Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
200172275
label
Matlock Chron March 1986 (3)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
200172275
contentType
document
title
Matlock Chron March 1986 (3)
citationUrl
identifierLocal
351
collections
Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
200172275
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
67722a3be1447d5b
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron March 1986 (3)
Box: 15
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/14/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (3/8)
FOIA
F06-114/4
Box Number
15
YARHI-MILO
1504
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8132 MEMO
MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE ADELMAN
2 3/10/1986 B1
PAPER ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS
CONTROL AND FOR THE USSR
R 3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8133 MEMO
POINDEXTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1
ND
B1
ACDA PAPER ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
ARMS CONTROL FOR THE USSR
R 3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8143 PAPER
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL
2
ND
B1
FOR THE SOVIET UNION
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8134 MEMO
MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE REACTIVATION
1
ND
B1
OF U.S.-USSR JOINT MEDICAL/HEALTH
AGREEMENT
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8135 MEMO
MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE
1 2/13/1986 B1
REACTIVATION OF THE U.S.-USSR JOINT
MEDICAL AGREEMENT
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8144 MEMO
PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE REACTIVATION
2 1/23/1986 B1
OF THE U.S.-USSR MEDICAL AGREEMENT
R 3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/14/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON MARCH 1986 (3/8)
FOIA
F06-114/4
Box Number
15
YARHI-MILO
1504
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8136 MEMO
KIMMITT TO HILL RE REACTIVATION OF
1 5/5/1984 B1
THE U.S.-USSR COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENTS IN HEALTH
R 3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8137 MEMO
POINDEXTER TO CASEY RE "WORLDWIDE
1 3/10/1986 B1
BRIEFING"
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8138 MEMO
MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE
1 2/25/1986 B1
WORLDWIDE BRIEFING PAPER
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8139 PAPER
WORLDWIDE BRIEFING
16 1/30/1986 B1
R 1/23/2008 NLRRF06-114/4
8140 MEMO
MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE
1 3/10/1986 B1
WEINBERGER-SOKOLOV MEETING
R 11/5/2009 F06-114/4
8141 LETTER
DRAFT LETTER WEINBERGER TO
1
ND
B1
MARSHAL SOKOLOV
R 11/5/2009 F06-114/4
8142 MEMO
SHULTZ TO POINDEXTER RE USSR
2 3/1/1986 B1
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
8132
SYSTEM II
90187
JM-C
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
March 10, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER Am
FROM:
JACK MATLOCKS
SUBJECT:
Adelman Paper on Economic Benefits of Arms Control
for the Soviet Union
Ken Adelman has sent over a brief paper on the subject mentioned
for the President's weekend reading. It has the virtue of
brevity, but I believe that it is rather thin in substance and am
not sure that it will be particularly enlightening for the
President.
My own view of Ken's main points is as follows:
1. Have arms control agreements in the past caused the Soviets
to divert resources from the military? We really cannot say. It
is clear that arms control agreements have not caused any
lowering of the overall military effort, and Soviet expenditures
have grown with or without agreements. However, we do not know
whether Soviet spending would have been even higher if there had
been no agreements. For example, the latest CIA estimates are
that in the 1976-1982 period the growth rate was 2% as compared
with an annual rate of 4% and higher in the preceding period.
Then, in the early 80's, the 4% rate was resumed. I am not
totally certain of the validity of these figures, but if they are
accurate they would indicate that the growth rate of military
expenditures was moderated during a period following the
signature of Salt I, and continued until it was clear that
SALT-II would not be ratified.
2. The current economic situation differs from that earlier in
that overall Soviet economic expansion is slowing down and the
reduced annual growth rate squeezes the funds available for
increments to the Soviet military budget. They will doubtless
continue to increase it every year, but it is more and more
difficult to think of increments above 4% -- particularly since
the technological backwardness of the economy as a whole is
growing compared with the U.S., and this places additional
constraints on how much more can be devoted to military spending
without pushing the economy even further behind.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/4#8132
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
3/9/11
2
SECRET
2
3. Gorbachev's main economic incentive is to avert strong
pressures for radical increases in military spending, which could
make shambles of his domestic program eventually. SDI is a
factor here, but only one factor. Equally worrisome to the
Soviets (maybe even more worrisome) are emerging technologies for
conventional weapons and other new technologies such as stealth.
They know that if they try to match us in these fields they will
always be behind so long as we don't give up trying. The thrust
of their policies is to convince us to stop trying. This has
both a military and an economic rationale.
alif Plact alix Plat
and Linhard concur.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you not send the Adelman memo to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
If you decide to send it, that you send it with the cover
memorandum at TAB I which makes some of the points above.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman
SECRET
8133
3
SYSTEM II
90187
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT:
ACDA Paper on Economic Benefits of Arms Control
for the Soviet Union
Ken Adelman has forwarded a paper for your review on the economic
benefits of arms control for the Soviet Union. It is attached at
Tab A.
In connection with the points that Ken makes, I think it
important to bear in mind that we really cannot say whether arms
control agreements have caused the Soviets to divert resources
from the military. While there has certainly not been any
lowering of the overall Soviet military effort as a result of
arms control, the latest CIA estimates show Soviet military
spending dipping from a 4% annual growth rate in the early 70's
to 2% in the period 1976-82. It jumps back to 4% after 1982.
If these figures are accurate they could mean the Soviets
moderated spending after signing SALT I and resumed the higher
pace when it became clear SALT II would not be ratified.
At the same time it is important to remember that Soviet
economic expansion is now slowing down, and the country's growing
technological backwardness places additional constraints on
planning the military budget. Gorbachev's main economic incentive
is to avert pressure for radical increases in military spending
which could thwart his economic program. In this context SDI is
a concern for the Soviets as are emerging conventional weapons
technologies. The thrust of Soviet policies has been to convince
us to stop our programs so they won't have to play an expensive
game of catch up.
Attachments:
Tab A
ACDA paper on economic benefits of arms control for the
Soviet Union
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/4#8133
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TIME STAMP
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT
SECRET
SYSTEM II
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90187
ACTION OFFICER:
3/10
DUE:
Prepare Memo For President
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
X
Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
Prepare Memo
to
CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*
PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112
FYI
FYI
FYI
Burghardt
Levine
Sachs
Cannistraro
X
Linhard
Sestanovich
Childress
Mahley
Sigur
Cobb
Major
Small
Covey
Mandel
Sommer
X
Danzansky
Matlock
Soos
deGraffenreid
May
Stark
Djerejian
Menges
Steiner
Dobriansky
Miller
Tahir-Kheli
Donley
North
Teicher
Douglass
Platt
Thompson
Grimes
Pugliaresi
Tillman
Hughes
Raymond
Wigg
Kraemer
Reger
Wright
Laux
Ringdahl
Lenczowski
Sable
INFORMATION
McDaniel
X
Pearson
X
Secretariat
Rodman
X
Lehman
Poindexter (advance)
Fortier (advance)
COMMENTS
GS 7/2/02
SECRET
Return to Secretariat
5
National Security Council
The White House
It
System #
Package # 90187
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson
1
P
A
Rodney McDaniel
Don Fortier
Paul Thompson
Florence Gantt
John Poindexter
Rodney McDaniel
NSC Secretariat
2
staff
Situation Room
I = Information
O A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC: VP Regan Buchanan
Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Statting Instructions
action: JFM
Concur: REL
SID
SYSTEM II
90187
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
March 7, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Economic Benefits of Arms Control for the
Soviet Union
Attached is a paper on the above subject for the President's
weekend reading.
Ken
Kenneth L. Adelman
Attachment:
As stated
8143
Economic Benefits of Arms Control for the Soviet Union
The argument is often made that the Soviets are interested in
arms control because of its economic benefits.
