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(United States Information Agency) USIA Conference on Public Diplomacy London (03/03/1986 - 03/04/1986)
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(United States Information Agency) USIA Conference on Public Diplomacy London (03/03/1986 - 03/04/1986)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack: Files
Folder Title: (United States Information Agency)
USIA Conference on Public Diplomacy London
(03/03/1986 - 3/04/1986)
Box: 44
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https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
6/7/2005
File Folder
USIA CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY LONDON
FOIA
MARCH 3-4, 1986
F06-114/13
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
44
4403
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
13617 REPORT
1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT
4
ND
B1
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
[1 -4 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
13618 REPORT
TALKING POINTS ON U.S.-SOVIET
5
B1
RELATIONS
[5 -9 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
13619 CABLE
140004Z FEB 86
2 2/14/1986 B1
[14 15 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
13620 CABLE
271655Z FEB 86
2 2/27/1986 B1
[16 17 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose Information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose Information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
c. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
6/7/2005
File Folder
USIA CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY LONDON
FOIA
MARCH 3-4, 1986
F06-114/13
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
44
4403
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
13621 CABLE
281940Z FEB 86
1 2/28/1986 B1
[19 - 19 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
0
13616 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCDANIEL RE USIA
4 3/18/1986 B1
CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
ND
[21 - 24 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
13622 CABLE
051909Z MAR 86
6 3/5/1986 B1
[25 30 ]
R
5/15/2008
NLRRF06-114/13
13624 REPORT
SAME TEXT AS DOC #13617
4
ND
B1
[34 - 37 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial Information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
c. Closed In accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
6/7/2005
File Folder
USIA CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY LONDON
FOIA
MARCH 3-4, 1986
F06-114/13
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
44
4403
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
13625 REPORT
SAME TEXT AS DOC #13618
5
ND
B1
[38 - 42 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
c
13627 REPORT
1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT
3
ND
B1
F,
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
ONDO'
[45 - 47 ]
R
5/15/2008 NLRRF06-114/13
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose Internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted Invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information complied for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial Institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical Information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
SECRET
1644
1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT
Public Diplomacy Strategy
Regardless of the date ultimately set for the President's
meeting with Gorbachev in the United States, the approach to the
issues in our public diplomacy should build on the success
achieved at the Geneva Summit. The fundamental themes should be
the same: to stress the steadiness and consistency of our policy
and highlight our practical proposals in all four areas of the
agenda and our determination to find common ground wherever
possible. Of course, appropriate adjustments of detail must be
made to take account of developments, possible shifts in the
Soviet position, and the line taken by Soviet spokesmen.
Overall Goals
-- To show that we retain the initiative in guiding the
U.S. -Soviet relationship and prevent public pressure to make
unwise or premature concessions.
-- To use the meeting to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet
leadership to move toward resolution of important problems in an
acceptable manner.
-- To uphold and strengthen the President's role as the
preeminent leader of our Alliances.
U.S. Themes
Our public diplomacy should foster the following basic
perceptions:
1. Summitry is part of a process. The Geneva Summit
established a framework for dialogue. The meeting in the United
States continues that dialogue at the higest level.
-- The dialogue is necessary to manage an adversarial
relationship and give impetus to resolution of outstanding
problems.
-- We must keep expectations realistic. Specifically,
the thrust of our public diplomacy should be to keep the focus on
our four-part agenda - not only arms control - and to redefine
summitry so that lack of specific agreements will not be seen as
failure.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
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BY Cr NARA DATE 5/15/08
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SECRET
-- We aim for fair and effective agreements. Summit
meetings should not be judged by the number of agreements
reached, but by their contribution to managing the relationship
peacefully and constructively.
2. We must deal with the full agenda; no single area can be
treated in isolation. In real life, the areas are interrelated.
The four areas of this agenda are:
a. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and
threat of force in resolving international disputes
b. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass
destruction
C. Building trust and a more cooperative working
relationship
d. Encouraging respect for human rights
3. The United States has made practical proposals in all
these areas. We place no arbitrary or mechanical linkages
between different areas, but recognize that progress in one
facilitates progress in the others. This is simply a fact of
life, not a policy determination.
4. We want the Soviets to see the truth about the U.S. While
the fundamental issues between the U.S. and USSR are real, they
are exacerbated by Soviet misunderstanding of the United States.
Mr. Gorbachev has never visited the U.S. and has numerous
misperceptions of U.S. life and U.S. policy. Therefore, one
important aim of the 1986 Summit is to show Gorbachev the real
U.S. This could lead eventually to a more realistic posture on
his part.
5. The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry Will Not Disappear. The vast
difference in our political systems, values and ideology means
that we will be rivals for the forseeable future. The challenge
is to manage this rivalry in a peaceful fashion. The U.S.
follows a steady policy based on realism, strength and dialogue.
We are prepared to solve problems in a fair and practical
fashion, without the expectation that the Soviet system will
change or the Soviet Union will eventually act as an ally. We
can have a peaceful world even if our systems and ideologies
compete.
6- Consultations with Allie
SECRET
3
- 3 -
SECRET
Soviet Goals
Soviet objectives are to focus attention exclusively on arms
control issues in order to portray themselves as the "peace
party." They will continue to press an array of largely public
initiatives designed to capture headlines and deflect criticism
of other aspects of their policy rather than to solve problems.
They will try to put the U.S. in the position of responding to
their thrusts and thus put pressure on us to make concessions at
the negotiations.
A primary goal of their initiatives is their long-standing
effort to drive wedges between the U.S. and our allies in order
to reap the economical and technical benefits of relaxation of
tensions with the Europeans. The Soviets also want to enhance
their standing as a global power -- an equal of the U.S. in the
world's eye.
Soviet Public Themes
We can expect Moscow to stress the following themes in its
propaganda:
1. The central issue in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is arms
control; all others are secondary.
2. Another Summit meeting would be meaningless unless
agreement can be reached in some important area of arms control.
3. The Soviet Union is sincere in wanting a world without
nuclear weapons, but U.S. policies -- particularly SDI -- block
progress.
4. SDI is inconsistent with nuclear weapons reduction.
5. While the President may be sincere in his expressed
desire to reduce nuclear weapons and create a non-threatening
strategic defense, some of the members of his Administration are
bent on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and
developing a first-strike capability behind the cover of SDI.
6. The U.S., not the USSR, is guilty of using military force
to intervene in other countries.
7. Pressure on "human rights" is both hypocritical -- since
the U.S. is plagued by racism, inequality and poverty -- and also
represents unwarranted interference in Soviet internal affairs.
It is not acceptable as an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations or as a
subject for negotiation.
SECRET
4 -
SECRET
8. The Soviet Union has a vigorous new leadership which
wants peace and cooperation. The U.S., dominated by its
"military-industrial complex," only pays lip service to relaxing
tensions and uses "dialogue" to lull its public.
9. It is up to the U.S. to change its policies in order to
make a more peaceful world possible.
These propaganda themes will likely be accompanied by a show
of resisting U.S. pressure for restraint in the Third World, and
engaging in some public and semi-public gestures designed to show
the Soviets as interested in solving regional disputes, e.g.
Cyprus, the Middle East, and which actually repackage standard
Soviet positions. They will, however, stop short of inviting a
direct confrontation. Arms supplies to Nicaragua, Libya and
Angola, for example, may be stepped up. Although some further
dissidents may be released, this will be done while proclaiming
that human rights is not an issue. Strident propaganda to
"prove" that the U.S. is following militaristic policies and is
covertly involved all over the world will continue.
Countering Soviet Propaganda
The best counter to Soviet propaganda will be a combination
of exposing the facts about Soviet actions and policies and a
vigorous presentation of positive U.S. initiatives and policies.
Criticisms of Soviet actions and policies are most effective when
they do not appear to be strident or examples of knee-jerk
negativism, but reasoned objections to dangerous policies.
Whenever possible, critiques of Soviet actions, proposals and
policies should be accompanied by an explanation of what the U.S.
proposes to deal with the issue. In addition, we should welcome
positive Soviet initiatives as consistent with the spirit of
Geneva and proof of the effectiveness of our approach.
5
SECRET
1644
Talking Points on
U.S. Soviet Relations
A. The Agenda
1. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of
force in resolving international disputes. The use of force to
serve national ends threatens the peace and makes reduction of
arms more difficult.
2. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass
destruction. Nuclear, chemical and -- if they still exist --
bacteriological weapons are the weapons potentially most
destructive of human life. We must move rapidly to reduce
nuclear weapons and ban chemical weapons, with effective
verification. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate all weapons of
mass destruction from the arsenals of all countries, but we
recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely
until conventional weapons are at a balance and at lower levels
and large countries refrain from using force to achieve national
goals.
3. Building trust and a more cooperative working
relationship. High levels of suspicion, fed by isolation,
threaten the peace and make it much more difficult to solve
practical problems. A better working relationship requires the
following:
-- Strict compliance with all agreements.
-- More contact between the peoples of both
countries and better information flow through the
media in both.
-- Frank discussion of our differences, coupled
with a readiness to solve practical problems
fairly.
-- Strict reciprocity of benefit in all
arrangements.
4. Encouraging respect for human rights. Governments
which respect the rights of their own citizens to speak their
minds, to travel and to depart their country if they wish are
less likely to follow aggressive policies than those which
attempt to control every aspect of their citizen's lives. Human
rights is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian issue; it is also
essential to a stable peace.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/13 #13618
SECRET
DECL OADR
BY Cu NARA DATE 5/15/08
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- 2 -
SECRET
B. U.S. Proposals
1. To reduce use and threat of force: The President's
proposal at the UNGA in October, 1985. We are pursuing this
initiative with the Soviets in diplomatic contacts and in a
series of regular consultations on regional issues, and with the
parties in the affected areas.
2. To reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction:
-- Proposal at NST talks for 50% reduction in
strategic offensive nuclear arms.
-- President's February, 1986, proposal for
elimination, over three years, of all U.S. and
Soviet LRINF systems.
-- U.S. proposal to discuss and eventually
negotiate means whereby strategic defense
systems, should they prove feasible, can be
introduced in a cooperative manner to facilitate
the reduction and ultimate elimination of
nuclear weapons.
-- U.S. draft treaty at Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons globally,
with strict verification.
-- Western proposal in MBFR for initial
reductions of conventional forces in Central
Europe and agreement on verification measures
which would subsequently permit reductions to a
common and much lower ceiling.
-- In CDE, western proposals for concrete measures
to reduce risk of surprise attack, war through
miscalculation, and for measures to build
confidence by providing for greater openness in
military movements and deployments.
3. To enhance confidence:
-- U.S. proposals for eliminating violations of
treaty and political commitments.
-- President's initiative for massive increase in
people-to-people contacts and reciprocal access
to media.
SECRET
7
- 3 -
SECRET
-- U.S. proposals for increased cooperation in many
areas, including peaceful use of space, medical
research, environmental research and other
scientific areas.
4. To protect human rights: U.S. has made clear that
development of bilateral U.S. -Soviet relations will depend
importantly on Soviet observance of their political obligations
assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.
C. Countering Soviet Propaganda
The following points should be made in preempting and
responding to Soviet arguments:
-- The President is realistic about the nature of the
Soviet system, but is serious, firm and patient in his desire to
solve concrete problems. Our proposals are designed to get at
those real problems which are amenable to solution; they are
subject to the give-and-take of negotiation so long as our basic
principles are preserved.
-- In contrast, the Soviets are still trying to achieve the
public perception of relaxation without addressing the causes of
tension. There is still too much of "what's mine is mine and
what's yours is negotiable" in their approach.
-- The Soviets seem to desire a world in which the West is
psychologically and physically disarmed, while the Soviet
leadership is free to use its military force to expand whereever
it chooses and to intimidate others. They also wish to establish
as a principle the regime's right to conduct whatever repression
it considers expedient toward its own citizens and those in
countries under its domination.
-- This is not a prescription for a peaceful world, or one
in which democratic values can be preserved. Therefore, it
cannot lead to improved relations with the United States.
-- If the new Soviet leadership is genuinely interested in
reducing tensions and creating a less threatening world in the
future, it will have to address the underlying causes of U.S.-
Soviet tension and work with us to solve as many of the concrete
issues as we can.
-- Summit meetings are important in providing an
opportunity to discuss these issues at the highest level, and to
work on ways to solve them. They are not a "favor" to either
side and must not be subject to preconditions.
-- Whatever policies the Soviets follow, there will be
peace between us, so long as the U.S. maintains its strength and
deterrent capacity. However, we would like more than that. If
SECRET
8
- 4 -
SECRET
this is also the Soviet desire, they will find us willing to
address outstanding issues fairly and realistically, so that we
can establish a more stable and constructive long term
relationship -- as the President called for in his January 1984
speech.
