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Shultz/Shevardnadze Meeting in New York 10/25/1985
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Shultz/Shevardnadze Meeting in New York 10/25/1985
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s United States of America (U.S.A.) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Summits Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Shultz/Shevardnadze
Meeting in New York, October 25, 1985
Box: 45
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https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: dlb
File Folder: Shultz/Shevardnadze in N.Y. October 25, 1985
Date: 1/4/01
Box 98129 45
Skinner/F00-008/1
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
+ MemCon
The Secretary's Meeting with Soviet Foreign
10/25/85
B1
Minister Shevardnadze, October 25, 1985, US
Mission to the United Nations, 15 P/
R 2/13/02 Foo-008/, # 141
2 MemCon
Same as Item #1, with additional 2 paragraphs
10/25/85
B1
inserted on page 5, 15 p.
R
a
d #142
u
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
the FOIA].
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
FOIA].
the FOIA].
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
NLS DECLASSIFIED F00-008/, #141
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
BY Cts NARA, DATE 2/13/02
October 25, 1985
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: The Secretary's Meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze
DATE: October 25, 1985
TIME: 7:30 a.m.-9:30 a.m.
PLACE: US Mission to the United Nations
PARTICIPANTS
US
Secretary Shultz
Assistant to the President McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Matlock
DAS Palmer
Interpreter Zarechnak
Soviets
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov
Assistant to the FM Chernishev
Assistant to the FM Tarasenko
Minister-Counselor Sokolov
Interpreter N. Uspenskiy
Interpreter P. Palashchenko
Secretary Shultz welcomed Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and
noted that we have a tradition of working breakfasts and lunches.
Shevardnadze said that he believed that this is a good tradition.
Shevardnadze noted that the President had had a reception in the
same room the day before. The Secretary said that the President had
met with Thatcher, Craxi, Kohl, Mulroney, Nakasone -- noting that we
meet with the group of seven on economic issues each year. All of
them had been present except France, which had other things to do.
The Secretary noted that we had a well-known comic with a long nose
named Jimmy Durante. He had a saying "everybody wants to get into
the act". It seems that everybody has advice for us with regard to
President Reagan's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
SECRET SENSITIVE
-2-
Shevardnadze agreed that this was the case, and noted that at
every meeting he had had when he was last in New York and again this
time all of his interlocutors raised the meeting next month. This
is the center of discussion. The Secretary said that this shows
people attach great importance to the meeting and everything it
covers. Shevardnadze said that now literally the whole world is
living day to day with thoughts about this meeting. The Secretary
noted that during the meeting he had held with Gromyko last January
in Geneva there were around 1500 journalists. We imposed a rule
that we would say nothing for two to three days, so they had zero to
report. They were reduced to interviewing each other. Shevardnadze
said that this time journalists in New York had more food for
reporting as there are more heads of government here; although the
majority of the heads seem to have already departed. The Secretary
noted that the President still has bilaterals with Nakasone and
Kohl, and he would then be seeing the family of Mr. Klinghoffer. He
was the man murdered on the Italian ship under tragic
circumstances. Indeed, one of the issues he wanted to raise this
morning was this question of terrorism. He noted it now because the
Klinghoffer family lives here in New York.
Shevardnadze noted that they did not have much time as far as he
understood the situation. The Secretary said that they had until
9:30 a.m., they would have their eggs right now and then be ready to
proceed. He understood from our Ambassador to the United Nations
that the social schedule up here at the UN was such that you could
eat 10 to 15 times a day. Shevardnadze responded that we need to
take a closer look at what our people are doing there. He said that
he had a warm recollection of the time he spent at the Secretary's
house in Washington. The Secretary said that he and his wife had
enjoyed having them and that he had asked his wife about how her
lunch with Mrs. Shevardnadze had been. She had noted that Mrs.
Dobrynin had been a very able interpreter. Mrs. Shultz has decided
that she would like to accompany him to Moscow. The Secretary asked
whether Shevardnadze had thought further about how the trip would be
announced. Shevardnadze said that they assumed Mrs. Shultz will be
coming, and they are ready for an announcement to journalists
today. He would say that the Soviet Union had invited the Secretary
and that we have now agreed that such a trip would be useful and
would take place. The Secretary noted that he would probably be
asked whether he would see Gorbachev in Moscow. He would say that
he looks forward with interest to meeting with Gorbachev. He would
discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin the details of the trip and could
do this on the next Tuesday as he would be away in Canada on Monday.
Shevardnadze said that one thing is clear about the meetings in
Moscow -- this would be the closing stage of preparations for
Geneva. We should have that in mind as we put together the program
for Moscow. The Secretary said that we should try to get as much
settled as possible in Moscow, though he would not preclude
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
ambassadors continuing the work on some problems afterwards but we
should do as much as we can in Moscow. Shevardnadze said that we
can start here and finish in Moscow.
The Secretary noted that we have worked out an innovation with
regard to interpretation. We will go with simultaneous
interpreting. If at any moment either side wants it to be slower,
the simultaneous will stop and we will pick up with consecutive.
There are items when we will want to be sure of what is being said
and we should take the time to be careful.
Shevardnadze said that he agreed and that as he understood it he
should raise his hand if he wants clarification. This will not be a
sign of protest. The Secretary noted that in the United States this
was traditionally a sign that you wanted to go to the bathroom.
At this point the food was cleared away and the formal part of
the meeting began. The Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze back to New
York. We had looked forward to the discussion here. As
Shevardnadze was the guest, the Secretary would invite him to go
first. The Secretary noted that he had a lot to cover himself as
well.
Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary. He said that on behalf of
his delegation he wanted to give a cordial greeting and to thank the
Secretary for the attention and hospitality which had been given to
him personally, his family, and their delegation. Shevardnadze
noted that this was his fourth meeting with the Secretary if
Helsinki is included. The focus of recent contacts had been
addressing the issues which needed preparations for the meeting
between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. In this
meeting, their purpose was to review what they had been able to do
and how to go about making the Summit successful and meeting the
hopes for the future. The day before he had mentioned to the
President that the Soviets had taken certain steps. On the one
hand, they had made some large-scale proposals with regard to
security. For example, they had proposed a prohibition on
space-strike weapons, deep cuts on strategic weapons, as well as
addressing medium-ranged weapons in Europe. That is how they see
the proposals which they are bringing to Geneva. They have adopted
serious steps. Unfortunately, all of these steps are of a
unilateral nature. to date. They also have pledged not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons. They have placed limits on
medium-range missiles in Europe. They have put into effect a
unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. They have proposed a ban on
ASAT tests to be followed by destruction of ASAT systems. This is a
program of unilateral measures which the Soviet government has
announced. Many of these unilateral measures are in effect.
Gorbachev in Paris mentioned to the French Parliament that the
number of medium-ranged nuclear weapons will be equal to the number
in June 1984. He also said that they have begun dismantling of
these missiles.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
-4-
Shevardnadze continued that they are convinced that these acts
are conducive to accomplishment of the main task. Unfortunately, he
had to note that on the part of the US Administration these had not
been met by understanding. It seems to the Soviets that one side
has an interest in preparing for the Summit while the other side is
not interested and is dragging its feet and delaying. They have
this impression with regard to the Geneva negotiations. Gorbachev
had sent a letter to President Reagan which laid out their concept
with regard to these negotiations. Their delegation had then
elaborated in Geneva. They are following the course of these
negotiations with big interest. So far they have not seen any
encouraging signs. He wanted to take an objective stand. He knew
that within a week or a month it was hard to answer all questions.
But now is the time for the other side to make a contribution.
Given past experience, it is possible to bring positions together.
With very few days to go, each side must take a responsible
approach. They need to use every hour. The leadership in the
Soviet Union and you in the United States have a responsibility to
shoulder. This was mentioned by your President at the meeting the
day before.
