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Matlock Chron May 1984 (1)
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135840552
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Matlock Chron May 1984 (1)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron May 1984 (1)
Box: 4
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Archivist: smf
File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (1)
Date: 5/30/97
Box 4
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
7. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert MeFarlane re Proposed
5/29/84
P1
(90547)
Presidential Statement Building Cooporation
between US and Soviet Peoples (1 p.)
R
11/17/99
NLSF95-074
#7/
2. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re Proposed
n.d.
P1
(90547)
Presidential Statement Building Cooperation
between the US and Soviet Peoples (1p)
R 11/17/99 NLSF95-
04 #72
memo
Charles Hill to Robert Mel Farlane re Proposed
5/8/84
P1
(90547)
Presidential Statement Building Cooperation
between the US and Soviet People (2 pp.)
R
11/17/99 NLSF95-074
# 73
4. memo
Kenneth eGraffenreid to Robert McFarlane re
5/31/84
P1
(90547)
Concurrence on Proposed Presidential Statement on
Cooperation between the US and Soviets p.)
R
N/17/99NLSAS
#H
5 memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US USSR
5/29/84
P1/P5
(3466)
Agreement (2 pp.) R 10/17/05 MOZ-011#1
6. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US USSR
n.d.
P1
(3466)
Agreement
(1
(-d
R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074
#75
7. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US USSR
5/8/84
P1/P5
(3466)
Agreement (2 pp.) R 10/17/05 M02-011 # 2
8. memo
John Lenczowski to Robert McFarlane re US USSR
5/8/84
P1/P5
(3466)
Agreement (2 pp.) R 10/17/05 M02-01 # 3
9. memo
Charles Hill to Robert Farlane re US USSR
4/30/84
P1
(3466)
Agreement (2 pp.)
R 11/17/99 NLSF95-004 76
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Archivist: smf
File Folder: Matlock Chron May 1984 (1)
Date: 5/30/97
Box4
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
10. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McF arlane re US -USSR
5/29/84
P1/P5
(4107)
Agreement (1p.)
R 10/17/05 M02-011#4
11. memo
Robert Kimmitt to Charles Hill re US USSR
n.d
P1
(4107)
Agreement (1 p.)
R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074
JJ
12. memo
Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re US-USSR
5/21/84
P1
(4107)
Agreement (2pp.) e 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 78
R 11/20/12 MOZ-011 #5
13. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McFarlane re US Attempts to
5/29/84
P1
(4113)
Reach Agreements with Soviets 2 pp.)
R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074 79
14. paper
US Proposals and Initiatives toward the USSR Since
n.d.
P1
Early January (5 pp.)
R11/17/99 NCSA95-074
80
15. talking
re US Initiatives Toward USSR (3 pp.)
n.d.
P1
points
R11/17/99
NLSF95-024
#81
16. memo
Jack Matlock to Admiral Poindexter re Father
5/23/84
P1
(4212)
Morlion's Request to Meet with the President or Mr.
4-MeFarlane (1p.)
R 11/17/99 NLSF95-074
#
82
17. memo
Jack Matlock to Robert McF Farlane re US Attempts to
5/23/84
P1/P5
(4113)
Reach Agreements with Soviets (1 p.)
R 10/17/05 moz-01176
RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
the FOIA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of
the FOIA].
the PRA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
the FOIA].
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9)
of the FOIA].
PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O 13233
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer CAS
Box Number
4
FOIA M02-011
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON MAY 1984 (1)
DATE 3/22/2007
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
MVH 3/17/08
5 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US USSR
2 5/29/1984
AGREEMENT (#1)
MVH 3/17/08
7 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US USSR
2 5/8/1984
AGREEMENT (#2)
MVH 3/17/08
8 MEMO
JOHN LENCSZOWSKI TO MCFARLANE
2 5/8/1984
RE US SOVIET AGREEMENT (#3)
MVH 3/17/08
10 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US USSR
1 5/29/1984
AGREEMENT (#4)
MVH 3/17/08
12 MEMO
CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE US
2 5/21/1984
USSR AGREEMENT (#5)
MVH 3/17/08
17 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE US
1 5/23/1984
ATTEMPTS (#6)
4255 Add-on
C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 31, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK JFM
SUBJECT:
Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington Post
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to Bill Staples at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
net availlable
R. Lehman concurs.
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Bill Staples
Tab A
Incoming correspondence
4255 Add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington Post
We have reviewed and concur, with editorial changes on
pages two and three, with the redraft of the Op Ed piece
for the Washington Post (Tab A).
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Tab A
Draft Op Ed piece
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8404255
RECEIVED 24 MAY 84 20
TO
KIMMITT
FROM STAPLES, B
DOCDATE 24 MAY 84
KEYWORDS USSR
ARMS CONTROL
SUBJECT: OP ED PIECE RE ARMS CONTROL FOR WASHINGTON POST
ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO STAPLES
DUE: 25 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES WH
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
LEHMAN, R
KIMMITT
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
( MD
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
Kimmitt
X 5/25 FOR SiG
5/26
Mutluck S 5/28 FOR Invther Action 5/29
MAtluelc - 5/29 Reed ACDA 2nd version RIC,Ze
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
National Security Council
The White House
System #
Package #
4255
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y
Bob Kimmitt
1
K
John Poindexter
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
2
Staff ASAP
Situation Room
to MaHock
using wishing#
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
" Kimmitt
Rhehman
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Office of the Director
May 29, 1984
NOTE TO BOB KIMMETT:
Attached is a revised draft of the
Director's OpEd piece reflecting comments
from NSC via Jack Matlock. We would
appreciate another quick look with your
approval for release by noon, Wednesday,
May 30, 1984.
Thanks,
Bill Stable
Bill Staples
5/29/84
2nd Version
It has become fashionable for many observers today to
depict U.S.-Soviet relations as tumbling to their lowest
point ever in the post-war era. Indeed, the picture is
often portrayed so darkly as to suggest that we are on a road
to nuclear conflagration somewhere in the murky but not-too-
distant future.
Before this rhetorical roll gains yet more momentum, we
should pause to ask: Is it all really true?
Granted, the words from Moscow these days are harsh.
The Soviet leadership talks about Italy possibly suffering
the fate of Pompeii, Scandinavia and Japan burning in nuclear
fires, and President Reagan pursuing a Hitler-like policy.
Such statements are indeed aggravating. Granted, the refusal
of the Soviets to participate in nuclear arms talks is lamentable.
Granted, the increased patrol of Soviet submarines off U.S.
coasts is grating, even if they have prowled these waters
for many years. And granted, the Soviet Olympic boycott is
regrettable.
But are we, really, in a situation where the chances
of U.S.-Soviet conflict and nuclear conflagration are
higher than in the past? Are we really less secure today
than we were four years ago?
- 2 -
I think not. Quite the contrary. The two most likely paths
to nuclear conflict -- use by a Third World leader who gets
his hands on the bomb in some regional conflict or use in a
Soviet-U.S. conflict as a result of an escalating crisis and
conventional war -- are both less probable today and in the
years to come, than in the past.
first of these possibilities could come about only as
The most likely use of nuclear weapons, although still
the result of
very remote, involves nuclear proliferation. Herein,
surprisingly, lies one of the major success stories in the
realm of arms control. One of Parkinson's wisest laws
has it that the success of a policy can be measured by the
catastrophes which do not happen. By that measure, we have
here a welcome success.
And an unforeseen amount of success, at that. In 1958,
a special committee of the National Planning Association
predicted in a monograph that "by 1970, most nations with
appreciable military strength will have in their arsenals
nuclear weapons -- strategic, tactical or both." In the
early 1960's, President Kennedy warned of a world in 1975
with 15 to 20 nuclear weapon states.
Neither dire forecast has come to pass, largely because
for over 30 years we have worked with many other countries to
build and buttress the political, legal, and moral barriers
against the spread of nuclear weapons. This has been accomp-
lished in a largely undramatic but ultimately effective way,
helping to hold proliferation in check. Reinforcing and,
-3-
as necessary, revising policies and programs for stopping
the spread of nuclear weapons have received top priority
under President Reagan.
Herein, not surprisingly, also lies a critical area of
U.S.-Soviet dialogue and cooperation. In the past few years,
this dialogue has been extensive and intensive. It has
not been halted, as were the nuclear arms talks by the Soviets,
when NATO proceeded with its year-end missile deployments
to counter the Soviets new missiles, the SS-20s. This dialogue
endures because the Soviets, like us, share a deep concern
about the spread of nuclear weapons. The prospect of a
Khomeini, Qadaffi, Amin, or such other leader acquiring
nuclear weapons is unsettling to them, as it is to us.
Though we still have much to do on non-proliferation,
this path to nuclear weapons use is considered today less
likely in the future than was estimated in earlier
years. As Barry Blechman, a former arms control official
in the Carter Administration, wrote just recently: "A realistic
current assessment of the potential number of nuclear weapon
states in 1990 would be roughly one-third
(that of)
previous assessments." We strive to cut that even further,
but it is still good progress.
- 4 -
The second most likely path towards nuclear war, that
through conflict escalation, is likewise less likely today
than in years gone by. Undeniably, we have serious problems
in Central America and the Middle East, particularly now in
the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, the world flashpoints are
less numerous and less heated than many that have come before.
Just go back two decades, for example, and compare President
Kennedy's 1,000 days in office to President Reagan's first
1,200 days. The Kennedy era is popularly recalled as one
of suave and skillful American stewardship over foreign affairs.
Yet, during that brief time, we endured the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
a disastrous U.S.-Soviet summit in Vienna, the build-up of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the construction of the Berlin
Wall and, certainly not least, the Cuban Missile crisis.
Those were dangerous days. Events during the past three
plus years, no matter how nettlesome, certainly do not match
that cascade of crises.
Likewise in the 1970's, when the U.S.-Soviet dialogue
was so rich and hopes for detente so high, regional crises
were nonetheless severe. From 1970 to 1976, while American
and Soviet leaders held five summits and managed an array of
arms control negotiations with each other, the Soviet Union
fully backed and armed the continuing infiltration of
North Vietnam troops into South Vietnam . -- making a peaceful
- 5 -
settlement of the conflict impossible. The Middle East then
erupted to the point of the Soviets threatening to intervene
with their own troops in the conflict, prompting us to go on
strategic nuclear alert. Those too were dangerous days.
In many ways, 1975 symbolized the whole decade. In that
year, there was a full-blown U.S.-Soviet dialogue -- a Ford-
Brezhnev summit in Helsinki and four Kissinger-Gromyko meetings --
and also severe regional reverses or scares: the fall of
three countries in Southeast Asia; a NATO ally, Portugal,
being gravely threatened by Communist subversion; and the
Soviets arming and dispatching thousands of Cubans to Angola
to enable the Marxists to win that civil war.
The last year of that decade, 1979, proved similar.
During the first six months, Secretary Vance and
Ambassador Dobrynin met some 25 times, followed by the
Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna. Still, regional crises
flared: the discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba; the
false Soviet statements adding fuel to the already-blazing
fires in Iran after the American hostages were seized; and,
most seriously, the massive Soviet invasion of Afghanistan --
called by President Carter the greatest crisis since
World War II.
