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A. Geneva Meeting: Arms Control General
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A. Geneva Meeting: Arms Control General
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s United States of America (U.S.A.) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Summits Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: A. Geneva Meeting: Arms Control General
Box: 45
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection: MATLOCK, JACK: Files
Archivist: dlb
File Folder: A.1 Geneva Meeting: Arms Control General
Date: 1/4/01
Box 22120 45
Skinner/F00-008/1
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NO. AND TYPE
Paper
ren Arms Control Strategy for Geneva Meeting, 2 p.
n.d.
B1
R 2/13/02 FOO-008/1 # 145
2. Memo
Bill Wright, Bob Linhard to Robert McFarlane, re:
11/13/85
B1
NSPG Meeting, Thursday, November 14, Arms
Control Issues, 1 p.
3. Talking Pts
National Security Planning Group November 14,
n.d.
B1
1985, Arms Control Issues for Geneva Meeting,
Draft Talking Points for Mr. McFarlane, 12 p.
4. Paper
re: Nuclear and Space Talks, 17 p.
n.d.
B1
5. Paper
re: Nuclear and Space Talks, 4 p.
n.d.
B1
RESTRICTION CODES
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
the FOIA].
B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an egency [(b)(2) of the
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of
FOIA].
the FOIA].
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information
[(b)(8) of the FOIA].
[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of
the FOIA].
JP
Arms Control Strategy for Geneva Meeting
-- Preparations for Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings
about to acceleraté. Need your guidance before we begin
detailed work on substance.
-- key issue is how we use the weeks ahead to try for
progress on the main arms control issues. We should use the
Shevardnadze meetings to lay the groundwork for a positive
outcome with Gorbachev and to take the initiative away from
Moscow on arms control. If the Soviets respond, we may be able
to move toward achievement of your arms control agenda. If
not, we'll be in a better position to deal with their
propaganda.
-- Our leverage is probably as high now as it will ever be.
Gorbachev's expressions of willingness to negotiate
seriously have been accompanied by private hints that
Soviets are looking at ways to break negotiating
log-jam; this may be simple propaganda, but
His ambitious economic recovery plans would be eased
by infusions of resources on which military has
traditionally had first claim;
While he cannot afford to be seen as giving anything
away, he may be willing to put his prestige behind
subsequent efforts to achieve concrete agreements if
he can return from Geneva with an outcome he can claim
could lead to an enhancement of Soviet security and
free up scarce resources.
-- We won't have time to negotiate a detailed agreement by
November; but we might be able to agree on elements which could
serve as guidelines for our negotiators.
-- The elements we would need:
Soviet commitment to strategically significant
reductions in the threat to the survivability of
either side's land-based deterrent;
Acknowledgement that the ABM Treaty permits both sides
to pursue SDI-type research and arrival at an agreed
interpretation of the Treaty's cefinitions and
provisions (in so doing we would lay down markers to
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET SENSITIVE
NLS E00-008/1*145
DECL: CADR
BY (ts NARA, DATE 2/13/02
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 2 -
preserve the option of a cooperative transition
toward greater reliance on defensive systems -- and
ultimately toward complete elimination of nuclear
weapons -- should future research demonstrate the
validity of such an approach);
o Treatment of INF in a way which meets US and allied
concerns;
O
Satisfaction of our most serious verification and
compliance concerns (including the Krasnoyarsk radar
issue).
-- The current Soviet bottom line -- that offensive
reductions must follow banning of SDI -- is clearly
unacceptable to us.
-- But based on Gorbachev's public statements and private
Soviet hints, he might accept guidelines to our negotiatiors
which would call for simultaneous addressal of the offensive
limitations of interest to us and the defensive limitations of
interest to both sides, including a "recommitment" on our part
to the ABM Treaty as currently written. (Again, we would need
Soviet concurrence in interpreting such a step as ensuring the
permissibility of SDI research and resolution of the
Krasnoyarsk and other radar issues).
FALLISNGS/LTIOGS
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER y. LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SYSTEM II
91156
add-on
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP MEETING
Thursday, November 14, 1985
Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00
GENEVA ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
Agenda
I.
Introduction and
Robert C. McFarlane
Overview of Arms
(15 minutes)
Control Issues
II.
Discussion
All Participants
(40 minutes)
III.
Summary
Robert C. McFarlane
(5 minutes)
DECLASSIFIED
By db NARA, Date 1/4/01
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SYSTEM II
91156
add-on
MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY GROUP
Thursday, November 14, 1985
Situation Room
11:00 a.m. - 12:00
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES FOR GENEVA
List of Participants
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chief of Staff to the President
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Edward Rowny
Colonel Robert Linhard (NSC Staff)
Captain William H. Wright (NSC Staff)
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By db NARA, Date 1/4/01
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
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LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.
D
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
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RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.