Shevardnadze continued that it cannot be said there is nothing
positive in the relationship. He and the Secretary had had four
meetings. Shevardnadze had met with the President. They had a
variety of bilateral consultations. There were the meetings in
Geneva. But this was not enough. What they had in mind today is to
review what had been done and to formulate what they could bring to
the Summit; what the results of that meeting could be. With the
Secretary's permission he would like to continue for some time and
to discuss some practical problems.
Shevardnadze noted that during his last meeting they had
proposed 50% reductions of appropriate weapons; of course with
banning space-strike weapons. Since then the Soviet delegation had
presented this in Geneva. On the basis of discussions among the two
delegations, they need to think how best to prepare for serious
discussions at the Summit of Soviet proposals. Detailed
consideration requires time. Thus at this stage, it would be better
not to focus on details, but search for a mutually acceptable
approach. They would like to instruct the delegations to explore
language that could be included in a final document. As he
understood, there is agreement that there could be a concluding
document. They are thinking not of a detailed paper but one which
reflects similarity of viewpoints. In Gorbachev's letter of
September 12, they had put forward suggestion with regard to a
concluding document. Regarding a document, there could be a joint
statement on the inadmissibility of war. It was Shevardnadze's
impression that the President agrees about the inadmissibility of
war. He would like to outline the content of such a pronouncement
[Soviet Embassy will provide precise language -- promised October
26th].
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
-5-
Shevardnadze continued that they believed such a joint statement
could be an important part of the Summit. It could be a separate
statement or it could be part of a concluding document. Perhaps the
Secretary would like to say something with regard to this issue or
Shevardnadze could go on to medium-ranged missiles. The Secretary
said that he would have comments but it was better for Shevardnadze
to finish and then he would present his materials.
Shevardnadze stated that the Soviets assume the United States
will have some remarks. This is draft language. It will require
work to reach agreement.
Shevardnadze said he would now like to turn to medium-range
missiles. The Soviet side was working to achieve a radical solution
to medium-range systems in Europe. The US side has said it is ready
to reach an agreement. But the two delegations have not been able
to find convergence in order to reach a radical and final
settlement. Considering all the circumstances, it is possible to
accommodate the US proposal for an interim solution. The Soviet
delegation has set forth a proposal. As of December 1, they would
set aside deployment of medium-range systems. They would also
discontinue implementation of other countermeasures in Europe and
there would be a freeze in other areas with the understanding that
there was no substantial change in the strategic setting in Asia.
There could then be staged reductions in Europe. In eighteen months
to two years you could end up with 120 US cruise missiles and have a
Soviet number of medium-range warheads equivalent to the number of
warheads on US missiles and the relevant arms of the UK and France.
In the meantime, we could continue to work for a more radical
solution including aircraft. So what the Soviet Union is proposing
is a practical approach. If an accord could be reached, this also
could be reflected in a concluding document. If, however, there is
a need for additional work, then the Soviet side proposes that the
delegations in Geneva explore what can be mutually agreed upon as
soon as possible. This exploration could then continue in Moscow.
Shevardnadze stated that he also wanted to make some suggestion
with regard to the SALT II Treaty. December 31, 1985 is the date
when SALT II becomes ineffective or expires. What should we do
beyond that. It seems to the Soviet side that at least we should
extend it through 1986, that the US and the USSR should continue to
adhere to the extent they're now doing. They have language to
suggest in this regard [Soviet Embassy to provide]. Shevardnadze
noted that they would be prepared to consider any formulation the
United States wanted to put forward on this subject.
Shevardnadze said that we also would have to consider the
question of the large American radars in Greenland and the UK.
These have been raised in previous meetings. They are clearly in
violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union had expressed this
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET ENSITIVE
-6-
concern in the SCC. Despite US assertions, this is not
modernization of old stations. Instead of a non-phased array, the
US is building phased array. He would like to say emphatically that
depiction of Krasnoyarsk as incompatible with the Treaty is not
true. This station is designed for tracking space objects. It has
nothing to do with early warning. The Soviet Union is in favor of
jointly looking for a settlement. This could be done by means of
ceasing construction at Krasnoyarsk, in Greenland and in Britain.
If this is acceptable, then a basic agreement could be reached at
the summit and more detailed agreement at the SCC.
Shevardnadze continued that with regard to non-proliferation
there are some positive things. The representatives of the two
countries have prepared a draft text. This text could be adopted at
the Summit as it has the necessary set of elements. If the
Secretary has no objection, they can consider this agreed at their
level and can submit it to their leaders for the Summit. There are
no great differences on this question.
He then wanted to say a few words about their moratorium on
nuclear weapons tests. They did not consider that this was off the
agenda. For almost three months the moratorium had been in effect,
and it would continue to January 1, 1986. It would continue beyond
that if the United States decides to refrain from tests. Frankly,
reluctance by the US to follow does not appear logical. The US has
been saying that it is in favor basically of a full cessation of
nuclear tests. If that is true, the time has come. References to
verification are not appropriate. It would be readily verifiable.
Nuclear explosions can't be concealed. Soviet instruments and
probably US instruments are capable of recording explosions on any
scale. They had mentioned a specific test by the US. A positive
attitude by the US side towards refraining from tests and resumption
of CTB talks would open the way to solving verification and finding
reasonable compromises there. The Soviet side was certain solutions
could be found. He hoped there would be concrete discussions with
the US side on this question.
Shevardnadze continued that at their previous meetings Stockholm
had been discussed and they had seen some positive trends towards a
resolution. They had agreed on drafting. This is, of course, good
but agreements in principle need to be put in practice. The
approach proposed by the neutral countries would make possible
moving with a certain rhythm, including giving concerted attention
to working out an agreement on non-use of force and a set of
confidence-building measures. The Soviets had agreed on an annual
exchange of information on military activities. They hoped that
general agreement on this score would make difficult preparations
for a secret war. But their recent information from Stockholm is
that the US delegation is slowing things down. There is a
toughening of the US position, it is more rigid with regard to
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
-7-
non-use of force. The Soviet side had heard that nothing terrible
would happen if there is no agreement until the fall of 1986 and the
problem is just transferred to the Vienna conference. They hope
that no factors will be allowed to impede progress. Most
delegations are favorable to positive movement. The Soviet side
believes it would be desirable to include Stockholm in the
conclusions of the US-Soviet summit. They attached importance to
Stockholm and with the other participating parties intend to work
for an early successful conclusion.
With regard to the Vienna negotiations, Shevardnadze noted that
in several days there would be the 12th anniversary of the talks.
Unfortunately, there is a complete stalemate. In February, the
Warsaw Treaty countries had put forward a proposal for initial
reductions of US and Soviet forces followed by a freeze. What they
have in mind is a partial agreement on what is possible now. He
recalled comments by the US that it would soon determine its
position. This is a problem ripe for solving.
Shevardnadze asked whether he was abusing the amount of time
available. The Secretary said that he was watching Shevardnadze's
pile of briefing papers gradually decrease, but that he should
continue. Looking toward the simultaneous interpreters,
Shevardnadze said that this is a better way of using the time (as
opposed to consecutive interpretation).
Shevardnadze continued that last time they had had a useful
exchange on chemical weapons. They had looked at this again.
Banning these weapons is quite possible. In the stream of efforts
to ban chemical weapons, the Soviet Union now has said that it is
ready to work out a non-proliferation regime. If we had been able
to do this with regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
where our two countries had done a lot of the work, why couldn't a
similar approach work with regard to chemical weapons proliferation.
The problem of chemical weapons will become more complicated if the
US deploys binaries. The Soviet side hopes for a serious approach
on chemical weapons to be included in the summit. It would be
useful there to reaffirm that both sides are for banning these
weapons and for an international convention. If we agree in
principle, then we could agree on giving an impulse here.
Shevardnadze then stated that in quite a few areas of bilateral
relations there has been positive movement. This has progressed
quite a bit. On the North Pacific Air Safety Talks we have a
memorandum of understanding in effect and we have begun negotiations
on a technical agreement. Unfortunately, the first round did not
bring about agreement. The US side is insisting on a number of
provisions which go beyond the framework of the memorandum of
understanding. The Soviet side fails to understand the decision of
the US side to suspend the talks on air travel between the two
countries. A question arises whether the US really wants an
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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agreement on these matters. We need clarity on this issue. The
exchanges negotiations are in their final stages. They are impeded
only by a US demand that is not consistent with what they have in the
Soviet Union and also the practice in the United States. So whether
or not there will be an agreement is up to the United States.
