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Matlock Chron June 1986 (3)
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Matlock Chron June 1986 (3)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron June 1986 (3)
Box: 16
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/15/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON JUNE 1986 (3/6)
FOIA
F06-114/4
Box Number
16
YARHI-MILO
1610
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8338 MEMO
DONLEY/BROOKS TO POINDEXTER RE
1 6/11/1986 B1
HOFFMAN MEMO RE LONG-TERM
STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS
R 6/23/2010 M125/2
8339 MEMO
HOFFMAN TO POINDEXTER RE NSDD-219
13 5/28/1986 B1
PROCESS AND LONGER TERM ISSUES OF
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS
R 1/11/2012 M125/2
8340 MEMO
MATLOCK TO RAYMOND RE SITE
1 6/11/1986 B1
NEGOTIATIONS IN TURKEY FOR VOA
R
3/9/2011
F2006-114/4
8341 MEMO
SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE JUNE
1 6/12/1986 B1
11 MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR
DUBININ
R 6/23/2010 M125/2
8342 CABLE
SECRETARY DUBININ MEETING 6/11/86
4 6/12/1986 B1
(MEMCON)
R 6/23/2010 M125/2
8343 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8341
1 6/12/1986 B1
R 6/23/2010 M125/2
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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8338
System II
90419
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET
INFORMATION
June 11, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
MD.
Lit
FROM:
MICHAEL DONLEY/LINTON BROOKS
SUBJECT:
Hoffman Memorandum re Long-Term Strategy, Policy,
and Programs
Fred Hoffman has sent you the memorandum at Tab I, summarizing
his views on those issues emerging as we enter the final years of
the Reagan Presidency. His emphasis is on the strategic nuclear
balance: mainly force development and employment, especially as
they relate to the offense-defense issues surrounding SDI. While
many of Fred's comments in this area are not directly relevant to
the rewrite of NSDD-32, they will provide grist for follow-on
activities related to SDI. However, he also had some useful
comments on low intensity conflict which we are incorporating
into a new draft of NSDD-32.
Fred's most basic message is that SDI is not likely to survive
this Administration unless the program is restructured to
emphasize some intermediate goal between site defense and full
territorial defense. In doing so we must reopen some fundamental
issues of strategic policy. We concur that we must ensure the
long-term survival of the SDI program, but the timeframe and
circumstances in which a restructuring could be successfully
orchestrated are not self-evident. We need to give more thought
to creating a political and fiscal climate receptive to the
consideration of SDI transition issues, in a way that would not
jeopardize the future of the program.
Fred's second broad message is that employment policy for
offensive nuclear forces requires reconsideration to ensure
greater flexibility and military utility. Drawing on his work
for Fred Ikle's Nuclear Strategy Development Group, he advocates
publicly asserting that we do not depend on launching under
attack and have options other than threats of mutual suicide. He
suggests a number of topics for further study. While Fred's
points have merit, a White House nuclear warfighting reexam-
ination is more than the traffic will bear right now. Thus we
recommend these issues continue to be worked in DOD.
Bob Linhard, Ken deGraffenreid, Jack Matlock, Ron St. Martin, and
Howard Teicher concurred by telephone.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
Tab I
Memorandum from Fred Hoffman
NLRR M08-125/2 # 5338
BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10
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Declassify on: OADR
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I.
1
I
TOP SECRET
SYSTEM II
90419
3
May 28, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
8339
FROM:
FRED S. HOFFMAN
SUBJECT:
The NSDD-219 process and longer term issues of
national security policies and programs
My task as I understand it is to consider the course of national
security policy for the remainder of the current Administration,
in the light of high priority goals for the Administration and
the creation of conditions that increase the likelihood of
continuing and effective efforts beyond 1989 to strengthen the
U.S. in the long term competition with the Soviet Union. I have
concentrated on military aspects of national security policies,
but have touched on other aspects. Within the military, my
heaviest emphasis has been on issues of nuclear strategy.
1. Approach
Mike Donley has proposed that the NSDD-219 effort distinguish
issues that can be handled within the current schedule for
NSDD-32 review and those requiring more extended treatment
including studies by DOD or other agencies. As part of the
current NSDD 219 effort, such issues should be identified and a
Phase II of the Packard Commission implementation effort should
be directed to deal with them. In this memorandum I provide some
views on the longer term issues as background, propose some
changes in NSDD-32 language designed to motivate their
consideration, and formulate statements of the issues for
possible use with the agencies.
2. General Background for Issue Identification
As President Reagan's Administration moves toward its conclusion,
it becomes increasingly important, in addition to continuing the
implementation of his program, to provide a point of departure
that will make it likely thata successor will continue viable
programs for competing with Soviet military strength. This is
especially important for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
because of its close personal identification with the President,
its distant horizon and the heavy ideological burden it bears.
The SDI also is the most visible symbol of the President's
attempt to establish a more viable nuclear component of a
strategy for our long term competition with the Soviet Union.
The major problems in creating and maintaining the military
posture needed for the long term competition are:
Continuing fiscal stringency
Public desire at home and even more so among friends and
allies to see movement toward reduction in the threat of
nuclear destruction and the likelihood of war.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M08-125/2# 8339
TOP SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 1/11/12
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Belief among the public that such movement depends on arms
agreements and that failure to conclude such agreements will
result in an "arms race" and increase the probability of
war.
Soviet exploitation of the above through propaganda and
divisive diplomatic tactics
Public reluctance to support the use of military power to
oppose aggression by adversaries of the U.S. unless
extremely strict conditions are met concerning the
prospects of low-cost, quick and decisive victory, the
avoidance of harm to innocent civilians and the democratic
virtue of those allied with or supported by the U.S.
Inadequate U.S. effectiveness in translating technological
superiority into politically viable, usable and affordable
military power.
These problems clearly transcend military strategy but pose
important tasks for that strategy. Several factors, some related
to the above, will assist in mounting the necessary efforts.
Soviet internal problems and bureaucratic rigidity
Continuing disaffection for the Soviet Union and
Soviet-supported regimes among Soviet satellite nations
Distrust of the Soviet Union among the public in the West
The magnitude of our required future defense efforts will depend
not only on our effectiveness in exploiting our relative
strengths and Soviet vulnerabilities but to some degree on the
rate of growth in the size and effectiveness of Soviet military
capabilities. The outlook for a continued Soviet military
buildup is currently less clear than in the past because of
mounting evidence of Soviet internal economic and social problems
and strains among the satellite nations. However, in assessing
the possibility that internal difficulties will limit Soviet
military efforts we should take account of the failure of past
predictions in this vein to materialize. Moreover, Soviet
economic strains are likely to cause them to seek relief in the
form of Western capital and technology, once again intensifying
differences between us and our friends and allies over the
control of such flows.
In addition, it is becoming clear that requirements to deal with
low level conflict and state-sponsored terrorism are likely to
pose increasing burdens, if not on the size, then on the
qualitative capabilities of our military forces. Where they
occur in the Western Hemisphere, such conflicts may also
increasingly divert our attention from containing the USSR on its
periphery.
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5
The following sections go further into the background for issues
of strategic offensive forces and active defense, respectively.
3. Background for Strategic Offensive Force Issues
My comments in this area are without benefit of ESI clearance
(which I have not held since something like 1968), and with
access to significant compartmented information but of a degree
of completeness I am, of course, unable to assess. On the basis
of information available to me and discussions with those I
presume to have greater access, I have reached the following
conclusions.
NSDD-13 notwithstanding, the range of options and degree of
flexibility in the current SIOP and the assumed range of Soviet
operational options are so limited that they are believed to
provide little scope for precise, discriminate systems
capabilities, and selective options for their use, in affecting
the outcome of strategic nuclear operations if they occur.
Our knowledge of Soviet operational planning for intercontinental
operations depends on a combination of exercise data, inferences
from force posture trends, doctrinal statements and some
intelligence windows that allow us to understand plans and
preferred operations. There remain major uncertainties about
strategic operational flexibility in a real war and unanswered
questions about the relationship between military planners and
the political leaders who would make decisions about the use of
military forces.
Considerations of Soviet self-interest and prudence, together
with their doctrines subordinating military force to political
objectives will create powerful incentives for them to move in
the direction of greater flexibility and selectivity in strategic
options, notwithstanding the relatively greater competitive
advantage and political-military urgency for the U.S. in moving
in this direction; however, their declaratory policy will
continue to deny this possibility for political effect.