There is a grain of truth in this proposition to the extent
that the Soviets succeed in using the arms control process to limit
U.S. defense spending and place bounds on U.S. strategic moderniza-
tion. Arms control, in this sense, provides a measure of predicta-
bility on future U.S. forces which helps the Soviets better manage
and plan their future military requirements.
Soviet activities during the past fifteen years, however, do
not provide much support for the argument that the Soviets have
used arms control to divert resources from the military. Past
agreements have not prevented the Soviets from deploying large
numbers of new or modernized strategic weapon systems. Since the
early 1970s, these improvements have significantly increased the
capability of Soviet strategic forces. The Soviets have negotiated
arms agreements that permitted them to proceed with the key elements
of their military programs, while providing a degree of predictabil-
ity with regard to U.S. forces.
Soviet strategic programs receive the highest resources priority
and the Soviets have been willing to spend what they deemed necessary
to achieve their strategic objectives. In the past, any savings
from arms control agreements probably have had a negligible impact
on the overall Soviet economy.
The Soviets may see greater economic value in the current arms
control process because of SDI, and because the Soviets probably
are uncertain about their capability to offset future U.S. programs.
The Soviets probably see the principle economic value occurring
over the longer term because deep reductions probably would not
produce significant savings for some time and because the costs of
responding to SDI probably would not accrue until the late 1990s.
Despite Gorbachev's claim that the Soviet countermeasures to
SDI would be effective and less costly than SDI, Soviet attempts
to counter SDI would require new, and probably substantial, expendi-
tures. Moreover, the Soviets would have great difficulty in deter-
mining whether a large-scale force expansion and countermeasures
would be sufficient to offset U.S. defenses and permit the Soviets
to continue to accomplish their military missions. Therefore, the
Soviets may be faced either with undertaking large, expensive
increases in deployed strategic capabilities with uncertain prospects
for success, or affecting an agreed, regulated limitation on both
strategic offensive and defensive forces.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
NLRR F06-114/4#8143
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
3/9/11
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
8
-2-
At the same time, the Soviets may face greater constraints on
their ability to increase their strategic commitment than in the
past. Significant expansion could (1) reduce growth in investment
which is critical to modernizing their industrial base, and/or (2)
curtail growth in the production of consumer goods which is an
important factor in the Soviet drive to improve labor productivity.
Moreover, the increasing modernization of the Soviet strategic
posture itself confronts the Soviets with new resource burdens.
The weapons systems of the 1980s and 1990s require more advanced
technology and greater operating skill. They see the prospects of
effective U.S. strategic defenses as greatly compounding the problem.
The mass production of high technology items like modern air defense
systems may prove difficult for the Soviets. Furthermore, the move
we see the Soviets making toward a greater reliance on mobility is
costly in terms of support equipment, trained personnel, and operating
expenses.
There is no indication, however, that economic problems will
force the Soviets to forego or significantly constrain key strategic
programs in the near term. The Soviets already have made a sub-
stantial resource commitment to developmental programs that will
result by the mid-1990s in improved intercontinental nuclear attack
forces -- land-and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.
The Soviets appear well-postured to handle their strategic objectives
through the next five years or so.
SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL
Matloch 8134 a
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
0626
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
FILE
March 10, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Reactivation of U.S.-USSR Joint Medical/Health
Agreement (C)
We have reviewed your Memorandum to Admiral Poindexter of January
23, 1986, and endorse the proposal to reactivate the two
U.S.-USSR agreements in the health area-- the Medical Science and
Public Health Agreement and the Artificial Heart Research and
Development Agreement. (C)
Rodrens
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR F06-114/4#134
CONFIDENTIAL
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
8135
0626
10
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
February 13, 1986
ACTION
SIGNED
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOC
SUBJECT:
Reactivation of the U.S.-USSR Joint Medical
Agreement
I have reviewed the State Memorandum at TAB II and endorse the
proposal to reactivate the two U.S.-USSR agreements in the health
area -- the Medical Science and Public Health Agreement and the
Artificial Heart Research and Development Agreement.
Raymond, Sestanovich and Mandel concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve transmittal of the Memorandum at TAB I.
Approve of
Disapprove
Attachments:
TAB I
McDaniel-Platt Memorandum
TAB II
Platt-Poindexter Memorandum of January 23, 1986
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NLRR Fole 114/4#8135
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
8144
S/S 8601760 XR8601759
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
0626
January 23, 1986
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Reactivation of the U.S.-USSR Joint Medical Agreement
In the attached memorandum of May 5, 1984 the NSC approved a
proposal to reactivate the two US-USSR agreements in the health
area -- the Medical Science and Public Health Agreement and the
Artificial Heart Research and Development Agreement. The
memorandum cautioned against initiating a joint committee
meeting of the two sides and other expansion of activities
under the agreements while Yelena Bonner was being denied
permission to obtain medical treatment abroad. Now that the
Soviets have permitted Ms. Bonner to leave the Soviet Union for
medical treatment, we believe it is appropriate to reevaluate
that policy with a view to considering first steps toward the
reinvigoration of the medical agreements.
You will recall that in his June 27 speech to the
Smithsonian Institute, the President specifically cited the
medical agreement in calling for expansion of activities under
bilateral cooperative agreements. More recently, the joint
communique at Geneva, in the context of the President's
Exchanges Initiatives, called for resumption of US-Soviet
cooperation in a number of scientific, educational, medical and
sports fields, with special emphasis on cooperation to combat
cancer.
The State Department recommends that we now take the next
step towards expanding bilateral cooperation under the health
agreements in response to the Soviet decision on Ms. Bonner.
However, even though Ms. Bonner has been permitted to depart
the Soviet Union, we should react cautiously. We still have
grave concerns about the plight of her husband, Andrei
Sakharov, and about Ms. Bonner's ability to rejoin him in the
USSR at the conclusion of her treatment. Additionally, it is
possible that we or the public may learn additional information
about Sakharov's condition during her stay in the West which
would make it inadvisable to proceed with medical science
cooperation.
The Department recommends that HHS be authorized to begin a
three-step process to expand health science cooperation with
the Soviets as originally proposed by Secretary Heckler in her
CONF IDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8144
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
3/9/11
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
April 24, 1984 letter to the Secretary (also attached). The
Department recommends that Dr. James Wyngaarden, Director of
the National Institute of Health be authorized to accept a
recent Soviet invitation to travel to the USSR. Dr. Wyngaarden
could visit various biomedical research institutes to help
identify topics of collaborative research, including the joint
cancer research announced at Geneva. Dr. Wyngaarden will find
an appropriate opportunity to inform his Soviet interlocutor
that we welcome the Soviet decision to allow Ms. Bonner to
leave the USSR for medical treatment. Dr. Wyngaarden will
stress that further positive steps in the treatment of Andrei
Sakharov and other dissident scientists would have a beneficial
impact on U.S.-Soviet cooperation. We will provide suitable
talking points closer to Dr. Wyngaarden's departure.
Subsequently, Dr. C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General and also
the Director of HHS Office of International Health, could
arrange a follow-up trip to the Soviet Union to meet with his
counterparts to discuss health cooperation generally and to
prepare an agenda for a Joint Health Committee Meeting.
Finally, if planning proceeds satisfactorally and if there
are no further complications, the U.S. would host a Joint
Health Committee meeting sometime in late 1986.
for
Nicholas Bonckinley Platt
Executive Secretary
CONF IDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
8134
B
3477
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
VIA LDX
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
ACTION: EUR
May 5, 1984
Dist To:
S
D
CONFIDENTIAL
P
S/S
S/S-S MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
TMC
Executive Secretary
SL
Department of State
RF (SHM)
SUBJECT:
Reactivation of the U.S.-USSR Cooperative
Agreements in Health (C)
In reference to your memorandum of April 30, 1984, to Mr.