But these questions and the consulates are quite realistic.
Shevardnadze continued that the day before he had said to the
President that they are making preparations with regard to the
proposals of the President on such matters as computer education,
exchange of students, study of Russian and others. They had
instructed the Soviet ministries and departments to analyze these
proposals of the President. They would be prepared in Moscow to
give the Secretary a preliminary answer on these matters. Overall,
both sides need to clear the roadblocks that block bilateral
cooperation. They need to set aside what makes agreement more
difficult and focus on where they have a sufficient degree of mutual
understanding.
Shevardnadze said that he would now like to raise for discussion
the question of creating a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor
with socialist countries, China, the United States, West European
countries and Japan. This is a fundamentally new source of energy
and is practically inexhaustible. Thermonuclear fusion has been
confirmed by Soviet and US scientists who have been working
together. Our cooperating on a project of such a reactor has been
under development in the International Atomic Energy Agency since
1978. The Soviet side now thinks we should begin work on a
prototype. This would not be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. We
could get practice on this and then produce commercial reactors.
This is a very large scale and promising area. Realization of it
would demonstrate more broadly the possibility of peaceful
cooperation among states. The Soviets understand that the U.S. will
need to study this idea. We could then explore it further in Moscow.
Shevardnadze then said that with regard to regional problems, it
is positive we have had bilateral discussions on different regions.
They will continue towards the end of this month with talks on
Central America. On the basis of all these discussions, it seems
difficult to the Soviet side for the leaders to adopt concrete
proposals on separate regions. Therefore, the Soviet side proposes
that at the meeting of the leaders that they note the common
commitment of the two states to resolve urgent regional problems.
They would name the regions in question, where urgent solutions are
required and say they were in favor of solutions including of
bilateral conflicts. It would be important to reaffirm the need for
restraint and taking into account the legitimate interests of each
other and of other nations involved.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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-9-
Shevardnadze said that as he had noted to the President, it was
now of basic importance to give additional impulses to all of our
delegations -- in Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm and elsewhere. On
bilateral relations, we need to give additional instructions to our
embassies. We need more intensive preparations for the main
documents, we need to formulate the main things that would conclude
the summit meeting, having in mind that during the visit to Moscow
we will have more concrete discussions of all the problems. We need
to agree there on language for a joint overall concluding document.
This is the overall way the Soviets envisage the principal format
that could become the basis for discussion at the summit meeting.
Of course, the Soviets recognize that everything cannot be
considered and resolved at one summit meeting. They intend meetings
to continue to take place. They want to set an outline for the
future, for prospects beyond the meeting next month.
The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his comprehensive
presentation. There was much that was constructive. The U.S. will
have to study what he had said. Some things we can agree on; some
offer promise, but will need to be worked through; and there are
some where we clearly disagree. The Secretary agreed that we need
to continue to give impulses to those working in various areas
before our leaders meet. He said that he wanted now to go through
the areas which will be discussed in Geneva. He would start with
bilateral matters. Rather than going through subject by subject,
what our positions are and where there are problems, he would just
like to give Shevardnadze a written statement (Secretary handed over
three page, non-paper). This paper is presented in the hope that we
can bring focus on the problems and if possible prior to Moscow or
during and after that, but prior to Geneva see what can be resolved.
The Secretary continued that he could not say he had foreseen
the Soviet proposal for a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor.
His own company had worked in this field, he had thought it was far
away from development, but let us look at this proposal.
The Secretary said he would now like to comment on regional
issues. He noted Shevardnadze's points in his speech the day before
to the UNGA. Both sides recognized that these matters present in
themselves problems and problems between the two of us. Getting at
this is the intention of the President's proposals. As he noted,
the regional experts' talks have been useful. We have proposed
regularizing them, perhaps putting this in the joint document. We
have no answer from the Soviet side, although perhaps what
Shevardnadze had said about regional consultations implied that they
accepted this proposal. But we need to solve, not just discuss
these problems. Shevardnadze had said that there was no fated clash
between us. He also had said that these regional crises obstruct
economic development and had talked about the tragedies of small
wars -- although some are not so small anymore. So the US hopes
that this means that the Soviets are ready to help solve some of
these problems.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
-10-
The Secretary continued that what the President proposed is a
framework for US-Soviet efforts, principles and processes which we
might both act upon, recognizing that each area has its own history
and in some respects is unique. We need in the first instance to
work on those conflicts--Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola
and Ethiopia--which directly contributed to the deterioration of our
relations. These issues are at the core of international tensions
and were largely responsible for shattering efforts to improve
US-Soviet relations in the 1970's. So if we are to have the kind of
sustained improvement in our relations that we both seek, it is
important that we have movement on these issues. This is
particularly true with regard to Afghanistan which more than any
other example demonstrates for the American people the use of force
by a great power against a small nation and which basically ended
chances for ratification of SALT II. The Secretary mentioned this
as with all due respect to arms control agreements, they can be
readily derailed by an atmosphere created by regional conflicts.
These troubles often arise from local situations but outside
influences made them worse and gave them an East-West dimension.
The Secretary stated that we never made any secret that our
sympathies are with those who fight for independence but we need
negotiated solutions. He noted what Shevardnadze had said in this
regard. So the US is prepared as the President said for military
disengagement by both our countries.
What we have in mind is a peace process to address these
conflicts at three levels. First there should be negotiations
between the warring parties, designed to achieve an end to violence,
national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops. Second,
once these negotiations make real progress, then appropriate,
separate discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union
would begin. These talks would not be formal negotiations but would
support what the groups inside another country had been trying to
arrive at. In some cases, this would mean guaranteeing arrangements
reached in negotiations but in every case our role would be to help
reduce outside military involvement and to limit the flow of outside
arms. In the third stage, if there is more stability in a given
country and we are able to help, then it would be possible to
reintegrate these countries into the world economy. This would
require a multilateral reconstruction effort. The US is prepared to
play its part and we assume the Soviet Union would as well. So the
process is one of reducing violence, then supporting it through
bilateral efforts and third sponsoring economic reconstruction.
If Shevardnadze agreed, the Secretary would be prepared to
develop language for our leaders to use in Geneva in a document. In
any case, we would hope that the General Secretary would discuss
these regional matters with President Reagan in Geneva. There are
things he could say about each area but he would not take the time
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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as they have limited time left. But the United States does not
limit its interest to the five countries mentioned. They had
discussed Iran and Iraq as part of their discussion of the Middle
East, and he had some thoughts about Iran and Iraq. Both agree that
the war is not in our interest. Iran is the intransigent party.
They think they have a vertical hot line so there is no way to talk
with them. Thus the way is to stop the flow of arms to Iran. The
US has been trying this and with some success. According to US
information, the major flow of arms is coming from North Korea, some
countries in Europe and Libya.
The Secretary continued that with regard to Shevardnadze's
comments about banning chemical weapons, they were being used in
this war; and there was a potential major outbreak of the use of
these weapons. There is a common view that there is a stalemate;
this was the Secretary's view. But if Iran succeeds, this would
give fresh impetus to spreading its backward doctrines in that
region. So the US thinks there should be a stop to the flow of
weapons.
In general there is a great deal to talk about in the regional
field, where we could be a constructive force, help stabilize our
bilateral relations, and more broadly East-West relations. Perhaps
in Moscow they could return to regional issues; there was not time
today to go through his considerable stack of materials. It was
important to help bring about political settlements -- this would
help our relations and of course help the problems themselves. This
is security in the most fundamental way. If we can stop arms from
being used in these regions, then we can lay the basis for arms
control.
The Secretary wanted to say a word about terrorism. They might
talk about this further themselves and address it to our leaders.
