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Matlock Chron February 1986 (1)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron February 1986 (1)
Box: 14
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/14/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON FEBRUARY 1986 (1/6)
FOIA
F06-114/4
Box Number
14
YARHI-MILO
1408
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8078 MEMO
MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE REPLY TO
3 2/1/1986 B1
GORBACHEV'S HANDWRITTEN LETTER
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8079 LETTER
DRAFT REPLY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
6 ND B1
HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM
GORBACHEV
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8080 MEMO
MATLOCK TO LEHMAN; LINHARD; AND
3 2/3/1986 B1
SESTANOVICH RE REPLY TO
GORBACHEV'S HANDWRITTEN LETTER
R 3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8081 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8079
6
ND
B1
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8082 MEMO
DRAFT REPLY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
6
ND
B1
HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM
GORBACHEV
R 3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8083 MEMO
DRAFT REPLY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
6
ND
B1
HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM
GORBACHEV
R 3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/14/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON FEBRUARY 1986 (1/6)
FOIA
F06-114/4
Box Number
14
YARHI-MILO
1408
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8084 MEMO
DRAFT REPLY PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
5 2/11/1986 B1
HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM
GORBACHEV
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
Mathoud
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONCY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ADM POINDEXTER
AMB. MATLOCK
PRESERVATION copy
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
ENCLOSURE(S)
CAS 7/2/02
2
NOT FOR SYSTEM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
February 1, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINTEXTER $ 1
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter
I have tried my hand at drafting a reply to Gorbachev's hand-
written letter, as we discussed earlier. Although I believe that
most of the materials are now in place to put an answer to the
letter of January 14 together, I believe that an answer to the
handwritten letter should precede it and should not try to
address the specific questions raised in the January 14 letter.
My reasons are the following:
-- The exchange of handwritten letters may have started a process
of direct informal personal communication which should be
preserved. Thus there should be a specific answer to the long
handwritten letter of December 24.
-- The letter of January 14 had an entirely different status. By
going public, and also sending the same "proposals" to other
chiefs of state, Gorbachev was clearly signalling that he did not
intend this to be a confidential personal message to the
President. It should, therefore be handled entirely separately.
-- Gorbachev's handwritten letter contains a number of allega-
tions which need to be refuted lest the impression be left that
we accept them, or feel at a disadvantage in finding contrary
arguments.
-- The handwritten letter can be answered on its own terms,
without getting into some of the issues which need to be
addressed in the reply to the letter of January 14.
My suggested draft is at Tab I. It is longer than I would like,
but I feel it is desirable for the President to answer in
adequate detail the principal arguments Gorbachev advanced. It
is slightly but not significantly longer than Gorbachev's letter.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
NLRR F06-114/4#8078
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
3
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
- 2 -
In drafting it, I had the following considerations in mind:
-- I tried to reply directly to the observations and arguments
Gorbachev made, to indicate that the President takes them
seriously even if he rejects them.
-- I also tried to give considerable space to Afghanistan, Libya
and regional conflict in general. This will build on what the
President has said before and lay the groundwork for linking the
ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons to solution of these
issues. The comments on Libya are designed both to put a marker
down that they are playing with fire, and also to play on the
danger to the Soviet Union of getting too close to an unstable
character like Qaddhafi. (This latter point doubtless gives the
Soviets real concern, and we should do what we can to heighten
it.)
-- On the nuclear and SDI issues, I tried to answer Gorbachev's
arguments without impinging in any way on the content of our
response to his January "proposals." In particular, I think it
important to let him know that his argument about SDI being part
of a first-strike strategy is simply not going to fly in the
light of Soviet activities, and in fact can be used against them
if they persist. As you will note, I put in a plug for military-
to-military contacts in the context of Gorbachev's allegations
concerning disarming first-strike weapons in U.S. hands.
-- Regarding the NST negotiations, the draft makes abundantly
clear that we do not consider our November proposals to be
superceded by the Gorbachev January letter, but expect serious
negotiation on them.
-- As for Gorbachev's January "proposals," I tried in various
subtle but unmistakable ways to convey that the way they were
presented did not promote a favorable negotiating climate. In
deferring an answer to them and putting the answer in a more
formal channel, the President would be implicitly telling
Gorbachev that he knows much of the "Gorbachev initiative" was
designed for propaganda and this makes it unsuitable for serious,
totally private communication. At the same time, he does not
knock the "proposals" directly. I believe this approach is more
effective that direct criticism of Gorbachev's going public;
complaints on the latter might convey the impression that we feel
vulnerable. They also would leave us open to counter complaints
that we are also guilty of leaking or announcing our proposals.
-- Regarding the Washington summit, I omitted any reference to
it. Although Gorbachev had one reference to it in his letter
(the line about the correspondence being "a very important
channel in preparing" for it), he did not reciprocate the
President's statement that he was looking forward to the meeting.
Given the Soviet delay in setting a date it is probably best not
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
4
- 3 -
to show too much eagerness, but rather to make clear that we are
not going to make substantive concessions just to get him here at
the time we proposed.
-- Finally, on the way they address each other, I noted that the
President tried to move to a less formal salutation in his own
handwritten letter ("Dear General Secretary Gorbachev"), while
Gorbachev did not pick this up, but continued to address the
President as "Dear Mr. President." Though this is a trivial
point, I blieve that the President should follow Gorbachev's lead
and revert to the "Dear Mr. General Secretary." Russians are so
form-conscious they notice these little things and the fact that
Gorbachev did not write back with a "Dear President Reagan" was
doubtless deliberate.
I will be working with Lehman and Linhard on the reply to the
January 14 letter. I think it important, however, for the
handwritten letter to precede it by several days.
I have not shown this text to anyone else, since I am not certain
whether you want the handwritten exchange to be subject to
vetting on the staff or with other agencies. I would appreciate
your reaction and instructions on this point.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That you indicate your reaction to the text, noting any
changes you desire.
Approve of
It's a very good letter, John
Disapprove
2. That you indicate what sort of consultation or clearance you
desire.
a. I'll handle myself ;
OR
b. Consult and clear with the following:
Ichman, Bor Lindad, Steve
after Pres signs, sel show to shulty $ Weilenger before it gon.
3. Should I draft a Memorandum to the President to cover it?
Yes f
No
-
Attachments:
Tab I - Draft for reply to Gorbachev Handwritten Letter of
December 24, 1985
Tab II - Translation of Gorbachev letter of December 24, 1985
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
1
9
DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and
I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course
also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be
responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the
latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to
keep our private communications separate. Some of the issues are
of course the same, but I would hope that in this informal
fashion we can continue our candid exchange on some of the
fundamental issues facing us.
I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for
discussion over the next few years, directed at a steady and -- I
would hope -- radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I
suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would like
to suggest now a broad three-part agenda which I believe would
serve that purpose. That is, first, to find ways to reduce and
eventually eliminate the use and threat of force in solving
international disputes; second, to reach mutually acceptable
agreements to reduce the level of arms, particularly those of
mass destruction; and third, to take other steps which bolster
confidence in dealing with each other and reduce distrust.
These are of course broad categories and they are also
interrelated, for progress in one area makes it easier in the
others. I also believe that history has shown that improvements
in one area cannot long withstand an increase of tensions in the
others. How many times in the past has an improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations been reversed by actions which one or the
other side considered fundamentally inconsistent with an
improvement in relations? Unfortunately, this has occurred every
time in the past when relations seemed to be on the road to
improvement. The lesson, I believe, is clear: if we are to
avoid repeating the mistakes of the past which doomed every trend
toward improvement, we must take a broader view of the
relationship than any single issue, however important it may be.
Without expecting to solve all issues at once, we must seek to
solve problems in each of these three areas concurrently. It was
with this in mind that I made my earlier suggestion regarding
goals we might set before our next meeting. Finding a practical
way to reduce our nuclear arsenals is certainly one of these key
issues -- though by no means the only one. I am encouraged that
we can agree that our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear
weapons, and that we also agree that, as a first step, these
arsenals should be cut by half. I also agree that we must make
decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with
regard to the capabilities on both sides.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8079
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
- 2 -
1
Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your
conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike
would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. (By
such reasoning, one could "prove" that all countries involved in
World War II intended to use poison gas, because they issued gas
masks to their troops.) Though it may be true that, in a world
totally free of nuclear weapons, elaborate defenses against
nuclear attack would not be necessary, we have not yet created
such a world and we both recognize the difficult task we have set
for ourselves in moving in that direction. Should such defenses
prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further
reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence
that national security could be preserved without them.
Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding
defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a
disarming first-strike capability could indeed be destabilizing.
But this is not what we are proposing, and in fact it is why we
are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those
weapons which can be used to deliver a disarming first strike.
If neither of our countries have weapons suitable for a first
strike, why should either fear that defenses against ballistic
missiles would make a first strike strategy possible?