Some "Don'ts
Some arguments should be avoided because the Soviets can use
them either publicly or privately to call into question U.S.
seriousness or to put us at a tactical disadvantage in
negotiations. For these reasons, statements along the following
lines should be avoided when one is either speaking on the record
or on background when the speaker can be quoted as an
Administration official:
1. "Gorbachev was forced to come to Geneva."
(Instead: "The President has restored the balance of
power, and this permits negotiations on a fair and constructive
basis.")
2.
"Our latest proposal will put Gorbachev on the
spot.
(Note: Suggests we are not substantively serious; also
personalizes the issue, which should be discussed on its merits.)
3. "The Soviets will never (pull out of Afghanistan
respect human rights open up their society etc )
(Note: Our stance should be that these things are
possible if the Soviet leaders should desire. Otherwise, we
diminish pressure on the Soviets to move in the right direction
and make our own policies seem unrealistic. Of course, we also
should not predict that these things will happen.)
4. "The Soviet P.R. effort is a threat."
(Note: Ultimately, the effectiveness of Soviet
propaganda will depend on whether there are any real changes in
Soviet policy and actions, particularly if we do our job in
making clear to the public what the facts are. We therefore
have no need for any nervousness or defensiveness. It is far
SECRET
9
- 5 -
SECRET
better to welcome the apparent Soviet interest in influencing
Western opinion and express the hope that it will lead to a
review of those policies which have damaged the Soviet image
abroad.)
5. "We were surprised by the latest Soviet proposal."
(Note: We should never be surprised by Soviet tactical
maneuvering or highly publicized announcements of "new"
proposals. To suggest that we are surprised implies that we are
not prepared to deal promptly with them -- which is not the case.
It is preferable tactically -- and factually more accurate -- to
point out that this is part of the familiar Soviet pattern of
making periodic announcements of policies claimed to be new, but
that we will give it a close look and if we find positive
elements we will follow up at the negotiating table.")
SECRET
10
COUNTERING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. POLICY
Partly as the result of Soviet propaganda, and partly because
of genuine lack of comprehension, a number of unfounded myths are
current in some sections of the U.S. public or foreign publics.
They should be exposed as fallacious at every appropriate
opportunity -- certainly when they are raised in questions or in
published articles. We also should keep them in mind so that in
our own presentations we are careful not to use expressions or
arguments which appear to give them substance.
Attached are suggested talking points to deal with the
following such myths:
1. Current U.S. Policy Is "Detente II"
2. The U.S. and the Soviet Union Act the Same
3. The "Arms Race" is the Primary Threat to Peace
JM 4. "Rhetoric" Is Dangerous
JM 5. U.S. Pursues Artificial Linkages
SES 6. U.S. Seeks Military Superiority
SES 7. SDI Is Enemy of Arms Reduction
S.S 8. U.S. Makes East-West Issues out of Local Conflicts
9. U.S. Views World in Ideological Terms
SS 10. U.S. Thinks Only of Military Solutions
SES 11. U.S. Exaggerates Soviet Threat
JM12. 12. U.S. Aims to Destroy Soviet System
MYTH No. 1
"U.S. POLICY IS DETENTE II"
Response: Our policy is fundamentally different from the policy
of "detente" as it was practiced in the 1970's. In fact, we
have learned some bitter lessons from our experiences in the
1970's and have designed our policy to avoid the manifest
deficiencies of our policy at that time. It is very important to
understand the differences, since some of the elements of current
policy may seem superficially similar.
In practice, if not necessarily always in theory, the detente
policy of the 1970's had the following flaws:
1. Arms control was considered central and other issues
secondary. This led to a neglect of U.S. defenses and de facto
toleration of Soviet efforts to use military means to extend its
influence abroad and to intimidate its neighbors. These Soviet
actions, more than any other, brought an end to detente.
Our current policy rests on the conviction that the U.S. must
retain adequate strength, military and otherwise, to deal
effectively with the Soviet Union, and we have rebuilt that
strength. We also have made it clear that Soviet use of military
force outside its borders cannot be isolated from the prospects
of arms reduction, and that arms control cannot be pursued to the
neglect of other important issues in the relationship.
2. It was assumed that Soviet aggressiveness could be
contained by diplomacy, trade benefits and arms control.
We have no such illusion. Soviet aggressiveness can be
contained only if the Soviet leadership is convinced that
attempts to use military force to extend Soviet influence in the
world is risky and likely to fail. We have made clear that we
will take whatever steps are feasible to support those struggling
for freedom and democracy, and will do all we can to ensure that
Soviet aggression does not succeed. We reject condominium or any
division of the world into spheres of influence. At the same
time, we are prepared to join the Soviet Union in assisting
parties to regional disputes to reach peaceful accommodation, and
would welcome agreements with the Soviet Union to halt the flow
of arms and foreign troops into areas of conflict.
3. It was assumed that an expanding network of ties could
moderate Soviet behavior, and therefore such ties were sometimes
established for presumed atmospheric benefits without close
regard to reciprocity.
While we recognize the importance of ties and communication
in breaking down barriers to personal movement and to the flow of
information, we do not believe that such ties can be expected to
have a direct effect on Soviet policy. Therefore, they should be
established only on the basis of strict reciprocity of benefit.
12
We will not pay a price for "atmosphere."
4. Criticism of the Soviet system and Soviet actions was
muted on the assumption that frank criticism would offend the
Soviet leadership and "spoil the atmosphere."
Our policy is based on realism, which means that we will not
be silent when we find Soviet actions threatening or inconsistent
with peaceful and civilized behavior. We also will not refrain
from defending our values -- even at the height of "detente" the
Soviet leaders proclaimed that the "ideological struggle" must
continue. An improved atmosphere should only be the result of a
genuine reduction of tensions in the world. So long as they
exist, we will not try to pretend that the situation is other
than it is in fact.
Muting our voices when Soviet actions are dangerous,
aggressive or inhuman does not serve the peace or better U.S.-
Soviet relations. Our differences must be clearly understood if
they are to be dealt with successfully. And our publics must not
be misled about the true state of affairs if they are to support
the kind of policies necessary to preserve our freedoms and
protect our Allies.
5. It was assumed that general declarations of intent -- such
as the 1972 Declaration of Principles or the 1973 Agreement on
the Prevention of Nuclear War -- could moderate Soviet behavior
and discourage attempts to seek unilateral advantages.
We understand that general declarations of intent -- which at
best are subject to contradictory interpretations and at worst
can lull Western publics into a false sense of security -- are
rarely constructive unless accompanied by concrete, verifiable
undertakings which alleviate the underlying causes of the
problem.
6. It was assumed that trade ties could act as a restraint on
dangerous behavior, and that subsidized credits and guarantees
were justified.
While we welcome an expansion of trade in non-strategic
goods, we believe it should be conducted under market conditions
and should not receive direct or indirect subsidies from the
American taxpayer.
13
CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE
AGENDA
Monday, March 3, 1986:
0830-0845
Registration.
0900-0915
Welcome and Introduction. (London Charge
d'Affaires Seitz, EU-Mr. Remick)
0915-1015
U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union: Overview of
U.S. Goals and Objectives; Public Diplomacy
Considerations. (Ambassador Matlock)
1015-1030
Coffee.
1030-1200
Arms Control and the Geneva Negotiations:
Response to Gorbachev Proposals, Prospects for
Progress at the NST Negotiations and Other Fora
(CDE, CW, MBFR, Compliance). (NSC-Col. Robert
Linhard, Mr. Steiner; State-Amb. Nitze; DOD-Mr.
Sullivan)
1200-1330
Lunch (Embassy Green Room for PAOs; open for
other participants).
1330-1430
SDI (NSC-Col. Linhard, Mr. Steiner; DOD-Mr.
Sullivan)
1430-1530
Discussion - Regional Issues: Afghanistan and
Other Issues. (NSC-Amb. Matlock)
I
1530-1545
Coffee.
1545-1630
Discussion - Human Rights and Bilateral Issues:
Exchanges, Trade, Etc. (NSC-Amb. Matlock, PAO
Moscow Benson)
1800-2000
Reception Hosted by London PAO Korengold for
Conference Participants and British East/West
Experts (Wives Invited).
Tuesday, March 4, 1986:
0900-0930
USIA Research: European Attitudes on East/West
Issues Post-Geneva. (USIA/PG-Mr. Arnold)
0930-1100
Country Reports: HOW the Geneva Meeting and U.S.
Policy Have Been Perceived in Europe. Specific
Country Concerns. Roundtable moderated by EU-Mr.
Remick; PAO Bonn Catherman followed by PAO Rome
Baldyga; PAO Paris Courtney and PAO London
Korengold will lead off.
1100-1115
Coffee.
1115-1215
Indications of How the USSR May Be Preparing for
the Next "Summit" Meeting in the U.S. -- In
Substantive and Propaganda Terms. (NSC-Amb.
Matlock, PAO Mostow Benson)
1215-1345
Lunch (Open).
1345-1500
Discussion: Summit Public Diplomacy Strategy for
Europe. (NSC-Amb. Matlock, EU-Mr. Remick)
1500-1530
Coffee.
1530-1700
Conclusions and Recommendations. (NSC-Amb.
Matlock, EU-Mr. Remick)
CONF IDENT
mattack
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
10-Con
PAGE #1
USIA WASHDC ฿398
DTG:149004Z FEB 86 PSN: 819177
EOBB05
AN019178
TOR: 045/0012Z
CSN:EHA732
2. STATE/EUR FULLY SUPPORTS THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS
CONFERENCE AND WILL TAKE PART. UNFORTUNATELY, BUDGETARY
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-91 MAN-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 /004 A2
CONSTRAINTS PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATION BY
STATE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO NATO POSTS IN THIS MEETING. PAOS,
THEREFORE, SHOULD COORDINATE WITH THEIR STATE COUNTERPARTS AT
WRTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
POST BEFORE TRAVELING TO LONDON so THAT THEY MAY REPRESENT
SIT:
THEIR MISSIONS' VIEWS AT THE CONFERENCE.
EOB:
3. WASHINGTON PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE WILL INCLUDE
AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND SENIOR DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS,
OP IMMED /ROUTINE
NSC, WHO WILL CHAIR THE CONFERENCE; MARLIN V. REMICK, DEPUTY
DE RUEHIA #0398/01 0450006
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, USIA; LYNN PASCOE,
0 R 140004Z FEB 86
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS, STATE; PETER
FM USIA WASHDC
M. SULLIVAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL
TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2615
POLICY (OSD/ISP); AND STEVEN E. STEINER, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 2831
PROGRAMS AND ARMS CONTROL, NSC.
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1601
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 3959
4. A WORKING AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE FOLLOWS. POSTS ARE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 4094
INVITED TO PROVIDE COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS ON THE AGENDA BY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 7123
FEBRUARY 19.
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5407
MARCH 3, 1986
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9004
9:00-9:15
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION.
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3320
9:15-10:15
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION: THE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9709
AGENDA; ALLIED INTERESTS; RELATIONSHIP TO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4169
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 7120
BETTER UNDERSTANDING IN EUROPE OF U.S. POLICY.
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4783
10:15-10:30
COFFEE.
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4963
10:30-11:30
DISCUSSION SDI.
AMEMBASSY ANKARA. IMMEDIATE 2292
11:30-12:30 DISCUSSION ARMS CONTROL: IMPACT OF
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1559
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS ON
BT
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 USIA 10398
USIA
STATE FOR EUR/SOV LPASCOE
NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/STEINER
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP SKOCH
EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F.KORDEK, DIRECTOR/EU
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S.PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, MARCH
3-4 IN LONDON
1. USIA/EU WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE NSC WILL SPONSOR A PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY PLANNING CONFERENCE IN LONDON MARCH 3-4 FOR THE
NATO COUNTRY PAOS. THE CONFERENCE WILL ADDRESS HOW TO CONVEY
MORE EFFECTIVELY TO OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
PUBLICS THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA FOR U.S. /SOVIET RELATIONS,
PARTICULARLY LOOKING FORWARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S NEXT MEETING
DECLASSIFIED
WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. PAOS AT ADDRESSEE POSTS
SHOULD PLAN TO ATTEND AND BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IDEAS FOR
ACHIEVING GREATER ALLIED UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. POLICY GOALS
AND OBJECTIVES, GREATER RECOGNITION OF THE DEEP-SEATED
NLRR FO6-114/13 #13619
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, AND GREATER ALLIED
UNITY IN ADDRESSING SOVIET POSITIONS AND POSTURING. PAOS
BY Cil NARADATE 5/15/08
ALSO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEIR HOST COUNTRIES'
PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVES ON U.S-SOVIET RELATIONS AND HOW TO
ADDRESS THEM MOST EFFECTIVELY, INCLUDING HOW WASHINGTON CAN
BEST SUPPORT THEM IN THIS EFFORT.