Each of us has been the victim of terrorism in recent weeks. At
least one American has died; a Soviet diplomat also has died. Each
of us has hostages who are being held by terrorists in Lebanon. The
U.S. made a strong statement about your hostages and the dead
Soviet, and he wanted again to express our sympathies. The US knows
the Soviets are making a major effort to get their people released
just as the U.S. is doing. The U.S. believes the Soviet hostages
are being held by a small Sunni group very close to the group
holding our people. Both groups are heavily influenced by Iran
which has not been trying to obtain their release. Syria is
constrained by relations with Iran and by the confused situation in
Lebanon. In the case of the TWA hostages Iran's last-minute
endorsement, at Syria's urging, appeared to be a key factor in their
release. This is one area where we can and should stand together.
We should let the world know. The U.S. noted some greater
understanding initially on your part with regard to the Achille
Lauro incident, although subsequent Soviet press treatment was
opportunistic.
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The Secretary continued that we have some joint experience with
regard to discussing certain issues such as nuclear terrorism and
hostage taking. Here US-Soviet cooperation would be quite
dramatic. If nothing else it would show the terrorists that they
are isolated, that they have no sanctuary. This could have an
impact.
Next, the Secretary wished to turn to arms control. The US
continues to study the Soviets' ideas thoroughly. As the President
and he had said, the US sees seeds which could be nurtured in the
Soviet proposal. We will be responding. The Secretary noted that
the US had had proposals on the table since last spring and had had
a long wait to hear concrete Soviet proposals. Nevertheless, these
are issues that had been studied by both sides for years, they are
not new subjects. He would therefore give some reactions. First
the fact that the Soviets had put forward a specific proposal which
contemplates deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons was welcomed.
We welcome also their indication that they are prepared to reach a
separate agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces and their
acceptance of the fact of NATO deployments in Europe. At the same
time, the US is disappointed in many of the details of their
proposal. They are one-sided in the Soviet favor. Of course we
wouldn't expect them to be one-sided in our favor.
But, the Secretary continued, the Soviet proposals would
decrease rather than enhance stability. Neither we nor our allies.
can accept a definition of "strategic" which includes systems that
protect our allies -- LRINF, aircraft in Europe and Asia, and on
aircraft carriers at sea -- when the Soviets place no constraints on
the systems which threaten our allies. The US approach is that if
you strike my friend, you strike me. The Soviet proposal unfairly
imposes limits on the modernization of US strategic systems, while
locking in the advantages the USSR has accrued through massive
military buildup over the last decade -- in particular, Soviet heavy
ICBMs. The Soviet proposal would permit them to retain a
significant number of prompt, hard target capable warheads on heavy
missiles -- the most destabilizing of all strategic systems -- while
imposing severe limitations on the US strategic deterrent force.
Finally, the Soviet proposal would block the US strategic defense
program while allowing the Soviet program to proceed. Obviously,
the US cannot accept such unequal proposals. Once the US finishes
its analysis we will be trying to find ways to bridge the gaps
between the US proposal and the Soviet proposal.
Turning to nuclear testing, the Secretary noted that they had
discussed this issue before and US views had not changed. The
Secretary agreed about the importance of chemical weapons and maybe
they could get at it, but verification was the heart of the
problem. On non-proliferation the Secretary had met with the Soviet
delegation and had received a lecture on testing and had given a
lecture back.
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On CDE, it may be that something can be worked out. A year and
a half ago in Dublin the President had proposed the same framework
we are now discussing -- non-use of force and concrete confidence
measures which go beyond those in the final document. So we wish to
move these things along but we need a more constructive attitude on
the Soviet side. If the two sides are to move to drafting from the
informal stage which they entered on October 14, we need a more
positive approach by the Soviet side to resolve outstanding
differences. We believe our efforts should be focussed on finding
areas for common agreement on genuine confidence and
security-building measures that fall within the Madrid mandate.
Talking about areas outside the mandate, such as independent air and
naval maneuvers, only diverts attention from the task at hand. We
need to see what we can work out in CDE.
On MBFR, the Secretary said he had nothing beyond what had been
said before.
The Secretary then said that the US had given thought to the
subject of a joint statement or communique, and in particular to the
views Shevardnadze had expressed to him and that the General
Secretary had raised in his letter to the President. As we had said
at the time, US willingness to have a formal communique or document
very much depends upon its contents. We have no interest in tying
up time or resources in a futile debate. The enemy of good
discussions could be an argument over communique language. If we
can get agreed language before Geneva, that would be different. The
Soviets had suggested certain substantive areas. So the US has
blocked out an approach. Shevardnadze had given some suggested
language. So the Secretary would give him some of ours (Secretary
hands over draft joint communique). It may be that in the end we
may decide not to do this. So this is not given to the Soviet side
as finally decided. With that in mind and noting that there are
lots of brackets to be filled in, we think there are elements in our
draft for the Soviets to consider.
Dobrynin, noting the length of the US document said that this
was quite a draft. The Secretary noted that when he was a professor
he used to get out a scale to weigh his students' papers. The
Secretary noted that they were running out of time. It was very
important to have a good exchange on arms control but also a
discussion of regional tensions was important as these issues have
upset our relations in the past. He hoped we could reach agreement
on the bilateral matters. It was not good for our leaders to spend
much time on these bilateral issues. They give special content, but
are not at the center of matters.
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The Secretary stated that he knew the President had spoken to
Shevardnadze separately the day before and would only underline the
importance of the subject which the President raised. This was of
extreme significance for the United States. The Secretary then
asked whether McFarlane, Nitze, Ridgway, Matlock or Palmer had
anything to add. The Secretary noted that McFarlane chairs the
interagency group on arms control.
McFarlane noted that he finds the Soviet approach an innovative
way to provide full employment for the US arms control community.
There is a basis for serious negotiations at hand and there is a
prospect that progress can be made. Discussions in Moscow can
further address arms control.
Shevardnadze then thanked the Secretary for the detailed
presentation. He noted that the US draft would be studied in
depth. He hoped that everything which had been set forth by the
Soviet delegation would be studied by the US side. He noted that in
Moscow it would be possible to explore matters in greater detail.
But he also noted that there is little time left before the meetings
in Moscow. There are deep-seated differences. Realistically,
therefore, some central problems will remain but we should work on
them. He saw this as his central task.
Shevardnadze continued that without diminishing the importance
of regional matters, terrorism and bilateral issues, they are still
convinced that the principal area at the summit should be security
and arms control, in particular avoiding an arms race in space and
reducing nuclear arsenals. This is their conviction and it will
continue despite all complications. This is the most promising area
as here a lot hinges on the two powers with the greatest arsenals.
As far as regional matters are concerned, not everything depends on
our two countries. The US and the Soviet Union cannot become
international judges. There is the Security Council and other
mechanisms for that purpose.
Shevardnadze said that some of the problems raised by the
President with him the day before will be studied in the most
careful manner. He said that both sides need to intensify their
efforts and in Moscow discuss everything in greater detail. It
appeared to him that we should try to leave as little as possible
for the leaders. It is necessary to prepare the groundwork for
them; we need a productive approach to preparing the meeting. Many
layers of distrust have accumulated. He was not issuing an appeal
or making a banal statement but trying to reflect reality.
The Secretary said he agreed, so we should dedicate ourselves to
this task. In terms of handling the press, he thought that they
should say the meetings in New York and the upcoming meetings in
Moscow should be seen as part of a continuing effort to prepare as
carefully as possible for the President's meeting with Gorbachev.
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He would note that they had ranged across the issues in the
relationship, including, of course, our own special concern. With
regard to the visit to Moscow, he would say that this was at the
Soviet's invitation and demonstrated the seriousness of both sides.
He would say that he is looking forward to his meeting with the
General Secretary. The dates of November 4th and 5th were agreed.
Shevardnadze said that there is very serious and difficult work
to be done in Moscow. This would be the last time to prepare for
the Summit. The rest of it would just be technology which can be
dealt with by our ambassadors. The Secretary said that if this
meant "logistics" that is fine. He expects to work hard in Moscow.
