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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Chronological Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Matlock Chron September 1986 (1)
Box: 17
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/19/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1986 (1/9)
FOIA
F06-114/5
Box Number
17
YARHI-MILO
1708
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8506 PAPER
MR GORBACHEV---A KENNEDY IN THE
19 5/20/1986 B1
KREMLIN? BY JOHN BROWNE (MEMBER OF
PARLIAMENT FOR WINCHESTER,
ENGLAND)
R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5
8507 PAPER
POST SCRIPT BY JOHN BROWNE (MEMBER
1 7/2/1985 B1
OF PARLIAMENT FOR WINCHESTER,
ENGLAND)
R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5
8508 PAPER
GORBACHEV-THE MAN, HIS SUCCESSION
10
ND
B1
AND HIS POSSIBLE IMPACT ON EAST-WEST
RELATIONS BY JOHN BROWNE (MEMBER
OF PARLIAMENT FOR WINCHESTER,
ENGLAND)
R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5
8509 PAPER
REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT - GENEVA -
5 11/26/1985 B1
19/21 NOVEMBER, 1985
R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5
8501 E-MAIL
E-MAIL PROFS MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER
1 9/5/1986 B1
RE DANILOFF
R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5
8502 MEMO
DANIELOFF: THE "QUICK AND DIRTY"
5
ND
B1
B3
OPTION
PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/5
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/19/2005
File Folder
MATLOCK CHRON SEPTEMBER 1986 (1/9)
FOIA
F06-114/5
Box Number
17
YARHI-MILO
1708
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8503 MEMO
DRAFT NOTE RE USSR AND UN
3
ND
B1
R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5
8504 TALKING
DRAFT TALKING POINTS WHEN NOTE
1
ND
B1
POINTS
PRESENTED ON USSR AND UN
R 11/29/2007 NLRRF06-114/5
8505 TALKING
"LIAISON" MEETING IN VIENNA
2
ND
B1
B3
POINTS
APPROXIMATE TALKING POINTS
D
3/14/2011
F2006-114/5
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
This should go in
I
sept chron
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TIME STAMP
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT
6328
86 SEP 2 P7:19
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:
ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK
DUE:
8 SEP
Prepare Memo For President
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
Prepare Memo For Poindexter
Fortier / Keel
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan
Prepare Memo
to
CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*
PHONE* to action officer at V ext.
5112
FYI
FYI
FYI
Brooks
Laux
Ringdahl
Burghardt
Lavin
Ross
Burns
Lenczowski
Sable
Cannistraro
Levine
Sachs
Childress
Linhard
Saunders
X
Cobb
Mahley
X
Sestanovich
Danzansky
Major
Small
deGraffenreid
Mandel
Sommer
Dobriansky
Matlock
Soos
Donley
May
Stark
Douglass
Mingle
Steiner
Farrar
North
St Martin
Grimes
Perry
Tahir-Kheli
Hanley
Platt
Teicher
Kelly
Pugliaresi
Thompson
Kissell
Raymond
Tillman
Kraemer
Reger
INFORMATION
McDaniel
X
Pearson
Secretariat
X
Rodman
Cockell
Poindexter (advance)
Fortier (advance)
Keel (advance)
COMMENTS
Return to Secretariat
3
National Security Council
The White House
System #
Package #
6328
86 SFP 2 P7: 05
DOCLOG
A/O
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson
Rodney McDaniel
Don Fortier
Paul Thompson
Florence Gantt
John Poindexter
/
Rodney McDaniel
NSC Secretariat
2
Situation Room
MATLOCK 3
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC: VP Regan Buchanan
Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Shere were sent to the
President anything finan?
K
4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TIME STAMP
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT
6328
86 SEP 2 P7: 19
SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:
ACTION OFFICER: MATLOCK
DUE:
8 SEP
Prepare Memo For President
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
X
Prepare Memo For Poindexter
Fortier / Keel
Prepare Memo McDaniel to Dolan
Prepare Memo
to
5112
CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*
PHONE* to action officer at ext.
FYI
FYI
FYI
Brooks
Laux
Ringdahl
Burghardt
Lavin
Ross
Burns
Lenczowski
Sable
Cannistraro
Levine
Sachs
Childress
Linhard
Saunders
X
Cobb
Mahley
X
Sestanovich
Danzansky
Major
Small
deGraffenreid
Mandel
Sommer
Dobriansky
Matlock
Soos
Donley
May
Stark
Douglass
Mingle
Steiner
Farrar
North
St Martin
Grimes
Perry
Tahir-Kheli
Hanley
Platt
Teicher
Kelly
Pugliaresi
Thompson
Kissell
Raymond
Tillman
Kraemer
Reger
INFORMATION
McDaniel
X
Pearson
Secretariat
X
Rodman
Cockell
Poindexter (advance)
Fortier (advance)
Keel (advance)
COMMENTS
Return to Secretariat
5
20th May 1985
MR. GORBACHEV - A KENNEDY IN THE KREMLIN?
by John Browne (Member of Parliament for Winchester, England.)
Impressions of the Man, His Style and his Likely Impact Upon East
West Relations.
For decades, the Soviet Union has been ruled by expressionless
men who consciously hid behind a wall of secrecy. In March 1985,
it appears this image was put aside. A new type of leader was
selected - a leader who, whilst not tall, is, nonetheless
physically imposing a man with a penetrating stare and yet a
ready smile who exudes confidence and an inner strength. This
man is Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev, whose signature surmounts the
photograph (seen above) of him standing at Lenins desk in
Clerkenwell, London in December 1984. He represents a new
generation of Soviet leaders. He brings with him a new
combination of deep loyalty to the Communist party and an
apparent executive ability. Although he is obviously a product
of the Soviet system, Mr. Gorbachev not only exudes self-
confidence, but also a distinctive charismatic style which may
prove to be of much advantage to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately,
what is of advantage to the Soviet Union may provide a greatly
increased challenge to the West. In order the better to
understand the new Soviet leadership it is necessary to speculate
as to how such a man was selected for top leadership within the
Communist party system and to assess what impact his leadership
may have upon East West relations.
In December 1984 Mr. Gorbachev, accompanied by his wife Raisa,
led a high powered delegation on a visit to Great Britain. During
their stay in London as guests of the English Parliament I was
invited not only to serve on the Reception Committee but also to
escort them on certain expeditions during their tour. This
included a visit to Lenin's publishing house in Clerkenwell, to
the British Museum and to the House of Commons. These tours
provided me with an unique opportunity to observe Mr. and Mrs.
Gorbachev at close quarters, to listen to their questions and to
observe their reactions to statements and events.
From this unusual exposure to the Gorbachevs, I made the personal
observation that Mr. Gorbachev's charisma was so striking that,
if permitted by the Communist Party system, Mr. and Mrs.
Gorbachev could well become the Soviet equivalent of the Jack and
Jacqueline Kennedy team. However, I was at pains to point out
that Mr. Gorbachev was a tough and dedicated Communist whose
actual policies would differ markedly from those of the late
President Kennedy. This was merely my own opinion but one that
was based none the less upon a relatively long, and an unusually
relaxed and diverse exposure to the Gorbachevs.
- 1 -
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EASO)
NLRR F06-114/5 *8506
BY as NARA DATE 11/09/07
It is obvious that, for a man to have climbed to the top of the
Communist party system by the age of 54, he must have worked
extremely hard using both his ambition and his exceptional
political competence and panache. Ambition and ability however
arouse feelings of jealousy and suspicion. These feelings are
particularly strong within the Soviet Communist system where
loyalty to party superiors, dogma and traditions is vital to
promotion. TO have been promoted so rapidly under these
circumstances, Mr. Gorbachev must have shown great patience and
loyalty to the party.
From observing Mr. Gorbachev's speeches, presentations and
responses to questions, it became evident that he is a thoroughly
polished, able and contemporary politician. He is in no way a
'peoples popular leader' propelled from the ranks of either the
agricultural or the military communities. He is one of the first
representatives of the generation of 'groomed' Soviet politicians
to enter the world stage.
Within the first few moments of meeting Mr. Gorbachev it becomes
clear that he is intelligent, alert and inquisitive. Not only is
he constantly posing questions but he also listens very carefully
and attentively to the answers. This quality has important
political implications in that people assume that anyone who is
genuinely interested in what they have to say is probably worthy
of their respect. These qualities, together with his controlled,
yet warm smile, make him attractive and indeed beguiling.
However, he can also be extremely tough when he makes use of his
voice, his piercing eyes and even his physical gestures to
emphasize a point.
I witnessed a vivid example of these two extremes of expression.
The instance occurred when I asked him why the Soviet Union
continued to encourage and finance terrorism in Latin America. He
responded, whilst hitting me repeatedly on the shoulder even
before the interpreter had translated my question. This gave me
the distinct impression that he probably understands English. He
asked me whether I would consider that the colonists who fought
in the American Revolutionary War were terrorists or freedom
fighters. His whole mannerism then changed abruptly when he then
tapped me softly on the wrist saying "but of course we are
totally opposed to individual terrorists such as those who killed
Dr. Morro in Italy."
Not only did the above example show his capacity for very
controlled but extreme ranges of expression but it also
illustrated his knowledge and use of western history. His
knowledge was further evidenced when he questioned the
demonstration that took place within the British Museum. In the
course of my explanation, I mentioned that in Britain we allowed
- 2 -
people a great deal of freedom. Mr. Gorbachev replied that "what
you are saying Mr. Browne and what is the truth are two entirely
different things. Even Lord Byron had to leave England because of
the lack of freedom". His curiosity and interest in history were
also displayed when he questioned a curator at the British Museum
concerning some Saxon coins that the Russians returned to Britain
in the 19th century. He was most anxious to determine whether or
not there had been trade links between the two countries in those
early Saxon times.
Mr. Gorbachev's curiosity throughout his visit seems to have two
implications: first, he is anxious to learn from the West that
which may be adapted to the Communist system, and second, he
never misses an opportunity to challenge evidence that is
presented to him. This latter quality is obviously of critical
importance to any leader because it will inspire increased
respect and loyalty amongst his subordinates and it will
reinforce his effectiveness as an administrator.
Apparently Mr. Gorbachev's incessant and open desire to grasp
new knowledge is unusual among Soviet leaders. High ranking
Communist officials normally avoid any indications of personal
ignorance in order to create an impression of omniscience. On the
other hand, Mr. Gorbachev's expression of genuine curiosity may
prove to be one of his most effective political tools. Not only
does this curiosity provide a constant flow of new information
in a society where information is severely censored, but it will
gain him greater support from both his superiors and
subordinates. Recently as part of a tour of Moscow, he was
scheduled to take tea in the apartment of an ordinary working
couple. On examination of the cup from which he was drinking, he
found it was of government issue and obviously planted by his
aides to give him a false impression of the improved living
standards of working people in Moscow. Apparently Mr. Gorbachev
left in a fury on discovering this deception. Such an incident
surely will have left an indelible sense of admiration upon the
couple and of respect upon his staff.
Not only does Mr. Gorbachev appear anxious to learn as much as
possible about the past, but he was also eager to learn about
current customs and procedures that presently exist in the West.
He made impromptu departures from the planned schedules firstly,
to visit St. Pauls Cathedral in preference to visiting the Marx
tomb and secondly, to look at the Prime Minister's official
residence at No. 10 Downing Street. These changes illustrated an
apparent wish by him to gain a strong, first hand and subjective
impression of Britain. This reinforced the impression I
had that Mr. Gorbachev wishes to grasp the essential tools for
success in the Western world and to select, adopt and integrate
them for use in the Soviet Union. This may prove to be a stark
- 3 -
and important contrast to the action of Tzar Peter the Great
who on returning from visits to the west, sought to impose on
the Russian people rather than to integrate customs that he
admired in the West.