Our concerns over our ability to ensure continuing c³ together
with the current and projected vulnerability of land-based
elements of our strategic forces fundamentally condition our own
policies and plans.
The resulting set of policies and programs will be increasingly
hard to defend before the U.S. public and as a basis for
maintaining credibility in U.S. alliance guarantees and for what
Michael Howard has called "reassurance" of our friends and
allies. This results from public perceptions (often reinforced
by official statements--certainly not convincingly refuted by
them) that any use of nuclear weapons would lead inevitably to
uncontrolled use with catastrophic results to both sides (as well
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as noncombatants) and that postures on both sides offer intense
incentives to strike before being struck in crises.
The SDI reflects the President's sense of the long term problems
with simply holding the line on current strategic policy and
leaving these public perceptions unchanged. For the future, new
technologies of offense and defense and those available to
support robust and enduring CI offer the possibility of moving
in the direction of nuclear operational capabilities
(supplemented by long-range nonnuclear capabilities) that would
offer greater operational flexibility in strategic operations, a
more secure and stable second-strike capability, and a more
politically defensible set of programs.
Specifically, we should seek a posture that will permit us to
assert as soon as possible that our ability to respond to attack
does not depend on irrevocably launching under attack and avoids
reliance on threats of mutual suicide. To quote from the
Nuclear Strategy Develepment Group Report, a document approved by
the JCS as providing "useful general guidance on the direction of
future US strategy."
The United States should not rely on launching its nuclear
forces in an irrevocable manner upon warning that a Soviet
missile attack has begun. This would increase the risk of
accidental war. Continued improvements in U.S. tactical
warning and attack assessment capability and enhanced C and
forces survivability are a high priority in order to permit
a more deliberate presidential decision on whether or not to
commit the United States to nuclear war, and what kind of
offensive nuclear strike option to choose. The future U.S.
offensive forces posture should aim at having any NCA
decision to retaliate with nuclear forces determined by the
nature and size of the Soviet attack, not the vulnerability
of forces and C assets. [p. 25]
Further, we should move toward a posture that supports the
assertion that our plans for responding to Soviet attack
including Soviet use of nuclear weapons are based on options that
deny the objectives of the Soviet attack and that would serve
U.S. interests if they had to be executed. In both employment
policy and programs we need to give greater weight to improving
our ability to respond as above under plausible contingencies of
attack relative to making marginal improvements in outcomes under
extreme and relatively implausible contingencies.
This would require, as part of the Phase II effort, review an
amendment of NSDD-13 to:
-Change the language on maintaining Soviet uncertainty about
our response to warning;
-To reflect the need to maintain the credibility of U.S.
response to plausible Soviet attacks, by adding to the
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document's present emphasis on keeping Soviet assessments of
war outcomes "dangerous and uncertain" an emphasis on
options that would threaten Soviet interests and deny Soviet
attack objectives while serving U.S. national interests
under the circumstances if actually executed--rather than
only when threatened in advance;
-Establish priority between "immediate options" and
maintaining the integrity of pre-planned SIOP options.
We need to reassess the future roles of elements of the triad and
the requirements for prompt hard target capabilities in the light
of prospective changes in U.S. and Soviet postures, including the
possibilities of active defense, mobility, concealment and
deception. I am suggesting for Phase II of Packard Commission
implementation a number of questions for further analysis by DOD
to clarify these issues.
In this connection, the vulnerability of at least the first 50
Peacekeeper missiles is a troublesome issue. For this reason, I
have couched suggested changes to NSDD-32 in the form of
objectives for policy and programs "beyond the current Strategic
Modernization program". For obvious reasons, these suggested
emphases in policies and programs should not be held up until
completion of that program. If a basing mode like the
"carry-hard" movable hard capsule system could be viable for the
second 50, it would clearly be extremely attractive in resolving
the issue. At the moment, however, the only fix in view for the
vulnerability of the first 50 appears to depend on some form of
early defense deployment.
A hard-site defense is not the only contender here. An approach
that is more consistent with the goals of the SDI might be a
first-stage deployment of a country-wide defense (including
elements of an exo-atmospheric area defense and endo-atmospheric
terminal defense) to deny Soviet objectives in attacks against
M-X and other high priority targets including precursor attacks
against the NCA and possible limited attacks on objectives such
as force projection facilities critical to our plans to reinforce
NATO. It would not be necessary for such a defense to offer a
high level of protection from the outset if it showed prospect of
growth to convey that the U.S. was not committed to a vulnerable
deployment for the long term. If desirable, the deployment could
be approached initially as a Treaty-consistent defense with the
number of interceptors and deployment area as prescribed in the
Treaty. The protected area afforded by the exo-atmospheric layer
would, nevertheless, be very large with the addition of adjunct
sensors. In such an approach, the decision about further
deployments would be left open. It would incidentally serve the
NSDD-119 objective of contributing to a hedge against Soviet
breakout by giving us a warm production base analogous to the one
that causes our anxiety about Soviet breakout. An IOC objective
of this sort illustrates one first step in the kind of
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evolutionary approach required for a successful SDI transition,
discussed below.
4. Background on the future of SDI beyond President Reagan's term
The recent letter signed by 46 Senators illustrates the surfacing
of some of the problems that I have believed were inherent in the
Administration's posture on SDI from my earliest involvement in
it in 1983. Others are clearly in evidence.
The Administration's posture on SDI has been presented and is
generally perceived as a commitment to conduct a five-year
program limited to research and ending after President Reagan's
term of office with a decision about whether to drop the effort
or to enter a systems development phase. The objective of the
program is taken to be "population defense" which, in turn is
understood to be the achievement of a defense effective enough to
protect against a massive Soviet attack focussed on
cities--precisely the kind of attack assumed by those who either
favor MAD or regard it as an inevitable outcome of any use of
nuclear weapons, ignoring what we know of Soviet military
doctrine, forces and plans. The actual problem of population
protection in the event of nuclear attack is that of protecting
civilians from the collateral effects of Soviet attacks on
military targets, a systems design problem with different
implications from the other.
Both critics and supporters of the program have often equated
lesser defense capabilities with "hard-site" defenses, an
objective rejected by Secretary Weinberger as a dead end for the
program. The exception to this during the past year has been a
possible SDI contribution to a defense against theater ballistic
missiles. The net effect has been to put success in SDI on an
"all or nothing" basis, requiring achievement of the program's
technical goals in many, if not all, of the extremely advanced
and risky technologies pursued under the program. Success is
therefore also very distant in terms of time. These factors
together with the cost and high visibility of the program create
several threats to SDI's future viability:
O Expert opinion will continue to insist that "SDI is
infeasible" and intolerably expensive
O Its riskiness, cost and distant time horizon will permit
critics to question the allocation of substantial resources
to the program
O The DOD will have difficulty in justifying the allocation
of such large resources to a distant and risky payoff given
budgetary pressures on other programs in the 6.0 to 6.3A
area with similar time horizons, especially since it serves
no mission explicitly identified as essential by the JCS
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9
O Critics will dwell on the immediate arms control
opportunities foregone by unwillingness to limit an SDI
program with dubious benefits
O Some who will not attack the program outright will
nevertheless argue that interim constraints on the program
are consistent with its distant time horizon and the
uncertainty of success
O Continuation of the current posture on the program will
certainly provide no reason for reopening the ABM Treaty
within President Reagan's term or even reinterpreting it to
provide more latitude for SDI tests and demonstrations
Since President Reagan's successor is unlikely to have as close a
personal identification with the program as he, to be better
situated for reopening the ABM Treaty or to experience a markedly
easier fiscal situation, the prospects for a useful outcome from
the SDI look gloomy unless some of the foregoing conditions are
changed. I believe it is crucial that a process leading to
changes be initiated soon if it is to have an effect on the FY89
program guidance, the last opportunity for this Administration to
affect the formulation and presentation of DOD programs.
Several conditions can be identified as necessary to changing the
outlook:
O The program requires a constituency among the services in
the DOD
O It must offer some foreseeable benefits of a degree of
urgency commensurate with its funding level
O The restrictive effects of the ABM Treaty (and our
interpretation of its provisions) must be more clearly
understood in relation to program activities necessary to
produce early, useful results.