CONFIDENTIAL
is
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE #1
USIA WASHDC #398
DTG:140004Z FEB 86 PSN:#19182
AN015177
TOR: 045/8014Z
CSN:EHA733
FOR THE NEXT 'SUMMIT' MEETING IN THE US - IN
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROPAGANDA TERMS.
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 /004 A2
12:15-13:45
LUNCH (OPEN).
13:45-15:00
DISCUSSION: SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
--
FOR EUROPE.
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
15:00-15:30
COFFEE.
SIT:
15:30-17:00 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
EOB:
5. ACTION REQUESTED: ADDRESSEE PAOS ARE ASKED TO CONFIRM
THEIR PARTICIPATION BY CABLE TO EU AND USIS LONDON. TRAVEL
ITINERARIES AND HOTEL ROOM REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE SLUGGED
OP IMMED /ROUTINE
ACTION USIS LONDON INFO EU. (FYI - CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
DE RUEHIA #0398/02 0450009
WILL BE HOUSED AT THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL AT POUNDS sø FOR A
0 R 140004Z FEB 86
SINGLE AND POUNDS 65 FOR A DOUBLE ROOM). POSTS ARE
FM USIA WASHDC
AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE TRAVEL ORDERS FOR THIS TDY AND CHARGE
THEIR GOE FOR TRAVEL AND PER DIEM. EU WILL REIMBURSE USIS
TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2616
POSTS FOR ONE HALF OF THE TOTAL COST OF TRAVEL AND PER DIEM.
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 2832
WHEN ACTUAL COSTS ARE KNOWN, PLEASE NOTIFY M/CBEU AND REQUEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1602
REIMBURSEMENT. (EU)
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 3960
WICK
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 4ø95
BT
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 7124
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5408
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9005
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3321
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9710
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4170
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 7121
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4784
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4964
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 2293
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1560
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 USIA 1ø398
USIA
STATE FOR EUR/SOV LPASCOE
NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/STEINER
DEFENSE FOR OSD/TSP SKOCH
EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F.KORDEK, DIRECTOR/EU
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE GENEVA NST TALKS. PROSPECTS FOR
SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS.
12:30-14:00 LUNCH (OPEN).
14:00-15:00
DISCUSSION -- REGIONAL ISSUES.
15:00-15:30
DISCUSSION -- HUMAN RIGHTS: CSCE, BERN HUMAN
CONTACTS MEETING, PROSPECTS FOR VIENNA CSCE
REVIEW CONFERENCE.
15:30-15:45
COFFEE.
15:45-16:30
DISCUSSION -- BILATERAL ISSUES: EXCHANGES,
TRADE, AIR SAFETY, ETC.
18:00-20:00
RECEPTION HOSTED BY LONDON PAO KORENGOLD FOR
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AND BRITISH EAST/WEST
Dinner EXPERTS. w/Rohert Kleiman
MARCH 4, 1986
9:05-9:35
USIA RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARIZING EUROPEAN
ATTITUDES ON EAST/WEST ISSUES POST-GENEVA.
9:38-11:59
COUNTRY REPORTS: HOW THE GENEVA MEETING AND US
POLICY HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED IN EUROPE.
11:00-11:15 COFFEE.
11:15-12:15
INDICATIONS OF HOW THE USSR MAY BE PREPARING
CONFTDENTIAL
16
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01
USIA WASHDC 3909
DTG: 271655Z FEB 86 PSN: 848660
SIT358
TOR: 058/17122
(AMBASSADOR MATLOCK).
10:15-10:30 COFFEE.
DISTRIBUTION: MATL /801
10:30-12:00 ARMS CONTROL AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS:
RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV PROPOSALS, PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS AT
THE NST NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER FORA (CDE, CW, MBFR,
COMPLIANCE). INSC - COL. ROBERT LINHARD, MR. STEINER, STATE
OP IMMED
AMBASSADOR NITZE, DOD MR. SULLIVAN).
STU7402
12:00-13:30 LUNCH (FREE).
DE RUEHIA #3909/01 #581657
BT
0 2716552 FEB 86
FM USIA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1741
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2647
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 2869
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 4B1B
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 4134
AMEMBASSY ERUSSELS IMMEDIATE 7193
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5464
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9198
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3418
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9805
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4225
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 7226
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4853
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 5015
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 238B
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1566
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 USIA 13909
USIA
STATE FOR STATE/EUR/SOV AND STATE/PA
NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/LINHARD/STEINER/SMALL
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP PSULLIVAN/SKOCH
EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F. KORDEK, DIR., EU
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE
EAST/WEST RELATIONS)
REFERENCE: USIA 18398
1. THE FINAL SCHEDULE FOR THE CONFERENCE FOLLOWS IN PARA
2. FIRST DAY'S FORMAT WILL BE TO DISCUSS THE U.S. APPROACH
TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOCUSING PARTICULARLY ON
EUROPEAN CONCERNS AND PERCEPTIONS -- OR MISPERCEPTIONS --
ABOUT U.S. POLICY. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WOULD BE
PARTICULARLY USEFUL FOR PAOS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE
POLITICAL SECTION OF THEIR MISSIONS, TO IDENTIFY KEY 'MYTHS'
ABOUT U.S. POLICY WHICH NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IN OUR PUBLIC
DECLASSIFIED
DIPLOMACY STRATEGY. THE SECOND DAY WILL BE DEVOTED TO
CRAFTING SUCH A STRATEGY TAILORED TO ADDRESSING EUROPEAN
QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS BASED ON THE FIRST DAY'S DISCUSSIONS.
PAOS SHOULD REVIEW STATE #49461 AND STATE 056019 FOR
NLRR F06-114/13 * 13620
BACKGROUND ON THE U.S. APPROACH TO SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL
BY
NARA
ISSUES.:
DATE
5/15/08
2. SCHEDULE:
MARCH 3, 1986
9:00-9:15 WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION. (LONDON DCM SEITZ, EU -
MR. REMICK).
9:15-10:15 U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION: OVERVIEW OF
U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES; PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONSIDERATIONS.
CONFIDENTIAL
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01
USIA WASHDC 3909
DTG:271655Z FEB 86 PSN: 048661
SIT359
TOR: 058/17132
FOR EUROPE. (NSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, EU - MR. REMICK).
15:00-15:30 COFFEE.
DISTRIBUTION: MATL /801
15:30-17:00 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. (NSC
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, EU - MR. REMICK). (EU)
WICK
BT
OP IMMED
STU7403
DE RUEHIA #3909/02 0581659
0 271655Z FEB 86
FM USIA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1742
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2648
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 2870
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 4011
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 4135
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 7194
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 5465
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9199
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 3419
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 9807
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4226
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 7227
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4854
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 5016
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 2381
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1567
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 USIA 13909
USIA
STATE FOR STATE/EUR/SOV AND STATE/PA
NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/LINHARD/STEINER/SMALL
DEFENSE FOR OSD/ISP PSULLIVAN/SKOCH
EO 12356 DECL: OADR JOHN F. KORDEK, DIR., EU
13:35-14:30 SDI: (NSC - COL. LINHARD, MR. STEINER AND DOD
MR. SULLIVAN.)
14:30-15:38 DISCUSSION -- REGIONAL ISSUES: AFGHANISTAN AND
OTHER ISSUES. ONSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK).
15:30-15:45 COFFEE.
15:45-16:38 DISCUSSION -- HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES
EXCHANGES, TRADE, ETC.) (NSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PAO
MOSCOW BENSON).
18:00-20:00 RECEPTION HOSTED BY LONDON PAO KORENGOLD FOR
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AND BRITISH EAST/WEST EXPERTS.
MARCH 4, 1986
9:05-9:39 USIA RESEARCH: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON EAST/WEST
ISSUES POST-GENEVA. WSIA/PG . MR. ARNOLD).
9:30-11:00 COUNTRY REPORTS: NOW THE GENEVA MEETING AND US
POLICY HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED IN EUROPE. SPECIFIC COUNTRY
CONCERNS. ROUNDTABLE MODERATED BY EU - MR. REMICK; PAO BONN
CATHERMAN FOLLOWED BY PAD ROME BALDYGA, PAO PARIS COURTNEY
AND PAO LONDON KORENGOLD WILL LEAD OFF.
11:00-11:15 COFFEE.
11:15-12:15 INDICATIONS OF NOW THE USSR MAY BE PREPARING FOR
THE NEXT 'SUMMIT' MEETING IN THE US - IN SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROPAGANDA TERMS. (NSC - AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PAO MOSCOW
BENSON).
12:15-13:45 LUNCH (FREE).
13:45-15:00 DISCUSSION: SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY
18
CONF DENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
London
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
USIA WASHDC 2467
DTG: 220831Z FEB 86 PSN: 035737
EOB284
AN004614
TOR: 053/0834Z
CSN: EHA850
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 /003 A2
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:
ROUTINE
DE RUEHIA *2467 053ø833
R 220831Z FEB 86
FM USIA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON 1682
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
CONF I DE NTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USIA 12467
USIA
LONDON FOR USIS; STATE FOR EUR/SOV: LPASCOE;
NSC FOR MATLOCK, STEINER, MANDEL
EO 12356 N/A
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, MARCH 3-4 IN
LONDON
REFERENCE: USIA 10398 (C)
1. WASHINGTON/LONDON ITINERARY FOR CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS
AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK, STEVEN STEINER AND JUDYT MANDEL OF
THE NSC AND LYNN PASCOE OF STATE/EUR/SOV IS AS FOLLOWS:
MARCH 1
LV DULLES AT 6: 45 PM VIA PA 106
MARCH 2
ARR LONDON (HEATHROW) AT 6:45 AM
2. STEINER AND MANDEL WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON MARCH 5.
THEIR LONDON/WASHINGTON ITINERARY FOLLOWS:
a
MARCH 5
DEP LONDON (HEATHROW) AT 1:45 PM VIA PA 107
MARCH 5
ARR DULLES AT 5: 10 PM.
3. AMBASSADOR MATLOCK WILL RETURN TO WASHINGTON ON MARCH 6.
HIS LONDON/WASHINGTON ITINERARY FOLLOWS:
MARCH 6
LV LONDON (HEATHROW) AT 1:45 PM VIA PA 107
MARCH 6
ARR DULLES AT 5: 10 PM.
4. REQUEST A SINGLE ROOM FOR AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AT THE
CUMBERLAND HOTEL FOR THE NIGHTS OF MARCH 2, 3, 4, 5.
5. REQUEST SINGLE ROOMS FOR STEINER, MANDEL AND PASCOE AT
THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL FOR THE NIGHTS OF MARCH 2, 3, 4.
6. WILL ADVISE CONCERNING PASCOE' S ONWARD TRAVEL VIA
SEPTEL. (EU)
WICK
BT
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By CDS NARA, Date 8/20/02
CONF IDENTIAL
19
CONFIDENTIAI
NSTGENEVA 002032
ACTICA: PCL-10 INFO: AME DCM PAO PCI/L POLAD-2 ECON-6 SCI FIN
DAO SUSLC A/COUNS CCA/28
VZCZCIDO718
28-FEB-86 TOR: 19:44
00 RUEHLD
CN: 64764
DE RUFHGV #2032 0591941
CHRG: STA
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
DIST: POL
C 2819402 FEB 86
FM USDEL NSI GENEVA
TC RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3803
'INFC RUEHID/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRICRITY 0147
BT
CONFIDENTIAL NST GENEVA 02032
FROM INF AMEASSADOR GLITMAN
Matloch
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, INF, NST, START, UK, UR, US
SUBJECT: UK-U.S. CONSUITATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL
REFS: (A) NST GENEVA 1691, (B) LONDON 4020
F4/
1. CCNEIDENTIAL- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER REF B. AMBASSADOR GLITMAN WILL BE IN LONDON
MARCH 10 TO CONSUIT WITH UK ON INF.
3. INF NEGCTIATING GROUP HAS PREPARED A SUMMARY OF
EXCERPTS (SIIGHTLY SANITIZED TO DELETE DATES) OF HOW THE
SCVIETS HAVE TREATED THE UK/FRENCH ISSUE IN THEIR
STATEMENTS HERE SINCE INTRODUCING THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL
INTC THE NEGOTIATIONS JANUARY 16. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD
BE USEFUL TC PROVIDE THE BRITISH WITH SUCH A SUMMARY IN
ADVANCE CF THE UK-SOVIET BILATERALS.
4. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE FOR
AMBASSADOR GIITMAN TO PROVIDE THE BRITISH WITH SUCH
A SUMMARY DURING HIS VISIT ON MARCH 10. KAMPELMAN
BT
#2032
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL NSTGENEVA 002032
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/13 # 13621
BY Cut NARADATE 5/15/08
UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
Fte
PAGE #1
LONDON 3869
DTG: 211828Z FEB 86 PSN: #41863
SIT824
TOR: 552/18542
AT LEAST 1: " P. M. AND PERHAPS LATER ON DAY OF
ARRIVAL.
DISTRIBUTION: SMAL /091
4. PAO IS NOSTING COMMUNITY BREAKFAST SUNDAY
MORNING, MARCH 2, AT PAO RESIDENCE, 139 GLOUCESTER
OP IMMED
ROAD, SW7 (TWO BLOCKS FROM GLOUCESTER ROAD TUBE
DE RUEHLD 83869 #521828
STATION AND EN ROUTE BETWEEN THE AIRPORT AND THE
0 211828Z FEB 86
CUMBERLAND HOTEL) FOR PARTICIPANTS AWAITING ACCESS
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO THEIR ROOMS THAT DAY. FOR PLANNING, WOULD
APPRECIATE AN ALERT IF YOU PLAN TO-STOP BY.
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5897
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE #931
KORENGOLD
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 2294
BT
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7168
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 0361
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4153
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 4326
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5400
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1931
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 3560
AMEMBASSY MOSCOV IMMEDIATE 9452
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6932
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4475
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 5402
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE #357
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4919
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2420
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS LONDON #3869
USIA
USIA FOR EU/KORDEK; STATE FOR EUR/SOV LPASCOE;
NSC FOR MATLOCK/MANDEL/STEINER; DEFENSE FOR
OSD/ISP SKOCH
EO 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN
EUROPE, MARCH 3-4 IN LONDON
REF: USIA 10398-C
1. BECAUSE A NUMBER OF YOU WILL BE COMING EARLY
OR STAYING AFTER THE MARCH 3-4 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
CONFERENCE, AND MAY WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
LONDON'S THEATER OFFERINGS, WE HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS
WITH THOMAS cooK, WHO ARE LOCATED IN THE EMBASSY,
AT 499-9599, EXT. 2707, TO ACCEPT DIRECT TELEPHONED
REQUESTS FROM PARTICIPANTS DESIRING THEATER TICKETS.
BOOKINGS CAN BE DONE BY PROVISION OF CREDIT CARD
NUMBER, ADDRESS, AND EXPIRY DATE.
2. USIS LONDON REGRETS, HOWEVER, THAN IT CANNOT,
IN MOST CASES, PROVIDE TRANSPORT TO AND FROM THE
AIRPORT. LOCAL TRANSPORTATION IS READILY AVAILABLE
BY TAXI. THE TUBE WITH A TRANSFER) OR THE AIRBUS
NAVE STOPS AT MARBLE ARCH, WHICH IS QUITE NEAR TO
THE CUMBERLAND NOTEL, WHERE MOST CONFERENCE
PARTICIPANTS WILL BE STAYING.
3. BE FOREWARNED ALSO THAT, UNLESS BOOKING IS
DESIRED FOR THE PREVIOUS NIGHT, AT FULL COST,
NOTEL ROOMS PROBABLY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL
21
JME
2169
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
March 18, 1986
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK 008/5004
SUBJECT:
USIA Conference on Public Diplomacy
As you know, USIA conducted a conference of PAO's in NATO
countries in London March 3-4. The purpose was to discuss public
diplomacy strategy for dealing with East-West issues in Allied
countries.
The telegrams reporting on the conference proceedings are at
Tab I. Those of us participating came away with the following
impressions of European attitudes:
1. An attitude that both superpowers act very much alike (i.e.,
something close to the "moral equivalence" thesis) is an
important sentiment in all the countries with the possible
exception of France. It underlies many of our political problems
in obtaining Allied consensus on specific issues, especially
those involving conflict out of the NATO area.
2. The Geneva Summit had a major impact in all countries, with
approval of U.S. handling of East-West issues rising everywhere.
Coupled with this, however, was a rise in approval of Soviet
foreign policy. In Italy, for example, Gorbachev's "approval
ratings" rose more than Reagan's, although the President remains
far ahead of Gorbachev. (This suggests, by the way, that we face
a PR problem in Europe if the Summit this year does not
materialize.)
3. At the moment, Allied cohesion on most arms control issues is
solid. Our consultations on Gorbachev's January 15 proposals
(which were received skeptically in Europe to begin with)
succeeded brilliantly. (This shows, by the way, the value of
intensive consultations, particularly when they result in some
shift of the U.S. position in response to Allied comments.)
4. Nevertheless, lurking under the surface are problem areas:
a. Some polls indicate that skepticism toward SDI seems to
be growing among the broad publics in Europe. It is difficult,
however, to interpret the polling evidence since much depends on
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NLRR F06-114/10*13616
BY Cil NARA DATE 5/15/08
22
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- 2 -
the way the question is asked. It is probably more relevant to
note that SDI is not a front-burner issue in Europe, and a
relatively quiet, systematic educational approach seems
preferable in dealing with it since there seems no good reason to
make it a high profile issue in Europe.
b. In some countries (the UK for example) there is disquiet
about our refusal to enter into negotiations on a CTB. (This is
not the same as pressure to join the Soviet-proposed moratorium;
the British, for example, oppose that, but advocate agreeing to
resume negotiations on a cTB. In general, anti-nuclear sentiment
is particularly strong in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and on the
left side of the political spectrum in Germany.)
5. As noted, public criticism of U.S. policy tends to be greatest
in regard to regional conflicts. In most countries (France,
again, is an exception), Afghanistan gets little attention, while
U.S. policy in Central America is the object of widespread
criticism. (The feeling was that we are limited in what we can
do directly to swing the sentiment regarding Central America; for
this, the most persuasive spokesmen will be persons from the
area. We should think more about getting our friends in Central
America to put the case more actively in Europe. As for
Afghanistan, we clearly need steps to get more news of Soviet
actions there into the European media.)
6. France, in many ways the exception to these general trends,
presents one of the brightest pictures in Europe, in terms of
public attitudes. In recent years, there has been a decided
swing of French intellectual sentiment to a more anti-Soviet and
pro-American position. Raymond Aron is the intellectual hero of
much French youth, and the non-Communist left is bitterly
critical of the Soviet Union. This is a reversal of French
intellectual attitudes from those prevalent just after World War
II. In the past, French intellectual currents have been the
precursors of those which sweep through intellectual circles in
Europe as a whole. We can only hope that this will prove true in
the future as well.
Bearing in mind these general conclusions regarding the
substantive job to be done, we also came away with the following
impressions of USIA's capacity to deal with them in the field:
1. The meeting was definitely needed; most PAO's were not solidly
familiar with important nuances of our current policy,
particularly in regard to arms control issues. Their questioning
reflected this, and we were able to give them solid guidance
across the spectrum of East-West issues. For this, the
participation of Linhard, Steiner and Mandel -- backed up by DOD
representatives -- was absolutely essential. The USIA officials
present were unable to cope with the questions, and indeed, had
to be corrected at times on important points.
CONFIDENTIAL
23
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- 3 -
2. The PAO's, except for Korengold, were not aware of the need
for factoring possible Presidential activity into their plans for
local treatment of issues. (Example: the possibility of
arranging, from time to time, written Presidential interviews in
the local media, designed both to deal with important issues in
the country in question and to be replayed elsewhere.) They were
encouraged to think in advance how Washington involvement to
strengthen their programs and plan media coverage pro-actively.
Karna Small was particularly effective in advising on techniques
and approaches which draw on White House experience, and make use
of the support we can offer.
3. Few seemed to have taken a forward look at attitudes in their
countries, and developed a long-term strategy to deal with it.
Since some fundamental attitudes can only be changed over time, a
comprehensive and persistent program is necessary. USIA will be
tasking such plans shortly, and the PAO's were asked to start
thinking about them.
The following specific taskings were developed at the conference,
or are being discussed currently with USIA as a result of the
conference:
1. The NSC staff will develop talking points on the most
prevalent "myths" about U.S. policy for use in the field. A
preliminary version of these points was presented at the
conference, and PAO's were instructed to add myths current
locally to the list so that we can provide appropriate guidance.
2. USIA, working with State Public Affairs, will refine our
current list of speakers available for particular topics, and
will add to this an indication of relevant foreign language
capability. (In some countries there is a great need for
speakers who can deal with the issues in the local language --
particularly effective for TV interviews, for example. We may
not be able to help out much with Icelandic, Danish and Dutch,
but we should be able to find some who can handle French, German,
Spanish or Italian.)
3. We will take another look at the problem of encouraging
friendly representatives from Latin America to be more active in
spreading the public diplomacy message in Europe. Attention has
been given to this in the past, but results so far have been
meager. (It is a major problem; one of the first things the
Soviets and their clients do is to organize major public efforts
utilizing local people -- just look at how much more active the
Sandinistas are in Europe than the Costa Ricans, Hondurans and
Salvadorans. We clearly need to do more to get our friends to go
out front.)
4. Detailed public affairs guidance on dealing with the
Washington Summit will be issued as soon as the Summit date is
CONFIDENTIAL
24
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- 4 -
set. (A draft was sent up for approval February 28 -- package
number 1644.)
5. We are now discussing with USIA the terms of tasking PAO's
formally to develop local long-term strategies for dealing with
the underlying misconceptions regarding U.S. handling of East-
West issues.
USIA tells me that feed-back from the conference from PAO's has
been very positive. Several commented to Kordek, the USIA
Assistant Director for Europe, that it was the most useful of
recent USIA conferences since it focussed on substantive issues
rather than the nuts and bolts which usually dominate USIA
conferences.
n.e.
n.e.
n.e.
Small, Linhard, Mandel and Steiner concur.
Attachment:
Tab I -- USIA cables reporting on the conference.
CC: Walt Raymond
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05/19132
SINGLE ASPECT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP, SUCH AS
ARMS CONTROL, AND GIVE IT PRIORITY OVER ALL
ACTION OFFICE SPEC-B4
HANDLED AS SPECDIS
OTHERS. THE U.S. FOUR-POINT AGENDA DEFINES
INFO 1884 A3 1
THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE
USSR:
0 #51989Z MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
-- ELIMINATING THE SOVIET USE OF MILITARY
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE #9#9
FORCE TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE.
ST
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION $1 OF #6 LONDON #4778
-- THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF
MEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
USIA
-- IMPROVING THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP AND
FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK
CONFIDENCE.
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
-- SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS. THE SOVIET HUMAN
RIGHTS RECORD WILL INFLUENCE THE DEGREE OF
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
CONFIDENCE VE CAN HAVE THAT SOVIETS WILL CARRY
IN EUROPE
OUT THEIR COMMITMENTS IN OTHER AREAS.
1. SUMMARY: THE FIRST DAY OF THE CONFERENCE
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK TOOK ISSUE WITH SOME OF THE
ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLONACY IN EUROPE FOCUSED ON
MOST PROMINENT MYTHS EUROPEANS AND OTHERS HOLD
THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIMENSIONS OF U.S. POLICY
ABOUT THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, AMONG
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, ARMS CONTROL, SDI,
THEM: THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION AS
REGIONAL ISSUES, AND NUMAN RIGHTS. AMBASSADOR
SUPERPOWERS TEND TO ACT THE SAME; THAT THE
MATLOCK PROVIDED CONTEXT FOR THE DAY'S
ARMS RACE IS THE PRIMARY THREAT TO PEACE; THAT
DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS REVIEW OF U.S. POLICIES
RHETORIC AND PUBLIC CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION PREMISED ON THE BELIEF
UNION IS IN ITSELF DANGEROUS.
THAT EUROPEAN MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT AMERICAN
POLICIES ON MANY ISSUES DERIVE FROM BASIC
DURING DISCUSSION, NE POINTED OUT THAT THE
MISPERCEPTIONS OF U.S. APPROACHES TO THE
U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD SUMMIT MEETINGS HAD NOT
SOVIET UNION. AMBASSADOR NITZE DISCUSSED
BT
PROBLEMS WITH THE LATEST SOVIET ARMS PROFE ALS
#4778
AND PROVIDED THE RATIONALE FOR THE PRESIDENT $
RECENT RESPONSE. THE CONFERENCE CLOSED WITH A
SECOND DAY'S DISCUSSION OF USIA RESEARCH ON
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON EAST-WEST ISSUES,
DISCUSSION OF NOW THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARING
FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT,- AND U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE
MEETING. END SUMMARY.
2. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION:
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK OPENED THE CONFERENCE WITH
COMMENTS ABOUT EUROPEAN MISPERCEPTIONS OF A
86 MAR
VARIETY OF U.S. POLICIES THAT DERIVE
FUNDAMENTALLY FROM MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT U.S.
cre
POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. ME NOTED
THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES OFTEN TAKE A
PAROCHIAL VIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WHILE
THE U.S. MUST HAVE A BROADER OUTLOOK. ME SAID
ME FELT THE U.S. HAD MADE PROGRESS DURING THE
PAST TWO-THREE YEARS IN CORRECTING SOME OF
THESE MISPERCEPTIONS.
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK BRIEFLY CONSIDERED THE U.S.
POSITION AS VE MOVE TOWARD THE NEXT SUMMIT
MEETING. ME EMPHASIZED THE U.S. VIEW THAT
DECLASSIFIED
U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS CAN HAVE A SUCCESSFUL
MEETING, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL
SECRETARY GORBACHEV DID IN NOVEMBER, WITHOUT NECES-
NLRR Fob-114/15
SARILY SIGNING AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT. THE REAL
ACHIEVEMENT OF GENEVA WAS PUTTING A FRAMEWORK IN
PLACE FOR FUTURE CONTACTS AND NEGOTIATIONS, AT
BY Cu NARADATE 5/15/08
VARIOUS LEVELS.
SUMMIT MEETINGS SHOULD DEAL WITH THE ENTIRE
1
RANGE OF ISSUES IN THE U.S. -SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP. THEY SHOULD NOT ISOLATE A
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##5#45 ICA603
005045 ICA603
05/19142
OFFER ON THE OFFENSIVE WEAPONRY SIDE, THEIR
INF PROPOSALS ARE UNACCEPTABLE, AND THEY HAVE
ACTION OFFICE SPEC-04
HANDLED AS SPECDIS
SAID NOTHING ABOUT STRATEGIC WEAPONS. WE WANT
INFO 1984 A3 1
TO TALK TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE OFFENSIVE-
DEFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP, ME SAID, AND WE WANT AN
0 #519#92 MAR 86
"OFFENSIVE TREATY as SOLID AS THE ABM TREATY."
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8916
NITZE THEN TURNED TO THE WENRKUNDE CONFERENCE,
07
WHICH ME MAD ATTENDED OVER THE WEEKEND. NE
CONFIDENTIA 1 SECTION #2 OF #6 LONDON 84778
SAID THAT MANY ALLIED SPOKESMEN THERE WERE
SKEPTICAL OF THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION IN BOTH INF
USIA
AND STRATEGIC FORCES. GERMAN MOD WOERNER,
ACCORDING TO NITZE, FULLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT
FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK
REAGAN'S PROPOSAL. WOERNER FURTHERMORE SEES
OTHER WAYS, BESIDES INF, OF "COUPLING" THE
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
U.S. TO WESTERN EUROPE.
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AMBASSADOR NITZE CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION
IN EUROPE
WITH A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND
AMERICAN PROPOSALS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INF,
CHANGED: THE UNITED STATES STILL WANTED A
AND AN ANALYSIS OF GORBACHEV'S MARATHON SPEECH
WELL-PREPARED MEETING, BUT FELT THAT THERE
TO THE PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH ME FOUND
SHOULD BE NO PRECONDITIONS SUCH AS
PREDICTABLE AND STALE.
REQUIREMENTS FOR AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE. THERE
WAS ALSO DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER THE FORTHCOMING
COL. ROBERT LINHARD, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR
SUMMITS WOULD LEAD WESTERN PUBLICS TO EXPECT
DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND ARMS CONTROL AT THE NSC,
ANNUAL MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS
ALSO NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATIONS
TO BE a PERMANENT FIXTURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
AMONG THE ALLIES AND DESCRIBED THE NSC'S
AGENDA AND WHETHER THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.
EXPLANATION OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY TO THE U.S. CONGRESS.
3. ARMS CONTROL AND THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS:
NE DISCUSSED THE THREE QUESTIONS ON INF MOST
COMMONLY POSED BY AMERICAN REPORTERS: ARE THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
AMBASSADOR NITZE SPOKE ON THE U.S. RESPONSE TO
BT
GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS FOR THE
#4778
ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. ME EMPHASIZED THE VALUE OF AMERICA'S
CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AND CALLED THEM
"A COMPLETE SUCCESS." AS A RESULT OF THESE
CONSULTATIONS, ME ADDED, "THE ALLIES ARE WITH
US AND THE ALLIANCE IS STRONGER."
AMBASSADOR NITZE SAID NIS CONSULTATIONS WITH
OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES SHOWED THAT THEIR INTERPRETATION
OF THE SOVIETS' JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS COINCIDED
WITH OUR OWN. THE EUROPEANS EXPRESSED CONCERN
OVER THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF INF WHILE A SOVIET
PREPONDERANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES STILL
EXISTS. BRITISH AND FRENCH OFFICIALS
REITERATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO ANY PROPOSAL
THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE ABOLITION OF THEIR
INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENTS. TAKING THESE
CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT, THE PRESIDENT IN HIS
RESPONSE TO MOSCOW INSISTED THAT SEVERAL STEPS
MUST BE COMPLETED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE
USSR BEFORE THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENTS
MIGHT BE BROUGHT INTO THE NEGOTIATING EQUATION.
CTS, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR NITZE, STILL
PROVOKES DEBATE IN SOME QUARTERS. POWERFUL
ELEMENTS IN SEVERAL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS
CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE CT8. IT IS U.S. POLICY,
SAID NITZE, TO GO ON TESTING AS LONG AS WE
MUST RELV ON NUCLEAR MEAPONS. FOR A VARIETY
OF REASONS, THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE TO RELY so
EXTENSIVELY ON TESTING.
IN REGARD TO SDI, NITZE NOTED THAT THE U.S.
WILL NOT AT THIS TIME NEGOTIATE IT. THE
SOVIETS, BE SAID, HAVE NOT MADE AN ATTRACTIVE
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085947 ICA608
#5/19202
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, RECALLING A CABLE POSTS HAD
PROVIDED IN LATE 1985 ON SDI, SUGGESTED
ACTION OFFICE SPEC-B4 HANDLED AS SPECDIS
THE TIME was RIPE FOR AN UPDATE WITH POSTS'
INFO /894 A3 1
CURRENT VIEW ON NOW PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE SDI
NAD EVOLVED.
0 #51989Z MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
5. REGIONAL ISSUES:
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0911
ST
a SECTION #3 OF #6 LONDON 64778
MATLOCK OPENED THIS SESSION WITH A DISCUSSION
OF THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR THE PEACEFUL
USIA
RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. NE SAID THAT
THE U.S. DID NOT EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO REPLY
FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK
IMMEDIATELY TO THIS PROPOSAL. NOWEVER, "OVER TIME,
AND WITH ENOUGH INCENTIVES, THEY MAY RESPOND."
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
THE GROUP DISCUSSED SEVERAL OF THOSE REGIONAL
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
ISSUES--AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, ANGOLA--
IN EUROPE
AND NOTED SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THESE AREAS
PRESENT IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.
REGIONAL CONFLICTS PRECONDITIONS TO MOVE
FORWARD ON ARMS CONTROL? AREN'T THESE
ALL AGREED THAT THOSE PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN
PROPOSALS THE SAME OLD ZERO-ZERO OPTION OF
EACH OF THESE ISSUES OUGHT TO BE IN THE
1982? WON'T THE ELIMINATION OF INF LEAD TO
FOREFRONT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS. FOR
"DECOUPLING?" THE ANSWER TO ALL THREE
EXAMPLE, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM COSTA RICA
QUESTIONS IS "NO."
AND GUATEMALA SHOULD ADVOCATE THEIR OWN
CAUSES. WHEN THE U.S. TRIES TO SUBSTITUTE
PETER SULLIVAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY TO THE DEPUTY
FOR THEM IT ERODES CREDIBILITY.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR
FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY, SPOKE ON MBFR,
ACTION:
CDE, AND CHEMICAL VEAPONS. IN ALL THREE,
VERIFICATION REMAINS THE STUMBLING BLOCK TO
THAT THE U.S. ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE PUBLIC
AGREEMENT AND THERE CAN BE NO AGREEMENT UNTIL
DIPLOMACY VISITS TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BY
THIS ISSUE IS RESOLVED. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT
CREDIBLE PERSONS FROM THE REGIÓNS INVOLVED.
BEEN FORTHCOMING +x THESE DISCUSSIONS AND THEY
ST
WILL-PROBABLY NOT BE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
#4778
4. SDI AND NUCLEAR TESTING:
DISCUSSION WAS LED BY COL. ROBERT LINHARD AND
STEVE STEINER, NSC, AND PETER SULLIVAN, DOD.
STEINER REVIEWED THE WORK OF THE INTERAGENCY
GROUP WORKING ON SDI PUBLIC HANDLING POLICY
AND CITED. MAIN ISSUES RELATING TO THE
INITIATIVE. THE FLOOR WAS THEN THROWN OPEN FOR
DISCUSSION. PAOS' CONCERNS CENTERED ON: U.S.-
ALLIED DIFFERENCES OVER THE DESIRABILITY OF
TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A cTBT; THE POSSIBLE COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVENESS OF USING A SUGGESTED TALKING POINT
THAT a MALT TO U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING WOULD AMONG
OTHER THINGS LEAD TO THE LOSS OF SCIENTISTS FROM
U.S. WEAPONS LABORATORIES; THE DIFFICULTY OF
CONVINCING ALLIES THAT A NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS A
POOR IDEA WHEN OUR OWN CONGRESS HAS PASSED A
RESOLUTION FAVORING IT; PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE
SUDDEN APPARENT SOVIET FORTNCOMINGNESS ON
VERIFICATION AND THE NEED TO BASE OUR DEFENSE
OF CONTINUED NUCLEAR TESTING ON THE
REQUIREMENT (THAT WILL REMAIN VALID AS LONG AS
DETERRENCE IS BASED ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS) TO
TEST OUR STOCK TO ENSURE IT REMAINS RELIABLE
AND USABLE; THE NEED FOR SENSITIVITY IN
EXPLAINING TO PUBLICS THE SMALL BUT IMPORTANT
NUCLEAR COMPONENT OF THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM;
PUBLIC QUESTIONING OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMITMENT TO SHARE SDI TECHNOLOGY WITH THE
SOVIETS; AND U.S. OFFICIAL ATTITUDES TO THE
EUROPEAN DEFENSE INITIATIVE.
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#5/19232 EAST-WEST RELATIONS:
ACTION OFFICE SPEC-04 HANDLED AS SPECDIS
INFO /894 A3 1
PHIL ARNOLD OF USIA'S PROGRAM BUREAU REVIEWED
RECENT AGENCY RESEARCH. ME NOTED P/R'S
0 #519092 MAR 86
FEELING THAT THE U.S. PRE-GENEVA MEETING
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY WORKED IN THAT
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE #912
EXPECTATIONS THAT THE SUMMIT wou
BT
LD OR SHOULD
CONFIDENT I a 1 SECTION #4 OF #6 LONDON 84778
PRODUCE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS WERE KEPT LOW AND
SDI REMAINED A SUBSIDIARY ISSUE. ME NOTED
USIA
POLL RESULTS SHOWING MAJORITIES IN KEY EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES AS BELIEVING THAT U.S. ARMS CONTROL
FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK
EFFORTS ARE GENUINE. DURING SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION,
PAOS VOICED CONCERNS ABOUT EVIDENCE OF a CONTINU-
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
ING "MORAL EQUIVALENCY" PRECONCEPTION, THE
MISPERCEPTION THAT SDI IS a BARRIER ON THE ROAD
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
TO ARMS CONTROL, AND EUROPEAN FEARS THAT THE
IN EUROPE
PROTECTION OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA MAY BE
TAKEN AWAY WITH THE COMING OF SDI AND EVENTUAL-
THIS SHOULD INCLUDE, WHEN APPROPRIATE,
ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. STEINER (NSC)
APPEARANCES ON WORLDNET.
URGED POSTS TO STRESS THAT IN FACT SDI IS NOT
PROVING A BARRIER TO ARMS CONTROL DESPITE
6. KUMAN RIGHTS:
SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO LINK PROGRESS IN
NEGOTIATIONS TO THE U.S. ABANDONMENT OF SDI.