- 6 -
It is remarkable to recall that in each year from
1975 to 1981, Soviet armies or armies supported by Moscow
(mostly surrogates) invaded and occupied a different country:
South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 1977,
Cambodia in 1978, Afghanistan in 1979, and Chad in 1980.
Nothing on the scale of the above crises has happened
over the past three years. This is all to the good, not
only for those around the globe spared the imposition of
totalitarianism, but also because greater regional stability
diminishes the chances of U.S.-Soviet conventional or nuclear
conflict. The Soviets have, since 1981, encountered resistance.
This is the inevitable product of their own actions. At the
same time, American strength and leadership have been restored.
Even so harsh a critic of the Administration's handling
of Soviet affairs as Strobe Talbott writes in his new tract,
The Russians and Reagan: "Soviet expansionism has been
slowed; embittered and impacted as the Soviet-American
relationship was, it was also remarkably free of full-scale
crises" during the Reagan Administration. He points out that
of the three major wars during this period -- those of Iran-
Iraq, Lebanon, and the Falklands -- "none had become a superpower
confrontation."
This is the key point. The world is not more dangerous
today. The factors that make it more stable, that dampen chances of
nuclear conflict, are: (1) active U.S. diplomacy and relationships,
- 7 -
which calm down potential flashpoints and build up regional
security; (2) increased U.S. deterrent strength, which demon-
strates to a potential aggressor that any attack would be
too costly, that the anticipated pain far outweighs any
conceivable gain; and (3) arms control proposals, which are
designed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both
sides and to reduce the risk that crises will result in the
use of nuclear weapons.
These three factors make the recent words of President
Reagan, that "the world is a little bit safer than in the
past," right on the mark.
To be sure, there is room to improve the current state
of affairs. And it does need marked improvement. President
Reagan has attempted to do just that by strengthening Allied
and other relationships; by restoring a credible military
posture; and by embarking on a wide-ranging arms control agenda.
He has sought to reopen and deepen the U.S.-Soviet dialogue,
as shown in his January 16 speech, and through a variety of
private channels. A better dialogue and active nuclear arms
talks would be preferable to continued Soviet stonewalling,
if the Soviets were willing to undertake serious talks.
But they haven't been willing for the past six months.
They walked out of INF and have not agreed to our proposal to
resume START not because of the Reagan Administration's
approach to the Soviets, not because of any previous or
existing rhetoric, and not because of the ambitious "deep
cuts" we seek in nuclear arms.
-8-
They walked out, quite simply, because NATO stayed the
course set in December 1979. That course called for deployment
of missiles to counter the ever-growing number of highly
mobile and threatening SS-20 nuclear missiles, if arms control
was not successful.
It is hard to imagine any U.S. Administration proceeding
differently on deployments in the face of Soviet insistence
on its "half-zero" option -- hundreds of warheads for the
Soviet side vs. zero for our side. And it is hard to imagine
any Administration accepting such a lopsided arms control
"solution" (quite apart from whether any U.S. Senate would
ratify such a skewed accord).
Nevertheless, the Soviets are now emoting outrage, anger
and sullenness over the NATO deployments, and over some other
things. Whether they truly feel what they so dramatically
display may be another matter.
Such a long-time and astute negotiator with the Soviet
Union as Ambassador Paul Nitze recently spoke on their "precept"
of not letting their "emotion interfere with what they call
'scientific realism.' One should never let anger influence
one's judgment, although it might be advisable from time to
time to show anger." Witness what they did after the U-2
affair in 1959, and today.
- 9 -
The Administration still strongly hopes -- as do those
critical of the Administration -- that the Soviets will recognize,
and act on, their interest by returning to the nuclear arms
talks. But our beckoning is different from their returning.
It brings to mind the question Hotspur asked, when his cousin
bragged in Henry IV, Part I, that he could "call spirits
from the vasty deep" to help them. "Why so can I, or so can
any man, but will they come when you do call for them?"
C
4255 Add-on
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 30, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK 4FM
SUBJECT:
Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington Post
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to Bill Staples at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
R. Lehman concurs.
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Bill Staples
Tab II
Incoming correspondence
4255 Add-on
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 30, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM STAPLES
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Op Ed Piece re Arms Control for
Washington Post
We have reviewed and concur, with editorial changes on
pages 2 and 3, with the redraft of the Op Ed Piece for
the Washington Post.
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8404255
RECEIVED 24 MAY 84 20
TO
KIMMITT
FROM STAPLES, B
DOCDATE 24 MAY 84
KEYWORDS USSR
ARMS CONTROL
SUSPENSE
SUBJECT: OP ED PIECE RE ARMS CONTROL FOR WASHINGTON POST
ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO STAPLES
DUE: 25 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES WH
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
LEHMAN, R
KIMMITT
COMMENTS
REF#
#
LOG
NSCIFID
( MD
ACTION OFFICER (S)
ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
Kimmitt
X 5/25 FOR SiG
5/26
Mutluck
n
5/28
FOR Invther Action
5/29
MAtluelc
—
5/29
Reed ACDA 2nd version
RIC,Ze
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
National Security Council
The White House
System #
Package #
4255
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y
Bob Kimmitt
I
K
John Poindexter
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
2
Staff ASAP
Situation Room
to Mattick
using wishing#
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC:
VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
" Kimmitt
Rhehman
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Office of the Director
May 29, 1984
NOTE TO BOB KIMMETT:
Attached is a revised draft of the
Director's OpEd piece reflecting comments
from NSC via Jack Matlock. We would
appreciate another quick look with your
approval for release by noon, Wednesday,
May 30, 1984.
Thanks,
Bill Stable
Bill Staples
5/29/84
2nd Version
It has become fashionable for many observers today to
depict U.S.-Soviet relations as tumbling to their lowest
point ever in the post-war era. Indeed, the picture is
often portrayed so darkly as to suggest that we are on a road
to nuclear conflagration somewhere in the murky but not-too-
distant future.
Before this rhetorical roll gains yet more momentum, we
should pause to ask: Is it all really true?
Granted, the words from Moscow these days are harsh.
The Soviet leadership talks about Italy possibly suffering
the fate of Pompeii, Scandinavia and Japan burning in nuclear
fires, and President Reagan pursuing a Hitler-like policy.
Such statements are indeed aggravating. Granted, the refusal
of the Soviets to participate in nuclear arms talks is lamentable.
Granted, the increased patrol of Soviet submarines off U.S.
coasts is grating, even if they have prowled these waters
for many years. And granted, the Soviet Olympic boycott is
regrettable.
But are we, really, in a situation where the chances
of U.S.-Soviet conflict and nuclear conflagration are
higher than in the past? Are we really less secure today
than we were four years ago?
- 2 -
I think not. Quite the contrary. The two most likely paths
to nuclear conflict -- use by a Third World leader who gets
his hands on the bomb in some regional conflict or use in a
Soviet-U.S. conflict as a result of an escalating crisis and
conventional war -- are both less probable today and in the
years to come, than in the past.
first of these possibilities could come about only as
The most likely use of nuclear weapons, although still
the result of
very remote, involves nuclear proliferation. Herein,
surprisingly, lies one of the major success stories in the
realm of arms control. One of Parkinson's wisest laws
has it that the success of a policy can be measured by the
catastrophes which do not happen. By that measure, we have
here a welcome success.
And an unforeseen amount of success, at that. In 1958,
a special committee of the National Planning Association
predicted in a monograph that "by 1970, most nations with
appreciable military strength will have in their arsenals
nuclear weapons -- strategic, tactical or both." In the
early 1960's, President Kennedy warned of a world in 1975
with 15 to 20 nuclear weapon states.
Neither dire forecast has come to pass, largely because
for over 30 years we have worked with many other countries to
build and buttress the political, legal, and moral barriers
against the spread of nuclear weapons. This has been accomp-
lished in a largely undramatic but ultimately effective way,
helping to hold proliferation in check. Reinforcing and,
-3-
as necessary, revising policies and programs for stopping
the spread of nuclear weapons have received top priority
under President Reagan.
Herein, not surprisingly, also lies a critical area of
U.S.-Soviet dialogue and cooperation. In the past few years,
this dialogue has been extensive and intensive. It has
not been halted, as were the nuclear arms talks by the Soviets,
when NATO proceeded with its year-end missile deployments
to counter the Soviets new missiles, the SS-20s. This dialogue
endures because the Soviets, like us, share a deep concern
about the spread of nuclear weapons. The prospect of a
Khomeini, Qadaffi, Amin, or
such
other
leader acquiring
nuclear weapons is unsettling to them, as it is to us.
Though we still have much to do on non-proliferation,
this path to nuclear weapons use is considered today less
likely in the future than was estimated in earlier
years. As Barry Blechman, a former arms control official
in the Carter Administration, wrote just recently: "A realistic
current assessment of the potential number of nuclear weapon
states in 1990 would be roughly one-third.
(that of)
previous assessments." We strive to cut that even further,
but it is still good progress.
- 4 -
The second most likely path towards nuclear war, that
through conflict escalation, is likewise less likely today
than in years gone by. Undeniably, we have serious problems
in Central America and the Middle East, particularly now in
the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, the world flashpoints are
less numerous and less heated than many that have come before.
Just go back two decades, for example, and compare President
Kennedy's 1,000 days in office to President Reagan's first
1,200 days. The Kennedy era is popularly recalled as one
of suave and skillful American stewardship over foreign affairs.
Yet, during that brief time, we endured the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
a disastrous U.S.-Soviet summit in Vienna, the build-up of
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the construction of the Berlin
Wall and, certainly not least, the Cuban Missile crisis.
Those were dangerous days. Events during the past three
plus years, no matter how nettlesome, certainly do not match
that cascade of crises.
Likewise in the 1970's, when the U.S.-Soviet dialogue
was so rich and hopes for detente so high, regional crises
were nonetheless severe. From 1970 to 1976, while American
and Soviet leaders held five summits and managed an array of
arms control negotiations with each other, the Soviet Union
fully backed and armed the continuing infiltration of
North Vietnam troops into South Vietnam - -- making a peaceful
- 5 -
settlement of the conflict impossible. The Middle East then
erupted to the point of the Soviets threatening to intervene
with their own troops in the conflict, prompting us to go on
strategic nuclear alert. Those too were dangerous days.
In many ways, 1975 symbolized the whole decade. In that
year, there was a full-blown U.S.-Soviet dialogue -- a Ford-
Brezhnev summit in Helsinki and four Kissinger-Gromyko meetings --
and also severe regional reverses or scares: the fall of
three countries in Southeast Asia; a NATO ally, Portugal,
being gravely threatened by Communist subversion; and the
Soviets arming and dispatching thousands of Cubans to Angola
to enable the Marxists to win that civil war.
The last year of that decade, 1979, proved similar.
During the first six months, Secretary Vance and
Ambassador Dobrynin met some 25 times, followed by the
Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna. Still, regional crises
flared: the discovery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba; the
false Soviet statements adding fuel to the already-blazing
fires in Iran after the American hostages were seized; and,
most seriously, the massive Soviet invasion of Afghanistan --
called by President Carter the greatest crisis since
World War II.