All of the above require a process for identifying possible
missions for an initial defense deployment as a first step in an
evolutionary program with foreseeable benefits within a time
horizon commensurate with the resource and political costs of
proceeding. Such a process requires an interaction between
USD/P, the JCS and the SDIO. Ultimately, it must lead to JCS
approval of initial deployment objectives as a basis for dealing
with the problems identified above.
The above problems and opportunities motivate the changes
suggested below in NSDD-32 language and the selection of issues
for further treatment.
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5. NSDD-32 Language Changes by Issue Area and by Section, with
Associated Issues Identified for Study
A. Nuclear Strategy and Programs
Global Objectives §
Insert in place of "To neutralize
disinformation":
To neutralize efforts by the U.S.S.R.to increase its
influence and weaken ties between the U.S. and countries
allied to or friendly with this country, by exploiting
anxiety over nuclear destruction and desires for arms
limitations, by its use of diplomacy, arms transfers,
economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and
disinformation.
Insert as new global objectives:
To reduce the threat of nuclear destruction over time by
increasing our ability to keep control of our forces during
military operations, by basing deterrence of plausible
Soviet attacks increasingly on defensive systems and on
weapons that permit us to achieve our military objectives
through selective means while avoiding unintended or
undesired destruction, and, as consistent with these
objectives, by reducing our reliance on weapons of
widespread destruction and creating incentives for the USSR
to do so too.
In the event of war with the Soviet Union to exploit the
potential for fragmenting the Warsaw Pact through a
selective policy for attacking or withholding attacks on
targets within the East European countries.
Nuelear Strategic Forces §
[My amendment of John Douglass' proposed language]
Completion of the planned modernization of our strategic
forces and the pursuit of research and development on the
Strategic Defense Initiative shall receive the first
priority.
A prudent basis for deterring Soviet attacks requires
strategic offensive and defensive forces capable of
responding to the full range of plausible Soviet attacks in
ways that would deny Soviet confidence in achieving the
objectives of the attacks and that would be in the U.S.
interest in the specific circumstances. This requires the
ability to destroy military targets where it serves the
national interest, while restricting collateral damage to
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provide continuing incentives for the Soviets to limit their
own force employment.
The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear
deterrent by sustaining its five part Strategic
Modernization Program, which includes the Strategic Defense
Initiative, in accordance with guidance provided in
NSDD-178, NSDD-13, and NSDD-172. The strategic force
modernization program set forth in NSDD-178 is reaffirmed
except as may be modified by new decisions in the basing
mode for the second 50 Peacekeeper missiles. missiles.
Special emphasis will be placed on achievement of the
initial operational capability date for the new stealthy
Advanced Technology Bomber set forth in NSDD-178.
Beyond these programs, we should plan to develop and acquire
offensive and defensive forces and the means to direct and
keep control of their use during combat operations so as to
maintain a prudent deterrent posture. It is in the long
term interest of the U.S. to achieve this objective at the
lowest possible level of nuclear forces and offensive weapon
yields consistent with responding to the threat and if
possible to do so with levels that decline over time. Our
plans should take account of the opportunities being
provided by new technologies to maintain a high level of
military effectiveness and to keep continuing control over
forces during military operations while limiting damage to
ourselves and our Allies and restricting unintended
destruction to innocent civilians. In this context we
should assess the value of non-nuclear options as a
supplement to nuclear capabilities. Such plans should also
take account of the utility of the strategic offensive triad
of land-based ballistic missiles in complicating a surprise
Soviet attack and guarding against technical surprise that
might jeopardize any single leg of the triad.
Issue 1:
What characteristics of our future forces, plans for their
use and declaratory policies on nuclear strategy can counter
Soviet attempts to fragment our alliance relations in
peacetime? What elements of our posture contribute to
countering such attempts in crises?
Issue 2:
Given projected Soviet SOF trends (hardening, mobility),
passive defense of critical leadership targets, improving
accuracy, what should be the objectives of our future
strategic offensive force programs? Specifically:
What are our specific target objectives under various
contingencies of attack and how do they influence the
outcome?
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What aspects of Soviet future force structure
critically threaten our own strategic objectives?
What assumptions should we employ about Soviet
strategic attack objectives as a basis for our force
planning?
What is the difference in outcomes under various
plausible future attack contingencies and over the
range of uncertainties in operational factors of
different levels of prompt, hard target kill
capability?
What aggregate levels of damage to the U.S. and USSR
result from employment of alternative postures above
and what incentives are implied for each side to
execute or withhold elements of the attack.
Issue 3:
What solutions can we find to the vulnerability of our
land-based strategic forces or other critical strategic
targets? Evaluate them in terms of their effect on Soviet
attack assessments and on attack outcomes.
Issue 4:
What measures can we adopt in the future to provide
continuing intelligence, attack assessment and warning
capabilities, to maintain their functions under attack, and
reconstitute them? Assess the cost and effectivenes of
different levels of capability in term of the outcomes
during protracted combat involving the use of nuclear
weapons. Assess the role of SDI technologies for this
purpose.
Issue 5:
Similarly identify the means and assess the effect on
outcomes of capabilities to deny enemy intelligence, attack
assessment and warning capabilities.
Issue 6:
Assess tradeoffs between offensive and defensive
capabilities in meeting our objectives for future force
structures, given projected trends in Soviet offensive and
defensive posture.
Issue 7:
Assess Soviet responses to US deployment of active defenses
over time, taking account of realistic Soviet strategic
objectives. Specifically evaluate Soviet assessments of
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their ability to achieve attack objectives by increasing
offensive force levels if they are unable to negate defenses
by qualitative countermeasures. Consider the effect on
Soviet force planning over time. Consider the calculation
of cost-effectiveness at the margin that would be made in
the course of Soviet force planning, given realistic Soviet
force posture objectives.
Issue 8:
Define possible initial and growth missions for alternative
evolutionary SDI deployments. Establish estimated time paths for
such deployments, based on current assessments of progress in the
SDI research program and the estimated grow pattern of their
technical capabilities. Consider as one alternative and ABM
Treaty-compliant IOC and address the possible utility of such a
deployment in meeting objectives of future force posture.
Identify elements of the SDI that could contribute to such an
IOC. Identify associated air defense requirements needed to
realize the benefits. Base the assessment on realistic
assumptions about Soviet attack objectives and Soviet assessment
of its attack capability. Specifically, what levels of defense
capability and what combinations of defense components could
contribute significantly to:
- Protection of NCA, intelligence, warning and attack
assessment systems, and bomber bases against precursor
attacks
- Protection of missile silos
- Reducing the potential attractiveness of Soviet
selective attack options against critical military
facilities
Issue 9:
Assess the roles, cost and effectiveness in our future
strategic force structure and operations of advanced
technologies including:
Nuclear weapons with tailored effects, e.g. earth
penetrator weapons
Non-nuclear weapons of extreme accuracy with tailored
warheads for long range attack on selected strategic
targets
Improved, high data rate communications systems with
SSBNs
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14
B. General Purpose Forces Issues
Global Objectives §
Insert new objective:
To increase our ability to deal with low-level, relatively
likely conflicts requiring the use of parts of our military
forces, while deterring large scale attack or maintaining
readiness to protect U.S. interests in situations requiring
our full military capabilities.
General Purpose Forces S
Insert at beginning of existing I 3 of §:
US General Purpose Forces must provide the flexibility to
deal quickly, decisively and discriminately with low-level
conflict contingencies requiring US military involvement.
In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union
Force Integration S
Insert as new I between present $5 and 16.
It has become increasingly clear that our forces must
provide the flexibility to respond to the need for military
action in contingencies of low-level conflict. Such
contingencies require flexibility, effectiveness and an
ability for discriminate action not currently provided by
our forces, which have been sized, deployed, equipped and
trained primarily for global conflict against the Soviet
Union. To provide the needed capabilities for low level
conflict contingencies, our future force development should
be based on an appropriate mix of special-purpose forces,
general purpose forces, and appropriate elements of
long-range attack forces, suitably trained, equipped and in
readiness for such missions. Where special-purpose
equipment, exploiting advanced technology, is appropriate
and unsuitable or unaffordable as standard equipment for
global conflict, it should be acquired and deployed in
quantities appropriate for low-level conflct.