MANDEL (DISC) REMINDED THE GROUP THAT OUR
JUDYT MANDEL, MSC, DISCUSSED THREE KEY MISCONCEP-
PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSITION LOOKED SAD IN THE
TIONS ABOUT U.S. NUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES:
EARLY DAYS OF THE INF DEBATE, BUT GRADUALLY
EUROPEAN AUDIENCES WERE SENSITIZED TO THE
-- THAT THE U.S. WAS CURRENTLY "PULLING ITS
SOVIET $5-28 THREAT AND THE NEED FOR a NATO
PUNCHES" ON SOVIET NUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BECAUSE
RESPONSE; SHE ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NEED FOR
OF THE SUMMIT ATMOSPHERE. NOT so, SHE SAID;
a STEADY, PATIENT PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM
NUMAN RIGHTS CONTINUE TO BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT
STRESSING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT THE SOVIETS
OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT
HAVE THEIR OWN VERY VIGOROUS PROGRAM OF
AND OTHER USG OFFICIALS WILL CONTINUE TO SPEAK
BT
OUT ABOUT ABUSES BUT IN GENERAL TERMS, AVOIDING
84778
THE PUBLIC AIRING OF SPECIFIC CASES.
-- THAT WE HAVE SINGLED OUT THE SOVIETS AND
THEIR ALLIES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CRITICISM AND
IGNORED EQUALLY SLATANT VIOLATIONS OF NUMAN
RIGHTS IN COUNTRIES CLOSE TO THE U.S. ON THE
CONTRARY, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IS
UNIVERSAL. WE HAVE BEEN QUITE FORTHRIGHT IN
CONDEMNING ABUSES EVERYWHERE.
-- THAT A FOCUS ON NUMAN RIGHTS JEOPARDIZES
MORE IMPORTANT EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON
ARMS CONTROL OR REGIONAL ISSUES. THE SOVIET
HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS
FOR OUR ABILITY TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE
SOVIETS ACROSS THE BROAD FRONT OF ISSUES THAT
CONCERN us, BUT THERE IS NO "LINKAGE" BETWEEN
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMS CONTROL MATTERS.
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT
CONGRESS HAD MANDATED LINKAGE BETWEEN EMIGRATION
AND TRADE MATTERS.
J. THE SECOND DAY OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONFERENCE
WAS LARGELY DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF THE PUBLIC
AFFAIRS FALLOUT FROM THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT AND PROS-
PECTS FOR THE NEXT REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING. PAOS
NOTED THE VERY POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE GENEVA
MEETING. THEY ALSO REVIEWED OTHER MAJOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS CONCERNS IN THEIR COUNTRIES. A CONCLUDING
DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
BY WASHINGTON AND FIELD POSTS ADDRESSED TO THE
SEVERAL ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING THE CONFERENCE.
8. USIA RESEARCH ON EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON
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085851 1CA612
005051 ICA612
#5/19242 SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WE DID IN THE LEAD-UP TO
ACTION OFFICE SPEC-04
MANDLED AS SPECDIS
GENEVA. ME OPINED THAT, WHILE GORBACHEV IS
INFO /894 A3 1
GETTING MORE MEDIA ATTENTION, IN THE LONG RUN
A FAVORABLE IMPACT ON WESTERN PUBLICS IS LIKELY
0 #51989Z MAR 86
TO DEPEND ON CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY. IF THE
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
SOVIETS ARE GETTING MORE PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSCIOUS,
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE #913
NE SAID, THAT COULD BE GOOD IF THE FEEDBACK THEY
ST
GET LEADS THEM TO BE MORE SENSITIVE TO WESTERN
CONE DENT A 1 SECTION #5 OF #6 LONDON 94778
CONCERNS AND THUS TO ALTER THEIR POSITIONS ON
SOME ISSUES. NE JUDGES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
USIA
EXAGGERATING THEIR WORRIES ABOUT SDI AND THEY
WOULD FALL OFF THEIR PRESENT POSITION--WHICH
FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK
THEY KNOW IS NOT NEGOTIABLE--WHEN THEY ARE READY
FOR AN AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MATLOCK
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
SAID ME SENSED SOME DECLINE IN EUROPEAN PREOCCUPATION
WITH SDI, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
NAVE TO HAVE ACTIVE EUROPEAN SUPPORT TO CARRY OUT
IN EUROPE
THE PROGRAM, IN CONTRAST TO INF WHEN THE APPROVAL
OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS WAS ESSENTIAL. IF THE
STRATEGIC DEFENSE RESEARCH.
ISSUE IS QUIESCENT, NE ARGUED, WE SHOULD NOT ACT
TO STIR UP A DISPUTE WHERE THERE IS NONE.
9. COUNTRY REPORTS: THE REACTION TO GENEVA:
STEINER (ISC) SAID THERE WERE STILL SITUATIONS
IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES WHERE APPROPRIATE SDI
ALL PAOS AGREED THAT THE GENEVA SUMMIT WAS A
PROGRAMMING WOULD SEEM WORTHWHILE. ME NOTED
BOON TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PERSONAL IMAGE IN
THAT WASHINGTON WOULD SOON HAVE READY A NEW
EUROPE AND TO NOST-COUNTRY ATTITUDES TOWARD
PAMPULET EXPOSING SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS
THE UNITED STATES. POLLS INDICATE THAT THE
AGAINST SDI.
PRESIDENT GAINED IN APPROVAL RATINGS
EVERYWHERE. THIS IMPROVEMENT VARIED FROM SLIGHT
MATLOCK NOTED THAT RECENT -SOVIET MEDIA
IN ITALY TO DRAMATIC IN GREAT BRITAIN. GORBACHEV
EXCHANGES HAD PROVEN USEFUL AND THAT WE SHOULD
ALSO BENEFITED FROM THE SUMMIT, REGISTERING
SEEK MORE. THE PRESIDENT'S APPEARANCES ON
ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT GAINS IN ITALY.
BT
04778
SDI,- ACCORDING TO THE PAOS, CONTINUES TO CLAIM
MUCH ATTENTION, ALTHOUGH IN MOST COUNTRIES
POLLS SUGGEST THAT IT HAS NOV BEEN ACCEPTED BY
/
HALF OR MORE OF THE POPULATION. U.S. POLICY
TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA, NOWEVER, REMAINS
UNPOPULAR AMONG SMALL BUT VOCAL MINORITIES IN
EVERY COUNTRY.
THE SOVIETS ARE HELD IN LOW REPUTE IN WESTERN EUROPE
FOR THEIR POLICIES TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS, POLAND AND
AFGHANISTAN. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN FRANCE,
A COUNTRY INCREASINGLY PRO-AMERICAN BUT ONE PRE-
OCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES.
FINALLY, THE PAOS AGREED THAT U.S. CONSULTATIONS
WITH EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON
ATTITUDES TOWARD OUR POLICIES.
18. SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT:
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK AND MOSCOW PAD RAY BENSON
OPENED THE DISCUSSION. BENSON CONSIDERED
PUBLIC THEMES THE SOVIETS ARE EMPHASIZING
DURING THIS PRE-SUMMIT PERIOD. NE EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT POST BUDGETS WOULD BE CUT UNDER
GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS AT A TIME WHEN MORE
NEEDS TO BE DONE, AND AT THE VERY TIME WHEN
THE SOVIETS ARE USING FAR MORE SOPHISTICATED
PUBLIC AFFAIRS TOOLS THAN THEY HAVE USED IN
THE PAST. BENSON ALSO NOTED THAT THE MOST
EFFECTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS VEHICLE WAS STILL THE
WELL-INFORMED AGENCY OFFICER MEETING AND
DEBATING WITH HIS CONTACTS. MATLOCK SAID THAT
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SHOULD STRESS THE SAME
CONFIDENTIAL
30
LUNT IDENTIAL
UNITED STATES
TELEGRAM
INFORMATION AGENCY
PAGE 01
005052 ICA613
05/19252
ACTION OFFICE SPEC-04
HANDLED AS SPECDIS
INFO /004 A3 1
o 0519ø92 MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0914
BT
c o N F IDENTIAL SECTION 06 OF 66 LONDON 04778
USIA
FOR EU/KORDEK FROM EU/REMICK
EO 12356: DECL: OADR
SUBJECT: CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
IN EUROPE
SOVIET TELEVISION DURING THE GENEVA MEETING
AND ON NEW YEAR' S DAY SERVED TO DE-DEMONIZE
HIM IN THE EYES OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC AND
UNDERMINED SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRUM UP
XENOPHOBIC FEELINGS. MATLOCK SAID GORBACHEV
HAS ESSENTIALLY MADE TWO ACCUSATIONS AGAINST
SOI, BOTH OF THEM EASILY REFUTABLE. GORBACHEV
HAS SAID THAT SDI COULD BE USED TO SUPPORT A
U.S. FIRST-STRIKE STRATEGY. HOWEVER, U.S.
ARMS CONTROL POLICY AIMS FOR DEEP CUTS IN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SUCH CUTS WOULD MAKE ANY
SUCH STRATEGY UNTHINKABLE. SECONDLY, GORBACHEV
CLAIMS THAT ONCE WEAPONS ARE DEPLOYED IN SPACE,
IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH WHETHER
THEY ARE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. HOWEVER, SDI
DEPLOYMENTS WOULD NOT BE A REASONABLE WAY TO
OPTIMIZE THE USE OF SPACE FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.
11. SUMMIT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY STRATEGY FOR EUROPE:
A CONSENSUS EMERGED THAT PARTICULAR ATTENTION
SHOULD BE PAID TO FINDING AND SPONSORING
EFFECTIVE SPEAKERS FOR BOTH THE PRE- AND
POST-SUMMIT PERIODS, IF POSSIBLE SPEAKERS WITH
A FLUENT COMMAND OF THE HOST-COUNTRY LANGUAGE.
SDI BRIEFING TEAMS HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL,
AND THE PAOS ARE INTERESTED IN HAVING MORE OF THEM.
ACTION:
<
1. WORK UNDERWAY IN USIA, STATE AND NSC SHOULD
BE CONTINUED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF LISTS OF
AVAILABLE SPEAKERS.
V
2. NSC WILL DEVELOP, IN COOPERATION WITH STATE
AND USIA, APPROVED TALKING POINTS TO BE USED TO
REFUTE THE MORE IMPORTANT MISPERCEPTIONS OF
U.S. POLICY ON EAST-WEST ISSUES.
)
3. DETAILED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING
THE RUN-UP TO THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT WILL BE
DISTRIBUTED.
KORENGOLD
BT
#4778
CONFIDENTIAL
31
PAGE 01
LONDON 4806
DTG: 061209Z MAR 86 PSN: 058589
IBM172
TOR: 065/1213Z
CSN: EHA510
DISTRIBUTION:
NSJL
EAST EUROPE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SOVIET USSR
NSHGS
SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY USSR
NSSRS
EAST EUROPE SOVIET USSR
NSDGM
SOVIET USSR
NSJEM
SOVIET USSR
NSHP
UK
NSJD
UK
NSNDS
EUROPE
NSPJD
EAST EUROPE
WHSR COMMENT:
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: MATL
EOB:
ROUTINE
DE RUEHLD #4806 0651209
R 061209Z MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO USIA WASHDC 0921
UNCLAS LONDON 04806
USIA
USIA FOR EU/KORDEK, REMICK; NSC FOR AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK
EO 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES OF
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
1. AS AN ADJUNCT TO HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE
MARCH 3-4 USIA/NSC CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR
DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS, NSC,
CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF HIGHLY USEFUL PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES FOR USIS LONDON. HE MET
WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF KEY GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, AND JOURNALISTS DEALING
WITH EAST-WEST AFFAIRS, OUTLINING IN EACH
INSTANCE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE NEAR AND LONG
TERM. HIS DETAILED SCHEDULE WAS AS FOLLOWS:
TUESDAY PM:
DRINKS AND DISCUSSION WITH LORD
37
BETHELL, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
POLITICAL COMMITTEE RAPPORTEUR,
ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY REPORT
ON U.S./EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
POLITICAL RELATIONS.
WEDNESDAY AM: MEETINGS WITH CABINET
--
OFFICE DEPUTY SECRETARY
--
CHRISTOPHER MALLABY; TIMOTHY
RENTON, FCO MINISTER OF
STATE; DEREK THOMAS, FCO
POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY.
LUNCH:
HOSTED BY DCM RAY SEITZ. GUESTS
INCLUDED NICHOLAS ASHFORD,
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, THE
--
TIMES; MICHAEL BRUNSON, DIPLO-
MATIC EDITOR, INDEPENDENT TELE-
VISION NEWS; PROFESSOR LAWRENCE
--
FREEDMAN, KING'S COLLEGE; NIK
--
GOWING, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CORRESPONDENT, CHANNEL 4 NEWS;
--
SIR CURTIS KEEBLE, FORMER UK
--
AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW DURING AMB.
MATLOCK'S TIME; MALCOLM
MAC INTOSH, CABINET OFFICER,
--
EAST EUROPE EXPERT; DR. ROBERT
--
O'NEILL, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
--
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES.