- 6 -
It is remarkable to recall that in each year from
1975 to 1981, Soviet armies or armies supported by Moscow
(mostly surrogates) invaded and occupied a different country:
South Vietnam in 1975, Angola in 1975-76, Ethiopia in 1977,
Cambodia in 1978, Afghanistan in 1979, and Chad in 1980.
Nothing on the scale of the above crises has happened
over the past three years. This is all to the good, not
only for those around the globe spared the imposition of
totalitarianism, but also because greater regional stability
diminishes the chances of U.S.-Soviet conventional or nuclear
conflict. The Soviets have, since 1981, encountered resistance.
This is the inevitable product of their own actions. At the
same time, American strength and leadership have been restored.
Even so harsh a critic of the Administration's handling
of Soviet affairs as Strobe Talbott writes in his new tract,
The Russians and Reagan: "Soviet expansionism has been
slowed; embittered and impacted as the Soviet-American
relationship was, it was also remarkably free of full-scale
crises" during the Reagan Administration. He points out that
of the three major wars during this period -- those of Iran-
Iraq, Lebanon, and the Falklands -- "none had become a superpower
confrontation."
This is the key point. The world is not more dangerous
today. The factors that make it more stable, that dampen chances of
nuclear conflict, are: (1) active U.S. diplomacy and relationships,
- 7 -
which calm down potential flashpoints and build up regional
security; (2) increased U.S. deterrent strength, which demon-
strates to a potential aggressor that any attack would be
too costly, that the anticipated pain far outweighs any
conceivable gain; and (3) arms control proposals, which are
designed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both
sides and to reduce the risk that crises will result in the
use of nuclear weapons.
These three factors make the recent words of President
Reagan, that "the world is a little bit safer than in the
past," right on the mark.
To be sure, there is room to improve the current state
of affairs. And it does need marked improvement. President
Reagan has attempted to do just that by strengthening Allied
and other relationships; by restoring a credible military
posture; and by embarking on a wide-ranging arms control agenda.
He has sought to reopen and deepen the U.S.-Soviet dialogue,
as shown in his January 16 speech, and through a variety of
private channels. A better dialogue and active nuclear arms
talks would be preferable to continued Soviet stonewalling,
if the Soviets were willing to undertake serious talks.
But they haven't been willing for the past six months.
They walked out of INF and have not agreed to our proposal to
resume START not because of the Reagan Administration's
approach to the Soviets, not because of any previous or
existing rhetoric, and not because of the ambitious "deep
cuts" we seek in nuclear arms.
-8-
They walked out, quite simply, because NATO stayed the
course set in December 1979. That course called for deployment
of missiles to counter the ever-growing number of highly
mobile and threatening SS-20 nuclear missiles, if arms control
was not successful.
It is hard to imagine any U.S. Administration proceeding
differently on deployments in the face of Soviet insistence
on its "half-zero" option -- hundreds of warheads for the
Soviet side vs. zero for our side. And it is hard to imagine
any Administration accepting such a lopsided arms control
"solution" (quite apart from whether any U.S. Senate would
ratify such a skewed accord).
Nevertheless, the Soviets are now emoting outrage, anger
and sullenness over the NATO deployments, and over some other
things. Whether they truly feel what they so dramatically
display may be another matter.
Such a long-time and astute negotiator with the Soviet
Union as Ambassador Paul Nitze recently spoke on their "precept"
of not letting their "emotion interfere with what they call
'scientific realism.' One should never let anger influence
one's judgment, although it might be advisable from time to
time to show anger." Witness what they did after the U-2
affair in 1959, and today.
- 9 -
The Administration still strongly hopes -- as do those
critical of the Administration -- that the Soviets will recognize,
and act on, their interest by returning to the nuclear arms
talks. But our beckoning is different from their returning.
It brings to mind the question Hotspur asked, when his cousin
bragged in Henry IV, Part I, that he could "call spirits
from the vasty deep" to help them. "Why so can I, or so can
any man, but will they come when you do call for them?"
C
SYSTEM II
90547
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
May 29, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Statement -- Building
Cooperation between U.S. and Soviet Peoples
State has proposed that we consider a Presidential statement to
the upcoming Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges to be held at
the Smithsonian June 26-27 (TAB II). This would provide an
opportunity to make public our efforts to improve bilateral
relations with the USSR. As State points out, the message would
attract more media attention if the President could receive the
group briefly.
I believe that the June meeting is well suited as a forum for
presentation of our efforts in the bilateral area, and also could
provide an opportunity to spell out the rationale for this aspect
of our policy. Therefore, I recommend that State be instructed
to prepare a draft message -- which we could review and
coordinate with the speech writers -- and that a brief
appointment with the President be sought, unless his calendar for
the two days in question makes this impossible.
Recommendations:
1. That you authorize transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
at TAB I instructing State to prepare a draft Presidential
message.
Approve
Disapprove
2. That you authorize me to prepare a Schedule Request for the
President to meet with members of the group for 10-15 minutes on
June 26 or 27.
Approve
Disapprove
unavailable
De Graffenreid and Lenczowski concur.
JL does not concur. How can we conduct business-as-usnal
Attachments:
with the USSR when it has been behaving so abominably ? The
exchange agreement crafted by State/matlock will not improve people to
Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum for appróval
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of May 8, 1984
people exchanges or increase
u.s. access at all. If the
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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peoples of the USSR declaring our
searof 1.10 ties. dommention freed.
SYSTEM II
90547
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Statement - Building
Cooperation Between the U.S. and Soviet Peoples
We agree that the meeting scheduled for June 26-27 at the
Smithsonian on U.S.-Soviet exchanges might provide an opportunity
for a Presidential message outlining our efforts to improve our
bilateral relationship with the USSR.
We would appreciate your preparing a draft message and submitting
it for consideration by June 10, 1984.
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
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United States Department of State
SYSTEM II
Washington, D.C. 20520
90547
84 MAY 8 All: 40
3694
May 8, 1984
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Proposed Presidential Statement - Building
Cooperation between the US and Soviet Peoples
We have an opportunity next month to package together and
highlight what the President is doing to promote contacts
between the US and Soviet peoples. The Woodrow Wilson Center
for International Studies is sponsoring a conference at the
Smithsonian June 26-27 of the major scholarly and professional
organizations conducting exchanges with the USSR. Its primary
aim is to initiate an effort to break out of the narrow circle
of contacts to which the Soviets now try to confine us inside
the Soviet Union. The organizations will be sympathetic with
what the Administration has been quietly doing to increase
US-Soviet communication outside the deadlocked nuclear arms
control field. It would be an excellent backdrop for a
Presidential statement bringing to public attention for the
first time the full range of initiatives we have taken in this
area in recent months.
Specifically, the President could present a five-point
program for increased contact and cooperation with the peoples
of the Soviet Union.
1. Initiation of negotiations on a new exchanges agreement,
which will both reopen the way for official exchanges and
encourage increased people-to-people private activity. Our
proposed agreement contains some novel features, e.g., an
annual appearance by each country's leader on the other's
television.
2. Opening of new Consulates in Kiev and New York, a move
immensely popular in the Ukrainian-American community as it
will provide direct access to the Ukrainian people -- the
largest non-Russian nationality in the USSR.
3. Reinvigorating existing agreements for practical
cooperation in the fields of environmental protection,
housing, health and agriculture -- the last area
reinforcing how the Administration has responded to
farmers' interests, as it did by renewing and strengthening
the Long-term Grain Agreement.
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4. Renewing three agreements expiring this year -- the
fishing agreement (supported by the fishing industry and
individual fishermen on the West Coast), the Long-term
Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation
Agreement, and the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement (important in
defusing potential naval incidents), and preparing to
examine renewal of the World Oceans Agreement (of
importance to NOAA and the oceanographic community) with no
problems anticipated.
5. Promoting other agreements and steps to deal with
problems, e.g. negotiations to settle the Pacific maritime
boundary question and technical measures to prevent another
KAL disaster.
Most of these agreements have people-to-people
implications. All are of obvious humanitarian or economic
benefit or serve to improve communication and reduce risks of
confrontation.
The statement could be simply released in connection with
the opening of the conference (and read there by a senior
Administration official). However, its impact would be
greatest if the President, schedule permitting, were to deliver
it in person at the Smithsonian or invite conference attendees
to the East Room (or the Rose Garden) for a brief reception.
By reading the statement to the group he would dramatize his
interest both in better contact between the American and Soviet
peoples and in private sector initiatives (by these
organizations) -- two themes he has stressed.
If this approach is approved, we will be pleased to draft a
statement.
Chriles Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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90547 (add-on)
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
File
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
INFORMATION
May 31, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
KENNETH deGRAFFENREID
SUBJECT:
Concurrence on Proposed Presidential Statement
on Cooperation Between the US and Soviets
There is no official CI objection to this proposal.
Nevertheless, there may be CI or security concerns with one or
more of the agreements. Some of the agreements cited in the
State proposal have been vetted by one or another intelligence
community groups. Others were approved before we had an
opportunity to request review. Also some of the agreements
recommended for renewal never had CI review prior to their
initial negotiation. Moreover, it should be remembered that,
despite our best efforts, the ability and willingness to assess
potential agreements for their total security impact is
embroynic at best. Often no single agency or interagency group
has the knowledge or mandate to provide this review.
It is also important to note, as was borne out by the recent
FBI briefing on Moscow Embassy security, the degree of even
ostensible reciprocity in many of our diplomatic arrangements
with the Soviets is open to very serious question. We should
be careful that the President not be seen to imply that he
believes that all of these arrangements are acceptable or
precedential.
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3466
Add-on 2
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
May 29, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK your
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reactivation of US-USSR Environmental
Cooperation Agreement
On May 8, I sent you a memorandum on this subject (TAB II), which
recommended that the State/EPA recommendation be approved, with
the proviso that timing of meetings should take the
Sakharov/Bonner situation into account. John Lenczowski
disagreed, and submitted a separate memorandum on the subject
(TAB III).
I do not concur with John's judgment that reactivating the
cooperative agreements we have under consideration represents "a
revival of the 'detente' relationship" or that the decision would
be based on Kissinger's "web of relationships" thesis. The
rationale is quite different, and rests on two important
considerations: (1) the need to stress our policy of dialogue
and negotiation at at time when the Soviets are attempting
artificially to make it seem that tensions are rising; and (2) to
preserve and expand our long-term contacts with a wide spectrum
of Soviet citizens. Cutting the Soviet Union off from contact
with us is simply not in our long-term interest (although we of
course should be careful to avoid letting contacts be a channel
for unauthorized technology transfer).
As for Afghanistan, I believe our long-term pressure on the
Soviets will be most effective if it concentrates on steps to
increase international disapproval (particularly among the
Islamic states), as well as measures of concrete assistance to
the resistance forces. Such "sanctions" have a bite, exact a
real price, and act to dissuade; those which tend to undermine
our own long-term interests in dealing with the Soviets do not.
Therefore, I recommend that we proceed to take steps to
reactivate this agreement, with due regard to the evolving
Sakharov situation. I have prepared a Kimmitt to Hill Memorandum
which makes these points.
