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Matlock Chron June 1986 (1)
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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron June 1986 (1)
Box: 16
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/15/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1986 (1/6)
FOIA
F06-114/4
Box Number
16
YARHI-MILO
1608
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8302 MEMO
MCDANIEL TO GREGG; PLATT; COOKSEY;
2
ND
B1
BROWN; GALEBACH; KEEL; RIXSE; AND
BITOFF RE AGENDA FOR NSPG MEETING
ON FRIDAY JUNE 6, 1986
R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
8303 MEMO
MATLOCK TO RODMAN, LINHARD,
1 6/2/1986 B1
SESTANOVICH, PUGLIARESI RE
GORBACHEV MESSAGE
R 6/23/2010 M125/2
8304 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8302
2
ND
B1
R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
8305 MEMO
PUGLIARESI TO MCDANIEL RE
1 6/2/1986 B1
GORBACHEV STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR
SAFETY
R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
8306 MEMO
MCDANIEL TO PLATT RE STATEMENT BY
1
ND
B1
GORBACHEV ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
R 2/26/2009 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
8314 SPEECH
SPEECH RE NUCLEAR POWER
7
ND
B1
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8307 TALKING
TALKING POINTS
1
ND
B1
POINTS
R 6/23/2010 M125/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/15/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1986 (1/6)
FOIA
F06-114/4
Box Number
16
YARHI-MILO
1608
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8315 CABLE
021219Z JUN 86
6 6/2/1986 B1
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8316 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8302
1 6/3/1986 B1
R 6/23/2010 GUIDELINES - M08-125/2
8308 MEMO
POINDEXTER RE MEETING WITH
1
ND
B1
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP
JUNE 6, 1986
R
3/20/2013
F2006-114/4
8309 AGENDA
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP
1
ND
B1
MEETING JUNE 6, 1986
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8310 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8308
1
ND
B1
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8311 AGENDA
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8309
1
ND
B1
R
3/20/2013
F2006-114/4
8312 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8308
1
ND
B1
R 3/20/2013 F2006-114/4
8313 MEMO
MATLOCK TO PUGLIARESI RE SCIENCE
1 6/2/1986 B1
POLICY
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
Im him 1
AB
"
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
90417
June 2, 1986
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY M. McDANIEL
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
XX
SUBJECT:
NSGP Meeting -- June 6, 1986
Attached at Tab I is a multiple-addressee memorandum notifying
relevant agencies of an NSPG meeting to be held on Friday,
June 6, at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, in the Situation Room, and
forwarding an agenda for the meeting.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Multiple-Addressee Memo
Tab A
Agenda
CONE IDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
By
15 6/21/02
8302
2
90417
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON DC 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury
COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH
Senior Special Assistant
to the Attorney General
Department of Justice
DR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
RADM JOHN BITOFF
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT:
Agenda for NSPG Meeting on Friday, June 6, 1986 (U)
The NSPG meeting will be held in the White House Situation Room
at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on Friday, June 6, 1986, to discuss
policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance
of 1986. An agenda for the meeting is attached. Attendance is
principals only. (e)
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Agenda
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
White House Guidelines,
Declassify: OADR
By
NARA, Date 12/26/19
3
CONFIDENTIAL
AGENDA
NSPG MEETING -- FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 1986 -- SITUATION ROOM
1. The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations
which require further examination.
2.
Discussion by principals.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
8303 gm chron4
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 2, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR PETER W. RODMAN
ROBERT E. LINHARD
STEPHEN R. SESTANOVICH
LUCIAN S. PUGLIARESI
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Gorbachev Message
Upon reflection, following our meeting with the Admiral, I am
inclined to think that a prompt, general answer to the message --
using the same device as he did -- an oral statement, might be in
order. I would suggest something like the following:
"The President has received the General Secretary's oral
statement, which was delivered June 1, and welcomes the
proposals for international cooperation in dealing with
nuclear power plant safety. He has directed that a careful
study be undertaken, in a positive spirit, of these
proposals and of the overall question of international
efforts to improve nuclear power plant safety.
"The President also shares the General Secretary's expressed
desire to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals and to find
ways to move ultimately to a cessation of nuclear testing
and the elimination of nuclear weapons. He hopes, there-
fore, that the Soviet Union will join the United States
in serious negotiations to implement the understandings
reached in Geneva last November and to explore ways to
verify progressive limitations on nuclear testing, which
would move us toward these goals."
Note: The second paragraph may be a bit forward leaning, but it
might stimulate some interest in Moscow. As for the timing, I
would think that some sort of message along these lines should be
sent ASAP. It might encourage some concrete answers to the
previous correspondence. I would appreciate your comments.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
NLRRM08-125/2#8303
BY KML NARA DATE6/28/10
5
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
90417
June 2, 1986
CONF IDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY M. McDANIEL
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
mgm
SUBJECT:
NSGP Meeting -- June 6, 1986
Attached at Tab I is a multiple-addressee memorandum notifying
relevant agencies of an NSPG meeting to be held on Friday,
June 6, at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, in the Situation Room, and
forwarding an agenda for the meeting.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Multiple-Addressee Memo
Tab A
Agenda
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
By
White as House Guidelines, 6/21/02 1997
NARA, Date
Declassify: OADR
8304
90417
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury
COLONEL DAVID R. BROWN
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. STEPHEN GALEBACH
Senior Special Assistant
to the Attorney General
Department of Justice
DR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
RADM JOHN BITOFF
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT:
Agenda for NSPG Meeting on Friday, June 6, 1986 (U)
The NSPG meeting will be held in the White House Situation Room
at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on Friday, June 6, 1986, to discuss
policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance
of 1986. An agenda for the meeting is attached. Attendance is
principals only.
(C)
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Agenda
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify: OADR
By
White GS House Guidelines, August 28, 1907
NARA, Date 4/6/09
CONFIDENTIAL
AGENDA
NSPG MEETING -- FRIDAY, JUNE 6, 1986 -- SITUATION ROOM
1.
The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations
which require further examination.
2.
Discussion by principals.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR
8305 mattoch 8
4297
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Im chron File
SECRET
June 2, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL
THRU:
STEPHEN I. DANZANSKY SID
FROM:
LUCIAN S. PUGLIARESI 4
SUBJECT:
Gorbachev Statement on Nuclear Safety
As per your request, the attached tasker (Tab I) informs the
State Department that they should bring together today an
interagency group to respond to the Gorabachev statement. We ask
that State get government-wide agreement on press guidance and/or
a Presidential statement by close of business today and work up a
specific policy response no later than June 5.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you transmit the attached tasker you to Nicholas Platt (by
LDX).