McFarlane, the proposal to reactivate the U.S.-USSR agreements in
the health area is approved. We note, however, that it will not
be desirable to hold a joint committee meeting and begin
expanding cooperative activity under these agreements while Mrs.
Yelena Bonner is being denied permission to obtain medical
treatment abroad. (C)
Secretary Heckler can be authorized to convey our decision in
principle to her Soviet counterpart when they meet in Geneva
during the World Health Assembly. If she does so, however, she
should also seek a brief private meeting with the Soviet Minister
of Health to point out our concern over Mrs. Bonner's inability
to leave the Soviet Union for medical treatment abroad. She
should indicate that we expect Mrs. Bonner's request to be acted
on favorably, and that resolution of this problem will affect our
willingness to expand cooperation in the medical area. (C)
If Mrs. Bonner is allowed to leave the Soviet Union for medical
treatment, a date for a joint committee meeting to plan
activities under the agreements in question can be set. If she
should not be allowed to leave the USSR, however, the Department
should refer the question to us again, with its recommendation,
before proceeding. (C)
Robert RobertM. M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06- 114/4#8136
CONFIDENTIAL
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/4
8412417
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201
USA
APR 24 1984
The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
After the President's speech of January 16th, in which he
indicated a desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union,
I asked the Public Health Service to review our program of
cooperation in health with the Soviet Union to see where our
relations stand at present and to see if any new initiatives
were possible. As a result, I believe that there are several
steps we could take to promote our cooperation and for which we
are asking clearance:
1. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee for Health Cooperation.
It has now been more than five years since the last formal
meeting of the Joint Health Committee, and there have been no
high-level contacts between senior health officials during this
time. Cooperation has successfully continued at the scientist
level, especially in the areas of cardiovascular research and
cancer. We are finding, however, that fewer good U.S.
scientists are willing to go to the Soviet Union, and without
high level contacts it is difficult to identify new oppor-
tunities for cooperation where we would clearly benefit from the
exchange. We would propose to schedule a meeting of the
Committee, in the United States, in late 1984 or early 1985.
The focus of such a meeting should be a review of the past
program of activities and a discussion of how best to gradually
strengthen the program, given our budgetary limitations and
mutual scientific interests. We would seek to avoid a large
meeting that might raise false expectations.
2. A visit to the Soviet Union this summer by the Surgeon
General, Dr. C. Everett Koop.
Dr. Koop, who is also the Director of our Office of Inter-
national Health, would be a U.S. Deputy Co-chairman in the event
of a Joint Health Committee Meeting. The purpose of this visit
would be to meet with his counterparts to discuss health coop-
eration generally and to prepare an agenda for a Joint Health
Committee meeting. This trip could probably be scheduled for
this summer.
APR 24 REC'D
3. Rescheduled visit to the Soviet Union by Dr. James
Wyngaarden, Director of the National Institutes of Health.
This trip had been scheduled for last October, but was post-
poned because of the shooting down of the KAL airliner. Dr.
Wyngaarden would visit various biomedical research institutes to
help identify topics of collaborative research to be pursued
under our current Agreements. He could also explore the
possibility of an agreement between the National Institutes of
Health and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Dr. Wyngaarden's
trip would probably be rescheduled for October, 1984.
I plan to head the U.S. Delegation to the World Health
Assembly, which will be held in Geneva in early May. If the
necessary approvals are granted by that time, I would plan to
discuss these proposals informally with my Soviet counterpart.
I would appreciate your reactions to these proposals and
would welcome the opportunity for further discussion.
Sincerely,
Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary
8412417
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201
UA
APR 24 1984
The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
After the President's speech of January 16th, in which he
indicated a desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union,
I asked the Public Health Service to review our program of
cooperation in health with the Soviet Union to see where our
relations stand at present and to see if any new initiatives
were possible. As a result, I believe that there are several
steps we could take to promote our cooperation and for which we
are asking clearance:
1. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee for Health Cooperation.
It has now been more than five years since the last formal
meeting of the Joint Health Committee, and there have been no
high-level contacts between senior health officials during this
time. Cooperation has successfully continued at the scientist
level, especially in the areas of cardiovascular research and
cancer. We are finding, however, that fewer good U.S.
scientists are willing to go to the Soviet Union, and without
high level contacts it is difficult to identify new oppor-
tunities for cooperation where we would clearly benefit from the
exchange. We would propose to schedule a meeting of the
Committee, in the United States, in late 1984 or early 1985.
The focus of such a meeting should be a review of the past
program of activities and a discussion of how best to gradually
strengthen the program, given our budgetary limitations and
mutual scientific interests. We would seek to avoid a large
meeting that might raise false expectations.
2. A visit to the Soviet Union this summer by the Surgeon
General, Dr. C. Everett Koop.
Dr. Koop, who is also the Director of our Office of Inter-
national Health, would be a U.S. Deputy Co-chairman in the event
of a Joint Health Committee Meeting. The purpose of this visit
would be to meet with his counterparts to discuss health coop-
eration generally and to prepare an agenda for a Joint Health
Committee meeting. This trip could probably be scheduled for
this summer.
APR 24 REC'D
3. Rescheduled visit to the Soviet Union by Dr. James
Wyngaarden, Director of the National Institutes of Health.
This trip had been scheduled for last October, but was post-
poned because of the shooting down of the KAL airliner. Dr.
Wyngaarden would visit various biomedical research institutes to
help identify topics of collaborative research to be pursued
under our current Agreements. He could also explore the
possibility of an agreement between the National Institutes of
Health and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Dr. Wyngaarden's
trip would probably be rescheduled for October, 1984.
I plan to head the U.S. Delegation to the World Health
Assembly, which will be held in Geneva in early May. If the
necessary approvals are granted by that time, I would plan to
discuss these proposals informally with my Soviet counterpart.
I would appreciate your reactions to these proposals and
would welcome the opportunity for further discussion.
Sincerely,
Heakler
Margaret M. Heckler
Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
8137
MAthock:
18
0821
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
FILE
March 10, 1986
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
CIA "Worldwide Briefing" (U)
I recently received a copy of your "Worldwide Briefing" on the
Soviet threat to U.S. national security interests. I have
reviewed it with interest and found many of the facts and trends
cited there disturbing. In particular, as you point out, we have
yet to see any clear sign that the Soviets are changing their
policy of using military force to exploit regional conflicts. (C)
I think the paper provides abundant examples which can be used to
keep public attention focused on Soviet behavior in the
developing world - a major obstacle to improved U.S.-Soviet
relations. (C)
John M. John Poindexter
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRR F06-114/4#8137
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
8130
19
0821
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 25, 1986
ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDENTER
CIA JACK Worldwide F. MATLOCK Am
SIGNED
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Briefing Paper
You asked me to review DCI Casey's "Worldwide Briefing" on the
Soviet arms buildup and Soviet involvement in regional conflicts
around the globe. It is a worst case view of Soviet capabilities
and intentions, in which some of the figures presented and
assertions made are open to question. I also believe that as a
"net assessment" it gives inadequate weight to U.S. strengths in
some of the areas discussed.
The paper does serve to highlight the importance of Soviet
behavior in the developing world as a major obstacle to improved
U.S. -Soviet relations - a theme we must continue to stress with
the public. One question which it does not address is that of
the domestic pressures on Gorbachev which could possibly lead to
a modification of some of the policies described. Since this has
not happened yet, it is well to bear in mind that the pattern
described by the DCI is still the reality and modifications in it
are no more than possibilities which may well not materialize.
Our task is to act so as to maximize the pressure on the Soviets
to restrain their aggressive activity, while offering the
possibility of reduced tension if they do so.
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the DCI acknowledging
receipt of the paper.
Sestahovich, deGraf fenreid, Kräemer, n.e Ringdahl, PL Burghardt, M.Q Mandel, n.a.
Major, Raymond, Sigar and North concur. Their specific comments
are noted in the paper.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to DCI Casey at Tab I.
