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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Action [Drafts of Papers re: USSR] (2)
Box: 20
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Ronald Reagan Library
Case: 1035
Archivist: Lisa Jones
DOC
TYPE
DATE
PAGES
CLASS.
1
Paper
08-09-1985
5
Subject: The Soviet Political Police (Paper VI)
To:
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#
6/21/06
11
From:
Restriction FOIA(b)1
2
Paper
07-18-1985
4
Subject:
Nomenklatura: The USSR's Patronage System (Paper IV)
R
11
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# 12
To:
From:
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3
Paper
08-09-1985
5
Subject: The USSR: Civil-Miltary Relations (Paper V)
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From:
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Paper
07-08-1985
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Subject: Role of the CPSU (Paper I-II-lb)
To:
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# 14
From:
Restriction FOIA(b)1
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Paper
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Subject:
The Soviet Military: Status, Role, and Relationship to the Party (Paper VI
I, II-8)
To: PArt u
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#15
From:
Restriction : FOIA(b)1 ,B3
COLLECTION: Matlock, Jack F.
SERIES: USSR Subject Files
FOLDER TITLE: Action [Drafts of papers re USSR] (2)
OA/ID NUMBER:
Box Number :20
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information.
F-1 National security classified information. (b)(1)
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute.
agency. (b)(2)
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute. (b)(3)
commercial or financial information.
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information. (b)(4)
and his advisors, or between such advisors.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. (b)(6)
personal privacy.
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donors'
purposes. (b)(7)
deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
PRM. Closed as a personal record misfile.
financial institutions. (b)(8)
F-9 Release would disclose geological of geophysical information
conceming wells. (b)(9)
Page 1
DOC
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Paper
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Subject:
Leadership Politics and the Role of the Communist Party (Paper II-1)
PART 6/21/06 NLSFUD-009/, #16
To:
From:
Restriction : FOIA(b)1 B3
7
Paper
6
Subject:
The Soviet Ruling Class: Nomenklatura (Paper 3, II-2)
To: PART
i
#17
From:
Restriction : FOIA(b)1 B3
COLLECTION: Matlock, Jack F.
SERIES: USSR Subject Files
FOLDER TITLE: Action [Drafts of papers re USSR] (2)
OA/ID NUMBER:
BOX NUMBER: 20
CLOSED DATE:
Restriction Codes
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
P-1 National Security Classified Information.
F-1 National security classified information. (b)(1)
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal Office.
F-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute.
agency. (b)(2)
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute. (b)(3)
commercial or financial information.
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
information. (b)(4)
and his advisors, or between such advisors.
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. (b)(6)
personal privacy.
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donors'
purposes. (b)(7)
deed of gift.
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
PRM. Closed as a personal record misfile.
financial institutions. (b)(8)
F-9 Release would disclose geological of geophysical information
conceming wells. (b)(9)
Page 2
PAPER VI
CONFIDENTIAL
THE SOVIET POLITICAL POLICE
Lenin created the "Sword and Shield of the Revolution*--the
Cheka--to crush domestic opposition and to protect the
Bolshevik party from its enemies, using any and all means,
including terror. By any standard, the Cheka succeeded
brilliantly and bloodily. Its present-day incarnation, the
KGB, has become one of the three pillars of the Soviet regime,
the other two being the party and the military.
There is no American analog for the KGB: apart from a
political role which would be unthinkable in a democracy, it
has the functions of the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, the
Coast Guard, the NSA, the EPS, and it has two divisions of
heavily-armed troops. The KGB also controls resources and uses
tactics which in the US could only be likened to those of
organized crime. Because of strict Soviet secrecy, no accurate
figure on personnel strength is available for the secret police
or even for the regular police.
Historical Background
The Cheka has strong roots in Russian history. Stalin in
his heyday gave favorable publicity to Tsar Ivan The Terrible's
equivalent institution, the Oprichnina which ruthlessly and
bloodily suppressed the Tsar's enemies. Although much subdued
compared to its 16th century predecessor, the Tsarist Okhrana
was the main persecutor of the Bolsheviks prior to the 1917
Revolution.
Soviet propaganda on the glamor and romance of the Cheka
goes back to its early period under Felix Dzerzhinskiy when it
launched "Red Terror" against the Bolsheviks' domestic and
foreign enemies. This was the time when Operation Trust snared
the feared British agent Sidney Reilly and when "Iron Felix"
and his underlings were hailed as the "knights of the
Revolution."
Its image worsened in the 1930s when the secret police
participated in Stalin's assaults against the peasantry and
destroyed the Old Bolsheviks and the Red Army's officer corps.
Led by such men as Yagoda and Yezhov, it doomed millions to
forced labor in the GULAG forced labor camps under inhuman
conditions and with appalling casualty rates. During World War
II it conducted a successful espionage effort against the Nazis
and created a special wartime disciplinary unit known as SMERSH
(Death to Spies). The GULAG population was at a peak--an
estimated 15 million--in the postwar reconstruction period,
swollen by captured Axis prisoners and Soviet victims of
Stalin's harsh policies.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS (600-009/11
as NARA, DATE 6/21/06
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
- 2 -
The KGB's Political Role After Stalin
Following the execution of Lavrentiy Beriya after Stalin's
death in 1953, the KGB gradually became intertwined with
leadership politics and has at key moments played a role in
leadership successions.
As the agency which provides the leadership with bodyguards
and secure communications, the KGB could also isolate the top
leader at a critical moment. When the Politburo members in
October 1964 chose to oust Khrushchev, the conspirators took
care to prevent Khrushchev from mobilizing his allies (as he
had dcne in June 1957). The party secretary for security,
Alexander Shelepin called upon his protege, the KGB chief at
that time, to cut off Khrushchev's communications from his
vacation dacha to Moscow. After the coup Khrushchev was flown
back to Moscow and expelled from the Politburo.
The KGB's resources were used in 1982 by Yuriy Andropov
(who gained the political police job after Brezhnev's
successful power play against Shelepin in 1967) to mount a
campaign aimed at capturing the succession from Brezhnev's
putative heir Chernenko. Andropov undertook in March 1982 a
widely leaked investigation of corruption on the part of
Brezhnev's political supporters and even Brezhnev's daughter
Galina. Andropov's goal was to taint Brezhnev's associates and
to demonstrate that Brezhnev could no longer protect his
followers. The most publicized target was Galina Brezhneva's
association with the colorful Boris the Gypsy, a shady figure
involved in underworld jewel dealings. The campaign was
successful, Andropov left the KGB when he acquired the party
secretaryship in May. Memories of the 1930's are still strong
enough that he could not move directly from the KGB into
Brezhnev's shoes.
The Gorbachev-KGB Link
As his health declined, Andropov pushed Gorbachev as his
successsor but could not determine the succession. During
Chernenko's reign, the KGB's disappointment and vexation over
having lost its moment of glory with the death of Andropov was
widely bruited. It was equally clear that the KGB as an
institution sided with Gorbachev, viewing him as Andropov's
heir. Its loyalties were repaid upon Gorbachev's accession in
March of this year. Chebrikov, brought into the KGB with
Andropov in 1967 and named by him as KGB chief in 1982, was
promoted to full member of the Politburo this April, obviously
as a member of Gorbachev's ruling coterie.
Two members of the Politburo--Chebrikov and Aliyev, who was
the Azerbaydzhan KGB chief until he became the republic party
CONF IDENTIAL
3
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
chief--have had professional experience in the KGB. Obviously,
KGB prestige and influence is now high and its relations with
Gorbachev are demonstrably supportive.
