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Biographical Analysis of USSR Officials (2)
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Biographical Analysis of USSR Officials (2)
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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Biographical Analyses of USSR
Officials (2)
Box: 21
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/21/2005
File Folder
BIO ANALYSES OF USSR OFFICIALS
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
21
YARHI-MILO
2109
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8929 PAPER
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
9
ND
B1
PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
8930 PAPER
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
1 3/8/1986 B1
8931 CHART
PARTY OFFICIALS
1
ND
B1
PAR 11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
8932 MEMO
DUBININ
1
ND
B1
D
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
8939 CABLE
241511Z JUN 86
5 6/24/1986 B1
R
12/13/2007
F06-114/6
8940 REPORT
USSR
2
ND
B1
B3
D
3/14/2011
F2006-114/6
B6
8933 POST IT NOTE
LODGE TO MATLOCK
1 5/8/1985 B1
PAR
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
8934 PAPER
USSR GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL ADVISERS
7 5/8/1986 B1
D
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
8941 REPORT
USSR
1 7/19/1985 B1
D
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
8942 REPORT
USSR
2 2/20/1986 B1
D
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/21/2005
File Folder
BIO ANALYSES OF USSR OFFICIALS
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
21
YARHI-MILO
2109
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8935 PAPER
LIGACHEV
6 1/15/1986 B1
R
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
8936 POST IT NOTE LODGE TO MATLOCK
1 2/24/1986 B1
PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
8943 REPORT
USSR
3 2/19/1986 B1
8944 REPORT
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8943
3 2/19/1986 B1
8945 REPORT
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8942
2 2/20/1986 B1
D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
8946 REPORT
SAME TEXT AS DOC #8942
2 2/20/1986 B1
D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
8937 POST IT NOTE
POINDEXTER
1 11/15/1986 B1
R
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
8938 PAPER
GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY TEAM:
8
ND
B1
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US
D 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
SECRET
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Success in the Central Committee: One of Gorbachev's
priority goals when he took office was to place his own selectees
into positions conferring membership on the Central Committee,
while removing as many potential opponents as possible from such
slots. (See box) He has been remarkably successful in achieving
this goal, with 85 of the 125 new members reflecting appointments
after his election. The wide-ranging purge of party and
government leaders that he has conducted since taking power in
March contributed to the largest turnover of Central Committee
members since Khrushchev's times. Over forty percent of the full
or voting members of the Central Committee elected at Brezhnev's
last congress in 1981 were turned out of office, while almost
fifty percent of the full and candidate members elected to the
new body are choices approved by Gorbachev, either when he was
senior secretary overseeing personnel or since he was named
General Secretary. They are presumably beholden to him and his
allies for their positions. (See Table)
BOX
Importance of the Central Committee
The Central Committee whose members are elected on the basis
of holding key party and government jobs has always been a key
lever of control for the General Secretary. In the 1920s Stalin
built his powerbase by packing that institution and Khrushchev
emulated his strategy in the 1950s. While their role in policy
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
12
NLRR F06-114/6#8929
ECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15
2
NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT A GLANCE
Full Members:
Reelected:
179/58%
New Full Members:
128/42%
Elevated from Candidate Member:
23/8%
Newcomers:
105/34%
Total
307/100%
(decreased 12 from 319 elected in 1981)
Candidate Members:
Reelected:
54/32%
Newcomers:
116/68%
Total
170/100%
(increased 19 from 151 elected in 1981)
Grand Total
477/46% new
(increased 7 from 470 elected in 1981)
INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN OF FULL MEMBERS
1986
1981
National Party
30 (10%)
31 (10%)
National Government
69 (23%)
77 (24%)
Regional Party and Gov't
117 (38%)
127 (40%)
Military
23 (7%)
23 (7%)
KGB
4 (1%)
4 (1%)
MFA
15 (5%)
16 (5%)
Media Editors
3 (1%)
4 (1%)
Mass Orgs and Unions
8 (3%)
8 (3%)
Scientific
11 (4%)
10 (3%)
Others*
27 (8)
19 (6%)
Total
307 (100%)
319 (100%)
*Includes: industrial and agricultural managers; workers;
honorary retirees; unknown
3
SECRET
formulation is indirect- that power resides in the Politburo and
the Secretariat--they play a crucial role in policy
implementation and can resolve conflicts when opinion in these
higher deliberative bodies is divided. They can even decide the
fate of the General Secretary, as they did in 1957 when they
supported Khrushchev against his Politburo opponents, and in
1964, when they threw their support to Brezhnev and sanctioned
Khrushchev's overthrow.