Approve
Disapprove
Peter Rodman, Jack Matlock, and Bob hard concur.
not available
up for Jm
Attachments
Tab I
Memo to Platt
Tab A
Gorbachev Statement
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
White House Guidelines, August 28 1997
By
W
NARA, Date 2/26/05
8306
9
4297
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Statement by General Secretary Gorbachev
on Nuclear Safety (C)
The attached statement by General Secretary Gorbachev outlines
some proposals for improving the safety of current and
prospective nuclear power plants. Given the widespread public
interest in nuclear safety issues, it is important that a
government-wide position on press guidance and/or a Presidential
statement be developed by close of business today. In addition,
we should develop a specific policy response to the Gorbachev
proposals no later than June 5. In this regard the State
Department should bring together today an interagency group to
develop press guidance, a Presidential statement, and initiate
work on a specific policy response to the Gorbachev proposals.
(C)
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Gorbachev Statement
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
By
White W House Guidelines,
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
NARA, Date
8314 10
In my TV statement of Way 14 I addressed the main conclusions
which, in our view, follow from the Chernobyl accident. Today I
would like to share with you some additional considerations on
this subject.
It is quite obvious that it is necessary as a practical mat-
ter, without delay, to start setting up an international regime
of safe development of nuclear energy. Such a regime would be
aimed at reducing to a minimum the possibility of peaceful atom
harming people. Ensuring a reliable, safe development of nuclear
energy should become a universal international obligation of
each state individually and all states taken together.
Preliminary steps in this direction, including in IAEA, are
already being taken. Various suggestions and proposals are being
put forward by some states. we are carefully studying them.
I would like to make it clear outright: we do not claim
that we have ready recipies. The total of 152 accidents at nuclear
power plants with emissions of radioactivity have already been
registered in the world. So some states have experience in this
field, and it is on the basis of that experience that an interna-
tional regime of nuclear safety should be elaborated.
of course, the first thing that is reguired is a system of
speedy notification in case of accidents and troubles at NPPs,
when they entail emission of radiation. The question of receiving
data in case of possible deviations from the levels of the
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8314 F06-
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/1
natural backgrounds of radioactivity is also connected with the
system of notification.
It is beyond the capability of many states to manage an acci-
dent on their own. That is why, in our view, an important component
of an international regime of safe development of nuclear energy
would be a fine-tuned international machinery which would ensure
the speediest mutual assistance in dangerous situations. Both
IAEA and the World Health Organization could be involved in that
machinery. Along with the states on whose territory an accident
has taken place, other states, if asked for help, should take
part in eleminating the consequences of the accident.
There is also the question of the international legal form
of agreements regarding the system of notification and the assis-
tance machinery. It woula seem that the appropriate obligations of
states could be laid out and recorded in a special international
convention or conventions. The Soviet side is currently thinking
over all these questions and will submit its suggestions on this
subject with account taken of the proposals of other states.
Some states, accepting such a solution to the problem, sugges
that before a convention is concluded, already in June a decision
be taken to set up as soon as possible within the framework of
IABA a system of notification in case of a nuclear accident.
Well, the sooner we can adopt appropriate measures the better,
even if they are going to be of a preliminary, temporary nature.
At the same time the main task, in our view, is to adopt
preventive measures which would ensure the prevention of
3.
accidents. That objective would be net by providing within short,
feasible periods of time TABA with information on the causes
of accidents. Such information would be studied by appropriate
experts in order to help IABA member-countries to take that
experience into account for the purpose of further enhancing the
safety of nuclear energy.
One should go even further - namely to develop within the
framework of the IASA recommendations on the security of atomic
power plants, to stiffen national and, where necessary, internati-
onal control for their application in all states. One could also
foster under the auspices of the IABA the cooperation of the
leading countries in the area of atomic energy with a view of
creating an economical and dependable new generation reactor with
a better, compared to the present models, level of operational
safety.
One also has to take into account the fact that the issue
of material, moral and psychological damage linked to accidents
on NPPs and nuclear installations, is not internationally developed
to a sufficient degree. we are of the opinion that legal order
should be introduced into this field, that attempts to exploit
nuclear accidents with a view to increasing international
tension and distrust among states, should be eliminated.
I believe that the problem of unification of permissible level
of radiation existing in different countries, warrants our atten-
tion in all of its aspects.
13
4.
One should not ignore another facet of nuclear security, such
as prevention of nuclear terrorism. The facts of intentionally
inflicted damage to some nuclear industry plants thathave occurred
in the West, cannot but instill concern. As a matter of fact,
32 cases of such damage were registered in the USA from 1974
to 1984. In Europe, 10 attacks were launched against various
nuclear installations from 1966 to 1977. Failure to take adequate
measures to prevent misappropriation of highly enriched fissiona-
ble materials is also evident. And this is but a short list of opp<
rtunities that can be taken by the terrorists. We believe that
all this dictates the necessity to work out a fool-proof set of
measures to prevent nuclear terrorism in all of its manifestations
To work out an international regime of a safe nuclear energy
development, one could use what already is available for the
matter in various international organizations - that is in the
IABA, World Health Organization, UNEP, World Meteorological
Organization and, finally, in the UN. It is necessary to put all
this on a firm basis of a broad international cooperation.
Apparently, the IABA will be the main link of this system. Th
why the role and capabilities of this Agency should be strengthene
To do this, evidently, its financial and material possibilities
should be expanded. This problem could be solved, for example,
by ad hoc mandatory contributions by all interested states-member:
of the Agency. One should also think of creating within the IAEA
a special fund with a view to providing urgent assistance in the
cases of nuclear accidents, to the countries which might be in
need of it.
On May 14 I already spoke in 1:.vor of convening a highly autho
ritative special international conference in Vienna under the
auspices of the IAEA to discuss the whole range of these issues.
I would further like to iet you know that we are taking prac-
tical measures to improve the work of the USSR State Committee of
Supervision on the Safety of work in Atoric Energy which was
established several years ago. we intend to make more active its
ties with appropriate international organizations as well as
similar national bodies with the aim of exchanging experience in
the area of ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy.
I would also add, that we are conducting a comprehensive
analysis of the state of atomic energetics, that additional
measures to heighten the safety of operation of the atomic power
being
plants are/worked out and will be taken with due regard for
conclusions resulting from the accident at the Chernobyl NPP.