The Public's View of the KGB
Not surprisingly, the Soviet public's attitude toward the
KGB is quite unlike that of western public opinion which is
uniformly hostile to it as a repressive agency with an
extraordinarily bloody past. With the exception of hardened
Soviet dissidents who have dealt with low-level KGB operatives,
the Soviet public tends to accept the high status and glamor
accorded the KGB in the media. There is an entire school of
literature, films, and TV glorifying the espionage and counter-
intelligence role of the KGB. But the public's respect for the
KGB rests largely on fear.
The KGB's Domestic Security Role
Like the party, the KGB is virtually everywhere in Soviet
society. There are KGB units on every level of government.
Every major factory and institution has its "first department"
which handles security matters, including employee clearances
and access to classified information. The KGB official who
sits on every party committee probably has the last word on
security issues, and even a republic first secretary is bound
to respect the KGB representative on the republic party bureau.
As a true political police, KGB local units haye a
widespread net of informers who report on their fellow workers
and neighbors. Citizens are encouraged to report deviant
speech and behaviour to the authorities. Unauthorized
assemblies and publications are searched out and terminatęd,
sometimes with significant criminal penalties for the
participants.
The KGB has organized special units to monitor religious
organizations and nationalist activities. A voluminous
literature exists abroad on these activities in addition to the
documentation of the KGB suppression of political dissent and
control over emigration.
The political police function extends to the armed forces
in which a net of secret informants reports on moods and
attitudes among the troops. Any security incident draws the
attention of KGB investigators.
In addition to their security responsibilities, the KGB has
special police jurisdiction over cases involving large amounts
of foreign currency, gold, and jewels. This conveniently
permitted Andropov in 1982 to investigate the scandals
involving Brezhnev's daughter Galina. Otherwise, the regular
police, headed by Brezhnev's crony Shchelokov, could have
whitewashed the affair.
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
4
- 4 -
KGB Influence Over The Civilian Police
The KGB under Andropov began an extensive purge of the
regular police following the ouster of MVD minister Shchelokov
in December 1982. (Shchelokov was disgraced and reportedly
committed suicide in December 1984 to avoid a trial for
corruption.) The regular police or MVD is now heaçed by a
former KGB official and several other KGB officials were
transferred to the MVD'S top leadership. In addition, a new
political administration was created in the MVD and a large
number of party members were detailed to police work in an
effort to purge and upgrade the police which is now playing a
larger role in Gorbachev's anti-corruption and anti-alcohol
campaigns. There is no question about the superior status of
the KGB compared to the MVD and its ability to intervene in the
jurisdiction and processes of the MVD and the courts, but there
is also a strong history of bad relations between the two
police agencies which occasionally erupts in ugly incidents.
Foreign Intelligence and Counter Intelligence
Abroad, the KGB is especially active in intelligence
collection--political, military, technical--under diplomatic,
journalistic, and business cover. It is without doubt the
world's largest and most active intelligence service, and it
also draws upon the resources of its Warsaw Pact allies to
complement its intelligence effort abroad.
KGB foreign reporting goes independently of foreign
ministry reporting to Moscow where it is coordinated and
submitted to the Politburo. KGB activities and reporting
partly parallel and duplicate those of the Defense, Ministry's
Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) and inevitably there is
rivalry between the two.
The KGB also engages in covert action "active neasures"
agent-of-influence operations, clandestine support of foreign
political parties, and forgeries and bribery to get press
placement of Soviet materials.
KGB counterintelligence work most often shows up in public
accounts of agent arrests and the declaration of foreign
diplomats persona non grata, but some of the counter-
intelligence materials published in the Soviet press must be
put into the prophylactic propaganda category, aimed primarily
at Soviet citizens. However, Western diplomats in Moscow and
Leningrad are primary, but not sole, targets of KGB
counterintelligence efforts. Heavy surveillance, active
attempts to penetrate the staff and buildings, and the creation
of effective obstacles between Soviet citizens and foreigners
are permanent elements in the KGB's operations.
CONF IDENTIAL
5
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
Soviet Views of the KGB
Soviet dissidents who have faced KGB harassment see it as
the regime's arm of repression--often arbitary in its actions.
Most Soviet citizens regard the KGB as a necessary part of
a well-ordered state. While Soviet citizens regard the media
with some of the skepticism that Americans have for
advertising, the flood of books, films and TV glorifying the
KGB's exploits in counter-intelligence and intelligence leaves
its impression. But the public's respect for the KGB still
rests mostly on fear.
Careerists look upon the secret police as an avenue for
upward mobility. The KGB successfully recruits the cream of
university graduates for careers in overseas intelligence work,
careers often under diplomatic and journalistic guise which are
regarded as more rewarding and interesting than most.
Drafter: D.Graves x29204
WANG 3233S
August 9, 1985
CONFIDENTIAL
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typed papeR IV
typed
NOMENKLATURA: THE USSR'S PATRONAGE SYSTEM
Structure
The Soviet institution of nomenklatura amounts to an
encyclopedia of "plum books." Its rules dictate that all key
jobs throughout the USSR--in the party bureaucracy, government,
economy, cultural life, military or academic establishments,
even agriculture--be reserved for candidates picked and
approved by the supervisory party organ. Stalin developed this
system of personnel patronage as a vehicle for gaining control
of both party and society. His successors have enlarged on it
to such an extent that it has no real parallel in the
noncommunist world: the Soviet party machine has greater power
in co-opting, blackballing and ejecting personnel than does the
NARA, DATE 6/21/06
most exclusive club in the west. Inside, one is entitled to a
lifestyle befitting the position; outside, one is relegated to
the "masses," to scramble as the average Soviet for an
existence. Ousted from the system, one is excluded from even
marginal benefits available to the masses.
The so-called nomenklatura are the elite of the USSR, the
most prominent and best rewarded people in each professional
group, all the decision and policymakers. They fall into
various categories:
NLS
a) The political elite, consisting of the leaders of the party
and government, along with the top party apparatchiki.
b) The managerial elite, who actually operate the government,
the economy, the armed forces, the police apparatus, and other
parts of the Soviet system.
c) The cultural and scientific elite, the artists, scientists,
writers, performers, and scholars.
These groups differ in political influence, social status,
prominence, and rewards. The political elite are those in the
Communist hierarchy who enjoy decisive influence. The
managerial elite, though not without political power,
essentially occupys nonpolitical career tracks. Although the
cultural and scientific elite wields relatively little
political influence; it enjoys greater prominence: members of
this group are often more visible and better paid than are the
managers or political leaders.
The political and managerial elites are known in Soviet
parlance as "leadership cadres". All in all they are estimated
to number around 4 million. About 500,000 are top-level
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bureaucrats, half of them in the party apparatus itself.
Another 500,000 hold government positions. Some 2 million are
the economic managers who are regarded as the cream of the
economic and technical intelligentsia. The rest occupy
management or supervisory positions ranging from shop stewards
to kolkhoz chairmen.
Getting Ahead
Ability and expertise are only one element in getting to
the top in Soviet society. Conformity with the current party
line and mastery of the techniques of maneuvering within the
system on the one hand, plus personal patronage from within the
nomenklatura itself on the other, are the aids on which the
ambitious rely.
The leaders of the USSR have long viewed economic
efficiency and consumer satisfaction as matters of secondary
importance. Their primary objectíve has always been a
maximization of the national power of the USSR. And the
consolidation, expansion and preservation of their own power is
justified as a means to that end. That in turn justifies the
higher income and perquisites of the ruling class.
Life Style
The nomenklatura by and large enjoy a life style well above
the drab level of reality faced by the average Soviet citizen.
The upper crust has its cars and special access to goods and
services. Its members move in a tight, private universe of
suburban dachas, downtown co-operative apartments, exclusive
clubs and vacation resorts. Its sons and daughters have
preferred access to the better schools and often intermarry.
Those further down the pecking order have similar special
stores, housing, resorts and benefits befitting their rank.