Concurrences noted on Memorandum of May 8 (TAB II)
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2
Recommendation:
That you approve transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at
TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum for approval
Tab II - Matlock-McFarlane Memorandum of May 8, 1984
Tab III - Lenczowski-McFarlane Memorandum of May 8, 1984
Tab IV - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of April 30, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
3466
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Environmental
Cooperation Agreement (C)
Your memorandum of April 30, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane on this
subject has been reviewed, and the proposal to grant an exception
to the Afghanistan sanctions to permit meetings of the Joint
US-USSR Committee on Environmental Cooperation has been approved.
We also concur that it is appropriate for EPA Administrator
Ruckelshaus to assume the position of US Co-Chairman of the Joint
Committee. (C)
Preparations should be initiated, within the US Government and on
an interagency basis, for a Joint Committee meeting in the
future, and the Soviets should be informed of our willingness to
hold a working level meeting to prepare for a formal Joint
Committee session. We should, however, refrain from agreeing to
a date for the Joint Committee meeting itself in view of the
situation currently facing Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner.
Timing of other meetings should also take the Sakharov situation
into account. The linkage of the timing with the Sakharov
situation should, however, not be conveyed explicitly to the
Soviets. (c)
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
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MEMORANDUM
BY
LOJ , NARA, DATE 10/17/05
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONF IDENTIAL
May 8, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
AM
SUBJECT:
Proposed Reactivation of US-USSR Environmental
Cooperation Agreement
State, acting on a recommendation by EPA Administrator
Ruckelshaus, has recommended (1) that the post-Afghanistan
sanction forbidding meetings of US-USSR Joint Committees be
lifted in respect to the Environmental Cooperation Agreement, and
(2) that Administrator Ruckelshaus be designated as the US
Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. If these recommendations are
approved, Mr. Ruckelshaus intends to propose a meeting of the
Joint Committee in the near future in order to plan for increased
activity and revise the largely outdated agenda.
Discussion
The Environmental Cooperation Agreement is one of the relatively
uncontroversial agreements with the Soviets which was allowed to
continue operating following the invasion of Afghanistan, and
which this Administration decided to renew for five years in
1982. In the absence of Joint Committee meetings, however,
activities have gradually decreased as projects were completed
and there was no mechanism in operation to agree on new ones.
Since the President has authorized a reactivation of those
agreements which do not threaten significant transfer of
military-related technology, the agreement on environmental
cooperation seems an appropriate candidate.
However, it seems to me that if Mrs. Bonner-Sakharov is held
under arrest, it would be inappropriate to move ahead in areas
such as this. Therefore, I would recommend that the
recommendations of State and EPA be approved, but with the
proviso that no meeting date be set for the Joint Committee
without further consideration of the question if we learn that
Mrs. Bonner is under arrest.
Fortier, 8 Lenczowski, Robinson (nour and Sestanovich concur.
JL does not concur
memo WILL FOLLOW.
lagra
case (and other hialy forms of harassment).
concer, but given importance of Bonner
CONFIDENTIAL
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2
Recommendation:
That you authorize transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at
Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of April 30, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
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3466 add-on
MEMORANDUM
BY LOJ , NARA, DATE 10/17/05
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONF IDENTIAL
May
8,
1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
ROM HAS SEEN
know
FROM:
JOHN LENCZOWSKI
SUBJECT:
Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Environmental Agreement
Once again another U.S.-Soviet agreement is up for reactivation
or renewal. Once again the issue appears all by itself and out
of context. Renewal of such an agreement seems innocent enough.
It does not appear to pose the risk of a technology transfer
hemorrhage, nor does it appear to pose a significant hostile
intelligence threat. Its political impact seems relatively
insignificant: not too many people pay attention to meetings
between environmental officials at the Under Secretary level.
The problem with this is that it is part of a pattern of a wide
variety of agreements that are appearing before us for renewal
one by one. The real policy question here is whether this is a
pattern to which we want to subscribe at this time. Other issues
which form the pattern include: the reactivation of U.S.-Soviet
Health agreements, the U.S.-Soviet Fishing relationship, the
Agricultural Cooperation agreement, the agreement on Economic,
Industrial and Technical Cooperation, the Consular agreement, the
Exchanges Agreement and others. (The ones listed are only those
which have appeared in recent weeks.)
Taken together, these add up to a relationship of wholesale
cooperation with the Soviets that amounts to a revival of the
"detente" relationship established by President Nixon. These
types of agreements were to help diminish the fundamental political
tensions between the two systems not only by their intrinsically
cooperative nature, but because they formed a web of relationships
which were organically linked so as to provide a system of
incentives for the Soviets to behave in a more moderate fashion.
Fully recognizing that we had more to offer the Soviets in these
various fields than vice versa, the threat of U.S. withdrawal
from these accords was to serve as the stick accompanying the
carrots. Even though it was recognized that these agreements
were not truly reciprocal, it was nevertheless part of the price
we were willing to pay to supply both the positive and negative
incentives of a "linkage" policy so as to encourage in particular
Soviet good faith in arms control.
If somebody is articulating the philosophy behind the current
renewal of U.S.-Soviet agreements, I have not heard it. Perhaps
the strategy underlying this has appeared in secret documents
which I have not seen. What I have been able to see is a rather
underarticulated policy of "intensified dialogue." But, this
expression cannot explain an entire foreign policy strategy.
CONFIDENTIAL
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2
Is the current policy a repetition of the Nixon policy of "linkage"
and incentives? Or are we willing, as it appears, to give more
and more carrots to the Soviets regardless of their external
behavior?
Today they are conducting a major escalation of their attack on
the innocent people of Afghanistan. Yet the reactivation of the
Environmental agreement as well as others involves lifting of
Afghanistan sanctions which, though imposed by President Carter,
we have chosen to retain for three and a half years. The Soviets
are harassing the Sakharovs with new intensity. They have
rejected countless of our good-faith efforts to get them to
return to several negotiating tables in spite of their dubious
record of treaty compliance. On top of this, their policy seems
pointed, as much as ever before, toward an open attempt to take
sides in a U.S. presidential election. How else to explain their
decision to pull out of the Olympics?
Under these circumstances, I believe the entire package of
agreements should come under review and should be postponed until
such time as the Soviets are willing to take even a few steps --
much less move halfway -- toward reaching some kind of mutual
code of behavior with us.
Unless we begin to treat these agreements more directly as part
of the entire strategic relationship with the USSR, and in doing
so link them to Soviet external behavior in a way that
establishes a coherent system of incentives, the Soviets will
interpret our actions as signs of weakness and will have no
incentive to mitigate the various types of aggression which they
and their proxies are currently conducting around the world.
Clearly we must continue our efforts to demonstrate that we in
fact want peace, but the challenge we face in trying to do so
involves avoiding adopting the position of a supplicant for
Soviet good will.
From a variety of indications, the Soviets appear to believe that
they can paint the President as a warmonger to assist his electoral
defeat and by tarring him this way, induce him to make concessions
in symbol if not substance. They are looking to see if we are
conscious of the nature of the signals we send them and if those
signals are ones of strength or weakness.
Renewing agreements in the absence of a clearly defined and
articulated strategy will only be seen as a sign of weakness --
especially a sign that we fear their anti-Reagan propaganda
campaign so much that we are willing to reach even for Environ-
mental agreements in hopes of mitigating it.
CONFIDENTIAL
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 30, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE,
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Proposed Reactivation of US-USSR Environmental
Cooperation Agreement
EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus has requested Secretary
Shultz's views on his proposal (attached) to take several steps
to increase activity under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Environmental Protection. Under the sanctions imposed by
President Carter in 1979 in response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan US agencies administering bilateral cooperation
agreements with the USSR have been forbidden to have high-level
contacts with Soviet counterparts or to hold meetings of the
US-USSR Joint Committees which set directions for cooperative
programs. They have been allowed to continue programs under
way at the time sanctions were instituted, but not to develop
new programs.
Mr. Ruckelshaus points out that this Administration found
the Environmental Agreement of sufficient value to extend it in
May 1982 for an additional five-year term. Inability to hold
Joint Committee meetings and have contacts with Soviet
counterparts at the policy-making level are, however,
constraining the substantive benefits to be obtained from the
agreement. To reinvigorate the cooperative program he suggests
it might be appropriate for him to assume the now-vacant
position of US Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee and initiate
planning for a meeting of the Committee to revise the
agreement's largely outdated agenda.
The Environmental Agreement has been one of the more
successful and less controversial of the bilaterals on science
and technology cooperation. As continental, heavily
industrialized countries the US and USSR share many
environmental problems, on which cooperation can have major
benefits for both parties. The potential for undesirable
technology transfer is minimal. Encouraging increased activity
under this agreement can provide a useful supplement to what we
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are currently trying to do in certain other areas. It should
also encounter considerable Allied and public support and
private sector involvement. The Soviets would find the onus on
them for failing to respond or responding negatively.
The Department considers that in this case continued
application of the Afghanistan sanctions runs counter to US
interests and recommends NSC approval of Mr. Ruckelshaus'
proposals as an exception to that policy.
Charles Hiel
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
AGEN
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
PROTECTION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20460
March 29, 1984
8409772
THE ADMINISTRATOR
Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
For some time now I have been concerned about the management
and implementation of the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in
the Field of Environmental Protection.
As you may know, the Administration decided to extend the
Environmental Agreement for a third five-year term effective
May 1982. This action was based on a positive assessment, on
the part of EPA and the other participating USG agencies, of
the Agreement's substantive merit and humanitarian nature.
At that time, we were charged, in effect, to continue those
activities which were found to be beneficial and which our
limited resources would permit us to support, all subject to
case-by-case review by the State Department and the National
Security Council. At the same time, however, the ban on high-
level contact with Soviet counterparts, imposed by the previous
Administration in the wake of events in Afghanistan, was left
intact. This meant that the position of U.S. Co-Chairman of
the US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Field of
Environmental Protection, a post traditionally held by the
Administrator of EPA, was left vacant.
It has been brought to my attention recently, both by my
own staff and by Ambassador Arthur Hartman, that this leader-
ship vacuum has come to interfere in a significant way with
the implementation of the Agreement. It is constraining more
and more the substantive benefit which this cooperative
relationship should bring us. We believe that if this program
is worth continuing, as seems to be the case, it is worth doing
properly. The professionals of this Agency, and of the other
participating organizations both public and private, should not
be expected to commit their valuable time, talent, and resources
to this or any international program without benefit of a
genuinely supportive administrative framework and a clear sense
of purpose.
Under these circumstances, and in the spirit of the
President's January 16 address on US-Soviet relations, I wonder
whether it might be appropriate for me to assume the position
of U.S. Co-Chairman of the Joint Committee. I would be prepared
to do so on the understanding that the extent of my personal
involvement would be limited by my very full range of domestic
concerns, and that my designated representative would be filling
in for me much of the time. Nevertheless, the weight and
authority of the Administrator's office must be brought directly
to bear if we are to engage the Soviets in revising the Agreement's
largely outdated agenda and to restore sound management and
effective leadership on the U.S. side. Accordingly, we would
expect to initiate planning at an early date for the ninth meeting
of the Environmental Joint Committee.
Please advise me what your views and wishes are on this matter.
Sincerely,
William D. Ruckelshaus
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
May 29, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
138
SUBJECT:
Rejuvenating the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Housing
Following the President's decision to review the existing
cooperative agreements with the USSR to see whether it is in our
interest to reactivate them, Secretary Pierce has written
Secretary Shultz to recommend that the Joint Steering Committee
under the housing cooperation agreement meet. His recommendation
follows similar recommendations in regard to the cooperative
agreements in agriculture, health and environmental protection.