I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space
strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. If that is the case,
you must know something of weapon types and physical phenomena
unknown to us. I have asked previously for concrete examples,
and would still appreciate at least some concrete hint as to what
you have in mind. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy
and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the
context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effect-
ive against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They
do not have the capability of mass destruction on earth, and if
one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not
seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques.
Their destructiveness can never approach that of the nuclear
weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real
problem.
Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential
to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak
often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have
defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from
earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike
targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such
weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM
system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the
atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital
anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. And our
specialists consider it most likely that the new missile we call
the SA-X-12 also is capable of destroying targets above the
- 3 -
8
atmosphere. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in
defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did
and seems well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some
testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of
directed energy.
I do not point this out in reproach. In our opinion, none of
these things as yet violates any agreement between our countries.
But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you
call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country
planning a first strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet
Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, in an
effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a
Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in
numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop
defensive weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible,
then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.
We are concerned, and deeply so. But not because you are
developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We
are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason
has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for
a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may
be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike
advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than
intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have such
an advantage in this area.
Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that
the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to
destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18
definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the accuracy for
such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the
Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic
weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time
is not substantially different from that of the more capable --
and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European
Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no
nuclear capability of their own. We are just beginning to deploy
missiles with a capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are
doing so only because we cannot accept a situation in which the
Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in first-strike
weaponry. Even if we unfortunately are required to complete all
these planned deployments in the absence of a strategic arms
accord which limits them, they will not match the number of
Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.
If our military specialists disagree regarding the capability of
the weapons on the other side, then by all means let us arrange
for them to meet and discuss their respective concerns. They
don't have to exchange blueprints or divulge technical secrets,
but a frank discussion of their respective assessments and the
- 4 -
9
reasons for them could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings
which are not based on fact.
In any event, I agree with you that we must move to stop this
cycle of action (or perceived action) and reaction. That is
surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. Our position
remains that we are willing to reduce those strategic weapons
systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the
Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the
United States. Our proposals in November represented a major
step to accommodate your concerns and I hope that your
negotiators will be empowered to discuss them thoroughly during
the current round.
So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what
I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used
to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing
weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be
practical ways our negotiators can find to prevent such
possibilities. I invite you to have your negotiators join ours
in a practical discussion of these matters. Of course, I have in
mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means which
both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies, neither of
which is a part of United States strategy or planning.
Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective
analyses of the causes are totally incompatible. There seems
little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we
are bound to disagree. The important question is where we go
from here; how we act to reduce the level of violence in the
world, particularly in those places where our own forces are
involved. This is not a trivial issue. It is also not unrelated
to our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, for fears that military
force might be used by other countries for aggressive purposes is
a root cause of the buildup of nuclear arsenals.
So let us end a fruitless debate regarding the causes of the
ongoing conflicts in the world and simply look at the current
situation. Such a look would show two very important facts, and
they are that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another
country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war
is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet
Union. So why is it continued?
Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we
do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people
to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with
the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other
than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who
can tell the people of another country they should not fight for
their motherland, for their independence and their national
dignity?
- 5 -
10
Would the Russian people accept a foreign army in its midst? If
confronted with such a situation they would fight with all they
had -- and take help from for any quarter -- as they proved so
valiantly in World War II. The whole world knows that. So it is
all the more difficult for those of us outside of the Soviet
Union to understand why the Soviet political leadership does not
seem to grasp the basic facts of that tragic situation.
I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just
political settlement and a practical "working formula." But I
have not seen either yet. Unfortunately, 1985 was marked by an
intensification of conflict, with higher casualties on both
sides. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.
As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from Afgha-
nistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We
have no desire or intent to exploit the situation in Afghanistan
to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is clear that the
fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops,
the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and the
restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. The
modalities used are of much less importance, so long as they lead
to this result. Such a result would have an immediate positive
effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would greatly facilitate
progress in many other areas.
The problem of halting superpower military involvement in local
disputes, and thus a source of serious tension between our
countries, is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in
Afghanistan. And I must say candidly that some recent actions by
your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of
your military support of a local dictator who has declared a war
of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against
the United States in particular? How can one take Soviet
declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted
with such actions? And, more importantly, are we to conclude
that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its
influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even
the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally
unbalanced local despot? If that turns out to be the case, then
I honestly cannot be sanguine about the future of U.S.-Soviet
relations.
You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot
accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to
search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes
militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes,
and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms
what should be of local concern to a U.S. -Soviet confrontation.
As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted
without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United
- 6 -
States. It is unlikely that either of us will ever agree with
the other on this point.
But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a
solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to
terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both
our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such
involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I
made last October, and I consider it both fair and workable. Let
us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations
to find political solutions, while our countries support the
process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war
materiel into the area.
Much of this letter deals with disagreements between us, because
it is important to understand them if we are to overcome them.
But I would not wish to leave the impression that I feel these
are either insoluble or that there has been no progress in
improving relations between our countries. On the contrary, I am
convinced that the central problems can be solved if we approach
them in the proper manner. And I am pleased that we gradually
are finding some additional points on which we can agree.
But we do need to speed up the negotiation process and to make it
more concrete and practical. Therefore, I would hope that your
negotiators in Geneva will soon be in a position to respond in
specific fashion to our November proposals, and that the "working
formula" to solve the conflict in Afghanistan is in fact
workable.
When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your
letter of January 14, I made an announcement welcoming them.
Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it
is I will be responding to the points you made in it.
Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.
Sincerely,
2
12
13
NOT FOR SYSTEM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
February 3, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RON LEHMAN
BOB LINHARD
STEVE SESTANOVICH
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter
I have tried my hand at drafting a reply to Gorbachev's hand-
written letter. Although I believe that most of the materials
are now in place to put an answer to the letter of January 14
together, I believe that an answer to the handwritten letter
should precede it and should not try to address the specific
questions raised in the January 14 letter.
My reasons are the following:
-- The exchange of handwritten letters may have started a process
of direct informal personal communication which should be
preserved. Thus there should be a specific answer to the long
handwritten letter of December 24.
-- The letter of January 14 had an entirely different status. By
going public, and also sending the same "proposals" to other
chiefs of state, Gorbachev was clearly signalling that he did not
intend this to be a confidential personal message to the
President. It should, therefore be handled entirely separately,
and the substance should be subject to consultations with the
Allies.
-- Gorbachev's handwritten letter contains a number of allega-
tions which need to be refuted lest the impression be left that
we accept them, or feel at a disadvantage in finding contrary
arguments.
-- The handwritten letter can be answered on its own terms,
without getting into some of the issues which need to be
addressed in the reply to the letter of January 14.
My suggested draft is at Tab I. It is longer than I would like,
but I feel it is desirable for the President to answer in
adequate detail the principal arguments Gorbachev advanced. It
is slightly but not significantly longer than Gorbachev's letter.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/4#880
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
2
In drafting it, I had the following considerations in mind:
-- I tried to reply directly to the observations and arguments
Gorbachev made, to indicate that the President takes them
seriously even if he rejects them.
-- I also tried to give considerable space to Afghanistan, Libya
and regional conflict in general. This will build on what the
President has said before and lay the groundwork for linking the
ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons to solution of these
issues. The comments on Libya are designed both to put a marker
down that they are playing with fire, and also to play on the
danger to the Soviet Union of getting too close to an unstable
character like Qaddhafi. (This latter point doubtless gives the
Soviets real concern, and we should do what we can to heighten
it.)
-- On the nuclear and SDI issues, I tried to answer Gorbachev's
arguments without impinging in any way on the content of our
response to his January "proposals." In particular, I think it
important to let him know that his argument about SDI being part
of a first-strike strategy is simply not going to fly in the
light of Soviet activities, and in fact can be used against them
if they persist. As you will note, I put in a plug for military-
to-military contacts in the context of Gorbachev's allegations
concerning disarming first-strike weapons in U.S. hands.
-- Regarding the NST negotiations, the draft makes abundantly
clear that we do not consider our November proposals to be
superceded by the Gorbachev January letter, but expect serious
negotiation on them.
-- As for Gorbachev's January "proposals," I tried in various
subtle but unmistakable ways to convey that the way they were
presented did not promote a favorable negotiating climate. In
deferring an answer to them and putting the answer in a more
formal channel, the President would be implicitly telling
Gorbachev that he knows much of the "Gorbachev initiative" was
designed for propaganda and this makes it unsuitable for serious,
totally private communication. At the same time, he does not
knock the "proposals" directly. I believe this approach is more
effective that direct criticism of Gorbachev's going public;
complaints on the latter might convey the impression that we feel
vulnerable. They also would leave us open to counter complaints
that we are also guilty of leaking or announcing our proposals.
-- Regarding the Washington summit, I omitted any reference to
it. Although Gorbachev had one reference to it in his letter
(the line about the correspondence being "a very important
channel in preparing" for it), he did not reciprocate the
President's statement that he was looking forward to the meeting.
Given the Soviet delay in setting a date it is probably best not
to show too much eagerness, but rather to make clear that we are
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
3
not going to make substantive concessions just to get him here at
the time we proposed.