Money income is the least important advantage of making it
in the USSR. The real boons derive from a compendium of
tangible and intangible privileges: greater freedom, better
medical care, the opportunity to travel abroad and read access
to domestic and imported goods unavaílable to the average
citizen at any time.
Many in the ruling class experience such a sheltered
existence they have not the faintest idea how the rest of the
country really lives. Others--the kolkhoz chairmen for
example-are more directly exposed but still are far better off
than their non-nomenklatura associates. Gorbachev has
spearheaded a drive against the isolation of the apparatchiki
from the masses, but the privileges of the Gorbachevs will
unquestionably remain palatial by Soviet standards. Nor is
there any real popular resentment of the advantages enjoyed by
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Raisa and the other "wives of. since their life style is not
flaunted before the public. The gap between the elite and the
masses is studiously ignored by the media.
Other Side of the Coin
The material advantages enjoyed by the power elite would be
reduced if a larger share of the national product were to be
allocated to economic investment and mass consumption. As a
result, the economic managers' advocacy of greater recognition
of economic factors and for greater professional autonomy
constantly runs into built-in opposition from the political
decisionmakers.
Even deeper is the tension between the ruling elite and the
prestigious intellectuals who advocate greater individual
freedom and more personal property. Although many cultural
figures are conformists and as jealous of their perks as the
power elite, some have advocated an easing of the internal
control system under the rubric of "de-Stalinization." One of
their targets is the party apparatus and its total domination
of the elite structure. The party ideologists for their part
are determined to keep a tight rein on the social sciences and
the arts; they see their mission as the preservation of
doctrinal purity which in turn justifies the rule of the party,
and of course, their own privileged existence.
- A generational conflict has also been developing within the
nomenklatura itself given the marked age difference between the
CPSU leadership and its rank and file. While about 40 percent
of the party's 18 million members are under 40 years of age
(6.9 million), there is no one under 50 in the top leadership
at all. And while men and women are represented about equally
within the educated strata of Soviet society, only 9 women are
full members of the Central Committee. (Women make up 27
percent of the party membership.) Nor is any woman now
included in the party's supreme leadership.
United We Stand
The interests of the nomenklatura are diverse: there are
orthodox and pragmatic conservatives as well as moderate
reformers within the policymaking bodies of the regime. They
are frequently at odds among. themselves, usually over questions
which affect the status of different groupings within the
nomenklatura itself. But there is no open opposition at any
level or within any group to the system per se. After all,
careers, lifestyle, future, and family well-being are all
dependent on. and a function of that system.
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For the sake of efficiency, Gorbachev apparently is
prepared to make certain concessions to dissatisfied elements
of the elite. He has urged more operational autonomy for lower
managerial personnel, and encouraged creative artists to be
more realistic in their portrayals of life. The younger
generation and women have been promised a larger role in the
conduct of political affairs. In the field of domestic policy,
the pressure is on for less cronyism and nepotism and more
specialized knowledge and expertise as the major criterion for
advancement. But the Gorbachev-led political elite is still
part of the nomenklatura, and any basic reform of the system
would threaten its power and its perks. Whatever changes
Gorbachev might introduce-and even the smallest will run into
opposition from some quarter-the nomenklatura as a whole will
insist on retaining control of the social processes in the
USSR. It cannot do otherwise and still preserve communist rule
in the country.
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Drafter:INR/SEE/SI:SPloss:csh
Wang 3052S
7/18/85
Aper I
SECRET
typed
The USSR: Civil-Military Relations
Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union are replete
with paradox. The military as an institution is a dominant
force in national security decision-making, yet it is also
under party control.
Civilian authority sets the broad outlines of defense
policy but relies almost exclusively on military expertise to
elaborate the military-technical side of strategy and
doctrine. On military planning and technical assessments,
there is no civilian counterweight to the General Staff.
Despite its internal bureaucratic politics, interservice
rivalries, and long history of alliances and intrigues between
individual military and civilian leaders, there is no evidence
that the military has ever plotted to take power. The military
as an institution has not aspired to rule. Nevertheless, it
has sought to protect its own interests and professionalism.
In recent years, military figures have been much in the
limelight. It has been primarily the arms control process and
the civilian leadership's need for expert opinion which has put
them there.
Anti-Bonapartist Tradition
There is a longstanding tradition of the importance of
military power in Soviet life. Externally, Russian and now
Soviet security and position in the world have rested primarily
on military strength. Domestically, both Tsars and General
Secretaries have played up military values and, when possible,
their own military careers in order to buttress personal and
regime authority.
Yet the military establishment itself is subject to more
rigorous political controls than any other institution in the
Soviet system. In both pre- and post- revolutionary societies,
the military has been subservient to political authority.
This seeming inconsistency -- on the one hand, the Soviets
emulate military values and, on the other, distrust the
military as an institution -- reflects an anti-Bonapartist
tradition in Soviet and Russian history. Indeed, the
Bolsheviks who took DECLASSIFIED power in 1917 frequently used
NLS F00-009/1 #3 #13
at CH NARA, DATE 6/21/06
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- 2 -
analogies to the French revolution to discuss political
developments in Russia, including the danger of a man on
horseback taking over the revolution.
This wariness of the military stems in part from
traditional revolutionary distrust of standing professional
armies, Marx and Engels viewed standing armies as the tools of
the 19th century monarchic-bourgeois states. Although their
doctrine eventually evolved to strongly supporting the idea of
a class-based revolutionary force, they left undefined the role
of the armed forces in a post-revolutionary socialist society.
Lenin did not reconcile himself to the need for a standing
army until after the 1917 revolution, and even then the
Bolsheviks' first order of business was to destroy the old
army. The early Bolsheviks moved cautiously in building the
new Red Army, emphasizing the principles of voluntary
recruitment. and elected commanders -- thus nullifying efforts
to turn the new army into an effective fighting force. When
War Commissar Trotsky, with Lenin's approval, finally undertook
to transform the Red Army into a centralized, efficient
professional force, he also incorporated the idea of political
officers at every rank who could check the actions of their
military counterparts.
Checks and Balances
Today, a set of extensive institutional arrangements is in
place intended to ensure civilian control over the military.
--The Main Political Administration (MPA) is the party's
political watchdog in the armed forces. As Trotsky envisaged,
political officers are assigned to every level down to
battalion and in general act as representatives of the party.
Although the MPA reports to the Ministry of Defense, it also
functions as a distinct department of the CPSU Central
Committee and is ultimately accountable to the Politburo for
the military's political reliability.
--In addition to the MPA network, party and Komsomol
membership is encouraged and widespread -- over ninety percent
of officers and enlisted men belong to one or the other of
these bodies.
--On t.op of all this, the KGB maintains its own secret
agents throughout the military establishment.
These arrangements underscore the continuing importance for
Soviet leaders of political loyalty over military interests.
The gravest charge made against Marshal Zhukov before his fall
from grace in 1957 was that he had sought to eliminate party
control. More recently, Marshal Ogarkov's demotion from Chief
of Staff a year ago was accompanied by intimations that he
harbored "unpartylike tendencies."
SECRET
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Civil-Military Interaction at the Top
Even though it is under Party control, the military is one
of the most highly organized and influential interest groups in
the USSR. It. has effectively used this influence to protect
its own general interests (with regard to resource allocation,
for instance) and professionalism.
Nevertheless, the military has only played an ancillary
role in Soviet leadership consideration of broader policy
questions. This is partly attributable to the fact that in
upper levels of the party, the military carries relatively
little weight. Only two professional military leaders have
been full Politburo members: Zhukov (1956-57) and Grechko
(1967-76). Ustinov, who succeeded Grechko as Defense Minister
in 1976, was a civilian Politburo member who had spent his
entire career dealing with defense production and was only
given the military rank of Marshal when he became Defense.