I would like to emphasize once more that lessons, derived
from this accident, should benefit all mankind. What happened
in Chernobyl is & serious reminder of those formidable forces
contained in the energy of the atom. If an accident on a peaceful
NPP brought about misfortune, one can imagine what tragic consequen
ces for the whole mankind would follow from the use of nuclear
weapons which exist solelyfor the purposes of destruction and
annihilation.
Nuclear and space age demands from the leaders of all countrie
of the would a new political thinking and new policies. These
inexorable requirements are met by our program of complete elimina-
tion of nuclear weapons and establisment of a comprehensive system
of international security.
From the moment the nuclear weapons emerged, the best minds
have been pondering .OW to drive the nuclear jinn back into the
bottle. However, the nuclear arms race grew more intense. Where
is that key, that decisive link, the use of which can help to
solve the nuclear proolem?Cessation of nuclear tests could be
the first practical step towards nuclear disarmament. We attach
special importance to this measure, since being
highly effective it is simple from the point of view of its
practical implementation. .Nat one should do is not to conduct
nuclear tests - of course, under strict verification.
This measure must become at last a reality of the international
life.
Having extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explo-
sions, the coviet Union has in fact renounced conducting them for
a whole year. He believe that such a long period of time should
be more then sufficient for the American side to evaluate the si-
tuation in an all-round manner and to take reciprocal steps which
would make it possible to terminate nuclear testing on a bilateral
basis.
Given the urgent nature of the issue of stopping nuclear test:
I have again reaffirmed my proposal to President Reagan that we
hold without delay a meeting and come to agreement with regard to
a ban on nuclear tests.
Both these tasks - ensuring the safety of peaceful uses of
atomic energy and ridding our planet of nuclear weapons - require
broad international interaction, joint efforts of all states and,
16 %
above all, the international organizations dealing with nuclear
issues and public groups which are interested in creating a comp-
rehensive and dependable system of international security. It
is a matter for all states taken together, as well as for each sta-
te individually. We urge you to make your contribution to this
important endeavor whose realization is required by the interests
of preserving human civilization.
6/2 John - Degroporte 11
Here is the Tiller
HOOVER INSTITUTI
letter 1 mentioned.
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Stanford, California 94305-6010
Job Matloch se
energed
May 20,
6/2/86
The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
2201 C Street
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear George:
This letter concerns proposed cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union on controlled fusion in
which the working material is confined by magnetic fields.
The short expression "magnetic fusion" is sometimes applied.
The relevant material was declassified in 1958 and world-
wide exchange of information has proven useful ever since.
There is not, and I believe there should not be, any objection
to the proposed cooperation from the point of view of secrecy.
Cooperation is partially in effect and partially in the
state of discussion with other countries. I would in general
prefer international cooperation with the Soviet Union included.
The practical and economic importance of magnetic fusion
does not appear to be great. The theoretical and scientific
importance is significant. One practical application of
magnetic fusion is, however, quite hopeful. This is the
fusion-fission hybrid.
The fusion-fission hybrid is an energy source which relies
on fusion for generating neutrons and for fission for the main
part of energy production. Practical results may be possible
by the turn of the century. This energy source would be ex-
tremely safe. In view of Chernobyl, this approach could be
most interesting to the Russians.
Actually, the Soviet Union has done more than any other
nation in developing the fusion-fission hybrid. It is a sub-
ject of particular interest to Evgenii Velikhov, who acts as
the science advisor to Gorbachev.
HOOVER INSTITUTION
HIGHER
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
SNNI
6161
Stanford, California 94305-6010
May 20, 1986
The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
2201 C Street
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear George:
This letter concerns proposed cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union on controlled fusion in
which the working material is confined by magnetic fields.
The short expression "magnetic fusion" is sometimes applied.
The relevant material was declassified in 1958 and world-
wide exchange of information has proven useful ever since.
There is not, and I believe there should not be, any objection
to the proposed cooperation from the point of view of secrecy.
Cooperation is partially in effect and partially in the
state of discussion with other countries. I would in general
prefer international cooperation with the Soviet Union included.
The practical and economic importance of magnetic fusion
does not appear to be great. The theoretical and scientific
importance is significant. One practical application of
magnetic fusion is, however, quite hopeful. This is the
fusion-fission hybrid.
The fusion-fission hybrid is an energy source which relies
on fusion for generating neutrons and for fission for the main
part of energy production. Practical results may be possible
by the turn of the century. This energy source would be ex-
tremely safe. In view of Chernobyl, this approach could be
most interesting to the Russians.
Actually, the Soviet Union has done more than any other
nation in developing the fusion-fission hybrid. It is a sub-
ject of particular interest to Evgenii Velikhov, who acts as
the science advisor to Gorbachev.
The Honorable George P. Shultz
page 2
May 20, 1986
A further Russian whose name should be mentioned in this
connection is Andrei Sakharov. His early suggestions on con-
trolled fusion are important and I know from his wife, Yelena
Bonner, that he continues to be highly interested in the topic.
He is now exiled to Gorky where it is hardly practical for him
to do scientific work. His return to Moscow and his partici-
pation in the work would make it scientifically and personally
much more attractive to scientists all over the world to par-
ticipate in the work. To ask that he may be permitted freely
to travel outside the Soviet Union may not be practical, but
his return to Moscow and his active participation might be a
realistic possibility. Such a move would be highly welcomed
by scientists in the free world.
If you could find a way in which these messages could be
conveyed, some progress in international understanding could
be achieved.
Sincerely,
Edward Teller
ET:pf
DE OF DETENSE ENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996
May 27, 1986
UNITED STATES OF OF AMERICA
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
Science Research Laboratory
Ambassador Jack Matlock
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Room #368
Washington, DC 20506
Dear Jack:
Here is Edward's letter on fusion cooperation with the Soviets. It was
impossible to keep him from riding not one but two of his hobby-horses (the
hybrid and Sakharov), but the operative sentence for you is there (second
paragraph).
Best,
&
THOMAS H. JOHNSON
Director, Science Research Laboratory
CONFIDENTIAL
4213
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MATLOCK
June 2, 1986
UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
LUNCHEON MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT
DATE: June 6, 1986
LOCATION: The President's Study
TIME: FROM: JOHN 11:45 M. a.m. POINDEXTER - 1:15 p.m. pub
I. PURPOSE
To follow up on their meeting of May 20.
