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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections. Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files Folder Title: Matlock Chron June 1985 (2) Box: 9 To see more digitized collections visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected] Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/ WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES Withdrawer JET 6/5/1985 File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1985 (2/4) FOIA F06-114/2 Box Number 9 YARHI-MILO 911 ID Doc Type Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 7438 MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING 1 6/5/1985 B1 WITH VOZNESENSKY R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 7439 MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE 1 6/3/1985 B1 VOZNESENSKY (SAME TEXT AS 7431) R 1/11/2012 M125/2 7440 MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SUMMITRY 2 6/18/1985 B1 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233 7441 MEMO SAME TEXT AS DOC #7440 2 6/18/1985 B1 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233 7442 MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE 1 6/18/1985 B1 GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO YOU R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 7443 MEMO MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE APPROACH 1 6/18/1985 B1 TO U.S.-USSR TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN JUNE 18-19 R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2 7444 REPORT US-USSR TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN SCOPE 8 ND B1 PAPER R 6/23/2010 M125/2 Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift. WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES Withdrawer JET 6/5/1985 File Folder MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1985 (2/4) FOIA F06-114/2 Box Number 9 YARHI-MILO 911 ID Doc Type Document Description No of Doc Date Restrictions Pages 7445 MEMO SAME TEXT AS DOC #7442 1 6/18/1985 B1 R 11/21/2007 F06-114/2 Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)] B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA] B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA] B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA] B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA] B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA] C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift. JM-C 4481 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL June 4, 1985 ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK As SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Mcfarlane from VISA re Chautauqua Conference June 24-28 Daniel Horodysky, Chairman of VISA has written you suggesting that you stress the importance of family visits in your speech at Chautauqua. A courtesy reply is attached for your signature at Tab I. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the letter at Tab I. Approve Disapprove Attachment: Tab I Letter to Mr. Horodysky Tab A Incoming Correspondence 2 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON June 4, 1985 Dear Mr. Horodysky: Thank you for your letter of May 27, 1985 with suggestions for my speech at the Chautauqua Conference. I will certainly keep your suggestions in mind as I prepare my remarks. Sincerely yours, Mr. Daniel Horodysky Chairman Visits International for Soviets and Americans P.O. Box 2361 Berkeley, California 94702 VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa po box 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa May 27, 1985 Robert C. Mc Farlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. Mc Farlane: According to press reports you are to be a participant at the June 24-28 Chautauqua conference on US-Soviet relations. There is one aspect of US-Soviet relations that needs to be separated from all others and focused upon. That is the inability of American and Soviet relatives to visit one another. The enclosed statistics and actual cases tell part of the story. There is a long-standing human tragedy occurring and millions of people have become pawns of politics. For what- ever reasons the US Government continually emphasizes emigration and dissidence. From time to time --- the Madrid talks, for example, --- family visits are mentioned but that is all --- just mentioned. If washington --- and Moscow and the UN are sincere in waging peace there must be a foundation. That foundation exists in family visits and it is being ignored. US and Soviet related persons have missed out on peaceful coexistence, detente, and now the era of dialogue. Please bring this story out during the conference, and beyond, as a representative of millions of unrepresented people. Let the age of family diplomacy start. We beseech you to bring out the facts and speak out. Respectfully, Daniel Horodysky Chairman (415)549-1791 VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa box 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa Visits Between USA and USSR USA to USSR USSR to USA USSR to USA total visits(1) total visits( (1) private visits- includes family visits(2) 1976 65,864 11,960 1,654 1977 57,798 8,347 1,632 1978 53,191 12,124 1,977 1979 44,166 13,838 2,283 1980 12,922 9,734 1,320 1981 22,342 8,323 1,650 1982 28,232 8,027 1,750 1983 38,256 8,018 1,423 1984 35,058 6,035 1,325 (1) World Without War Council, Seattle Office - compiled from US and Soviet sources (2) Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, US Congressional Staff report Following are some actual cases: - One man was prevented from visiting his dying mother. Official permission came about an hour before tour departure thereby making the trip impossible. - A woman was prevented by the Soviet militia from visiting her 93 yr. old grandfather. - An hourly bus was rerouted around an American couple and Soviet relatives trying to visit elderly relatives at a nearby village. Taxi drivers turned down the couple out of fear of losing their job if caught carrying Americans. - Soviet relatives were chased out of Intourist hotels when trying to inquire about relatives on a tour. - A young Soviet girl who applied for a visitor's visa was told to cease her efforts or be in big trouble. - An elderly American was given an unusual 2 month's visa. It was received after it became known that he intended to leave a sizeable sum of money to a Soviet relative. - Soviet authorities refused to send a telegram from an American tourist to Soviet relatives. VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa pobox 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa PURPOSE and GOALS World peace to a great extent depends on good US-USSR relations. Improvement in those relations can result in greater understanding, and eventual relaxation of tension. The Governments of the two States must continually reaffirm their commitment to the development of friendly relations and cooperation, thereby resulting in peace. Fundamental to this commitment is the right and freedom of the many thousands of related persons in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to establish and maintain personal contact and communication with each other. VISA --- Visits International for Soviets and Americans --- is an organization based on Article 13(2) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his [her] own, and to return to his [her] own country." The purpose of VISA is to promote the development of contacts between related persons in the two Countries and to facilitate freer movement of related individuals with the minimum and/or absence of official involvement, determent, and harassment. These contacts will serve as the foundation in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust. The immediate goal is to create a climate conducive to mutual understanding and respect of people at the most common level, which can only have an eventual positive effect on official attitudes. The long range goal is genuine long term meaningful World Peace and cooperation among all peoples. The future of the United Nations and Mankind depend on the concept of free contact among peoples. In the final analysis governments can make treaties but only people can make peace. ВСЕОБЩАЯ ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ПРАВ ЧЕЛОВЕКА Статья 13 OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2. Каждый человек имеет право no- кидать любую cTpaHy, включая свою Article 13. собственную, и возвращаться B свою cTpaMy. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, 10 ДЕКАВРЯ 1948 ГОДА Генеральная Ac- including his own, and to return to his country. самблев Организация Объединенных Ma- and утвердная . провозгавсила Всеоб. mym декларацию apas человека, On DOCAMBER 10. 1945 the General Assembly of the Пранив это решение исторического Liented Name adopsed and precissmed the Lierveras/ - Ассанблев обратилась € призы- Declaration of Human Rights, BOX NO DCBM госулврстван-чаенам OpΓa- Following this bioteric индации обнародовать TEXCT Декларамии act the Assembly called - all Alember CONDITIONS se сделеть ace везможное 120 ... pacnpo- publicize the next of the Declaration and "so - # to страневия, оглашения . разъвснения, be displayed. read and expounded prieci- главным образом . шислах . других pally in schools and other educacional with- учебных заведениях, 683 разанчия, OCNO- - distraction based - the political - of commines Banmers ma волитическом cTaTyce cTpaH or - территорий». VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa pobox 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa Family Diplomacy: Peace starts with relatives getting together. The 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords will soon pass. The Accords were signed by the U.S. ,U.S.S.R., and 33 other countries. They were quite specific as to the question of human contacts--- family visits. It has been 36 years since the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 13(2) states, "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." The Declaration was followed by the Covenant on Civil and Poli- tical Rights. It has been over 50 years since Moscow and Washington established diplomatic relations. A series of Soviet leaders and officials have stated that the Soviet Union wants "normal" relations with the United States. What is more normal than American relatives visiting Soviet relatives, and visa versa? The fact is that there are millions of related persons in the two countries and it is virtually impossible for them to visit one another. They represent many ethnic groups. While Moscow may argue that emigration and dissidence are internal matters, the question of family contacts is an international matter. The Helsinki Accords, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent covenants, diplomatic relations, world peace, and common human decency demand this. Détente overlooked and ignored this basic right. We are now in the period of "dialogue." Everyone wants to meet their counterpart. Shultz and Gromyko, Karpov and Kampel- man, scientist with scientist, physician with physician, peace group with peace group, trade delegation with trade delegation, and BO on. Hopefully soon Reagan will meet Gorbachev. And the problem of family visits will be once again ignored, or perhaps just mentioned. What kind of peace is Moscow, and Washington, and the UN talking about if related individuals cannot maintain normal human contacts? How long does quiet diplomacy take? We are asking for nothing more or less than the right en- Joyed by Messrs. Reagan and Gorbachev, Gromyko and Shults, O'Neill and Shcherbitaky, their predecessors, their success- ors. What better foundation for peace is there? We want the problem of family contacts to be given priority consideration on a continuous basis in Washington, at summit meetings, the forthcoming Ottowa talks, and all appropriate US-Soviet meetings. It should not be a bargain- ing chip or tradeoff! History shows that governments have been dismal failures at waging peace --- let family diplomacy be the foundation for better US-Soviet relations and world peace! 