Minister. The present Defense Minister, Marshal Sokolov, is a
long-time career military officer. He was promoted to
candidate member of the Politburo in April 1985, but is widely
regarded as a transitional figure with little political clout.
Likewise, the military's representation on the Central
Committee is minimal. In 1981, only 30 professional military
officers were candidate or full members, about sixpercent of
total Central Committee membership.
The party's predominance over the military has allowed
civilian leaders to meddle in military affairs at times.
Stalin, of course, decimated the high command in the purges of
the late 1930s, and after WWII moved quickly to reduce Marshal
Zhukov's stature.
Zhukov later regained his influence under Khrushchev. In
1957, Zhukov as Defense Minister was instrumental in helping
the First Secretary put down a challenge from the "anti-party
group." Khrushchev, however, soon ousted his erstwhile ally
and undertook to overturn measures instituted under Zhukov to
bolster professional autonomy within the armed forces.
Khrushchev even sought to intervene personally in the
formulation of military strategy, though he did not attempt to
create an institutional rival to the General Staff.
Gorbachev Continues the Tradition
Gorbachev presumably assumed the function of chairman of
the Defense Council (where actual decision-making on national
security issues . including arms control -- appears to be
centered) and, in effect, supreme commander-in-chief when he
became General Secretary. Events over the past. year do not
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suggest that the military has enjoyed greater-than-usual
influence as a result of the civilian leadership transition.
Although Gorbachev has pushed for increased industrial
investment as the number one priority in the next five-year
plan (1986-90), he has also spoken out against cutting defense
programs. At a June Central Committee meeting, he reaffirmed
that "requisite funds" for the country's defense would be
maintained. In his V-E Day address, Gorbachev stated that the
importance of a "military-political" upbringing for Soviet
citizens was growing.
Following the July 1 removal of Grigoriy Romanov as the
CPSU Secretary responsible for military affairs, Gprbachev has
moved vigorously to assert his leadership in this sphere. On
July 10 he delivered an address to an unusual meeting of top
military officers in Minsk and immediately afterward a number
of key changes in military personnel began surfacing.
Following the pattern of his personnel appointments in the
civilian sphere, he replaced several older military leaders
with younger -- in some cases relatively junior -- people.
--Army General Yepishev, 77, was replaced as head of the
MPA by 57-year-old Colonel General Lizichev. Lizichev was
promoted over several more senior officers in the MPA.
--Army General Maksimov, age 61, has apparently replaced
70-year-old Tolubko as head of the Strategic Rocket Forces.
Together with Yepishev, Tolubko has been put out to pasture at
the Main Inspectorate of the MOD.
--Army General Lushev, previously commander of the Moscow
military district, replaced army general Zaytsev as head of the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.
The replacement of 74-year-old Makeyev, the editor of the
military paper Krasnaya Zvezda since 1955, removed another
pillar of the military establishment.
There have also been reports that 74-year-old Defense
Minister Sokolov is sick and perhaps on the way out. Whatever
the case, the Soviet press reported that Sokolov was present at
Gorbachev's meeting with the high command of the Belorussian
military district on July 10.
The Soviet Military: Coming of Age
The military has gradually assumed a more important role in
national security decision-making over the past two decades
and, in the process, has assumed a higher public profile. This
has largely been due to the arms control process and
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increasingly sophisticated weaponry which have generated the
civilian leadership's need for more military expertise and
advice, The military has consequently also become more
involved in decision-making on arms control itself. Because of
the General Staff's technical expertise and its function, in
effect, as executive secretariat to the Defense Council, the
military is well positioned to argue its views and try to shape
the internal debate in this area.
In the early days, the role of the military in the arms
control process appeared to be limited to exercising a veto
option over any given proposal, after which it stepped back.
In the first SALT negotiations, sensitive information on the
Soviet side appeared to be strictly compartmented and there was
little interaction between military and civilian elements.
When Ogarkov was a member of the Soviet delegation in the early
1970s, he once appealed to an American negotiator not to
discuss Soviet classified information in front of Soviet
civilian team members.
In recent. years, however, the Soviets seem to have adopted
more of an American style in the internal arms control
process. Now the military is much more involved in interacting
on an ongoing basis with other components of the Soviet
national security structure both in Moscow and on the various
negotiating teams in Geneva, Vienna, and Stockholm. The MFA
has its own stable of arms control experts, and the major
Soviet negotiating teams are all led by diplomats with many
years of negotiating experience.
The military has also assumed a more prominent role in
explaining and advancing Soviet positions on military matters,
particularly with regard to the arms control process. By the
beginning of the INF period, it was Defense Minister Ustinov
who in October 1979 in Pravda began to lay out the public
argument that an INF balance already existed. Much of the
Soviet INF argument since then has been framed around the
assertion that the American deployment would upset this
balance, with Defense Ministry officials taking the lead in its
public formulation.
Both former Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov and now his
successor Akhromeyev, as well as Col. Gen. N.F. Chervov, head
of the Defense Ministry's arms control directorate, have been
active public spokesmen for Soviet positions. Far from staying
in the background, as would have been traditionally expected,
they have been at the cutting edge of publicly developing and
explicating Soviet positions.
Wang 3214S
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typed
Role of the CPSU
The Communist party is the core institution of the Soviet
political system, locus of the levers of power and prestige in
the USSR. Every branch of the bureaucracy--state, economic,
military and police--is subordinated to its control. At the
same time, the party is the guardian and interpreter of the
Marxist ideology and responsible for indoctrinating the
population with the ideas and values of Soviet-style communism.
The CPSU now numbers over 18 million members (including
700,000 candidates, i.e., probationers), encompassing about 6
percent of the adult population. The party does not solicit
adherents; it chooses its members. Prospective candidates are
carefully screened. Each must be recommended by three persons
who have already been party members for at least five years.
White-collar workers are prime targets for recruitment. They
made up close to half of the membership in 1983, even though
accounting for only a quarter of the general population.
of about 426,000 primary party organizations, 110,000 are
in factories, transportation, and the like, while 48,000 are on
farms. The remainder are in various institutions,
administrative offices, and military formations. Each CPSU
member is expected to stimulate production within his own
primary organization; these units in turn provide the central
authorities with a vehicle for constant pressure on lower
echelon officials.
Every member has the duty to "master Marxist-Leninist
theor /, raise his ideological level, and contribute to the
molding and rearing of the man of communist society." The
political training of communists ranges from short-term evening
and correspondence courses to the university-level Higher Party
School in Moscow which has a regular four-year qurriculum.
Training at fulltime party schools is regarded as so important
that middle-aged officials holding responsibilities as great as
those of the governor of an American state are sent to the
schools before being given new assignments.
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Mass Organizations
Several mass organizations exist outside the party
framework, but operate under its close and direct supervison.
The Communist Youth League, the Komsomol, is the most important
of these. Its 41-million membership includes a majority of the
country's adolescents (aged 14-18) and a substantial minority
of the 19-26 age group. The Komsomol not only serves to
indoctrinate the youth but it is also a testing and screening
agency for prospective CPSU members. Furthermore, the Youth
League exercises tutelage over the Pioneers, the organization
to which all children of primary school age (10-15) belong,
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The Soviet trade unions, with some 130 million members,
serve the party by stimulating production and prompting
"socialist emulation," competetive campaigns aimed at raising
productivity. They also administer social insurance funds, and
to a limited extent defend worker rights. Other mass
organizations effectively run by the party include the
Knowledge Society (Znaniye), an adult-education body with over
1 million members, and DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for
Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which fosters
military-type sports for civilians and school children.