Mr. Gorbachev appeared to be extremely sensitive to ideas that
conflicted with Communist principles and also references to any
potential weakness within the Soviet system. For instance, in
the British Museum when he was shown some ancient Egyptian tombs,
he displayed distinct discomfort when told that only the names of
those of noble birth were carved in stone. This elitest,
Egyptian custom was in sharp contrast to the Soviet communist
merit system. Mr. Gorbachev's visible discomfort might be
attributed to his origins as the son of a peasant farm worker in
Stavropol, from whence he rose, to the leadership of his country
by the age of 54. He achieved his present position by ascending
the extremely competitive ladder by virtue of his own personal
merit. A second instance of his sensitivity was apparent when in
response to one of his questions about seating in the House of
Commons, I mentioned that we had benches as opposed to
pre-assigned seats and even then, by packing the benches, there
was room for only about 500 of the 650 members. I also explained
that benches, as opposed to pre-assigned seats, lent a certain
'dynamic' to the Chamber which was effectively "The Live Theatre
Of English Politics". He greeted this with incredulity. As an
example, I explained that he and Mrs. Gorbachev were standing in
front of the very interesting, front bench below the gangway on
the opposition side. I described how, when in opposition, it was
traditionally occupied by the left wing socialist members but
that, since the right wing of the Socialist party had split off
to form the Social Democratic Party, there were now physical
struggles to sit on the bench. I further explained that this
behaviour often appeared childish to the ill-informed onlooker
but that it represented, in theatre form, the acting out of the
dilemma that now faces Socialist voters in the country, whether
to side with the left or the right wing of their party. Mr.
Gorbachev was incensed that I should mention that the Socialists
had any political dilemma whatsoever, such as existed in the
early days of the Soviet Union between the Bolsheviks and
Mensheviks and is now expunged from their history books. He spun
round upon the rest of his delegation and said "what Mr. Browne
has just said illustrates vividly the complete hypocrisy of
British politics. They elect 650 members of the Parliament and
only allow half of them in!"
It is well known that the Soviet leadership is essentially
pragmatic. It was interesting to see the blatant manner in which
it was displayed during the first reception at Claridges Hotel.
Having been with the Gorbachevs throughout most of that first
day, I found myself being asked to help introduce other Members
of Parliament to them at the reception. The introductions went in
- 4 -
the usual manner for guests and for MPs. However, it was
9
interesting to note that when Socialist MPs were introduced they
often overrode the normal descriptions of "may I introduce Mr A,
who is the Member of Parliament for X". They usually insisted
upon saying, "I am the 'Socialist' Member for X". This was
apparently done to gain an 'inside track' to the Communist leader
and his wife. The Gorbachevs, who were moving independently
amongst the guests, positively ignored MPs who overrode the
introductions in such a manner and moved on to others. It may be
possible that this indicated an assessment by the Soviets that,
as a result of the recent general election and the current
opinion polls which showed the Socialist party at an historic
low, it was highly likely that the Conservative party would be in
power in Britain for the forseeable future. It was therefore
important to establish contacts with Conservatives rather than
Socialists.
Despite Mr. Gorbachev's apparent wish to show, on occasion, that
his delegation was very democratic and that he was merely the
first amongst equals, it was very evident that he exerted great
authority and that this was reflected in the way in which his
comrades treated him. During the question and answer period with
the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons, I
was seated next to a very amiable but tired Russian General on
the flank of the Soviet delegation. The General appeared hard
pushed to stay awake when he was summoned by an aide to go to Mr.
Gorbachev's chair. A few words in his ear and he came back
sweating and started to take copious notes! Obviously Mr.
Gorbachev is not a man who tolerates much bluffing or laziness
amongst his staff.
It was also impressive to see how Mr. Gorbachev fielded
unnotified questions from the members of the Foreign Affairs
Select Committee on such difficult subjects as the persecution of
Jews and Christians in the Soviet Union and upon Soviet policy in
Afghanistan and in the Middle East. It was widely reported, I
think wrongly, that Mr. Gorbachev had lost his 'cool'. Whilst it
is true that he raised his voice, he did not shout. It is true
that he snapped back at the questioners, but he was not
personally rude to them. It is also true that he evaded any real
answer, but he did this skillfully by throwing back upon the
questioner the onus on religious persecution etc. He did so by
quoting allegations of religious persecution in Northern Ireland.
In short, he answered the questions with a skill that would have
done credit to any accomplished Western politician. What was more
impressive was that he answered with such authority and
confidence - the confidence that can normally be attributed to a
position of preeminent power. It was this great degree of
confidence that led me to believe, at the time, that he was
- 5 -
possibly already in the position of preeminent, effective power
in the Soviet Union under the ailing Chernenko. It convinced me
that he was either certain to be selected or had indeed already
been selected as Chernenko's successor.
The London programme arranged for Mr. Gorbachev and his
delegation was intense, and would have placed heavy physical and
mental demands upon any delegation leader. Mr. Gorbachev
undertook his role as delegation leader with great enthusiasm,
typically talking so much during official meals that he managed
to eat very little. He was so hungry that apparently he had to
return to the Soviet Embassy for supplementary meals. It was
most impressive to see how well he coped both physically and
mentally. Whilst his physique appears to be robust, he could also
be fairly described as mentally very tough and agile.
In addition to the obvious physical and mental toughness which
was exemplified during his visit to London, I sensed that he
possessed an inner strength based upon conviction, control and
confidence. In this respect I agree with Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher's remark that she feels she could do business with Mr.
Gorbachev.
The Communist system tends to discourage individuality,
creativity and flexibility. I believe that Mr. Gorbachev's inner
strength will allow him a good chance of exercising a degree of
these attributes that are most unusual in the Soviet Union. For
since the death of Stalin, with the possible exception of Mr.
Kruschev, such qualities have appeared to be singúlarly absent in
the Soviet leadership.
Balancing Mr. Gorbachev's toughness and pragmatism, I detected a
distinctly human side to his character. It is this human element
in a leader's character that is often so important in
contributing to that elusive quality of charisma. The leader
appears so human and yet, in himself, is different.
The above photograph depicts Mr. Gorbachev standing, with his
wife in the background, at Lenin's desk in his old publishing
house at Clerkenwell in London. It was from this desk that much
of the very earliest of Communist thought emanated. As one of
the very few people able to squeeze in to this tiny office I was
most interested to see how deeply moved was Mr. Gorbachev, the
potential leader of the Communist world, when standing at Lenin's
desk.
It was also interesting to note how very affected and embarrassed
he was by the demonstration of three students in one of the rooms
at the British Museum. They rushed up to about 12 feet of Mr.
Gorbachev and his delegation shouting words to the effect that he
was a killer and a murderer. Mr. Gorbachev's blush stretched
even down the back of his kneck and he appeared deeply shocked.
- 6 -
Despite some tense moments, it was obvious to me that Mr.
Gorbachev has a keen and subtle sense of humour. A number of
examples have been quoted in the press. The one which most
amused me was in the Saxon Department of the British Museum. The
Curator had just finished describing the greatness of King
Alfred. He ended by saying that "the problem is that the average
English school boy only remembers one thing about the great King
Alfred and that is that he burnt the cakes." As quick as a flash
Mr. Gorbachev replied, "Well, you did not have to do much to
become famous in those days".
From the above I determined that Mr. Gorbachev is a very
considerable character and personality. The fact that these
qualities have shone through, from within the strict stereotype
Communist party system is all the more remarkable.
The popular western image of the wives of Soviet leaders is that
they are large, bland and uninvolved in their husbands' careers.
Mr. Gorbachev's wife Raisa proved to be the antitheses of this
popular image. She is extremely well educated, having a PhD,
and is alert and attractive. In fact, by Soviet standards I
believe she could justly be termed chic. I found her extremely
intelligent, and well poised. She also has a keen sense of
humour. When the Curator of the Egyptian department at the
British Museum apologised for the fact that their route was
taking them backwards through time, she interjected "Well you can
only travel backwards in time in a museum. What was most
interesting and particularly apparent during Mr. Gorbachev's
meeting with the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. was that Mrs.
Gorbachev appeared deeply interested and aware of what was going
on. I believe that she takes a keen interest in her husband's
career and, I was given the impression, an active interest in his
dress. Figuratively speaking, she stands beside rather then
behind him. In short, she is a very professional politician's
wife and together they make a most formidable and impressive
political team.
It is also interesting to note that the Gorbachev's appear to
take an interest in the arts, attending the ballet as private
citizens. Mr. Gorbachev also remarked that the performance he saw
of Cosi fan Tutte was an example of Mozart at his best. It is
possible that this interest in the arts appeals to the
intelligentsia within the Soviet Union, a section of society
which, since 1917, has been almost totally opposed to the Soviet
leadership. It is therefore possible that Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev
may provide the political bridge of influence between the Soviet
leadership and the Soviet intelligentsia. In time, this could
provide a very useful political ally for him if properly managed.
- 7 -
As I have said earlier, Mr. Gorbachev is no liberal he is a
dedicated Communist and a product of the Communist school to
which he must have deep rooted loyalties. However, unlike all of
his predecessors, except for Kruschev and Stalin, Mr. Gorbachev
has, in my opinion, charisma - western style charisma, and an
ability and willingness to use the western media, particularly
television.
In evaluating the characteristics of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev it is
hard to imagine what additional public qualities were possessed
by President Jack and Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy. I believe it is
entirely reasonable to think that Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev, if they
are permitted to do so by the party system, could well become
the Soviet equivalent of the Kennedy team and, as such, they will
make a major impact upon the world. The advent of a charismatic
leader in Moscow could have a very beneficial effect upon the
Soviet Union. Equally it could have the effect of greatly
increasing the challenge to western leaders. Notwithstanding the
advantages that may accrue, it does seem strange that the
inherently conservative Communist party elite or Nomenklatura,
would have chosen Mr. Gorbachev as party secretary.
Exactly how the Soviet leader is chosen is known probably to only
very few people even within the Soviet Union. It appears that a
mere handful of senior members of the Politburo, and possibly on
occasion the outgoing leader, nominate a successor who has to be
not only acceptable to the majority power structure within the
Politburo but also to the Soviet elite or Nomenklatura.
It is well known that the Soviet Nomenklatura was created by
Stalin to run the Union of Soviet Republics in place of the
Russian Tzarist aristocracy and Civil Service whom Stalin had
largely liquidated. In return for their loyalty this elite were
given great privileges including special shops etc. To ensure
further their undivided loyalty, Stalin subjected them to part of
his Terror. Members of the Nomenklatura who remember Stalin's
Terror have a strong distrust and fear of any leader possessing
too much individual charisma and therefore power outside the
Communist party machine. It is interesting to note, in passing,
that when Mr. Kruschev began to develop his own brand of
charisma, he was quickly ousted from office, possibly as a result
of this innate fear on the part of the Nomenklatura. The
Nomenklatura enjoy such relatively vast privileges that their
vested interest is in maintaining the status quo within the
Soviet system. Amongst the Nomenklatura are, of course, many of
the Soviet military and part of the status quo is the maintenance
of massive military spending which is sustained by the
maintenance of a constant fear of invasion. The Tartar invasion
which held Russia in subjection for about 250 years; Napolean's
invasion in 1812; and finally Hitler's invasion in the second
world war, lend serious historic weight to this argument.
- 8 -
In addition the Soviet military point to the apparent
/encirclement of Russia by western allies, from Canada and the
United States over the North Pole to NATO; to CENTO (now
dissolved) to SEATO (now dissolved) round to the United States
bases in the Far East. The Soviet elite is therefore conditioned
both by fear and by privilege, to support the status quo - a
status in which they individually have a vested interest. They
would naturally support the selection of a 'Committee man' as
leader and would be highly suspicious of an individualist,
particularly one with potential charisma. Furthermore, the very
senior members of the Nomenklatura, namely those in the
Politburo, have shown a tendency to choose leaders who are
faceless committee men and virtually indistinguishable from
themselves.