1 Challenge to the Peace Movement Disarmament does not mean peace. Diasarmament is a treaty between governments and is merely a piece of paper. Peace means nations resolving conflicts without war. Peace means people meeting and knowing one another. Peace The key to World Peace rests with US-Soviet relations. There has never & been a good foundation in that relationship. The means to achieve that Disarmament foundation exist There are millions of related persons in the two countries, and they should be allowed to visit one another. The challenge to the peace movement is to make this a reality. *** JUST AS U.S. and SOVIET SOLDIERS EMBRACED IN TRIUMPH AT THE ELBE RIVER, Getting LET U.S. and SOVIET RELATIVES EMBRACE TO WORK FOR WORLD PEACE ! Together Hanna Vasylivna Malitska's father is a Soviet Army veteran. Vasyl Andreivich Malitsky met the U.S. forces on the Elbe in April 1945. Hanna, of the Ternopil Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, has applied to visit relatives in the U.S. She was told by the authorities to stop her efforts or be in big trouble. *** FAMILY DIPLOMACY: PEACE STARTS WITH RELATIVES GETTING TOGETHER Family Diplomacy The number of visas for family visits for Soviet citizens to the United States, even during detente, has averaged about 1000 per year. Because of Soviet policy, most Americans who wish to see relatives are forced to take a tour. Relatives are fortunate to spend precious few hours with one another --- if that I Soviet officials have stated that their citizens cannot afford to visit the U.S. The Soviet government should eliminate one missile and use that money to create a fund for family visits. Such a move will bring us two steps closer towards World Peace! *** HERE'S WHAT YOU CAN DO 1 Write to - Send letters to Secretary General M. Gorbachev, The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR, and to President R. Reagan, The White House, Reagan Washington, DC 20500, requesting that family visits be made and a priority in US-Soviet meetings as the first step towards Gorbachev normalizing relations. -ask why Hanna V. Malitska cannot visit the U.S. *** JOIN VISA Join --- Send in your contributions for real peace! (for further information send a large self-addressed VISA stamped envelope -SASE) Vehics International for Severes and Amer - ВИЗА visa pobox 2361 VISA borkeley, elifernic 94702 P.O. BOX 2361 use BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94702 THE WHITE HOUSE washington May 31, 1985 Loretta, Pls send attached for staffing. Karna Small is handling details for RCM address but this is something that needs to be addressed in substance (Matlock/ Raymond etc). Pls send me a copy for RCM's folder. Thanks. Rcm scheduled to speak at 10:30 Am, fai, San 28. We 9 4486 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Matton June 4, 1985 ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK As SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR LEAVE After attending the Chiefs of Mission Conference in London (June 6-8) I plan to take three days of leave. Attached at TAB 1 is form SF-71 Application for Leave for the period June 10 - 12, 1985. I will be returning from London on June 13 and will be in the office on June 14. RECOMMENDATION That you approve my leave. Approve Walfr Disapprove Attachment: Tab I SF-71 - Application for Leave Mattock 4481 10 CHRO JM-C THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON June 4, 1985 Dear Mr. Horodysky: Thank you for your letter of May 27, 1985 with suggestions for my speech at the Chautauqua Conference. I will certainly keep your suggestions in mind as I prepare my remarks. Sincerely yours, Robert C. McFarlane Mr. Daniel Horodysky Chairman Visits International for Soviets and Americans P.O. Box 2361 Berkeley, California 94702 4481 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL June 4, 1985 ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK As SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. Mcfarlane from VISA re Chautauqua Conference - June 24-28 Daniel Horodysky, Chairman of VISA has written you suggesting that you stress the importance of family visits in your speech at Chautauqua. A courtesy reply is attached for your signature at Tab I. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the letter at Tab I. Approve Disapprove Attachment: Tab I Letter to Mr. Horodysky Tab A Incoming Correspondence VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa box 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa May 27, 1985 Robert C. Mc Farlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. Mc Farlane: According to press reports you are to be a participant at the June 24-28 Chautauqua conference on US-Soviet relations. There is one aspect of US-Soviet relations that needs to be separated from all others and focused upon. That is the inability of American and Soviet relatives to visit one another. The enclosed statistics and actual cases tell part of the story. There is a long-standing human tragedy occurring and millions of people have become pawns of politics. For what- ever reasons the US Government continually emphasizes emigration and dissidence. From time to time --- the Madrid talks, for example, --- family visits are mentioned but that is all --- just mentioned. If washington --- and Moscow and the UN are sincere in waging peace there must be a foundation. That foundation exists in family visits and it is being ignored. US and Soviet related persons have missed out on peaceful coexistence, detente, and now the era of dialogue. Please bring this story out during the conference, and beyond, as a representative of millions of unrepresented people. Let the age of family diplomacy start. We beseech you to bring out the facts and speak out. Respectfully, Daniel Horodysky Chairman (415)549-1791 VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa box 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa Visits Between USA and USSR USA to USSR USSR to USA USSR to USA total visits(1) total visits(1) private visits- includes family visits(2) 1976 65,864 11,960 1,654 1977 57,798 8,347 1,632 1978 53,191 12,124 1,977 1979 44,166 13,838 2,283 1980 12,922 9,734 1,320 1981 22,342 8,323 1,650 1982 28,232 8,027 1,750 1983 38,256 8,018 1,423 1984 35,058 6,035 1,325 (1) World Without War Council, Seattle Office - compiled from US and Soviet sources (2) Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, US Congressional Staff report Following are some actual cases: - One man was prevented from visiting his dying mother. Official permission came about an hour before tour departure thereby making the trip impossible. - A woman was prevented by the Soviet militia from visiting her 93 yr. old grandfather. - An hourly bus was rerouted around an American couple and Soviet relatives trying to visit elderly relatives at a nearby village. Taxi drivers turned down the couple out of fear of losing their job if caught carrying Americans. - Soviet relatives were chased out of Intourist hotels when trying to inquire about relatives on a tour. - A young Soviet girl who applied for a visitor's visa was told to cease her efforts or be in big trouble. - An elderly American was given an unusual 2 month's visa. It was received after it became known that he intended to leave a sizeable sum of money to a Soviet relative. - Soviet authorities refused to send a telegram from an American tourist to Soviet relatives. VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa pobox 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa PURPOSE and GOALS World peace to a great extent depends on good US-USSR relations. Improvement in those relations can result in greater understanding, and eventual relaxation of tension. The Governments of the two States must continually reaffirm their commitment to the development of friendly relations and cooperation, thereby resulting in peace. Fundamental to this commitment is the right and freedom of the many thousands of related persons in the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to establish and maintain personal contact and communication with each other. VISA --- Visits International for Soviets and Americans --- is an organization based on Article 13(2) of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his [her] own, and to return to his [her] own country.' The purpose of VISA is to promote the development of contacts between related persons in the two Countries and to facilitate freer movement of related individuals with the minimum and/or absence of official involvement, determent, and harassment. These contacts will serve as the foundation in the strengthening of friendly relations and trust. The immediate goal is to create a climate conducive to mutual understanding and respect of people at the most common level, which can only have an eventual positive effect on official attitudes. The long range goal is genuine long term meaningful World Peace and cooperation among all peoples. The future of the United Nations and Mankind depend on the concept of free contact among peoples. In the final analysis governments can make treaties but only people can make peace. ВСЕОБЩАЯ ДЕКЛАРАЦИЯ UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ПРАВ ЧЕЛОВЕКА Статья 13 OF HUMAN RIGHTS 2. Каждый человек имеет право no- кидать дюбую cTpaHy, включая свою Article 13. собственную, и возвращаться B свою cTpaMy. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, 10 декавря 1948 ГОДА Генеральная Ac- including his own, and to return to his country. candace Организация Объединеними Ma- and утвердила . провозглесная Всеоб- mym apas человека, On 10 1988 the General Assembly of - Пранев STO решение исторического United Name adopsed and precissmed the Lierversal значения, Ассанблев обратилась c призы- Declaration of Human Rights, sex so BceM Opra- Following the инзации обтародовать TRUCT Декларамин act the Assembly called - all Member - . сделеть BCE возмажное 1.00 ... pacape- publicize the ISSUE of the Declarament and "n - . - странения, огзашения - разъвснения, be desplayed read and espounded главным образом . школах . другия pally se schools and other educaused учебных баз ocHo- distraction hased - political of Banmere sa cTaTyce cTpaH ase территорий». VISA Visits International for Soviets and Americans ВИЗА visa pobox 2361 berkeley, california 94702 usa Family Diplomacy: Peace starts with relatives getting together. The 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords will soon pass. The Accords were signed by the U.S. ,U.S.S.R., and 33 other countries. They were quite specific as to the question of human contacts-- family visits. It has been 36 years since the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 13(2) states, "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." The Declaration was followed by the Covenant on Civil and Poli- tical Rights. It has been over 50 years since Moscow and Washington established diplomatic relations. A series of Soviet leaders and officials have stated that the Soviet Union wants "normal" relations with the United States. What is more normal than American relatives visiting Soviet relatives, and visa versa? The fact is that there are millions of related persons in the two countries and it is virtually impossible for them to visit one another. They represent many ethnic groups. While Moscow may argue that emigration and dissidence are internal matters, the question of family contacts is an international matter. The Helsinki Accords, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent covenants, diplomatic relations, world peace, and common human decency demand this. Détente overlooked and ignored this basic right. We are now in the period of "dialogue." Everyone wants to meet their counterpart. Shultz and Gromyko, Karpov and Kampel- man, scientist with scientist, physician with physician, peace group with peace group, trade delegation with trade delegation, and so on. Hopefully soon Reagan will meet Gorbachev. And the problem of family visits will be once again ignored, or perhaps just mentioned. What kind of peace is Moscow, and Washington, and the UN talking about if related individuals cannot maintain normal human contacts? How long does quiet diplomacy take? We are asking for nothing more or less than the right en- joyed by Messrs. Reagan and Gorbachev, Gromyko and Shultz, O'Neill and Shcherbitsky, their predecessors, their success- ors. What better foundation for peace is there? We want the problem of family contacts to be given priority consideration on a continuous basis in Washington, at summit meetings, the forthcoming Ottowa talks, and all appropriate US-Soviet meetings. It should not be a bargain- ing chip or tradeoff! History shows that governments have been dismal failures at waging peace --- let family diplomacy be the foundation for better US-Soviet relations and world peace! 