WEDNESDAY PM:
ROUND TABLE MEETING ON
--
U.S./USSR RELATIONS AT CHATHAM
--
HOUSE. PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED
NICHOLAS ASHFORD (ABOVE);
ADMIRAL SIR JAMES EBERLE,
DIRECTOR, CHATHAM HOUSE;
ROBERT KLEIMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW;
DAVID KORN, RESEARCH FELLOW;
KEITH KYLE, MEETINGS SECRETARY;
WILLIAM WALLACE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES;
JOHN ROPER, EDITOR, INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS; PAULINE
NEVILLE-JONES, FOREIGN OFFICE;
DINNER:
HOSTED BY PAO ROBERT KORENGOLD.
--
GUESTS INCLUDED MELVIN LASKY,
--
EDITOR, ENCOUNTER MAGAZINE; MARK
FRANKLAND, COLUMNIST ON SOVIET
AFFAIRS FOR THE OBSERVER; DAVID
BUCHAN, EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
CORRESPONDENT, FINANCIAL TIMES;
3
--
ALFRED CAHEN, SECRETARY-GENERAL,
WEST EUROPEAN UNION.
2. POST IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK FOR HIS WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION IN
POST PROGRAM. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE HIM
RETURN AT ANY TIME.
KORENGOLD
** END OF CABLE **
34
JM-C
SECRET
1644
1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT
Public Diplomacy Strategy
Regardless of the date ultimately set for the President's
meeting with Gorbachev in the United States, the approach to the
issues in our public diplomacy should build on the success
achieved at the Geneva Summit. The fundamental themes should be
the same: to stress the steadiness and consistency of our policy
and highlight our practical proposals in all four areas of the
agenda and our determination to find common ground wherever
possible. Of course, appropriate adjustments of detail must be
made to take account of developments, possible shifts in the
Soviet position, and the line taken by Soviet spokesmen.
Overall Goals
-- To show that we retain the initiative in guiding the
U.S. -Soviet relationship and prevent public pressure to make
unwise or premature concessions.
-- To use the meeting to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet
leadership to move toward resolution of important problems in an
acceptable manner.
-- To uphold and strengthen the President's role as the
preeminent leader of our Alliances.
U.S. Themes
Our public diplomacy should foster the following basic
perceptions:
1. Summitry is part of a process. The Geneva Summit
established a framework for dialogue. The meeting in the United
States continues that dialogue at the higest level.
-- The dialogue is necessary to manage an adversarial
relationship and give impetus to resolution of outstanding
problems.
-- We must keep expectations realistic. Specifically,
the thrust of our public diplomacy should be to keep the focus on
our four-part agenda - not only arms control - and to redefine
summitry so that lack of specific agreements will not be seen as
failure.
SECRET
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-- We aim for fair and effective agreements. Summit
meetings should not be judged by the number of agreements
reached, but by their contribution to managing the relationship
peacefully and constructively.
2. We must deal with the full agenda; no single area can be
treated in isolation. In real life, the areas are interrelated.
The four areas of this agenda are:
a. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and
threat of force in resolving international disputes
b. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass
destruction
C. Building trust and a more cooperative working
relationship
d. Encouraging respect for human rights
3. The United States has made practical proposals in all
these areas. We place no arbitrary or mechanical linkages
between different areas, but recognize that progress in one
facilitates progress in the others. This is simply a fact of
life, not a policy determination.
4. We want the Soviets to see the truth about the U.S. While
the fundamental issues between the U.S. and USSR are real, they
are exacerbated by Soviet misunderstanding of the United States.
r.Gorbachev has never visited the U.S. and has numerous
misperceptions of U.S. life and U.S. policy. Therefore, one
important aim of the 1986 Summit is to show Gorbachev the real
U.S. This could lead eventually to a more realistic posture on
his part.
5. The U.S.-Soviet Rivalry Will Not Disappear. The vast
difference in our political systems, values and ideology means
that we will be rivals for the forseeable future. The challenge
is to manage this rivalry in a peaceful fashion. The U.S.
follows a steady policy based on realism, strength and dialogue.
We are prepared to solve problems in a fair and practical
fashion, without the expectation that the Soviet system will
change or the Soviet Union will eventually act as an ally. We
can have a peaceful world even if our systems and ideologies
compete.
SECRET
36
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SECRET
Soviet Goals
Soviet objectives are to focus attention exclusively on arms
control issues in order to portray themselves as the "peace
party." They will continue to press an array of largely public
initiatives designed to capture headlines and deflect criticism
of other aspects of their policy rather than to solve problems.
They will try to put the U.S. in the position of responding to
their thrusts and thus put pressure on us to make concessions at
the negotiations.
A primary goal of their initiatives is their long-standing
effort to drive wedges between the U.S. and our allies in order
to reap the economical and technical benefits of relaxation of
tensions with the Europeans. The Soviets also want to enhance
their standing as a global power -- an equal of the U.S. in the
world's eye.
Soviet Public Themes
We can expect Moscow to stress the following themes in its
propaganda:
1. The central issue in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is arms
control; all others are secondary.
2. Another Summit meeting would be meaningless unless
agreement can be reached in some important area of arms control.
3. The Soviet Union is sincere in wanting a world without
nuclear weapons, but U.S. policies -- particularly SDI -- block
progress.
4. SDI is inconsistent with nuclear weapons reduction.
5. While the President may be sincere in his expressed
desire to reduce nuclear weapons and create a non-threatening
strategic defense, some of the members of his Administration are
bent on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and
developing a first-strike capability behind the cover of SDI.
6. The U.S., not the USSR, is guilty of using military force
to intervene in other countries.
7. Pressure on "human rights" is both hypocritical -- since
the U.S. is plagued by racism, inequality and poverty -- and also
represents unwarranted interference in Soviet internal affairs.
It is not acceptable as an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations or as a
subject for negotiation.
SECRET
37
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SECRET
8. The Soviet Union has a vigorous new leadership which
wants peace and cooperation. The U.S., dominated by its
"military-industrial complex," only pays lip service to relaxing
tensions and uses "dialogue" to lull its public.
9. It is up to the U.S. to change its policies in order to
make a more peaceful world possible.
These propaganda themes will likely be accompanied by a show
of resisting U.S. pressure for restraint in the Third World, and
engaging in some public and semi-public gestures designed to show
the Soviets as interested in solving regional disputes, e.g.
Cyprus, the Middle East, and which actually repackage standard
Soviet positions. They will, however, stop short of inviting a
direct confrontation. Arms supplies to Nicaragua, Libya and
Angola, for example, may be stepped up. Although some further
dissidents may be released, this will be done while proclaiming
that human rights is not an issue. Strident propaganda to
"prove" that the U.S. is following militaristic policies and is
covertly involved all over the world will continue.
Countering Soviet Propaganda
The best counter to Soviet propaganda will be a combination
of exposing the facts about Soviet actions and policies and a
vigorous presentation of positive U.S. initiatives and policies.
Criticisms of Soviet actions and policies are most effective when
they do not appear to be strident or examples of knee-jerk
negativism, but reasoned objections to dangerous policies.
Whenever possible, critiques of Soviet actions, proposals and
policies should be accompanied by an explanation of what the U.S.
proposes to deal with the issue. In addition, we should welcome
positive Soviet initiatives as consistent with the spirit of
Geneva and proof of the effectiveness of our approach.
SECRET
1644
Talking Points on
U.S. -Soviet Relations
A. The Agenda
1. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and threat of
force in resolving international disputes. The use of force to
serve national ends threatens the peace and makes reduction of
arms more difficult.
2. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass
destruction. Nuclear, chemical and -- if they still exist --
bacteriological weapons are the weapons potentially most
destructive of human life. We must move rapidly to reduce
nuclear weapons and ban chemical weapons, with effective
verification. Our ultimate goal is to eliminate all weapons of
mass destruction from the arsenals of all countries, but we
recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely
until conventional weapons are at a balance and at lower levels
and large countries refrain from using force to achieve national
goals.
3. Building trust and a more cooperative working
relationship. High levels of suspicion, fed by isolation,
threaten the peace and make it much more difficult to solve
practical problems. A better working relationship requires the
following:
-- Strict compliance with all agreements.
-- More contact between the peoples of both
countries and better information flow through the
media in both.
-- Frank discussion of our differences, coupled
with a readiness to solve practical problems
fairly.
-- Strict reciprocity of benefit in all
arrangements.
4. Encouraging respect for human rights. Governments
which respect the rights of their own citizens to speak their
minds, to travel and to depart their country if they wish are
less likely to follow aggressive policies than those which
attempt to control every aspect of their citizen's lives. Human
rights is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian issue; it is also
essential to a stable peace.
DECLASSIFIED
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B. U.S. Proposals
1. To reduce use and threat of force: The President's
proposal at the UNGA in October, 1985. We are pursuing this
initiative with the Soviets in diplomatic contacts and in a
series of regular consultations on regional issues, and with the
parties in the affected areas.
2. To reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction:
-- Proposal at NST talks for 50% reduction in
strategic offensive nuclear arms.
-- President's February, 1986, proposal for
elimination, over three years, of all U.S. and
Soviet LRINF systems.
-- U.S. proposal to discuss and eventually
negotiate means whereby strategic defense
systems, should they prove feasible, can be
introduced in a cooperative manner to facilitate
the reduction and ultimate elimination of
nuclear weapons.
-- U.S. draft treaty at Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons globally,
with strict verification.
-- Western proposal in MBFR for initial
reductions of conventional forces in Central
Europe and agreement on verification measures
which would subsequently permit reductions to a
common and much lower ceiling.
-- In CDE, western proposals for concrete measures
to reduce risk of surprise attack, war through
miscalculation, and for measures to build
confidence by providing for greater openness in
military movements and deployments.
3. To enhance confidence:
-- U.S. proposals for eliminating violations of
treaty and political commitments.
-- President's initiative for massive increase in
people-to-people contacts and reciprocal access
to media.
SECRET
40
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SECRET
-- U.S. proposals for increased cooperation in many
areas, including peaceful use of space, medical
research, environmental research and other
scientific areas.
4. To protect human rights: U.S. has made clear that
development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations will depend
importantly on Soviet observance of their political obligations
assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.
C. Countering Soviet Propaganda
The following points should be made in preempting and
responding to Soviet arguments:
-- The President is realistic about the nature of the
Soviet system, but is serious, firm and patient in his desire to
solve concrete problems. Our proposals are designed to get at
those real problems which are amenable to solution; they are
subject to the give-and-take of negotiation so long as our basic
principles are preserved.
-- In contrast, the Soviets are still trying to achieve the
public perception of relaxation without addressing the causes of
tension. There is still too much of "what's mine is mine and
what's yours is negotiable" in their approach.
-- The Soviets seem to desire a world in which the West is
psychologically and physically disarmed, while the Soviet
leadership is free to use its military force to expand whereever
it chooses and to intimidate others. They also wish to establish
as a principle the regime's right to conduct whatever repression
it considers expedient toward its own citizens and those in
countries under its domination.
-- This is not a prescription for a peaceful world, or one
in which democratic values can be preserved. Therefore, it
cannot lead to improved relations with the United States.
-- If the new Soviet leadership is genuinely interested in
reducing tensions and creating a less threatening world in the
future, it will have to address the underlying causes of U.S.-
Soviet tension and work with us to solve as many of the concrete
issues as we can.
-- Summit meetings are important in providing an
opportunity to discuss these issues at the highest level, and to
work on ways to solve them. They are not a "favor" to either
side and must not be subject to preconditions.
-- Whatever policies the Soviets follow, there will be
peace between us, so long as the U.S. maintains its strength and
deterrent capacity. However, we would like more than that. If
SECRET
4
- 4 -
SECRET
this is also the Soviet desire, they will find us willing to
address outstanding issues fairly and realistically, so that we
can establish a more stable and constructive long term
relationship -- as the President called for in his January 1984
speech.
Some "Don'ts
Some arguments should be avoided because the Soviets can use
them either publicly or privately to call into question U.S.
seriousness or to put us at a tactical disadvantage in
negotiations. For these reasons, statements along the following
lines should be avoided when one is either speaking on the record
or on background when the speaker can be quoted as an
Administration official:
1. "Gorbachev was forced to come to Geneva."
(Instead: "The President has restored the balance of
power, and this permits negotiations on a fair and constructive
basis.
2.
"Our latest proposal will put Gorbachev on the
spot.
(Note: Suggests we are not substantively serious; also
personalizes the issue, which should be discussed on its merits.)
3. "The Soviets will never (pull out of Afghanistan
respect human rights open up their society etc.). "
(Note: Our stance should be that these things are
possible if the Soviet leaders should desire. Otherwise, we
diminish pressure on the Soviets to move in the right direction
and make our own policies seem unrealistic. Of course, we also
should not predict that these things will happen.)