Why is it that the handful of top Politburo members, who probably
make the leadership decision, have chosen, as Party Secretary a
man so out of character with the leadership concept that must
obviously receive the support of the Soviet Nomenklatura upon
whom the entire Soviet Union depends? I believe it is because
the Soviet leaders, though cautious, are essentially pragmatic
and they see the Soviet Union facing a time of economic, social
and military crisis. They realise that their backs are to the
wall and that change is not only necessary but desirable if their
view of the Soviet Union and the life style of the bulk of the
Nomenklatura is to continue.
It is widely believed that the Soviet Union's economy is in a
stagnant condition. Both management and workers are desperately
under-motivated to produce effectively and profiteering is wide
spread. The Soviet military have shown a serious inability to
translate research and development on advanced technologies into
production and effective deployment. This is one of their
greatest concerns over President Reagan's proposed Strategic
Defence Initiative. Furthermore, the enormous proportion of
Soviet productive capacity that has been devoted to military use
has resulted in a serious and continuing shortfall in the
production of consumer products.
The Soviet leaders must also be concious of the fact that they
are fast falling behind in the essence of the technological
revolution - the race for the new generation of computers. This
race for computer technology is not only way beyond the wildest
dreams of the third world, but is increasing the difference in
the so-called developed world between first and second rate
technological powers. It is apparent that the United States and
Japan are successfully competing in this race and that the Soviet
Union may join Europe in the 'second world', rendering its
survival as a super power impossible. This aspect of computer
technology and the impact of any acceptance of personal
computers, has major implications for a totalitarian state in
which the control and censorship of information is a vital
- 9 -
ingredient to power. Just as the power of the Roman Catholic
Church in Europe was eroded by the advent of the printing press,
power of a totalitarian government, such as exists in the Soviet
Union, could be severely eroded by the acceptance of personal
computers which would enable large numbers of the population to
transmit and receive information that, by its very volume, made
it impracticable, if not impossible, to censor
Not only are the Soviet leaders faced by this technological
challenge from the relatively 'passive' United States, but they
are faced by another new economic challenge from the potentially
'aggressive' China on their south eastern border.
When I was in Hong Kong in October 1983, there was great
pessimism with the majority feeling it would be impossible for
Great Britain, under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, to
conclude a treaty with Communist China that would be acceptable
to the Hong Kong Chinese. In the event, this was achieved. Now,
the Chinese appear not to be extending Communism into Hong Kong
but, on the contrary, to be sucking capitalism into China.
Chairman Deng Xiaping appears to be conducting a revolution in
China equally as significant as that which occured in Russia in
1917. He is encouraging limited private ownership,
decentralisation, and capitalist profit incentives. Such a
change in party dogma must be an enormous challenge to any
Communist leader. However, Chairman Deng Xiaping has three major
advantages over the Soviets. Firstly, China is relatively closer
to its Communist revolution and is therefore able more easily to
rekindle a spirit of capitalist enterprise and even to welcome
home some of its emigres who are skilled and still of working
age. Secondly, the Chinaman is more hard working than the
Russian. Finally, Chairman Deng Xiaping can expect less
resistance from the Nomenklatura established by Ma o Tse-tung
because most of them were either liquidated or neutralised in the
cultural revolution.
The effects of Deng's reforms are already being felt. A new
'responsibility system' has been introduced in the rural areas
and private farming, (in plots of up to 150 acres), has been
introduced. Rural income has increased by more than 250% since
1978 and China recorded the worlds highest economic growth rate
in 1984.
New slogans such as "strive to be rich" have replaced old
favourites such as "better to have socialist weeds, than
capitalist seedlings".
The Soviet Union has to face the direct economic challenge now
posed by Communist China who already talks of having its own
space shuttle mounted on Arian©rockets. The Soviets also have to
- 10 -
face the fact that the new Chinese, capitalistic style economy
may prove abundantly successful in the eyes of the third world.
Such relative success could threaten the crucial influence of the
USSR in a strategic sense.
The Soviet leaders also have to face a society in which
corruption, laziness and drunkenness are reaching epidemic
proportions. At the same time, there is a serious groundswell of
public opinion demanding more consumer products in the shops. A
stagnant or shrinking real economy is placing even greater
strains upon the Soviet Union in its hopes of maintaining the
military balance and its status as a super power.
Reports emanating from Afghanistan speak of very large Soviet
casualties and defectors. Whilst this can be partially
discounted as exaggeration, there can be little doubt that it
must cause great concern to the Soviet leadership particularly
with their large Islamic population. Furthermore, with the
successful deployment by NATO of Cruise and Pershing missiles and
the advent of President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative,
the Soviets are faced with renewed demands for vast military
spending if they are to maintain the present military balance.
Not only is it unlikely that their economy can sustain such an
increase in expenditure but they must also realise their weakness
in computer technology and their relative inability to translate
advanced, computer based weapon systems from the research phase
to effective deployment.
This area of computer technology is one of critical importance to
modern weapon systems. Here it is interesting to note the
implications of wide ownership of personal computers. The
retention of power in a totalitarian state depends largely on the
comprehensive censorship and control of information. The wide
ownership of personal computers in a totalitarian state will tend
to weaken dramatically the power of the Government to control
information. This means that if the Soviets push forward with
computer technology to the extent that they allow wide use of
personal computers they will incur serious weaknesses in their
present power system.
Faced with this situation of internal crisis, I believe that the
top Soviet leaders felt that change was vitally necessary in the
Soviet Union if they were to remain a super power. Not only did
they have to choose a leader whom they trusted, but one with the
intellect both to see and to grasp the essential problems facing
the Soviet Union and with the ability to solve them. More
importantly, but involving the greatest risk, I believe they had
to choose a leader with the power to persuade the Soviet elite
not only of the necessity but of the desirability of change.
- 11 -
16
Born on 2nd March 1931 to a peasant family in the village of
Priolnoye in the Stavropol region of the northern caucasus, Mr.
Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev was evacuated between 1946 and 1950
when he worked at a machine tractor station near the Caspian Sea.
This job must have given him deep experience of the Soviet
economy at the 'grass roots' level. He then went on to study law
at Moscow State University and joined the Communist party in
1952. Following his graduation in 1955, he was made First
Secretary of the Stavropol City Komsomol (the Party youth
organisation). This is a most interesting date, being two years
after Stalin's death and one year prior to Kruschev's
denunciation of Stalin in 1956. It is therefore difficult to see
whether Mr. Gorbachev's early political views were strongly
Stalinist or more moderate. At 31 he studied for an agriculture
degree. At 35 he assumed responsibility for increasing farm
production in the Stavropol region, an area that benefited from
relatively fertile soil which enabled him to preside over high
yielding harvests at a time when Soviet agriculture as a whole
was suffering. At 39 he was appointed First Secretary to the
Stavropol regional committee. In 1978 he was sent to Moscow where
he was placed in charge of Soviet agriculture as Secretary of the
Central Committee. In this role he showed himself to be a
'political survivor' for although he presided over a series of
disastrous harvests, so bad that the government ceased printing
crop statistics, the failure was not attributed to him, but to
bad weather. Whilst Mr. Gorbachev was not in a position to
implement fundemental changes at that time, he was in a good
position to see and obviously had the intellect to understand the
processes that drove the agricultural 'machine' but which were
not succeeding. He must have seen the problems of collective
agriculture. He had a chance to see, at first hand, what needed
to be done to restore efficiency to Soviet Agriculture. In 1979
he was promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo and in
October 1980, when he was still less than 50, he became a full
member of the Politburo of which he was easily the youngest
member.
Some people argue, by pointing to his attempt to carry out
agrarian reforms during the US grain embargo, that he is
somewhat of a 'liberal' by Soviet standards. This is difficult
to substantiate.
Essentially Mr. Gorbachev is a product of the Communist party.
Obviously he knew his place and must have resisted any temptation
to undermine his elders. From past precedent, and in keeping
with many other political regimes, promotion does not come by
ability and loyalty alone. Patronage and luck are also vital
ingredients. Mr. Gorbachev's earliest and perhaps most important
patrons were perhaps Fyodor Kulakof and Mikhail Suslov. Like
Mr. Gorbachev, both these men had held the post of Party
- 12 -
Secretaryship in Stavropol. Stavropol is a resort. Mr Gorbachev
was therefore required to entertain and was able to impress many
senior Politburo members during their holiday visits to the area.
Mr. Gorbachev followed Mr. Kulakof directly both in Stavropol and
subsequently in Moscow. In 1978, Mr. Kulakof died unexpectedly
early. This stroke of luck catapulted Mr. Gorbachev forward. Mr.
Suslov, who evidently played a leading role in promoting Andropov
as Soviet leader was apparently a most important patron for Mr.
Gorbachev. For it was Mr. Suslov who was assigned to ensure the
continuance of the Marxist/Leninist ideological purity of the
Communist party. Apparently, as part of this job he recruited
young, ideological and loyal talent for the party which he
started to mould in his own style. When in Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev
evidently became friendly with Marshal Ustinov. Under the
leadership of Yuri Andropov (ex KGB Chief) he was promoted from
agriculture to a position of responsibility for the oversight of
the entire Soviet economy. (I believe that it is possible that Mr
Andropov may have nominated Mr Gorbachev as his successor but
that the pro-Gorbachev faction within the Politburo were not, at
the time of Andropov's death, a strong enough influence within
the Politburo to force through his wishes for succession. It is
possible that, in an effort to buy time in order to consolidate
further their position within the Politburo, the pro-Gorbachev
faction pushed for the selection of the dying Mr. Chernenko,
whose fatal illness was first exposed to the world by Dr. David
Owen, M.P. In the event, the ailing Mr. Chernenko increased his
responsibility still further and before Mr. Chernenko's death,
Mr. Gorbachev was seen often in the company of Mr. Gromyko from
whom he was assumed to be receiving information and advice.) I
believe that the pro-Gorbachev faction within the Politburo
succeeded in having him nominated and even unofficially selected
as Party Secretary, even before Mr. Chernenko's death. It is
possible and indeed probable that, at the time of Mr Gorbachev's
visit to London in December 1984, he was in fact 'Managing
Director' of the Soviet Union under the 'Chairmanship' of the
dying Mr. Chernenko.
In choosing a leader to divert the Soviet Union from impending
crisis, the top Soviet elite had to choose a man who was not only
able but politically and ideologically loyal. However, at the
same time he had to be an 'engine' for change because, however
unattractive it appeared, change was probably seen as vitally
necessary. The new leader therefore had to be able to
communicate and persuade the rest of the Nomenklatura of not only
the necessity, but also the desirability of change.
In choosing Mr. Gorbachev, I believe that the Soviet leaders took
a calculated risk. Mr. Gorbachev was not only able, energetic
and loyal but was a force for change and also potentially
charismatic which, in the political infighting of the Communist
Party system, must have already been obvious. He was also young
- 13 -
18
which meant that if they made a mistake it would remain with them
for a long time. It is for this reason that I believe they
withheld the other two key posts of Head of State and of
Chairmanship of the five man Defence Council.
Following Mr. Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984 and
the deteriorating health of Mr. Chernenko, speculation increased
that Mr. Gorbachev might be considered for selection as the next
Soviet leader. I said at a number of presentations, both in
America and in England, that I believed Mr. Gorbachev had already
been selected and was in fact the 'Managing Director' of the
Soviet Union under the 'Chairmanship' of the ailing Chernenko. I
gained this conviction not only from my personal assessment of
Mr. Gorbachev, which I have tried to explain above, and the
chronic need for some form of change in the Soviet Union's
political machine, but also from a number of indications that I
felt occured during Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev's pre-Christmas visit
to London.