Party Structure
Theoretically, the CPSU's sovereign organ is the party
congress which, by statute, meets every five years, It is a
gathering of some 5000 delegates which, among other functions,
elects the party's Central Committee, the body nominally
responsible for policymaking in the interim between
congresses. The Central Committee (470 members 319 full and
151 alternates) in turn formally elects the members of smaller
executive bodies to handle the day-to-day work--in particular
the Politburo for policy decisions, and the Secretariat to
oversee and control party and government operations.
In practice, however, these two latter bodies are in
reality the decisionmaking organs of the party. the peak of the
CPSU's nearly perfect bureaucratic pyramid. The Politburo and
Secretariat control the appointment of the regional secretaries
throughout the country and, through them, the lesser
secretaries down to the lowest echelons. The Secretariat sends
binding "recommendations" for major personnel changes to the
non-Russian republics or regional-level party offices, and
often has its executives monitor the electoral plenums at those
levels which implement its "recommendations."
The whole process of electing the party committees that
choose the secretaries at each level is actually controlled by
the very secretaries who are supposed to be elected by those
same subordinates. Each non-Russian republic or regional party
headquarters has an Organizational Party work Department to
manage the process. And the top leadership in Moscow controls
the election of delegates to the sovereign party congress,
which, through the Central Committee its elects, technically
elects the General Secretary.
In the 5-year intervals between congresses, supreme
authority in the CPSU is formally delegated to the Central
Committee to which most of the important officials of the USSR
belong. They are drawn from all segments of the bureaucracy,
but most come from the party apparatus itself. (The party
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apparatus is the body of fulltime officials that erranges
implementation of decisions, manipulates elections and controls
discussions in party meetings.)
The Central Committee's brief and infrequent plenary
meetings (two-three per year) rule out its management of
day-to-day decision-making. Consequently, the real locus of
Soviet power is the Politburo. It is now composed of 13 voting
members and 5 alternates, and meets weekly (usually on Thursday
afternoons) to discuss and decide on major issues. The General
Secretary (Gorbachev) is de facto chairman of the Politburo,
which in recent years has seemed to reach most of its decisions
by consensus.
The Party Secretariat--a sort of NSC staff estimated to
have as high as 10,000 employees--sets the Politburo agenda,
provides the requisite documentation and oversees
implementation of Politburo decisions. of the 11 Secretaries,
Gorbachev, Ligachev and Ryzhkov are full Politburo members; 2
of the 5 Politburo alternates are also central party
Secretaries. (Six Party Secretaries hold no status in the
Politburo).
With the exception of the General Secretary, each of the
Secretaries exercises supervision over a specific sphere of
operations. He does so via departments of the Secretariat
which run parallel to all major state bodies and administer key
areas of Soviet society and foreign affairs. A crucial
function of the Secretariat's Organizational Party Work
Department, for example, is controlling the assignments of the
high- and medium-level personnel to party and Komsomol
organizations, as well as to state and trade union agencies,
Equally close to the heart of party operations are the
Secretariat departments for ideology and indoctrination. These
include the Propaganda, Culture, and Science and Educational
Institutions Departments. Their function is to assure that
every medium for conveying of ideas is actively and properly
promoting the objectives of the regime.
Personal rivalries and frictions permeate the CPSU.
Corruption is known to be rife from top to bottom. And there
has been an increasing tendency among the youth to regard the
Komsomol as a boring and restrictive institution.
Nevertheless, the CPSU has succeeded in creating a strong
amalgam of self-interest and pride in achievement which binds
many to the Soviet system. Gorbachev is clearly eager to
overhaul the party apparatus to make it more responsive to
economic management, committed to reform and to rejuvenate its
ranks. But neither he nor the apparatchiki have any intent of
introducing changes that threaten to loosen their present grip
on every facet of Soviet life.
HCP
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The Soviet Militáry:
Status, Role and Relationship to the Party
The Military Tradition
Since the beginning of the 18th century the military has maintained a
more pervasive role in Russian society than in most other modern European
states. That tradition, to which Gorbachev is heir, is continued by the
Soviet military establishment and contributes to a confluence of views and
goals between the military and the Party in the USSR.
The military in Russian history has played a signal role in state
construction and expansion in addition to its traditional role of state
defense. Peter the Great literally rebuilt a modern Russian state around the
military. The military continued to be the primary instrument of Russian
state growth even after 1917, becoming an important tool in forging the new
Soviet state under the Communist Party. In recent years the military has
continued to play this role through the use of military aid to support the
expansion of state influence and status in the post-WW II world.
The aflitary in Russian history also has performed the role of defender
of the ideological interests of the dominant political group within the
state. In the post-1917 era it has functioned as an instrument of the
Communist Party, initially in the struggle to suppress armed opposition at
home, and subsequently to spread Marxist-Leninist influence abroad.
The military has been an- administrative and organizational model for all
spheres of state activity throughout the history of imperial Russia and the
USSR.
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Hilitary district boundaries have been congruent with the primary
geo-administrative subdivisions of the state before and after 1917,
and the governing organs of each have interlocked.
Lenin adopted a military structure for the Party in 1905, and even
today it is not unusual to see the CPSU Secretariat described as the
"General Staff" of the Party,
0
The Five-Year State Economic Plan was originally based upon and
modeled after the Red Army's national mobilization plan, and military
economists from the Red Army Staff (later the General Staff) taught
courses in economic planning at the State Planning Committee
throughout the 1930s.
o
Many of the national infrastructure ministries, such as the
communications, railways, roadbuilding and maritime ministries and
Aeroflot have an internal structure closely resembling the military:
their heads are flag rank military officers; and they are merged with
or transformed into military formations in wartime.
Political Control Over the Military
The Communist Party from the inception of the Saviet state has concerned
itself with the question of control over the military. In addition to
fastering loyalty to the state and its principles among the military, the
Party has pursued two other approaches. First, it has created both Party and
police control mechanisms within the military. Second, it has attempted to
recruit the best part of the officer corps into the Party.
In order to secure control over the military in the early years of the
regime, the Party created a so-called "nomenklatura" system for the officer
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13
corps, as it did for all other institutions throughout society. This system
identifies key ranks and assignments that can only be filled with Party
members, and for which candidates must receive prior Party approval. The
nomenklatura system for the military and police is. administered by the
Administrative Organs Department of the Party's Central Committee
Secretariat. Before an officer can be promoted to flag rank, for example, the
Administrative Organs Department must approve his promotion. In addition, if
an officer is selected for the General Staff Service, regardless of rank, he
must receive prior approval from the Administrative Organs Department and have
been a Party member in good standing for at least two years.
The Main Political Administration (MPA) of the armed forces and its corps
of political of ficers constitute a key element of the control mechanism. The
head of the MPA simultaneously holds the status of a Central Committee
department head and a First Deputy Minister of Defense. He reports to the
Minister of Defense on military matters and to the CPSU Central Committee
Secretariat on political matters. Political officers, formerly known as
political commissars, serve at all echelons of the armed forces. from the
General Staff to the company level. They have the same dual chain of command
as the head of the MPA. Originally tasked with ensuring the loyalty of the
officer corps, today the political officer is more concerned with the
political performance and orthodoxy of party members in the military,
questions of morale and morality among the forces, and political training and
education. The political officer writes "political fitness. reports" on the
officer corps which are forwarded to the Administrative Organs Department of
the Central Committee. Gorbachev's recent appointment of General Lizichev to
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14
replace General Yepishev as head of the MPA may signal party concern that the
morale and readiness of the armed forces were not being energetically cared
for by the aging Yepishev, who had headed the MPA since 1962.
Party control of the military was also enhanced by the establishment
within the military of special departments of the secret police, known today
as the DOKGB. These officers serve at each echelan of the military and are
known only to a limited number of trusted military officers. their own KGB
chief, and the appropriate section of the Administrative Organs Department of
the Central Committee. They provide security reports on the officer corps as
part of the nomenklatura system. Ironically, these DOKGB officers are
themselves included in the nomenklatura system which they help to enforce.