16 Challenge to the Peace Movement Disarmament does not mean peace. Diasarmament is a treaty between governments and is merely a piece of paper. Peace means nations resolving conflicts without war. Peace means people meeting and knowing one another, Peace The key to World Peace rests with US-Soviet relations. There has never & been a good foundation in that relationship. The means to achieve that Disarmament foundation exist : There are millions of related persons in the two countries, and they should be allowed to visit one another. The challenge to the peace movement is to make this a reality. ### JUST AS U.S. and SOVIET SOLDIERS EMBRACED IN TRIUMPH AT THE ELBE RIVER, Getting LET U.S. and SOVIET RELATIVES EMBRACE TO WORK FOR WORLD PEACE ! Together Hanna Vasylivna Malitska's father is a Soviet Army veteran. Vasyl Andreivich Malitsky met the U.S. forces on the Elbe in April 1945. Hanna, of the Ternopil Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, has applied to visit relatives in the U.S. She was told by the authorities to stop her efforts or be in big trouble. *** FAMILY DIPLOMACY: PEACE STARTS WITH RELATIVES GETTING TOGETHER Family Diplomacy The number of visas for family visits for Soviet citizens to the United States, even during detente, has averaged about 1000 per year. Because of Soviet policy, most Americans who wish to see relatives are forced to take a tour. Relatives are fortunate to spend precious few hours with one another --- if that I Soviet officials have stated that their citizens cannot afford to visit the U.S. The Soviet government should eliminate one missile and use that money to create a fund for family visits. Such a move will bring us two steps closer towards World Peace! *** HERE'S WHAT YOU CAN DO ! Write to - Send letters to Secretary General M. Gorbachev, The Kremlin, Moscow, USSR, and to President R. Reagan, The White House, Reagan Washington, DC 20500, requesting that family visits be made and a priority in US-Soviet meetings as the first step towards Gorbachev normalizing relations. -ask why Hanna V. Malitska cannot visit the U.S. *** JOIN VISA Join --- Send in your contributions for real peace! (for further information send a large self-addressed VISA stamped envelope -SASE) Vers International for Severts and Amer виза visa box 2361 VISA barkeley, california 94702 P.O. BOX 2361 use BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94702 MEMORANDI \1 TM-C THE WHITE HOUSE 4338 WASHINGTON June 5, 1985 Mattub MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY OSBORNE FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE John for SUBJECT: Soviet Emigre Alexander Kaletski's Book Metro We have reviewed Alexander Kaletski's book Metro, and we see no reason why it should not be shown to the President and First Lady. Attachment: Tab A Book titled Metro ALEXANDER KALETSKI A NOVEL OF THE MOSCOW UNDERGROUND ИЙ МПС 4338 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL June 3, 1985 ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK for SUBJECT: Book to the President Titled Metro Kathy Osborne forwarded us a book by Soviet emigre and artist Alexander Kaletski titled Metro. I have reviewed the book and see no reason why it should not be shown to the President and the First Lady. I believe that they will find it most interesting. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the Tab I memorandum to Kathy Osborne. Approve Disapprove Attachments: Tab I Memo to Kathy Osborne Tab A Book on the Moscow underground titled Metro Tab II Incoming 20 4434 MEMORANDUM add-on NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONF IDENTIAL June 5, 1985 INFORMATION FROM: MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFAHLANE Assa RCM HAS SEEN JACK MATLOCK SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Andrei Voznesensky Friday, June 7 at 3:00PM Voznesensky may have some particular topics on his mind to take up with you, but if so, he did not indicate them to me. Some questions you may wish to raise would be: -- Is the situation of artists and writers getting better or worse? How does he see the prospects under Gorbachev? -- Does he have any thoughts on U.S. policy toward cultural exchanges and information? Are we getting through to the intellectuals? Should we do some things differently? -- Can the President do more to make sure the Russian people understand his policy of peace and arms reduction? How can he do this most effectively? As I- mentioned before, Voznesensky has maintained his personal and artistic integrity despite periodic regime attacks on him and constant fights with the censors. Although best known as a poet, he has also done work in the graphic arts, has authored the score of a very popular "rock opera," and is working on another theater production. Before the meeting you might want to glance at a review of his latest book of poetry in English, which came out in 1979, and of a couple of his poems which I translated. One, "Michelangelo's Pieta" illustrates his use of religious themes, and the other, "September," his portrayal of the plight of individuals caught in a system which promises more than it delivers. I would also appreciate your giving him my regards and conveying my regret that I will not be in town to see him during this visit. Attachment: Tab I -- Review and two poems. DECLASSIFIED NLS FD6-114/2#7438 CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07 21 National Security Council The White House System # I 85 JUN 5 P4: 03 Package # 4434Adden SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION Bob Pearson ( P Bob Kimmitt John Poindexter Paul Thompson Wilma Hall Bud McFarlane Bob Kimmitt NSC Secretariat Situation Room Matloch 2 reso I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action CC: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time) Please put time on meeting memos, es, June 7 at p.m. (a.m) Fx. BL Books ily. Knowing he must leave it makes his strates that ancient art has modern res- Smith have given the Russian, both man private world ever more intense, a work onance. Nostalgia for the Present proves and language, a new voice. of art founded on schizpphrenia. that Russia's contemporary poet tells age- At its most eloquent, that voice echoes Not all of Birdy reaches these heights. less parables. the lurching prophecies of Yeats: The conclusion is a letdown, the magic Voznesensky's tenth book reinforces partially dissipated in explanations. Birdy his reputation as a major lyricist and en- A man in the dark, drunkenly and Al are not above dime-store philos- hances his role as the last of the inter- seeking his matchbox, national troubadours, a public man as rec- cries: "Mary is pregnant again, ophizing, attempting to blame their and again the world is not wounds on their cramped pasts. Their rec- ognizable on American campuses as he " ollections, in fact, sound almost idyllic, a is on his own soil. Literary and political ready! Norman Rockwell vision of mischievous celebrities throng these pages: Poets Rob- Or the hellish stanzas of Brecht: childhood with none of the grime and fla- ert Bly, Allen Ginsberg, Lawrence Fer- vor air-brushed out. linghetti, Richard Wilbur are among the You and I, George, let us drink These few flaws arise from excess, many translators; Senator Edward Ken- together, from an ambitious giving of more than is nedy and Playwright Arthur Miller con- in our eyes the wild fires of strictly required. First Novelist William tribute moving forewords. Several poems centuries glow. Wharton (the pseudonym of a Philadel- recall encounters with Robert Lowell, Each sister is raped by her own phia-born painter now in his mid-50s and Robert Kennedy, Boris Pasternak and brother, living in Paris) is nothing if not audacious, Marc Chagall. By all customary standards and nobody knows whose brother and his skills and determination make Voznesensky should be thoroughly cor- is who. good on promises. Like his afflicted hero, rupted by recognition and applause. In- Wharton tries the impossible, and the re- stead, his work has retained its pure, al- sult, though linked to earth, mysteriously most elemental force. soars. - Paul Gray Nearly every poem glistens with iro- ny: the man who is regularly censured at Periscope of home is not one to go gentle into that good night. Muffled by Soviet bureaucra- The Buried Dead cy, he seethes: I'm NOSTALGIA FOR THE PRESENT 35th for a place in Vagankovo by Andrei Voznesensky Cemetery Edited by Vera Dunham and 16th at the optician Max Hayward 110th for an abortion Doubleday; 268 pages; $10 hard-cover, (not pregnant now, but ready when $4.95 paperback my time comes). In "Technology" he admits: artlett's Familiar Quotations spans With all due respect to samovars, some 5,000 years, from the Egyptian in the very middle of this Book of the Dead (circa 3500 B.C.) to the verse of Andrei Voznesensky (born 1933). provincial hole, The book ends are astonishingly appo- I long for plumbing and freedom of thought. site. The King Tut exhibition demon- Throughout, Voznesensky's work is 10111 transfigured by metaphors. A man clothes LEONID LUBIANITSKY himself in a suit, a car, a garage, a nation, a planet, a cosmos-and then realizes that he has forgotten his watch. Timeless, he has lost his place in history. A girl's black Reciting in a Moscow stadium, 1978 bell-bottomed trousers "flare out as shad- ow would flare out/ If the source of light/ Other lines evoke the imagery and Were centered in her belly." The poet attitudes of Auden and Whitman. But moves in his leather jacket, "a cow's hide for the most part Voznesensky recalls stuffed with soul." In "War" he compress- no one except himself. This courageous es the century's anguish to four barbed- and unique writer never retreats into wire lines: metaphysics, never merchandises the jar- With the open eyes of their dead gon of protest. Though all of his works concern human rights, most are addressed fathers to the human condition: to accidental Toward other worlds they gaze death and still more accidental love, to ahead- the encroachments of the state, to the Children who, wide-eyed, become Periscopes of the buried dead. lives of ordinary citizens of any country, who will not succumb to blind authority Nostalgia presents a single poetic vi- or cheap despair. sion and a choir of translators. They are On each page the poet attempts to not of equal worth. Robert Bly makes Voz- contemplate his epoch with the emotions nesensky sound like Robert Bly, all curt of a participant and the eye of a future ob- stanzas and quick vignettes. Ginsberg jet- server. The task is impossible; one can tisons the author's rhymes for some un- no more feel authentic nostalgia for the gainly free verse. The best work is the present than get in front of one's nose. In least obtrusive: working with Voznesen- the end, Voznesensky does not emerge Voznesensky in New York after U.S. tour sky's supple and difficult lines, Max Hay- with perfection, but with something bet- A journey past the language barrier. ward, Vera Dunham and William Jay ter: rare and unsuspected truths that are 74 Can also be translated "Nostalgia for the Real a TIME, JANUARY 15. 