, because
there are promising signs of progress toward a diplomatic
settlement. Such a settlement would serve the interests of the
states in the area, and of all those who value stability and
prosperity there.
The Middle East and Persian Gulf is another area where a
further exchange of views would be helpful. In this regard, I
was pleased to read of your personal commitment to seeking an
end to the Iran/Iraq conflict and to avoiding any actions which
might lead the parties to prolong or expand it. I wish to
assure you that the United States shares these objectives, and
that we will continue making every effort to achieve them.
To improve mutual understanding on this issue, Secretary
Shultz has on several recent occasions voiced to Ambassador
Dobrynin our concerns about any expansion of the war to other
areas of the Persian Gulf. In doing so, we have tried to
communicate the importance we attach to maintaining freedom of
navigation there for the ships of all nations. We believe our
interest in supporting this principle of international law serves
all and threatens none, and we regret the misrepresentations of
our position which have appeared in the official Soviet news
media. Such commentaries cannot serve to calm tensions in the
area.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 7 -
With respect to our bilateral relations, I think we agree
that we should seek to enlarge the areas of mutually beneficial
cooperation and inject real content into our bilateral
agreements. My representatives will soon be presenting a number
of specific proposals in this regard, and I hope that the Soviet
side will not put any artificial barriers in the way of progress.
I must add that I am disapppointed that you did not respond
to the appeal in my March 6 letter concerning humanitarian
issues. Steps in this area could have a substantial impact on
other aspects of our relations, and I hope that you will
continue to give them serious consideration.
To conclude, let me state once again that the United States
is ready for a turning point in our relations with the Soviet
Union. We have made a concerted effort to put content into our
dialogue. We have a number of specific ideas to explore with
you on questions of vital importance to both our peoples. We
intend to continue our efforts in this direction. For real
progress to be made, however, it will require similar efforts on
the part of the Soviet Union.
AV/0462M
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT REILLY
April 12, 1984
FROM:
Letter to Bishop for Francis A. Quinn
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
"A soft answer turneth away wrath" -- and for that reason, I
would advise quite a different approach in answering the Bishop's
letter. I don't believe making debating points will be
convincing -- except that it would confirm to him that no one is
listening to what he says.
In the first place, I would point out that, just after he sent
his letter, the President delivered a major address on
U.S. -Soviet relations, in which he outlined an approach which
encompasses many of the Bishop's thoughts. (Include a copy of
the January 16 speech -- one is attached.)
Second, on the specific points, I'm not sure it is worth the time
to refute each of them, but some are quite easy to answer, and in
a conciliatory way. For example:
1. The President has made clear that he would welcome a summit
meeting that is well prepared and could produce positive results.
We are currently in an intensive dialogue with the Soviets to try
to find areas where we can narrow our differences. When it
becomes apparent to both of us that a meeting of chiefs of state
would help the process, one will doubtless follow. But in the
meantime one must understand not only that an ill-prepared summit
could do more harm than good (if the top people cannot make
progress, then this would inhibit their subordinates), but also
that a summit cannot be "called" by the U.S. alone. The Soviet
leaders have made it clear that they have no interest in meeting
unless and until they feel that progress can be made. Obviously,
there can be no meeting unless both parties agree to one.
2. We have frequent senior level meetings with Soviet
representatives. They are marked by civility and we are
preserving confidentiality. We certainly agree that these
qualities are essential to an effective diplomacy.
3. The President met with Prime Minister Trudeau last December,
when they discussed, inter alia, Mr. Trudeau's proposal for a
five-power conference. We are not opposed to such a conference
in principle, but at least three of the five potential parties
have rejected the idea at this time. We are, however, in regular
diplomatic and high-level consultation with all of them on the
issues involved.
2
4. Of course we consider all proposals seriously. However,
history has taught us to be skeptical that sweeping declarations
act as a real impediment to war. The Kellog-Briand Pact, for
example, did nothing to stop the slide into World War II. And
all members of the United Nations are committed not to use force
in international relations. In general, we feel that if we
are to deal with the peace issue effectively, we must work to
reduce the real causes of war and violence, and to see to it that
violence cannot be used successfully to impose one nation's will
on another.