Drafted: EUR - MPalmer:mtz
10/25/85 ext. 1126
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This Copy inclosis the
strict stational 70p 5.6
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
-Fle
October 25, 1985
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: The Secretary's Meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze
DATE: October 25, 1985
TIME: 7:30 a.m.-9:30 a.m.
PLACE: US Mission to the United Nations
PARTICIPANTS
US
Secretary Shultz
Assistant to the President McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Matlock
DAS Palmer
Interpreter Zarechnak
Soviets
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov
Assistant to the FM Chernishev
Assistant to the FM Tarasenko
Minister-Counselor Sokolov
Interpreter N. Uspenskiy
Interpreter P. Palashchenko
Secretary Shultz welcomed Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and
noted that we have a tradition of working breakfasts and lunches.
Shevardnadze said that he believed that this is a good tradition.
Shevardnadze noted that the President had had a reception in the
same room the day before. The Secretary said that the President had
met with Thatcher, Craxi, Kohl, Mulroney, Nakasone -- noting that we
meet with the group of seven on economic issues each year. All of
them had been present except France, which had other things to do.
The Secretary noted that we had a well-known comic with a long nose
named Jimmy Durante. He had a saying "everybody wants to get into
the act". It seems that everybody has advice for us with regard to
President Reagan's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.
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Shevardnadze agreed that this was the case, and noted that at
every meeting he had had when he was last in New York and again this
time all of his interlocutors raised the meeting next month. This
is the center of discussion. The Secretary said that this shows
people attach great importance to the meeting and everything it
covers. Shevardnadze said that now literally the whole world is
living day to day with thoughts about this meeting. The Secretary
noted that during the meeting he had held with Gromyko last January
in Geneva there were around 1500 journalists. We imposed a rule
that we would say nothing for two to three days, so they had zero to
report. They were reduced to interviewing each other. Shevardnadze
said that this time journalists in New York had more food for
reporting as there are more heads of government here; although the
majority of the heads seem to have already departed. The Secretary
noted that the President still has bilaterals with Nakasone and
Kohl, and he would then be seeing the family of Mr. Klinghoffer. He
was the man murdered on the Italian ship under tragic
circumstances. Indeed, one of the issues he wanted to raise this
morning was this question of terrorism. He noted it now because the
Klinghoffer family lives here in New York.
Shevardnadze noted that they did not have much time as far as he
understood the situation. The Secretary said that they had until
9:30 a.m., they would have their eggs right now and then be ready to
proceed. He understood from our Ambassador to the United Nations
that the social schedule up here at the UN was such that you could
eat 10 to 15 times a day. Shevardnadze responded that we need to
take a closer look at what our people are doing there. He said that
he had a warm recollection of the time he spent at the Secretary's
house in Washington. The Secretary said that he and his wife had
enjoyed having them and that he had asked his wife about how her
lunch with Mrs. Shevardnadze had been. She had noted that Mrs.
Dobrynin had been a very able interpreter. Mrs. Shultz has decided
that she would like to accompany him to Moscow. The Secretary asked
whether Shevardnadze had thought further about how the trip would be
announced. Shevardnadze said that they assumed Mrs. Shultz will be
coming, and they are ready for an announcement to journalists
today. He would say that the Soviet Union had invited the Secretary
and that we have now agreed that such a trip would be useful and
would take place. The Secretary noted that he would probably be
asked whether he would see Gorbachev in Moscow. He would say that
he looks forward with interest to meeting with Gorbachev. He would
discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin the details of the trip and could
do this on the next Tuesday as he would be away in Canada on Monday.
Shevardnadze said that one thing is clear about the meetings in
Moscow -- this would be the closing stage of preparations for
Geneva. We should have that in mind as we put together the program
for Moscow. The Secretary said that we should try to get as much
settled as possible in Moscow, though he would not preclude
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ambassadors continuing the work on some problems afterwards but we
should do as much as we can in Moscow. Shevardnadze said that we
can start here and finish in Moscow.
The Secretary noted that we have worked out an innovation with
regard to interpretation. We will go with simultaneous
interpreting. If at any moment either side wants it to be slower,
the simultaneous will stop and we will pick up with consecutive.
There are items when we will want to be sure of what is being said
and we should take the time to be careful.
Shevardnadze said that he agreed and that as he understood it he
should raise his hand if he wants clarification. This will not be a
sign of protest. The Secretary noted that in the United States this
was traditionally a sign that you wanted to go to the bathroom.
At this point the food was cleared away and the formal part of
the meeting began. The Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze back to New
York. We had looked forward to the discussion here. As
Shevardnadze was the guest, the Secretary would invite him to go
first. The Secretary noted that he had a lot to cover himself as
well.
Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary. He said that on behalf of
his delegation he wanted to give a cordial greeting and to thank the
Secretary for the attention and hospitality which had been given to
him personally, his family, and their delegation. Shevardnadze
noted that this was his fourth meeting with the Secretary if
Helsinki is included. The focus of recent contacts had been
addressing the issues which needed preparations for the meeting
between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. In this
meeting, their purpose was to review what they had been able to do
and how to go about making the Summit successful and meeting the
hopes for the future. The day before he had mentioned to the
President that the Soviets had taken certain steps. On the one
hand, they had made some large-scale proposals with regard to
security. For example, they had proposed a prohibition on
space-strike weapons, deep cuts on strategic weapons, as well as
addressing medium-ranged weapons in Europe. That is how they see
the proposals which they are bringing to Geneva. They have adopted
serious steps. Unfortunately, all of these steps are of a
unilateral nature. to date. They also have pledged not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons. They have placed limits on
medium-range missiles in Europe. They have put into effect a
unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. They have proposed a ban on
ASAT tests to be followed by destruction of ASAT systems. This is a
program of unilateral measures which the Soviet government has
announced. Many of these unilateral measures are in effect.
Gorbachev in Paris mentioned to the French Parliament that the
number of medium-ranged nuclear weapons will be equal to the number
in June 1984. He also said that they have begun dismantling of
these missiles.
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Shevardnadze continued that they are convinced that these acts
are conducive to accomplishment of the main task. Unfortunately, he
had to note that on the part of the US Administration these had not
been met by understanding. It seems to the Soviets that one side
has an interest in preparing for the Summit while the other side is
not interested and is dragging its feet and delaying. They have
this impression with regard to the Geneva negotiations. Gorbachev
had sent a letter to President Reagan which laid out their concept
with regard to these negotiations. Their delegation had then
elaborated in Geneva. They are following the course of these
negotiations with big interest. So far they have not seen any
encouraging signs. He wanted to take an objective stand. He knew
that within a week or a month it was hard to answer all questions.
But now is the time for the other side to make a contribution.
Given past experience. it is possible to bring positions together.
With very few days to go, each side must take a responsible
approach. They need to use every hour. The leadership in the
Soviet Union and you in the United States have a responsibility to
shoulder. This was mentioned by your President at the meeting the
day before.
Shevardnadze continued that it cannot be said there is nothing
positive in the relationship. He and the Secretary had had four
meetings. Shevardnadze had met with the President. They had a
variety of bilateral consultations. There were the meetings in
Geneva. But this was not enough. What they had in mind today is to
review what had been done and to formulate what they could bring to
the Summit; what the results of that meeting could be. With the
Secretary's permission he would like to continue for some time and
to discuss some practical problems.
Shevardnadze noted that during his last meeting they had
proposed 50% reductions of appropriate weapons; of course with
banning space-strike weapons. Since then the Soviet delegation had
presented this in Geneva. On the basis of discussions among the two
delegations, they need to think how best to prepare for serious
discussions at the Summit of Soviet proposals. Detailed
consideration requires time. Thus at this stage, it would be better
not to focus on details, but search for a mutually acceptable
approach. They would like to instruct the delegations to explore
language that could be included in a final document. As he
understood, there is agreement that there could be a concluding
document. They are thinking not of a detailed paper but one which
reflects similarity of viewpoints. In Gorbachev's letter of
September 12, they had put forward suggestion with regard to a
concluding document. Regarding a document, there could be a joint
statement on the inadmissibility of war. It was Shevardnadze's
impression that the President agrees about the inadmissibility of
war. He would like to outline the content of such a pronouncement.