II. BACKGROUND
The President and Mrs. Massie have met on several occasions
to discuss internal developments in the Soviet Union and
U.S. -Soviet relations.
III. PARTICIPANTS
The President
The First Lady
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Suzanne Massie
IV. PRESS PLAN
None; staff photographer only.
V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Welcome Massie and initiate informal discussion of
U.S. -Soviet relations.
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
Attachment:
Tab A
Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)
CC First Lady
UNCLASSIFIED
Vice President
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
Don Regan
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
CONFIDENTIAL
2/16/05
8307
CONFIDENTIAL
4213
22
CONF IDENTIAL
TALKING POINTS
-- Nancy and I appreciate this chance to follow up on our
earlier conversation.
-- We are particularly interested in your ideas on the growing
influence of religion and Russian nationalism in the USSR.
-- How do you think this trend will effect Soviet society and
government policy over the coming years? What should our
reaction be?
-- Any pointers on how to deal with the Russian nationalist
streak in Gorbachev (if there is one) ?
-- What sort of things should we stress in our exchange
programs?
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRR # 8307
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
BY KML NARA DATE6/28/10
al
4213
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SIGNED
UNCLASSIFIED
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
May 28, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT:
President's Lunch with Suzanne Massie, June 6,
1986, 11:45 a.m. - 1:15 p.m.
The President and First Lady will have lunch with Suzanne Massie
as a follow up to their May 20 meeting.
Johnathan MC Miller concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the Meeting Memorandum at Tab I.
Approve of
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Meeting Memorandum
Tab A
Talking Points (CONFIDENTIAL)
Tab II
Clearance List
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
LOT
2/16/05
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS
To:
Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB
Friday, June 6
86
Please admit the following appointments on
, 19
THE PRESIDENT
for
of
:
(name OF PERSON TO BE VISITED)
(agency)
PARTICIPANTS
The First Lady
Donald T. Regan
John M. Poindexter
Suzanne Massie
MEETING LOCATION
Building WEST WING
Requested by Jack F. Matlock
Room No.
The President's Study
Room No.
368
Telephone
5112
Time of Meeting 11:45-1:15 PM
Date of request May 30, 1986
Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.
APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
SSF 2037 (03-81)
NODIS
Moscow 9279
WHITE HOUSE
DOBRYNIN/STOESSEL
VASHINGTON
5/30/86
PRESERVATION COPY'
WHSR
TIME STAMP
HANDLING SLIP
ve
Poindexter
O
I
Fortier
Thompson
McDaniel
J
Pearson
J
Bohn
MATLOCK
C
RODMAN
C
Lenhard
J
FILE
C
LDX/TTY
NSC/S
APPROVAL :
REMARKS :
C: Copy 0: Original F: FYI S: should See
C/H: Copy Hand Delivered C/T: Contacted via Phone
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONFIDENTIAL
S/S-0
Department of State
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INFO SSI-01 SARN-01 PM-01 SP-01 CIA-01 NSC-01 /006 A5
S/P E 0 SOLOMON; S/S PASS CIA E 0 DCI & NSC E 0 MCDANIEL FOR
POINDEXTER VIA COURIER
ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION PER S/S, NPLATT, 6/2/86
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INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 INR-01
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INR-EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ
ZOPLU
DIST AUTH BY
READ BY
DISTRIBUTED BY
EXSEC
(S/S-1)
DEPEXSEC
DATE/TIME
REPEATED TO
BY
DATE/TIME
SENSITIVE
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MAY BE SEEN ONLY BY THE ADDRESSEE AND IF NOT
EXPRESSLY PRECLUDED, BY THOSE OFFICIALS UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE
CONSIDERS TO HAVE A CLEAR-CUT "NEED TO KNOW." IT MAY NOT BE
REPRODUCED, GIVEN ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION, OR DISCUSSED WITH
NON-RECIPIENTS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.
ZODLU
ADDRESSEES OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT
OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS ON NODIS.
WHEN THIS DOCUMENT IS NO LONGER NEEDED, THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR SUPERVISING ITS DESTRUCTION AND FOR MAILING A RECORD OF THAT
DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-I, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DECLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State Guidelines,
By
US
NARA, Date 6/21/02
CONF IDENT IAL
8315
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONFIDENTIAL
28
S/S-O
Department of State
INCOMIN
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ACTION NODS-00
INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
000603 021241Z /50 44
0 021219Z JUN 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5571
C
MOSCOW 09279
NODIS
ZOOLS
E.0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: DOBRYNIN-STOESSEL MEETING, MAY 30, 1986
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
2. CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL
DEPARTMENT AND C C SECRETARY ANATOLIY DOBRYNIN
RECEIVED AMBASSADOR WALTER STOESSEL (RET.)
MAY 30 FOR AN HOUR'S DISCUSSION OF DOBRYNIN'S
NEW JOB AND U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. ONLY
DOBRYNIN AND STOESSEL (WHO BRIEFED US LATER
ZODLU
THAT DAY) WERE PRESENT. DOBRYNIN WAS CRITICAL
OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON SALT INTERIM
RESTRAINTS, PESSIMISTIC ABOUT A SUMMIT, BUT
DID NOT TOTALLY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
1986 REAGAN- GORBACHEV MEETING HE ARGUED THAT
IT WAS UP TO THE U.S. TO COME UP WITH SUBSTANTIVE
AREAS OF AGREEMENT THAT WOULD MAKE A SUMMIT
POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
DOBRYNIN'S NEW JOB
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8315
CONFIDENTIAL
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
IDEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONFIDENTIAL
S/S-0
UNITED STATES OF
Department of State
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3. DOBRYNIN SAID HIS CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT
WAS NOT COMPARABLE TO THE NSC, ALTHOUGH HE WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR "ALL FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS, "
FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S "GLOBAL" FOREIGN POLICY.
HE SAID HIS STAFF WOULD TOTAL ABOUT 200 AND
THAT HE WAS TRYING TO RECRUIT "GOOD PEOPLE, "
PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO HAD HAD PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE WAS THUS
PLEASED TO HAVE KORNIYENKO AS ONE OF HIS DEPUTIES.
OF COURSE, DOBRYNIN ADDED, HE HAD CLOSE FRIENDS
SUCH AS VORONTSOV AND BESSMERTNYKH IN THE
ZOPIS
FOREIGN MINISTRY.
PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON SALT II
4. SPEAKING IN A RELATIVELY LOW KEY, DOBRYNIN
SAID THE PRESIDENT'S JUST-ANNOUNCED DECISION
ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT A
HELPFUL STEP. IT WAS "REGARDED HERE AS VERY
SERIOUS." AN OFFICIAL SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD
BE MADE VERY SHORTLY. HOW, DOBRYNIN ASKED,
COULD THE U.S. EXPECT GORBACHEV TO COME TO
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FALL, JUST AT THE TIME
WHEN THE U.S. WOULD EXCEED THE SALT 11 LIMITS?
THIS WOULD BE "ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE."
ZOOLU
5. STOESSEL UNDERSCORED THE ADMINISTRATION' S
CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE
ON SUCH MATTERS AS THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR, THE
SECOND "NEW TYPE" OF STRATEGIC MISSILE, AND
TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION. DOBRYNIN SAID WE HAD
DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES AT GREAT LENGTH IN THE
SCC AND WERE STILL TALKING ABOUT THEM. IN
MOSCOW'S MIND, THEY WERE INSUFFICIENT TO "BLOW
UP" THE SALT TREATY. THE DECISION WAS "DIFFICULT
CONFIDENTIAL
INTARTMENT OF STATE
CONFIDENTIAL
30, S/S-0
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TO UNDERSTAND, UNFORTUNATE." IN LIGHT OF
THE CURRENT SITUATION, DOBRYNIN SAID HE "COULD
NOT BE ENCOURAGING" ABOUT A SUMMIT.
SHULTZ- SHEVARDNADZE MEETING
6. STOESSEL EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT SHEVARDNADZE
AND SHULTZ SHOULD MEET IN ORDER TO PROVIDE
A FOCUS FOR OUR RESPECTIVE BUREAUCRACIES.
THEY HAVE MET BEFORE, DOBRYNIN RESPONDED.
SHULTZ REVIEWS EVERYTHING, FROM A TO Z.
THERE IS NO FOCUS ON POSSIBLE AGREEMENT.
ZOPIS
YOU HAVE REJECTED OUR PROPOSALS; WE "NEED TO
FEEL" WHAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY.
DOBRYNIN AND HIS STAFF WERE LOOKING FOR AREAS
OF AGREEMENT, AS WAS THE MFA, BUT "WE FEEL
STUMPED. BETTER PRIVATE COMMUNICATION WAS
NEEDED: PERHAPS DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT
AND GORBACHEV. PERHAPS BETWEEN SHULTZ AND THE
SOVIET CHARGE, PERHAPS SOME OTHER CHANNEL.
SUCH COMMUNICATIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT
IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. GIVE US ONE OR TWO
SUBSTANTIVE POINTS OF AGREEMENT, SAID DOBRYNIN.
THEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SHULTZ AND
SHEVARDNADZE TO MEET.
NODIS
7. STOESSEL COMMENTED THAT IT SOUNDED AS IF
THE SOVIET SIDE WERE SETTING PRECONDITIONS.
NO. SAID DOBRYNIN, IT WAS JUST THAT HIS
APPROACH MADE GOOD SENSE. STOESSEL SUGGESTED
THAT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT HOLD AN
INITIAL PLANNING SESSION. THEN FOLLOW UP WITH
A MORE FOCUSED MEETING. DOBRYNIN REJECTED
THIS AS INSUFFICIENT.
CONF IDENTIAL
UNIVARTMENT If STATE
CONF IDENTIAL
31 S/S-0
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Department of State
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POSSIBLE SUBSTANCE FOR A SUMMIT: INF, TESTING
8. STOESSEL THOUGHT THE INF AREA MIGHT BE WORTH
PURSUING. DOBRYNIN SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD
MADE GREAT CONCESSIONS REGARDING FRENCH AND
BRITISH SYSTEMS BUT COULD NOT AGREE TO INF
REDUCTIONS UNTIL THE FRENCH AND UK SYSTEMS
WERE CONSTRAINED.
9. DOBRYNIN THOUGHT THE ISSUE OF A NUCLEAR TEST
BAN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THERE WAS "NO LOGICAL
REASON" AGAINST THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL. THE
ZOPLU
NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY FOR VERIFICATION ALREADY
EXISTED. STOESSEL SAID THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD
UNDERSTAND THAT FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW
THIS WAS NOT PROMISING. WE FELT IT MORE
REALISTIC TO WORK TOWARD RATIFICATION OF THE
PNET AND TTBT TREATIES. THE U.S. SEES A
RATIONALE FOR CONTINUED TESTING; WE THEREFORE
SHOULD START WITH SMALL STEPS. DOBRYNIN SAID
THE TREATIES WERE FINE AS THEY HAD BEEN
NEGOTIATED AND INITIALED. THEY SHOULD BE PUT
INTO FORCE, THEN ASSESSED AFTER A YEAR OR SO.
10. STOESSEL NOTED THAT WITH DOBRYNIN'S LONG
EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES, HE SHOULD
UNDERSTAND THAT WHEN GORBACHEV MAKES SWEEPING
ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS VIA THE PUBLIC MEDIA,
WASHINGTON TENDS TO DISMISS THEM AS PROPAGANDA.
DOBRYNIN VIGOROUSLY DENIED THAT GORBACHEV'S
INITIATIVES WERE PROPAGANDISTIC CLAIMING
THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAD MASTERED THE
DETAILS OF ARMS CONTROL, UNDERSTOOD ALL
THE NUANCES, AND WAS SERIOUS ABOUT MAKING PROGRESS.
BESIDES, DOBRYNIN CONTINUED, THE SAME CHARGE
COULD BE MADE AGAINST THE U.S. WHEN THE U.S.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF IDENTIAL
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ANSWERED SOVIET PROPOSALS ABOUT A TEST MORATORIUM
WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIETS SEND
OBSERVERS TO WITNESS A U.S. TEST, IT SEEMED
CLEAR THE U.S. DID SO FOR PROPAGANDA REASONS.
GORBACHEV PERSONALLY HAD BEEN BAFFLED BY THIS
U.S. PROPOSAL AND COULD NOT SEE THE RATIONALE
FOR IT. SOVIET SCIENTISTS DID NOT HAVE TO BE
PRESENT TO VERIFY U.S. TESTS; THEY COULD
ALREADY DO SO, INCLUDING LOW-YIELD, UNANNOUNCED
TESTS. DOBRYNIN STRESSED THAT THE SOVIETS
HAD SUGGESTED ONLY "RESUMPTION" OF NEGOTIATIONS
ABOUT A POSSIBLE TEST BAN AND THOUGHT THIS
ZOP_0
SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. SIDE.