Approve
your
Disapprove
attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to DCI Casey
Tab II
McDaniel to Rixse memorandum forwarding memorandum to
DCI
Tab II
"Worldwide Briefing"
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRR Fob-
DECL: OADR
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
10
DCI
30 Jan 1986
1100 hrs.
0821
WORLDWIDE BRIEFING
Intelligence must not only report developments around the world as
they occur. It must also step-back to discern patterns, linkages, and
strategies that may work to endanger the United States and its interests.
During 1985, the pattern of challenges and threats to our strategic interests
broadened, sharpened and intensified.
The main thrust still comes from the Soviet Union, which is increasingly
posing a many dimensioned global challenge to the United States and the Free
World. This threat resides:
(1) in the military might the Russians are piling up on the Eurasian
land mass,
continuance (W.R.)
(2) in its steady acquisition of geopolitical bridgeheads in Asia,
Africa and Latin America, and
(3) in the development, linking and use of these bridgeheads for
growing Soviet naval and air operation and to further enlarge
the Soviet geopolitical position.
The Soviets continue the modernization and expansion of their military
forces both conventional and strategic. The conventional weapons threat from
the Warsaw Pact countries was the first element of this threat to emerge.
It has been intensified in recent years and has now progressed to the point
significant (W.R)
where the Pact enjoys huge military advantages, and is now developing more
exotic arms for the future.
/E/EASE
NLRR F06-114/4 #8139
BY Gs NARADATE 1/23/08
In the European Central Region, the Pact maintains a three-to-one
advantage in tanks and artillery, and more than two-to-one in armored vehicles
and aircraft.
While NATO has historically had the qualitative edge in military weapons,
DCI says Soviets are 10 feet tall.
Sounds like a budget defense document.
And this after 5 R.R. years? (W.R.)
this edge is eroding.
The newest Soviet tanks are at least the equal of those in NATO's arsenal.
In some aspects, such as firepower and armor protection, they are superior.
The fielding of more self-propelled artillery is boosting the
maneuverability, survivability, and tactical nuclear firepower of Soviet
ground forces. Soviet bridging equipment to cross the rivers of Europe
is SO good that our army has reverse engineered to field models of Soviet
design.
Soviet aircraft are among the world's finest. Newer fighters and fighter-
bombers have improved performance, larger payloads, and better avionics--though
the latest US aircraft still maintain leads in sortie rate and avionics.
The Soviets have developed and used in Afghanistan fuel-air explosives
which inflict massive destruction without crossing the nuclear threshold.
We know that the Soviets are working to acquire the technology to develop
aircraft and cruise missiles employing stealth features, and remotely piloted
vehicles for acquiring and attacking armored vehicles. At the same time
they are developing their own anti-tank warheads with increased penetration
ability, precision guided munitions with enhanced accuracy, conventional
explosives with enhanced destructiveness, and a new generation of fighters,
some with multiple target look-down/shoot-down capability.
2
The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest chemical warfare
capability--with an agent stockpile nearly three times larger than ours.
They continue to replenish existing stocks and maintain an active research
and development program. The Soviet armed forces are trained and equipped
to operate on battlefields contaminated by nuclear and chemical weapons.
These Soviet developments add up to a dominance in land warfare which
requires the West to count on its maritime reinforcement capability to counter
and on its strategic forces to deter.
Some of the Soviets' greatest strides have been in submarine production.
In the last three years, they have introduced three new types of nuclear
attack submarines which are quieter, faster and able to dive deeper. They
have also launched a 65,000 ton aircraft carrier, and in their naval deployment
and naval exercises have brought US-Soviet competition into Atlantic and
Pacific waters where until now we have enjoyed a near monopoly.
The second element of Soviet military power to emerge is its strategic
force and over the last 10 years it has at least caught up and probably
surpassed ours. By the mid-1990s, nearly all of the Soviets' currently
deployed intercontinental nuclear attack forces--land- and sea-based ballistic
missiles and heavy bombers--will be replaced by new and improved systems.
The number of deployed strategic force warheads will increase by a few thousand
over the next five years, with the potential for greater expansion in the 1990s.
The Soviets are protecting their missile force by making much of it
mobile. They have already deployed their first new mobile ICBM and will
soon begin deploying a second.
3
Follow-on missile programs--with improved accuracy, greater throw weight
potential and probably more warheads--will begin flight-testing in the 1986-90
time period.
Major improvements are also under way in Soviet ballistic missile
submarines and bomber forces.
While all may be true and good intelligence targets for collection there is
a "net assessment" element that weaves in the text which almost characterizes
We expect the Soviets to complete improvements to their operational ABM
defenses at Moscow by 1987. This provides them with all the components necessary
for a much larger, widespread ABM defense, including transportable engagement
radars, above-ground launchers, and a new high-acceleration short-range
interceptor.
The distinction between missions for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and
ABMs is becoming increasingly blurred as the result of technology improvements
(W.R.)
to SAMs such as the SA-X-12. That system's capabilities against tactical
ballistic missiles gives it the potential to function in a missile defense role.
The Soviets have long been working on technologies basic to our own
Strategic Defense Initiative. Their work on directed-energy and kinetic-energy
us as profoundly inferior.
weapons goes back many years with more than 10,000 engineers involved.
We estimate that between 1980 and 1983, the cost of the Soviet space
program nearly doubled. The costs of their military space activities alone
are about the same as those for their strategic offensive forces. Soviet
space systems are likely to be an integral part of any strategic missile
defense system the Soviets might develop and deploy.
The five-year plan which Gorbachev will soon propose to the Party Congress
will call for an 80 percent increase in the investment in machine building.
4
24
There will also be ambitious goals for high tech support industries. This will
include the microelectronics and computers essential for developing the more
complex weapons systems the Soviets plan for the next decade. We believe the
current high level of military spending will continue to grow at the rate
that has prevailed for the past ten years.
Even at a time of economic difficulty and a reordering of domestic
priorities, Soviet defense programs have been protected. For example, during
the next five year plan we expect ICBM production to increase substantially
over the 1981-85 plan, submarine production to be up about 20-25 percent,
and tank production to jump well over 50 percent. There will be some 4,000
fighters and helicopters and a few hundred new strategic bombers produced
during this period. While the number of aircraft are somewhat lower than in
the preceding five-year period, the new aircraft will be substantially more
technically advanced and capable. Thus, the prospect is for continuation of
the steady 20-year expansion and modernization of Soviet strategic and conventional
forces. The cumulative effect of this buildup is SO great that the United
States has only begun to catch up.
Because of accumulated earlier investment and defense industrial capacity,
the number of weapons systems that they will be able to buy over the next
five years will be substantially greater than what they acquired the past
five years.
Despite the much increased US spending for arms of the past five years,
7
only recently has the US begun to catch up with Soviet weapons acquisition;
until then, we simply were not falling behind as fast as we had been.
5
The important thing is not how much the Soviets spend on arms, but the
quantity and quality of arms they get for their money. When you compare
US and Soviet procurement of major weapons systems, from 1974-1984, the
Soviet advantage in:
ICBMs and SLBMs is roughly about
3 times
IRBMs and MRBMs is roughly about
6 times
Surface-to-Air missiles
is roughly about
9 times
? rw.r.)Long and Intermediate
Range Bombers is more than
50 times
Fighters
is roughly about
twice
Helicopters
is more than
twice
Submarines
is more than
twice
Tanks
is more than
3 times
Artillery pieces is more than
10 times
The steady growth of Soviet weapons procurement from the high level of
the last decade will give the Soviets a massive cumulative inventory of
weapons, and they will continue to substantially modernize their forces in
the next five years and buy larger numbers of weapons.