END BOX
While engineering an historically high rate of turnover of
its members, Gorbachev- unlike many of his predecessors- did not
expand the size of the Central Committee nor did the influx of
new members shift the relative political influence of the
country's major institutions. (See Table) The number of full
members actually declined from 319 to 307, with the number of
candidate members growing slightly from 151 to 170. While
expanding the size would have allowed him to pack it with even
more of his supports, he appears to have shifted the body's
loyalty toward himself without the giving more of the elite a
claim to Central Committee status which might afford them greater
political independence from the center- a step which could
attenuate central control down the road, as the Brezhnev era
showed.
13
SECRET
4
SECRET
14
SECRET
SECRET
Gorbachev also took advantage of the elections to advance
several personal advisers, as well as to reward those supportive
of his policy views, and chasten opponents.
0 New foreign policy adviser A.S. Chernyayev was promoted to
full member, and domestic aides A.P. Lushchikov and V.I.
Roldin were made full and candidate members
respectively. A possible adviser on ideology, G.L.
Smirnov retained his candidate seat as well.
0 Arms control spokesman and reputed science adviser Ye. P.
15
SECRET
SECRET
Velikhov was among several Academy of Sciences Vice-
Presidents advanced to candidate membership, probably
reflecting the stress Gorbachev places on science and
technology in achieving his economic goals.
0 Richard Kosolapov, the Kommunist editor who has served as
the principal public spokesman for those resistant to
economic reform, lost his position as full member.
0 Reform-minded philosopher I.T. Frolov--criticized and
demoted in the 1970s for advocating "open debate" of
ideologically sensitive issues--was leapfrogged to full
membership, lending credibility to reports that he would
replace Kosolapov as editor of the important party
theoretical journal.
Reorganization of the Central Apparatus: The failure of a
number of department chiefs to gain reelection to the Central
Committee stongly suggests that Gorbachev also made good on his
rumored intention to streamline the party apparatus by reducing
the number of Central Committee departments.
Letters Department chief Boris Yakovlev failed to regain
his position on the Central Auditing Committee. These
departments have already been eliminated at the republic
level and the Auditing Commission has apparently assumed
16
SECRET
7
SECRET
this function at the national level. Yakovlev's removal
confirms the demise of his department.
0 Agricultural Machine Building Department chief I.I.
Sakhnyuk lost his seat on the Central Committee, possibly
indicating that this department created during Brezhnev's
last years has been merged with the Machine Building
Department or with the Agriculture Department in a move
parallel to Gorbachevs' recent merging of agricultural
ministries on the government side.
o K.S. Simonov, head of the Transport and Communications
Department, and V.F. Shauro, head of the Culture
Department, were not reelected candidate members. It is
unclear whether they have been replaced or their
departments eliminated.
These removals mark an almost complete turnover of
department chiefs in place when Brezhnev died in 1982, leaving
only International Information Department Chief Zamyatin--rumored
to going as ambassador to Great Britain, Administrative Organs
Department Chief Savinkin, and Agricultural and Food Industry
Chief Karlov--all of whom were reelected-- in their positions.
Continued criticism of the poor performance of several Central
Committee departments and their undesirable proliferation by
Moscow party boss Yeltsin suggest more streamlining may be under
17
SECRET
8
SECRET
consideration.
Honorable Retirement? In an unusual move, four retired
senior party and government officials--premier Tikhonov, Gosplan
chief Baybakov, International Department Chief Ponomarev, and
Supreme Soviet Presidium First Deputy Chairman Kuznetsov--were
reelected to the Central Committee. Gorbachev pointedly did not
extend this gesture of respect to fallen foes Romanov and
Grishin. (See box). This solicitude toward elderly ex-leaders--
almost unprecedented in the rough-and-tumble arena of Kremlin
politics-- is consistent with earlier signs that Gorbachev wants
to make retirement a more respectable step, and it may be
intended to coax remaining superannuated officials into
retirement. It cannot be completely ruled out that the move was
a quid pro quo forced upon Gorbachev by remaining old guardists
within the leadership. Gorbachev, however, would probably find
this a small price to pay for removing those officials who have
been major obstacles to his policies.
BOX
Brezhnevites Left in the Central Committee
While Gorbachev made impressive headway in cleaning deadwood
out the Central Committee, some Brezhnev longtimers managed to
survive the Gorbachev "purge" before the congress and held onto
their seats.
18
SECRET
9
SECRET
0 Over a dozen regional or republic party leaders of the
older generation who have held their posts under Brezhnev
for a decade or more remain at helm, some despite
criticism in the media and party directives.
o Several superannuated ministers including one who is 87
years old and several others who have been sharply
criticized since Brezhnev's death remain at their posts.
o Some key economic functionaries like State Price Committee
Glushkov, who shared an obstructionist approach to
economic change with ousted officials like Baybakov, also
remain in place.
Gorbachev will presumably continue his effort to root out
such officials, whose views or capabilities are clearly out of
step with his program.