Reactivation of the agreement would require the suspension of a
post-Afghanistan sanction, which prevents high-level meetings
between U.S. and Soviet officials.
This agreement, like the others we have considered recently, is
in an area where the danger of unauthorized transfer of sensitive
technology is low, where there is some U.S. commercial interest,
and where there is some Soviet technology of potential usefulness
to us. I believe it would be appropriate to deal with it as we
have with the others, and initiate plans for a meeting of the
Joint Steering Committee. While the Sakharov matter is pending,
however, I believe it would not be appropriate to set a firm date
for such a meeting.
Recommendation:
That you authorize transmittal of the Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum at
TAB I, which confirms lifting the Afghanistan sanction in respect
to meetings of the Joint Steering Committee, instructs that
proposed programs be drawn up on an interagency basis and that a
working level meeting with the Soviets be proposed to prepare for
a Joint Committee meeting, but that timing of meetings take the
Sakharov/Bonner situation into account.
Approve
Disapprove
JL
John Lenczowski does not concur; Steve Sestanovich concurs.
Attachments: Please see separate memo
only if communications
w/ soviets underscore
Tab I - Kimmitt-Hill Memorandum for approval
Tab II - Hill-McFarlane Memorandum of May 21, 1984
that our ability to
proceed depends on
CONFIDENTIAL
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Rejuvenating the U.S. -USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in Housing let
Your memorandum of May 21, 1984, to Mr. McFarlane on this subject
has been reviewed, and the proposal to grant an exception to the
Afghanistan sanctions to permit meetings of the Joint US-USSR
Steering Committee on Cooperation in Housing and other
Construction has been approved. tes
Preparations should be initiated on an interagency basis for a
future meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, and the Soviets
should be informed of our willingness to hold a working level
meeting to prepare for a formal session of the Joint Steering
Committee. We should, however, refrain from setting a date for
the Joint Steering Committee meeting in view of the situation
currently facing Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner. Timing of
other meetings should also take the Sakharov situation into
account. The linkage of the timing with the Sakharov situation
should, however, not be conveyed explicitly to the Soviets. ter (C)
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
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8412777
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United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
May 21, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Rejuvenating the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Housing
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel R.
Pierce, Jr., has written to Secretary Shultz requesting that
activities under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in
Housing and Other Construction be strengthened. Since the last
meeting of the bilateral housing committee (known as the Joint
Steering Committee) in September 1978, the Housing Agreement
has become increasingly inactive as a result of the January
1980 decision by President Carter to impose a sanction against
high-level US-Soviet contacts which has precluded further
meetings of the Committee. In the absence of these meetings,
no new programs have been approved under the Agreement and
older ones have not been extended when the first phases were
completed. The Housing Agreement has, therefore, begun to
atrophy.
Secretary Pierce points out that, following a positive
assessment of the program which noted in particular the support
by the US business community, the Administration decided to
allow the Agreement to extend automatically for a third
five-year term effective June 1984. However, the sanctions
policy has resulted in a substantial reduction of the exchange
program. In addition, setting of policy guidance has been
impeded by his inability to deal directly with his
counterparts. To resolve these problems, Pierce proposes that
he be allowed to convene a meeting of the Joint Steering
Committee to address major substantive and administrative
issues necessary to achieve a more effective collaborative
program.
The Administration's decision in late December 1983 to
extend the Housing Agreement was based on the extensive private
sector involvement and support of activities, the technical
benefits to the American participants (particularly in the
areas of construction in permafrost regions, earthquake-zone
construction, fire-preventive coatings for wood and other
fire-resistant techniques, and the use of large-scale research
models), the future commercial potential for export of American
goods and services to the Soviet housing industry, and the
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intelligence gain to the USG from the regularly-filed trip
reports. Furthermore, experience with the program has shown
that the potential for undesirable technology transfer has been
minimized.
Building up the activities under the Agreement would
supplement what the Administration has undertaken in
agricultural cooperation and other areas. Reactivation would
also demonstrate to the private sector participants the
Administration's support of their efforts and encourage them to
continue their input to the program.
The letter from Secretary Pierce is the fourth in a series
of letters from heads of US Government agencies (Mr.
Ruckelshaus - Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Block - US
Department of Agriculture, and Ms. Heckler - Department of
Health and Human Services) which conform to the White House
agenda of a steady improvement in US-Soviet relations. This
agenda, which receives Ambassador Hartman's strong personal
support, remains in place despite recent strains.
The Department considers that in this case continued
application of the Afghanistan sanctions does not advance US
interests and recommends NSC approval of Secretary Pierce's
proposal as an exception to that policy.
for Charles Bmokmlay Hill
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
8412777
4107
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
May 21, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Rejuvenating the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation
in Housing
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel R.
Pierce, Jr., has written to Secretary Shultz requesting that
activities under the US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in
Housing and Other Construction be strengthened. Since the last
meeting of the bilateral housing committee (known as the Joint
Steering Committee) in September 1978, the Housing Agreement
has become increasingly inactive as a result of the January
1980 decision by President Carter to impose a sanction against
high-level US-Soviet contacts which has precluded further
meetings of the Committee. In the absence of these meetings,
no new programs have been approved under the Agreement and
older ones have not been extended when the first phases were
completed. The Housing Agreement has, therefore, begun to
atrophy.
Secretary Pierce points out that, following a positive
assessment of the program which noted in particular the support
by the US business community, the Administration decided to
allow the Agreement to extend automatically for a third
five-year term effective June 1984. However, the sanctions
policy has resulted in a substantial reduction of the exchange
program. In addition, setting of policy guidance has been
impeded by his inability to deal directly with his
counterparts. To resolve these problems, Pierce proposes that
he be allowed to convene a meeting of the Joint Steering
Committee to address major substantive and administrative
issues necessary to achieve a more effective collaborative
program.
The Administration's decision in late December 1983 to
extend the Housing Agreement was based on the extensive private
sector involvement and support of activities, the technical
benefits to the American participants (particularly in the
areas of construction in permafrost regions, earthquake-zone
construction, fire-preventive coatings for wood and other
fire-resistant techniques, and the use of large-scale research
models), the future commercial potential for export of American
goods and services to the Soviet housing industry,
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Furthermore, experience with the program has shown
that the potential for undesirable technology transfer has been
minimized.
Building up the activities under the Agreement would
supplement what the Administration has undertaken in
agricultural cooperation and other areas. Reactivation would
also demonstrate to the private sector participants the
Administration's support of their efforts and encourage them to
continue their input to the program.
The letter from Secretary Pierce is the fourth in a series
of letters from heads of US Government agencies (Mr.
Ruckelshaus - Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Block - US
Department of Agriculture, and Ms. Heckler - Department of
Health and Human Services) which conform to the White House
agenda of a steady improvement in US-Soviet relations. This
agenda, which receives Ambassador Hartman's strong personal
support, remains in place despite recent strains.
The Department considers that in this case continued
application of the Afghanistan sanctions does not advance US
interests and recommends NSC approval of Secretary Pierce's
proposal as an exception to that policy.
for Bmokmlay Hill
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
4113 add-on
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
May 29, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK I'm
SUBJECT:
U.S. Attempts to Reach Agreements with Soviets
State has still not produced an unclassified list of our attempts
to reach agreement with the Soviets as you desired, and I have
been reluctant to move ahead on my own. However, I attach two
papers which should be useful as checklists for restricted
briefings with key members of Congress and representatives of
foreign governments.
The first, at TAB I, is the more inclusive, and the more
sensitive, since it specifies channels and times. It was
prepared for Secretary Shultz, who has not yet approved it, and
therefore you should not mention to him that you have it. I
believe it is quite accurate, and see no problem in drawing on it
in confidential briefings, if some of the sensitive details are
omitted.
The second, at TAB II, comprises the talking points used by U.S.
Embassies in briefing allied and other friendly governments. I
see no reason it should not also be used with Congress.
As for an unclassified fact sheet which might be issued or used
for press briefings, I believe it would be best to wait a while
until we decide how to release the information so that it will
have the greatest impact. Regarding our attempts to restore the
bilateral relationship, an upcoming opportunity to release this
to the public could be during the conference here of foundations
active in East-West exchanges, scheduled for June 26-27. (There
will be a separate memo on this event.) We could prepare a
message from the President to the conference, and -- if we wished
to maximize press coverage -- arrange for a brief meeting if the
President's calendar permitted.
On the arms control side, I would opt for a comprehensive review
by the President in late summer. If he publicizes the whole
package earlier, we may have little to add in the fall, and also
could be charged with "giving up too soon."
However, if you feel we need an unclassified fact sheet now, we
of course will prepare one.
Chris Mehman and Ron Rm Lehman concur.
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Recommendation:
That we use the classified list at TAB II for restricted
briefings of Congress and foreign governments for the time being,
and defer unclassified fact sheets until later.
Approve
Disapprove
OR, ALTERNATIVELY
That an unclassified fact sheet be prepared immediately
Approve
Disapprove
For use only with Congress
For use with the press as well
Attachments:
TAB I
- Informal List of US Proposals to Soviets Since January
(Secret/Sensitive)
TAB II - U.S. Initiatives Toward USSR: Talking Points Used
with Allied and Friendly Governments (Secret)
SECRET
SECRET/SENSITIVE
U.S. PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TOWARD THE USSR
SINCE EARLY JANUARY
General: The President's January 16 speech signaled a major
effort to improve our relations with the Soviet Union. It was
forward-looking, non-polemical, and designed to demonstrate to the
Soviet leadership his desire to move ahead on a wide range of
issues. Secretary Shultz, in the meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm
two days later, affirmed our interest in negotiations on the entire
range of agenda items between us. Vice President Bush met with
General Secretary Chernenko at Andropov's funeral and, in a useful
exchange, emphasized the importance we attach to the President's
approach and our hope for progress. The President has sent Mr.
Chernenko four letters, laying out his view of the relationship and
identifying concrete steps that could be taken to mutual benefit in
all four areas of our agenda. Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Hart-
man have had several meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin and Foreign
Minister Gromyko to discuss the various items on the agenda in some
detail. Overall, and with the notable exception of nuclear arms
issues, the Soviet response was wary willingness to work with us on
the issues we had identified, and progress seemed possible. How-
ever, the Soviets have recently quite obviously sought to put off
individual decisions and stall the whole process, replacing their
earlier enthusiasm for "small steps" arrived at through confidential
discussions with delaying tactics in private and shrill propaganda
for public consumption. Below are specific proposals that the U.S.
has made since the President's speech:
Arms Control:
-- INF: In addition to urging the Soviets to return to the INF
negotiations, we also told them we are ready to listen to any other
ideas they may have on the INF issue, and that we are prepared for
discussion not only in formal sessions at Geneva, but also in more
private channels. They have steadfastly refused to discuss any
aspect of INF.
-- START: As in INF, we said we were prepared to discuss these
issues not only in formal negotiations but also in private channels.