Issue 1:
[Adapted from Linton Brooks language on "Resource
Priorities"]
Develop the implications for our general purpose forces of
adopting the following order of priorities:
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Equipping, maintaining and training our forces to
provide, where and when required, combined arms teams
suitable for dealing with contingencies of low-level
conflict or state-sponsored terrorism quickly,
decisively and discriminately
Applying advanced technologies as appropriate for
modernizing our general purpose forces for high level
or global war with the USSR
Improving our mobilization base and reserves for a
global war with the USSR
Operating and maintaining our general purpose forces in
a high state of readiness for global war with the USSR
Assess tradeoffs among these force objectives in terms of
our ability to handle plausible contingencies of conflict,
and the nature of the risks we would incur in the near term
and in the more distant future, given projected levels of
resources.
Issue 2.
Assess the alternatives of establishing, equipping and
training specialized combined arms teams for low-level
conflict situations against relying on deployed general
purpose forces for such missions, provided with special
equipment, if and where appropriate, in quantities required
for such missions.
C. Arms Control
NSDD-32 currently has no language on arms control. The Executive
Summary of NSSD 1-82 has a single sentence (page vii). The
following should be included in NSDD-32:
Global Objectives §
Our policy in negotiating arms agreements, our evaluation of
arms control proposals and our policies for observing
existing agreements should be based on realistic assessments
of our ability to ensure a level of compliance that will
result in equal restraints on the parties.
Issue 1:
Assess the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty on the SDI
in relation to a baseline established by considering how the
program would have been designed in the absence of Treaty
constraints. Assess our ability to enforce Soviet
compliance with analogous constraints in the future.
Develop principles for observance of the Treaty based on
equal constraints.
TOP SECRET
8340
& Payment- 6/12
SECRET
16
4134
J agree If we
git the sites in Brad,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C 20506
want this loland
June 11, 1986
he about all we can
MATLOCK
fund) ?
R SOMMER
LENCZOWSKI
Jash
RAYMOND
) Site Negotiations in Turkey
I have not been normally negative. I believe that this Wick
effort to open up Turkey is a loser. Nothing in the attached
chronology suggests otherwise. You will note that we did try the
Presidential card on April 1985.
I have talked at length to Paul Henze, who has spent many years
in Turkey, and in an earlier incarnation tried to establish a
Western radio in Turkey. He is preparing a memorandum for me on
the basis of several delicate conversations that he has had in
Turkey which may offer a new opportunity to move forward. There
is an element high up in the Turkish government that would like
to develop a broadcasting capability to broadcast to the Soviet
Union. They will need money, technical advice, and subsequently
professional programmatic assistance. He believes that with a
very limited financial commitment we could set in motion a
low-visibility joint study commission which could seek to work on
the problem. I am not certain what will come out, but it may
afford us an opportunity under some type of country arrangement
to get a great deal of the RFE/RL material broadcast over a
Turkish radio and the Soviet Union.
Henze's recommendation is that we not actively pursue the Wick
angle because it is not going to go any place. I would urge that
you not discuss the Henze idea with anyone outside of the NSC
until I get the detailed memo which he has promised me. Mean-
while -- unless any of the three of you have a different idea --
I do not think that we should expend much energy or equity in
pursuing Charlie Wick's Turkish caper. We have so many other
negotiations going on concerning VOA and SO little actual build-
ing that has been done as a result of these negotiations, I would
rather concentrate VOA's energies on building the facilities for
which they have already negotiated and which will cost over $1
billion anyway. Lastly, if we were successful in getting a
Turkish site, I have no idea how we would pay for it.
Comments?
Attachment
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
NLRR F06-114/4#8340
SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 3/9/11
June 12, 1986
TO:
Sven Kraemer
Judyt Mandel
Jack Matlock
Don Mahley
0/12
Lint Brooks
Karna Small
Ed Djerejian/Mike Guest
FROM:
Steve Steiner
SUBJECT: Adelman Article on Strategic Arms Control
Attached is an article which the NYT has agreed to run on Sunday.
Given to us and other agencies on very short notice. ACDA staff
gave to NYT already as a first draft to get commitment to run,
but with understanding there will be changes. While I told ACDA
this is not generally an acceptable procedure, I think it is o.k.
in this case because the issue is hot and we want to get as much
good stuff as we can out there--ASAP.
PM has cleared already. OSD has not answered; at my suggestion,
ACDA is calling them and trying to get them on board. I have
given a provisional green lite, with the fixes indicated here.
My main purpose with these fixes, and consistent with the ACDA
title here, is to make this a FORWARD looking article on strate-
gic AC, not backward on SALT. I think this is consistent with
what the President was saying last nite.
If you have any problems with this, please advise right away.
This is a moving train. Sunday NYT has excellent circulation,
and we want to make it.
Thanks.
copies to:
Rod McDaniel
Walt Raymond
Will Tobey
For Sunday NYT
MASTER
6111
18
BEYOND SALT - ARMS CONTROL WITH REALISM
Kenneth L. Adelman
Bertrand Russell once remarked that we often defend most
passionately those opinions for which we have the least factual
basis. It is difficult to find any other way to explain the
torrent of emotion that has greeted the President's decision on
SALT
II statyic arms control.
Even on its face, the case against the President's decision
looks dubious at best. After all, the Senate Armed Services
7
Committee agreed unanimously in 1979 that SALT II was not in the
make
nation's "national security interests." The treaty was never
sur
ratified. It never had the force of law. It never
gained the support needed for ratification. The chief prediction
of its critics--that it would permit a vast modernization and
expansion of Soviet strategic forces--has come true, in spades.
some
On top of all this, the Soviet Union is violating the agreement
key provisions
centalponsione of
President U.S. should continue to abide by SALT II Milaterally? Let me elite Some
What could be more clear-cut? Why do critics say that the
1. Soviet violations are alleged to be "peripheral." The Presi-
5/th
argum
dent's critics would like to have it both ways. When SALT II
JJ
was up for ratification in 1979, treaty supporters commonly
cited three provisions as the treaty's main advantages: (1) the
numerical limits (on warheads-per-launcher and overall launchers);
Tesp.
more than/
(2) the prohibition on a second new type of ICBM; (3) the
restraints on encoding test data. The Soviets are completely
contravening provisions (2) and (3), in addition to exceeding
- 1 -
19
We Find it difficult understand to
the launcher limit in provision (1). In other words ^ treaty
and
imposible
provisions hailed as central when SALT II was being sold have
to the accy
somehow become "peripheral" since the Soviets began violating
claim
them.
that
2. The Soviet violations are sometimes said to be "ambiguous"
illegal Saviet
missile
or unimportant. The new, SALT violating SS-25 A is not in any
sense marginal. It is one of two powerful new land-based strategic
missiles the Soviets are now fielding. In short, a major portion
of the current Soviet ICBM buildup is occurring in clear contra-
vention of SALT II. The violation is clear since the throwweight
#
1
of the SS-25 missile is not, as some critics continue to claim,
just "slightly" greater than x its alleged predecessor (the SS-13),
but roughly twice that--clearly beyond the treaty-permitted 5 per-
explain
cent. In addition, Soviet signal scrambling is seriously impeding
the
provision
verification.
3. It is sometimes claimed that the Soviets have dismentled 1000
or more systems to comply with SALT. This Notably the Soviets them-
is
fat
that
work?
word
selves claim only 540 dismantlements under SALT. More important,
what the critics' figures really demonstrate are not the quanti-
tative limits on the Soviet arsenal, but the vast qualitative
growth of the Soviet arsenal under the treaty. The Soviets
dismantled more during SALT than the U.S. because they built
faster and modernized much more than we did. The vast majority
of silos cited by the critics became the homes of new, vastly
more powerful missiles. The figures are less a testimony to
SALT's effectiveness than a measure of what it failed to control.
- 2 -
20
Nor should we attribute dismantlements solely or even mainly
to SALT. When new Soviet systems come on, old, obsolescent
systems generally go. For example, 650 SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles
--unconstrained by any arms accord--were dismantled by the Soviets
as the SS-20 came on stream. The claim that Soviet dismantlements
necessarily
during the period of SALT were due to SALT is a case of misplaced
causality.