5. We feel that our approach in the various arms control talks is
indeed vigorous, hopeful and imaginative. In the case of nuclear
weapons talks, it was the Soviets who walked away from the
negotiating table. We hope they will come back soon, because our
positions are flexible and we earnestly desire to reach
agreement. (Include publications available from State on our INF
and START positions)
6. We have many women active in our diplomacy, including our
Ambassador to the United Nations and our Ambassador to the German
Democratic Republic. We do not choose persons on the basis of
sex, however, any more than we do on the basis of race or
religion, and we have not noted a correlation of conciliatory
skills and sex. These depend on the professional and human
qualities of each individual.
7. Despite our strained relations, activity under the cooperative
agreements in force with the USSR never ceased entirely.
Exchanges of students and scholars, for example, have continued.
We would, however, like to expand these activities as you suggest
and are currently discussing ways to do so with Soviet
representatives.
8. We feel that the President's speech of January 16 represented
the sort of overture you recommend.
9. We certainly agree that all normal people yearn for peace.
Nothing has a higher priority for us.
10. As the President put it in his January 16 speech, we do not
view our strength as an instrument to COW the Soviets into
submission but, first, to insure that there not be a war between
us, and second, to give us something to bargain with. Strength
can facilitate negotiation with an adversary who expects
something in return for concessions made.
11 Of course.
12. Of course we agree with the first part. But the other two
paragraphs deserve comment. First, we do not believe that the
Soviet leaders want a war with the United States. We equally
3
want none with them. As the President has said many times, "If
the Soviet leaders want peace, then there will be peace.' But we
must recognize that military strength can be used not only to
make war, but to intimidate. The Soviet preference is clearly to
obtain the fruits of a military victory without fighting. We
must conduct ourselves in such a manner as to preserve peace and
prevent the successful use of the threat of force to undermine
our freedoms.
13. If some claim that the U.S. is an arms merchant to the world,
then they labor under a misperception. The Soviet Union is by
far the largest supplier of arms to the Third World. Most
nations do have legitimate defense needs, and we cannot ignore
these. On the other hand, we can and do exercise great prudence
both in the quantity and types of arms supplied to other
countries. Clearly, we cannot deprive the nations of Western
Europe of the means to defend themselves, or Israel, or many
other countries in the world. Nevertheless, we recognize that
far too much is being spent on arms, and we are trying to assist
other countries to settle their regional disputes without resort
to arms. There has been encouraging progress recently in some
areas such as Southern Africa, and frustration, despite our best
efforts, in others, such as Lebanon. But we are determined to
keep on trying.
14. We have no desire at all to attempt to establish a Pax
Americana. But as one of the strongest countries in the world,
many peoples intent on preserving their freedom and working out
their problems peacefully must depend on us for support of
various kinds. We provide much more economic aid than military
support to the Third World. We also feel that the whole
civilized world has a stake in insuring that terrorism not become
an international norm. No sense of economic or political
grievance can justify attacks on innocent people, and the fact
that some regimes, such as the Libyan and the Iranian, have
resorted to terrorism as an instrument of national policy is one
of the most disturbing of contemporary problems. We are
determined to act, in concert with other countries, to stamp out
this hideous practice.
15. We agree with you on the importance of maintaining support
for the United Nations. But we are obligated not only to provide
support, but to encourage the United Nations system to take
corrective action when the activities of some of its agencies
begin to run contrary to the objectives of those agencies.
In sum, we are in total agreement on the need to preserve the
peace, and I feel that the President's approach is congruent in
most essential respects with yours.
2960
C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 11, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT:
Letter to Anne Higgins from Terry E. Branstad
I recommend that you forward the memorandum to Sally Kelley
at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memo to Sally Kelley
Tab II
Incoming correspondence
2960
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
April 11, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Letter to Anne Higgins From Terry E. Branstad
We have reviewed and concur with the Department of State's
proposed draft letter to Mr. Terry E. Branstad in response to
his letter to Ms. Higgins regarding American-Soviet student
exchange this summer.
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
s/s 8409408
Date April 10, 1984
For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To: Anne Higgins
From: Terry E. Branstad
Date: 3-21-84
Subject: Approves of David Wheelers
suggestion that an American - Soviet student exchange be held
this summer and hopes White House will give it serious attention
WH Referral Dated: 3/29/84
.
NSC ID# 219126
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.