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"The Soviet Union and the United States of America will in their
relations proceed from the indisputable fact that nuclear war cannot
be allowed to break out and that there shall be no winners in such
war. Consequently, they will not seek a military superiority or
infringe in any other way upon the legitimate security interests of
each other.
Wishing to implement their resolve to do everything for
preventing nuclear war and ultimately for completely eliminating
nuclear arms everywhere, the sides agreed to take practical measures
for a speedy working out of effective agreements aimed at preventing
an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and
reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability,
which is the agreed objective of Soviet-American negotiations on
nuclear and space arms."
Shevardnadze continued that they believed such a joint statement
could be an important part of the Summit. It could be a separate
statement or it could be part of a concluding document. Perhaps the
Secretary would like to say something with regard to this issue or
Shevardnadze could go on to medium-ranged missiles. The Secretary
said that he would have comments but it was better for Shevardnadze
to finish and then he would present his materials.
Shevardnadze stated that the Soviets assume the United States
will have some remarks. This is draft language. It will require
work to reach agreement.
Shevardnadze said he would now like to turn to medium-range
missiles. The Soviet side was working to achieve a radical solution
to medium-range systems in Europe. The US side has said it is ready
to reach an agreement. But the two delegations have not been able
to find convergence in order to reach a radical and final
settlement. Considering all the circumstances. it is possible to
accommodate the US proposal for an interim solution. The Soviet
delegation has set forth a proposal. As of December 1, they would
set aside deployment of medium-range systems. They would also
discontinue implementation of other countermeasures in Europe and
there would be a freeze in other areas with the understanding that
there was no substantial change in the strategic setting in Asia.
There could then be staged reductions in Europe. In eighteen months
to two years you could end up with 120 US cruise missiles and have a
Soviet number of medium-range warheads equivalent to the number of
warheads on US missiles and the relevant arms of the UK and France.
In the meantime, we could continue to work for a more radical
solution including aircraft. So what the Soviet Union is proposing
is a practical approach. If an accord could be reached, this also
could be reflected in a concluding document. If, however, there is
a need for additional work, then the Soviet side proposes that the
delegations in Geneva explore what can be mutually agreed upon as
soon as possible. This exploration could then continue in Moscow.
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Shevardnadze stated that he also wanted to make some suggestion
with regard to the SALT II Treaty. December 31, 1985 is the date
when SALT II becomes ineffective or expires. What should we do
beyond that. It seems to the Soviet side that at least we should
extend it through 1986, that the US and the USSR should continue to
adhere to the extent they're now doing. They have language to
suggest in this regard. "Convinced that the Treaty on the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1979 serves the interests
of maintaining strategic stability, the sides agreed to continue
mutually their policy of further complying with the basic provisions
of the said Treaty, having in mind to review this matter again, at
the end of 1986". Shevardnadze noted that they would be prepared to
consider any formulation the United States wanted to put forward on
this subject.
Shevardnadze said that we also would have to consider the
question of the large American radars in Greenland and the UK.
These have been raised in previous meetings. They are clearly in
violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union had expressed this
concern in the SCC. Despite US assertions, this is not
modernization of old stations. Instead of a non-phased array, the
US is building phased array. He would like to say emphatically that
depiction of Krasnoyarsk as incompatible with the Treaty is not
true. This station is designed for tracking space objects. It has
nothing to do with early warning. The Soviet Union is in favor of
jointly looking for a settlement. This could be done by means of
ceasing construction at Krasnoyarsk, in Greenland and in Britain.
If this is acceptable, then a basic agreement could be reached at
the summit and more detailed agreement at the SCC.
Shevardnadze continued that with regard to non-proliferation
there are some positive things. The representatives of the two
countries have prepared a draft text. This text could be adopted at
the Summit as it has the necessary set of elements. If the
Secretary has no objection, they can consider this agreed at their
level and can submit it to their leaders for the Summit. There are
no great differences on this question.
He then wanted to say a few words about their moratorium on
nuclear weapons tests. They did not consider that this was off the
agenda. For almost three months the moratorium had been in effect,
and it would continue to January 1, 1986. It would continue beyond
that if the United States decides to refrain from tests. Frankly,
reluctance by the US to follow does not appear logical. The US has
been saying that it is in favor basically of a full cessation of
nuclear tests. If that is true, the time has come. References to
verification are not appropriate. It would be readily verifiable.
Nuclear explosions can't be concealed. Soviet instruments and
probably US instruments are capable of recording explosions on any
scale. They had mentioned a specific test by the US. A positive
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attitude by the US side towards refraining from tests and resumption
of CTB talks would open the way to solving verification and finding
reasonable compromises there. The Soviet side was certain solutions
could be found. He hoped there would be concrete discussions with
the US side on this question.
Shevardnadze continued that at their previous meetings Stockholm
had been discussed and they had seen some positive trends towards a
resolution. They had agreed on drafting. This is, of course, good
but agreements in principle need to be put in practice. The
approach proposed by the neutral countries would make possible
moving with a certain rhythm, including giving concerted attention
to working out an agreement on non-use of force and a set of
confidence-building measures. The Soviets had agreed on an annual
exchange of information on military activities. They hoped that
general agreement on this score would make difficult preparations
for a secret war. But their recent information from Stockholm is
that the US delegation is slowing things down. There is a
toughening of the US position, it is more rigid with regard to
non-use of force. The Soviet side had heard that nothing terrible
would happen if there is no agreement until the fall of 1986 and the
problem is just transferred to the Vienna conference. They hope
that no factors will be allowed to impede progress. Most
delegations are favorable to positive movement. The Soviet side
believes it would be desirable to include Stockholm in the
conclusions of the US-Soviet summit. They attached importance to
Stockholm and with the other participating parties intend to work
for an early successful conclusion.
With regard to the Vienna negotiations, Shevardnadze noted that
in several days there would be the 12th anniversary of the talks.
Unfortunately, there is a complete stalemate. In February, the
Warsaw Treaty countries had put forward a proposal for initial
reductions of US and Soviet forces followed by a freeze. What they
have in mind is a partial agreement on what is possible now. He
recalled comments by the US that it would soon determine its
position. This is a problem ripe for solving.
Shevardnadze asked whether he was abusing the amount of time
available. The Secretary said that he was watching Shevardnadze's
pile of briefing papers gradually decrease, but that he should
continue. Looking toward the simultaneous interpreters,
Shevardnadze said that this is a better way of using the time (as
opposed to consecutive interpretation).
Shevardnadze continued that last time they had had a useful
exchange on chemical weapons. They had looked at this again.
Banning these weapons is quite possible. In the stream of efforts
to ban chemical weapons, the Soviet Union now has said that it is
ready to work out a non-proliferation regime. If we had been able
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to do this with regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
where our two countries had done a lot of the work, why couldn't a
similar approach work with regard to chemical weapons proliferation.
The problem of chemical weapons will become more complicated if the
US deploys binaries. The Soviet side hopes for a serious approach
on chemical weapons to be included in the summit. It would be
useful there to reaffirm that both sides are for banning these
weapons and for an international convention. If we agree in
principle, then we could agree on giving an impulse here.
Shevardnadze then stated that in quite a few areas of bilateral
relations there has been positive movement. This has progressed
quite a bit. On the North Pacific Air Safety Talks we have a
memorandum of understanding in effect and we have begun negotiations
on a technical agreement. Unfortunately, the first round did not
bring about agreement. The US side is insisting on a number of
provisions which go beyond the framework of the memorandum of
understanding. The Soviet side fails to understand the decision of
the US side to suspend the talks on air travel between the two
countries. A question arises whether the US really wants an
agreement on these matters. We need clarity on this issue. The
exchanges negotiations are in their final stages. They are impeded
only by a US demand that is not consistent with what they have in the
Soviet Union and also the practice in the United States. So whether
or not there will be an agreement is up to the United States.