We told them we have some new ideas on START in which the concerns
of both sides and differing U.S. and Soviet force structures could
be taken into account, and that we are willing to discuss them at
any time. In this connection, we continue to refine and develop our
positions in the interagency process in order to have new proposals
available the moment the Soviets are ready to talk. The President
asked Brent Scowcroft to carry a letter to Chernenko and engage in
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a high-level exchange of views on the basis for getting talks on
nuclear issues going again. The Soviets offered Scowcroft a third-
ranking official, and have been unresponsive to all our efforts,
refusing either formal or informal talks on both START and INF.
-- Chemical Weapons: In addition to tabling a draft CW treaty
at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on April 18, we suggested
bilateral discussions to help move the negotiations forward and
resolve some of the verification issues. All the Soviets have done
to this point is to denounce our draft treaty.
-- MBFR: In addition to tabling the new Western proposal on
MBFR that substantially modified the Western stance on data, we
have suggested intensive bilateral discussions in Vienna on MBFR
issues. Again, the Soviets quickly denounced our initiative with-
out taking time to study it carefully.
-- CDE: With the Western CBM proposals designed to reduce the
risks of surprise attack tabled at Stockholm, Ambassador Goodby ini-
tiated private discussions with his Soviet counterpart in an effort
to move the meeting ahead. Goodby later invited Ambassador Grinev-
skiy to Washington for confidential discussions during the recess.
When the Soviets said they preferred to meet in Moscow, Goodby went
there for talks. In these meetings, we emphasized our readiness to
discuss their proposals as long as they are ready to discuss ours.
-- Space Arms Control: Over a year ago, we offered to discuss
the implications of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative
with the Soviets in START as well as in the Standing Consultative
Commission. More recently we proposed a special working group in
the SCC on these issues. In response to Soviet proposals for ASAT
negotiations, Secretary Shultz offered private discussions to
review the entire question of space arms control. In addition, the
Secretary invited Soviet Academy of Sciences Vice Chairman Velikhov
to discuss space issues with him or other knowledgeable officials
during his April visit. Unfortunately, however, the Soviets have
been unwilling to pick up seriously on any of these offers.
-- Confidence Building Measures: The United States has long
taken the lead in suggesting confidence building measures to improve
the atmosphere between the superpowers and decrease the danger of
conflict. We have recently taken the following steps:
Following up on our proposals for advance notification of
missile launches and major nuclear exercises we have offered
in START and INF, we volunteered advance notification to the
Soviets of this spring's GLOBAL SHIELD exercise.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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We proposed a draft agreement to upgrade the Hotline, and a
team of U.S. communications experts went to Moscow in late
April to work out the technical details.
We also proposed talks on amending the 1971 Accidents
Measures Agreement to include consultation in the event of a
nuclear terrorist incident.
We put forward once again our proposals to establish a
Joint Military Command Center and upgrade embassy commun-
ications in both countries.
The President proposed to Mr. Chernenko that we institute
regular, high-level contacts between U.S. and Soviet military
personnel.
With the exception of the Hotline, the Soviets have not shown any
interest in our CBMs proposals.
Non-Proliferation Talks: Secretary Shultz first proposed on-
going bilateral consultations on non-proliferation issues in the
fall of 1982. The third round of these consultations met in Feb-
ruary in Geneva at U.S. initiative and with the U.S. acting as host.
Again, at U.S. initiative, we scheduled the next round for December.
Regional Issues: We have emphasized our willingness to address
regional issues of interest to the Soviets as well as issues of
interest to us in bilateral talks. We have recently discussed the
Middle East on several occasions. At our initiative, we also
discussed the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf issues. The United States has
proposed a special meeting between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador
Dobrynin that would include high-level experts on the area from both
sides. On other regional areas, we have in the past had three
useful meetings between Assistant Secretary Crocker and his Soviet
counterpart on Southern Africa. We recently suggested another
meeting to discuss events in the area. However, the Soviets have
not responded either to this offer or to the proposal for a special
Middle East meeting.
Human Rights: Human rights is always a subject raised by our
side. In the past few months we have encouraged progress on
emigration and cultural freedom, turned over representation lists,
raised prominent cases, and, in particular, made high-level
requests for improvement in the Sakharovs' situation. In the wake
of the KAL tragedy, we proposed concrete measures, such as the
installation of radar beacons on Soviet territory along the Pacific
air corridors, to help make recurrence impossible. So far, the
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Soviets have not been responsive on the human contacts issue nor
willing to move forward on the navigational aids.
Bilateral Issues:
-- People-to-People: Despite other broad political concerns,
we have supported an improvement in people-to-people contacts
between the two countries including the following:
We proposed the negotiation of a new official exchanges
agreement to increase and regularize exchanges between the
two countries.
We have identified areas for increased activity and high-
level meetings in fields of particular benefit to our
peoples -- the environment, health, housing, and agriculture.
The U.S. suggested a date for consular review talks
designed to improve certain visa and travel procedures.
We initiated talks on opening consulates in Kiev and New
York to facilitate visits between the two countries and
improve our official representations.
We proposed a joint simulated space rescue mission in
which astronauts of the two countries would carry out a
combined exercise in space simulating a rescue mission of
personnel from a malfunctioning spacecraft.
-- Economic and Other Bilateral Issues:
We have renewed our bilateral economic agreements expiring
this year, and in the case of fisheries proposed that the
agreement be extended for eighteen months rather than the
normal one year.
We suggested a compromise formula to settle the Pacific
maritime boundary dispute betseen the two countries, hosted
a round of talks in January, and proposed a follow-on
session.
We proposed discussions between the U.S. Coast Guard and
the Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine on search and rescue
procedures be scheduled for this summer.
The United States Government made a major effort to ensure
the success of the U.S.- Soviet Trade and Economic Council's
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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May meeting in New York by sending two Deputy Secretaries and
a Deputy Assistant Secretary to speak and welcoming the
leader of the Soviet delegation to meetings at the top levels
of the State Department, Commerce Department, and the NSC.
-- Rhetoric: The Soviets continually complain about the
supposed anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Administration. President
Reagan signaled in his Time Magazine interview at the start of the
year that he did not intend to engage in harsh polemics with the
Soviets. In his major January 16 address, the President emphasized
his desire for constructive cooperation in the relationship. The
Soviets, however, instead of responding in kind by lowering their
own rhetoric, have greatly stepped up their polemics and anti-
Administration propaganda. Most recently, their rhetoric has
reached a disgusting level -- comparing the President with Hitler,
saying the Secretary of State was acting like a "dimwit" and calling
Assistant Secretary Burt "a petty snooper and provocateur" -- that
would be ludicrous if it were not coming from a major world power.
Clearly the Soviets have been unwilling to carry out the lowering
of voices that they so strongly advocated in public and private.
#0788M
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET
TALKING POINTS
U.S. Initiatives Toward USSR: Talking Points Used
with Allied and Friendly Governments
The President's January 16 speech established the framework
for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union aimed at building a
more productive and stable relationship.
In that speech, the President cited the profound and obvious
differences in policies and political systems that divide
the U.S. and Soviet Union, but stressed the vital common
interest that the two countries share in the avoidance of
war and reduction of existing levels of arms and tensions.
It is this need to preserve the peace that is at the heart
of U.S. deterrent policy. The U.S. will defend its
interests, but does not seek to threaten the Soviet Union.
The President also elaborated on the basic aims of the U.S.
in its relationship with the Soviet Union: developing ways
to eliminate the use and threat of force in international
disputes; significantly reducing the vast arms stockpiles in
the world, particularly nuclear weapons; and establishing a
better working relationship with the Soviet Union
characterized by greater cooperation and understanding and
based on mutual restraint and respect. He emphasized that
the U.S. will be guided in its efforts to those ends by
realism, strength and willingness to engage in serious and
practical dialogue.
Following up on the President's January 16 speech, in recent
months the U.S. has sought to engage the Soviet Union in
just such a productive dialogue aimed at finding practical
solutions in three broad areas: arms control and security,
regional problems, and bilateral issues. We have of course
also made clear that gestures in the humanitarian field
would lead to significant improvement in the overall
atmosphere of our relationship.
The most pressing arms control and security issues
undoubtedly are START and INF. We have underscored our
readiness to return to the negotiating table, without
preconditions, and to be flexible in renewed negotiations.
We have made clear our readiness to discuss the substance of
the START and INF negotiations at any time and any place the
Soviets choose. We have also made clear that we understand
negotiations must be a give-and-take process in which the
concerns of both sides and the differing force structures of
the two sides must be taken into account. Both countries
made adjustments in their positions before negotiations were
broken off, and we are ready to resume this process, but
thus far the Soviets refuse to engage in such discussions.
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We recently tabled a new draft chemical weapons treaty at
the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. We hope the Soviet
side will reconsider its initial negative reaction to the
U.S. initiative. As Chairman Brezhnev once advised us with
respect to MBFR, "Let us taste the wine."
The same also still holds for MBFR itself. The U.S. and its
Allies have introduced a new initiative at the MBFR talks in
Vienna. That proposal attempts to build upon constructive
elements of the East's latest proposals, and to find a
creative way around the long-standing dispute over data. As
with our chemical weapons proposal, we hope the Eastern side
will, upon reflection, respond in a constructive fashion.
--
Regarding the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE),
U.S. delegation Chief James Goodby consulted with his Soviet
counterpart in Moscow late last month to explore the
possibilities for moving forward and particularly to permit
full discussion of Eastern proposals for specific
confidence-building measures.
U.S. and Soviet communications experts also met in Moscow
last month to discuss improvements in the "hotline" linking
our two capitals. These talks concluded April 27, with
agreement reached on most technical aspects. We feel we
should be able to resolve the few remaining technical and
procedural difficulties in short order if the political will
is there on the Soviet side.
--
On regional issues, we have discussed with the Soviets
consultations on Southern Africa as well as a more intensive
diplomatic dialogue on the Middle East, and we are ready to
proceed with such exchanges. We have long made it clear to
the Soviets that we are prepared for any bilateral exchange
of views which might contribute to a negotiated settlement
in Afghanistan.
With respect to bilateral issues, we have begun proposed
exchanges concerning arrangements to open new Consulates in
Kiev and New York, and are awaiting a Soviet response. The
U.S. side is also prepared to negotiate a new U.S. -Soviet
Exchanges Agreement.
Annual talks pursuant to U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea
Agreement will take place in Moscow at the end of May.
The U.S. side has proposed resumption of talks to review a
number of smaller consular problems of mutual interest.
This would resume discussions that began last May.
The two countries have had several rounds of negotiations
concerning depiction of our maritime boundary in the Bering
Sea, and we would like to see another round take place in
the not-too-distant future.
SECRET
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3
Finally, those bilateral cooperative agreements that were
to expire this year have been renewed, and the U.S. -Soviet
Trade and Economic Council will meet in New York later this
month. It will involve the participation of senior U.S.
Government officials, and senior Soviet participants will be
appropriately received in Washington as well.
This is by no means an exhaustive list. But it serves to
illustrate that the United States is indeed making a
concerted effort to enhance our bilateral dialogue with the
Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet response in many
cases has been negative or they have not responded at all.
We are not sure why, but the authorities in Moscow do not
seem prepared for constructive dialogue at this time.
--
Their decision to boycott the Los Angeles Olympics was
completely unjustified. The U.S. was bending over backwards
to meet Soviet concerns -- and we had met them. This
decision surprised and clearly dismayed even their closest
allies.