1979 double entendre in Russian. the great goals of poetry. In the author's Voznesensky recited for nearly two Milestones indelible metaphor: hours, from memory as he always does. 23 His voice, softened in maturity, was al- MARRIED. Nancy Lopez, 22, champion pro The poet thrusts his body ternately playful, mocking and most often golfer who in her rookie season last year like a tolling bell sorrowing. As a spotlight shot harshly became her sport's top woman money- against the dome of insults. into his face, his gaze turned inward in maker with nearly $200,000 in earnings; It hurts. But it resounds. painful concentration. Asked why he ap- and Timothy Melton, 29, a sportscaster - Stefan Kanfer peared so pained, Voznesensky explained: from Harrisburg, Pa.; both for the first "When I read, I repeat the process of cre- time; in Medford Lakes, N.J. In Russia 14,000 people gathered in ation. I remember my mood when I was a Moscow sports stadium last year to hear writing a poem, as if I had walked into a MARRIED. Sylvia Field Porter, 65, syndicat- Andrei Voznesensky read his verse. As forest. It is necessary masochism; it means ed financial columnist and author; and many as 500,000 Soviet citizens have sub- suffering, but I like it." He even welcomes James F. Fox, 61, New York City-based scribed to buy a volume of his poetry. In the intrusion of the spotlight. "It blinds public relations executive; she for the the U.S. more modest but still impressive me, and I forget about the faces in front third time, he for the first; in Manhattan. numbers of students jam college audito- of me I lose all connection with people. I Porter, whose daily column appears in riums whenever the poet pays a visit. In can say everything then. It is like talking over 400 papers worldwide, once earned New York City after a two-month, 21- to God, to your life and death. On stage, a compliment from a White House read- campus tour (his fifth in the U.S. since you are another person. You belong to er. "Why, goddammit," Lyndon Johnson 1966), Voznesensky charted his journey language." thundered, "can't these economists talk past the language barrier in America. straight like Sylvia?" "At first I was exotic," the 45-year- old poet recalls in fluent, strongly accent- Editors' Choice MARRIAGE REVEALED. Bernardo Bertolucci, ed English. "People were listening to me 38, Italian film director (Last Tango in more for the sound of my poetry than for FICTION: Shosha, Isaac Bashevis Paris, 1900); and Clare Peploe, 31, his Eng- the sense. It helped that in those days I Singer The Cement Garden, Ian lish assistant and onetime companion of McEwan was writing in a more musical and ag- The Coup, John Updike The Flounder, Günter Grass The Film Director Michelangelo Antonioni; gressive style than I am now. My work both for the first time; on Dec. 16, in was also more constructivist. You could Stories of John Cheever, John Rome. Cheever see, and even hear, how my poetry was The World According to Garp, John Irving War and made: the rhythm, rhymes, associations DIED. Olga Deterding, 52, Swiss heiress and metaphors. My poems were easy to Remembrance, Herman Wouk (Royal Dutch/Shell Oil Co.), who fre- catch hold of. When my book, Antiworlds, NONFICTION: A Distant Mirror, quently forsook affluent society to work came out in English, translated by W.H. Barbara W. Tuchman A Jew for Dr. Albert Schweitzer in West Africa; Auden and other marvelous poets, it pre- Today, Elie Wiesel American after choking on a piece of meat at a New pared audiences for the more delicately Caesar, William Manchester E.M. Year's Eve party; in London. Deterding orchestrated poetry I've been writing late- Forster: A Life, P.N. Furbank In first joined Schweitzer's hospital in 1956, ly. It's more surreal, analytical and elusive Search of History, Theodore H. while on an African safari. Assigned such -quite impossible to catch." White The Annotated chores as floor scrubbing and potato peel- On his current tour, Voznesensky's Shakespeare, A.L. Rowse The ing, she stayed for a year, returning at ir- readings have been more muted than his Culture of Narcissism, Christopher regular intervals until Schweitzer's death galvanic performances of the '60s and ear- Lasch in 1965. "There are times when I like to ly '70s. In those days he would scuttle back suffer," said the peripatetic millionaire. and forth across the stage in spurts of con- "Having so much money makes it nec- vulsive energy, flailing the air with one Best Sellers essary to cleanse oneself." hand while his powerful baritone voice FICTION rolled with the rhythms and assonances DIED. Bolaslaw Piasecki, 63, Polish Com- of such poems as Goya, his now famous 1. War and Remembrance, Wouk munist official and chairman of the progo- (1 last week) war dirge. ("I am Goya/ of the bare field, vernment Roman Catholic organization by the enemy's beak gouged/ till the cra- 2. Chesapeake, Michener (2) called PAX; of a thrombotic ailment, Buer- ters of my eyes gape." 3. The Stories of John Cheever, ger's disease; in Warsaw. Jailed by the So- Cheever (5) viets in 1944, he reportedly bartered for 4. Second Generation, Fast (3) n contrast, at Voznesensky's reading his eedom by agreeing to establish an as- 5. Fools Die, Puzo (4) last month in Joseph Papp's Public sociation of "patriotic" Catholics. Found- Theater in New York City, the poet cre- 6. Evergreen, Plain (6) ed in 1945, PAX was scorned by many Pol- ated an atmosphere of almost monastic se- 7. The Far Pavilions, Kaye (9) ish Catholics (including the present Pope) renity. A large, white, Russian Orthodox 8. The Coup, Updike (10) as a tool of the regime designed to split the church candle burning on the podium pro- 9. The Empty Copper Sea, church. Its influence began to wane in the MacDonald (7) vided virtually the only lighting. "It is early 1960s as Warsaw and Rome started more intimate for you, my friends," Voz- 10. Eye of the Needle, Follett seeking an accommodation. In 1971, Pia- nesensky explained to an audience that NONFICTION secki was appointed a member of the 16- included Mstislav Rostropovich, Arthur 1. Mommie Dearest, Crawford (1) man Council of State. Schlesinger Jr. and C.P. Snow. As Poet 2. A Distant Mirror, Tuchman (3) William Jay Smith, a favored translator 3. American Caesar, Manchester (2) DIED. Conrad N. Hilton, 91, financial wizard and friend, read English versions from 4. Gnomes, Huygen & Poortvliet (5) who parlayed a small Texas hotel into Nostalgia for the Present, Voznesensky 5. In Search of History, White (4) an international chain of 261 hostelries; could be glimpsed in the wings, his slight 6. Faeries, Froud & Lee (7) of pneumonia; in Santa Monica, Calif. (see figure rigid with apprehension, as if 7. If Life Is a Bowl of Cherries ECONOMY & BUSINESS). braced for combat. Following the Eng- -What Am I Doing in the Pits?, lish readings, Voznesensky moved for- Bombeck (6) DIED. Julia Rush Biddle Henry, 92, diminutive ward to recite the Russian originals. 8. The Complete Book of Running, grande dame of Philadelphia society, Among them was a new poem: "Fighting Fixx (8) whose daily jogs throughout her 80s eternal idiocy,/ born to the greatest deeds 9. Tutankhamun: The Untold Story, helped keep her weight at 88 lbs. and her there are,/ the literature of Russia/ con- Hoving (9) name on the world's best-dressed lists; in ducts civil war." 10. Jackie Oh!, Kelley (10) Chestnut Hill, Pa. TIME, JANUARY 15. 1979 75 ПИЕТА МИКЕЛАНДЖЕЛО MICHAELANGELO'S PIETA What hosts of incomprehension were there Сколько было тьмы непониманья, чтоб ладонь прибитая Христа that Christ's pierced palm stretched out to us for cleansing протянула HaM для умыванья пригорошни, полные стыда? cupped hands full of shame? And again on pitch-dark waters и опять Ha непроглядных водах draining from a defiled pond cToKoM ocKBepHeHHoΓo пруда a lily grasps for air -- ЛИЛИЯ хватается 3a воздух - like Christ's pierced palm. KaK ладонь прибитая Христа. SEPTEMBER СЕНТЯБРЬ Your black Volga chases distant headlights into a grove of golden disillusionment. воя «Волга» черная гонит фары дальние рощи золоченого разочарования. The devlish laser of will, early motherhood speeds into a golden disillusionment оли лазер чертовый, материнство paHHee чится B золоченое разочарование! They promised you gold -- they gave you brass. And the dawn brings home the disillusionment, осулили золото - - дали caMoBapHoe. I зарей подчеркнуто разочарование above the black plain and above the torn clouds weeps the golden disillusionment' ад равниной черною и над тучей рваною лачет золоченое разочарование! A diamond dust in the grove, like over a waterfall, asks you to press the brakes when the trees are shedding leaves. роще пыль алмазная - - KaK над водопадом росит пригормаживать B пору листопада. Don't race the car, my dear. Drive with care into that golden disillusionment. e гони, шоферочка! Берегись аварии это золоченое разочарование. 7439 4434 JM-C MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Mattant SECRET June 3, 1985 ACTION FROM: MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE ASE JACK MATLOCK SUBJECT: Russian Poet Voznesensky's Desire to Meet with President I understand that an appointment has been set for you to meet with Andrei Voznesensky on Friday, June 7. I believe you will find him a very interesting person to talk to. You should also be aware that Voznesensky has expressed an interest in seeing the President. I have known Voznesensky for about 25 years and have translated some of his poetry. He is an outstanding example of an artist who has retained his integrity while staying within the requirements of the system sufficiently to avoid expulsion or imprisonment. I hosted him at a small dinner May 24, at which time he made several penetrating comments about the system and its impact on creativity. (He is one of the intellectuals who feels that there is political rivalry between Gorbachev and Gromyko. He also spoke at length about techniques for getting non-official messages past the censors. His own poetry has a heavy religious cast; in this respect his attitude is very close to Pasternak's -- and Pasternak was his mentor when he got his start in poetry.) Since Voznesensky can speak with insight on several of the topics the President is interested in, the President might enjoy a few minutes with him. Voznesensky has met several other world leaders and recently was granted a private audience with the Pope. He told me that if he could see the President, he would appreciate it being done without publicity, since that would only create problems for him at home. While I would normally be eager to attend any meetings with Andrei, I will be in London Friday at the Chief of Mission conference. Recommendation: That you try to arrange for Voznesensky to see the President, if you think the President would be interested and his calendar permits. DECLASSIFIED SECRET Approve pcm Disapprove NLRRM08-125/2#7439 Declassify on: OADR BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12 R mataclane THE WHITE HOUSE Chron- Jene 85 to WASHINGTON tive amb Jack matlock UNCLASSIFIED OF CAS CLASSIFIED UPON the 4/17/12 OSHREIC REMOVAL PRESERVATION COPY Classified THE WHITE HOUSE Summitry 21 WASHINGTON Eyes only Mat lock Classified PRESERVATION COPY UNCLASSIFIED CAS 6/17/02 UPON REMOVAI JFM07 Jul-C MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET 'SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY June 18, 1985 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM: JACK MATLOCK SUBJECT: Summitry Mark Palmer mentioned to me last night that he understood that you and Secretary Shultz would be meeting with Dobrynin to deliver a reply on Gorbachev's meeting suggestion, and that he understood that we would be proposing Geneva. I hope Mark's information is garbled, and that this is not the case. On the possibility that he misunderstood the current state of play, I would like to submit the following thoughts for your consideration: 1. It is undesirable to respond too quickly to Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting in Europe, since that will reinforce the impression that the President wants a meeting more than he does. This is particularly true given the conflicting signals we have received. regarding Gorbachev's own desires. 