But these questions and the consulates are quite realistic.
Shevardnadze continued that the day before he had said to the
President that they are making preparations with regard to the
proposals of the President on such matters as computer education,
exchange of students, study of Russian and others. They had
instructed the Soviet ministries and departments to analyze these
proposals of the President. They would be prepared in Moscow to
give the Secretary a preliminary answer on these matters. Overall,
both sides need to clear the roadblocks that block bilateral
cooperation. They need to set aside what makes agreement more
difficult and focus on where they have a sufficient degree of mutual
understanding.
Shevardnadze said that he would now like to raise for discussion
the question of creating a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor
with socialist countries, China, the United States, West European
countries and Japan. This is a fundamentally new source of energy
and is practically inexhaustible. Thermonuclear fusion has been
confirmed by Soviet and US scientists who have been working
together. Our cooperating on a project of such a reactor has been
under development in the International Atomic Energy Agency since
1978. The Soviet side now thinks we should begin work on a
prototype. This would not be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. We
could get practice on this and then produce commercial reactors.
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This is a very large scale and promising area. Realization of it
would demonstrate more broadly the possibility of peaceful
cooperation among states. The Soviets understand that the U.S. will
need to study this idea. We could then explore it further in Moscow.
Shevardnadze then said that with regard to regional problems, it
is positive we have had bilateral discussions on different regions.
They will continue towards the end of this month with talks on
Central America. On the basis of all these discussions, it seems
difficult to the Soviet side for the leaders to adopt concrete
proposals on separate regions. Therefore, the Soviet side proposes
that at the meeting of the leaders that they note the common
commitment of the two states to resolve urgent regional problems.
They would name the regions in question, where urgent solutions are
required and say they were in favor of solutions including of
bilateral conflicts. It would be important to reaffirm the need for
restraint and taking into account the legitimate interests of each
other and of other nations involved.
Shevardnadze said that as he had noted to the President, it was
now of basic importance to give additional impulses to all of our
delegations -- in Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm and elsewhere. On
bilateral relations, we need to give additional instructions to our
embassies. We need more intensive preparations for the main
documents, we need to formulate the main things that would conclude
the summit meeting, having in mind that during the visit to Moscow
we will have more concrete discussions of all the problems. We need
to agree there on language for a joint overall concluding document.
This is the overall way the Soviets envisage the principal format
that could become the basis for discussion at the summit meeting.
Of course, the Soviets recognize that everything cannot be
considered and resolved at one summit meeting. They intend meetings
to continue to take place. They want to set an outline for the
future, for prospects beyond the meeting next month.
The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his comprehensive
presentation. There was much that was constructive. The U.S. will
have to study what he had said. Some things we can agree on; some
offer promise, but will need to be worked through; and there are
some where we clearly disagree. The Secretary agreed that we need
to continue to give impulses to those working in various areas
before our leaders meet. He said that he wanted now to go through
the areas which will be discussed in Geneva. He would start with
bilateral matters. Rather than going through subject by subject,
what our positions are and where there are problems, he would just
like to give Shevardnadze a written statement (Secretary handed over
three page, non-paper). This paper is presented in the hope that we
can bring focus on the problems and if possible prior to Moscow or
during and after that, but prior to Geneva see what can be resolved.
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The Secretary continued that he could not say he had foreseen
the Soviet proposal for a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor.
His own company had worked in this field, he had thought it was far
away from development, but let us look at this proposal.
The Secretary said he would now like to comment on regional
issues. He noted Shevardnadze's points in his speech the day before
to the UNGA. Both sides recognized that these matters present in
themselves problems and problems between the two of us. Getting at
this is the intention of the President's proposals. As he noted,
the regional experts' talks have been useful. We have proposed
regularizing them, perhaps putting this in the joint document. We
have no answer from the Soviet side, although perhaps what
Shevardnadze had said about regional consultations implied that they
accepted this proposal. But we need to solve, not just discuss
these problems. Shevardnadze had said that there was no fated clash
between us. He also had said that these regional crises obstruct
economic development and had talked about the tragedies of small
wars -- although some are not so small anymore. So the US hopes
that this means that the Soviets are ready to help solve some of
these problems.
The Secretary continued that what the President proposed is a
framework for US-Soviet efforts, principles and processes which we
might both act upon, recognizing that each area has its own history
and in some respects is unique. We need in the first instance to
work on those conflicts--Afghanistan Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola
and Ethiopia--which directly contributed to the deterioration of our
relations. These issues are at the core of international tensions
and were largely responsible for shattering efforts to improve
US-Soviet relations in the 1970's. So if we are to have the kind of
sustained improvement in our relations that we both seek, it is
important that we have movement on these issues. This is
particularly true with regard to Afghanistan which more than any
other example demonstrates for the American people the use of force
by a great power against a small nation and which basically ended
chances for ratification of SALT II. The Secretary mentioned this
as with all due respect to arms control agreements, they can be
readily derailed by an atmosphere created by regional conflicts.
These troubles often arise from local situations but outside
influences made them worse and gave them an East-West dimension.
The Secretary stated that we never made any secret that our
sympathies are with those who fight for independence but we need
negotiated solutions. He noted what Shevardnadze had said in this
regard. So the US is prepared as the President said for military
disengagement by both our countries.
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What we have in mind is a peace process to address these
conflicts at three levels. First there should be negotiations
between the warring parties, designed to achieve an end to violence,
national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops. Second,
once these negotiations make real progress, then appropriate,
separate discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union
would begin. These talks would not be formal negotiations but would
support what the groups inside another country had been trying to
arrive at. In some cases, this would mean guaranteeing arrangements
reached in negotiations but in every case our role would be to help
reduce outside military involvement and to limit the flow of outside
arms. In the third stage, if there is more stability in a given
country and we are able to help, then it would be possible to
reintegrate these countries into the world economy. This would
require a multilateral reconstruction effort. The US is prepared to
play its part and we assume the Soviet Union would as well. So the
process is one of reducing violence, then supporting it through
bilateral efforts and third sponsoring economic reconstruction.
If Shevardnadze agreed, the Secretary would be prepared to
develop language for our leaders to use in Geneva in a document. In
any case, we would hope that the General Secretary would discuss
these regional matters with President Reagan in Geneva. There are
things he could say about each area but he would not take the time
as they have limited time left. But the United States does not
limit its interest to the five countries mentioned. They had
discussed Iran and Iraq as part of their discussion of the Middle
East, and he had some thoughts about Iran and Iraq. Both agree that
the war is not in our interest. Iran is the intransigent party.
They think they have a vertical hot line so there is no way to talk
with them. Thus the way is to stop the flow of arms to Iran. The
US has been trying this and with some success. According to US
information, the major flow of arms is coming from North Korea, some
countries in Europe and Libya.
The Secretary continued that with regard to Shevardnadze's
comments about banning chemical weapons, they were being used in
this war; and there was a potential major outbreak of the use of
these weapons. There is a common view that there is a stalemate;
this was the Secretary's view. But if Iran succeeds, this would
give fresh impetus to spreading its backward doctrines in that
region. So the US thinks there should be a stop to the flow of
weapons.
In general there is a great deal to talk about in the regional
field, where we could be a constructive force, help stabilize our
bilateral relations, and more broadly East-West relations. Perhaps
in Moscow they could return to regional issues; there was not time
today to go through his considerable stack of materials. It was
important to help bring about political settlements -- this would
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help our relations and of course help the problems themselves. This
is security in the most fundamental way. If we can stop arms from
being used in these regions, then we can lay the basis for arms
control.
The Secretary wanted to say a word about terrorism. They might
talk about this further themselves and address it to our leaders.