It was strange that a visit of such an apparently high powered
Russian team would be carried out under the auspices of a
Parliamentary as opposed to a Government delegation. The Soviets
appeared to be unusually cautious as if to protect against the
slightest risk of failure. Secondly, unlike most parliamentary
delegations from the Communist block, where the 'real' leader is
normally ranked as either second or third, Mr. Gorbachev was very
definitely the leader of his delegation from the outset. The way
in which other members of his delegation treated him and reacted
to his wishes gave me the impression that he was extremely
important and in possession of very great power. The authority
with which he spoke and the confidence with which he answered
unprepared and potentially embarrassing questions from the
Foreign Affairs Select Committee and others, gave me the distinct
impression that here was a man who was no longer jockeying for
power but already had the reins in his hands. Finally, when
Marshal Ustinof died, the announcement was not made as is
customary, in Moscow by Pravda or Tass, but uniquely by Mr.
Gorbachev in Edinburgh. This appeared to indicate that he was
already in a position of top power and confirmed many of my
earlier observations during his visit to London.
Following Mr. Chernenko's death I was impressed by the somewhat
unusual speed and smoothness of the succession which again has
led me to believe that Mr. Gorbachev had been pre-selected. I
was further reinforced in this view by the fact that the Geneva
Arms talks were neither postponed for Chernenko's funeral not did
they change in character. Whilst the overall pattern of the
talks has not changed much from previous talks, in that both
super powers have, so far, circled around each other with no
major, serious, new proposals, I believe that the style of the
Soviet negotiating team has continued to reflect a style which is
- 14 -
distinctly of the Gorbachev ilk. This style is vastly different
to the Soviet approaches in the past where their negotiators
brushed past newsmen with poker faces and without comment. At
Geneva, Soviet negotiators not only posed for Western
photographers but spoke and joked with the pressmen - a
decidedly new style and one with appeal in the West.
At Mr. Chernenko's funeral, Mr. Gorbachev's speech was more than
a eulogy of his old comrade. It appeared to be a State of the
Union Message in which he told the Soviet people that they must
begin to get up and work and that there was no time to lose.
Indeed, it was reported that one Communist worker was somewhat
worried and asked whether the succession of Mr. Gorbachev meant
that workers would now have to work much harder. In the past few
months the Western news media has contained many stories of Mr.
Gorbachev and, indeed his family, including his daughter and
grand-daughter.
Based upon what I heard of remarks he made concerning his family
during his London visit, I felt that it would not be long before
his family were brought to the fore. This has now begun to
happen and represents a radical change from the excessively
discreet attitude previously taken by Soviet leaders with regard
to their families. I believe that Mr. Gorbachev's more open
manner will lend his popular image a humanist side which could
prove to be of importance in the increasing struggle for the
hearts and minds of not only the Third World but also amongst the
people of the industrialised democracies.
Since his succession, it appears that Mr. Gorbachev has not been
slow to move his own proteges into positions of power and so
start to consolidate a strong personal power base. Furthermore,
he has not been shy, indeed he has been unusually frank in his
comments upon corruption, drunkenness and laziness within the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the amount and type of coverage he
has been given in the Western news media since his succession
leads me to believe that the latent charisma I believe he has
will not remain unobserved for long.
I strongly believe that Mr. Gorbachev's charismatic leadership
style will have a major influence both inside and outside the
Soviet Union.
Within the Soviet Union he is likely to be the first leader to
succeed in persuading rather than forcing Soviet workers to work.
They are therefore likely to work more effectively. This should
have a dramatic effect upon the Soviet economy and upon the
ability of the USSR to sustain its role as a super power both in
terms of impressing and keeping the allegiance of large parts of
the third world and also in maintaining its military balance, or
- 15 -
should I say superiority, with the West. In addition, it will
fall to Mr. Gorbachev to persuade the bulk of the Soviet
Nomenklatura, in which the military is well represented, not only
of the necessity but also the benefit and indeed urgency of the
need to accept at least some important economic changes. From
this we are likely to see increased flexibility not only in
trade but in military and political negotiations. It is unlikely
to reflect any weakness in the Soviet position or indeed any
change in their ultimate goals, but it will represent increased
opportunities for western traders and politicians to do business
with the Soviet block. For instance it is probable that major
opportunities will exist in the fields of trade and project
financing, even including major financings in the Western capital
markets.
Mr. Gorbachev is likely to prove to be the first Soviet leader
with the ability to use the Western media to talk over the heads
of western negotiators or politicians directly to western grass
roots. This will be effectively a 'one way street' because
western leaders will not be given the same access to the Soviet
media to talk in the reverse direction to grass roots in the
Communist block. By virtue of television in particular, he is
likely to provide external leadership and inspiration for such
movements as the CND, Anti-nuclear Movement and also to many
surreptitious and anti-democratic forces which the western
democracies not only harbour but with which they have to contend
internally.
Furthermore, Mr. Gorbachev is likely to use his very considerable
powers of personal persuasion directly upon western leaders. He
is likely to exploit even the smallest splits and differences of
opinion that may occur within the western alliance over such
issues as the SDI programme, the transfer of high technology in
the fields of trade and the political implications of harbouring
American military hardwear or bases etc.
It is interesting, when considering the East-West power struggle,
to compare the fundamental strengths and weaknesses of the
totalitarian states, such as the Soviet Union, and the
democracies, such as the United States. The totalitarian state's
strength is in its ability to sustain armed conflict when no
direct threat to the home country exists. Its greatest weakness
is its inability to generate enormous economic wealth. The great
strength of a democracy, such as the United States, is its
ability to generate enormous economic wealth. Its weakness
especially since Vietnam, is its inability to conduct sustained
military operations in defence of freedom and other democracies
when there is no apparent threat to the mainland of the United
States. We should learn that lesson and always be conscious of
it. It is always much better for us to use our economic power in
preference to risking being placed in an inherently weak position
where we have to use our short-term military power.
- 16 -
It is most unlikely that Soviet goals will change under Mr.
Gorbachev, but Soviet style has and I believe will, continue to
change. Out will go the brutish Russian Bear and in will come
the new image of the Soviet Union - responsible, reasonable and
reassuring. (In sighting the contrary view some people point to
the recent shooting of US Army Major Nicholson by a Russian
sentry. Personally, I believe that this incident was an error
similar to the downing of KAL flight 007 in 1983 which caused
great embarrasement to the Soviet hierarchy.) The Soviet's dirty
work will. increasingly be done by surrogate states such as North
Vietnam, Cuba, East Germany, etc. Speaking figuratively I feel
that whilst the hammer will be kept available, it will be
replaced by the sharpened sickle. However, the back drop will
remain the same - red, blood red, Soviet red. We in the West
must never forget it.
Whilst his public posture may appear attractive and similar to
that of the late President Kennedy, there is no way that his
active, political posture will be seen or felt as liberal.
I have never intimated that Mr. Gorbachev's policies would be
liberal or indeed anything like those of the late President
Kennedy. However, when I consider the physical, mental and
personal attributes of both Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev, I wonder,
what additional public attributes were possessed by President and
Mrs. Kennedy. When I look at the impact Mr. Gorbachev has
already had in the West, and the ability he continues to show in
exploiting the western media, I become increasingly convinced
that my initial impression was correct. For instance, have we
ever seen a Soviet leader conduct a 'walk about' within the
Soviet Union? How often have the photographs of the wife, let
alone the daughters or grand-daughters, of Soviet leaders
appeared in the Western media? If and when Mr. Gorbachev speaks
at the United Nations in the autumn of 1985, I feel that the full
effect of what I am trying to communicate will become
increasingly apparent. Many people, particularly in the United
States, will then see for themselves that Mr. Gorbachev truly has
western style charisma. As time passes, they will see that, in
addition to ability, appeal and decisiveness, he has a type of
inner strength that will make him a formidable foe. This may be
good for the Communist block but it spells danger for the West.
For Mr. Gorbachev has, I believe, great potential power to
beguile and lull western leaders and grass roots opinion. He has
the ability to talk billions of dollars off the defence budgets
of the Western allies.
Last month I had the great privilege of meeting President
Reagan. In the near future, it is possible that both President
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev will join in a super power summit
meeting. The vast majority of us will hope for some substantial
achievement to arise from such a meeting. In reality a serious
- 17 -
achievement is unlikely and the main battle between the leaders
will be one of words to establish a personal leadership
credibility in the hearts and minds of the world.
In anticipation of a possible summit in which personality will
play possibly a critical role, it is interesting to compare the
two leaders. In my opinion, both men are physically impressive,
Mr Gorbachev for the reasons given earlier. President Reagan
gave me the impression of being larger than I had expected from
having seen him previously both on television and from seeing him
at a distance such as when he spoke to the English Parliament.
He is also strikingly fit for his age, particularly when one
consdiers that not long ago he was the subject of an assassins
bullet.
Both men appear to have a sense of inner strength. In my opinion
President Reagan's strength seems to be based, like Margaret
Thatcher's, upon a genuine conviction in the rightness of his
cause. Mr. Gorbachev's strength appears to me to be based upon a
great confidence in his own ability and past track record.
Both men are outstandingly good communicators. However, Mr.
Gorbachev is new and that in itself is newsworthy.
Both men have great charm. President Reagan's charm is quite
remarkable and appears to be perfectly genuine and come from the
heart. Mr. Gorbachev's charm, on the other hand, appears to come
from the head and is very controlled and calculated.
This latter point may appear to some readers to be frivolous.
However it probably forms a very significant part of that elusive
quality known as charisma and certainly can play a very crucial
role in the image produced on world wide television in the battle
for hearts and minds. I believe that President Reagan should be
alert, during the televised portion of any summit meeting, to the
risk that Mr. Gorbachev might lull him into a situation where
both leaders appear to be charming and engaging in 'bonhomie' in
front of the cameras. In such an instance, Mr. Gorbachev's
control and sharpness could prove devastating by apparently wrong
footing the American President and so reducing his credibility.
I also feel that the location of any summit meeting is important.
The American press is usually more supportive of their President
when he is abroad. My advice to the President is that if he
should agree to a summit, then it should be held on neutral
territory, outside the United States.
In conclusion, I believe that Mr. Gorbachev does represent the
potential equivalent of a Kennedy in the Kremlin. I feel that,
despite the powerful strictures of the Communist Party system, he
could have a major impact upon Soviet politics. Many will
- 18 -
23
disagree with this statement upon which only history can be the
true judge. However, if I am right, we in the west have reason
to alert ourselves. Mr. Gorbachev may remain in the Kremlin for
a long time, possibly greatly increasing his power. He is likely
to present the West with a set of new and more complex challenges
which we must meet with increasing imagination, unity and
fortitude. For instance, the battle for the hearts and minds in
the non-aligned world and also for grass roots opinion within the
western democracies, is likley to be stepped up in new and more
subtle ways. The choice and conduct of any super power summit is
likely to be of crucial importance.
Politicians of western democracies are likely to face an
increasingly sophisticated political challenge from Mr. Gorbachev
both at home and abroad.
POST SCRIPT - - 2nd July, 1985
24
The announcement today of the election of Mr. Andrei Gromyko to
the Presidency of the Soviet Union is most interesting. In my
main article (attached) I had pointed to the fact that Mr.
Gorbachev had not been appointed either to the post of Soviet
President or as Chairman of the powerful Defence Committee and
that the nominations for these two positions would be of great
importance in analysing Mr. Gorbachev's initial success.
I think that Mr. Gromyko will be widely accepted as an
international statesman with long experience and knowledge of
international affairs. I believe that his appointment will lend
stature to the Presidency of the Soviet Union and that he will
continue to take an active interest in foreign affairs. It should
also be remembered that Mr. Gromyko is believed to be a strong
supporter of Mr. Gorbachev as is his replacement as Foreign
Minister, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze. When these appointments are
taken together with yesterday's removal of Mr. Gorbachev's main
contender, Mr. Grigory Romanov, I believe one can see further
strengthening of Mr. Gorbachev's power base at senior levels
within the Soviet Union.