4. "The Soviet P.R. effort is a threat."
(Note: Ultimately, the effectiveness of Soviet
propaganda will depend on whether there are any real changes in
Soviet policy and actions, particularly if we do our job in
making clear to the public what the facts are. We therefore
have no need for any nervousness or defensiveness. It is far
SECRET
41
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SECRET
better to welcome the apparent Soviet interest in influencing
Western opinion and express the hope that it will lead to a
review of those policies which have damaged the Soviet image
abroad.)
5.
"We were surprised by the latest Soviet proposal."
(Note: We should never be surprised by Soviet tactical
maneuvering or highly publicized announcements of "new"
proposals. To suggest that we are surprised implies that we are
not prepared to deal promptly with them -- which is not the case.
It is preferable tactically -- and factually more accurate -- to
point out that this is part of the familiar Soviet pattern of
making periodic announcements of policies claimed to be new, but
that we will give it a close look and if we find positive
elements we will follow up at the negotiating table.")
SECRET
COUNTERING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. POLICY
Partly as the result of Soviet propaganda, and partly
because of genuine lack of comprehension, a number of
unfounded myths are current in some sections of the U.S. public
or foreign publics. They should be exposed as fallacious at
every appropriate opportunity -- certainly when they are raised
in questions or in published articles. We also should keep them
in mind so that in our own presentations we are careful not to
use expressions or arguments which appear to give them sub-
stance.
Attached are suggested talking points to deal with the
following such myths:
1. Current U.S. Policy Is "Detente II"
2. The U.S. and the Soviet Union Act the Same
3. The "Arms Race" is the Primary Threat to Peace
4. "Rhetoric" Is Dangerous
5. U.S. Pursues Artificial Linkages
6. U.S. Seeks Military Superiority
7. SDI Is Enemy of Arms Reduction
8. U.S. Makes East-West Issues out of Local Conflicts
9. U.S. Views World in Ideological Terms
10. U.S. Thinks Only of Military Solutions
11. U.S. Exaggerates Soviet Threat
12. U.S. Aims to Destroy Soviet System
AL
MYTH No. 1
"U.S. POLICY IS DETENTE II"
Response: Our policy is fundamentally different from the
policy of "detente" as it was practiced in the 1970's. In fact, we
have learned some bitter lessons from our experiences in the
1970's and have designed our policy to avoid the manifest defi-
ciencies of our policy at that time. It is very important to
understand the differences, since some of the elements of current
policy may seem superficially similar.
In practice, if not necessarily always in theory, the detente
policy of the 1970's had the following flaws:
1. Arms control was considered central and other issues sec-
ondary. This led to a neglect of U.S. defenses and de facto tol-
eration of Soviet efforts to use military means to extend its
influence abroad and to intimidate its neighbors. These Soviet
actions, more than any other, brought an end to detente.
Our current policy rests on the conviction that the U.S. must
retain adequate strength, military and otherwise, to deal effec-
tively with the Soviet Union, and we have rebuilt that strength.
We also have made it clear that Soviet use of military force out-
side its borders cannot be isolated from the prospects of arms
reduction, and that arms control cannot be pursued to the
neglect of other important issues in the relationship.
2. It was assumed that Soviet aggressiveness could be con-
tained by diplomacy, trade benefits and arms control.
We have no such illusion. Soviet aggressiveness can be con-
tained only if the Soviet leadership is convinced that attempts to
use military force to extend Soviet influence in the world is
risky and likely to fail. We have made clear that we will take
whatever steps are feasible to support those struggling for free-
dom and democracy, and will do all we can to ensure that Soviet
aggression does not succeed. We reject condominium or any
division of the world into spheres of influence. At the same
time, we are prepared to join the Soviet Union in assisting
parties to regional disputes to reach peaceful accommodation, and
would welcome agreements with the Soviet Union to halt the flow
of arms and foreign troops into areas of conflict.
3. It was assumed that an expanding network of ties could
moderate Soviet behavior, and therefore such ties were sometimes
established for presumed atmospheric benefits without close
regard to reciprocity.
While we recognize the importance of ties and communication
in breaking down barriers to personal movement and to the flow
of information, we do not believe that such ties can be expected
to have a direct effect on Soviet policy. Therefore, they should
be established only on the basis of strict reciprocity of benefit.
45
NURR F06 714/13*13627
1986 REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT
BY G NARADATE 5/15/08
Public Diplomacy Strategy
Regardless of the date ultimately set for the President's
meeting with Gorbachev in the United States, the approach to the
issues in our public diplomacy should build on the success
achieved at the Geneva Summit. The fundamental themes should be
the same, to stress the steadiness of our policy. Of course,
appropriate adjustments of detail must be made to take account of
developments, possible shifts in the Soviet position, and the
line taken by Soviet spokesmen.
Overall Goals
To position the President in the public eye so that he
retains the initiative in guiding the U.S.-Soviet relationship
and is protected from public pressure to make unwise or premature
concessions.
U.S. Objectives
Our public diplomacy should foster the following basic
perceptions:
1. Summitry is part of a process. The Geneva Summit
established a framework for dialogue. The meetings in the United
States continue that dialogue at the higest level.
-- The dialogue is necessary to manage an adversarial
relationship.
-- If it is burdened by perceived requirements to
reach agreements, a regular dialogue at the highest level will
become impossible and it will be difficult to achieve good,
balanced agreements.
-- We of course aim for the maximum possible
agreement at all times, but summit meetings should not be judged
by the degree of agreement reached since the objective is to
manage our rivalry in a peaceful manner.
2. We must deal with the full agenda; no single area can be
treated in isolation. The agenda is not a policy choice but is
inherent in the relationship itself. In real life, the areas are
interrelated. The four areas of this agenda are:
a. Reducing and eventually eliminating the use and
threat of force in resolving international disputes. The use of
force to serve national ends threatens the peace and makes
reduction of arms more difficult.
b. Reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass
destruction. The greatest threat to the world is posed by
46
nuclear, chemical and -- if they still exist -- bacteriological
weapons. We must move rapidly to reduce nuclear weapons and ban
chemical weapons, with effective verification. Our goal is to
eliminate both from the arsenals of all countries, but we
recognize that nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated entirely
until conventional weapons are at lower levels and large
countries refrain from using force to achieve national goals.
C. Building trust and a more cooperative working
relationship. High levels of suspicion, fed by isolation,
threaten the peace and make it much more difficult to solve
practical problems. A better working relationship requires the
following:
-- Strict compliance with all agreements.
-- More contact between the peoples of both
countries and better information flow through the
media in both.
-- Frank discussion of our differences, coupled
with a readiness to solve practical problems
fairly.
-- Strict reciprocity of benefit in all
arrangements.
d. Encouraging respect for human rights. Governments
which respect the rights of their own citizens to speak their
minds, to travel and to depart their country if they wish are
less likely to follow aggressive policies than those which
attempt to control every aspect of their citizen's lives. Human
rights is, therefore, not merely a humanitarian issue; it is also
a peace issue.
is serious about solving there problems and
3. The United Stateshas made practical proposals in all
these areas. We place no arbitrary or mechanical linkages
between different areas, but recognize that progress in one
facilitates progress in the others and, conversely, problems in
one can block real progress in the others. This is simply a fact
of life, not a policy determination. U.S. proposals include:
a. To reduce use and threat of force: The President's
proposal at the UNGA in October, 1985. We are pursuing this
initiative with the Soviets in diplomatic contacts and in a
series of regular consultations on regional issues, and with the
parties in the affected areas.
b. To reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction:
-- Proposal at NST talks for 50% reduction in
nuclear weapons.
-- President's February, 1986, proposal for
elimination, over three years, of all LRINF
AT
systems.
-- U.S. proposal to discuss and eventually
negotiate means whereby strategic defense systems,
should they prove feasible, can be introduced in a
cooperative manner to facilitate the reduction and
elimination of nuclear weapons.
-- U.S. draft treaty at Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons, with strict
verification.
-- U.S. and Allied proposal in MBFR for initial
reductions of conventional forces in Central Europe
and agreement on verification measures which would
subsequently permit reductions to a common and much
lower ceiling.
c. To enhance confidence:
-- U.S. proposals for eliminating violations of
treaty and political commitments.
-- U.S. and Allied proposals at the Stockholm CDE
for measures to build confidence by providing for
greater openness in military movements and
deployments.
-- President's initiative for massive increase in
people-to-people contacts and reciprocal access to
media.
-- U.S. proposals for increased cooperation in many
areas, including peaceful use of space, medical
research, environmental research and other
scientific areas.
d. To protect human rights: U.S. has made clear that
development of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations will depend
importantly on Soviet compliance of the political obligations it
assumed in the Helsinki Final Act.
48
UNCLASSIFIED
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
LONDON 48.06
DTG: 061209Z MAR 86 PSN: #58589
EOB280
AN000281
TOR: 065/1213Z
CSN:EHA51#
CORRESPONDENT, CHANNEL 4 NEWS;
File
--
SIR CURTIS KEEBLE, FORMER UK
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 /003 A2
--
AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW DURING AMB.
:
MATLOCK'S TIME; MALCOLM
--
MAC INTOSH, CABINET OFFICER,
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
--
EAST EUROPE EXPERT; DR. ROBERT
SIT: MATL
:
O'NEILL, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
EOB:
--
INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES.
WEDNESDAY PM: ROUND TABLE MEETING ON
:
U.S./USSR RELATIONS AT CHATHAM
ROUTINE
:
HOUSE. PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED
DE RUEHLD #4806 0651209
--
NICHOLAS ASHFORD (ABOVE);
R 061209Z MAR 86
:
ADMIRAL SIR JAMES EBERLE,
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
:
DIRECTOR, CHATHAM HOUSE;
--
ROBERT KLEIMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW;
TO USIA WASHDC 0921
:
DAVID KORN, RESEARCH FELLOW;
NSC WASHDC
:
KEITH KYLE, MEETINGS SECRETARY;
--
WILLIAM WALLACE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
UNCLAS LONDON 04896
--
AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES;
:
JOHN ROPER, EDITOR, INTER-
:
NATIONAL AFFAIRS; PAULINE
USIA
:
NEVILLE-JONES, FOREIGN OFFICE;
USIA FOR EU/KORDEK, REMICK; NSC FOR AMBASSADOR
DINNER:
HOSTED BY PAO ROBERT KORENGOLD.
MATLOCK
:
GUESTS INCLUDED MELVIN LASKY,
:
EDITOR, ENCOUNTER MAGAZINE; MARK
EO 12356: N/A
:
FRANKLAND, COLUMNIST ON SOVIET
:
AFFAIRS FOR THE OBSERVER; DAVID
SUBJECT: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES OF
:
BUCHAN, EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
:
CORRESPONDENT, FINANCIAL TIMES;
:
ALFRED CAHEN, SECRETARY-GENERAL,
:
WEST EUROPEAN UNION.
1. AS AN ADJUNCT TO HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE
MARCH 3-4 USIA/NSC CONFERENCE ON U.S. PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,
2. POST IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL TO AMBASSADOR
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR
MATLOCK FOR HIS WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION IN
DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS, NSC,
POST PROGRAM. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE HIM
CONDUCTED A NUMBER OF HIGHLY USEFUL PUBLIC
RETURN AT ANY TIME.
DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES FOR USIS LONDON. HE MET
KORENGOLD
WITH A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF KEY GOVERNMENT
BT
OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS, AND JOURNALISTS DEALING
WITH EAST-WEST AFFAIRS, OUTLINING IN EACH
INSTANCE U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE NEAR AND LONG
TERM. HIS DETAILED SCHEDULE WAS AS FOLLOWS:
TUESDAY PM: DRINKS AND DISCUSSION WITH LORD
--
BETHELL, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
--
POLITICAL COMMITTEE RAPPORTEUR,
--
ON EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY REPORT
--
ON U.S./EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
:
POLITICAL RELATIONS.
WEDNESDAY AM: MEETINGS WITH CABINET
OFFICE DEPUTY SECRETARY
--
CHRISTOPHER MALLABY; TIMOTHY
--
RENTON, FCO MINISTER OF
--
STATE; DEREK THOMAS, FCO
--
POLITICAL DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY
--
UNDER SECRETARY.
LUNCH:
HOSTED BY DCM RAY SEITZ. GUESTS
--
INCLUDED NICHOLAS ASHFORD,
--
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT, THE
--
TIMES; MICHAEL BRUNSON, DIPLO-
--
MATIC EDITOR, INDEPENDENT TELE-
--
VISION NEWS; PROFESSOR LAWRENCE
--
FREEDMAN, KING'S COLLEGE; NIK
GOWING, FOREIGN AFFAiRS
UNCLASSIFIED