Each of us has been the victim of terrorism in recent weeks. At
least one American has died; a Soviet diplomat also has died. Each
of us has hostages who are being held by terrorists in Lebanon. The
U.S. made a strong statement about your hostages and the dead
Soviet, and he wanted again to express our sympathies. The US knows
the Soviets are making a major effort to get their people released
just as the U.S. is doing. The U.S. believes the Soviet hostages
are being held by a small Sunni group very close to the group
holding our people. Both groups are heavily influenced by Iran
which has not been trying to obtain their release. Syria is
constrained by relations with Iran and by the confused situation in
Lebanon. In the case of the TWA hostages Iran's last-minute
endorsement, at Syria's urging, appeared to be a key factor in their
release. This is one area where we can and should stand together.
We should let the world know. The U.S. noted some greater
understanding initially on your part with regard to the Achille
Lauro incident, although subsequent Soviet press treatment was
opportunistic.
The Secretary continued that we have some joint experience with
regard to discussing certain issues such as nuclear terrorism and
hostage taking. Here US-Soviet cooperation would be quite
dramatic. If nothing else it would show the terrorists that they
are isolated, that they have no sanctuary. This could have an
impact.
Next, the Secretary wished to turn to arms control. The US
continues to study the Soviets' ideas thoroughly. As the President
and he had said, the US sees seeds which could be nurtured in the
Soviet proposal. We will be responding. The Secretary noted that
the US had had proposals on the table since last spring and had had
a long wait to hear concrete Soviet proposals. Nevertheless, these
are issues that had been studied by both sides for years, they are
not new subjects. He would therefore give some reactions. First
the fact that the Soviets had put forward a specific proposal which
contemplates deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons was welcomed.
We welcome also their indication that they are prepared to reach a
separate agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces and their
acceptance of the fact of NATO deployments in Europe. At the same
time, the US is disappointed in many of the details of their
proposal. They are one-sided in the Soviet favor. Of course we
wouldn't expect them to be one-sided in our favor.
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But, the Secretary continued, the Soviet proposals would
decrease rather than enhance stability. Neither we nor our allies.
can accept a definition of "strategic" which includes systems that
protect our allies -- LRINF, aircraft in Europe and Asia, and on
aircraft carriers at sea -- when the Soviets place no constraints on
the systems which threaten our allies. The US approach is that if
you strike my friend, you strike me. The Soviet proposal unfairly
imposes limits on the modernization of US strategic systems, while
locking in the advantages the USSR has accrued through massive
military buildup over the last decade -- in particular, Soviet heavy
ICBMs. The Soviet proposal would permit them to retain a
significant number of prompt, hard target capable warheads on heavy
missiles -- the most destabilizing of all strategic systems -- while
imposing severe limitations on the US strategic deterrent force.
Finally, the Soviet proposal would block the US strategic defense
program while allowing the Soviet program to proceed. Obviously,
the US cannot accept such unequal proposals. Once the US finishes
its analysis we will be trying to find ways to bridge the gaps
between the US proposal and the Soviet proposal.
Turning to nuclear testing, the Secretary noted that they had
discussed this issue before and US views had not changed. The
Secretary agreed about the importance of chemical weapons and maybe
they could get at it, but verification was the heart of the
problem. On non-proliferation the Secretary had met with the Soviet
delegation and had received a lecture on testing and had given a
lecture back.
On CDE, it may be that something can be worked out. A year and
a half ago in Dublin the President had proposed the same framework
we are now discussing -- non-use of force and concrete confidence
measures which go beyond those in the final document. So we wish to
move these things along but we need a more constructive attitude on
the Soviet side. If the two sides are to move to drafting from the
informal stage which they entered on October 14, we need a more
positive approach by the Soviet side to resolve outstanding
differences. We believe our efforts should be focussed on finding
areas for common agreement on genuine confidence and
security-building measures that fall within the Madrid mandate.
Talking about areas outside the mandate, such as independent air and
naval maneuvers, only diverts attention from the task at hand. We
need to see what we can work out in CDE.
On MBFR, the Secretary said he had nothing beyond what had been
said before.
The Secretary then said that the US had given thought to the
subject of a joint statement or communique, and in particular to the
views Shevardnadze had expressed to him and that the General
Secretary had raised in his letter to the President. As we had said
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at the time, US willingness to have a formal communique or document
very much depends upon its contents. We have no interest in tying
up time or resources in a futile debate. The enemy of good
discussions could be an argument over communique language. If we
can get agreed language before Geneva, that would be different. The
Soviets had suggested certain substantive areas. So the US has
blocked out an approach. Shevardnadze had given some suggested
language. So the Secretary would give him some of ours (Secretary
hands over draft joint communique). It may be that in the end we
may decide not to do this. So this is not given to the Soviet side
as finally decided. With that in mind and noting that there are
lots of brackets to be filled in, we think there are elements in our
draft for the Soviets to consider.
Dobrynin, noting the length of the US document said that this
was quite a draft. The Secretary noted that when he was a professor
he used to get out a scale to weigh his students' papers. The
Secretary noted that they were running out of time. It was very
important to have a good exchange on arms control but also a
discussion of regional tensions was important as these issues have
upset our relations in the past. He hoped we could reach agreement
on the bilateral matters. It was not good for our leaders to spend
much time on these bilateral issues. They give special content, but
are not at the center of matters.
The Secretary stated that he knew the President had spoken to
Shevardnadze separately the day before and would only underline the
importance of the subject which the President raised. This was of
extreme significance for the United States. The Secretary then
asked whether McFarlane, Nitze, Ridgway, Matlock or Palmer had
anything to add. The Secretary noted that McFarlane chairs the
interagency group on arms control.
McFarlane noted that he finds the Soviet approach an innovative
way to provide full employment for the US arms control community.
There is a basis for serious negotiations at hand and there is a
prospect that progress can be made. Discussions in Moscow can
further address arms control.
Shevardnadze then thanked the Secretary for the detailed
presentation. He noted that the US draft would be studied in
depth. He hoped that everything which had been set forth by the
Soviet delegation would be studied by the US side. He noted that in
Moscow it would be possible to explore matters in greater detail.
But he also noted that there is little time left before the meetings
in Moscow. There are deep-seated differences. Realistically,
therefore, some central problems will remain but we should work on
them. He saw this as his central task.
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Shevardnadze continued that without diminishing the importance
of regional matters, terrorism and bilateral issues, they are still
convinced that the principal area at the summit should be security
and arms control, in particular avoiding an arms race in space and
reducing nuclear arsenals. This is their conviction and it will
continue despite all complications. This is the most promising area
as here a lot hinges on the two powers with the greatest arsenals.
As far as regional matters are concerned, not everything depends on
our two countries. The US and the Soviet Union cannot become
international judges. There is the Security Council and other
mechanisms for that purpose.
Shevardnadze said that some of the problems raised by the
President with him the day before will be studied in the most
careful manner. He said that both sides need to intensify their
efforts and in Moscow discuss everything in greater detail. It
appeared to him that we should try to leave as little as possible
for the leaders. It is necessary to prepare the groundwork for
them; we need a productive approach to preparing the meeting. Many
layers of distrust have accumulated. He was not issuing an appeal
or making a banal statement but trying to reflect reality.
The Secretary said he agreed, so we should dedicate ourselves to
this task. In terms of handling the press, he thought that they
should say the meetings in New York and the upcoming meetings in
Moscow should be seen as part of a continuing effort to prepare as
carefully as possible for the President's meeting with Gorbachev. He
would note that they had ranged across the issues in the
relationship, including, of course, our own special concern. With
regard to the visit to Moscow, he would say that this was at the
Soviet's invitation and demonstrated the seriousness of both sides.
He would say that he is looking forward to his meeting with the
General Secretary. The dates of November 4th and 5th were agreed.
Shevardnadze said that there is very serious and difficult work
to be done in Moscow. This would be the last time to prepare for
the Summit. The rest of it would just be technology which can be
dealt with by our ambassadors. The Secretary said that if this
meant "logistics" that is fine. He expects to work hard in Moscow.
Drafted: EUR - MPalmer:mtz
10/25/85 ext. 1126
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