Personally, I believe there is a subtle element to the
strengthening of Mr. Gorbachev's power in that he has held
himself back from the appointment to the figurehead position of
President and so, whilst increasing his own power he appears to
be modest, thus reducing potential antagonism and jealousy.
Evidently the 57 year old Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze is a man in the
Gorbachev mold: energetic and gregarious with a career pattern
that is very similar to that of Mr. Gorbachev. His position as
Georgian Communist Party leader illustrates his party loyalty.
I believe that the appointment of Mr. Gromyko and Mr.
Shevardnadze will not only increase further Mr. Gorbachev's
personal power base but that it represents evidence of the
continuing thrust for a 'new style' of Soviet foreign policy in
which the Soviet Union will appear to be increasingly
responsible, reasonable and reassuring, whilst their strategic
goals remain unchanged. It is possible that Soviet foreign policy
will appear to be more concentrated upon Soviet block affairs
rather than on an aggressive world-wide strategy. I feel that
Mr. Shevardnadze will represent this fresh and potentially
beguiling style of Soviet policy whilst Mr. Gromyko maintains the
overall strategic goals from his position as President.
Finally, I was very pleased to see that the United States -
Soviet summit meeting proposed for 19th/21st November, 1985 will
take place, as I had hoped, outside the United States in a
neutral country, i.e. Geneva. I believe that this will be to the
advantage of the United States President.
JOHN BROWNE
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 806-114/5 48507
BY Ca NARA DATE 11/29/07
From: John Browne MP (Winchester)
JUNE 1985
GORBACHEV the Man, his Succession and his Possible Impact on
East - West Relations
For decades the Soviet Union has been ruled by expressionless
men who hid behind a wall of secrecy. In March of 1985, this
image was put aside. A new type of leader was elected. A
leader who while not physically outstanding is none the less
imposing. A man with a penetrating stare and equally ready
smile who exudes confidence and inner strength. This man
is Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev.
In December 1984 I was privileged to be a member of the
delegation that received Mr and Mrs Gorbachev on their visit to
London. In addition, probably because I knew so little that I
could give nothing away to the KGB, I was asked to escort Mr
and Mrs Gorbachev on their visit to London; Lenin's Museum at
Clerkenwell, to the British Museum and to show them around the
House of Commons. These lengthy excursions gave me the
opportunity of a most interesting insight into the Gorbachevs
in relatively relaxed surroundings.
I have entitled this article "Gorbachev - the Man, his
Succession and his Possible Impact on East-West Relations". I
intend to discuss Mr Gorbachev's succession and outline his
main characteristics as they appear to me. I will then try to
show how I believe he will affect the international political
scene and particularly how he could affect the East-West
dialogue. I would also like to remind you of three main
background factors within the Soviet Union which are pertinent
to the reasons behind and significance of Mr Gorbachev's
selection as Soviet leader. I refer to the Soviet economy, the
three main challenges facing the Soviet Union, and to the
Soviet Elite or Nomenklatura.
SOVIET UNION BACKGROUND FACTORS
The Soviet economy is stagnant. There is a serious lack of
motivation among both management and the workforce. There is
also a very serious lack of administration and technological
skill which is made all the worse by the enormous, inefficient
and energy sapping bureaucracy that is typical not only of the
Soviet Union, but of all Communist regimes. Soviet central
planners have used their energies to boost old-fashioned heavy
light industry and high technology. This results in the Soviet
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Union, while having a very significant ability in various
fields of research, having a serious inability to translate the
results of this research particularly in the area of high
technology.
A modern economy depends not only upon a flexible management
style and a high level of technological education, but also
upon an application of computers. The production of such
computers is beyond the wildest dreams of the Third World and
is the key to progress in the technological revolution. While
Japan can be considered the leader in the field of robotics,
the United States still maintains a convincing lead in computer
technology. The United States and Japan can be considered in
the first rank of computer technology. Europe can be considered
in the second rank while, in many fields, the Soviet Union is
behind much of Europe. The economic implications of such a
position mean that the Soviet Union will find it increasingly
difficult to maintain the expenditure obligations of a
Super-Power.
The three main challenges facing the Soviet Union are from
the United States, China and from domestic sources.
Obviously the United States stands as a a challenge to the
Soviet Union on all fronts. However, two main areas of
contention now stand out. The first is President Reagan's
Strategic Defence Initiative or 'Star Wars'. The bill for
merely the phase I research into the system is 26 billion
dollars. In addition to conventional and nuclear weaponry, a
Super-Power now has to compete in the field of space weapons.
The entry ticket for this new competition is 26 billion
dollars. This figure represents a large financial burden, even
for the United States. For the Soviet Union, with a stagnant
economy, it is a burden that will provide very serious economic
and political strain. As a result of the great disparity in
the ability to generate real wealth in the United States and
the Soviet Union, large military budgets have meant that the
Soviet people have been starved of consumer products. Because
of the scarcity of consumer goods, the Soviet people, even with
their relatively meagre earnings, have accrued considerable
savings, and there is now great pressure upon the Government to
provide consumer products in the shops. With greatly increased
travel and contact with the Western world, this demand has
serious political implications for the Communist Party. In
addition, the pressing need of the Soviet Union to drive for
greater computer technology has a worrying political aspect,
for the impact of any acceptance of personal computers has
major implications for a totalitarian state in which the
control and censorship of information is a vital ingredient of
power. Just as the power of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe
was eroded by the advent of the printing press, the power of a
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totalitarian government such as that which exists in the Soviet
Union, could be severely eroded by the acceptance of personal
computers which will enable large numbers of the population to
transmit and receive information that by its very volume is
impracticable if not impossible to censor.
As if the prodigious financial cost were not enough of a
problem, the SDI presents the Soviets with an even greater
challenge. For in the laser or the first defensive layer of the
SDI, target rockets have to be located and hit within ten
seconds of their launch. In order for such fantastic speed to
be achieved, computer systems of the most sophisticated
capability and speed are essential. The Soviet leaders must
know that their own computer power is years behind that of the
United States and the gap is increasing rather than decreasing.
In my opinion, the SDI has presented the Soviet Union with a
challenge that it cannot effectively meet. Indeed, when their
delegation visited London in December 1984, I sensed that they
were desperate to negotiate either the curtailment or halting
of the SDI.
Not only are the Soviet leaders faced by this technological
challenge from the relatively 'passive' United States, but they
are faced by another new economic challenge from the
potentially 'aggressive' China on their south eastern border.
When I was in Hong Kong in October 1983, there was great
pessimism, with the majority feeling it would be impossible for
Great Britain to conclude a treaty with Communist China that
would be acceptable to the Hong Kong Chinese. In the event,
this was not the case. The Chinese appear not to be extending
Communism into Hong Kong, but rather to be sucking capitalism
back into China. Chairman Deng Xiaping appears to be
conducting a revolution in China equally as significant as that
which occurred in Russia in 1917. He is encouraging limited
private ownership, decentralisation, and capitalist profit
incentives. Such a change in party dogma must be an enormous
challenge to any Communist leader, particularly with regard to
differentials, vested interests and corruption. However,
Chairman Deng Xiaping has several major advantages over the
Soviets. First, China is relatively closer to its Communist
revolution and is therefore able to more easily to rekindle a
spirit of capitalist enterprise and even to welcome home some
of its former emigres who are skilled and still of working age.
Second, Chairman Den Xiaping can expect less resistance from
the Communist elite established by Mao Tse-tung because most of
them were either liquidated or neutralised in the cultural
revolution.
The effects of Deng's reforms are already being felt. New
slogans such as "strive to be rich" have replaced old
favourites such as "better to have socialist weeds, than
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capitalist seedlings." A new 'responsibility system' has been
introduced in rural areas, and private farming (in plots of up
to 150 acres) has been introduced. Rural income has increased
by more than 250% since 1978 and China recorded the world's
highest economic growth rate in 1984. The Soviet Union now has
to face the direct economic challenge posed by Communist China
which already talks of having its own space shuttle mounted on
Arian rockets. The Soviets also have to face the fact that the
new Chinese, capitalistic style economy may prove abundantly
successful in the eyes of the Third World. Such relative
success could threaten the crucial influence of the USSR in a
strategic sense.
The Soviet Elite number some 3 million persons and are
drawn from all sectors of the community including the military.
As is well known this Elite or Nomenklatura was created by
Stalin to run the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in place
of the Russian Tzarist aristocracy and Civil Service which
Stalin had effectively liquidated. In return for their loyalty
this Elite was given great privileges including special shops
etc. To further ensure their undivided loyalty, Stalin
subjected them to his 'Terror'. Members of the Nomenklatura
who remember Stalin's Terror have a strong distrust and fear of
any leader possessing too much individual charisma and
therefore personal power outside the Communist Party machine.
It is interesting to note that when Mr Kruschev began to
develop his own brand of charisma he was quickly ousted from
office, possibly as a result of this innate fear of too much
power on the part of the Nomenklatura. The Nomenklatura enjoy
such relatively vast privileges under the present system that
they have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
Among the Nomenklatura are of course many of the Soviet
military, and much of their interest is in the maintenance of
massive military spending which is in turn sustained by a
constant fear of invasion. The Tartar invasion which held
Russia in subjection for hundreds of years; Napoleon's invasion
in 1812; and Hitler's invasion in the Second World War, lend
serious historic weight to the argument for massive military
spending.
In support of their continued push for large defence budgets,
the Soviet military can point to the apparent encirclement of
Russia by Western Allies; from Canada and the United States
over the North Pole to NATO across Europe; round to the United
States bases in the Far East. The Soviet Elite is therefore
conditioned both by fear and privilege to support the status
quo. They would naturally support the selection of a 'Committee
man' as leader and would be highly suspicious of an
individualist, particularly one with potential charisma.
Furthermore, the very senior members of the Nomenklatura,
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namely those in the Politburo, have shown a tendency to choose
leaders who are faceless committee men and virtually
indistinguishable from themselves in that they lack any
charisma and support the status quo.
WHY MR GORBACHEV?
As we have seen, the Soviet Elite have a vested interest in
preserving the status quo and a strong fear of any leader
possessing too much personal charisma. Why is it then that the
few top Politburo members who make the leadership decision,
have chosen as Party Secretary a man so out of character with
the concept of leadership that must receive the support of the
Soviet Nomenklatura? I believe it is because the Soviet
leaders though cautious are essentially pragmatic and that they
see the Soviet Union facing a time of economic, social and
military crisis. They now realise that their backs are to the
wall and as a result of the influence of far sighted people
such as Fyodor Kulakof and Mikhail Suslov, they are forced
increasingly to accept that change is not only necessary but
desirable if their view of the Soviet Union and the life style
of the Nomeklatura is to continue.
For change to be acceptable within the Soviet Union it will
have to be change in a Communist way. To execute such a change
successfully the Communist leader must have the intelligence to
see what are the real problems facing the Soviet Union. He
must have the ability to adapt the essentials for success from
the Capitalist System and 'sell' them to the Soviet people as
Communism. He will also need suficient power of charisma to
persuade the Nomenklatura of the necessity for change. He will
also need time.