-- Finally, on the way they address each other, I noted that the
President tried to move to a less formal salutation in his own
handwritten letter ("Dear General Secretary Gorbachev"), while
Gorbachev did not pick this up, but continued to address the
President as "Dear Mr. President." Though this is a trivial
point, I blieve that the President should follow Gorbachev's lead
and revert to the "Dear Mr. General Secretary." Russians are so
form-conscious they notice these little things and the fact that
Gorbachev did not write back with a "Dear President Reagan" was
doubtless deliberate.
REQUEST:
Please review as quickly as possible and get any suggestions to
me on an EYES ONLY basis.
Adm. Poindexter has indicated to me that he wants to clear with
Shultz and Weinberger after it has been written by the President.
Therefore, no mention should be made of this draft except among
the four of us (plus of course Don F. and John P.).
I will be doing a cover memo to the President incorporating most
of the points above. If you have any suggestions, let me know.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
16
NOT FOR SYSTEM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
February 4, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Isam
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter
A Memorandum to the President conveying the draft text of a reply
to Gorbachev's handwritten letter to the President is at Tab I.
The text of the draft has been slightly revised from the one you
saw earlier, following consultation with Lehman, Linhard and
Sestanovich.
(Lehman, Linhard and Sestanovich concur I'm
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Draft Reply to Handwritten Letter from Gorbachev
Tab B
Translation of Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter of
December 24, 1985
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
By OKS
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 7/2/02
Authority NLSS97-001 Date #117 7/2/02 smf 10/22/99
NARA,
BY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter
Issue
Whether to reply to Gorbachev's handwritten letter of December
24, 1985
Facts
Gorbachev answered your handwritten letter with one of his own
dated December 24, 1985. You have also received a more formal
letter dated January 12 making proposals for a three-stage
process for the elimination of nuclear weapons by 1999.
Discussion
The handwritten letter was obviously the more personal one,
particularly since Gorbachev immediately announced the content of
his letter of January 12 and wrote in the same vein to several
other Chiefs of State. Therefore, it would be appropriate to
answer the two letters separately, keeping the handwritten
exchange more personal, private and direct. I think it is
important to give a specific reply to the handwritten letter both
to sustain this private exchange and to reply to some of the
unacceptable allegations in it. This can be done without getting
into the details of his letter of January 12.
The proposed draft at Tab A attempts to achieve the following:
-- It answers the principal arguments advanced by Gorbachev
against SDI, implicitly reminding him that Soviet programs are
such that his arguments can be turned against him, while still
leaving the door open to concrete negotiation of legitimate
issues.
-- By separating the reply to his handwritten letter from that to
his "public" letter of January 12, the draft indicates clearly,
without saying so, that the use of "proposals" for propaganda is
not helpful to the negotiating process, and that such "proposals"
will not be given the status of private messages.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-- By devoting special attention to regional conflicts and
Afghanistan in particular, it lays the ground for a linkage of
restraint in these areas to the reduction of nuclear weapons
beyond the initial 50 percent. It also includes a strong
statement regarding Soviet involvement with Qaddhafi, based on
the danger posed to the Soviet Union by his unpredictability.
(This is a factor the Soviets probably worry about, and it will
not hurt to play on it a bit.)
You will note that the draft contains no mention of the
Washington summit. Given the Soviet delay in suggesting a firm
date -- or reacting in any way officially to our proposal made in
early December -- I think it is desirable to avoid showing any
exceptional eagerness. Also, in his letter, Gorbachev made no
mention of the meeting other that to say that he considered the
correspondence "a very important channel" for preparing for it.
One other small matter is that Gorbachev did not pick you up on
your effort to develop a less formal salutation. (You had
written "Dear General Secretary Gorbachev," while his reply was
addressed "Dear Mr. President." You may, therefore, wish to
revert to "Dear Mr. General Secretary."
Although the draft reply is longer than I would like it to be, it
is only slightly longer than Gorbachev's letter (a translation of
which is at Tab B for your reference). Nevertheless, I consider
it important to provide answers to Gorbachev's allegations in
some detail, and this cannot be done much more briefly.
Providing him with a detailed reply does indicate that you take
his arguments seriously and have given them careful thought.
If you decide to write out a letter along the lines of the draft,
I would recommend that we do a courtesy translation (on very
close hold) and send it through Hartman in a sealed envelope, as
we did with your previous handwritten letter.
Regarding the letter of January 12, we will be consulting the
Allies over the next few days and should have a formal reply
ready for you to consider at the end of next week.
Recommendation:
OK
No
That you write a reply to Gorbachev along the
lines of the draft at Tab A.
-
Attachments:
Tab A
Draft Reply to Handwritten Letter from Gorbachev
Tab B
Translation of Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter of
December 24, 1985
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET/SENSITIVE
,
DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and
I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course
also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be
responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the
latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to
keep our private communications separate. Some of the issues are
of course the same, but I would hope that in this informal
fashion we can continue our candid exchange on some of the
fundamental issues facing us.
I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for
discussion over the next few years, directed at a steady and -- I
would hope -- radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I
suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would like
to suggest now a broad three-part agenda which I believe would
serve that purpose. That is, first, to find ways to reduce and
eventually eliminate the use and threat of force in solving
international disputes; second, to reach mutually acceptable
agreements to reduce the level of arms, particularly those of
mass destruction; and third, to take other steps which bolster
confidence in dealing with each other and reduce distrust.
These are of course broad categories and they are also
interrelated, for progress in one area makes it easier in the
others. I also believe that history has shown that improvements
in one area cannot long withstand an increase of tensions in the
others. How many times in the past has an improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations been reversed by actions which one or the
other side considered fundamentally inconsistent with an
improvement in relations? Unfortunately, this has occurred every
time in the past when relations seemed to be on the road to
improvement. The lesson, I believe, is clear: if we are to
avoid repeating the mistakes of the past which doomed every trend
toward improvement, we must take a broader view of the
relationship than any single issue, however important it may be.
Without expecting to solve all issues at once, we must seek to
solve problems in each of these three areas concurrently. It was
with this in mind that I made my earlier suggestion regarding
goals we might set before our next meeting. Finding a practical
way to reduce our nuclear arsenals is certainly one of these key
issues -- though by no means the only one. I am encouraged that
we can agree that our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear
weapons, and that we also agree that, as a first step, these
arsenals should be cut by half. I also agree that we must make
decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with
regard to the capabilities on both sides.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#081
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
- 2 -
20
Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your
conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike
would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. (By
such reasoning, one could "prove" that all countries involved in
World War II intended to use poison gas, because they issued gas
masks to their troops.) Though it may be true that, in a world
totally free of nuclear weapons, elaborate defenses against
nuclear attack would not be necessary, we have not yet created
such a world and we both recognize the difficult goal we have
set. If such defenses prove feasible in the future, they could
facilitate further reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a
feeling of confidence that national security could be preserved
without them. They could also provide insurance that no one
could gain from reintroducing nuclear weapons once they were
abolished.
Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding
defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a
disarming first-strike capability could under some conditions be
destabilizing. However, without defenses, it could be even more
difficult to preserve stability. That is why we are proposing
that both sides concentrate first on reducing those weapons which
can be used to deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if
neither of our countries has forces suitable for a first strike,
neither need fear that defenses against ballistic missiles would
make a first strike strategy possible.
I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space
strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. If that is the case,
you must know something of weapon types and physical phenomena
unknown to us. I have asked previously for concrete examples,
and would still appreciate at least some concrete hint as to what
you have in mind. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy
and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the
context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effect-
ive against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They
would be ill-suited for mass destruction on earth, and if one
were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not
seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques.
Their destructiveness can never approach that of the nuclear
weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real
problem.
Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential
to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak
often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have
defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from
earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike
targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such
weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM
system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the
atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital
- 3 -
anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses
utilizing directed energy before the United States did and seems
well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some testing
outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed
energy. The Soviet Union also has deployed extensive defenses
which complement its ABM capability.
I do not point this out in reproach. But if we were to follow
your logic to the effect that what you call "space strike
weapons" would only be developed by a country planning a first
strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet Union devoting
enormous resources to defensive systems, in an effort which
antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a Soviet Union
which has built up its counterforce weapons in numbers far
greater than our own. If the only reason to develop defensive
weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible, then
clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.
We are concerned, and deeply SO. But not because you are
developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We
are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason
has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for
a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may
be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike
advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than
intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have an
advantage in this area.
Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that
the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to
destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18
definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the capability for
such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the
Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic
weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time
is not substantially different from that of the more capable --
and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European
Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no
nuclear capability of their own. Our forces currently have a
very limited capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are
improving this capability only because we cannot accept a
situation in which the Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage
in counterforce weaponry. Even if we unfortunately are required
to complete all these planned deployments in the absence of a
strategic arms accord which limits them, they will not match
Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.