OTHER ISSUES
11. DOBRYNIN SAID THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE
WILLING TO TALK ABOUT "ANYTHING" AT THE NEXT
SUMMIT, INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER
REGIONAL PROBLEMS. HE REFERRED TO THE
VARIOUS BILATERAL REGIONAL TALKS AS WORTHWHILE.
THE SOVIET SIDE FAVORED THEIR CONTINUATION, HE
SAID.
12. DOBRYNIN MENTIONED THE U.S. "VETO" OF A
FINAL DOCUMENT AT THE BERN CSCE MEETING, CLAIMING
ZODLU
THIS WAS ANOTHER LINK IN A CHAIN OF DISTURBING
U.S. ACTIONS HE SAID HE DOUBTED THAT THE
RIGID, J N I L A T E R A U.S. POSITION AT BERN
WOULD BE HELPFUL IN WORKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PROBLEMS IN THE FUTURE. STOESSEL INDICATED
IT WAS SILLY TO THINK THERE WAS A U.S. PLOT
TO FORGE A CHAIN OF HOSTILE ACTIONS. SUCH
MATTERS WERE UNRELATED AND STEMMED FROM
CASE-BY-CASE DECISION MAKING. DOBRYNIN COMMENTED
THAT EVEN SO. THESE DECISIONS MADE A "BIG PILE"
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AND WERE ALL ANTI-SOVIET. (DOBRYNIN DID NOT
MENTION THE LIBYA RAID OR SDI IN THIS CONTEXT.)
STOESSEL'S IMPRESSIONS
13. STOESSEL FELT THAT DOBRYNIN WAS HIS USUAL
JOVIAL SELF, IN GOOD PHYSICAL SHAPE AND PLEASED
WITH HIS NEW POSITION. STOESSEL ALSO FELT
DOBRYNIN SEEMED GENUINELY DISCOMFORTED OVER
THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING AREAS OF SUBSTANTIVE
AGREEMENT FOR THE NEXT SUMMIT. HE REPORTED
DOBRYNIN AS SAYING HE WAS NOT ONE WHO FELT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT DEAL WITH THE
ZOPIS
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. DOBRYNIN SAID HE WAS
FOR A SUMMIT BUT DID NOT SEE IT HAPPENING
UNLESS "SOMETHING CHANGES." GIVEN THE UPCOMING (1988)
U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, DOBRYNIN NOTED,
"THE TIME TO DEAL" WAS GROWING SHORT.
COMBS
ZOOLU
CONFIDENTIAL
8316 34
90417
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
CONF IDENTIAL
June 3, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State
MS. SHERRIE COOKSEY
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury
COLONEL JAMES F. LEMON
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. JOHN N. RICHARDSON
Senior Special Assistant
to the Attorney General
Department of Justice
DR. PHIL DUSAULT
Associate Director for National Security
and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
MR. JOHN H. RIXSE
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
RADM JOHN BITOFF
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT:
Agenda for NSPG Meeting on Friday, June 6, 1986 (U)
The NSPG meeting will be held in the White House Situation Room
at 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon on Friday, June 6, 1986, to discuss
policy options for managing US-Soviet relations for the balance
of 1986. An agenda for the meeting is attached. Attendance is
principals only. (C)
Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A
Agenda
DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
CONF IDENTIAL
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
Declassify: OADR
BY NARA KML DATE6/28/10
35
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506
SYSTEM II
90422
June 4, 1986
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Aim
SUBJECT:
NSPG Meeting
Friday, June 6 -- 11:00 a.m.
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding an
agenda and a list of participants for the NSPG meeting scheduled
on Friday, June 6, at 11:00 a.m., in the Situation Room.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo for Pres
Tab A
Agenda
Tab B
List of Participants
DECLASSIFIED
By White House as Guidelines, NARA, Date August 6/21/02 28 1997
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
8308 36
SYSTEM II
90422
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP
DATE:
June 6, 1986
LOCATION:
Situation Room
TIME:
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations
for the balance of 1986.
II. BACKGROUND
Given the Soviet delay in setting a date for Gorbachev's
visit to the US and the active Soviet propaganda campaign,
it is timely to review our strategy in dealing with the
Soviet Union over the coming months.
III. PARTICIPANTS
List of participants is at Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
None
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
You would lead off by outlining your views on the work to be
done in developing a strategy, after which you would invite
the comments of the participants.
Attachments:
Tab A
Agenda
Prepared by:
Tab B
List of Participants
Jack F. Matlock
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
NLRR F06-114/4#308
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
8309 31
SYSTEM II
90422
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING
Friday, June 6, 1986
White House Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
US-Soviet Relations
Agenda
1. The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations
which require further examination.
2. Discussion by principals.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
NLRR F06-114/4#8309
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
38
SYSTEM II
90422
PARTICIPANTS
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
39
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SYSTEM II
90422
June 4, 1986
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Aim
SUBJECT:
NSPG Meeting
Friday, June 6 -- 11:00 a.m.
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding an
agenda and a list of participants for the NSPG meeting scheduled
on Friday, June 6, at 11:00 a.m., in the Situation Room.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo for Pres
Tab A
Agenda
Tab B
List of Participants
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify: OADR
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By
as
NARA, Date 6/21/02
8310
40
SYSTEM II
90422
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP
DATE:
June 6, 1986
LOCATION:
Situation Room
TIME:
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations
for the balance of 1986.
II. BACKGROUND
Given the Soviet delay in setting a date for Gorbachev's
visit to the US and the active Soviet propaganda campaign,
it is timely to review our strategy in dealing with the
Soviet Union over the coming months.
III. PARTICIPANTS
List of participants is at Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
None
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
You would lead off by outlining your views on the work to be
done in developing a strategy, after which you would invite
the comments of the participants.
Attachments:
Tab A
Agenda
Prepared by:
Tab B
List of Participants
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8310
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
8311 41
SYSTEM II
90422
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING
Friday, June 6, 1986
White House Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
US-Soviet Relations
Agenda
1. The President reviews issues in US-Soviet relations
which require further examination.
2. Discussion by principals.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
NLRR 06-114/4#8311
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
42
SYSTEM II
90422
PARTICIPANTS
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
43
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SYSTEM II
90422
June 4, 1986
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK Aim
SUBJECT:
NSPG Meeting
Friday, June 6 -- 11:00 a.m.