END BOX
19
SECRE
FOIA(b) (3)
Table 2
REGIONAL PARTY OFFICIALS REPLACED SINCE GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY
Buro or
Secretariat
Central Committee
Politburo*
1st Sec
2nd Sec
Other Secs
Full Mbrs
Cand Mbrs
Total
% Replaced
Armenia
4 (of 18)
no
yes
4 (of 4)
52 (of 121)
29 (of 61)
81 (of 182)
44%
Azerbaydzhan
6 (of 18)
no
no
0 (of 4)
53 (of 128)
29 (of 72)
82 (of 200)
41%
Belorussia
8 (of 19)
no
no
0 (of 4)
92 (of 151)
44 (of 68)
136 (of 219)
62%
Estonia
7 (of 17)
no
yes
0 (of 3)
48 (of 131)
43 (of 68)
91 (of 199)
46%
Georgia
5 (of 19)
yes**
no
2 (of 4)
73 (of 148)
38 (of 63)
111 (of 211)
53%
Kazakhstan
4 (of 11)
no
no
2 (of 4)
122 (of 175)
39 (of 67)
161 (of 242)
67%
Kirgiziya
8 (of 14)
yes
yes
3 (of 3)
89 (of 142)
35 (of 58)
124 (of 200)
62%
Latvia
6 (of 14)
no
no
2 (of 3)
63 (of 141)
35 (of 65)
98 (of 206)
48%
Lithuania
0 (of 14)
no
no
0 (of 3)
61 (of 146)
29 (of 73)
90 (of 219)
41%
Moldavia
6 (of 15)
no
no
0 (of 3)
54 (of 125)
35 (of 55)
89 (of 180)
49%
Tadzhikistan
7 (of 12)
yes
yes
0 (of 3)
76 (of 132)
42 (of 56)
118 (of 188)
63%
Turkmenistan
5 (of 14)
yes
no
1 (of 3)
86 (of 154)
27 (of 44)
113 (of 198)
57%
Ukraine
1 (of 16)
no
no
1 (of 5)
74 (of 197)
56 (of 92)
130 (of 289)
44%
/
Uzbekistan
10 (of 17)
no
yes
2 (of 3)
123 (of 167)
65 (of 75)
188 (of 242)
78%
Moscow Gorkom
13 (of 17)
yes
yes
1 (of 4)
125 (of 175)
35 (of 57)
160 (of 232)
69%
Leningrad Obkom*** 9 (of 19)
yes**
no
2 (of 4)
The Buros in Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine were increased in size, while those in Georgia, Kirgiziya,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were reduced.
**The Georgian and Leningrad Oblast first secretaries were promoted; others appear to have been removed for shortcomings.
***Comparative figures are not available for Leningrad Oblast.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06114/6#8931
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15
<. DTG> 241511Z JUN 86
<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PSN: 044794
<PREC> 5 ROUTINE
<CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOS
< TO> UTS1547
13
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6605
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
e ONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 10759
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR
File: bio
<SUBJ> SUBJECT: VIGNETTES ABOUT GORBACHEV
<TEXT> 1.
ENTIRE TEXT
SUMMARY
2. THIS CABLE PROVIDES INFORMATION RELATING TO
GORBACHEV ACQUIRED RECENTLY BY SEVERAL EMBOFFS
FROM A VARIETY OF SOVIET AND DIPLOMATIC SOURCES.
WE CANNOT CONFIRM ANY OF IT BUT BELIEVE IT WORTH
REPORTING. IN BRIEF:
AN ACADEMIC SOURCE REPORTED THAT GORBACHEV,
UNLIKE BREZHNEV, SUBMERGES HIMSELF IN THE
DETAILS OF THE ISSUES;
A SOVIET JOURNALIST AND A REFUSENIK
REPORTED THE GENERAL SECRETARY SUFFERS FROM
DIABETES AND A SERIOUS HEART PROBLEM,
RESPECTIVELY;
A STAVROPOL' JOURNALIST DESCRIBED WHAT GORBACHEV
HAD DONE FOR HIS HOME TOWN AND HIS MODEST
STYLE OF LIVING WHEN HE WAS FIRST SECRETARY THERE;
A SOVIET OFFICIAL DISCUSSED GORBACHEV'S
MOTHER AND HER LIVING CONDITIONS; AND
A SOVIET ACADEMIC REPORTED THAT GORBACHEV READ
THE RIOT ACT TO KUYBYSHEV oBKoM FIRST SECRETARY
MURAV'YEV WHEN THE GENERAL SECRETARY VISITED
THAT OBLAST IN APRIL.