4. Critics claim that without SALT II the Soviets will vastly
increase their warheads and accelerate the arms buildup. Projec-
tions of large Soviet warhead increases--beyond the considerable
increases already anticipated under SALT--are easily made on
paper. In reality, such changes are neither quick nor cheap--
recessing
nor even militarily useful. For example, some critics claim
that the Soviets would put 20 or 30 warheads on the SS-18 missile,
instead of 10--but this is likely to undermine, if not preclude,
T
the SS-18's main mission, that is, to destroy our missiles in
their silos.
The basic notion that SALT is meaningfully constraining the
highly questionsble.
Soviet buildup now, or would do so in the future, is an illusion.
It presumes future compliance on critical treaty provisions, when
we already have seen clear and major violations of key parts.
Stratgic Mist
Even within the terms of SALT II, Soviet warheads have nearly
doubled from 5,000 to 9,200. Under SALT II they could rise
further to 12,000 by 1990. With or without SALT II, we envision
a 5 to 7 percent growth in Soviet strategic investment every
year as far out as we can see. With or without SALT II, we
envision an all-new Soviet ICBM force in the next decade.
- 3 -
21
If this is constraint, it is hard to envision non-constraint.
With their defense spending running at 15 to 17 percent of GNP,
the Soviets already have their accelerator near or on the floor.
Ironically, many of the critics who now base so much of
their argument predicting on Soviét warhead increases beyond those envisioned
under SALT II (which did not explicitly limit warheads) used to
tell us that warheads don't count. Back in the 1970s, when the
United States enjoyed a 3-to-1 advantage in warheads, many of
these same critics were arguing that "strategic superiority" and
numbers of warheads were "meaningless" and could be bargained
away without loss to U.S. security.
this decision
5. It is argued that leaving SALT II behind is bad for our
alliances. Despite extensive Administration consultations with
there have been some Allied disagrement + some
India All's
the Allies, we anticipated adverse effects among some segments
WeNgret naturally this.
of Allied public opinion. This is unfortunate, and as the reason-
better
ing for the decision and the facts become known, we hope this
will change.
an
But short-term popularity N not the criterion by which we
judge the wisdom of policy. Continued adherence to a ineffective
and unratified treaty that our adversary has is seriously rampled PALO violating the
Our overiding concern must emain
ground is not cost- or risk-free Ithers. Such a stance suggests
that the U.S. is more concerned about the momentary state of
public opinion than long-term strategic safety and genuine arms
control Such a course might provide the mirage of mutual
the Pain. said, red reductions. Only This callprovide a
solid
restraint [but but never the reabiti]
dair
for
- 4 -
while getting solid + my AC
new and framework, more 22
6. It is alleged that the administration wants 50 an "all-
out arms race.' This is simply false. Anyone who reads the
ad listers to that ho in saying
President's decision will see that we have provided a clear new
which will be
formula for mutual restraint, potential ly Amore effective than
SALT. The President pledged not increase launchers or ballistic
that villon our run contine to exercise utmost restral
For
missile warheads above Soviet levels. Real reductions in the
example
Soviet arsenal will be reciprocated on our side This is a
will
serious pledge, one which creates real costs for a Soviet buildup
reductions +
and provides real rewards for Soviet restraint--just as genuine
arms control should do. It is verifiable and do-able. In con-
continued
trast,
N
unilateral would observance of SALT II in the absence of Soviet
compliance will merely reinforce the dangerous idea that we can
do nothing about Soviet violations and may even encourage the
can easily be tolented, will likely encourage further even
-that they
set
Soviets on their drive for military superiority.
Violation
Insum,
The President's decision bears on the heart of our security
n
and the Auture integrity of the arms control process. It was
made with seriousness and care. It needs to be debated on its
merits and on the facts.
As the President has repeatably
made clear, what we seek the
are serious regitiations in Sereva leading
to deep quitable A -verifield reduc tions in us+ Societ
nuclear arends. -
- 5 -
23
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4596
WASHINGTON DC 20506
ACTION
June 12, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF
FROM:
RODNEY B. MCDANIEL kirl To
SUBJECT:
Word Processing/Printer Requirements Questionnaire
Attached is a questionnaire asking about your word processing and
computer printer needs. The information you provide on this
questionnaire will be reviewed by a visiting systems analyst, Mr.
Richard Clausen, who will recommend to me provements in
computer support to meet the needs of the NSC staff.
Please take a few minutes to complete this questionnaire. Return
it by Wednesday, 18 June, to George Van Fron who is coordinating
Mr. Clausen's efforts. Your answers will have an important
impact on the support you receive in the future.
/
Attachment
From Jack Matloch
Computer User Survey Questionnaire
24
COMPUTER USER SURVEY
6-JUN-1986
Name:
Office:
Ext:
To support your computing requirements, the NSC is conducting a survey of
how you use your terminal or workstation. Please take a few minutes to
answer these questions. There is space for your comments at the end. If
you have any questions, please call Lance Charnes or Nell Hurley at x5132.
1. How do you use your workstation?
Evaluate each of the following tasks as an approximate percentage of your
computer use. Don't worry if the percentages don't add exactly to 100%.
If appropriate, indicate the average number of people who review or revise
this work.
% OF
AVG # OF
TASK
WORKTIME
REVIEWERS
Memorandum/report/document preparation
60%
2
Profs notes/electronic mail
40%
3
Reading cables (messages)
GESCAN (text search & retrieval)
Administrative (Personnel evaluations, etc.)
Statistics/numerical analysis
Doc Log
Calendar/personal schedules
Graphics (briefing slides, etc.)
Other
2.
Document Processing.
Document processing includes creating, coordinating, revising, and
printing. Your document processing needs are of particular interest.
Please rate the importance to you of the following typical document
processing functions and circle the appropriate number. A "1" means you
must have this feature to do your job. A "4" means you probably wouldn't
use the feature.
NICE
PROBABLY
MUST
TO
WOULDN'T
FEATURE
HAVE
IMPORTANT
HAVE
USE
Simultaneous display of two
1
2
3
4
documents
Simultaneous editing of two
1
2
3
4
documents
Text block operations (move, copy, or
1
2
3
4
delete blocks of text)
Adjustable tab stops & margins
1
2
3
4
Right-justification of text
1
2
3
4
Boldfacing/underlining text
1
2
3
4
Proofreading ("spell-check")
1
2
3
4
Automatic page numbering
1
2
3
4
Automatic placing of headers/
1
2
3
4
footers/footnotes
Search and replace
1
2
3
4
"Undo" (reverse the last operation)
1
2
3
4
Mixed text and graphics
1
2
3
4
On-screen help
1
2
3
4
Other
1
2
3
4
26
3. More Document Processing
Rank-order the importance to you of these document processing attributes.
"1" is most important, "8" is least important.
ORDER
OF
ATTRIBUTE
IMPORTANCE
Ease of storing documents
4
Ease of deleting documents
7
Ease of use ("user-friendliness")
6
Speed of operation
3
Security of documents
1
Ease of invoking/exiting functions
5
Variety of functions
2
Other
4. Printing
Rank-order the importance to you of these printing attributes. "1" is most
important, "11" is least important.
ORDER
OF
ATTRIBUTE
IMPORTANCE
Proximity of printer to your desk
Ability to print draft quality at your desk
Ability to print letter quality in your office
/
Ability to print cables (messages) in your office
5
Printing mixed text and graphics
Multiple typefaces/fonts
4
Physical size of your printer
Ability to print on different paper types and
thicknesses
Ability to print on different sizes of paper
2
Speed
3
Other
27
5. Additional features you recommend and their relative importance:
6. Changes you recommend to your workstation (as opposed to the computer):
Daniel
Shutts-Dubenen
6/11/86
Amb. Matlock
For your eyes only
OEOB
room 368
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED
31 6/21/02
COPY
8618447
14311
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 12, 1986
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz
yrs
SUBJECT:
June 11 Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin
The arms control initiative Dubinin wanted to convey was a
copy of a proposal being made to UN Secretary General de
Cuellar for multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of
space. I reminded Dubinin that Moscow had been unresponsive
to our own earlier proposals for space cooperation, but said
we welcomed in principle the opportunity to work together in
this area. I am sending John Poindexter the text and our
analysis of the document.
As we discussed, I took the occasion to make three points
which I asked Dubinin to convey on your behalf to Gorbachev:
-- That we viewed the Soviets' recent proposals in Geneva
as serious ones, and that they would receive careful study
and a reply;
-- That you had noted what has been done in resolving some
humanitarian cases, and viewed recent steps as positive
and welcome;
-- And that, if Gorbachev wanted to suggest a date in
mid-November for the 1986 summit, you would be prepared to
accept.