2. The fact of the matter is that a meeting in a third country in Europe is, in most respects, the least attractive of the three alternatives. I say this because it is the variant which puts the least pressure on the Soviets to change some of their policies in order to insure a successful meeting. These pressures are greater if they receive an American President there, and also if they send their leader here. And our historical experience has been that meetings in third countries tend to be either failures or sterile (Kennedy-Khrushchev in DECLASSIFIED NARA, DATE 11/21/07 Vienna and Carter-Brezhnev, also in Vienna -- the latter sterile in the sense that SALT-II had already been negotiated, and even if that is considered an achievement, it was not an achievement of the meeting). I believe these factors should be carefully considered by the President before he is encouraged to move in the direction of a meeting in a third country. 3. If there is some difference between Gromyko's desires regarding a meeting and Gorbachev's, then a quick acceptance of the proposal in the letter (which bears all the earmarks of LOJ having been written in the Foreign Ministry) simply hands Gromyko NLS an easy victory. We should be cautious about doing this until we get a better feel for Gorbachev's real desires. SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - 2 - 4. For this reason, I would strongly recommend that we delay a reply for a couple of weeks, and use the time to have the Agency contact try to find out from Ryzhkov what Gorbachev really wants. I still suspect that he would prefer to come to the U.S., and if this is the only way he can get a meeting, he might well agree. 5. Rather than agreeing precipitously to a third country, we should give careful thought to the advantages and disadvantages of the President going to Moscow. I don't like the idea of his making the trip first any more than the others, but I believe that if we cannot have a meeting here, one there would almost certainly be more productive than one in a third country. Given the Soviet approach to these things, it would put them under pressure, at a minimum, to moderate their propaganda attacks and start making some gestures in the human rights field. It would make it most difficult for them to continue to portray the President as a threat, since the symbolism of his visit would undermine this claim -- certainly among the Russian people and probably also in Western Europe. None of these advantages are gained from a meeting in a third country, which in fact maximizes the liabilities (high public expectations) and minimizes the leverage for Soviet performance. In sum, unless an irrevocable decision has already been made, I would strongly recommend that we slow down, give some careful thought to these nuances, and play our cards deliberately. I would appreciate an opportunity to see you briefly as soon as you can make time, in order to obtain your guidance on several ongoing issues. SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 30 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY June 18, 1985 INFORMATION set it MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM: JACK MATLOCK fam SUBJECT: Summitry mty Mark Palmer mentioned to me last night that he understood that you and Secretary Shultz would be meeting with Dobrynin to deliver a reply on Gorbachev's meeting suggestion, and that he understood that we would be proposing Geneva. I hope Mark's information is garbled, and that this is not the case. On the possibility that he misunderstood the current state of play, I would like to submit the following thoughts for your consideration: 1. It is undesirable to respond too quickly to Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting in Europe, since that will reinforce the impression that the President wants a meeting more than he does. This is particularly true given the conflicting signals we have received regarding Gorbachev's own desires. 2. The fact of the matter is that a meeting in a third country in Europe is, in most respects, the least attractive of the three alternatives. I say this because it is the variant which puts the least pressure on the Soviets to change some of their policies in order to insure a successful meeting. These pressures are greater if they receive an American President there, and also if they send their leader here. And our historical experience has been that meetings in third countries tend to be either failures or sterile (Kennedy-Khrushchev in Vienna and Carter-Brezhnev, also in Vienna -- the latter sterile in the sense that SALT-II had already been negotiated, and even if that is considered an achievement, it was not an achievement of the meeting). I believe these factors should be carefully considered by the President before he is encouraged to move in the direction of a meeting in a third country. 3. If there is some difference between Gromyko's desires regarding a meeting and Gorbachev's, then a quick acceptance of the proposal in the letter (which bears all the earmarks of having been written in the Foreign Ministry) simply hands Gromyko an easy victory. We should be cautious about doing this until we get a better feel for Gorbachev's real desires. DECLASSIFIED NLS F06-114/2-# 7441 SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/21/07 31 SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - 2 - 4. For this reason, I would strongly recommend that we delay a reply for a couple of weeks, and use the time to have the Agency contact try to find out from Ryzhkov what Gorbachev really wants. I still suspect that he would prefer to come to the U.S., and if this is the only way he can get a meeting, he might well agree. 5. Rather than agreeing precipitously to a third country, we should give careful thought to the advantages and disadvantages of the President going to Moscow. I don't like the idea of his making the trip first any more than the others, but I believe that if we cannot have a meeting here, one there would almost certainly be more productive than one in a third country. Given the Soviet approach to these things, it would put them under pressure, at a minimum, to moderate their propaganda attacks and start making some gestures in the human rights field. It would make it most difficult for them to continue to portray the President as a threat, since the symbolism of his visit would undermine this claim -- certainly among the Russian people and probably also in Western Europe. None of these advantages are gained from a meeting in a third country, which in fact maximizes the liabilities (high public expectations) and minimizes the leverage for Soviet performance. In sum, unless an irrevocable decision has already been made, I would strongly recommend that we slow down, give some careful thought to these nuances, and play our cards deliberately. I would appreciate an opportunity to see you briefly as soon as you can make time, in order to obtain your guidance on several ongoing issues. SECRET/SENSITIVE/EVES ONLY JM06 4910 MEMORANDUM J4-C NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 32 CONFIDENTIAL June 18, 1985 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM: JACK MATLOCK JEM SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Reference to Remarks Attributed to You You will recall that I mentioned to you the report from the Italians that Gorbachev had told Craxi that he had just received a cable from Dobrynin which reported that you had "confirmed nonchalantly" that the negotiations in Geneva had no prospect of success and had "insisted on the importance of a summit meeting." Hartman reported this from Moscow and was instructed to inform those allied missions briefed by the Italians that the purported quotations were a total fabrication. State subsequently raised the matter with Sokolov, pointing out NLS F06-114/2# 2442 NARA, DATE 11/21/07 that such misquotations damage Dobrynin's reputation as a reliable reporter. Sokolov said that he would discuss the matter with Dobrynin and attempt to obtain an explanation. The next day, Sokolov telephoned Simons to say that Dobrynin had DECLASSIFIED sent two cables to Moscow, one reporting conversations at Ken Dam's farewell reception, which included conversations with you and Secretary Shultz, the latter touching on the summit question, and one reporting on his luncheon conversation with Kampelman, which dealt primarily with the Geneva negotiations. Dobrynin speculated that Gorbachev had read both cables and had mixed up the identity of the interlocutors. Comment: Even if it is true that Gorbachev mixed up a cable reporting a conversation with Kampelman with one reporting on a conversation with you and/or Shultz, it does not explain why Gorbachev received such a distorted view of what was said. Certainly Max was not as negative on the prospects for Geneva as was reported, nor could Shultz's comments on the possibility of a summit be considered "insisting on its importance." I believe that we should consider this incident as clear warning of the danger of depending largely on Dobrynin to convey our messages to Moscow. It is obvious either that his reporting is inaccurate, or that his commentary puts a twist on the conversation so that his report leaves a distorted impression on his readers. The lesson for us should be clear: if we want to be understood accurately in Moscow, we better make sure that the message is conveyed directly by our own people. CONF IDENTIAL 7443 SYSTEM II MEMORANDUM 90681 33 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Matlock SECRET/SENSITIVE June 18, 1985 ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM: JACK MATLOCK Asm SUBJECT: Approach to U.S.