I believe that all these qualities are possessed by Mr
Gorbachev. Exactly how the Soviet leader is chosen is known to
only a very few people even within the Soviet Union. It
appears that a mere handful of senior members of the Politburo
and on occasion the outgoing leader, nominate a successor who
has to be not only acceptable to the majority power structure
within the Politburo but also to the Soviet Elite. It is
probable that even before Mr Chernenko was selected as Soviet
leader, Mr Andropov may have nominated Mr Gorbachev as his
successor but that the pro-Gorbachev faction within the
Politburo were not, at the time of Andropov's death, a strong
enough influence within the Politburo to force through
Andropov's wishes for succession. It is likely that, in an
effort to buy time in order to consolidate their position
within the Politburo, the pro-Gorbachev faction pushed for the
selection of the dying Mr Chernenko, whose fatal illness
precluded a long term of office. In the event, the ailing Mr
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Chernenko increased Mr Gorbachov's responsibility still
further. Before Mr Chernenko's death, Mr Gorbachev was seen
often in the company of Mr Gromyko from whom he was assumed to
be receiving information and advice. I feel that the
pro-Gorbachev faction within the Politburo succeeded in having
him nominated and even unofficially selected as Party Secretary
before Mr Chernenko's death. It is possible and indeed
probable that at the time of Mr Gorbachev's visit to London in
December 1984, he was in actuality 'Managing Director' of the
Soviet Union under the 'Chairmanship' of the dying Mr
Chernenko.
In choosing a leader to divert the Soviet Union from impending
crisis, the top Soviet Elite had to nominate a man who was not
only able to do this, but politically and ideologically loyal
to the Party. At the same time he had to be an 'engine' for
change because however unattractive it appeared, change was
probably seen as vitally necessary. The new leader therefore
had to be able to communicate and persuade the rest of the
Nomenklatura of not only the necessity, but also the
desirability of change. When they chose Mr Gorbachev, the
Soviet leaders took a calculated risk. Mr Gorbachev was not
only able, energetic and loyal but was also a force for change
and potentially charismatic, which in the political infighting
of the Communist Party system, must have been readily obvious.
He was also young, which meant that if they made a mistake it
would remain with them for a long time.
Following Mr Gorbachev's visit to London in December 1984 and
the deteriorating health of Mr Chernenko, speculation increased
as to the consideration of Mr Gorbachev for selection as the
next Soviet leader. I felt that Mr Gorbachev had already been
selected and was, in fact, the 'Managing Director' of the
Soviet Union under the 'Chairmanship' of the ailing Chernenko.
I gained this conviction not only from my personal assessment
of Mr Gorbachev, and the chronic need for some form of change
in the Soviet Union's political machine, but also from a number
of indications that I felt occurred during Mr and Mrs
Gorbachev's pre-Christmas visit to London.
It was strange that the visit of such a high powered Russian
team would be carried out under the auspices of a
Parliamentary, as opposed to a Government delegation. The
Soviets appeared to be unusually cautious so as to protect
against the slightest risk of failure. In addition, unlike
most parliamentary delegations from the Communist block where
the 'real' leader is normally ranked as either second or third,
Mr Gorbachev was very definitely the leader of his delegation
from the outset. The way in which other members of his
delegation treated him and reacted to his wishes gave the
impression that he was extremely important and in possession of
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very great power. It was interesting to note the self-assured
way in which he made impromptu departures from the planned
schedules; first to visit a christian building, St Pauls
Cathedral, instead of visiting the tomb of Karl Marx and later
to look at the Prime Minister's official residence at 10
Downing Street. Furthermore I was impressed by the authority
with which he spoke and the confidence with which he answered
unprepared and potentially embarrassing questions from the
Foreign Affairs Select Committee and others. This gave the
distinct impression that here was a man who was no longer
jockeying for power but already had the reins in his hands.
Finally, when Marshal Ustinof died, the announcement was not
made as is customary, in Moscow by Pravda or Tass, but uniquely
by Mr Gorbachev in Edinburgh. Following Mr Chernenko's death,
the somewhat unusual speed and smoothness of the succession led
me to believe that Mr Gorbachev had been pre-selected. I was
further reinforced in this view by the fact that Geneva Arms
talks were neither postponed for Chernenko's funeral nor did
they change in style - a new style in which Soviet delegates
rather than shun publicity, talked and joked with the press.
MR GORBACHEV - THE MAN
Mr Gorbachev is essentially a product of the Communist Party.
It is obvious that for a man to have climbed to the top of the
Communist Party system by the age of 54, he must have worked
extremely hard, using both his ambition and his exceptional
political competence and panache. Ambition and ability however
arouse feelings of jealousy and suspicion, especially within
the Soviet system where loyalty to party superiors, dogma and
tradition is vital to promotion. To have been promoted so
rapidly under these circumstances, Mr Gorbachev must have shown
great patience and loyalty to the Party.
In a strange way, he appears to be physically impressive to the
observer. He has a deep voice which he uses not only
authoratively but also in a very soft and charming manner. He
has strong brown eyes with a deep penetrating stare and a ready
smile. However his smile is very controlled. He is tough both
physically and mentally with a strong sense of self-confidence,
presumably based upon his outstandingly impressive track
record. He has a good sense of humour and is a very good and
professional speaker. A number of examples have been quoted in
the press. The one which most amused me was in the Saxon
Department of the British Museum. The Curator had just
finished describing the greatness of King Alfred. He ended by
saying that "the problem is that the average English school boy
only remembers one thing about the great King Alfred and that
is that he burnt the cakes." As quick as a flash Mr Gorbachev
replied, "Well, you did not have to do much to become famous in
those days".
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Within the first few moments of meeting Mr Gorbachev it becomes
clear that he is intelligent, alert and inquisitive. Not only
is he constantly posing questions but he also listens very
carefully and attentively to the answers. This quality has
important politicial implications in that people assume that
anyone who is genuinely interested in what they have to say is
probably worthy of their respect. These qualities, together
with his controlled and warm smile make him attractive and
indeed beguiling. However, he can also be extremely tough when
he makes use of his voice, his piercing eyes and even his
physical gestures to emphasize a point. From observing Mr
Gorbachev's speeches and presentations as well as his responses
to questions, it becomes evident that he is a thoroughly
polished, able and contemporary politician. He is in no way a
peoples popular leader' propelled from the ranks of either the
agricultural or the military communities. He is one of the
first representatives of the 'groomed' Soviet political leaders
to enter the world stage.
Apparently Mr Gorbachev's incessant and open desire to grasp
new knowledge is unusual among Soviet leaders. High ranking
Communist officials normally avoid any indications of personal
ignorance in order to create an impression of omniscience. Mr
Gorbachev's expression of genuine curiosity may prove to be one
of his most effective political tools. Not only does this
curiosity provide a constant flow of new information in a
society where information is severely censored, but it will
gain him greater support from both his superiors and
subordinates. This curiosity shown by Mr Gorbachev throughout
his visit to London seems to have two implications: first that
he is anxious to learn from the West that which may be adapted
to the Communist system, and second, he never misses an
opportunity to challenge evidence that is presented to him.
In short, Mr Gorbachev has charisma - western style charisma.
He also shows not only the ability but the willingness to
exploit the western news media. However, Gorbachev is not only
impressive as an individual, he is also part of a team. It is
interesting therefore to consider Mrs Gorbachev. The popular
western image of the wives of Soviet leaders is that they are
large, bland and uninvolved in their husband's careers. Mr
Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, proved to be the antitheses of this
popular image. She is very well educated, having a PhD, and is
alert and attractive. In fact, by Soviet standards, I believe
she could be termed chic. I found her extremely intelligent,
well poised and having a keen sense of humour. What was most
interesting and particularly apparent during Mr Gorbachev's
meeting with the Foreign Affairs Select Committee was that Mrs
Gorbachev appeared deeply interested in and aware of what was
going on. She takes a keen interest in her husband's career
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and an active interest in his dress. She is a very
professional politician's wife and together they make a most
formidable and impressive political team.
In evaluating the characteristics of Mr and Mrs Gorbachev it is
hard to imagine what additional public qualities were possessed
by President John and Mrs Jacqueline Kennedy. It is entirely
reasonable to think that Mr and Mrs Gorbachev, if they are
permitted to do so by the party system, could well become the
Soviet equivalent of the Kennedy team and as such they will
make a major impact upon the world. The advent of a
charismatic leader in Moscow could have a very beneficial
effect upon the Soviet Union. Equally, this could have the
effect of greatly increasing the challenge to western leaders.
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF MR GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSION
I strongly believe that Mr Gorbachev's charismatic leadership
style will have a major influence both inside and outside the
Soviet Union. Within the Soviet Union he is likely to be the
first leader to succeed in 'persuading' rather than forcing
Soviet workers to work. This should have a dramatic effect upon
the Soviet economy and upon the ability of the USSR to sustain
its role as a Super Power both in terms of retaining the
respect and allegiance of large parts of the third world and in
maintaining its military balance with the West. In addition,
it will fall to Mr Gorbachev to persuade the bulk of the Soviet
Nomeklatura, in which the military is well represented, not
only of the necessity but also of the benefit and urgency of
the need to accept important economic changes. From this we
are likely to see increased flexibility not only in trade but
in military and political negotiations. Such flexibility is
unlikely to reflect any weakness in the Soviet position or any
change in their ultimate goals, but it will represent increased
opportunities for Western merchants and politicians to deal
with the Soviet block.
Mr Gorbachev will likely be the first Soviet leader with the
ability to use the Western media to talk over the heads of
Western negotiators or politicians directly to Western grass
roots. This will be effectively a 'one way street' because
Western leaders will not be given the same access to the Soviet
media to talk in the reverse direction. By virtue of
television in particular, he is likely to provide external
leadership and inspiration for movements such as the CND and to
many surreptitious and anti-democratic forces which the Western
democracies harbour. By using his personal charm to lull the
West into a false sense of security, and by using his authority
to talk direct to subversive forces in the Western world, Mr
Gorbachev may be able to talk billions of dollars off the
defence budgets of the Western world. Furthermore, Mr Gorbachev
34
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is likely to use his very considerable powers of personal
persuasion directly upon Western leaders. He is likely to
exploit even the smallest splits and differences of opinion
that may occur within the Western Alliance over such issues as
the SDI programme, the transfer of high technology in the
fields of trade, and the political implications of harbouring
American military hardwear or bases etc.
In anticipation of the upcoming summit in which personality
will play a critical role, it is interesting to compare the two
leaders. Both men are physically impressive, and both appear
to have a sense of inner strength. President Reagan's strength
seems to be based upon a genuine conviction in the rightness of
his cause, while Mr Gorbachev's appears to be based upon a
great confidence in his own ability and past track record. Both
men are outstandingly good communicators. However, as Mr
Gorbachev is relatively new, his newness will itself be
newsworthy. Finally, both of these men have a great deal of
charm. President Reagan's charm is quite remarkable and
appears to be perfectly genuine and come from the heart. Mr
Gorbachev's charm, on the other hand, appears to come from the
head and is very controlled and calculated.
In conclusion, I believe that Mr Gorbachev represents the
potential equivalent of a Kennedy in the Kremlin. Despite the
powerful strictures of the Communist Party system, he will have
a major impact upon Soviet politics. He will likely present
the West with a set of new and more complex challenges which we
must meet with increasing imagination, unity and fortitude.
Politicians of Western democracies are likely to face an
increasingly sophisticated political challenge from Mr
Gorbachev both at home and abroad. The forthcoming summit talks
could prove to be a fascinating first round.
DECLASSIFIED /RE/CASO)
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BY Cir NARA DATE 11/29/07
26th November 1985
REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT - GENEVA - 19/21 NOVEMBER, 1985
To expect a real and major break through as a result of a
few hours of talking at the Geneva Summit was unrealistic
and would have exemplified gross ignorance of the
complication of arms negotiations. The main hope of the
Geneva Summit was to cut a path for future meetings. This
appears to have been achieved. As President Reagan said "At
Geneva we achieved a fresh start.' Surely this must be a
significant factor for mankind.
President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev are respectively true
champions of capitalism and communism; two ideologies that
are almost totally opposed. The fact that these two great
champions met for the first time in six years, had
constructive talks and agreed to further meetings must
surely be considered a victory for mankind, albeit only the
first victory in a series that will be necessary before the
achievement of a halt and then hopefully a reduction in the
arms race.