Dubinin undertook to convey your message to Gorbachev
personally. He then asked -- on a "personal" basis -- what we
intended to do about SALT II. I outlined the rationale for
your decision, emphasizing our desire to achieve a reliable
regime of mutual restraint, and pointing to the first element
of your message to Gorbachev as evidence of your desire to
achieve real reductions in strategic weapons. Dubinin noted
in response only that the timing of a decision to exceed SALT
restraints was "an important element.' He seemed to be
suggesting that it might be difficult for Gorbachev to come
here with such a decision hanging over him or having just been
made.
Dubinin confirmed he would be returning from Moscow in
time to present his credentials to you June 23 as we had
proposed.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
NLRRMD8-125/2*8341 8341
BY KML NARA DATE6/28/10
8342
30
SECRET
EUR/SOV: MRPARRIS:MRP
6/12/86 647-3738 WANG 0951F
EUR: MPALMER
S:
S/S:
S/S-0
IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
SPECIAL ENCRYPTION NODIS//ADAM
RMP
E.O. 12356: OADR
MRP
S S/S
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
S/S-0
SUBJECT: SECRETARY DUBININ MEETING 6/11/86 {MEMCON}
-
1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THIS TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF A DETAILED MEMCON
FOR SUBJECT MEETING. EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED SEPTEL SECPRES
COVERING HIGHLIGHTS. END SUMMARY.
3. FOLLOWING A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SOVIET PROPOSAL TO UN
SECGEN FOR CREATION OF WORLD SPACE ORGANIZATION {SEPTEL},
THE SECRETARY INDICATED HE WISHED TO GIVE DUBININ A
READ-OUT OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD JUST HAD WITH PRESIDENT
REAGAN.
4. THE PRESIDENT HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF THE PROPOSAL
THE SOVIETS HAD MADE THAT MORNING IN THE START WORKING
GROUP AT THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. WE HAD ALSO
NOTED THE SOVIETS' NEW IDEAS THE WEEK BEFORE IN THE SPACE
WORKING GROUP. WHILE WHAT THE SECRETARY HAD TO SAY
REFERRED EXPLICITLY TO THOSE INITIATIVES, WE HAD ALSO
TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THE NEW WARSAW PACT INITIATIVE ON
CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. WE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M08-125/2#8342
BY KML NARA DATE 6/28/10
31
SECRET
2
IMPRESSED IN THE CASE OF THE NST PROPOSALS THAT THEY HAD
BEEN MADE PRIVATELY, RATHER THAN THROUGH THE MEDIA. WE
HAD NOTED THAT, APPRECIATED IT, AND FELT IT WAS A GOOD
WAY TO PROCEED.
5. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT, WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAD
LEARNED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE MEETING WITH DUBININ,
AND THAT DUBININ WOULD BE RETURNING TO MOSCOW, HE HAD
ASKED THE SECRETARY TO CONVEY THREE POINTS WHICH THE
)
PRESIDENT HOPED COULD BE PASSED TO GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV.
-- THE FIRST WAS THAT WE REGARDED THE PROPOSALS THE
SOVIETS HAD MADE IN GENEVA AS CLEARLY SERIOUS PROPOSALS.
THEY WOULD RECEIVE INTENSIVE AND CAREFUL STUDY HERE. WE
WOULD BE RESPONDING TO THEM.
-- SECOND, RECALLING THEIR CONVERSATION IN GENEVA, THE
PRESIDENT DID NOT WANT THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO
MISUNDERSTAND THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT SAID A
LOT ABOUT THE HUMANITARIAN CASES WHICH HAD BEEN RESOLVED
SINCE THEN. THE PRESIDENT WANTED THE GENERAL SECRETARY
TO KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SEEN WHAT HAS BEEN DONE,
AND THAT HE REGARDS IT AS A POSITIVE AND WELCOME MOVE BY
THE SOVIET UNION.
-- FINALLY, THE PRESIDENT WANTED THE GENERAL SECRETARY TO
KNOW THAT, IF THE GENERAL SECRETARY WANTED TO SUGGEST A
DATE IN MID-NOVEMBER OR so FOR THEIR NEXT MEETING, THE
PRESIDENT WOULD ACCEPT. {THE SECRETARY ADDED FOR
DUBININ'S INFORMATION THAT THE PRESIDENT HABITUALLY SPENT
THANKSGIVING AT HIS CALIFORNIA RANCH, AND THAT, IF THE
NOTION OF A NOVEMBER MEETING WERE OF INTEREST TO MOSCOW,
THE WEEK BEFORE THANKSGIVING MIGHT BE THE BEST TIME}.
THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GENERAL
SECRETARY COULD MAKE A SUGGESTION FOR THIS PERIOD KNOWING
THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ACCEPT.
6. DUBININ EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR THE SECRETARY'S WORDS
AND SAID HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONVEY THEM TO THE GENERAL
SECRETARY. DUBININ NOTED THAT DURING THEIR LAST MEETING
THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED WHEN DUBININ WOULD RETURN FROM
MOSCOW. THE WHITE HOUSE HAD PROPOSED JUNE 23 AS THE DATE
FOR DUBININ'S PRESENTATION OF HIS CREDENTIALS TO THE
PRESIDENT. DUBININ WAS NOT YET IN A POSITION TO SPECIFY
THE DATE OF HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW, BUT HE COULD CONFIRM
HE WOULD RETURN BY THE TWENTY THIRD. HE COULD THEREFORE
ACCEPT WITH GRATITUDE THE DATE PROPOSED. HE WOULD TRY TO
BE BACK A DAY OR TWO IN ADVANCE TO OVERCOME JET LAG.
SECRET
32
SECRET
3
7. IN TERMS OF HIS OWN SCHEDULE, THE SECRETARY INFORMED
DUBININ THAT HE WOULD BE IN THE FAR EAST ALL OF THE WEEK
OF JUNE 21. IN HIS ABSENCE, DUBININ COULD DEAL WITH
DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD OR UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST IF
THERE WERE SOMETHING TO TRANSMIT; AND OF COURSE THE
SECRETARY HIMSELF WAS IN CONSTANT COMMUNICATION WITH THE
DEPARTMENT.
8. DUBININ SAID HE WAS TEMPTED TO ASK THE SECRETARY A
QUESTION "OFF THE RECORD": WHAT DID THE U.S. PLAN TO DO
ABOUT START II? THE SECRETARY RECALLED FOR DUBININ THE
RATIONALE USED BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS LATE MAY STATEMENT
ON INTERIM RESTRAINTS. SUMMARIZING, HE STRESSED THAT:
FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE WOULD REMAIN IN COMPLIANCE
WITH SALT II NUMERICAL LIMITS; THE THRUST OF THE
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WAS A CALL FOR A REGIME OF MUTUAL
RESTRAINT; AND THE STATEMENT CONTAINED A SERIES OF FLAT
ASSURANCES THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT EXCEED SOVIET LEVELS
IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS OR LAUNCHERS.
9. IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION BY DUBININ AS TO
WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD ULTIMATELY EXCEED SALT II
NUMERICAL LIMITS, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT HAD MADE OUR LEVELS A FUNCTION OF
SOVIET LEVELS. WE WOULD HAVE NO MORE LAUNCHERS OR
WARHEADS THAN THE SOVIETS. WE HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT
WE HAD NO PLANS FOR A MAJOR EXPANSION OF OUR CAPABILITIES
IN THESE AREAS. DUBININ SAID HE HAD ASKED THE QUESTION
BECAUSE, WHILE THE SOVIETS HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEWS ON
THE COMPLIANCE QUESTION, THE ESSENCE OF THEIR POSITION
WAS TO PRESERVE THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF KEEPING
THE ARMS RACE IN CHECK. THE U.S. MIGHT HAVE DOUBTS; THE
SOVIETS HAD DOUBTS OF THEIR OWN. BUT IT WOULD BE
UNFORTUNATE WERE DOUBTS TO OPEN THE WAY TO AN
UNRESTRICTED ARMS RACE. THAT, THE SECRETARY NOTED, WAS
WHY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE HAD EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR
MUTUAL RESTRAINT.