This huge military force and its continued growth may never be used
against the United States or NATO--although the Soviets clearly are prepared
to use it if their vital interests are threatened. The mere existence of
this force not only validates the Soviet Union as a superpower, but has an
intimidating effect on countries around the world helping the Soviets expand
their presence, influence, and power. It represents the backdrop for an
aggressive challenge being played out worldwide, but most particularly
on the ground in the Third World and in the vicinity of critical sea lanes.
6
24
The Soviet Union has acquired bridgeheads in Cuba, Cambodia, South Yemen
and Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Gorbachev, since coming to
power, has moved sharply to strengthen the Soviet hold on these bridgeheads.
In the last six months alone, he has extended a $600 million credit to Nicaragua,
$1 billion in new economic assistance to Vietnam, and completed the supply
advisors (P.R.)
of $1.5 billion in military equipment to Angola. Soviet and Cuban troops
^
have become more active in Angola, Nicaragua, and South Yemen, and Soviet
forces have been reinforced and pursued more aggressive tactics in Afghanistan.
Each of these countries has become an outpost for Soviet intelligence collection,
propaganda and subversion in its respective region. Several have undertaken
on their own to destabilize neighboring regimes. Virtually all are strategically
located either near important strategic choke points or in areas of almost
certain regional conflict.
As the map indicates, the USSR now has Marxist-Leninist allies or clients
spread around the globe. It has naval and air basing rights close to
sea lane choke points vital to the Free World. These strategic positions
which the Soviets have acquired around the world are being linked, moreover,
in a growing logistic and infrastructure network.
Let me illustrate by describing the Soviet complex in the Caribbean
and its links. The Soviets have created in Cuba the strongest military
force in the Western Hemisphere, with the exception of our own. Even more
worrisome than this military bastion on our doorstep are the growing logistic
networks that the Soviets have sponsored in both Cuba and Nicaragua. In
Cuba at least three, and probably more, airfields are capable of hosting
Soviet TU-95 Bear heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear air-to-surface
missiles
7
21
missiles. TU-95 Bear Reconnaissance and ASW aircraft routinely fly from the
Kola Peninsula in the Soviet Arctic to Cuban airfields. In Nicaragua, aircraft
revetments to handle high performance fighters have been completed at Sandino
airfield in Managua. The runways at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on the
Atlantic coast and Montlimar on the Pacific have been extended to host MIG
fighters.
Cuban construction crews are completing the new airfield at Punte Huete
outside Managua, which with a 10,000 foot runway will be the largest military
airbase in Central America capable of accommodating Soviet jet fighters,
heavy transport aircraft, and TU-95 bombers.
There will be a short, direct sea connection between the Cuban base and
its extension in Nicaragua this year when the Bulgarians complete a major
port facility at E1 Bluff on the Caribbean coast near Bluefields.
This, in conjunction with the Pacific ports of Corinto and San Juan del Sur,
where the Soviets intend to install a dry dock, will provide the Soviets with
secure port facilities on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in close
proximity to the Panama Canal. In addition, a Soviet team reportedly has surveyed
the construction of a second canal between the Atlantic and Pacific across
the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua.
We see similar links and components of this network snaking around the
globe. In the South Atlantic, Soviet naval and naval air forces operate
astride Western shipping lanes. These forces depend on a growing infrastructure
manned and protected by nearly 2,000 Soviet Bloc advisors, 35,000 Cuban
military, and a local Angolan government army of 100,000. You will note
from the map that this node is linked to the Cuban segment of the network.
8
28
The Mediterranean segment of this Soviet global network is anchored at
Libya and Syria. About 6,000 Soviet Bloc advisors support facilities in
those countries, which include air, naval and air defense facilities.
Similarly, this network threatens Western sea lanes in the Red Sea-
Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean from bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Over
7,000 Soviet and Cuban military personnel and about a quarter million Ethiopian
military support this segment, as well as Soviet Bloc personnel in South Yemen
and Mozambique.
Finally, Soviet naval and air forces operating out of Cam Ranh Bay and
Da Nang in Indochina not only command the economic lifelines of Japan, Taiwan
and South Korea, but linked with Soviet naval and air bases in Siberia are a
threat to US bases in the Philippines, SO critical to our position in the
Pacific Ocean. Thousands of Soviet military personnel man the infrastructure
of this second largest Soviet military complex outside the Warsaw Pact.
Beyond the consolidation and linking of positions in these Soviet outposts,
there is the spread of Soviet subversion--active measures, support to insurgent
forces, efforts to destabilize countries friendly to the West and exploitation
of economic hardship and political instability for strategic advantage.
Both their outposts and this subversion is supported by a flood of weapons
pouring out of the great arms depot at Nikolaev on the Black Sea to regimes
and groups all over the world.
To build the foundation and further project this far-flung program, Moscow
maintains an extensive military advisory presence in 29 Third World countries.
This presence ranges from 5 military specialists in Benin to about 6,000 in Vietnam.
9
There are something like 3,000 in Syria, about 2,000 in Ethiopia, Libya and
Afghanistan, and 1,200 in Angola and South Yemen, and 800 in Mozambique.
In some of these countries--Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan-- Soviet officers
exercise command and control and in others they have great leverage and influence.
The Soviets and their surrogates provide support to Communist or radical
insurgents in some ten countries. They help some seven Socialist-oriented
client regimes suppress insurrections of their own. All this involves 335,000
combat troops, over 65,000 advisors, extensive political and military training,
a heavy flow of weapons, and various levels of political support. The 335,000
combat troops occupying other countries include 120,000 Soviet soldiers in
Afghanistan, over 130,000 Vietnamese in Cambodia and 45,000 in Laos, and over
40,000 Cubans in Africa.
The principal Soviet targets in supporting insurgencies are:
- El Salvador and Guatemala, supported from Cuba and Nicaragua;
some unusual choices (W.R.)
- Chile, in which Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union and several
East European countries have been training and providing weapons for
violent opposition and funding of the Communist party;
- Colombia, where three insurgent groups receive support from some
combination of Moscow, Cuba and Nicaragua;
Mozambique? Lebanon? (W.R.)
- Namibia, where weapons and military training for the insurgents
of the Southwest Africa Peoples Organization comes from the Soviet
Union, Libya and Cuba; and
? (W.R.)
- Sudan, Somalia, Chad, and Zaire, where Libya, Ethiopia and Cuba
help insurgents.
- Yemen and Oman from time to time where the Soviets and Cubans support
7
(W.R.)
rebels.
10
30
During the decade of the 70s, people all over the world were flocking
CW.R.)? to join Communist insurgencies. This has been reversed and today some half
million people around the world are fighting in resistance movements against
Communist regimes. In Afghanistan, there is virtually a nation in arms
fighting against 120,000 Soviet troops; in Angola, Savimbi has some 60,000
fighters in all parts of Angola. In Ethiopia, Eritrean and Tigrean rebels
fight the Marxist Mengistu government and the largest army in Africa with
its Cuban and Soviet advisors. In Indochina, 50,000 insurgents fight
170,000 Vietnamese soldiers. In Nicaragua, 20,000 resistance fighters
are in a standoff with 120,000 Sandinista troops and militia.
In this contest, the Soviets have proclaimed the Brezhnev doctrine
which says once Communist always Communist. There is every indication that
Gorbachev has adopted and is applying that doctrine vigorously with renewed
and increased weapons and Soviet and Cuban involvement against the growing
effectiveness of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, Savimbi in Angola, and the
contras in Nicaragua. We are witnessing a sudden and forceful application
of this doctrine in South Yemen right now. The Soviets succeeded in establishing
a Marxist regime and a Russian naval and communications center in that country
in the 1970s. Recently, Ali Nasser, the President of that country, began to
draw away a little from the Soviets and seek some help elsewhere. Two weeks
ago, the more pro-Soviet elements in his government and President Ali Nasser
had a shootout and a civil war broke out between military and tribal elements
loyal to the President and those loyal to the more pro-Soviet elements. The
Vice President was out of the country and he flew to Moscow. The Soviets sat
and watched for a few days evacuating Soviet citizens from the country.