The recent Geneva Summit Talks illustrated three new
factors: a new frontier; a new negotiating balance and a new
negotiating style on behalf of the Soviets, at least from a
public perception.
Although the talks covered many areas, the central issue at
the Geneva Summit was the new frontier of arms talks -
space. The concept of weapons in space has been talked about
for some time. So far, the Soviets are the only nation to
have taken serious steps to establish such a weapon system.
The fact that they have done so inspired relatively little
comment in the West until President Reagan launched his
Strategic Defence Initiative, or SDI.
Since the 1950s, super power negotiations have typically
reflected creativity on the part of the Western Alliance and
resistance on the part of the Soviet Bloc. Usually the
Western nations, led by the United States, appeared to have
wished to achieve something at Summit Talks whilst the
Soviets have appeared content to talk but disinterested in
any real achievement in terms of halting the arms race.
President Reagan's SDI appears to have changed this stance
dramatically. The Soviets now appear not only willing to
negotiate seriously to halt or destroy the SDI, but
desperate to do so. The reason for their desperation is not
just the prohibitive cost. More importantly, it is the fact
that computer power is the key to the success and
competitive edge of the SDI. In computer power, the Soviets
know that they lag far behind the US and are unlikely ever
to catch up within the foreseeable future. In his SDI,
President Reagan has therefore gained the Western Alliance a
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34
trump card. This card has brought the Soviets to the
negotiating table, for the first time in decades actually
wanting to achieve firm results. This is a key and
relatively new factor. It should be remembered however that
the playing of the SDI card implies an awesome
responsibility. No super power can readily accept effective
domination by another super power by means of an
overwhelming weapon system, albeit defensive. There is
little doubt that to overplay the SDI card may result in
preemptive action by the Soviets and an increased risk of
conflict.
The Geneva Summit also illustrated vividly the new
negotiating style of the Soviet Union. This new style
apparently began with Mr Gorbachev's official appointment to
the Soviet leadership in March 1985. I believe that this
new style was already apparent before March 1985 when Mr
Gorbachev was, in my opinion, already effectively 'Managing
Director' of the Soviet Union under the 'Chairmanship' of
the ailing Chernenko. Nonetheless, at the Geneva Summit we
saw a vivid example of the new Soviet style.
Under Mr Gorbachev the image of the brutal Russian bear
appears to have disappeared. Now the bear appears to smile
when showing its teeth rather than growl. Under Mr
Gorbachev, the Soviet position begins to appear reasonable,
responsible and even reassuring.
Like President Reagan, Mr Gorbachev is a superb
communicator. He has the rare ability to put into words
what is in the subconcious minds of hundreds of millions of
people throughout the world. At his press conference on the
morning of 21st November, he must have appealed to the
hearts of hundreds of millions of people with phrases such
as : 'the choice is not just between our ideologies but
between survival and destruction'; 'the passage of time
makes it increasingly difficult to halt the arms race'; 'our
analysis must be broad and unprejudiced'; 'we do not seek
superiority but balance or parity, even reduced parity';
'imbalance creates mistrust which in turn creates
instability'; 'space is a common concern to all people and
we must not open the doors to establish weapon systems in
space' (he made no mention that the Soviets are already
there in rudimentary form, and alone!) ; 'peaceful
co-existance is an historic reality'; 'it is in the interest
of each nation on earth that the world should not belong to
any one nation'; 'only equal security can give us mutual
confidence'; and 'normalisation is a joint rescue task'.
Such phrases must have sounded so reasonable and reassuring
and have found strong support amongst hundreds of millions
of people throughout the world.
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In his powers of communication, Mr Gorbachev showed vividly
that he is probably the first Soviet leader to be able to
talk over the heads of Western politicians and negotiators,
direct to grass roots throughout the world. We should
remember that so far this is a one way street. No Western
leader has such access, via television, to grass roots
within the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, Mr Gorbachev showed not
only his skill but his willingness to act as a personal
focus of leadership for any force within the free world that
suits, even for the moment, the purpose of the Soviet Union.
/
At Geneva he specifically mentioned and indeed praised the
initiative of Sweden, Mr Jessie Jackson, and of others.
Indeed, he siezed an important opportunity viz a viz
television coverage during the well timed news black-out, to
receive Mr Jackson.
It is interesting how Mr Shultz's faux pas concerning womens
potential interest and ability to understand arms talks was
quickly seized upon by both Mr and Mrs Gorbachev.
Besides showing himself to be a brilliant communicator, Mr
Gorbachev also showed his skills as a lawyer. Not only was
he confident, professional and appealing in his manner of
delivery but he was logical, clever and convincing. He did
not attempt to steal a march on President Reagan either in
the conduct of the talks or at his press conferences. He
did not hit the US position in an aggresive way. He
appealed to the hearts and minds of the Western peoples to
convince them of the Soviet case, a case which for once
appeared to be reasonable, responsible and reassuring rather
than aggressive and threatening. Indeed he was serious,
realistic and surprisingly frank. He appeared to take the
audience into his confidence and appealed to their sense of
logic and good sense and to their deepest feelings. He
pointed to the great responsibility of world leadership in
meeting the true wishes of the people of the world.
Whilst the Soviet negotiating style may have changed it was
clear that their goals have not changed one iota. Not only
was the Soviet sense of suspicion blatantly apparent, but
also their aggression and their wish to 'fish in troubled
waters'. For example, if the translation can be relied upon
as correct, Mr Gorbachev, made what I believe was an
interesting Freudian slip. In discussing areas of regional
tension and the international debt crisis he mentioned that
the situation in some countries was "ripening" or "coming to
fruition". One usually uses such words when about to pluck
or eat such things as fruit! Could he be looking for
trouble?
3L
-4-
Furthermore, when Mr Gorbachev came to discussing President
Reagan's SDI, I believe the veneer of his new image began to
crack; a sense of desperation and the old threatening
attitude of the Soviet Union showed through. Whilst
ignoring the fact that the Soviets are so far the only
nation to have weapons in space, he ridiculed the defensive
aspect of SDI and pointed to what he termed as the enhanced
risk of 'computer error' in triggering conflict. He also
offered 50% reductions in Soviet nuclear arsenals, a test
ban and verification within the Soviet Union in return for
the US abandoning the SDI. On the other hand he left little
doubt that the Soviet Union feels severely threatened by the
SDI and that this could have awesome consequences.
Whilst the Geneva Summit provided an outstanding example of
what I have often termed as Mr Gorbachev's charismatic
ability, he failed to dominate the meetings or to win any
major concessions from the United States. This must surely
testify to the achievement of President Reagan, for there is
no doubt that the Geneva Summit was a milestone in East West
relations and there was no 'sell out' by the West.
Many commentators and some important statesmen such as ex
President Nixon have ridiculed the importance of physical
characteristics in super power summitry. I believe that
they underestimate the importance of television coverage and
the influence of physical factors on the subconcious minds
of many hundreds of millions of people throughout the world.
(Mr Nixon appears to forget his own claim of the
disadvantage of his 'five o'clock shadow' when as a
Presidential candidate he debated with Mr Jack Kennedy.) I
think it was of no mean importance that President Reagan was
physically taller and had more experience of international
summitry then Mr Gorbachev. I believe he successfully
upstaged Mr Gorbachev by not wearing an overcoat and very
kindly pointing Mr Gorbachev towards the cameras at their
initial meeting. Mr Gorbachev appeared to be the 'guest'
and somewhat lost whilst President Reagan appeared to be the
'host' and perfectly at home. In addition, the subsequent
warm handshakes and smiles appeared to be initiated by
President Reagan with Mr Gorbachev responding well but
nonetheless responding to the initiatives of the American
President.
Like Mr Gorbachev, President Reagan is also a brilliant
communicator. Whilst he chose not to give a major press
conference in Geneva, his efforts to brief his Western
allies in Brussels and to address Congress immediately upon
his return to the United States, were extremely well
received.
39
-5-
Perhaps the greatest attribute of President Reagan during
the summit talks was his integrity. There must have been
great temptation for the American President to yield, no
matter how slightly, on a major point such as SDI in order
to achieve a major and public concession on behalf of the
Soviets. There is no doubt that President Reagan had an
opportunity, to appear to be the greatest American President
since Washington. Such temptation must have appeared
attractive to a President near the end of his second term.
President Reagan's resistance of such temptation, despite
the clamour of the Western media for a major result,
testifies to his indomitable integrity and must have
inspired the admiration and respect of Mr Gorbachev.
In the event the two champions of the major opposed
ideologies of the world did meet for the first time in six
years, achieved relatively small but constructive results in
terms of the various accords that were signed, and cut the
path for future meetings which resulted in a 'fresh start'.
Realistically, this must be seen as a significant victory
for mankind.
What of the future? Mr Gorbachev has brought a new image to
Soviet diplomacy and a far more subtle style. At Geneva,
President Reagan showed himself a match for Mr Gorbachev and
earned the respect not only of the Soviet leader but of the
majority of people throughout the world. Mutual respect
must form a good basis for future talks in which efforts
will obviously be made to find areas of mutual interest and
to create a feeling of mutual security. In this respect, Mr
Gorbachev's enormous self-confidence, resulting apparently
from his impressive track record and from his powerful
patronage, could be very significant. People who are filled
with confidence tend more readily to accept new ideas. At
the same time they can be more creative and more flexible in
their approach. Although the Soviet goals may not have
changed, their approach, under the leadership of Mr
Gorbachev and the threat of SDI, may well become more
flexible to a degree that allows real achievements to be
attained at subsequent Summit talks. History may yet prove
that the ideological champions of the Western and Soviet
blocs may also be champions of negotiation and of peace.
JOHN BROWNE
SYSTE II
II
40
EXPI/4/8665
/HITE HOUSE
Daniloff
SHINGTON
PRESERVATION COPY
UNCLASSRED UPON REMOVAL
OF
(A) 6/25/02
41
SYSTEM II
90616
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 4, 1986
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Gorbachev
re Nichilas Daniloff
Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding
a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev re the detention of
Nicholas Daniloff of U.S. News and World Report.
Paul Hanely concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments
Tab I
Memo for President
Tab A
Ltr to Gorbachev
Tab II
State Draft
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify: OADR
White C/J House Guidelines, NARA, Date 1/3/02 28. 1997
By
42
THE WHITE HOUSE
SYSTEM II
WASHINGTON
90616
SECRET
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
SUBJECT:
Letter to Secretary General Gorbachev
re Nicholas Daniloff
Issue
Attached at Tab A for your signature is a letter to General
Secretary Gorbachev regarding the detention of Nicholas Daniloff.
Facts
The Soviets have detained Nicholas Daniloff, Moscow correspondent
of US News and World Report, on contrived espionage charges.
Discussion
This letter, which would be delivered in Moscow tomorrow morning,
if you approve, informs Gorbachev that Daniloff is innocent of
the charges made against him and signals to Gorbachev that you
are prepared to take concrete actions if he is not freed
promptly.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you authorize dispatch of the letter.
Attachments
Tab A
Letter to Gorbachev
Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify: OADR
By
White CAS House Guidelines, August 28, 7/3/02 1997
NARA, Date
43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. General Secretary:
I am sure that you have been monitoring, as I have,
developments relating to the detention by Soviet
authorities of the U.S. News and World Report Moscow
correspondent, Nicholas Daniloff. I would like you
to have in mind two points as you consider how to
handle this case.
First, I can give you my personal assurance that Mr.
Daniloff has no connection whatever with the U.S.
Government. If you have been informed otherwise,
you have been misinformed.