They have responded harshly to the expressions of concern
not only from the U.S. but from many other nations over the
health of Andrei Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner.
Regardless of their behavior, however, the United States is
steady and patient. Our agenda remains on the table.
SECRET
4286
C
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 29, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
is
$ 40
SUBJECT:
Letter to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
We have reviewed and concur, with editorial change on page 2,
with the Department of State's draft letter to Mr. Ueberroth
for Mr. Deaver's signature.
Deb
SRS
DeGraffenreid and Sestanovich concur.
Attachment:
Tab I
Draft letter to Mr. Ueberroth
S/S# 8415439 4286
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
May 25, 1984
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Letter to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of the
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
At Michael Deaver's request the Department has prepared a
letter for his signature to Mr. Peter Ueberroth, President of
the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, concerning
actions taken with respect to the 1984 Summer Games. A
suggested draft response is attached for forwarding to Mr.
Deaver.
bor Bmckinly Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
as stated.
UNCLASSIFIED
Mr. Peter Ueberroth
President,
Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
Los Angeles, California 90084
Dear Peter,
I would like to bring you up to date on the actions taken
by the Federal Government in recent weeks concerning the Soviet
boycott of the 1984 Olympics.
As you know, in the latter part of April the Soviet media
and Olympic officials spread allegations that the U.S. had
"violated" the Olympic Charter and sought to gain political
capital out of the Games in Los Angeles. In light of these
spurious charges, the State Department instructed our Embassies
in Eastern Europe to explain clearly that the U.S. Government
welcomes athletes from all countries, that the Olympic Charter
would be strictly enforced, and that the U.S. was prepared to
take whatever measures would be required to ensure security at
the 1984 Games. On May 9, these instructions were reiterated.
On April 27, Ed Derwinski, Counselor of the State
Department, met with Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov to give
the Soviet Government official and direct assurances of what we
were prepared to do for Soviet visitors, along the lines of my
letter to you of March 16, 1984. Several of our proposed
actions constituted major exceptions to the procedures normally
followed for Soviet nationals --procedures which are instituted
-2-
by the U.S. Government in reciprocity for Soviet restrictions
on Americans in the USSR.
On May 9, the State Department furnished guidance to all
its posts overseas to explain our position and enable each of
them to respond authoritatively to the Soviet allegations about
the Olympics. Similiar briefing materials were sent out by USIA
at the same time.
On May 12, the State Department cabled its posts again with
additional material refuting the various Soviet charges.
On May 14, the State Department took the unusual step of
releasing the "non-paper" Ed Derwinski had given to the Soviet
Embassy on April 27, in light of the absurd and wholly
inaccurate interpretation given that meeting by Marat Gramov
delivered a form
and the Soviet media. The same day, the Department formally
remarks. protested Gramov's remarks to the Soviet Embassy regarding Gramov's
You met with George Shultz and me on May 15 and outlined
the stand you would be taking in Lausanne at the forthcoming
meeting of the IOC. We offered the assistance of two State
Department officials, which you later declined.
-3-
On May 23, we relayed to our Embassies LAOOC's request for
information from eighteen National Olympic Committees with whom
your communications had been faulty. At LAOOC's request, we
also sent a second message along these lines to an additional
thirteen countries. We also authorized our Ambassadors in four
key African countries to encourage attendance of their Olympic
teams.
Our objective throughout this period has been to give quiet
but firm and effective support to your own efforts to encourage
or confirm attendance at the Games prior to the June 2
deadline, without intensifying the politicization of the Games
caused by the Soviet boycott.
We are encouraged that no country outside the hard core of
Soviet allies has so far chosen to stay away from the Games.
Moreover, non-bloc press and official comment reported to us
has exhibited no signs of reluctance to have their national
athletes attend the Games. The State Department is, of course,
sharing these assessments with your staff on a continuing basis.
While there is room to be optimistic, I believe there is
more that could be done to "grease the skids" and I would like
to offer some suggestions.
-4-
The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa (SCSA) will meet in
Upper Volta June 14-16 to discuss the Olympics and its agenda
for the coming year. Sending an American representative to the
meeting to explain the arrangements in Los Angeles and
generally spread goodwill could be extremely helpful. While
this occurs after the June 2 deadline, it is important to
remember that the Africans withdrew from the 1976 Olympics
while in Montreal. One excellent candidate for this job would
be Mayor Tom Bradley, who is both very knowledgeable and very
well-respected in Africa.
The number of press accreditations for African journalists
has long been a sensitive issue. We understand Nigeria, for
example, has received only three accreditations, Ivory Coast
one, and VOA's Africa service none. Given the enormous African
interest in the Games and the important role of sports in the
national life of these countries, we feel that LAOOC would do
itself a large favor by indicating a willingess to grant
additional accreditations.
We also anticipate that some African or other heads of
State or very senior officials will decide to attend the Games
only at the last minute. We hope that the Organizing Committee
is prepared for such an eventuality and has the flexibility to
accommodate requests for additional tickets, whether by
-5-
allocating additional seats to the national committees or by
granting more liberal access to Stand G. In this connection, we
understand you have granted special tickets to SCSA
Secretary-General Lamine Ba. We believe this action will help
significantly to promote full African participation.
Lamine Ba also hopes to bring between 100 and 150 African
Olympic contenders to Atlanta in July to participate in a
pre-Olympic training camp organized by Mayor Andrew Young, with
support shared by Mayor Young, the U.S. Information Agency, and
Lamine Ba's organization. The training camp has proven
extremely popular with African athletes and sports officials.
If these numbers (or more) actually show up, there may well be
a financial shortfall which the Committee or its corporate
sponsors might wish to help cover.
You may also wish to consider a personal appearance on
AFNET, a closed circuit satellite television hookup run by the
US Information Agency to many African countries. It would be a
good means of spreading the word about the Los Angeles Olympics
to opinion leaders throughout the continent.
Please continue to let me know if there is any way we can
help on these or any other projects to ensure fullest possible
participation at the Games. We all continue to have the highest
-6-
respect for the tremendous job you and the Committee are doing
on behalf of a successful 1984 Summer Olympics.
Sincerely,
Michael K. Deaver
C
4212
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
May 23, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 4sm
SUBJECT:
Father Morlion's Request to Meet with the
President or Mr. McFarlane
As you suggested following your telephone conversation with
Norman Bailey, I met with Father Andrew Morlion this morning. He
wants a five-minute meeting with the President, if possible, and
if not with Bud, to present an idea he has to bring the Soviets
back to the negotiating table, or else to solidify public opinion
behind our positions. Specifically, he would like the President
to propose (following informal soundings in Moscow) a limited
delay in deployment of a portion of the INF missiles provided the
Soviets resume negotiations.
In what may have been a coincidence, I received a call from
Norman Cousins just after I met with Morlion, and Cousins urged a
variant on the same theme: that informal soundings be made with
the Soviets (he suggested through Gen. Jones and himself) to see
if they would respond to a fixed period of delay in deployments
by resuming negotiations on INF.
I of course gave neither any encouragement, but said that I would
see that their suggestions received appropriate consideration. In
Morlion's case, you may want to receive him briefly so that he
can be reassured that he was taken seriously, but I do not
consider this essential.
Recommendation:
If your schedule permits, that you schedule a brief meeting with
Father Merlion.
Approve
Disapprove
Time:
Attachments:
Tab I
Copy of Merlion's letter to the President and copy
of his proposal
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLS F95-074 #82
BY sort NARA, DATE 11/17/99
COMMITTEE OF HUMAN RELATIONS FOR PEACE
EROP
CROP
COMITE DE RELATIONS HUMAINES POUR LA PAIX
(opy
PRESIDENT
w F. Morlion O.P.
President Ronald Reagan
ale Pola, Rome
The White House
444989-859303
Washington, D. C.
JNTS-COMPTES
Dear Mr. President:
n° 410192387
At this crossroad of history, I respectfully note that you
di Sicilla AR 8
alone among the world leaders can act to assure the survival of
in Nomentans
mankind. Having been personally associated with the resolution
of the Cuban missile crisis through the simple mediation of Pope
John XXIII which enabled President Kennedy to break the political-
n° 30326546
military deadlock with Khrushchev, I believe I can make that ob-
é Générale
servation. Thus, I seek your consideration as I pray for your
de Sêvres
initiative to arrest the threat of nuclear warfare.
You can assure the peoples of the world that peace is pos-
n° 430006756140
sible and that you, as America's President, are committed to its
thank
preservation. I know of and have been deeply impressed by your
d'Arenberg
gracious reception of two Franciscan fathers who were unable to
les
achieve a reciprocal acceptance by President Chernenko. Having
demonstrated beyond a doubt America's firm resolve and your com-
c/o H.C. Röglin
mitment to your country's strength, Mr. President, you are in
It Crop
the unique position of being able to call for and act on a
Friedrich Ring
"Pause for Peace".
dorf Tel. 578285
I enclose a memo in the hope that upon returning to Rome on
Account CROP
June 10th I can carry a light of hope in a favorable reaction.
cel Bank
I believe you can strengthen your policy of national security
ieller Center
with the support of the public opinion of most peoples of the
otk N.Y.
world with a courageous, unilateral initiative, a limited but
ahn P.E. Brown
Suite 6F
realistic proposal to initiate a first and a decisive step--an
Patk Avenue
act for peace.
ork N.Y.
a24483
I believe my prior efforts as well as my current chancel-
lorship of the International University of Social Studies in
Rome are known to your government as may be my recent efforts
for private diplomacy which have now brought me to Washington
where I will be staying at St. Dominic's Rectory, 630 E Street,
PRESIDENTS
NW, phone 554-7863, until May 25th. In union with the prayers
a Cousins
of hundreds of millions of our brothers and sisters of the human
Hussein
family, that you will be our Lord's providential agent for peace
on earth,
ary Publications
Cordially yours in Christ,
Pezzimenti
any Audio-visuals
['ellini
Andrew F. Morlion, O.P.
President
at
WHY PRESIDENT REAGAN CAN REDUCE THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR
by Andrew F. Morlion, O.P.
I. President Reagan is, today, uniquely the one world leader able
to initiate a realistic first step for peace.
President Reagan has demonstrated the resolve for a strong
American policy in the Western alliance, has buttressed U.S.
military power and has presided over a strong economic recov-
ery. A Reagan rescheduling of one-third (174) of the 522 new
American missiles to be implaced in western Europe by 1989 to
subsequent years, declared unilaterally, and combined with a
call for matching force reductions by the Soviets, might
create a climate of sufficient confidence for phased unilateral
-matched force reductions.
II. Chernenko and the Soviets cannot initiate a unilateral force
reduction. Illesss and age, flux in leadership, and the
internal structural problems of the Soviets do not afford the
confidence and intrinsic strength essential for a policy of
mobility. The Soviets would have more difficulty
in dismissing a unilateral act of force reduction calling for
a matching move than in its rejection of the President's last
addresses.
III. A Presidential Appeal for Unilateral but Matched Force Reduc-
tions and an Appeal to the Conscience of the World
to replace the open ended escalating multiplication of nuclear
-2-
arms will win the widest support as it will
A. Be welcomed by the peoples of the world as a constructive
de-escalation in the nuclear arms race. It can arouse the
for Tresident Rengens uncrease procepolicies,
sensitivit of world political leaders, religious leaders
(such as the Pope and Catholic bishops in America and abroad)
as well as the masses of peoples desirous of peace.