If our defense and military specialists disagree regarding the
capability of the weapons on the other side, then by all means
let us arrange for them to meet and discuss their respective
concerns. They don't have to exchange blueprints or divulge
22
- 4 -
technical secrets, but a frank discussion of their respective
assessments and the reasons for them could perhaps clear up those
misunderstandings which are not based on fact.
In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50%
reduction of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is
surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. We remain
willing to reduce those weapons systems which the Soviet Union
finds threatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce those
which pose a special threat to the United States and its Allies.
Our proposals in November included significant movement on our
part in this direction and were a major step to accommodate your
concerns. I hope that your negotiators will be empowered to
discuss them thoroughly during the current round.
So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what
I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used
to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing
weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be
practical ways to prevent such possibilities. Of course, I have
in mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means
which both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies,
neither of which is a part of United States strategy or planning.
In addition, we remain committed to discuss the relationship of
offensive and defensive systems, and practical ways to reduce the
threat of nuclear weapons and move to a safer world.
Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective
analyses of the causes are totally incompatible. There seems
little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we
are bound to disagree. The important question is where we go
from here: how we act to reduce the level of violence in the
world, particularly in those places where our own forces are
involved. This is not a trivial issue. It is also not unrelated
to our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, for fears that military
force might be used by other countries for aggressive purposes is
a root cause of the buildup of nuclear arsenals.
So let us end a fruitless debate regarding the causes of the
ongoing conflicts in the world and simply look at the current
situation. Such a look would show two very important facts, and
they are that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another
country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war
is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet
Union. So why is it continued?
Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we
do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people
to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with
the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other
than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who
can tell the people of another country they should not fight for
5
their motherland, for their independence and their national
dignity?
Would the Russian people accept a foreign army in its midst? If
confronted with such a situation they would fight with all they
had -- and take help from any quarter -- as they proved so
valiantly in World War II. The whole world knows that. So it is
all the more difficult for those of us outside of the Soviet
Union to understand why the Soviet political leadership does not
seem to grasp the basic facts of that tragic situation.
I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just
political settlement and a practical "working formula." But I
have not seen either yet. Unfortunately, 1985 was marked by an
intensification of conflict, with higher casualties on both
sides. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.
As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from
Afghanistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable
way. We have no desire or intent to exploit the situation in
Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is
clear that the fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of
Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country,
and the restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state.
The modalities used are of much less importance, so long as they
lead to this result. Such a result would have an immediate
positive effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would help clear the
way to progress in many other areas.
The problem of halting superpower military involvement in local
disputes, and thus a source of serious tension between our
countries, is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in
Afghanistan. And I must say candidly that some recent actions by
your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of
your sharply increased military support of a local dictator who
has declared a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the
world, and against the United States in particular? How can one
take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously
when confronted with such actions? And, more importantly, are we
to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to
extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige
(and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a
mentally unbalanced local despot? If that turns out to be the
case, then I honestly cannot be sanguine about the future of
U.S.-Soviet relations.
You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot
accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to
search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes
militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes,
and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms
what should be of local concern into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted
without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United
States. It is unlikely that either of us will ever agree with
the other on this point.
But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a
solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to
terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both
our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such
involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I
made last October, and I consider it both fair and workable. Let
us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations
to find political solutions, while our countries support the
process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war
materiel into the area of conflict.
Much of this letter deals with disagreements between us, because
it is important to understand them if we are to overcome them.
But I would not wish to leave the impression that I feel these
are either insoluble or that there has been no progress in
improving relations between our countries. On the contrary, I am
convinced that the central problems can be solved if we approach
them in the proper manner. And I am pleased that we gradually
are finding some additional points on which we can agree.
But we do need to speed up the negotiation process and to make it
more concrete and practical. Therefore, I would hope that your
negotiators in Geneva will soon be in a position to respond in
specific fashion to our November proposals, and that the "working
formula" to solve the conflict in Afghanistan is in fact
workable.
When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your
letter of January 14, I made an announcement welcoming them.
Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it
is I will be responding to the points you made in it.
Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.
Sincerely,
DECLASSIFIED
NLS597-00'1
(ZELCASED) #1188mt smt
10/22/97
Authority
CAS
NARA,
Date
7/2/82
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TY
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES
(TRANSLATION)
LS NO.
118545
DZ/GT/WH/LB
Russian
His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.
The White House
Dear Mr. President:
I consider your letter important and also value the form you
used in writing to me.
I say this to you because I see the desire to continue and to
strengthen what we achieved in Geneva. I am glad that we
began there -- both in substance and in spirit -- a direct and
frank discussion. I attach special significance to the fact
that we have been able to overcome the serious psychological
barrier which for a long time has hindered a dialogue worthy of
the leaders of the USSR and USA.
I have the feeling that now you and I can set formalities aside
and can get down to the heart of the matter -- establishing a
specific topical agenda for discussion over the next few years
on the basis of our understanding, and straightening out Soviet
-American relations. I visualize this task very concretely:
we have to broaden areas of agreement, strengthen the elements
of responsibleness in our policy, and make the appropriate
practical decisions. In my opinion the ideal situation would
be one in which you and I would give impetus to a constant
forward movement. I agree with what you said: in the final
analysis no one besides us can do this.
The first thing we should do is to take upon ourselves the task
of undoing the knot which has been tied around the issues of
nuclear and space weapons. I was encouraged by the fact that
you, Mr. President, also consider that this is of key
significance.
I think you understood from what I told you in Geneva that our
decisive opposition to the development of space-strike weapons
is dictated by the fact that weapons of this class which, due
to their specific nature, possess the capability of being used
both for defensive and offensive aims, represent in the final
analysis an extremely dangerous build-up of offensive
potential, with all the consequences inevitably ensuing
therefrom from the point of view of further escalating the arms
race.
26
- 2 -
You say, Mr. President, that the U.S. has no intention of using
the SDI program to obtain military superiority.
I do not doubt that you personally may really have no such
intentions. But you must agree that the leadership of one side
has to evaluate the actions of the other in the area of
developing new types of weapons, not in accordance with
intentions, but in accordance with the potential cababilities
which may be attained as a result of the development of these
weapons.
Examining the SDI program from this perspective, the Soviet
leadership comes to the same conclusion every time: given the
realities of the current situation, only a country which is
preparing for a first (disarming) strike needs a "space
shield"; a country which does not base its actions on such a
concept should have no need for such a weapons system.
After all, space-strike weapons are all-purpose weapons. The
space-strike weapons that are being created in the U.S. are
kinetic energy weapons and also long-range, directed energy
systems (with a range of several thousand miles and great
destructive power). As our experts and scientists and yours
confirm, those weapons are capable of destroying in space, as
well as from space, within a very short time, in great
quantities and selectively, objects which are thousands of
miles away. I stress -- thousands of miles away.
For example, how should we regard the space weapons of a
country which have the capability of destroying another
country's centers for controlling space objects and of
destroying its space devices for monitoring, navigation,
communication etc. within very short time intervals measured in
minutes? Essentially, these weapons can only be intended for
"blinding" the other side, catching it unprepared and depriving
it of the possibility of countering a nuclear strike.
Moreover, if these weapons are developed, the process of
perfecting them and giving them even better combat
characteristics will begin immediately. Such is the course of
development of all weaponry.
How then, Mr. President, should the Soviet Union act in such a
situation? I would like to repeat what I already told you in
Geneva. The USSR cannot simply reduce and will not reduce
nuclear weapons to the detriment of its security, when the SDI
program is being implemented in the U.S. Whether we like it or
not, we will be forced to develop and improve our strategic
nuclear forces and increase their capability of neutralizing
the U.S. "space shield." At the same time, we would also have
to develop our own space weapons inter alia for the purpose of
- 3 -
a territorial ABM defense. Probably, the U.S. would in turn
then take some other additional steps. As a result, we will
not get out of the vicious cycle of measures and
countermeasures, out of the whirlpool of an ever-increasing
arms race. The consequence of such competition for our peoples
and for all of mankind is unpredictable.
I am convinced that the only sensible way out is not to engage
in this at all. From every point of view the correct path for
our countries is negotiation on the prevention of an arms race
in space and its cessation on earth. And we need to come to
agreement on the basis of equal and mutually acceptable
conditions.
You and I agreed to accelerate the negotiations. I took
satisfaction in hearing you say that the U.S. would not
"develop space-based offensive weapons."
As I see it, some kind of common basis is emerging between you
and me for a very significant part of the problem of preventing
an arms race in space. Let us have our representatives at the
negotiations proceed on this basis to begin working out
specific measures to prevent the development of offensive space
weapons, i.e., all space-based weapons which can destroy
targets in space and from space.