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding an
agenda and a list of participants for the NSPG meeting scheduled
on Friday, June 6, at 11:00 a.m., in the Situation Room.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo for Pres
Tab A
Agenda
Tab B
List of Participants
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
By
White Q15 House Guidelines, August 28 1997
NARA, Date 6/21/02
Declassify: OADR
8312 44
SYSTEM II
90422
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP
DATE:
June 6, 1986
LOCATION:
Situation Room
TIME:
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
I. PURPOSE
To discuss policy options for managing US-Soviet relations
for the balance of 1986.
II. BACKGROUND
Given the Soviet delay in setting a date for Gorbachev's
visit to the US and the active Soviet propaganda campaign,
it is timely to review our strategy in dealing with the
Soviet Union over the coming months.
III. PARTICIPANTS
List of participants is at Tab B.
IV. PRESS PLAN
None
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
You would lead off by outlining your views on the work to be
done in developing a strategy, after which you would invite
the comments of the participants.
Attachments:
Tab A
Agenda
Prepared by:
Tab B
List of Participants
Jack F. Matlock
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
NLRR FD6-114/4#312
BY RW NARA DATE 3/20/13
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
45
TIME STAMP
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT
8313
86 JUN
?
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:
4290
A 9: 53
ACTION OFFICER:
PUGLIARESI
DUE:
5 JUNE
Prepare Memo For President
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
Prepare Memo
CONCURRENCES/COMME
To: Pugharesi
FYI
Burghardt
Lou - Negrignante is really
Cannistraro
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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/4#8313
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
CONFIDENTIAL
Return to Secretariat
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
June 5, 1986
NOTE FOR KARNA SMALL
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJ:
News Conference Materials
Please find attached my comments
and re-writes.
CC:
Bob Linhard
John Douglass
Mike Donley
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
June 5, 1986
NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK
BOB LINHARD
JOHN DOUGLASS
MIKE DONLEY
FROM:
KARNA SMALL
SUBJ:
News conference materials
May I have yur urgent clearance/
re-write of attached talking points
to be submitted to the President
for his upcoming news conference.
You will note we have inputs from
BOTH State and Defense please decide
which page you want to use on each
issue -- incorporate other comments
as appropriate, cut and paste or
whatever you wish and tube back to
me. We will retype. (It would be
terrific if you could talk to
eachother on this, though - so I
don't receive three different
mark-ups and have to decide which
to use) .
Sorry for quick turn-around--we need
these BEFORE LUNCH TODAY
but we
just received the material.
Many thanks.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 5, 1986
NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK
BOB LINHARD
JOHN DOUGLASS
MIKE DONLEY
FROM:
KARNA SMALL
SUBJ:
News conference materials
May I have yur urgent clearance/
re-write of attached talking points
to be submitted to the President
for his upcoming news conference.
You will note we have inputs from
BOTH State and Defense
please decide
which page you want to use on each
issue -- incorporate other comments
as appropriate, cut and paste or
whatever you wish and tube back to
me. We will retype. (It would be
terrific if you could talk to
eachother on this, though - so I
don't receive three different
mark-ups and have to decide which
to use)
Sorry for quick turn-around--we need
these BEFORE LUNCH TODAY
but we
just received the material.
Many thanks.
STATE
U.S.-SOVIET
What are the prospects for a U.S.-Soviet Summit this year?
O
At our Summit last year, I invited General Secretary
Gorbachev to visit the U.S. in 1986 and he accepted. That
invitation stands without preconditions.
-- The two of us made progress at Geneva last November and
there's more to be made if the Soviets are ready. We
certainly are.
SALT II: Does the Interim Restraint decision put U.S. -Soviet
dialogue in jeopardy?
Not as far as we're concerned.
The decision was clear. SALT II was inadequate; under its
terms the Soviets increased their threat to us.
My highest priority now is a meaningful arms control
agreement on deep reductions of offensive nuclear arms. I
am ready to work now with Mr. Gorbachev to achieve this.
SDI, Compliance with ABM
O
In SDI we're researching whether defenses against nuclear
weapons are feasible. That research will go on until we
have answered the basic questions.
Unlike SALT, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified
treaty. We have said again and again that we will adhere
to it as we conduct our defense research. Our policy has
not changed.
-- We are concerned about Soviet violations of the ABM
Treaty, and we seek to reverse the Treaty's erosion.
New Soviet offer in Geneva
O
We've said Geneva was the place for detailed negotiations,
SO the way they handled their latest proposals may be a
good sign.
Obviously we will study the Soviet proposals very closely
and very seriously.
-- I certainly won't comment now on the details of a
confidential proposal.
STATE
USSR - DIVIDED FAMILIES
How do you view the announced Soviet decision to resolve 71
U.S. - Soviet divided family cases?
We welcome this important step. It is significant in human
and political terms, and contributes to an improvement in
our overall relations.
-- This is the largest number of divided family cases
the Soviets have agreed to resolve since we began
raising the issue with them almost thirty years ago.
This shows that the U.S. -Soviet dialogue on these issues
can produce results.
Of course, our thoughts and prayers are with those families
whose cases remain unresolved. We will not forget them.
-- We also remain concerned about the continued low
levels of Jewish emigration.
STATE
51
STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
What are your Plans for Strategic Modernization?
O
The balanced five-part modernization program I announced in
1981 stands. That program is designed to:
-- redress what was in 1981 a growing strategic imbalance
between the United States and the Soviet Union;
-- strengthen and modernize the U.S. forces that have
deterred war for almost 40 years; and
-- pave the way for meaningful arms control negotiations.
Has the Program been Successful in Obtaining your Objectives?
O
Since 1981, much has changed in the world. These changes
have both vindicated the wisdom of our comprehensive program
and shown us the need for continued modernization.
We have achieved many of the military and political results
we expected.
Deterrence has been strengthened and we are stronger and more
able to defend the values we hold dear. The Soviets have
taken note of this and returned to the negotiating table.
Where Do Defensive Systems Fit In?
Trends set in motion by extensive Soviet programs in both
strategic offense and strategic defense suggest that it may
be unwise in the future to depend exclusively on offensive
forces.
This is why our SDI research program and ASAT testing
programs are also essential for our long-term security. They
are prudent steps for ensuring deterrence and stability over
the long term.
Where should Congress Take Cuts in Strategic Programs?
We have been able to hold spending on strategic program to
less than 15% of the DOD budget. This modest investment is
far below the percentages devoted to strategic forces built
during the 1960s which we now need to replace.