END SUMMARY
GORBACHEV THE MANAGER
3. A DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN ACADEMIC VISITOR,
CITING A SENIOR SOVIET ACADEMIC WHO ALSO OCCUPIES AN
IMPORTANT POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC), CLAIMED
THE SOVIET ACADEMIC DESCRIBED GORBACHEV AS "VERY
ANALYTICAL" IN HIS APPROACH. THE GENERAL SECRETARY
REPORTEDLY WORKS THROUGH EVERY PROBLEM HIMSELF,
WHILE RELYING HEAVILY ON HIS ADVISERS, WHO WERE
EXPECTED TO BE ON TOP OF THE ISSUES. GORBACHEV'S
APPROACH TO WORK WAS THUS UNLIKE THAT OF BREZHNEV,
SAID THE SOVIET ACADEMIC. BREZHNEV FUNCTIONED MORE
AS AN "EMPEROR," ESPECIALLY IN HIS DECLINING
YEARS. HE SIMPLY SIGNED OFF ON PROJECTS WITHOUT
HIMSELF GETTING INVOLVED.
4. ON THE SUBJECT OF GORBACHEV'S ADVISERS,
AN INFORMED WESTERN COMMUNIST (PROTECT)
CLAIMED THAT A.S. CHERNYAYEV WAS EXTREMELY
CLOSE TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY, OFTEN
SPENDING AS MUCH AS SIX HOURS A DAY WITH HIM.
CHERNYAYEV ALSO PERSONALLY HAS RESPONSIBILITY
FOR DRAFTING GORBACHEV'S SPEECHES ON FOREIGN
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#8939
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
AFFAIRS BUT ALSO HAS AN INPUT ON THOSE DEALING
WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES, IN WHICH CHERNYAYEV
14
HAS BOTH AN INTEREST AND INFLUENCE. A
ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT REPORTED THAT ANOTHER AIDE,
A.P. LUSHCHIKOV, WAS GORBACHEV'S MOST
IMPORTANT AIDE, AN AGRICULTURE SPECIALIST,
AND HAD BEEN WITH HIM SINCE 1967 OR 1968.
POSSIBLE MEDICAL AILMENTS?
5. A SOVIET JOURNALIST COMMENTED THAT "EVERYBODY
KNOWS GORBACHEV WAS SICK, THAT HE HAS DIABETES,"
IN TRYING TO EXPLAIN WHY LIGACHEV AND
RYZHKOV, BUT NOT GORBACHEV, HAD VISITED
CHERNOBYL' SHORTLY AFTER THE ACCIDENT THERE.
ANOTHER SOVIET, A REFUSENIK WELL KNOWN TO THE
EMBASSY, CITED A FRIEND WHO ALLEGEDLY WORKED
AS A MEDICAL TECHNICIAN IN THE KREMLIN CLINIC
TO THE EFFECT THAT GORBACHEV WAS REGULARLY
CHECKED FOR HEART PROBLEMS, TAKES SPECIAL
MEDICATION FOR HIS HEART DAILY, AND HAS ALREADY
SUFFERED TWO HEART ATTACKS, THE LAST
IN THE EARLY 1980S.
BACK HOME IN STAVROPOL'
<TIME>
ORIG DTG:
241511z JUN 86
CONFI
WHCA TOR:
176/0543Z
PSN: 044794 VAX663
CMC TOR:
25 JUN 86
02:23
DB ADD:
25-JUN-86
02:25:00
< GE#>000118
<SECT> 01 < PSN> 044794 < SSN> 0759
<TOR> 860625022500
< DTG> 241511Z JUN 86
<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PSN: 044797
<PREC> 5 ROUTINE
<CLAS> C ONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 MOS
< TO> UTS1548
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6606
16
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C
N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 10759
<SUBJ> SUBJECT: VIGNETTES ABOUT GORBACHEV
<TEXT> TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR
6. A VARIETY OF SOURCES PROVIDED INFORMATION
RELATING TO THE EMERGING "GORBACHEV MYTH"
THE "CULT OF MODESTY" HIS STYLE OF LIFE,
AS WELL AS ABOUT HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY.
A "STAVROPOL' SKAYA PRAVDA" REPORTER, WHO CLAIMED
TO BE PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH THE GORBACHEV
FAMILY, REPORTED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY
SHUNNED THE USE OF PERSONAL SERVANTS EVEN
NORMALLY WALKING TO WORK DURING HIS TENURE AS
FIRST SECRETARY OF STAVROPOL' KRAY. THE
JOURNALIST CLAIMED HAVING SEEN GORBACHEV REGULARLY
DOING SUCH CHORES AS TAKING OUT THE GARBAGE AND
WALKING THE FAMILY'S DOG. GORBACHEV REPORTEDLY
ENJOYED PUTTERING AROUND HIS HOUSE, FIXING
WINDOWS, PAINTING AND TAKING CARE OF THE GARDEN.