11
31
Neighboring countries, North Yemen and Ethiopia, moved to help the South Yemen
government. After a few days, it appeared that the rebels were gaining the
upper hand, the South Yemen Politburo met and declared the Vice President in
Moscow the head of a new government, Moscow warned North Yemen and Ethiopia
not to help the government forces and Soviet fliers in MIG-21s given to
South Yemen joined in pounding beleaguered government forces and Soviet
transport planes started bringing in weapons for rebel forces.
Now I'd like to turn briefly to areas of great instability where US and
Western political and strategic interests are at risk and which offer the
potential of enormous gain to the Soviets. The Philippines, Sudan and elsewhere
in southern and Central Africa are prime examples.
These soft spots may have largely indigenous causes, but they offer
tempting opportunities to the apparatus I have been describing. The most
critical situation is that of the Philippines where a Communist-led insurgency,
the NPA, controls an increasing proportion of the country's villages and
rural areas. It has shown an ability to conduct urban violence in the second
and third cities, Davao and Cebu, and substantial preparation and potential
for bringing violence into Manila itself. Whatever the outcome of the February
election we are likely to face rising challenges to US interests in the
not a given (W.R.)
Philippines. The Soviets have been very careful to date, dealing with Philippine
establishment figures there, not openly associating itself with the NPA--but
definitely in touch covertly with various revolutionary groups. If the
NPA's fortunes improve, as seems likely, we can expect the Soviet role to
grow. Meanwhile, political and insurgent pressures on US basing facilities
are likely to grow and the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay is only 120 minutes
away from our bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay.
12
Another soft spot is Sudan. Its severe political and economic disarray
is compounded by Libya's strenuous efforts to gain predominant influence there.
At the moment, insurgents of the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA)
are supported primarily by Ethiopia. Recent reporting suggests that the
Soviets may be increasing their contact with the SPLA and providing some
arms assistance through the Ethiopians. We believe that East Germans and
Cubans have been training Sudanese insurgents inside Ethiopia. Resulting
temporarily (P.R.)
pressures have led the Sudanese to withdraw ^ from joint military exercises
with us, revoke access rights for US forces (P.R.) and question the future status
of prepositioned US military equipment. Additionally, the Libyans have been
given rights of air passage over Sudan enabling the Soviets to hook up more
easily their presence in Libya and Ethiopia. US interests will be further
jeopardized if radical elements pull off a successful coup in Khartoum, or
if the general situation becomes one of near anarchy, or if a weak elected
government should draw closer to Libya. Stronger Libyan and Soviet influence
and presence in Sudan would face Egypt with a hostile force on the west and
the south--and pro-Soviet elements in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen
would command the southern approaches to the Suez Canal.
This combination of subversive aggression and soft spots around the
world has been gravely compounded by the emergence of what we call the radical
entente of Syria, Libya and Iran, all of which share the common objective of
expelling the United States from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Southwest
Asia. These three states all have radically diverging interests, personalities,
and style, but they share critical characteristics. They oppose nearly all
aspects of US policy in the region. They want to weaken or destroy moderate
Arab leadership. They are in active opposition to the US peace process.
And they practice and sponsor terrorism to attain political goals.
13
33
The activities of these states are not necessarily or always directed
by the USSR, but their policies serve Soviet interests by damaging both
Western interests and moderate forces. The Soviets provide major military
support to two of the three--Syria and Libya.
Syria is the most effective of the three. While its goals are more
limited than the other two, its leadership is tactically brilliant and
generally successful--qualities which hardly describe Iran or Libya.
Iran's attentions are largely consumed by the Gulf war and by Shia politics
in the Gulf. But it does have broader long-term interests in propagating
Shia fundamentalism in the world. Its role in Lebanon was a critical factor
in stimulating the US exodus from that country in the face of unremitting
Shia attack.
In Libya, Qadhafi's interests and ambitions parallel those of the USSR
in SO many respects that the disruptive effects are not measurably different
from what they would be, with Qadhafi a total surrogate of Moscow's.
No other state outside the Soviet Bloc has a geographic range of subversive
activity to match that of Libya. Oadhafi's ambitions are mirrored in subversive
meddling which now ranges from Chile to the Caribbean, to South Africa, across
the Middle East to East Asia, Indonesia, and New Caledonia in the Southwest
Pacific.
how many planes? (W.R.)
Libya has significant military forces to bring to bear and its threat
to its immediate neighbors of Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia is very real.
Libya is the greatest stockpiler of weapons in the world with billions of dollars
worth, including hundreds of T-72 tanks (far more, for example, than Poland
has), and hundreds of sophisticated Soviet jets.
14
34
Oadhafi's explicit ambitions with respect to Malta and the air and air
defense weapons the Soviets have provided him to make Libya a threat to the
Mediterranean sea lane.
I will not dwell in detail on international terrorism this afternoon,
but I do wish to stress the relationship of the USSR and its associates
to terrorism.
The USSR and its Eastern European allies support a host of Near East and
other Third World terrorist groups. The Eastern European hand is the more
pronounced, the Soviet hand more disguised. Their combined support takes
many forms: training, arming, the providing of communications and documentation,
safehaven, and SO on. Many of the most notorious terrorist leaders--including
Carlos and Abu Nidal--have for years circulated fairly freely in Eastern Europe.
These problems we have highlighted this morning by no means exhaust the
threats that will increasingly confront the US. I can assure you that the
Intelligence Community is deeply involved on a priority basis with alerting
policymakers to hazards and opportunities in numerous other categories.
These include, for example, developments concerning Soviet domestic problems,
the Iran-Iraq war, China, Japan, the Korean Peninsula, LDC debtors, nuclear
proliferation, CW proliferation, BW proliferation, technology transfer, drug
trafficking, oil futures, ecological problems, resource problems, and so on.
15
35
All these questions will continue to receive our close attention. But
in planning US defenses and military assistance, we believe, now and in
the future, the broad, linked threats that I have stressed today demand and
deserve the closest attention. The backdrop of growing Soviet military
power, the Soviet network of assets and facilities abroad, and Soviet promotion
of disorder in the Third World are together creating an increasingly
interrelated threat of growing proportions. Growing Soviet global reach,
Soviet basing facilities, developing military infrastructures, Soviet military
air lanes, and growing Soviet or Soviet client proximity to target countries
Is this to be given in a forum where it will get a lot of attention?
and to sea lane choke points are all combining to confront the United States
with rising challenges for the future.
If so, some of the points could probably stand a closer look.
We have a tendency too often to focus on specific events as they come
along, and to be skeptical about drawing linkages and relationships between
events. In this view of the world in 1986 and the threats awaiting us in
the future, I have tried to lay out for you how US intelligence sees the
challenges which our country will have to face in the years ahead. It is
only through understanding these emerging patterns and relationships that
the United States can shape effective strategies for meeting these challenges.
Otherwise, looks fine. (SRS)
Thank you for your attention. I have with me Larry Gershwin, NIO for
Strategic Programs; Doug MacEachin, Director of Soviet Affairs; George Montgomery,
Assistant NIO for General Purpose Forces: and Bob Vickers, NIO for Latin America.
My colleagues and I will be pleased to entertain any comments or questions
you may have.
16
0821
30
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT:
CIA "Worldwide Briefing"
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to DCI Casey commenting on the
CIA's "Worldwide Briefing" paper recently forwarded to the NSC.
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
attachment:
Tab I
Memorandum to DCI Casey
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
By CAS
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 7/2/02
JMathrk 3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Classified
Eyes Only
Weiberge- Soklar
Mathock
PRESERVATION FABY
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
as 7/2/02
8140
38
OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 10, 1986
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT:
Weinberger-SokoTov Meeting
I think this is a good idea.