In the spirit of the frankness in which we are talking, I would
like to say that this issue has now become very acute: either
events will determine policy or we will determine policy. In
order not to be governed by events, it is especially important
once again to conduct a profound analysis of all aspects of the
objective interrelationship between offensive and defensive
weapons and to hear each other out on this issue. However, it
seems to me that there will be little meaning to such
discussions if in tandem with them weapons of war start coming
out of the doors of our laboratories, weapons whose influence
on strategic stability we must not now miscalculate. Common
sense dictates that until we determine together those
consequences, we must not permit anything to go beyond the
walls of the laboratory. We are prepared to negotiate to reach
agreement on this matter as well.
It appears to me this is a practical way to implement the joint
accord you and I confirmed in Geneva concerning the
inadmissibility of an arms race in space and concerning the
ultimate elimination of nuclear arms.
In line with such an approach it would also make sense at the
Geneva negotiations to discuss the issue of eliminating the
danger of a first (disarming) nuclear strike. I would like to
a
- 4 -
state to you again very definitely: we are not making a bid
for a first nuclear strike, we are not preparing our nuclear
forces for one.
I cannot agree with the way you formulate the issue of first
strike nuclear forces. This issue, of course, is not merely
one of ICBM warheads. For example, there is no difference
between U.S. ballistic missile warheads on "Trident" submarines
and warheads on modern Soviet land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles as far as their kill capability is
concerned, i.e. in terms of such indices as accuracy, power and
range. And if one considers this issue from the point of view
of warning time, then, for a significant portion of submarine
missiles, where the U.S. has a three-fold advantage in
warheads, the warning time is significantly shorter.
And can we view the "Pershing II" missiles deployed in Europe
with their high accuracy and short flight time to targets on
USSR territory as anything other than first-strike weapons?
Please forgive me for dealing with technical details in a
personal letter like this. But these are vitally important
realities, and we simply cannot get around them.
Believe me, Mr. President, we have a genuine and truly serious
concern about U.S. nuclear systems. You talk about mutual
concerns. This matter can be resolved only through considering
and counting the sum total of the respective nuclear systems of
both countries. Let our delegations discuss this matter as
well.
Mr. President, I would like to give you my brief reaction to
what you said concerning regional conflicts. At the time when
we touched on these issues in Geneva, I stressed that it is
most important to view things realistically, to see the world
as it is. If we recognize the fact that independent states
exist and function in the international arena, then we also
have to acknowledge their sovereign right to have relations
with whomever they wish and the right to ask for assistance,
including military assistance.
Both you and we offer such assistance. Why apply a double
standard and assert that Soviet assistance is a source of
tension and U.S. assistance is beneficial? It would be better
for us to be guided by objective criteria in this matter. The
Soviet Union is assisting legitimate governments which come to
us because they have been and are being subjected to outside
military interference.
30
- 5 -
And, as the facts indicate, the U.S. incites actions against
governments and supports and supplies weapons to groups which
are inimical to society and which are, in essence, terrorists.
Looking at things objectively, it is such actions and outside
interference that create regional tension and conflict. If
such actions cease, I am convinced tensions will decrease and
the prospects for political settlements will become much better
and more realistic.
Unfortunately, at present, developments are proceeding in a
different direction. Take, for example, the unprecedented
pressure and threats which the government of Nicaragua is being
subjected to - a legitimate government brought to power through
free elections.
I will be frank: what the United States has done recently
causes concern. It seems that there is a tilt in the direction
of further exacerbation of regional problems. Such an approach
does not make it easier to find a common language and makes the
search for political solutions more difficult.
With regard to Afghanistan, one gets the impression that the
U.S. side intentionally fails to notice the "open door" leading
to a political settlement. Now there is even a working formula
for such a settlement. It is important not to hinder the
negotiations in progress, but to help them along. In that
event a fair settlement will definitely be found.
Mr. President, I would like to have you take my letter as
another one of our "fireside talks." I would truly like to
preserve not only the spirit of our Geneva meetings, but also
to go further in developing our dialogue. I view our
correspondence as a very important channel for preparing for
our meeting in Washington.
The new year will be upon us very soon, and I would like to
send you and your wife our very best wishes.
Sincerely,
M. Gorbachev
Moscow, December 24, 1985
31
DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and
I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course
also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be
responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the
latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to
keep our private communications separate. Some of the issues are
of course the same, but I would hope that in this informal
fashion we can continue our candid exchange on some of the
fundamental issues facing us.
I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for
discussion over the next few years, directed at a steady and -- I
would hope -- radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I
suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would like
to suggest now a broad three-part agenda which I believe would
serve that purpose. That is, first, to find ways to reduce and
eventually eliminate the use and threat of force in solving
international disputes; second, to reach mutually acceptable
agreements to reduce the level of arms, particularly those of
mass destruction; and third, to take other steps which bolster
confidence in dealing with each other and reduce distrust.
These are of course broad categories and they are also
interrelated, for progress in one area makes it easier in the
others. I also believe that history has shown that improvements
in one area cannot long withstand an increase of tensions in the
others. How many times in the past has an improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations been reversed by actions which one or the
other side considered fundamentally inconsistent with an
improvement in relations? Unfortunately, this has occurred every
time in the past when relations seemed to be on the road to
improvement. The lesson, I believe, is clear: if we are to
avoid repeating the mistakes of the past which doomed every trend
toward improvement, we must take a broader view of the
relationship than any single issue, however important it may be.
Without expecting to solve all issues at once, we must seek to
solve problems in each of these three areas concurrently. It was
with this in mind that I made my earlier suggestion regarding
goals we might set before our next meeting. Finding a practical
way to reduce our nuclear arsenals is certainly one of these key
issues -- though by no means the only one. I am encouraged that
we can agree that our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear
weapons, and that we also agree that, as a first step, these
arsenals should be cut by half. I also agree that we must make
decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with
regard to the capabilities on both sides.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
32
- 2 -
Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your
conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike
would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. (By
such reasoning, one could "prove" that all countries involved in
World War II intended to use poison gas, because they issued gas
masks to their troops.) Though it may be true that, in a world
totally free of nuclear weapons, elaborate defenses against
nuclear attack would not be necessary, we have not yet created
such a world and we both recognize the difficult task we have set
for ourselves in moving in that direction. Should such defenses
prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further
reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence
that national security could be preserved without them.
Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding
defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a
disarming first-strike capability could indeed be destabilizing.
But this is not what we are proposing, and in fact it is why we
are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those
weapons which can be used to deliver a disarming first strike.
If neither of our countries have weapons suitable for a first
strike, why should either fear that defenses against ballistic
missiles would make a first strike strategy possible?
I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space
strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. If that is the case,
you must know something of weapon types and physical phenomena
unknown to us. I have asked previously for concrete examples,
and would still appreciate at least some concrete hint as to what
you have in mind. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy
and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the
context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effect-
ive against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They
do not have the capability of mass destruction on earth, and if
one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not
seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques.
Their destructiveness can never approach that of the nuclear
weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real
problem.
Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential
to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak
often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have
defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from
earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike
targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such
weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM
system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the
atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital
anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. And our
specialists consider it most likely that the new missile we call
the SA-X-12 also is capable of destroying targets above the
- 3 -
33
atmosphere. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in
defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did
and seems well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some
testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of
directed energy.
I do not point this out in reproach. In our opinion, none of
these things as yet violates any agreement between our countries.
But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you
call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country
planning a first strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet
Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, in an
effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a
Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in
numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop
defensive weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible,
then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.
We are concerned, and deeply so. But not because you are
developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We
are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason
has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for
a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may
be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike
advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than
intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have such
an advantage in this area.
Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that
the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to
destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18
definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the accuracy for
such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the
Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic
weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time
is not substantially different from that of the more capable --
and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European
Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no
nuclear capability of their own. We are just beginning to deploy
missiles with a capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are
doing so only because we cannot accept a situation in which the
Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in first-strike
weaponry. Even if we unfortunately are required to complete all
these planned deployments in the absence of a strategic arms
accord which limits them, they will not match the number of
Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.
If our military specialists disagree regarding the capability of
the weapons on the other side, then by all means let us arrange
for them to meet and discuss their respective concerns. They
don't have to exchange blueprints or divulge technical secrets,
but a frank discussion of their respective assessments and the
- 4
34
reasons for them could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings
which are not based on fact.
In any event, I agree with you that we must move to stop this
cycle of action (or perceived action) and reaction. That is
surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. Our position
remains that we are willing to reduce those strategic weapons
systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the
Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the
United States. Our proposals in November represented a major
step to accommodate your concerns and I hope that your
negotiators will be empowered to discuss them thoroughly during
the current round.
So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what
I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used
to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing
weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be
practical ways our negotiators can find to prevent such
possibilities. I invite you to have your negotiators join ours
in a practical discussion of these matters. Of course, I have in
mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means which
both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies, neither of
which is a part of United States strategy or planning.
Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective
analyses of the causes are totally incompatible. There seems
little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we
are bound to disagree. The important question is where we go
from here; how we act to reduce the level of violence in the
world, particularly in those places where our own forces are
involved. This is not a trivial issue. It is also not unrelated
to our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, for fears that military
force might be used by other countries for aggressive purposes is
a root cause of the buildup of nuclear arsenals.