7. ANOTHER STAVROPOL' SOURCE, AN AGRONOMIST AT
THE AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTE THERE, LIKEWISE
PRAISED THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S PERSONAL
QUALITIES. THE AGRONOMIST ADDED THAT GORBACHEV
HAD DONE A GREAT DEAL TO TRANSFORM STAVROPOL'
FROM A DUSTY PROVINCIAL CAPITAL TO A GROWING,
MODERN CITY. HE HAD ORDERED THE RENEWAL AND
RESTORATION OF THE CITY'S CENTER AND
SUPPORTED THE BUILDING OF A MAMMOTH SPORTS/CULTURAL
CENTER WHICH OPENED JUST LAST YEAR. HE HAD
BROUGHT BOTH PRIDE AND MATERIAL PROGRESS TO
THE CITY.
8. A MID LEVEL STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY (SCST) OFFICIAL RELATED A STORY ABOUT
GORBACHEV'S MOTHER, WHO REPORTEDLY CONTINUES
TO RESIDE IN A SMALL COTTAGE ON A LANE OFF
THE MAIN STREET OF THE VILLAGE OF PRIVOL'NOYE.
SINCE HER SON'S ACCESSION TO THE GENERAL
SECRETARYSHIP, SHE HAS BEEN ASSIGNED A KGB
BODYGUARD APPARENTLY AGAINST HER WISHES.
THIS WAS DONE NOT BECAUSE SHE WAS CONSIDERED
TO BE IN PERSONAL DANGER BUT BECAUSE SHE WAS
BEING BESIEGED BY SOVIETS WHO HAD TRAVELLED
FROM FAR AND WIDE TO REQUEST HER INTERCESSION
WITH MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH ON THEIR BEHALF.
THE SCST OFFICIAL ALSO RELATED THAT SHORTLY
AFTER GORBACHEV BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY, THE
LOCAL STAVROPOL' AUTHORITIES PAVED THE LANE
LEADING TO MRS. GORBACHEV'S COTTAGE. SHE,
HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY CALLED HER SON THE NEXT
DAY, COMPLAINED THAT SHE HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED,
MAINTAINED THAT NO OTHER STREETS IN THE VILLAGE
HAD BEEN so PAVED AND SHE WAS THEREFORE
RECEIVING UNFAIR TREATMENT, AND ASKED THAT
THE LANE BE RESTORED TO ITS ORIGINAL STATE.
17
THAT THE AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY DID THE NEXT DAY.
GORBACHEV READS THE RIOT ACT IN KUYBYSHEV
9. ACCORDING TO A RETIRED HISTORIAN, CITING
FRIENDS IN KUYBYSHEV, DURING HIS APRIL 7 9
VISIT TO THAT CITY, GORBACHEV PUBLICLY CHASTISED
THE OBLAST FIRST SECRETARY, YE. F. MURAV'YEV,
FOR NEGLECTING THE NEEDS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION,
FOR ARBITRARILY EXPELLING PARTY MEMBERS WHO
CRITICIZED HIS STEWARDSHIP OF THE OBLAST
(AS WELL AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE TOL'YATTI CITY
PARTY COMMITTEE ON THE SAME COUNT) AND GENERAL
DISORGANIZATION THERE. CITING HIS KUYBYSHEV
SOURCES, THE HISTORIAN SAID THAT GORBACHEV
HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THE PUBLIC
IN TOL'YATTI NOT ONLY AT THE AUTOMOBILE FACTORY
BUT AT THE CENTRAL DEPARTMENT STORE AND MARKET.
THERE THREE THOUSAND AND TEN THOUSAND PEOPLE
REPORTEDLY GATHERED, RESPECTIVELY. THE MEETINGS
WERE CALLED OFF, HOWEVER, REPORTEDLY ON THE
INSISTENCE OF GORBACHEV'S SECURITY DETAIL.
(COMMENT: SOVIET TV COVERAGE SHOWED GORBACHEV
VISITING OTHER SITES IN TOL'YATTI, BUT WITHOUT
CROWDS OF THIS MAGNITUDE. END COMMENT)
AT THE AIRPORT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, GORBACHEV
REPORTEDLY ORDERED MURAV'YEV TO GET THINGS IN
ORDER ASAP AND ASKED HOW LONG THAT WOULD TAKE.
MURAV'YEV REPORTEDLY REPLIED, "A YEAR, A
YEAR AND A HALF," TO WHICH GORBACHEV BARKED
IN A MENACING TONE, "THAT IS NOT SOON ENOUGH,"
TURNED AND, WITHOUT SHAKING HANDS, BOARDED HIS PLANE.