On the modalities, I would suggest that Secretary Weinberger send
a letter to Sokolov inviting him and Akhromeyev to visit the U.S.
this year. (I believe it should be independent of the summit
invitation. In fact, there are advantages to having this visit
separate from Gorbachev's.) The letter should be delivered by
our Embassy in Moscow.
Actually, I doubt that the Soviets will let Sokolov accept. The
betting is that he may be replaced soon. However, as you say,
the fact of the invitation could be useful to us subsequently --
and if Sokolov is replaced, the invitation could be renewed to
his successor.
I am discussing this matter with Ridgway. It probably would be a
good idea to suggest that the President review the text of the
letter of invitation. I attach a first stab at a draft --
although Cap may prefer to do it himself. (I have repeated some
language from one of the President's letters to Gorbachev.)
Attachments:
Tab I
Draft Weinberger letter
Tab II
Shultz Letter of March 1, 1986
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED MANNO
NLRR F06-114/4#8140
BY RW NARA DATE 11/5/09
8141
39
DRAFT
Dear Marshal Sokolov:
In the spirit of the meeting in Geneva last year between
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, I would like to
extend an invitation to you to visit the United States this year.
I would hope that our meeting could initiate a process of
increased contact and better communication between our defense
establishments.
Although our views differ on many topics, better communication
between our defense officials and professional military officers
could serve to diminish misunderstandings and thus lower those
suspicions which are not based on fact. The American people, I
am sure, would warmly welcome the establishment of contact
between us.
If you are able to accept this invitation, our representatives
can discuss which dates would be mutually convenient.
Sincerely yours,
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR #8141
BY RW NARA DATE 11-5-09
40
National Security Council
The White House
EYES ONE
System #
Package #
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson
William Martin
Don Fortier
Paul Thompson
Florence Gantt
John Poindexter
/
g
William Martin
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
MATLOCK
2
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Regan
Buchanan
Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Jack
& Lat do you think of this ?
&
ES SEN ITIVE
8605760
8142
41
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 1, 1986
SECRET/SENSITIVE
&
Dear John,
I have written to Cap Weinberger to let him know that I
share his concerns about American official attendance at Soviet
Armed Forces Day receptions this year. Thus, the Department
earlier this month instructed all diplomatic and consular posts
that sanctions against attending Soviet Armed Forces Day
receptions remain in effect, and that no civilian or military
personnel should attend.
At the same time, I want to share with you and Cap my
strong belief that we should make a distinction between
acceptance of invitations to highly visible events in honor of
the Soviet military, and other contacts with Soviet defense
officials that can increase our understanding of Soviet
military doctrine, policies and practices -- and give them a
better understanding why we view them as the threat they are.
A hallmark of the Administration's policy towards the
Soviet leadership is seeking a realistic dialogue. As a result
of the Geneva summit, we are working actively to expand our
contacts with the Soviets in diverse fields. Several of our
Cabinet colleagues have already had beneficial exchanges with
Soviet cabinet-level counterparts. With regard to defense
contacts, at the UNGA in October 1984, and again in Strasbourg
in May 1985, the President personally endorsed a policy of
greater exchanges between American and Soviet military
officials. I believe it is in our national interest to begin
working to implement this policy without further delay. Senior
defense officials play a key role in the Soviet Union, just as
Cap and his colleagues do here. I believe it is of great value
to be talking with them every appropriate chance we get.
At our breakfast on February 12, you, Cap and I discussed
the pros and cons of high-level.exchanges with Soviet defense
officials. I would like to revisit with you and Cap ways in
which we might best implement the President's policy. Such
exchanges would be an important element of our overall effort
to improve our understanding of the perspectives of the top
Soviet leadership, which is critical to our picture of Soviet
policy-making.
VAdm John M. Poindexter,
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs,
The White House.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL:OADR
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
SECRET/SENSITIVE
42
- 2 -
An additional consideration is the delicate trilateral
relationship with China. You are of course aware that the
Chinese Defense Minister, Chief-of-Staff, and the heads of all
their respective services have already visited the United
States. Although the character of these visits differs
markedly from any prospective Soviet exchanges, it is in our
interest not to lose sight of the trilateral ramifications.
Thus, I would like to suggest that a meeting between Cap
and Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov would be in our foreign
policy interest. This could be followed up with a meeting
between Admiral Crowe and his Soviet counterpart, Marshal
Akhromeyev. We could begin working toward an agreement at this
year's Summit to exchange visits by defense ministers and
military chiefs-of-staff between the 1986 and 1987 summits.
Alternatively, Cap and Admiral Crowe could invite their Soviet
counterparts to Washington during this period.
My staff stands ready to work together with yours and Cap's
on this matter.
Sincerely yours,
General
George P. Shultz
CC: Admiral Crowe
SECRET/SENSITIVE
mathich
43
1787
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
"FIXE
March 11, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS
FROM:
RODNEY B. MCDANIEL
Carol the Clurland
SUBJECT:
Letter to Mr. Don Mischer
We have reviewed and concur in the proposed letter to Mr. Don
Mischer of Don Mischer Productions, Beverly Hills, California,
concerning his proposal for a television production in connection
with the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev
later this year.
Attachments:
Tab A
Proposed Letter to Mr. Mischer
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence
1787
44
AUIZ/COM/
Dear Mr. Mischer:
Thank you for your letter to President Reagan and for
him
sharing with your proposal for a television production
in connection with the meeting planned for later this
year between the President and Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev. Your interest in writing is understood.
As you know, planning for this meeting is at a very
early stage, and the exget timing of the meeting has yet to
be determined. Nevertheless, your suggestion is appre-
it
ciated, and I have taken the liberty of forwarding Eo
appropriate officials in the White House for further
review. You can be sure that it will be given consid-
eration and that further response will be forthcoming
as preparations proceed.
Again, thank you for bringing your ideas to our atten-
tion. With the President's best wishes,
CC:
White House Communications (television)
NSC Public Affairs
Pete Roussel
Scheduling
45
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 3, 1986
Dear Mr. Mischer:
Thank you for your letter to President Reagan and for sharing
with him your proposal for a television production in connection
with the meeting planned for later this year between the
President and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. Your interest
in writing is understood.
As you know, planning for this meeting is at a very early stage,
and the exact timing of the meeting has yet to be determined.
Nevertheless, your suggestion is appreciated, and I have taken
the liberty of forwarding it to appropriate officials in the
White House for further review. You can be sure that it will be
given consideration and that further response will be
forthcoming as preparations proceed.
Again, thank you for bringing your ideas to our attention. With
the President's best wishes,
Sincerely,
Anne Higgins
Special Assistant to the President
and Director of Correspondence
Mr. Don Mischer
Don Mischer Productions
Suite 328
9350 Wilshire Boulevard
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
1487
DONMISCHERPRODUCTIONS
December 19, 1985
9350
Wilshire Boulevard
Suite 328
Beverly Hills. California
90212
213-276 2093
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
In anticipation of Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the
United States and in light of our new cultural agreement
with the Soviet Union, we would like to propose a live
primetime television event, a gala evening of entertain-
ment in celebration of this historic occasion.
For several months we have been developing an entertainment
special which would originate simultaneously from the United
States and the Soviet Union by means of the spacebridge
format. Now, with Mr. Gorbachev's visit to the United
States, such a cultural co-venture would certainly highlight
this unique meeting and outwardly demonstrate the cohesive
artistic efforts of both nations.
We already have had discussions with Gostelradio concerning
such a gala evening and they have been very supportive of
this idea. We have also received network interest in
televising this special.
With you and Mr. Gorbachev in attendance, this event could
originate from either coast of the United States, wherever
this historic meeting takes place. For instance, this event
could originate from the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C.
or the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion in Los Angeles; while in
Russia, it could originate from the Russiya or perhaps the
Palace of Congresses in Moscow.