Second, there are no grounds for Mr. Daniloff's
detention, nor for any attempt to link him to any
other case. If he is not freed promptly, it can
only have the most serious and far-reaching con-
sequences for the relationshp between our two
countries. That would be an extremely unfortunate
outcome, and I therefore thought it important to
emphasize personally the gravity with which this
situation is viewed by the United States.
Therefore, I hope sincerely you will take the
necessary actions to allow us to put this matter
behind us in the nearest future.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow
DECLASSIFIED (ZE/EASE)
BY Authority Crs NLSF99-051 #446, SmA 10/16/00
,
NARA, Date 7/3/02
14
EYES ONLY Sept 8 Chron- 86
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
(Dain: loff)
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
PRESERVATION COPY
Crs 6/25/02
Do you want this your Daniliff working file 45
MSG FROM: NSJFM
-CPUA
TO: NSMMW
--CPUA
09/05/86 14:14:12
To: NSMMW -CPUA
NOTE
FROM:
Jack
Matlock
Subject:
DANILOFF/SIZE
OF
ESTABLISHMENTS
Please
print
out.
Classification:
SECRET
*** Forwarding note from NSDGM
CPUA
09/05/86 13:43 ***
To: NSPWR -CPUA
NOTE
FROM:
David
Major
SUBJECT:
DANILOFF/SIZE
OF
ESTABLISHMENTS
PER STATES CONSIDERATION OF COMMERCIAL OVER SMUN PERSONNEL, THE FOLLOWING
ARE
THE
REAL
NUMBERS
WE
ARE
DEALING
WITH:
IN
NEW
YORK
CITY:920
SOVIETS
SOVIET MISSION TO UN: 284 SOVIETS, 118 ARE KGB OR GRU*targetgroup*
UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT: 310 SOVIETS, 67 ARE KGB OR GRU
COMMERCIAL
AREOFLOT:
5
SOVIETS,
NO
KGB
or
GRU
AMTORG:
54
SOVIETS,8
KGB
or
GRU
SOVFRACT:
5
SOVIETS
1
KGB
TRADE AND ECONOMIC COUNCIL: 8 SOVIETS 3 KGB ORGRU
CC: NSRBM
--CPUA
JOHN M. POINDEXTER NSWRP
CPUA
JOHN M. POINDEXTER
NSDGM
--CPUA
NSKED
-CPUA
NSJFM
--CPUA
NSPBT
CPUA
NSVMC
--CPUA
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/5*801
BY CH NARA DATE 11/29/07
46
TOP SECRET/EXTREMELY SENSITIVE
DANILOFF: THE "QUICK AND DIRTY" OPTION
If the Soviets do not respond positively to the proposals in the
Ridgway-Sokolov channel within 36 hours, the following steps
might bring the most rapid resolution of the matter and cover all
the President's priorities. (They would not, however, secure the
freedom of the dissidents, which is a part of the current
"package." However, it will probably be impossible to negotiate
this arrangement in timely fashion.)
1. Pass word (preferably indirectly) that if Daniloff is expelled
from the Soviet Union within 24 hours, Zakharov will be expelled
from the U.S. within 24 (or 48) hours of the arrival in the U.S.
of Daniloff and his family.
Make clear this is not a formal deal; simply description of
what will happen.
2. If Daniloff released and his family allowed to leave, expel
Zakharov promptly. This can be done either with a guilty plea
followed by expulsion (which would require Soviet cooperation),
or simply by dropping charges and expelling him (which of course
would be done only after Daniloff and his family are out of the
Soviet Union).
3. Concurrently with Zakharov's expulsion, notify the Soviets
officially of the expulsion of all known Soviet intelligence
officers in their missions to the United Nations, plus four or
five in the U.N. Secretariat and possibly some from their
commercial establishments in the U.S.; announce immediate
imposition of the ceiling of 170 on the U.N. Missions; and
announce policy of not issuing visas to any persons in those
installations who are known to be intelligence officers.
Simultaneously, give the Soviets the same warning regarding
bilateral representation which we would have given under the
original demarche.
NOTE: For political purposes, we should make sure this
number is greater than 105 -- the number expelled by the UK in
1972. A target of 120 to be expelled would be reasonable.
FOIA(b)
Advantages
1. Probably the quickest route to resolution of the problem.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/5#850R
BY RW NARA DATE 3/14/11
- 2 -
47
2. Avoids a drawn-out period when the President could be accused
of negotiating a trade -- which might be the case if a "package"
is negotiated which requires weeks -- or conceivably months -- to
implement.
3.
Disadvantages
1. Might be considered a case of deception by the Soviets, which
could be a burden on other negotiations. (This will be the case
with the "package" option as well.) However, the President will
also gain respect in Soviet minds for reacting forcefully.
2. Soviets would be strongly motivated to retaliate in some
fashion: if they retaliated against our offices in the USSR, this
would require another round of massive expulsions. However, the
Soviets are unlikely to embark on this course if they were
convinced of our determination to react as we warn them. The KGB
would understand that they risk a total sweep of their
installations here if the escalate matters, and there ability to
hamstring our operations in Moscow for a while would be cold
comfort.
3. Soviets could respond with other arrests of Americans: some
could be accused of serious crimes, but many could probably be
accused of petty offenses (blackmarketing, distributing Bibles
and prayer shawls, etc.). If the charges were based on actual
offenses (which they well might be, since many private Americans
visiting the Soviet Union break Soviet law in various ways) it
would be difficult to challenge such a form of harassment. If we
continued retaliating, our "hostage assets" (the surplus of
Soviet representatives over the number of our own) could diminish
rapidly and leave us with little leverage. (However, for the
reasons given under the preceding paragraph, plus the potential
damage to their public image, they would probably stop short of
this.)
4. Gorbachev could delay arranging a summit, claiming that he
could not conduct negotiations in the face of such deception and
"provocation." Our reaction would indeed be a severe blow to his
prestige and he would need a few months to put it behind him
before meeting the President. Gorbachev is unlikely to sulk
indefinitely if he feels that he can achieve something he desires
at a summit.
ALL OF THESE DISADVANTAGES ARE INHERENT IN THE "PACKAGE" OPTION
AS WELL, EXCEPT THAT THE MATTER WOULD HAVE LESS POTENTIAL IMPACT
ON A 1986 SUMMIT IF IT IS DONE SOONER RATHER THAN LATER.
48
- 3 -
THE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN BOTH THE "PACKAGE" SCENARIO
AND THE "QUICK AND DIRTY" SCENARIO IS THAT WE BE ABLE TO EXPEL A
LARGE NUMBER OF SOVIETS IN NEW YORK, WITHOUT GETTING HUNG UP BY
OBJECTIONS IN THE BUREAUCRACY. BOTH THESE OPTIONS ARE EXTREMELY
DANGEROUS UNLESS WE ARE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN OF THIS POINT.
- 4 -
49
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND RISKS
The various modes of retaliation carry different degrees of risk
and different magnitudes of advantage in regard to particular
objectives. Assessing them is highly subjective, but here is an
attempt.
Definitions: OPTION I: The "Demarche Option" (original
NSC proposal)
OPTION II: The "Package Option"
(Ridgway-Sokolov)
OPTION III: The "Quick and Dirty Option"
Comparative Advantages
Objectives:
OPTION I
OPTION II
OPTION III
Quick Release
Medium pro-
High pro-
Maximizes
bability of
bability of
speed
delay
delay
No parallelism
None at all
None at end;
None at end;
possibility
accomplished
of delay
along with
while U.S.
"exchange"
court pro-
cess proceeds
Deter hostages
High, since
Moderate
Moderate
KGB would
since KGB
(as Op. II)
still have
would have
substantial
reduced as-
assets to
sets to pro-
protect
tect
Maximum KGB
Modest
High
High
Reduction
Secure Release
Neutral
Modest;
Slightly
of dissidents
(Not included
(includes
negative;
but would not
dissidents;
might inhibit
inhibit sub-
however, sub-
releases or
sequent deals)
sequent ex-
exchanges for
changes dif-
a few months.
ficult)
- 5 -
Risks
Interests at Risk
OPTION I
OPTION II
OPTION III
"Demarche"
"Package"
"Quick-Dirty"
1. Confidence in
Low risk
Moderate risk Moderate risk
dealing with
each other
2. Retaliation
Low risk
Medium risk
Medium risk
on U.S. instal-
lations
3. Retaliation on
Low risk
Somewhat
Same as II
U.S. citizens
higher; still
low
4. Risk to summit
Low risk
Substantial
More risk than
risk to 86
Op. I; less
than Op. II
51
DRAFT NOTE
The Government of the United States hereby informs the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the
following.
The Government of the United States has noted that
throughout the history of the United Nations Organization, the
Soviet Union has made a practice of assigning large numbers of
intelligence officers not only to its missions accredited to the
United Nations but even to the United Nations Secretariat itself.
Obviously such practices violate elementary principles of
legitimate international practice, undermine the purposes of the
United Nations and the integrity of its Secretariat, and
constitute a threat to the national security of the host country,
the United States.
The Government of the United States has repeatedly called to
the attention of the Soviet Union the fact that such practices
are intolerable and must be terminated. Unfortunately, the
Soviet Union has not seen fit to cease exploiting the physical
location of the United Nations for the conduct of espionage
against the United States. Recent events have demonstrated that
this situation not only constitutes a danger to the national
security of the United States but, given the propensity of the
Soviet authorities to seek hostages when their agents are
DECLASSIFIED /RE/0450)
NLRR Fob-114/5 #8503
BY Cir NARA DATE 11/29/07
52
- 2 -
apprehended in intelligence operations, also threatens the safety
of private American citizens who may be in the Soviet Union at
the time a Soviet agent is apprehended.
Therefore, to avoid further jeopardy to the supreme
interests of the United States, the United States Government
hereby takes the following steps:
1. The [115] employees of the Soviet Missions in New York
and the [5] employees of the United Nations Secretariat named in
the attachment to this Note, all of whom are believed, on the
basis of substantial evidence, to be employees of Soviet
intelligence organizations, are ordered to depart the territory
of the United States within seven calendar days if they are
present in the United States at this time. If they are not in
the United States, their re-entry visas are hereby cancelled and
they will not be permitted re-entry into the United States.
2. The United States will, in the future, issue visas for
entry into the United States only to the following maximum
numbers of employees of Soviet Missions accredited to the United
Nations: for the Permanent Mission of the USSR: 150; for the
Permanent Mission of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic: 10;
for the Permanent Mission of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic: 10.
- 3 -
53
3. From this date, pursuant to the provisions of Section
212 (a) (27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (U.S. Code
), the Government of the United States will not issue visas
to any Soviet citizen assigned to work in the Soviet Missions
accredited to the United Nations, or to work in the United
Nations Secretariat, if it has reasonable grounds to conclude
that the Soviet citizen in question is an employee of any of the
intelligence organs of the Soviet Union.
The attached list of persons constitutes an integral part of
this Note.
- 4 -
54
DRAFT TALKING POINTS WHEN NOTE PRESENTED
1. These steps will be announced to the public at
o'clock
Eastern Daylight Time, on
.
2. I am instructed to state the following unofficially and
informally, but with total authority:
-- If the Soviet authorities should attempt to retaliate against
American offices in the Soviet Union (none of which are attached
to international organizations, therefore are not comparable to
the installations mentioned in our Note), the policy of the
United States will be the following: the comparable Soviet
installation in the United States will be reduced in size to the
exact number of Americans assigned to the counterpart American
office in the Soviet Union, after which the same number of Soviet
employees as that of the Americans subject to retaliatory action
will be required to leave.
-- If there should be any other form of retaliation, avowed or
implicit, the United States response will be concrete, vigorous,
and designed to reduce further the unilateral advantages which
the Soviet Union enjoys in its dealings with the United States.
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EASO)
NLRR P06-114/5 #8504
BY Cir NARADATE 11/29/07