The military council of each military district includes the Party First
Secretary from the political subdivision or republic with which that district
conforms geographically. Thus, the Party apparatus most equivalent to state
governments in the US interjects itself into deliberations of the military
district command. In this way, up and coming military commanders come to the
attention of rising Party leaders, and personal networks are formed that
transcend the formal organizations each represents. It is probable that
Gorbachev established his first working relationships with the military when
he was in the Party Secretariat of the Stavropol Region in southern Russia.
While building an extensive network of control mechanisms, the Party also
has pursued a policy of coopting the officer corps into its ranks. By 1930
over 50 percent of the officer corps were Party members. By the onset of the
military purges in 1938 the number was 79 percent, and had risen to about 85
percent at the end of World War II. For the past quarter century about 90
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percent of the officer corps have been Party members. In effect, these
officers' individual careers are tied in large part to the Party. They hold
the same basic values and goals as other Party members, and the senior
military leadership constitutes an element of the state and Party
leadership.
This meshing of the officer corps within the Party body politic has
dramatically shaped the course of Party-military relations. In the early
years of the Soviet Republic, when Party membership in the officer corps was
low and 6 significant number of the officers were ex-Tsarist military, the
Party--through the commissars and secret police--played a watchdog role. By
1930 this relationship had begun to change as the Party membership lists
claimed a majority of the officer corps and the number of ex-Tsarist officers
declined significantly. The role of commissars and police became one of
enforcers of orthodoxy within the Party. This condition gave the purge of the
officer corps in 1938 more the cast of an internecine struggle within the
Party than a Party-military conflict.
Although World War II is often viewed as a major force in building
loyalty to the Party within the military, it might better be seen as proof
that the policies of the Party toward the military before 1941 had
succeeded. The overwhelmingly Communist officer corps led the military to
victory, and in the process identified the Communist Party with the patriotic
traditions of Russian society. Most of the political leadership in post-World
Mar H USSR served as military officers in some capacity in World War II, and
this service, as in the case of Brezhnev, became a positive factor in their
political lives, General Secretary Gorbachev represents the first generation
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of Soviet political leaders which has not served in the military. As this new
generation of political Teaders comes to the fore, the lack of personal
military experience is likely to make more important the institutional
mechanisms through which the military influences policymaking.
Another important aspect of the interweaving of Party and military is the
place of military leaders in Soviet society. Since the officer corps is part
of the dominant political group, plays a significant role in all the Party's
voluntary and elected organizations, and has privileged access to scarce
consumer goods, it has little incentive to be disloyal to either Party or
state. This is not to suggest that an individual may not become active in
politics, representing the parochial interests of one or another subset of the
military. Marshal Zhukov, who achieved Politburo membership as a Khrushchev
supporter, threatened to use the military to resolve the issue of internal
Party leadership, causing Khrushchev to remove him. The mílitary remained
loyal to Khrushcher, contributing to Zhukov's downfall. More recently, the
September 1984 transfer of General Staff Chief Marshal Ogarkov to the less
important and powerful post of head of the Western Theater of Military
Operations may have signaled differences between Ogarkov and the Chernenko
Readership, possibly over matters of defense and foreign policy. If so, then
his recent rumored restoration to the central military apparatus would signal
that he has gained the support of the new leadership. In each of these cases
it would be a mistake to see a conflict between the "Party" and the
"military." Rather, it appears that personal relationships, the policy
agreement or differences these reflect, and individual competence are the
determining factors in the rise or fall of military personalities from high
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office in the USSR, not a mythical Party-military conflict.
Military Influence on Policymaking
The military affects policymaking in the USSR through a wide range of
informal and formal mechanisms. It exercises a passive influence because of
its identification with the patriotic traditions of Russian history, the
legitimate defense concerns of the state, and the interests of the Party.
Party leaders, therefore, cannot afford to appear- unconcerned with the
military's needs, In addition, so long as the military is viewed as an
administrative and organizational model, the importance of various policy
positions supported by the military will be reinforced in the minds of Party
leaders and bureaucrats alike.
By virtue of its sheer enormity as-a consumer of resources, the Soviet
military establishment exercises a strong influence on policymaking at every
level. Military economists review every aspect of the five-year and annual
economic plans to assure that the military's minimal needs are met. It is
likely that policymakers seeking to shift resources to other sectors will be
forced to develop doctrinal justifications to support their views, as did
Khrushchev in the late 1950s, when he shifted resources away from conventional
forces into the new Strategic Rocket Forces and the civilian sector. Given
the current problems with the Soviet economy, Gorbachev is likely to be faced
with similar difficulties if he tries to reallocate resources away from growth
16 military spending.
The General Staff system provides the military with its most important
institutional influence on policymaking. All branches of the armed forces and
elements of the central military apparatus are subordinate to the General
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Staff in its role as the personal staff of the Defense Minister and executive
organ of the Supreme High Command. The General Staff not only centralizes
decisionmaking within the military, it also centralizes and controls the flow
of military information to the outside. The Minister, when participating in
Politburo deliberations, draws on the General Staff for support on all
matters. Also, the General Staff provides the Secretariat for the Defense
Council- body roughly equivalent to the National Security Council--
comprising key Party, military, and economic leaders. In addition, because
all senior command and staff positions in the armed forces must be filled by
officers of the General Staff Service, this system mutes interservice
rivalries that might otherwise dilute the mílitary's influence.
The military also influences the development of policy through the corps
of military advisers to the Council of Ministers. These officers from the
General Staff Service serve on the various state committees and commissions
attached to the Council of Ministers, which oversee such diverse functions as
economic planning, state material reserves, foreign economic relations, and
defense and heavy industries. In each case there is a military department
staffed by the military advisers, which has access to all plans and data of
the committee or commission. Through this system the senior military
leadership has access to a constant flow of state economic data and B conduit
into the levels of the state apparatus where policy initiatives are staffed.
The military's influence in Soviet industry is legion. Many of the
defense industrial ministries and their subcomponents are or have been headed
by military officers. Movement back and forth between the military and these
establishments is not uncommon. For example, the current Deputy Minister of
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19
Defense for Armaments served for years in various industrial posts including
that of Deputy Hinister of the Radio Industry. The late Defense Minister,
Marshal Ustinov, served as Minister of Armaments during and after World War II,
before becoming the senior Party Secretary for military and defense industrial
atters.
In addition to occupying management positions in industry, the military
exerts its influence through the system of military representatives. This
body of technical officers, estimated at about 30,000, serves in plants,
laboratories, and design bureaus throughout the USSR. Their role is to assure
that the military's standards are being met wherever goods are being produced
for the armed forces, from gun tubes to ice cream. Organized in a territorial
network, these officers constitute yet another pipeline of the central
military leadership into Soviet society.
Any review of Party-military relations in the USSR today makes two
conditions apparent. First, the military--in the form of its officer corps--
is a completely subservient component of the Party. Second, the military
exercises a profound influence on policymaking, formally and informally, at
every level. Given these conditions, it is difficult to conceive of a
situation where the military would perceive of and pursue its interests
separate from or to the detriment of the Party.
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Leadership Politics and the Role of the Communist Party
The CPSU as a Mass Institution
Having started out as a conspiratorial group of
revolutionaries under Lenin, the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) has become a mass organization. Currently there are
over 18 million party members; about one in twelve Soviet citizens
and about one in five adult males belong to the party. Among the
political, economic, and intellectual elite membership is virtually
one hundred percent.
While the party prides itself on the number of workers and
collective farmers in the party, its real core is the so-called
nomenklatura, the group of officials holding positions requiring
party confirmation. Roughly speaking, they can be divided into two
broad categories: full-time party workers--mainly party
secretaries--and other important bureaucrats in organizations such
as the soviets, the trade unions, the ministries, the military and
the diplomatic corps.