-Soviet Talks on Afghanistan, June 18-19 State has finally submitted a scope paper for the talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan today and tomorrow. These are consistent with the approach worked out in consultation with Don Fortier, Steve Sestanovich and me, but the paper arrived too late for us to give formal approval before the talks. At this late date I see no point in your taking time to read the paper; a report on the outcome (if any) of the talks should be available shortly. Steve Sestanovich and Jock Covey concur. Recommendation: That you ask Bill Martin to request State to submit scope papers for important consultations in more timely fashion in the future. Approve of Disapprove I Attachment: TAB A U.S. -Soviet Talks on Afghanistan: Scope Paper CC: Don Fortier SECRET / SENSITIVE By White House Guidelines, August 28, 1907 DECLASSIFIED NARA, Date 2/16/19 United States Department of State 34 Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II 90681 June 17, 1985 SECRET SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE SUBJECT: Approach to U.S. Soviet Talks on Afghanistan Attached for your concurrence is a scope paper out- lining the U.S. approach to the U.S. - -Soviet Talks on Afghanistan scheduled for June 18-19 in Washington. Mucholes Mair Mucholas Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary SECRET/SENSITIVE DECL: OADR DECLASSIFIED Department By Crs of State NARA, Guidelines, Date 6/17/02 July 21, 1997 7444 35 SECRET/SENSITIVE SUBJECT: US-Soviet Talks on Afghanistan: Scope Paper I. THE SETTING Our experts' talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan come at a difficult moment in the conflict. Under the new leadership in Moscow, the Soviets are carrying the war to the resistance and the Afghan civilian population with increasing purpose and brutality and are stepping up their diplomatic and military pressure on Pakistan. This forward-leaning approach is tempered by occasional hints of flexibility on Moscow's part. The Pakistan Government has responded firmly to this increased militancy but is anxious for continued long-term support from the U.S. Now that the Pakistanis have begun a process of democratization, sustaining public support for their cooperation with us and for their tough stand on the Afghanistan issue may become a problem. In these circumstances, we are in a position to advance our interests in several ways. We will want to reiterate to them that Afghanistan is a major obstacle to improvement of relations between us, that our support for Pakistan is unwavering, that we support the elements of a solution to the problem outlined in successive UNGA resolutions and the U.N. negotiations as a means of achieving this outcome, and that, were the Soviets genuinely willing to seek a negotiated solution, we would explore seriously the prospect of giving some form of U.S. guarantee to an overall settlement. As to the issue itself, we will reassert that the inter-relationship of Soviet troop withdrawal and the the other eleménts of a comprehensive settlement is the core of the problem and will try to see if there has been any change in Moscow's position on this point. Finally, our presentation will be designed in such a way that, if, as we expect, there is no give to the Soviet position, we will be in a good position to exploit their intransigence in our public diplomacy. In sum, although we doubt our talks with the Soviets will produce substantive progress, they should benefit our relationship with Pakistan as well as our public diplomatic posture. We have consulted closely with the Pakistanis, who have stressed the importance they attach to our holding these talks, and to our projecting an impression of seriousness in our presentations. From their comments, we have a precise idea as to how we can further their interests as we serve our own. Ensuring that our ideas are heard by the Soviets, following SECRET/SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED NLRRM08-125/2#7444 BY KML NARA DATE 6/25/10 34 SECRET/SENSITIVE - 2 - through with more U.S.-Pakistani consultations after the talks, and working together when appropriate to exploit likely Soviet intransigence publicly should serve to enhance our relations with Islamabad. If we learn something from the Soviets in the process, and perhaps do something to disabuse them of the notion that we are out to "get" them in Afghanistan, so much the better. II. U.S. OBJECTIVES A. To reiterate that the Afghanistan issue is important to us both as a matter of principle and because it is a major obstacle to the development of constructive relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Our stand requires that we continue to give all appropriate forms of support to the Afghan resistance and to the Pakistan Government. B. To emphasize that we stand behind the Pakistanis and that Soviet attempts to put pressure on Islamabad risk a widening of the conflict. That we are discussing Afghanistan with the Soviets is to be a reassurance to doubters in Pakistan that we are seriously interested in peace. C. While we are not and will not be a party to the negotiations on Afghanistan, to confirm our support for a negotiated solution to the conflict which is based on all elements of successive UNGA resoutions and in which the interests of all parties are recognized, for the U.N. negotiator's efforts, and for the peace agreement framework he has devised. We do not seek a strategic position for ourselves in Afghanistan but rather a return to the country's former independent and non-aligned status in which Soviet security interests were met. D. To explore the substance of the Soviet position with a view to determining whether there has been any shift in the Soviet attitude towards the conflict generally and on the linkage between Soviet troop withdrawals and other elements of a settlement in particular. E. To position ourselves to exploit in our diplomatic exchanges the intransigent Soviet attitude we expect will emerge from these talks. III. SOVIET OBJECTIVES 1. The Soviets will presumably want to project continuity in policy during a time of leadership transition. In particular we believe they will stress that they will not be forced to quit SECRET/SENSITIVE 31 SECRET/SENSITIVE - 3 - Afghanistan by the military pressure of the mujahidin. This is likely to be expressed in their formal statements, which will be tough and unyielding; it may also be reflected in Soviet military action on the ground before the talks. The Soviets might see the latter as a signal to us of their determination to stay the course. 2. Pakistan, and our support for Islamabad, will be a specific Soviet target. After impressing upon us their intention of toughing it out in Afghanistan, the Soviets are likely to point out Pakistan's "complicity" in supplying the "bandits" in Afghanistan and the possible negative consequences for regional security (read increased Soviet military pressures on Islamabad). We will need to make clear that Soviet efforts to bully Pakistan, to whom we have a strong commitment, are futile. 3. We assume that the Soviets will want to avoid any discussion of the DRA regime in Afghanistan and specifically any changes in the composition of the current Karmal government. These issues may, however, come up in conversations on the margin of the talks and may shed some light on whether the hints we have picked up about possible Soviet interest in kicking Karmal upstairs might have some substance. Without explicitly drawing the link to the future of the Karmal regime, we will want to impress on the Soviets that any negotiated settlement will have to address the concerns of the mujahidin. 4. The Soviets have already heard Dick Murphy's presentation on Afghanistan and will be listening carefully to see if we have modified our position on Afghanistan in any way. They will be particularly interested in seeing if this might include a willingness to cut a deal which would sacrifice Afghanistan in return for a Soviet concession somewhere else. 5. Based on the record of Murphy and Crocker's meetings, the Soviets will try to strike a pose of aggrieved reasonableness. They may also seek to use the fact of these talks to deflect criticism of their Afghan policy, by arguing with some interlocutors that they remain flexible and interested in pursuing negotiations, while we remain committed to pursuing the war against the Karmal regime rather than ending it by negotiation. IV. U.S. PRESENTATION Our opening presentation to the Soviets should contain the following elements: SECRET/SENSITIVE 38 SECRET/SENSITIVE - 4 - A. Nature of the Problem: We see the mujahidin military activity and popular opposition to the Soviet occupation and to the Kabul regime also rising. We see the cost in Soviet men, materiel, and other resources (including Soviet prestige) rising. After five and a half years of fighting, loss of life and destruction of property continue to increase. The bombardment of civilian targets has intensified, forcing more and more Afghans to abandon their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. International condemnation of what is happening in Afghanistan is expressed virtually unanimously at the United Nations and in other international gatherings. Any possible doubt either that the war in Afghanistan is anything other than a national liberation struggle by an entire people against a foreign occupier and an oppressive, foreign-imposed regime or that the Afghan people reject the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan as their representative has long since been dispelled. A symbol of this national resolve is the decision of the major resistance groups to join in a single alliance which will speak for the Afghan people throughout the world. Our position in support of the Afghan people, and of the Government of Pakistan, is a principled one. It is based on the bedrock of American public opinion, expressed directly and through the elected representatives of the people, that the United States has a moral obligation to stand behind a cause that is just. The expressions of support for this policy from Congress are strong across the board. The unambiguous nature of the Afghanistan situation means that there is no alternative to continuing our present policy towards the conflict and to maintaining our unwavering commitments to the Pakistan Government. In these circumstances, the Afghanistan issue cannot but remain a major obstacle to the emergence of a more normal and constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. What is happening in Afghanistan inevitably raises questions as to whether measures aimed at reducing tensions should even be attempted and creates a climate of suspicion. As a result, everything else in our relationship is made more difficult while the Soviet Union is waging war in Afghanistan. For us, it is the outstanding example of Soviet willingness to use military force to impose political solutions unacceptable to third countries and parties without regard to the consequences in our bilateral relations. We attach major importance to developing a constructive relationship and therefore welcome the opportunity both to discuss the Afghanistan problem and to seek practical means of resolving it. SECRET/SENSITIVE SECRET/SENSITIVE - 5 - B. The U.S. Position: For the United States, Afghan affairs are ordinarily of slight interest. The Soviet Union will always have great influence in Afghanistan. A negotiated solution should be the most attractive of the options the Soviet Union currently faces, but we have not yet seen any sign of a serious Soviet commitment to this course. Other Soviet choices include an escalation of the war or allowing the present standoff to continue indefinitely. Each of these latter alternatives is grim. The first would involve a sharp increase both in the number of Soviet casualties and in the suffering inflicted on the Afghan people. The war would become an even larger issue in the eyes of the world, and the international opprobrium the Soviet Union would face could be expected to grow. Also, given the record of the Afghan resistance up to now, it is questionable whether such tactics would succeed in ending the conflict in the near or middle term. As for continuing the present course, the prospect of more casualties over an indefinite time period, of continued tension in the sub-continent with the attendant risk of a widening of the war, and of growing criticism of Soviet policies by the world community must not be an attractive one from Moscow's point of view. Serious negotiations offer a possibility of resolving the conflict in a way satisfactory to all concerned. The U.S. position, which has always been consistent with the U.N. resolutions, is that a comprehensive settlement include the following elements: (a) withdrawal of Soviet troops; (b) restoration of Afghanistan's independence and non-alignment within internationally recognized borders; (c) safe and honorable return of the refugees; and (d) the opportunity for the Afghan people to determine their own political future. The Cordovez talks have produced a framework upon which such a comprehensive settlement could be built. These negotiations could go forward on the basis of the following principles: 1. Inter-Relationship of Troop Withdrawal and Other Elements of a Comprehensive Settlement: The heart of the Afghanistan problem is the relationship between the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the other elements of a comprehensive settlement of the Afghanistan problem. If the principle can be established that troop withdrawals would take place in the same timeframe in which other elements of the settlement were being brought into force and becoming practical realities, and if the timeframe for withdrawals were both specific and short, a great step towards peace will have been taken, and an internationally SECRET/SENSITIVE 40 SECRET/SENSITIVE - 6 - guaranteed settlement could be envisaged. There are, of course, other knotty problems which must be resolved, but this, it seems to us, is the core issue. 