10. DUBININ TOOK THE POINT, BUT ADDED THAT THE STATEMENT
HAD ALSO REFERRED TO A "MOMENT OF DECISION" AT THE END OF
THIS YEAR. THE TIMING OF SUCH A DECISION WAS VERY
IMPORTANT. PRESERVING THE TREATY WAS THE IMPORTANT
THING. IF THE POSITION OF THE U.S. WAS THAT THERE WOULD
BE A DECISION ON SALT II NUMERICAL RESTRAINTS BY THE END
OF THE YEAR, THAT WAS "ANOTHER ELEMENT" WHICH HAD TO BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ASSESSING THE GENERAL SITUATION --
AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT. THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAD SAID HE WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET
SECRET
33
SECRET
4
ACTIONS IN MAKING ANY DECISIONS: THIS INCLUDED NOT JUST
DEPLOYMENTS, BUT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WHOLE CONTEXT.
11. DUBININ CAUTIONED THAT MAKING SUCH EVALUATIONS ON
THE BASIS OF THE "BEHAVIOUR" OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WAS
AN "UNCOMFORTABLE" WAY OF DOING BUSINESS. THE SECRETARY
OBSERVED THAT THE KEY WAS TO REMEMBER WHAT HAD BEEN SAID
IN GENEVA ON THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON RADICAL REDUCTIONS
OF STRATEGIC FORCES. THIS WAS WHY THE PRESIDENT HAD
ASKED THE SECRETARY TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THE SECRETARY
HAD GIVEN DUBININ FOR GORBACHEV ON OUR INTENTION TO STUDY
WITH GREAT CARE RECENT SOVIET START AND OTHER PROPOSALS.
YY
tell Y.D. later that Pres. wild not
NB: JMP says Pres anthorized 65 to
go over S-II himit in Nov if M6
coming here.
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 34
TIME STAMP
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT
86.JUN 12 P3:23 23
SYSTEM II
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 90452
ACTION OFFICER:
DUE:
Prepare Memo For President
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
Prepare Memo
to
CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*
PHONE* to action officer at ext.
FYI
FYI
FYI
Brooks
Laux
Ross
Burghardt
Lenczowski
Sable
Cannistraro
Levine
Sachs
Childress
Linhard
Sestanovich
Cobb
Mahley
Small
Danzansky
Major
Sommer
deGraffenreid
Mandel
Soos
Djerejian
Matlock
Stark
Dobriansky
May
Steiner
Donley
North
St Martin
Douglass
Perry
Tahir-Kheli
Farrar
Platt
Teicher
Grimes
Pugliaresi
Thompson
Hanley
Raymond
Tillman
Kelly
Reger
Kraemer
Ringdahl
INFORMATION
McDaniel
A
Pearson
X
Secretariat
x
Rodman
Poindexter (advance)
Fortier (advance)
COMMENTS NO ACTION IS REQUIRED, PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY SEEN.
By
CVS 6/21/02
SECRET
Return to Secretariat
SUPER SENSITIVE
8618447
8343
SYSTEM II
35
90452
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 12, 1986
SECRET/SENSITIVE
you
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz yes
SUBJECT:
June 11 Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin
The arms control initiative Dubinin wanted to convey was a
copy of a proposal being made to UN Secretary General de
Cuellar for multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of
space. I reminded Dubinin that Moscow had been unresponsive
to our own earlier proposals for space cooperation, but said
we welcomed in principle the opportunity to work together in
this area. I am sending John Poindexter the text and our
analysis of the document.
As we discussed, I took the occasion to make three points
which I asked Dubinin to convey on your behalf to Gorbachev:
-- That we viewed the Soviets' recent proposals in Geneva
as serious ones, and that they would receive careful study
and a reply;
-- That you had noted what has been done in resolving some
humanitarian cases, and viewed recent steps as positive
and welcome;
-- And that, if Gorbachev wanted to suggest a date in
mid-November for the 1986 summit, you would be prepared to
accept.
Dubinin undertook to convey your message to Gorbachev
personally. He then asked -- on a "personal" basis -- what we
intended to do about SALT II. I outlined the rationale for
your decision, emphasizing our desire to achieve a reliable
regime of mutual restraint, and pointing to the first element
of your message to Gorbachev as evidence of your desire to
achieve real reductions in strategic weapons. Dubinin noted
in response only that the timing of a decision to exceed SALT
restraints was "an important element." He seemed to be
suggesting that it might be difficult for Gorbachev to come
here with such a decision hanging over him or having just been
made.
Dubinin confirmed he would be returning from Moscow in
time to present his credentials to you June 23 as we had
proposed.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
NLRR # 8343
BY KML NARA DATE6/28/10
MATLOCK 36
4619
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 13, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCKY Asm
SUBJECT:
Resignation Acceptance Letter to Gerald Carmen
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for David Chew noting NSC
concurrence with a draft Presidential letter accepting Gerald
Carmen's resignation as Representative of the United States to
the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva.
peter town
Sommer concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo for DChew
Tab A
Draft Presidential Ltr
37
4619
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 13, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCKS *Km
SUBJECT:
Resignation Acceptance Letter to Gerald Carmen
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for David Chew noting NSC
concurrence with a draft Presidential letter accepting Gerald
Carmen's resignation as Representative of the United States to
the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva.
Peter out oftown
Sommer concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo for DChew
Tab A
Draft Presidential Ltr
38
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
4619
MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW
FROM:
RODNEY B. McDANIEL
SUBJECT:
Resignation Acceptance Letter to Gerald Carmen
The National Security Council concurs with the attached draft
Presidential letter accepting Gerald Carmen's resignation as
Representative of the United States to the European Office of
the United Nations in Geneva.
Attachment
Tab A
Draft Presidential Ltr
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 29
TIME STAMP
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY REFERRAL
86 JUN 13 All: 06
SYSTEM I LOG NUMBER: 4619
(FIRST DRAFT OF REMARKS)
matloch
ACTION OFFICER:
DUE: 13 June TODAY
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott
IMMEDIATE
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Speakes
Prepare Memo
to
*** PUT RESPECTIVE STAFF OFFICER'S NAME IN MARGIN BESIDE CHANGES.
CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*
DUE:
*PHONE to action officer at ext.
Brooks
Lenczowski
Sable
Burghardt
Levine
Sachs
Cannistraro
Linhard
Sestanovich
Childress
Mahley
Small
Cobb
Major
X
Sommer
Danzansky
Mandel
Soos
deGraffenreid
X
Matlock
Stark
Dobriansky
May
Steiner
Donley
North
St Martin
Douglass
Perry
Tahir-Kheli
Farrar
Platt
Teicher
Grimes
Pugliaresi
Thompson
Hanley
Raymond
Tillman
Kelly
Reger
Kraemer
Ringdahl
Laux
Ross
INFORMATION
McDaniel
X
Pearson
X
Secretariat
X
Rodman
Exec. Sec. Desk
Poindexter (advance)
Fortier (advance)
Document No.
4619 40
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
6/13/86
COB TODAY
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
SUBJECT: RESIGNATION ACCEPTANCE LETTER TO GERALD CARMEN
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
MASENG
REGAN
POINDEXTER
MILLER
RYAN
BALL
SPEAKES
BUCHANAN
SPRINKEL
CHEW
P
SS SVAHN
DANIELS
THOMAS
HENKEL
TUTTLE
HICKS
WALLISON
KING
KINGON
LACY
REMARKS:
Do you have any objection/comments on the attached?
RESPONSE:
David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702
41
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1986
Dear Jerry:
It is with deep regret that I accept your resignation as
Representative of the United States of America to the
European Office of the United Nations, Geneva,
effective August 31, 1986.
You mention Robert Frost's lines about taking the "road
less traveled," and that making all the difference. You
and I go back a long way together, Jerry, and seeing
everything you've done for the people of the United States
in behalf of our agenda of hope and opportunity, I am
convinced those are words you live by.
Throughout your career, your dedication to excellence and
your unflinching commitment to our nation's well-being
have served as shining examples. Your appreciation for
the power of ideas and your lifelong devotion to liberty
and human rights have inspired all who cherish freedom
and self-government.
I am proud to have had you on my campaign teams as well,
Jerry. You have fought the good fight with energy, con-
viction, and enthusiasm. You have helped us focus on our
fundamental principles and you've spared neither time nor
effort to make sure policy reflected those principles.