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
December 19, 1985
Page Two
Our goal is two hours of pure entertainment. Utilizing the
spacebridge format, which incorporates the simultaneous
transmission of images via large screen hook-ups here and
in the Soviet Union, we would be able to present a
distinguished array of artists of both nations, the finest
entertainers from every area of the arts.
Some of the performances would be expressly designed to
make the best use of the creative potential of the space-
bridge technique. American and Soviet artists would have
their first opportunity to perform together while on
separate stages. The spacebridge will also have an
important impact on the audiences of the two theatrical
arenas as well as the viewing public of both nations as
everyone will get to see and hear what is actually
happening on both stages at the same time.
In addition, some of our American artists might travel to
perform on the Soviet stage while Soviet artists might come
here to perform. The drama and dynamic energy of the live
responses and one to one interaction of the American and
Soviet hosts, performers and audiences will make this a
very special television event.
As a television packager, I have had the opportunity to
produce and direct many event specials over the years, but
I am particularly excited at the prospect of being involved
in this event because of its historical and cultural
significance.
I have enclosed a professional biography, but may I mention
that as the producer and director of the Barbara Walters
specials, I had the pleasure of working with you on the
Thanksgiving special taped at your ranch in Santa Barbara
in 1981 and then with Mrs. Reagan on her segment for the
Barbara Walters specials the following year. In addition,
I have directed "The Kennedy Center Honors" for eight years.
As my biography reflects, I have an extensive background in
variety television, having won Emmys for "The Kennedy Center
Honors", "Motown 25", "Baryshnikov By Tharp", and "Motown
Returns to the Apollo", among others.
48
The Honorable Ronald Reagan
December 19, 1985
Page Three
I will be joined in this venture by Mr. Kim Spencer of
Internews who has been involved in many spacebridges,
including one devoted to the memory of Samantha Smith
and one with Phil Donahue to take place at the end of
this month.
Thank you in advance for your consideration of this
proposal. I sincerely hope that such a television event
will be of interest to you and will have your support.
I look forward to your comments.
Dae Mishe Respectfully yours,
Don Mischer
DM:kp
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Ed Djerijian
Deputy Press Secretary
for Foreign Affairs
DON MISCHER
Professional Bio
As President of Don Mischer Productions and Juniper Television
Productions, Inc., Don Mischer is a well-known producer, director,
and packager of television programs.
In April of 1985 he produced and directed "MOTOWN RETURNS TO THE
APOLLO", a three-hour primetime special for NBC which received
an unprecedented 11 Emmy nominations and won the Emmy for the
best music variety comedy program of 1985. Don had previously
worked with Motown on "MOTOWN 25: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND FOREVER"
for NBC in 1983, the year's most successful special, winning an
Emmy, a Peabody, and a Directors Guild of America Award for
Outstanding Directorial Achievement. Tom Shales of The Washington
Post said of "Motown 25", "The overwhelming warmth and luster of
it has been brilliantly preserved by producer-director Don Mischer."
In association with MacLaine Enterprises, Don produced and directed
"SHIRLEY MACLAINE: LIVE" for Showtime, and "SHIRLEY MACLAINE:
ILLUSIONS" for CBS. This highly acclaimed special won three
Emmys and Don received a Directors Guild Award for his efforts.
For eight years Don has directed "THE KENNEDY CENTER HONORS", a
prestigious two-hour CBS special celebrating the performing arts
in America. This national event, held at The White House and
The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington,
D.C., has honored such American artists as Lena Horne, Isaac Stern,
Aaron Copland, Fred Astaire, Tennessee Williams, George Balanchine,
Richard Rodgers, Henry Fonda, Leonard Bernstein, Cary Grant,
Helen Hayes, Frank Sinatra and James Stewart. For his work on
the Honors, Don has received three Directors Guild Awards and the
Emmy in 1981 for Best Direction of a Musical or Variety Program.
Collaborating with Mikhail Baryshnikov and Twyla Tharp, Don produced
and directed the premiere of the Great Performances series (PBS)
in 1984 for Dance in America. "BARYSHNIKOV BY THARP WITH AMERICAN
BALLET THEATRE" features three outstanding Tharp ballets and each
draws upon a different aspect of Baryshnikov's genius. This Don
Mischer production was made in association with WNET, New York
which won Don an Emmy for Outstanding Individual Achievement in
Directing in 1985.
In 1984 Don produced a pilot special for NBC called "JUMP!",
featuring eight kids in an innovative dance format. Although not
initially picked up for a series, "JUMP!" aired as an "impressive
experiment" and prompted syndicated columnist Marvin Kitman to say
"Mischer is the Balanchine of TV variety. He also has the spirit
to try everything."
-1-
Included among his other credits as producer and director are:
THE AMERICAN FILM INSTITUTE SALUTE TO GENE KELLY (CBS)
GOLDIE AND LIZA TOGETHER (CBS)
AIN'T MISBEHAVIN' (NBC)
BARBARA MANDRELL: SOMETHING SPECIAL (CBS)
SUPER NIGHT OF ROCK N ROLL (NBC)
MAKING TELEVISION DANCE (with Twyla Tharp) (PBS)
THE GREAT AMERICAN DREAM MACHINE (PBS)
In a joint venture with Phil Donahue, Don produced and directed
"DONAHUE AND KIDS", a one-hour NBC special dealing with children
who have life threatening illnesses. Response to "Donahue and
Kids" was overwhelming: New York Times, "extraordinary";
UPI, "uncommonly strong"; Chicago Tribune, "one of the most
important TV hours you'll ever spend!" It won the Emmy as the
Best Children's Program broadcast in 1981, and seven other major
awards.
For six years, in association with Barbara Walters, Don packaged
the highly successful "BARBARA WALTERS SPECIALS" (Emmy nominations
in 1981 and 1982). Don was Executive Producer and Director of
these ABC primetime specials which featured visits with celebrities
that included John Wayne, Bing Crosby, Elizabeth Taylor, Burt
Reynolds, Sir Lawrence Olivier and President Reagan.
Don has also produced and directed specials with:
ROBIN WILLIAMS (HBO)
BOB HOPE (NBC)
JOHN DENVER (ABC)
BARRY MANILOW (ABC)
LYNDA CARTER (CBS)
MARLO THOMAS (ABC)
CHERYL LADD (ABC)
DONNA SUMMER (ABC)
GOLDIE HAWN (CBS)
-2-
DECEMBER 1985
NAME
DON MISCHER
ADDRESS
9350 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 328
Beverly Hills, California 90212
PH: 213/276-2093
EDUCATION
BA, University of Texas 1962
Sociology/Political Science
MA, University of Texas 1964
Sociology/Political Science
OCCUPATION
Television Producer/Director/Packager
President, Don Mischer Productions
President, Juniper Television Productions, Inc.
ASSOCIATIONS
National Academy of Television Arts & Sciences
Directors Guild of America
American Film Institute
Who's Who In America
AWARDS
Six Prime Time Emmy Awards
(Sixteen Nominations)
Six Directors Guild of America Awards
for Outstanding Directorial Achievement
Peabody Award
Gabriel Award
Chicago International Film Festival Award
Ohio State Award
Golden Rose of Montreaux Award
1787
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
March 10, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL
SIGNED
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK am
SUBJECT:
Letter to Don Mischer of Don Mischer Productions
I have reviewed and concur in the proposed letter to Mr. Don
Mischer of Don Mischer Productions, Beverly Hills, California,
concerning his proposal for a television production in connection
with the President's meeting with Secretary General Gorbachev
later this year.
Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to Anne Higgins for your
signature.
Sestanovich and Mandel concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward the memorandum to Ms. Higgins at TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to Ms. Higgins
Tab A
Draft Letter to Mr. Mischer
Tab B
Incoming Correspondence