So let us end a fruitless debate regarding the causes of the
ongoing conflicts in the world and simply look at the current
situation. Such a look would show two very important facts, and
they are that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another
country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war
is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet
Union. So why is it continued?
Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we
do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people
to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with
the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other
than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who
can tell the people of another country they should not fight for
their motherland, for their independence and their national
dignity?
- 5 -
35
Would the Russian people accept a foreign army in its midst? If
confronted with such a situation they would fight with all they
had -- and take help from for any quarter -- as they proved so
valiantly in World War II. The whole world knows that. So it is
all the more difficult for those of us outside of the Soviet
Union to understand why the Soviet political leadership does not
seem to grasp the basic facts of that tragic situation.
I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just
political settlement and a practical "working formula." But I
have not seen either yet. Unfortunately, 1985 was marked by an
intensification of conflict, with higher casualties on both
sides. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.
As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from Afgha-
nistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We
have no desire or intent to exploit the situation in Afghanistan
to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is clear that the
fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops,
the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and the
restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. The
modalities used are of much less importance, so long as they lead
to this result. Such a result would have an immediate positive
effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would greatly facilitate
progress in many other areas.
sharply
splayared
The problem of halting superpower military involvement in local
disputes, and thus a source of serious tension between our
countries, is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in
Afghanistan. And I must say candidly that some recent actions by
your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of
your military support of a local dictator who has declared a war
of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against
the United States in particular? How can one take Soviet
declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted
with such actions? And, more importantly, are we to conclude
that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its
influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even
the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally
unbalanced local despot? If that turns out to be the case, then
I honestly cannot be sanguine about the future of U.S.-Soviet
relations.
You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot
accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to
search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes
militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes,
and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms
what should be of local concern to a U.S. -Soviet confrontation.
As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted
without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United
36
- 6 -
States. It is unlikely that either of us will ever agree with
the other on this point.
But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a
solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to
terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both
our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such
involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I
made last October, and I consider it both fair and workable. Let
us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations
to find political solutions, while our countries support the
process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war
materiel into the area of conflist
Much of this letter deals with disagreements between us, because
it is important to understand them if we are to overcome them.
But I would not wish to leave the impression that I feel these
are either insoluble or that there has been no progress in
improving relations between our countries. On the contrary, I am
convinced that the central problems can be solved if we approach
them in the proper manner. And I am pleased that we gradually
are finding some additional points on which we can agree.
But we do need to speed up the negotiation process and to make it
more concrete and practical. Therefore, I would hope that your
negotiators in Geneva will soon be in a position to respond in
specific fashion to our November proposals, and that the "working
formula" to solve the conflict in Afghanistan is in fact
workable.
When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your
letter of January 14, I made an announcement welcoming them.
Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it
is I will be responding to the points you made in it.
Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.
Sincerely,
31
DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and
I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course
also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be
responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the
latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to
keep our private communications separate. Some of the issues are
of course the same, but I would hope that in this informal
fashion we can continue our candid exchange on some of the
fundamental issues facing us.
I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for
discussion over the next few years, directed at a steady and -- I
would hope -- radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I
suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would like
to suggest now a broad three-part agenda which I believe would
serve that purpose. That is, first, to find ways to reduce and
eventually eliminate the use and threat of force in solving
international disputes; second, to reach mutually acceptable
agreements to reduce the level of arms, particularly those of
mass destruction; and third, to take other steps which bolster
confidence in dealing with each other and reduce distrust.
These are of course broad categories and they are also
interrelated, for progress in one area makes it easier in the
others. I also believe that history has shown that improvements
in one area cannot long withstand an increase of tensions in the
others. How many times in the past has an improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations been reversed by actions which one or the
other side considered fundamentally inconsistent with an
improvement in relations? Unfortunately, this has occurred every
time in the past when relations seemed to be on the road to
improvement. The lesson, I believe, is clear: if we are to
avoid repeating the mistakes of the past which doomed every trend
toward improvement, we must take a broader view of the
relationship than any single issue, however important it may be.
Without expecting to solve all issues at once, we must seek to
solve problems in each of these three areas concurrently. It was
with this in mind that I made my earlier suggestion regarding
goals we might set before our next meeting. Finding a practical
way to reduce our nuclear arsenals is certainly one of these key
issues -- though by no means the only one. I am encouraged that
we can agree that our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear
weapons, and that we also agree that, as a first step, these
arsenals should be cut by half. I also agree that we must make
decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with
regard to the capabilities on both sides.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8083
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
- 2 -
JACK. want to avoid giving impeession
THEN JUCLEARKIST no As OWLENGE SUCH Toes <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< THE TO MAY Builty BE TIEFENSES THAT EVER NONE SURANCE PROVIDE FRODUCT will 38
that nukes obviates the need for SOI.
Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your
conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike
would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. (By
such reasoning, one could "prove" that all countries involved in
World War II intended to use poison gas, because they issued gas
masks to their troops.) Though it may be true that, in a world
totally free of nuclear weapons, elaborate defenses against
nuclear attack would not be necessary, we have not yet created
such a world and we both recognize the difficult task we have set
for ourselves in moving in that direction. Should such defenses
prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further
reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence
that national security could be preserved without them.
UNDER SOME CONDITIONS
Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding
defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a
CERTAINLY,IF
disarming first-strike capability could indeed be destabilizing.
But this is not what we are proposing. and in fact it is why we
are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those
weapons which can be used to deliver FORCES a disarming first strike.
If neither of our countries have weapons suitable for a first
strike, why should either fear that defenses against ballistic
missiles would make a first strike strategy possible?
JACK need to watch
catagoric statements
about capability
I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space
strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. If that is the case,
you must know something of weapon types and physical phenomena
unknown to us. I have asked previously for concrete examples,
and would still appreciate at least some concrete hint as to what
you have in mind. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy
GREATER DEGREE. THAT
and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the
context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effect-
would BE
ive against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They
-
the SUITED FOR
do not have the capability of mass destruction on earth, and if
one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not
seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques.
Their destructiveness can never approach that of the nuclear
weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real
problem.
Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential
to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak
often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have
INDEED, WITHOUT DEFENSES, WE ARE FACED FACED WITH THAT THE DANGER, AND UNDOUBLY TO
defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from
earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike
targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such
weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM
system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the
atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital
anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. And our
specialists consider it most likely that the new missile we call
the SA-X-12 also is capable of destroying targets [above the
JACK- would drop SA-X-12. IT is not
ballistic
an XOATMOSPHURK INTRACOPTOR"- therefore
not for use against space things in
- 3 -
AND, THE SOVIET UNION ALSO HAS EXTENSIVE DEFENSES ALREADY
DEPLOYED WHICH COULD COMPLEMENT ABM CAPABILITY.
za
atmosphere. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in
defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did
and seems well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some
testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of
directed energy.
THIS YOUR RESEARCH EPFORT
?-
I do not point this out in reproach. In our opinion none of
these things as yet violates any agreement between our countries
But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you
call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country
planning a first strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet
Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, in an
effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a
Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in
numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop
defensive weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible,
then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.
We are concerned, and deeply SO. But not because you are
developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We
are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason
has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for
a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may
be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike
advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than
intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have such
an advantage in this area.
Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that
the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to
destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18
CAPABILITY
definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the accuracy for
OUR FORCES CURRENTLY HAVE
A VERY LIMITED CAPABILITY
such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the
Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic
weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time
is not substantially different from that of the more capable --
and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European
Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no
nuclear capability of their own. We are just beginning to deploy
missiles with a capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are
doing so only because we cannot accept a situation in which the
Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in first strike COUNTER-MILITARY
weaponry. Even if we unfortunately are required to complete all
these planned deployments in the absence of a strategic arms
accord which limits them, they will not match the number of
Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.
DEFENSE AND
IMPROVING THIS
CAPABILITY
If our military specialists disagree regarding the capability of
the weapons on the other side, then by all means let us arrange
for them to meet and discuss their respective concerns. They
don't have to exchange blueprints or divulge technical secrets,
but a frank discussion of their respective assessments and the
- 4
40
reasons for them could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings
which are not based on fact.
THIS THE AREA FORCES of EXISTING
In any event, I agree with you that we must move to stop this
cycle of action (or perceived action) and reaction. That is
surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. Our position
remains that we are willing to reduce those strategic weapons
systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the
AND AHIES.
Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the
United States Our proposals in November, represented a major
step to accommodate your concerns. and I hope that your
negotiators will be empowered to discuss them thoroughly during
the current round.