<TIME>
ORIG DTG:
241511z JUN 86
CONFI
WHCA TOR:
176/0545Z
PSN: 044797 VAX670
CMC TOR:
25 JUN 86
02:27
DB ADD:
25-JUN-86
02:31:24
< GE#>000124
<SECT> 02 < PSN> 044797 < SSN> 0759
<TOR> 860625023124
<. DTG> 241511Z JUN 86
<ORIG> FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PSN: 044799
<PREC> 5 ROUTINE
<CLAS> CONFI D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOS
< TO> STU7309
18
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6607
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C ONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 10759
<SUBJ> SUBJECT: VIGNETTES ABOUT GORBACHEV
<TEXT> TAGS: PGOV, PINR, UR
10. RAISA GORBACHEVA REPORTEDLY HAD HER OWN
ITINERARY IN KUYBYSHEV AND TOL'YATTI, VISITING
SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, STORES AND EVEN A FEW
FACTORIES. IN ONE OF THOSE, THE SWEETS PLANT
"ROSSTYA," A LARGE GROUP OF WORKERS REPORTEDLY
SURROUNDED RAISA AND HER BODYGUARDS AND
SEVERAL TRIED TO PASS TO HER "PETITIONS"
ADDRESSED TO HER HUSBAND. WHEN ONE OF HER
BODYGUARDS SOUGHT TO INTERVENE, RAISA
REPORTEDLY ORDERED HIM TO ALLOW THE PETITIONS
THROUGH AND NOT INTERFERE
WITH HER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE WORKERS.
12. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SOVIET ACADEMIC, RAISA
GORBACHEVA'S MAIDEN NAME WAS TITARENKO, WHICH
IS UKRAINIAN IN ORIGIN. SHE WAS NOT BORN IN
UKRAINE, HOWEVER, BUT APPARENTLY IN THE URALS,
ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE. HARTMAN
<TIME>
ORIG DTG:
241511z JUN 86
CONFI
WHCA TOR:
176/0546Z
PSN: 044799 VAX666
CMC TOR:
25 JUN 86 02:24
DB ADD:
25-JUN-86
02:27:47
< GE#>000120
<SECT> 03 < PSN> 044799 < SSN> 0759
<TOR> 860625022747
21
Date
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
8 May 1986
(b)(3)
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
Initials
Date
building, Agency/Post)
1. Ambassador Jack Matlock, Jr.
2. Sepcial Assistant to the President
3. Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs
4. National Security Council
5. Rm 368, Old EOB
Action
File
Note and Return
Approval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
As Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
Circulate
For Your Information
See Me
Comment
Investigate
Signature
Coordination
Justify
REMARKS
FYI
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
Room No.-Bidg.
1.G 23, HQS.
Phone No
OCR/USSR-EE/POL
5041-102
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
* U.S.G.P.O.: 1983 -421-529/320
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/6#8933
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15
32
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
15 January 1986
File's
Ussr-
USSR
B10
Ligachev Oversees Turnover Among Regional Leaders
Since Gorbachev became general secretary last March there has
been massive turnover in the regional party apparat, and the changes
have been accelerating as next month's CPSU congress approaches.
Second Secretary Ligachev has supervised the selection of new
leaders for regional party organizations. The remarkable number of
regional leaders who are being selected from among his direct
subordinates-either his deputies in the cadres department or
Central Committee inspectors in the department-would seem to
increase his clout in the Gorbachev regime.
Gorbachev's accession last March brought a sharp break with earlier cadre
practices. Heads of local party organizations increasingly are being drawn
from outside the local area, often from the Organizational-Party Work
Department of the Central Committee. Under Brezhnev, regional leaders were
rarely changed; when they were, local subordinates usually were advanced to
replace them. Andropov altered the Brezhnev pattern, rapidly replacing many
oblast first secretaries and greatly expanding the introduction of outsiders (to
about half the appointees). But almost all those outsiders were people drawn
from other provinces or from republic-level posts-not from the Central
Committee bureaucracy. Only three CPSU Central Committee inspectors
were named kray or oblast first secretaries under Andropov and Chernenko.¹
Under Gorbachev, the list of new regional leaders drawn from the
Organizational-Party Work Department has already reached 20, counting
cadres department leaders and Central Committee inspectors, all of whom
appear to work in this department. (Announcements of appointments of these
inspectors never mention any specific Central Committee department, but
recently two of the inspectors who have been appointed oblast first
1 The three inspectors were P. M. Telepnev in Arkhangelsk in November 1983, G. G.
Vedernikov in Chelyabinsk in January 1984, and D. N. Gagarov in Primorskiy Kray in April
1984. (The latter two were locals brought to Moscow for short periods; Telepnev was
previously from Tyumen in West Siberia.)
DECLASSIFIED
25
NLRR F06-114/6#8935
CONFIDENTIAL
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
11/16/15
33
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
15 January 1986
secretaries-Udmurt First Secretary P. S. Grishchenko and Kalmyk First
Secretary V.A. Zakharov-were identified at a conference as "inspectors of
the Organizational-Party Work Department of the CPSU Central
Committee" in the 26 November Ukrainian daily Radyanska Ukraina.)