Your ability, vision, and drive will continue to serve you
well. It's good to know that I can call on you in the
future. I too remember that first phone call of ours --
but perhaps we'll try to make the next one or two simply
to ask how those gorgeous New Hampshire woods look to
you and Anita.
From the bottom of my heart, thank you for all those promises
you've kept and all the many miles we have walked together.
God bless you and Anita always.
Sincerely,
The Honorable Gerald P. Carmen
Representative of the
United States of America
European Office of the United Nations
Geneva
42
4615
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 13, 1986
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK I.m
SUBJECT:
Chernobyl: Resolution re Emergency Medical
Assistance
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for Sally Kelley noting that
NSC has reviewed and concurs with the attached draft letter to
Ralph J. Perk, President of American Nationalities Movement of
Ohio, regarding his proposal that the US offer assistance to the
Soviet Union following the Chernobyl disaster.
nt available
Steve Danzansky concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo for Sally Kelley
Tab A
Draft Ltr to Perk
Tab B
Incoming Resolution
43
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
4615
MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY
FROM:
RODNEY B. McDANIEL
SUBJECT:
Chernobyl: Resolution re Emergency Medical
Assistance
The National Security Council has reviewed and concurs with the
attached draft response to Ralph J. Perk, President of American
Nationalities Movement of Ohio, regarding his proposal that the
US offer assistance to the Soviet Union following the Chernobyl
disaster.
Attachment
Tab A
Draft Response
Tab B:
Incoming Proposal
UNCLASSIFIED
46.5
(Classification)
44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM
S/S 8616604
Date June 12, 1986
For: VADM John M. Poindexter
National Security Council
The White House
Reference:
To: President Reagan
From: The Honorable Ralph J. Perk
Date: May 10, 1986
Subject: Resolution providing
emergency medical assistance to those effected by Chernobyl.
Referral Dated: May 29, 1986
ID# 403539
(if any)
The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State
Action Taken:
XX
A draft reply is attached.
A draft reply will be forwarded.
A translation is attached.
An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
Other.
Remarks:
Tim collins
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary
UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)
45
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Suggested Reply
Dear Mr. Perk:
I am replying to your May 10 letter regarding your proposal
that the United States offer assistance to the Soviet Union
following the Chernobyl accident.
When the Department first learned of the accident at the
Chernobyl Atomic Energy Station, we sent a message to the Soviet
Government expressing our regret and hope that casualties would
be limited. In that same message we offered humanitarian and
technical assistance. The Soviet Government expressed
appreciation for our offer of assistance but indicated their
resources were sufficient.
A communique issued May 5 by the leaders of all seven
nations attending the Tokyo Economic Summit reflects the
position of the United States Government on international
cooperation for nuclear safety and reporting of nuclear
incidents. We remain ready to extend assistance, in particular
medical and technical, when and if requested. We believe each
The Honorable
Ralph J. Perk,
President, American Nationalities
Movement of Ohio,
207 Statler Office Building,
Cleveland, Ohio.
in
-2-
country engaged in nuclear power generation bears full
responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture,
operation and maintenance of its installations. Furthermore,
each country is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and
complete information on nuclear emergencies and accidents, in
particular those with potential trans-boundary consequences.
Each of the economic summit countries accepts that
responsibility, and we urge the government of the Soviet Union,
which did not do SO in the case of Chernobyl, to provide such
information in a timely manner.
We were pleased that the Soviets invited International
Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix and two of his
associates to Moscow for discussions and a site visit in
connection with the Chernobyl accident. We welcome and
encourage the work of the IAEA in seeking to improve
international cooperation on the safety of nuclear
installations, the handling of nuclear accidents and their
consequences, and the provision of mutual emergency assistance.
We urge an early commitment by the parties to report and
exchange information in the event of nuclear emergencies. The
U.S. proposed such an international convention in 1981.
Sincerely,
47
8616604
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
REFERRAL
MAY 29, 1986
TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION REQUESTED:
DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER
DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:
ID:
403539
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED MAY 10, 1986
TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN
FROM:
THE HONORABLE RALPH J. PERK
PRESIDENT
AMERICAN NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT OF
OHIO
207 STATLER OFFICE BUILDING
1127 EUCLID AVENUE
CLEVELAND OH 44115
SUBJECT: FORWARDS RESOLUTION SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO
PROVIDE EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO ALL
PEOPLE EFFECTED BY THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER
PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.
RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500
SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE
ID# 403539
THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET
48
INCOMING
DATE RECEIVED: MAY 22, 1986
NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE RALPH J. PERK
SUBJECT: FORWARDS RESOLUTION SUPPORTING EFFORTS TO
PROVIDE EMERGENCY MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO ALL
PEOPLE EFFECTED BY THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER
ACTION
DISPOSITION
ROUTE TO:
ACT
DATE
TYPE C COMPLETED
OFFICE/AGENCY
(STAFF NAME)
CODE YY/MM/DD
RESP
D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS
ORG 86/05/22
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
199005
D 86/05/2
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
/ /
/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:
COMMENTS:
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:
2 MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:
PL MAIL
USER CODES: (A)
(B)
(C)
*ACTION CODES:
*DISPOSITION
*OUTGOING
*
*
*
*CORRESPONDENCE:
*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION
*A-ANSWERED
*TYPE RESP=INITIALS
*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM
*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL
*
OF SIGNER
*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE
*C-COMPLETED
*
CODE = A
*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED
*COMPLETED = DATE OF
*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*
*
OUTGOING
*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *
*
*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE
*
*
*
*X-INTERIM REPLY
*
*
*
REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.
HI
403539
AMERICAN NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT OF OHIC
Ralph J. Perk, President
207 Statler Office Bldg.
1127 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, Ohio 441
Semper
(216)861-550
Fidelis
99
L Koplis
May 10, 1986
h
THE WHITE HOUSE
Albanian
Washington, D.C.
Bulgarian
Byelorussian
RESOLUTION
Croatian
Cuban
The American Nationalities Movement of Ohio representing 25 ethnic
Czech
communities, at its annual meeting held on May 8, 1986 at the
Estonian
Donauschwaben Hall in 01msted Township, Ohio, unanimously endorsed
the following resolution:
German
Greek
WHEREAS the Chernobyl nuclear explosion in Ukraine is the worst
Hungarian
catastrophy in the history of nuclear power, and
Indian
WHEREAS this explosion has affected the lives of tens of thousands
Irish
of fellow Ukrainians and Byelorussians, and
Italian
Lebanese
WHEREAS many of our members have close family ties with the people
Latvian
effected in the immediate area of the nuclear plant, and
Lithuanian
WHEREAS the nuclear radiation is affecting the health of our members'
Polish
relatives living in the neighboring countries such as Sweden, Denmark,
Puerto Rican
Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
Rumanian
Roumania, and other areas of the European continent.
Russin
We, the representatives of 25 ethnic nationalities of Ohio, deeply
Serbian
concerned about the effects of this explosion on human lives, whole
Slovak
heartedly support the President's efforts to provide emergency medical
Slovenian
and other material assistance to all people effected by this catastrophy.
Ukrainian
In the spirit of humanitarian principles, we urge the President to
Vietnamese
impress upon the Soviet government and the governments of Eastern Europe
to open up the channels of communication between the families of our
members and their relatives effected by this tragic nuclear explosion.
50
AMERICAN NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT OF OHIC
Ralph J. Perk, President
207 Statler Office Bldg.
1127 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, Ohio 4411
Semper
(216)861-550
Fidelis
Albanian
Page 2
May 10, 1986
Bulgarian
Byelorussian
We offer our help to any appropriate international organization
directly responsible to supply medical and other badly needed assistance.
Croatian
Cuban
We urge our President to appeal to the Soviet leadership not to use
Czech
political prisoners to clean-up contaminated areas.
Estonian
Respectfully submitted by:
German
Greek
Hungarian
Indian
the Hon
Ralph J. Perk, President
Irish
American Nationalities Movement of Ohio
Italian
Lebanese
Latvian
Lithuanian
Dr. President
Polish
William William Liscynesky, Lis yurky
United Ukrainian Organization of
Puerto Rican
Greater Cleveland
Rumanian
Russin
Serbian
Slovak
John John Rakovich, Rekenst President
Slovenian
Byelorussian Community of Greater
Cleveland
Ukrainian
Vietnamese