So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what
I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used
to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing
weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be
practical ways our negotiators can find to prevent such
possibilities. I invite you to have your negotiators join ours
in a practical discussion of these matters Of course, I have in
mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means which
both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies, neither of
which is a part of United States strategy or planning
OU OUR PART IN THIS DIRECTION AND
INCLUDED SIGNIFICANT, SERIOUS MOVEMENT
Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective
analyses of the causes are totally incompatible. There seems
little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we
IN ADDITION, WE REMAIN PREPARED AND COMMITED To DISCUSS THE
are bound to disagree. The important question is where we go
RELATIONSHIP of offensive AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, AND
PRACTICAL ways IN WHICH WE CAN REDUCE THE OF THREAT OF
from here; how we act to reduce the level of violence in the
world, particularly in those places where our own forces are
involved. This is not a trivial issue. It is also not unrelated
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MOVE TO A SAFOR WORLD.
to our efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, for fears that military
force might be used by other countries for aggressive purposes is
a root cause of the buildup of nuclear arsenals.
So let us end a fruitless debate regarding the causes of the
ongoing conflicts in the world and simply look at the current
situation. Such a look would show two very important facts, and
they are that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another
country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war
is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet
Union. So why is it continued?
Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we
do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people
to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with
the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other
than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who
can tell the people of another country they should not fight for
their motherland, for their independence and their national
dignity?
- 5 -
41
Would the Russian people accept a foreign army in its midst? If
confronted with such a situation they would fight with all they
had -- and take help from for any quarter -- as they proved so
valiantly in World War II. The whole world knows that. So it is
all the more difficult for those of us outside of the Soviet
Union to understand why the Soviet political leadership does not
seem to grasp the basic facts of that tragic situation.
I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just
political settlement and a practical "working formula." But I
have not seen either yet. Unfortunately, 1985 was marked by an
intensification of conflict, with higher casualties on both
sides. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.
As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from Afgha-
nistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We
have no desire or intent to exploit the situation in Afghanistan
to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is clear that the
fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops,
the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and the
restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. The
modalities used are of much less importance, so long as they lead
to this result. Such a result would have an immediate positive
effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would greatly facilitate
progress in many other areas.
The problem of halting superpower military involvement in local
disputes, and thus a source of serious tension between our
countries, is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in
Afghanistan. And I must say candidly that some recent actions by
your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of
your military support of a local dictator who has declared a war
of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against
the United States in particular? How can one take Soviet
declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted
with such actions? And, more importantly, are we to conclude
that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its
influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even
the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally
unbalanced local despot? If that turns out to be the case, then
I honestly cannot be sanguine about the future of U.S.-Soviet
relations.
You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot
accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to
search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes
militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes,
and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms
what should be of local concern to a U.S. -Soviet confrontation.
As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted
without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United
- 6 -
42
States. It is unlikely that either of us will ever agree with
the other on this point.
But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a
solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to
terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both
our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such
involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I
made last October, and I consider it both fair and workable. Let
us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations
to find political solutions, while our countries support the
process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war
materiel into the area.
Much of this letter deals with disagreements between us, because
it is important to understand them if we are to overcome them.
But I would not wish to leave the impression that I feel these
are either insoluble or that there has been no progress in
improving relations between our countries. On the contrary, I am
convinced that the central problems can be solved if we approach
them in the proper manner. And I am pleased that we gradually
are finding some additional points on which we can agree.
But we do need to speed up the negotiation process and to make it
more concrete and practical. Therefore, I would hope that your
negotiators in Geneva will soon be in a position to respond in
specific fashion to our November proposals, and that the "working
formula" to solve the conflict in Afghanistan is in fact
workable.
When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your
letter of January 14, I made an announcement welcoming them.
Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it
is I will be responding to the points you made in it.
Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.
Sincerely,
CONF IDENTIAL
THE
43
90055
DECLASSIFIED
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White CAS House Guidelines,
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matwock
No. NSDD 209
COPY #1 ORIGINAL
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
INFORMATION
Notice
The attached document contains classified National Security Council
Information. It IS to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by
law
Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you
will show or discuss information contained in the document only with
persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.
Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and
understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with
any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any
unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.
Access List
DATE
NAME
DATE
NAME
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SYSTEM II
90055
44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
matlock
February 4, 1986
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR OF U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
SUBJECT:
NSDD on Implementing Decisions at the Geneva
Summit (0)
The President has approved the attached National Security
Decision Directive on implementing decisions at the Geneva
Summit. (C)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
John M. Poindexter
Attachment:
NSDD-209
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28. 1997
By Crs
NARA, Date 7/21/02
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
.OPY
OF 10
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SYSTEM
::
90055
45
Authority CAS J.SAUNDers DECLASSIFIED NSC 7/2/02 3/13/96 THE
WHITE HOUSE
Matlock
NARA, Date
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
February 4, 1986
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 209
IMPLEMENTING DECISIONS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT
(C
My meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev produced a fresh
start in U.S.-Soviet relations in the sense that it established a
framework for bilateral negotiations of some of our outstanding
differences. It is now our task to make use of this framework to
move us toward the goals I have set for U.S.-Soviet relations.
This will also be a key component in the substantive preparations
for my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in the United States this year.
(U)
In order to ensure vigorous pursuit of a dialogue and, where
appropriate, negotiations in those areas where the Joint
U.S.-USSR Statement at Geneva indicated that progress is
possible, I hereby designate the following agencies to take the
lead in coordinating the United States position and pursuing it
actively with representatives of the Soviet Union: (L)
1. Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms: The Senior Arms
Control Group will continue to have responsibility for
coordinating views of U.S. positions to be taken, which will then
be reviewed by the National Security Council.
(C)
2. Regional Conflicts: The Secretary of State will have
responsibility for developing concrete new ways to pursue my
initiative to end regional conflicts, as outlined in my speech to
the United Nations General Assembly last October, and for
conducting regular consultations with the Soviet Union. This
issue is a major one, and the Department of State should also
take the lead in ensuring that it receives an appropriate share
of public attention.
(C)
3. People-to-People Contacts and Information Exchange: The
Director of the United States Information Agency will have the
responsibility for implementing the initiatives I have made in
this area. Policy matters will be considered by an
Interdepartmental Group chaired by the National Security Council
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
COPY OF 10 COPIES
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
46
CONF IDENTIAL
2
Staff. I would note in this connection that the areas for
expansion of contacts noted in the U.S.-USSR Joint Statement are
only a start toward the objective I have set for a radical
expansion of contacts. Therefore, efforts should concentrate not
merely on implementing those programs to which the Soviets agreed
at Geneva, but to expanding their scope and size in accord with
the proposals made by the United States before the Geneva Summit.
set
4. Chemical Weapons: The Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency shall, in coordination with the
Interdepartmental Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms
Control, have primary responsibility for preparing the United
States position for talks with the Soviets on verification
measures to enforce a chemical weapons ban, and on measures to
combat the proliferation of chemical weapons. In case of
interagency disagreement, the issues should be referred to the
Senior Arms Control Group.
set
5. Risk Reduction Centers: The Staff of the National Security
Council, working with the existing ad hoc interagency group on
this subject, will retain primary responsibility for the
development and implementation of the U.S. approach to be taken
in the exploratory, expert-level discussions on the concept of
risk reduction centers.
6. Thermonuclear Fusion: The Secretary of Energy shall have the
responsibility of coordinating the United States position for the
study of the feasibility of an international effort to build a
prototype fusion power plant.
7. Cancer Research: The Secretary of Health and Human Services,
in cooperation with the National Institutes of Health, shall be
responsible for developing a cooperative program in this area,
utilizing the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of
Medical Science and Public Health as a framework for
implementation.
(U)
8. Environmental Research: The Director of the Environmental
Protection Agency will have the responsibility for implementing
cooperation in this area, utilizing the U.S.-USSR Agreement on
Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection.
9. Humanitarian Issues: The Secretary of State will be
responsible for conducting a vigorous effort, based primarily on
private diplomacy, for achieving United States objectives in this
area.
CONFIDENTIAL
COPY OF 10 COPIES
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
In all of these areas, the normal interagency process will be
utilized to ensure that steps taken are in the interest of the
United States. While I wish to ensure that these issues are
pursued vigorously with the Soviet Union, all should be discussed
and negotiated strictly on their merits. In negotiating with the
Soviet Union no artificial deadlines should be set, nor any
concessions made merely because another meeting with Genera.
Secretary Gorbachev will be scheduled for this year.
1et
CONFIDENTIAL
COPY OF 1.0 COPIES
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
48
THE WHITE HOUSE
SYSTEM II
90055
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
February 3, 1986
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
John
SUBJECT:
NSDD on Implementation of Geneva Summit Agreements
Issue
Whether to sign an NSDD on implementing the Geneva Summit
Agreements.
Facts
At your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva you agreed to pursue
negotiations or discussions with the Soviet Union in a number of
areas.
Discussion
In order to ensure that the agreements reached at Geneva are pursued
vigorously, it is desirable to designate particular officials to
see that each is followed up properly. The NSDD which is
attached makes such assignments and also cautions that all
matters should be negotiated solely on their merits and without
artificial deadlines.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you sign the NSDD at Tab A.