Gorbachev Appointees From CPSU Cadres Department
Name
New Appointment
Date
Cadres Department Leaders
Yu. V. Petrov (deputy head
Sverdlovsk first secretary
19 April
of department)
I. K. Polozkov (head of
Krasnodar first secretary
3 June
a sector)
G. I. Revenko (deputy head
Kiev Oblast first secretary
4 November
of department)
P. A. Smolskiy (deputy head
Ryazan first secretary
14 December
of department)
Central Committee Inspectors
V.V. Bakatin
Kirov first secretary
22 March
V.P. Anishchev
Uzbek CC secretary
29 March
Yu. P. Kochetkov
Armenian second secretary
12
Ye. S. Stroyev
Orel first secretary
22
A. N. Plekhanov
Kurgan first secretary
25
L. V. Sharin
Amur first secretary
29
M.A. Knyazyuk
Ivanovo first secretary
15
V.A. Kuptsov
Vologda first secretary
20
August July June June July June April
Yu. I. Livintsev
Tula first secretary
5
A. M. Masaliyev
Kirgiz first secretary
2 November
I.S. Boldyrev
Stavropol first secretary
4 November
V.V. Sakalauskas
Lithuanian premier
18 November
P.S. Grishchenko
Udmurt first secretary
13 December
G. N. Kiselev
Kirgiz second secretary
13 December
V.A. Zakharov
Kalmyk first secretary
20 December
V.V. Grigoryev
Vitebsk first secretary
6 January
26
CONFIDENTIAL
34
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
15 January 1986
By drawing on cadres department personnel for local appointments, Ligachev
has had a good opportunity to get to know most of the new regional leaders
before they are appointed. Some of the inspectors are locals brought to
Moscow to serve briefly before returning to their home province, apparently a
process of grooming them for leadership. For example, Masaliyev was relieved
as first secretary of Kirgizia's Issyk-Kul Oblast in late June to become a
CPSU inspector in Moscow and then returned to Kirgizia as republic first
secretary at the beginning of November. Kuptsov, identified as Vologda
second secretary as late as 28 February 1985, became an inspector and then
on 20 July returned as Vologda first secretary. Boldyrev was still identified as
a Stavropol Kray secretary on 30 January, then did a short tour as inspector,
and returned as Stavropol first secretary on 4 November.
The practice of selecting regional officials from among Central Committee
inspectors is not new but has dramatically increased, apparently both as a
training and testing process and as part of an effort to get more central control
over regional party organizations and break up the development of the
entrenched local baronies which flourished under Brezhnev. The position of
CPSU inspector was originally created by Stalin in 1946 to create a group of
powerful plenipotentiaries who could crack down on local leaders and who
themselves sometimes were appointed first secretaries of republics. Since the
1950's, however, they had not been much in evidence.
Pattern in RSFSR
The tendency to appoint inspectors or other cadres
department officials has been notably strong in the
RSFSR, where the heads of kray and oblast party organizations usually are
full Central Committee members. Virtually all new RSFSR kray and oblast
first secretaries appointed under Gorbachev are either not from the province in
question or are locals who have been serving in Moscow just prior to
appointment. Only two of the 22 RSFSR kray or oblast first secretaries
appointed under Gorbachev have been promoted directly from below (the
normal pattern under Brezhnev): Tambov Executive Committee Chairman
Ye. M. Podolskiy was promoted to first secretary in April, and Kostroma
Executive Committee First Deputy Chairman V. I. Toropov was promoted to
first secretary in January 1986.
Of the 22 new first secretaries, three have been drawn from other regional
party organizations (Saratov, Kabardino-Balkar, Khakass), while 13 are from
the CPSU cadres department (ten inspectors and three department deputy
27
CONFIDENTIAL
35
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
15 January 1986
heads or sector heads). Three are from central ministries in Moscow
(Industrial Construction Minister Yu. F. Solovyev became Leningrad Oblast
first secretary, Deputy Agriculture Minister N. F. Tatarchuk became Kalinin
Oblast first secretary, and Agriculture Minister V. K. Mesyats became
Moscow Oblast first secretary) and one was from the Central Committee's
Heavy Industry Department (first deputy head N. S. Yermakov, who became
Kemerovo first secretary).
Pattern Outside
The changes in the pattern of appointments have not
RSFSR
been as extensive outside the RSFSR, where oblast
leaders fall under republic cadre departments rather
than directly under the CPSU cadre organs. Among the 18 new oblast first
secretaries named under Gorbachev in non-Russian republics, five were simply
promoted within the oblast (as under Brezhnev) while most of the others were
promoted from within the republic. Only three were from Moscow: new
Andizhan First Secretary M. M. Aripdzhanov (an Uzbek) listed vaguely as
working in the CPSU Central Committee apparat, new Kiev Oblast First
Secretary G. I. Revenko, a Ukrainian from Kiev who worked as CPSU cadres
department deputy head during 1985, and new Vitebsk First Secretary V.V.