The Decisionmaking Hub
The key decisionmakers in the party are the General Secretary
and the members of the Politburo and Secretariat. These officials
are nominally elected by the Central Committee which, under party
rules, is the CPSU's supreme decisionmaking body in the periods
between its quinquennial congresses. In fact, however, the General
Secretary, Politburo, and Secretariat are able to control the
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selection of the Central Committee that theoretically oversees
them.
The General Secretary: The General Secretary is de facto head
of the party, and as such is the most important man in the USSR.
o The General Secretary chairs Politburo and Secretariat
meetings, giving him considerable power over both the
formulation and the implementation of policy.
Although rarely identified as such in the Soviet media, the
General Secretary is Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Gorbachev
has presumably had this post from the time of his
election. As General Secretary, he also chairs the Defense
Council, the body that formulates military-economic and
defense policy.
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During Brezhnev's final years and under Andropov and
Chernenko, the General Secretary was also President--giving him a
formal government position to go with his actual power. While
Gorbachev has passed up the Presidency for now, he may eventually
assume this post, or perhaps even assume the Premiershíp--the head
of the government bureaucracy--as Khrushchev did during his
tenure.
A General Secretary's power is in some ways greater than that
of the US President. He does not have to deal with an assertive
Congress or face criticism from the media. There are, however,
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limits on his powers and he serves at the sufferance of the
Politburo and the Central Committee which elected him. As
Khrushchev found in 1964, a party leader who alienates both his
Politburo colleagues and the Central Committee can be ousted from
office by a determined group of conspirators.
Building a Powerbase
As Khrushchev's experience indicates, the General Secretary
cannot work alone or against his Politburo colleagues. An
effective General Secretary must, therefore, be responsive to the
views of other Politburo members or he must promote his allies and
proteges into the leadership to establish a working majority:
O As Brezhnev became ensconced in power, he grew more
confident of his ability to act independently. However, he
always took pains to cultivate good relations with key
bureaucratic groups by guaranteeing them political security
and being sympathetic to expansion of their bureaucratic
empires.
Andropov attempted to break with Brezhnev's approach,
realizing that it had led to economic stagnation and
widespread corruption. The continuing presence of
influential Brezhnevites, like then "second secretary"
Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov forced him to move
cautiously, however, and to concentrate on bringing in
personnel loyal to him.
Chernenko returned to the Brezhnev model, attempting to
cement loyalty by slowing up the pace of personnel change,
and allowing policymaking initiative to pass to other
B1,63
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SECRET
Politburo members like Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense
Minister Ustinov, and Secretary Gorbachev.
o
Gorbachev has picked up where Andropov left off. Building
on his mentor's early personnel moves, he has engineered the
ouster of his chief rival, Secretary Romanov, and the
addition. of several of his allies and proteges to the
leadership in record time. His earliest moves show a
willingness to push controversial policies, even at the risk
of alienating his Politburo colleagues and important
bureaucracies.
The Politburor Gorbachev's most powerful colleagues are his
fellow Politburo members. Currently, there are 13 full members and
[íve candidate members of this body. In addition to the General
Secretary, the Premier and the President, the Politburo now
includes four other party secretaties-- two full and two candidate
members--one First Deputy Premier, the heads of three of the
largest republic or regional party organizations, the Foreign and
Defense Ministers, the head of the KGB, and the Minister of
Culture. The six party secretaries who are not Politburo members
evidently also participate in Politburo meetings on a regular
basis.
In a system where caution is the watchword and centralization
is almost a religious belief, nearly all problems get bucked up to
the Politburo. As 3 result, the two dozen or so men who attend its
sessions cun the Soviet Union in a real sense. They are not
politicians in the Western sense, who are adept at public speaking
and communicating with coastituencies on whom they rely for
B1,B3
SECRET
election. While some leaders like Gorbachev possess such skills,
it has traditionally been bureaucratic skills that have contributed
to their rise. The ability to make an institution work despite the
inertia and over-regulation of the system has been crucial to their
advancement.
From a variety of sources, we know that the the Politburo
usually meets once a week or Thursday morning to deal with a wide
range of issues from the most mundane to the most dramatic.
o Published agendas indicate that the Politburo's business
ranges from approval of its members' meetings with foreign
leaders to the endorsement of the production of a new model
color television DZ the increased production of storage
sheds for agrículture.
In discussing Politburo procedure with Western reporters in
the 1970s, Brezhnev said that an attempt is made to come to
consensus and few votes are ever taken. Items that prove
contentious are apparently remanded for additional staff
work. It is possible, however, that Gorbachev, who appears
more determined to press through controversial changes,
could have a major impact on traditional procedure.
Despite the urgency of decisionmaking during foreign policy
crises, the "collective leadership" has been actively
involved. In 1968, for instance, Politburo members were
brought in from outside MOSCOW to take a decision on the
crisis in Czechoslovakia,
O. The Politburo also plays a pivotal role in routine
B1.B3
25
SECRET
diplomacy. It regularly sets policy for upcoming
negotiating sessions, like the Geneva arms talks, and will
certainly discuss the upcoming summit.
The Secretariat: The Secretariat is the second key
institution at the pinnacle of power. Chaired by the General
Secretary, it deals with day-to-day operations of the party
bureaucracy and touches on all aspects of political life. The
Secretariat does most of the staff work for the Politburo,
preparing the Politburo's agenda, processing its decisions, and
seeing to their implementation. Many of the decisions bucked to
the top, but not quite important enough for Politburo
consideration, are decided in the Secretariat. Personnel
appointments and other important policy decisions are in practice
hammered out at this level and only forwarded to the Politburo for
formal approval.
Currently, there are three so-cálled "senior secretaries"--
that is secretaries who are also full Politburo members. They
oversee the eight other party secretaries and a bureaucracy which
includes 24 departments. These departments conduct the party's day
to day operations falling into the following broad categories:
national security and foreign affairs; ideology; industry;
Agriculture; and internal party affairs. They act as the party's
eyes and ears. Although Andropov reportedly wanted to curtail the
party involvement in the minutiae of running the country, no
efforts have yet been made to pare back this bureaucracy.
The Central Committee: The party Central Committee in theory
has the most power-it elects the Politburo and Secretariat and
133
SECRET
chooses the General Secretary. The reality is quite different and
only in very tare cases--for example in 1957 when it overrode the
Politburo's decision to oust Khrushchev--has it exercised its
formal powers.
The Central Committee includes the five hundred or so most
important members of the political elite. Although some Western
scholars have compared it to the US Congress or a Western
parliament, the comparison is misleading. The Central Committee
meets only briefly, usually twice a year, and normally rubberstamps
the decision of the Politburo and Secretariat. A better comparison
might be to the assemblies of the nobility in medieval Europe--this
modern Soviet elite, however, is composed of government ministers,
regional party leaders, key military officers and diplomats, with a
handful of token workers. The Central Committee acts as a
soundingboard for policies made in the Kremlin. The leadership has
a strong interest in keeping it informed and sympathetic because,
in most cases, its members are the bureaucrats who will carry out
the Politburo's policies.
The Lower Runys of the Party Apparatus
While the party apparatus below the top has little imput in
policymaking, it plays the critical role in implementing Politburo
and Secretariat policies. At the outset of the revolution, Lenin
outlined a theory of "transmission belts" whereby the party. would
control the actions of the mass institutions, the government, trade
unions, and the economy. It is in this capacity that the lower
party committees, which include the leaders of these other
bureaucracies, play their crucial role. In essence, the lower
SECRET
committees and their first secretaries act like miniature
Politburos and Secretariats in their own right:
o
nearly every local problem eventually ends up on the
desk of the party first secretary.