Action Taken:
X
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
Draft Reply
Dear Governor Branstad:
I have been asked to reply to your letter of March 21 to
Special Assistant to the President Ann Higgins expressing
support for a proposal by David Wheeler of the University of
Iowa.
At Ms. Higgins' request the Department of State replied to
Mr. Wheeler. I am pleased to enclose a copy of that reply.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure: As stated
The Honorable
Terry E. Branstad,
Governor of Iowa,
State Capitol,
Des Moines, Iowa.
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 3, 1984
Mr. David Wheeler,
University of Iowa,
E-144 Currier,
Iowa City, IA
Dear Mr. Wheeler:
I have been asked to reply to your letter of February 20 to
Anne Higgins in the White House proposing that a forum/exchange
of American and Soviet youth leaders be held this summer.
The Department considers that in principle exchanges
between American and Soviet young people can be useful and
serve the cause of better mutual understanding when conducted
on a basis of reciprocity and open expression of views. Based
on considerable experience, we believe that people-to-people
exchanges of this sort work best when organized on a private
basis between American and Soviet organizations. A number of
American organizations have contacts with Soviet youth
organizations and experience in carrying out exchanges with
them. Among them are: The American Friends Service Committee,
1501 Cherry Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 (215-241-7000); the
American Council of Young Political Leaders, 426 "C" Street.,
N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 (202-546-6010) the Citizen
Exchange Council, 18 East 41st St. #1900, New York, NY 10017
(212-889-7960); and the YMCA of the USA, 101 N. Wacker Dr.,
Chicago, IL 60606 (312-977-0031). You may find it useful to
discuss your proposal with one or more of these groups.
Should you arrange for Soviet youth to attend meetings in
this country, you should be in touch with the Department's
Office of Soviet Union Affairs (202-632-2248).
Sincerely,
R. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
8409408
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
MARCH 29, 1984
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
219126
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MARCH 21, 1984
TO:
ANNE HIGGINS
FROM:
THE HONORABLE TERRY E. BRANSTAD
GOVERNOR OF IOWA
STATE CAPITOL
DES MOINES IA 50319
SUBJECT: APPROVES OF DAVID WHEELERS SUGGESTION
THAT AN AMERICAN - SOVIET STUDENT
EXCHANGE BE HELD THIS SUMMER AND HOPES WHITE
HOUSE WILL GIVE IT SERIOUS ATTENTION
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
nedsist 2325 3/28/84 CTOS
RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY
CLASSIFICATION SECTION
No. of Additional
Correspondents:
Media: L) Individual Codes: 2110
Subject Prime Code: F0005-01
Subject Codes:
Secondary Co 165.
-
ST015.
-
-
-
PRESIDENTIAL REPLY
Code
Date
Comment
Form
C
Time:
P-
DSP
Time:
Media:
SIGNATURE CODES:
MEDIA CODES:
CPn - Presidential Correspondence
n-0 - Unknown
B - Box/package
n-1- Ronald Wilson Reagan
c Copy
n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
D Official document
n - 3 Ron
G Message
n-4 Dutch
H Handcarried
n - 5 Ron Reagan
L - Letter
n - 6 Ronald
M- Mailgram
n - 7 Ronnie
o Memo
P - Photo
CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
R - Report
n-0 Unknown
S - Sealed
n-1 - Nancy Reagan
T - Telegram
n-2 Nancy
V Telephone
n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
X Miscellaneous
Y - Study
CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
n-1- Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
n - 2 - Ron Nancy
SEAL OF THE STATE
219126
THE I OF GREAT
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE CAPITOL
8409408
DES MOINES. IOWA 50319
515 281-5211
TERRY E. BRANSTAD
GOVERNOR
March 21, 1984
fate
Ms. Anne Higgins
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Ms. Higgins:
Recently, David Wheeler wrote to you with the suggestion
that an American-Soviet student exchange be held sometime
soon, perhaps as early as this summer. David feels strongly
that such an exchange would be helpful in promoting greater
understanding among the peoples of the world's two super-
powers.
I believe there is merit in David's suggestion and would
urge that you or someone else on the White House staff give
it the serious consideration it deserves.
Thank you and best regards.
Sincerely,
They Z Buanstad
Terry E. Branstad
Governor
TEB/cd
CC: David Wheeler