I have recently submitted to the Congress a message
explaining why it would be most unwise to make any cuts in
strategic programs.
DOD
50
U.S. SOVIET SUMMIT
What are the Prospects for a Summit at this Time?
We continue to believe a Summit should and will be
held. The General Secretary has repeatedly indicated
he is willing, and I see no reason why a suitable time
and place cannot be worked out. Both these points are
under discussion, and I would not want to go into the
details as this time.
A Number of Issues have Tended to Aggravate U.S.-Soviet
Relations in Recent Weeks--the Resumption of Nuclear
Testing, Chernobyl, and the U.S. SALT Decision.
Have these not Diminished the Chances of a Summit?
Not at all. These are the very issues we should
discuss at the Summit.
We want to make progress an controlly nuchar testing,
:
I would be happy to explain to General Secretary
Gerbachev why we believe nuclear testing is important:
and theref
to modernize and to make safer and nore reliable our
nuclear stocks.
made concret
fore have
and evoyeration international
and practical
In the light of Chernobyl, it is vital to develop
program
mechanisms for prompt international notification) when
to
such cross border nuclear incidents occur. I am
improver
pleased to note that Mr. Gorbachev has already indicated
veri-
a willingness to move in this direction.
ficates
On the matter of SALT II, the issue is really not one
of compliance or violation of an ill-considered agree-
ment; it is whether the United States is going to
stand by and let the other side take advantage of our
good will The sand has just run out of the SALT hour-
glass. I would welcome the opportunity to revisit this
matter with Mr. Gorbachev.
Prepared by:
accidents
Long Range Policy
ODASD/Negotiations Policy
04 June 1986
is to more now nusteur to negotiate
real strategic
wearons.
DOD
53
SALT II
is the decision that the U.S. will no longer observe SALT II
limits reversible if the Soviet Union's conduct improves?
0 I decided that, in the future, the United States must base
decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the
nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic
forces -- NOT on standards contained in the SALT structure
which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance. Such
decisions cannot be determined by a flawed SALT II treaty
which:
- codified major arms buildups rather than reductions.
- was never ratified,
- would have expired if it had been ratified. and
- J has Lave been made violated clear by that the the Soviet U.S. Union. will continue the utmost restrant
in our
O
Our goal cannot be to resurrect the SALT structure, which
simply will not improve our security or moderate the arms
race even if observed ty the USSR. No policy of interim
deplay went and
restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and
will not
equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms which is our
exceed
primary goal.
will lugin negotiation
Soviet
0 I continue to hope that the Soviet Union terminates its
levels
non compliance with existing arms control agreements, reverses
its military buildup and negotiates constructively in Geneva.
However,
If it does, we will take this into account.
no finterin policy
SDI: COMPLIANCE WITH ABM TREATY
Will the United States continue to comply with the ABM Treaty?
I have directed that the SDI research program be formulated in
full compliance with all U.S. Treaty obligations. The Defense
Department has planned and reviewed the program to ensure that
it remains compliant, and will continue to do SO.
The Soviet Union, in contrast, has violated the ABM Treaty.
The large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk
in Siberia is in clear violation of the Treaty.
o
That radar and other Soviet ABM-related activities suggest that
the USSR might be preparing an ABM defense of its national
territory Such an action, if left without a U.S. response,
would have serious adverse consequences for the East West balance
that has kept the peace.
D OD
is
SDI: INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY
Do you have any plans to restructure the SDI program toward the
broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty?
0
Last year my Administration carefully reviewed the ABM Treaty
as it relates to future strategic defensive systems based on
"other physical principles".
- As a result of that review, I determined that a reading of
the ABM Treaty that would allow the development and testing
of such systems based on other physical principles, regard-
less of basing mode, is fully justified.
o
In October, 1885, while reserving the right to do so in the
future, I decided not to restructure the SDI program, towards
the boundaries possible under that interpretation -- so long
as the program receives the support necessary to implement
its carefully drafted plan.
- Obviously, we must continue to review the extent to which
this requirement is being met.
It
RECENT SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL
Is it true that the Soviet Union recently presented a new
proposal in Geneva, and if so, what do you think of it?
O
Our study of their new proposal indicates that it is merely a
way of restating part of their previous proposal and is still
unacceptable.
o
Like their previous proposal, the new proposal would effec-
tively ban research and technology development of the type we
are pursuing in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Such a ban on SDI remains a Soviet precondition for agreement on
reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
The potential benefits of SDI -- not only to ourselves and
our allies, but to the whole world -- means we won't use it
as a bargaining chip. Consequently, the original Soviet
proposal and its reformulation is unacceptable to us.
DOD BUDGET -- STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION
Would you please comment on Congressional proposals to limit the
budget deficit by cutting the Strategic Modernization Program?
O Nothing is more critical to the security of this nation than
the full and timely implementation of the Strategic Modern-
ization Program.
-- Significant progress has been made over the last few years
in restoring the credibility and military effectiveness
of our nuclear deterrent.
-- We are on the threshhold of deploying several new systems
which are absolutely essential to continued effective
deterrence in the years ahead.
-- It would be foolhardy to abandon now our commitment to
completing this vital modernization of our nuclear forces.
DOD
5
58
DEFENSE BUDGET
How about congressional proposals to reduce your defense budget
by $19 billion to $35 billion?
O
We have urged Congress to maintain the momentum of our
efforts to restore U.S. defenses. Our budget requests are
consistent with the goal we all endorsed nearly 6 years ago.
To stop now denies us success and risks falling back into
the hollow, ill-prepared, and under-equipped military of the
1970's.
: - Cuts of that magnitude on top of last year's large
reduction will lead both our friends and enemies to
question our resolve.
:- What global national security commitments would they
have us abandon? Even the exaggerated claims of waste
in the defense budget will not cover a $20 billion
reduction.
:- Congress risks squandering the gains we have made and
the initiatives In progress if it backslides on its
responsibility to provide for the common defense.
Where will the cuts hit?
0
I hope there are no large reductions. No one should believe
they wouldn't hit key areas like manpower and readiness.
-- Cuts of the magnitude of $20-$30 billion would devastate
military R&D, preclude or drastically curtail new
programs like the C-17 cargo aircraft, and reduce
training.
-- The efficiencies, such as multiyear contracting, which
allow DoD to save money would also become impossible
with a large cut.
:- I recently provided the Congress with a long list of
programs that would have to be considered for reduction
if the budget is cut deeply. We need to keep that list
from becoming a reality.