0
Despite criticism of overinvolvement of the party committees
in state affairs, the party is still being enjoined to play
the leading role in modernizing Soviet society.
So long as policy is made in the party and handed down from on
high, representatives of all other institutions will remain
subordinate to party bureaucrats and dependent on their clout to
solve the myriad of problems stemming from the complexity of the
planned economy and the over-centralization of the system.
Whither the Party?
Gorbachev is clearly intent on keeping the party in its
dominant position, although he apparently envisions the party less
as 3 ideological watchdog and more as a motor of economic change.
0
There is general agreement among Soviets and East European
who know him that he takes a pragmatic approach to issues
rather than refering to Marxist dogma. He reportedly
intends to promote likeminded party officials.
0
He has called on the party to do the strategic planning for
the modernization of the economic system, acting as a
driving force in the S&T revolution. He is bringing capable
managers and economic experts, such as Secretary Ryzhkov,
into key party positions despite their lack of extensive
background in party affairs.
B1,B3
SECRET
o While calling for a "revolutionary" approach to modernizing
the Soviet economy, he has made it clear that he does not
intend to dismantle central planning or or take other steps
which would threaten the primacy of the party bureaucracy.
B1,33 typed PAPER 3
CONFIDENTIAL/
II2
The Soviet Ruling Class: Nomenklatura
The ruling class in the Soviet Union today-the hundreds of
thousands of Party-appointed bureaucrats who control the lives of
all Soviet citizens and organizations- has reigned more or less
without interruption since the late 1930s. The beginnings of
this class, rising from the ashes of Stalin's mass terror and
constant purges, were difficult to discern at that time. This
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS $ f00-009/17
NARA, Date 06
was when Winston Ch.
: made his famous remark about Russia
being a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. And in
fact it was not possible then to second-guess the motives and
designs of the unpredictable dictator, who seemed determined to
put his domestic opponents off-balance by keeping his political
establishment in a state of permanent instability. Yet, the
gathering clouds of a world war forced Stalin to prepare the
By
country against the anticipated storming by Nazi Germany, and in
the process was born the ruling class that survives to this day.
Studies by Western scholars and government analysts
typically describe today's ruling class in the USSR 85
"Stalinist Analysis of the backgrounds and careers of the
Soviet elite establishment has shown conclusively that the most
senior leaders over the past four decades gained their positions
either by accommodating to the political goals of Stalin himself
(e.g., Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kosygin) or by attaching themselves
CONFIDENTIAL
B1,33
CONFIDENTIAL
to the "tail" of factions or groupings headed by Stalinist
leaders (e.g., Chernenko, Tikhonov, Gorbachev). Entrance into
the elite has invariably resulted from such accommodation, and
not from challenging the status quo.
Understanding the unique political instrument known as the
nomenklatura helps to explain why the Soviet regime has produced
a ruling class that has been SB consistently Stalinist over a
period of more than four decades. This instrument is the key to
the Soviet Communist Party's unified personnel system. Like all
instruments, rts application and effectiveness depend a great
deal on how it is wielded.
The nomenklatura is relatively simple in concept but, as is
shown below, complex in its ramifications. According to one
Soviet administrative handbook, it is "a list of persons whose
ranks are confirmed by higher authorities." Another Soviet
textbook for Communist Party members elaborates on this
politically sensitive subject 85 follows:
"The nomenklatura is a list of the highest positions.
Candidates for these positions are examined by various party
committees. recommended, and confirmed. These nomenklatura
party committee members can be relieved of their positions
only by authorization of their committees. Persons elevated
to the nomenklatura are those in key positions.'
B1,33
3
CONFIDENT TAL/
This theoretical definition of the nomenklatura omits
several crucial points. For example, if it is a list of the
"highest" positions, which is the highest approving authority?
The answer, of course, lies in the hierarchical nature of the
political establishment, best viewed as a pyramid at the top of
which sits the General Secretary. As head of the Politburo, he
has the ultimate authority in political appointments. Thus,
positions in the Communist Party and state that rate membership
in the party's putatively highest committee, the Central
Committee, are approved by the next higher authority--t the
Politburo, which the Central Committee "elects" to conduct the
party's day-to-day business. An official could not become a
Central Committee member, however, without the ultimate approval
of the General Secretary, whom the Central Committee *elects* to
direct the work of the Politburo as well as the Party
Secretariat.
6. This bureaucratic, legalistic facet of the Soviet
hierarchical system helps to throw light on how Stalin and his
successors in the top party post have managed to place their
personal stamp on the ruling elite over the years. It is
reinforced b.y the statutory mandate of the Secretariat (not the
Politburo) to "select, place, and train" the party's cadres.
This answers another question not addressed in the theoretical
definition: who ultimately forwards the names of candidates to
the "various party committees" to be "examined, recommended, and
confirmed?" It is- the party secretariats at all levels,
B1,33
CONF IDENTIAL/
beginning at the top with the Central Committee Secretariat,
headed by the General Secretary.
Considering the vaqueness of the theoretical definitions
about the "highest" and "key" positions of the nomenklatura
"list," an outsider might estimate that it comprises the
approximately 500 jobs that rate Central Committee status, or at
most the roughly 5,000 positions held by delegates elected to a
typical party congress every 5 years. in fact, however, the
nomenklatura: is much lårger. One published Soviet account
indicated that in October 1947 (i.e., soon after the political
system had assumed its present general structure) the
nomenklatura of the Central Committee-- posts to he filled over
which the Central Committee, Including the Politburo and
Secretariat, had authority--compriseg about 40,000 positions.
This number presumably has increased as Communist Party
membership and the bureaucracy have grown since then.
in fact., the nomenklatura extends down to the lowest levels
of the political establishment, so that virtually any position of
any importance is controlled by the next echelon, right up to the
ery top. One former Soviet insider who recently completed a
comprehensive study of the nomenklatura system estimates the
total number of controlled positions at three quarters of a
million. In his view, it is the existence of the nomenklatura
that has resulted in the emergence of a privileged "new class" of
rulers, to borrow from the phrase used decades ago by the
IN
B1,B3 3
CONFIDENTIAL/
disenchanted Yugostav Communist, Milovan Djilas.
As the above discussion implies, the nomenklatura is
actually an officially sanctioned system of political
patronage. Using it carefully, a General Secretary can gradually
appoint his followers and allies to key positions and, over time,
create a Central Committee that largely consists of officials
beholden to him for their positions. Brezhnev skillfully
employed this tool to advance former associates from the Ukraine
and Moldavia, and even his relatives, to some of the "highest"
positions, including those conferring Central Committee status
and privilege.
Resides encouraging cronyism and even nepotism, the
nomenklatura system strongly promotes a certain sameness in the
political and social traits of the appointers and the
appointees. This tendency is reflected in the backgrounds of
leading Soviet officials appointed since Stalin's time, the vast
majority of whom have had an engineering or technical
education. This his been carried to such an extreme that even
one of Brezhnev's foreign policy assistants was a graduate of a
railway engineering school. (Perhaps equally significant was the
school' location-- in the Brezhnev bailiwick of
Onepropetrovsk.) The system is designed, it appears, to
discourage diversity of views and to exclude broad-minded persons
with far-reaching ideas.
B' 33
3
CONFIDENTIAL/
in short, there are no philosopher-kings waiting in the
wings to advance to the highest positions of leadership. Even
the legally trained Garbachev, a. rare exception smong the
engineers who populate the Stalinist ruling elite, had to
accommodate to the demands of the nomenklatura in order to make a
political career, attending an agricultural institute and
advancing through a long train of positions in agriculture before
becoming General Secretary. Such is the power of the
nomenklatura, which puts overwhelming value on bureaucratic
conformity rather than intellectual breadth.
14