Attachment:
Tab A
NSDD
DECLASSIFIED
By White Crs House Guidelines, NARA, Date August 7/2/02 1997
CC Vice President
CONEIDENTIAL
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
CONFIDENTIAL
49
SYSTEM II
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1 90055
WASHINGTON D.C 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
January 21, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK KIM
SUBJECT:
NSDD on Implementation of Geneva Summit Agreements
Attached at Tab A is the suggested text of an NSDD to assign
responsibility for implementing the Geneva Summit Agreements.
Although thought was given to combining these assignments with
matters concerning preparation for the Washington Summit this
year, I decided after reflection that it would be preferable to
cover the latter after a date has been agreed upon with the
Soviets.
If you concur in this judgment and find the NSDD text acceptable,
I recommend that you forward it to the President for approval and
signature.
Bob Limard Mar concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve of
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Memorandum to the President
Tab A - - NSDD
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, 28
By CAS
NARA, Date August 7/2/02
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
WASHINGTON
SENSITIVE
File Feb Chron
Return to
Jack Matloch
Admural John if
SENSITIVE
SECRET
NOT IN SYSTEM
PRESERVATION COPY
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
CVS 7/2/02
51
NOT FOR SYSTEM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
February 4, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Isour
SUBJECT:
Reply to Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter
A Memorandum to the President conveying the draft text of a reply
to Gorbachev's handwritten letter to the President is at Tab I.
The text of the draft has been slightly revised from the one you
saw earlier, following consultation with Lehman, Linhard and
Sestanovich.
(Lehman, Linhard and Sestanovich concur. I'm
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve %
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Draft Reply to Handwritten Letter from Gorbachev
Tab B
Translation of Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter of
December 24, 1985
2/13
Dwill want to give this
to President Saturday morning
DECLASSIFIED
abound AFI.
By
White Crs House Guidelines, August 28 1997
NARA, Date 7/2/02
&
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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52
I
in
I
2/11/86 7:15 PM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
John-
Sec. Shultz & did not Lave time to
look at the letter immediately, but
asked me to leave it with him.
He will study it tonight and let
us know in the morning if he
approves.
Attached in the revised text J
left with him. It is now much
sthorter than before, and shightly
shorter that Harbachev's
1 did not take all I Palmer's
suggestions but J did cut those
passages which he indicated the
Secretary felt strongly about-
Jock
54
2/11/86
DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and
I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course
also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be
responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the
latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to
keep our private communications separate. Some of the issues are
of course the same, but I would hope that in this informal
fashion we can continue our candid exchange on some of the
fundamental questions.
I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for action
to achieve a steady and -- I would hope -- radical improvement in
U.S.-Soviet relations. I suggested two such topics in my
previous letter, and I would hope that we could agree to add
others: agreement on a verification regime that would permit a
global ban on chemical weapons is one potential area that comes
to mind. There are no doubt others, and I would welcome your
suggestions.
Regarding arms reduction in general, I also agree that we must
make decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but
with regard to the capabilities on both sides. Nevertheless, I
do not understand the reasoning behind your conclusion that only
a country preparing a disarming first strike would be interested
in defenses against ballistic missiles. If such defenses prove
feasible in the future, they could facilitate further reductions
of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence that
national security could be preserved without them.
Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding
defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a
disarming first-strike capability could under some conditions be
destabilizing. That is why we are proposing that both sides
concentrate first on reducing those weapons which can be used to
deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if neither of our
countries has forces suitable for a first strike, neither need
fear that defenses against ballistic missiles would make a first
strike strategy possible.
I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space
strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. As I understand it,
the sort of directed-energy and kinetic devices both our
countries are investigating in the context of ballistic missile
defense are potentially most effective against point targets
moving at high velocity in space. They would be ill-suited for
mass destruction on earth, and if one were planning to strike
earth targets from space, it does not seem rational to resort to
such expensive and exotic techniques. Their destructiveness can
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR Fole- 114/4#8084
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NARA
DATE
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55
never approach that of the nuclear weapons in our hands today.
Nuclear weapons are the real problem.
Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential
to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak
often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have
defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from
earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike
targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such
weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM
system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the
atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital
anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses
utilizing directed energy before the United States did and seems
well along in research (and -- incidentally -- some testing
outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed
energy.
I do not point this out in reproach or suggest that these
activities are in violation of agreements. But if we were to
follow your logic to the effect that what you call "space strike
weapons" would only be developed by a country planning a first
strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet Union devoting
enormous resources to defensive systems, in an effort which
antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a Soviet Union
which has built up its counterforce weapons in numbers far
greater than our own. If the only reason to develop defensive
weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible, then
clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.
We are concerned, and deeply so. But not because you are
developing -- and unlike us deploying -- defensive weaponry. We
are concerned over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason
has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for
a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may
be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike
advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than
intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have an
advantage in this area.
Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that
the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to
destroy hardened missile silos -- a capability your SS-18
definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the capability for
such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the
Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic
weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time
is not substantially different from that of the more capable --
and much more numerous -- Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European
Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no
nuclear capability of their own. Our forces currently have a
very limited capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are
improving this capability only because we cannot accept a
- 3 -
situation in which the Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage
in counterforce weaponry. Even if we unfortunately are required
to complete all these planned deployments in the absence of a
strategic arms accord which limits them, they will not match
Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.
If our defense and military specialists disagree regarding the
capability of the weapons on the other side, then by all means
let us arrange for them to meet and discuss their respective
concerns. They don't have to exchange blueprints or divulge
technical secrets, but a frank discussion of their respective
assessments and the reasons for them could perhaps clear up those
misunderstandings which are not based on fact.
In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50%
reduction of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is
surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. Let me stress
once again that we remain willing to reduce those weapons systems
which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the Soviet
Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the United
States and its Allies. Our proposals in November included
significant movement on our part in this direction and were a
major step to accommodate your concerns. I hope that your
negotiators will be empowered to respond to these proposals
during the current round and to engage us in negotiating which
strategic systems are to be included in the 50% reduction.
So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what
I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used
to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing
weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be
practical ways to prevent such possibilities. Of course, I have
in mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means
which both sides can rely on to avoid these contingencies,
neither of which is a part of United States strategy or planning.
I honestly believe that we can find a solution to this problem if
we approach it in practical fashion rather than debating
generalities.
I would like nothing more than to find, by our next meeting, an
approach acceptable to both of us to solve this problem. But I
believe that will require two things: accelerating negotiations
to reach agreement on the way to reduce offensive weapons by 50%,
and discussion of concrete ways to insure that any future
development of defensive sytems cannot be used as a cover for a
first-strike strategy or for basing weapons of mass destruction
in space.
Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective
analyses of the causes are incompatible. There seems little
point in continuing to debate those matters on which we are bound
to disagree. Instead, I would suggest that we simply look at the
current situation in pragmatic terms. Such a look would show two
very important facts: that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war
- 4 -
in another country and the United States is not. And furthermore,
this war is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the
Soviet Union. So why is it continued?
Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we
do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people
to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with
the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other
than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who
can tell the people of another country they should not fight for
their motherland, for their independence and their national
dignity?
I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just
political settlement. Of course, we support the U.N. process and
hope that it will take a practical and realistic turn. However,
1985 was unfortunately marked by an intensification of conflict.
I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.
As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from
Afghanistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable
way. We have no desire or intent to exploit the situation in
Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is
clear that the fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of
Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country,
and the restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state.
Such a result would have an immediate positive effect on
U.S.-Soviet relations and would help clear the way to progress in
many other areas.
The problem of superpower military involvement in local disputes
is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in Afghanistan.
And I must say candidly that some recent actions by your
government are most discouraging. What are we to make of your
sharply increased military support of a local dictator who has
declared a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the
world, and against the United States in particular? How can one
take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously
when confronted with such actions? And, more importantly, are we
to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to
extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige
(and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a
mentally unbalanced local despot?
You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot
accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to
search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes
militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes,
and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms
what should be of local concern into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted
without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United
States.
- 5 -
sq
But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a
solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to
terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both
our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such
involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I
made last October. Let us encourage the parties to these
conflicts to begin negotiations to find political solutions,
while our countries support the process by agreeing to terminate
the flow of weapons and war materiel into the area of conflict.
Mr. General Secretary, there remain many points on which we still
disagree, and we will probably never reach agreement on some of
them. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the central problems can
be solved if we approach them in the proper manner. I have the
feeling that we gradually are finding some additional points on
which we can agree, and would hope that, by concentrating on
practical solutions, we can give greater momentum to this
process.
But we do need to speed up the negotiation process if this is to
occur. Therefore, I would hope that your negotiators in Geneva
will soon be in a position to respond in specific fashion to our
November proposals, that the efforts to end the war in
Afghanistan will take a practical direction, and that our
representatives can make more speedy progress in other important
areas.
When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your
letter of January 14, I made a statement welcoming them. Our
study of that message will shortly be completed and when it is I
will be responding to the points you made in it.
Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.
Sincerely,