2. Respect for the Interests of All Parties: A settlement of the Afghanistan issue involves the restoration of the country's independent and non-aligned status. As President Reagan wrote to Chairman Gorbachev earlier this year, the United States would like to see "a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference." Contrary to charges made from time to time by the Kabul authorities, the United States does not seek the transformation of Afghanistan into a base for future anti-Soviet activities. Over many decades, and with Afghan regimes of all kinds, we have been content to have no role. This was so even though the Soviet Union did have a major role in Afghan affairs. At the same time, as President Reagan wrote to Chairman Gorbachev, we recognize the interest of the Afghan people in living under a government of their own choosing and of the Soviet Union in having a secure southern frontier. We also recognize, as part of an overall settlement, the importance of procedures for the safe and honorable return of the refugees to their homes. 3. Mutual Confidence: Finally, although the United States is not involved in Afghanistan peace negotiations, we believe that a measure of mutual confidence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is important to the success of such discussions. Unfortunately, such confidence is lacking at present. We, for example, believe we have seen a discrepancy between Soviet professions of an interest in peace and the realities on the ground inside the country. At the same time, the Soviets continue to make known their skepticism at our insistence that we have no ulterior motives in seeking a withdrawal of their forces from Afghanistan. V. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON DISCUSSIONS The foregoing presentation in itself serves the first three of our objectives and at the same time leaves the Soviets openings for further discussion should they choose to pursue them. As indicated above, we expect the Soviets will stake out a tough position in their reply to our presentation, and it is conceivable that their statement will be entirely rhetorical. If this is the case, we will rebut their arguments as necessary and allow the talks to come to an end with most of our objectives fulfilled. SECRET/SENSITIVE 41 SECRET/SENSITIVE - 7 - If, on the other hand, the Soviets make it clear that they are interested in exploring some of our ideas more fully, we will be prepared to set forth a few of our ideas in more detail and to make one specific suggestion to them. At the beginning of this part of our presentation, we will reiterate the point that we are not a party to the conflict in Afghanistan and have neither the wish nor the intention to negotiate with them on the issue. We will then stress that the problem nonetheless causes us major and growing concern and that we have had occasion to think carefully about ways of resolving it. The role we might play in the endorsement of a comprehensive solution to the problem is a subject which might bear further discussion. How we approach this issue will be governed by the Soviet approach to the overall question of a negotiated solution. We may, for example, get an indication from their presentation that they are seriously considering Cordovez's latest formulation and that, specifically, they recognize the need for an "inter-relationship instrument" in which the link between Soviet troop withdrawal and other aspects of the settlement is recognized. In this situation, we might counter by reiterating our view that some sort of international endorsement or undertaking to guarantee all elements of such a settlement would be appropriate and desirable, while pressing the point that any guarantees should apply to the entire agreement, not just cessation of outside interference. There is a small chance that the Soviets will go farther, perhaps indicating, as academician Evgeni Primakov did in a recent Washington Post interview, that they recognize the linkage between troop withdrawal and cessation of "outside interference" and that they do not intend to force socialism on an unwilling recipient. In this event, we might want to be more specific about our interest in facilitating the withdrawal of their troops and in endorsing an overall agreement that was acceptable to all the parties. We will also be alert for any sign that the Soviets are interested in exploring formulas that would link the withdrawal of their troops from Afghanistan to other aspects of a comprehensive settlement. The latest word from the Pakistanis and U.N. negotiator Cordovez is that the Soviets have for the first time agreed to accept the principle that a "mother document" mentioning troop withdrawal could be part of an overall agreement. They have apparently not, however, agreed to giving this document any juridical status. There is not much we can contribute in this domain except to encourage the linkage of SECRET/SENSITIVE SECRET/SENSITIVE - 8 - troop withdrawal with other elements of the settlement and to press for a specific, short timeframe for getting Soviet forces out of the country. During our consultations, the Pakistanis noted that one question which greatly interested the Soviets was prisoner exchange. We said we had decided not to pursue this issue since the ICRC was being denied access to Kabul's Pul-i-Charkhi jail and therefore could not play its proper role and since, in any case, it was our understanding that the Soviets did not take mujahidin prisoners. The Pakistanis said they understood the Soviets might be willing to make some concessions which would facilitate a genuine exchange of prisoners and subsequently asked that we suggest to the Soviets that they pressure the Kabul authorities to grant the ICRC access to its resistance prisoners. In return, the Pakistanis said they would be willing to use their good offices with the resistance to reactivate the process of having Soviet prisoners sent to Switzerland for a two-year period following which the prisoners could choose to go back to the Soviet Union or to seek asylum elsewhere. The Pakistanis asked that we make their offer of good offices known to the Soviets. If the atmosphere in our talks warrants it, we plan to pass on the Pakistani request and offer. V. LIKELY SOVIET REACTION AND POST-TALKS U.S. POSTURE As noted above, we are skeptical that the Soviets will be any more forthcoming in this round of talks than they were in any of our previous discussions on the Afghanistan issue, and we doubt that we will get very far into a discussion of the issues described in the previous section. Nevertheless, our intention is to signal Moscow that, while we remain unyielding on major questions of principle, we are prepared to facilitate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan should they prove seriously interested in leaving. At this juncture, it seems particularly important to emphasize the centrality of the relationship between troop withdrawal and the other elements of a general settlement and to stress the need for the timeframe for troop withdrawal to be short. In the 1982 talks we spent much of the time discussing the need for the removal of the Karmal regime in Kabul as a pre-condition for a settlement. As a practical matter this would be necessary as part of a genuine settlement. It is a point, however, which the Soviets are unwilling to consider and whose discussion in 1982 led to a sterile exchange as to whether the conflict were the result of conditions inside Afghanistan or, as the Soviets insist, the situation "around" the country. We should focus this time on the issue which is central to the achievement of a comprehensive settlement. SECRET/SENSITIVE 4910 MEMORANDUM JM-C NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONFIDENTIAL June 18, 1985 DECLASSIFIED NLS F06-114/2#7445 NARA, DATE 11/21/07 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE RCM HAS SEEN FROM: JACK MATLOCK fem SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Reference to Remarks Attributed to You You will recall that I mentioned to you the report from the Italians that Gorbachev had told Craxi that he had just received a cable from Dobrynin which reported that you had "confirmed nonchalantly" that the negotiations in Geneva had no prospect of success and had "insisted on the importance of a summit meeting." Hartman reported this from Moscow and was instructed to inform those allied missions briefed by the Italians that the purported quotations were a total fabrication. State subsequently raised the matter with Sokolov, pointing out that such misquotations damage Dobrynin's reputation as a reliable reporter. Sokolov said that he would discuss the matter with Dobrynin and attempt to obtain an explanation. The next day, Sokolov telephoned Simons to say that Dobrynin had sent two cables to Moscow, one reporting conversations at Ken Dam's farewell reception, which included conversations with you and Secretary Shultz, the latter touching on the summit question, and one reporting on his luncheon conversation with Kampelman, which dealt primarily with the Geneva negotiations. Dobrynin speculated that Gorbachev had read both cables and had mixed up the identity of the interlocutors. Comment: Even if it is true that Gorbachev mixed up a cable reporting a conversation with Kampelman with one reporting on a conversation with you and/or Shultz, it does not explain why Gorbachev received such a distorted view of what was said. Certainly Max was not as negative on the prospects for Geneva as was reported, nor could Shultz's comments on the possibility of a summit be considered "insisting on its importance." I believe that we should consider this incident as clear warning of the danger of depending largely on Dobrynin to convey our messages to Moscow. It is obvious either that his reporting is inaccurate, or that his commentary puts a twist on the conversation so that his report leaves a distorted impression on agre his readers. The lesson for us should be clear: if we want to be understood accurately in Moscow, we better make sure that the message is conveyed directly by our own people. CONF IDENTIAL 4672 JM JMCH4 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL June 20, 19PMI ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK Jan mult SUBJECT: Letter from Armand Hammer Armand Hammer wrote you notifying you that he would be seeing Gorbachev June 17 and offering "to render any assistance you may wish. " It of course is not our policy to use Hammer to pass specific messages. Since I understand that an appointment has been set for Hammer to see the President briefly on June 24, I believe a reply to Hammer's June 6 letter is unnecessary. Sestanovich, Robinson na and Martin concur. 