B. Unite the American people and their allies behind the
president's appeal to the world's conscience for unilateral,
matched de-escalation.
C. Provide sufficient time, 'A Pause for Peace', for the
leaders of the Soviet Union to react more constructively to an
American proposal in support of peace.
IV. A 'Pause for Peace' will afford an opportunity for private and
personal diplomacy to operate, to open dialogues at different
levels of the American social and academic, scientific and cul-
tural communities which, in the United States, are ready to
support constructive acts for peace consistent with national
security and international welfare. Private diplomacy never
commits political or religious leaders; if successful, it
provides a supportive base for their achievements.
Appendix
A RELEVANT CHRONOLOGY OF PERSONAL DIPLOMACY
1. October 22, 1962
The author of this document, through two of his trusted friends,
obtained Khrushchev's acceptance of the mediation of Pope John XXIII
to resolve the Cuban nuclear crisis.
2. January, 1963
Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador in Washington and a member
of the Soviet Central Committee called the author in response to a
request for a further gesture of good will and advised that
Khrushchev had freed the Eastern rite but catholic 'metropolitan' of
Ukraine, Archbishop Slipyi. A personal friendship between the author
and Dobrynin followed and fruitful meetings have occurred as often as
three times a year since then.
In respect to more recent events:
3. June, 1983
Through the Czechoslovakian ambassador and the Soviet ambassador
in Rome, a dialogue was started which resulted in the author's
participation in six meetings of a world assembly in Prague. The
author focused on the premise that 'understanding and trust were more
important than deterrents.'
4. September, 1983
Through the Soviet ambassador in Rome exchanges with the Academy
-2-
of Sciences were opened through cable, phone and personal
communications.
A first subject proposed for joint research were comparative
studies for Slavic civilizations and their relations to other
cultures. The proposals envisioned three levels:
(a) Natural sciences and technology
(b) Social sciences and methodology
(c) Human sciences and arts
This initiative of our Committee of Human Relations for Peace (CROP)
was inspire by the motto, 'Science is a bridge for peace between
peoples.
'
5. September and December, 1983
Received the impression that American scientists would be
welcomed by their Soviet counterparts.
Arranged to go, as founder of the International University of
Social Studies in Rome, to the Soviet Union with two leaders in
American science, Professor Linus Pauling and President Jean Mayer of
Tufts University, for whom the Soviets issued visas.
6. January 5, 1984
Met with Anatoly Dobrynin upon his return from Moscow when he
confirmed that cultural relations should be intensified.
7. January 18, 1984
Learned from Moscow that eminent Soviet scientists and other
personalities desire to prove they are peace loving. U.S. Ambassador
Hartman (whose children are studying at Tufts University, whose
-3-
presidont is Jean Mayer) had been advised that authorities of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences had confirmed their desire to start more
global scientific cooperation with American and other scholars.
During Ambassador Hartman's absence at the Stockholm Conference, his
counselor Hart phoned the author from Moscow on this date with this
information.
8. January 19, 1984
To assure t at private diplomacy would not be inconsistent with
U.S. governmental aims, the author had been in touch with the State
Depar ment. On this date, Byron Morton, deputy chief of the Soviet
Desk phoned the author in New York to confirm that there were no
objections to private initiatives for peace.
9. January 23, 1984
At 10 am on the day of departure, the author was advised that
our group would not be able to have official contacts with
counterpart scientists in the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Clearly
Kremlin authorrities were not ready to accept private contacts with
leaders of either the Academy or peace committee.
The author queried whether this limitation held also for
Patriarch Pimen, head of the Orthodox Church of Russia, to whom he
had sent a personal letter proposing study of the spiritual trditions
of orthodoxy via the Orthodox Dean of St. Nicholas Cathedral of New
York, who was traveling to Moscow. The Russian consul said he would
inform himself. An hour later he advised us that t'is contact was
forbidden. We would not be picked up at the airport.
The decision was made that the author, Professor Pauling and
-4-
President Mayer (who was officially scheduled to lecture on Friday,
January 27th at the Soviet Academy) would postpone the trip.
Subsequently, a letter to the author from Dobroselsky, head of
the Foreign Relations department of the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R., stated that 'my letter sent from New York on January 21,
1984, to Moscow is of the competence of the governmental organs'. My
letter, written in Russian, had been delivered by hand to Patriarch
Pimen. The reply, also in Russian, from the Academy of Sciences
demonstrated that the head of the Orthodox Church does not represent
a private religious party but is an organ subordinate to political
authority.
10. March 2-3, 1984
At an international conference in Milan on 'Encounter with the
Future', the co-chairman for the Soviet Committee for Science and
Technology, Germen Gvishiani, was scheduled to speak on the plan of
the Soviet Union for 1985-2005. He was unable to attend as his
permission to travel was cancelled. A text which consisted only of
Gvishiani's political introduction was read in his place by an
English professor from Birmingham University.
11. May 13-20, 1984
A telegram to Rome from Yuri Zhukov, editorial writer for Pravda
and President of the Soviet Peace Committee, suggested a meeting with
the author on the occasion of the Dartmouth Conference in the U.S.A.
These conferences have been held alternatively in the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. since 1960. His proposal appeared to suggest a reluctance on
the part of Soviet authorities to break this long standing tradition
-5-
of private exchanges between eminent Americans and Soviet personalities,
many of whom are members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and Peace
Committee.
12. May 10, 1984
At 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 10th, Father Morlion received a visit in
Rome from Peter A. Vares, head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences section
for receiving foreign guests. He told me that we were officially invited
to procede with the research agreement starting October 1984 with a pre-
paratory visit of Prof. Pauling, Prof. Mayer and myself to Moscow. It
is now officially accepted that we open a private channel for peacemaking
on the basis of objective scientific conclusions
-6-
In summary, at this time:
A. The above and related events appear to signal a program of
tighter control over scientific, spiritual and other activities.
Soviet focus appears to be shifting with less dependence on party
ideolgy and more concentration on nationalist oriented fear of
encirclement and nuclear aggression. This is reflected in the
unmonitored queries of Russian youth: 'Is it true that Reagan will
throw bombs on us soon and then we will all be dead?' The
conciliatory character of recent presidential addresses have either
not been described or have been dismissed.
These efforts appear to have been more effective than the
Soviet program to promote official atheism. After two generations the
Soviets have 6 million Orthodox, 5 million Catholics, 2 million
Protestants, 3 million Jews, 50 million Moslems, SO many of whom
stubbornly cling to their religious traditions that 120 million of
the 230 million Soviet citizens claim the right to participate in
religious practices.
B. A number of academic and scientific leaders in the U.S. are
prepared to engage their efforts to utilize private diplomacy to open
dialogue with Soviet citizens. Such dialogue can encourage and in
turn be made more fruitful by a presidential act to arrest nuclear
escalation which would demonstrate confidence in the conscience of
the human family and would help mobilize American and Soviet citizens
in support of such presidential initiative even as it would
contribute to a constructive competition for peace.
MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA
TO: Jack Matlock
+05/22/84 15:05:56
To: Jack Matlock
SECRET
NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
Subject: Forwarding Note 05/22/84 15:02 Father Andrew F. Morlion
I did not put the address on the first copy.
***FORWARDED NOTE***
To: NSGVE --CPUA GEORGE VAN ERON
SECRET
NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Father Andrew F. Morlion
Norman Bailey called today to say he had subject who is Chancellor of
International University of Social Studies in Rome in his office. Father
Morlion apparently has what Norman thinks might be a good idea on the subject
of US-Soviet relations. Norman wanted him to see me. I told Norman it would be
better for him to see you and if you think it is important, I can see him. He
will be in town through Friday. He can be reached at 554-7863. I said you
would see him. Norman suggests it might be useful if Walt Raymond sat in if
you can get schedules to match. Let me know what its all about.
CC: NSFEG --CPUA FLORENCE GANTT
CC: NSFEG --CPUA FLORENCE GANTT
R
@BCLASSPED
to 12001, Sec. 30(b)
Who House Quidalines Fat 24. 1983
BY smp N/
5/29/97
DECLASSIFIED
NLS M02-011
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 10/17/05
4113
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
May 23, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT:
U.S. Attempts to Reach Agreements with Soviets
I am working with State on the unclassified checklist of actions
we have taken in regard to the Soviets, and will be consulting
with Chris and Ron Lehman on the list before I send it up.
However, I believe we should think through the timing and manner
of our release of this information. It will get far greater
attention if we work it into a Presidential speech at an appro-
priate time. If we feed too much out so that it is reported
piecemeal, then we may fall victim of the Scylla of attracting
too little attention, and the Charibdis of having many react to a
Presidential statement as "nothing new." Still, we must stay in
front of the power curve in our public diplomacy.
My initial thought is that it will be useful to start citing some
of the facts to Congress in private briefings, but that we should
hold off on trying to attract publicity for a couple of months
still. Otherwise, we risk the charge this fall that we gave up
too soon, and may find ourselves on the defensive more than
necessary as the campaign heats up. I think a record at this
time of patient quiet effort can in fact pay dividends in Septem-
ber and October.
One upcoming occasion for a Presidential announcement covering
part of our package is the planned meeting of institutions
involved in U.S.-Soviet exchanges the last week in June. A
message to that group from the President could lay out what we
have been attempting in this area, and if we want to maximize
media attention, the President could even invite the group to the
White House for a short meeting. (The fly in this particular
ointment is that the Sakharov situation has prevented us from
moving ahead as we had intended in formally proposing a cultural
exchanges agreement and steps to reactivate some of the coopera-
tive agreements.)
If you can find time, it would be useful to discuss some of these
thoughts.
CC: Chris Lehman
Ron Lehman
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
National Security Council
The White House
I
System #
Package #
84 MAY 21 P 2: 37
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y
Bob Kimmitt
1
K
John Poindexter
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
2
Stuff
Situation Room
I = Information
A= Action
R = Retain
D= Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
:
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Action Matlock
Cut Richmon
Chilman
Memo to RCM due 5/21.
4113
1MSG FROM: NSRMK
CPUA
TO: NSRA
CPUA
05/21/84 13:05:27
To: NSRA CPUA
SECRET
NOTE FROM: Robert M. Kimmitt
Subject: Forwarding Note 05/21/84 12:55 Note to Jack Matlock
print
***FORWARDED NOTE***
To: NSPBT
CPUA
SECRET
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock
While at a "Foreign Policy Day" for two Congressmen this a.m. one of them
mentioned to me that the public needs to have a better appreciation of how far
the President has gone to try to solve problems with the Soviets. She said it
would be useful to have on the public record the several attempts we have made
to reach agreement in arms control and other issues--bilateral, regional and
otherwise. I think there is something to this although there are pitfalls.
Could I ask you to work with Ron Lehman to put together a useable document?
Many thanks
copy to R. Lehman C. Lehman
CC: NSJMP CPUA
NSRMK CPUA
BRCLASSIFIED
12366, Sec. 3.4(b)
House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
smp
NARA, Date 5/29/97