85 RECOMMENDATION That you thank Hammer for his letter when you see him June 24. Approve m Disapprove Attachments: Tab A Letter from Armand Hammer with attachments Haff Mattock 4673 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD SUITE 1600 RCM HAS SEEN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024 (213) 879-1700 (213) 208-8800 ARMAND HAMMER CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER June 6, 1985 The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Bud: I was informed today that I will be meeting with General Secretary Ghorbachev in the Kremlin on June 17th. I have written to notify the President and George Shultz and am prepared to render any assistance you may wish. A copy of my letter to the President is attached. I enjoyed the recent New York Times Sunday piece on you and am very glad that all is going so well with your own career. With every best wish, I am, Sincerely, annund Attachment AH:ec 4p OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD SUITE 1600 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024 (213) 879-1700 (213) 208-8800 ARMAND HAMMER CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER June 6, 1985 The President The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. President: I was informed yesterday while in Bogota, Colombia, where I was meeting with President Betancur, that General Secretary Ghorbachev will receive me at the Kremlin on June 17th. I wanted to officially inform you of this in the event it is of any assistance. I am also notifying Secretary Shultz and Bud McFarlane. As an American citizen, I am always available to you for any consultation you may desire. Thank you very much for the kind words about my "youth" which you expressed to Gordon Reece at George Will's dinner Tuesday night. He told me of it and was very thrilled at the honor of meeting and talking with you. I had an excellent meeting with Jay Keyworth Monday morning, and I believe he will shortly send you a full report on the achievements of your Cancer Panel, which I have the honor to chair. With every best wishes, Respectfully, annoud Hannum AH:ec Haff attace 4672 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 47 10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD SUITE 1600 ROM HAS SEEN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024 (213) 879-1700 (213) 208-8800 ARMAND HAMMER CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER June 6, 1985 The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Bud: I was informed today that I will be meeting with General Secretary Ghorbachev in the Kremlin on June 17th. I have written to notify the President and George Shultz and am prepared to render any assistance you may wish. A copy of my letter to the President is attached. I enjoyed the recent New York Times Sunday piece on you and am very glad that all is going so well with your own career. With every best wish, I am, Sincerely, annund Attachment AH:ec 48 UNCLASSIFIED (Classification) DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT TRANSMITTAL FORM XR-8517085 S/S # 8517430 Date: June 17, 1985 FOR: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane National Security Council The White House Reference: To: The President From: Armand Hammer Date: June 6, 1985 Subject: Mr. Hammer's June 17 Meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev WH Referral Dated: June 13, 1985 NSC ID# 305310 (if any) The attached item was sent directly to the Department of State Action Taken: A draft reply is attached. A draft reply will be forwarded. A translation is attached. X An information copy of a direct reply is attached. (see REMARKS below) We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below. The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel. Other. Remarks: Mr. Hammer sent similar letter to Secretary Shultz on same date; Department believes attached reply from the Secretary should suffice as a response to letter to the President. Janes Executive Nicholas w Secretary Platt Bean UNCLASSIFIED (Classification) THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON June 15, 1985 Dear Mr. Hammer: Thank you for your letter of June 6, concerning your upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow. I understand that Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer recently talked with your associate, Bill McSweeney. I gather that they went over the entire agenda of issues we are now pursuing with the Soviets, and that Mark suggested the kinds of themes we believe it would be useful for you to stress with the Soviets during your upcoming trip. I think it would be particularly important that you underscore to Mr. Gorbachev and any of his colleagues you meet the President's determination to build a more constructive relationship. We have put forward a number of ideas for consideration in every area of our dialogue. We are frankly somewhat disappointed that they have refused to engage us in a serious discussion of many of these issues. The President's decision to continue our policy of interim restraint with regard to the SALT II Treaty is a case in point. I am sure you read their negative reaction as published in TASS. I don't need to tell you the significance of that decision and what it says about the President's determination to pursue a new arms control agreement in Geneva. I hope you will emphasize to the Soviet leadership the importance of seizing the current political opportunity to build a better relationship. I hope you will also emphasize the importance which all Americans place on positive Soviet actions on key human rights concerns. We have let Ambassador Hartman in Moscow know about your trip. I hope you will be able to meet with him after your meetings to share your impressions and your assessment of the way in which the new Soviet leadership is approaching both domestic and international problems. With warm personal regards. Sincerely yours, Gone George P. Shultz - Armand Hammer, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, 10889 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California so OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD SUITE 1600 LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90024 (213) 879-1700 (213) 208-8800 ARMAND HAMMER CHAIRMAN AND June 6, 1985 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER The Honorable George P. Shultz Secretary of State 8517085 Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Dear Mr. Secretary: I have been informed that I will be received by General Secretary Ghorbachev in the Kremlin on June 17th and have written to the President. A copy of my letter is attached. As you know, I am always prepared to be of whatever service possible to our government and will make myself available for consultation if you so desire. I admire greatly what you have accomplished as Secretary of State and wish to express every con- fidence with you at the helm of our foreign policy in the years immediately ahead. With every best wish, I am, Sincerely, amount Harmana Attachment AH:ec JUN 7 REC'D 51 8517430 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE REFERRAL JUNE 13, 1985 TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION REQUESTED: DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING: ID: 305310 MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JUNE 6, 1985 TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM: MR. ARMAND HAMMER PRESIDENT OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION SUITE 1600 10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD LOS ANGELES CA 90024 SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING MEETING HE WILL HAVE WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GHORBACHEV ON JUN 17 85 PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486. RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE (OR DRAFT) TO: AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE - SALLY KELLEY DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE 52 ID# 305310 THE WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET INCOMING DATE OFFUNT 1985 NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. ARMAND HAMMER SUBJECT: WRITES REGARDING MEETING HE WILL HAVE WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GHORBACHEV ON JUN 17 85 ACTION DISPOSITION ROUTE TO: ACT DATE TYPE C COMPLETED OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME) CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD ROBERT C. MCFARLANE ORG 85/06/06 C 85/06/10 q REFERRAL NOTE: & R 85/06/13 / / REFERRAL NOTE: / / / / REFERRAL NOTE: / / / / REFERRAL NOTE: / / / / REFERRAL NOTE: COMMENTS: State ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) (B) (C) *ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING * * * *CORRESPONDENCE: * *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED TYPE RESP=INITIALS * *C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER * *D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A * *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED COMPLETED = DATE OF * *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* * OUTGOING * *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * * *S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * * *X-INTERIM REPLY * * * REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590 KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS MANAGEMENT. 305310 53 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 10889 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD SUITE 1600 LOS ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90024 (213) 879-1700 (213) 208-8800 ARMAND HAMMER CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 5517430 June 6, 1985 The President The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. President: I was informed yesterday while in Bogota, Colombia, where I was meeting with President Betancur, that General Secretary Ghorbachev will receive me at the Kremlin on June 17th. I wanted to officially inform you of this in the event it is of any assistance. I am also notifying Secretary Shultz and Bud McFarlane. As an American citizen, I am always available to you for any consultation you may desire. Thank you very much for the kind words about my "youth" which you expressed to Gordon Reece at George Will's dinner Tuesday night. He told me of it and was very thrilled at the honor of meeting and talking with you. I had an excellent meeting with Jay Keyworth Monday morning, and I believe he will shortly send you a full report on the achievements of your Cancer Panel, which I have the honor to chair. With every best wishes, Respectfully, annoud Hannum AH:ec

nara / coll_rr-0170 / doc

Matlock Chron June 1985 (2)

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source	import

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url	https://catalog.archives.gov/id/195991011
naId	195991011
levelOfDescription	fileUnit
recordType	description
ocrSource	nara-archive

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Page 1 OCR

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