Grigoryev, a CPSU inspector. Another official identified with the CPSU
Central Committee apparat, B. F. Satin, was named first secretary of
Tashkent city in September. Most new republic-level party officials have also
been promoted from within the republic, but there are exceptions: CPSU
inspectors were named as an Uzbek Central Committee secretary in late
March, as Armenian second secretary in mid-April, and as Kirgiz first and
second secretaries in November and December.
There has also been a slight increase in the infusion of Slavs in this process of
increasing introduction of outsiders. Russians and Ukrainians replaced natives
as ideology secretary in Latvia in late March and as Latvian industry
secretary in December, as Tashkent city first secretary in September, as first
secretary of Uzbekistan's Ashkhabad Oblast in November, as first secretary
of Kazakhstan's Mangyshlak Oblast in November, and as first secretary of
Alma-Ata city in December.
Ligachev as
Ligachev, 65, was first brought to Moscow by
Cadre Leader
Andropov to become cadres department head in April
1983 and was promoted to Central Committee
secretary at the December 1983 plenum. He worked under senior Secretary
Gorbachev's supervision, serving as Gorbachev's right-hand man in running
28
CONFIDENTIAL
36
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
15 January 1986
cadre affairs and, later, agriculture as well. He and
Gorbachev presumably did most of the work in
developing the new cadre policy adopted by the
Politburo in October 1984, while Chernenko was still
general secretary.² That policy called for less tolerance
of incompetent officials and more aggressive
promotion of younger leaders.
Ligachev, who became second-ranking secretary and a
full Politburo member after Gorbachev became
general secretary, has applied the new cadre policy in
Ligachev (Soviet TV,
20 November 1985)
an unusually vigorous and tough manner, demanding
sharp improvements and tonguelashing lower officials.
In a 26 July speech kicking off the regional election campaign leading up to
next month's party congress, for example, Ligachev decried the prevailing
atmosphere of tolerance in which "boot licking, servility, and conceit flourish
like wild thistles, and party principles of cadre selection
are consigned to
oblivion." He claimed that "serious measures" were being implemented to
improve cadre selection and warned that "while showing as considerate an
attitude as possible toward experienced workers, we must free ourselves of
unenterprising, inert people who avoid real organizational work among the
masses" (Kommunist, No. 14, August).
Ligachev has already addressed three party election conferences and has used
his speeches to stress the urgency of cadre improvement as well as the regime's
impatience with the status quo. According to the 13 October Pravda account
of a speech at Chelyabinsk, for example, Ligachev attacked the later years of
the Brezhnev era, claiming that "trust in cadres was frequently not linked with
high exactingness toward them." He called those years a time "when
accountability for assignments declined," and he insisted that it was
"necessary to radically change the attitude toward cadre training." He
followed with a 20 November speech to the party conference of the State
Committee of Television and Radio Broadcasting, in which he promised "to
completely cleanse the moral atmosphere and eradicate careerism,
individualism, flattery, servility, and everything that fetters our progress"
(Pravda, 21 November). In a speech at the Baku city party conference on
21 December, he warned that party officials, even "those in leadership
positions, must answer for their misdeeds" (Bakinskiy Rabochiy,
22 December). (U/FOUO)
2 See the Trends of 10 April 1985, pages 12-13.
29
CONFIDENTIAL
37
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
15 January 1986
China
Authoritative speeches and commentary marking the New Year and
emerging from a recent conference on agricultural work reflected
concern and controversy over effects of the radical economic reforms
Beijing initiated over the past year and over the social and economic
implications of China's first grain shortfall in six years. The
commentary indicated that the pace of reform would be slowed
down, though it also emphasized Beijing's determination to press
forward with the reform agenda.
New Year Celebrations Indicate Slowed Pace of Reforms
Both this year's Renmin Ribao New Year's editorial and the keynote address
at the annual New Year's gathering held by the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) made clear that the party's economic
reform goals for the coming year are considerably less ambitious than those of
recent years. While acknowledging last year's problems in implementing the
reforms, the editorial nonetheless took as its keynote the Chinese folktale of
"the foolish old man who moved the mountain-immortalized in a 1945
speech by Mao Zedong-that stresses optimism in the face of overwhelming
obstacles. Calling for emulation of the spirit of the foolish old man, the
editorial stated "we must do things with relentless perseverance, forge ahead
despite difficulties, and refuse to stop until our goal is achieved."
The editorial appraised the reforms begun over the past year as a "giant step,"
but called in the coming year for "concentrating our efforts in consolidating,
digesting, and supplementing the achievements that we have already scored."
Steps to "promote the beneficial and abolish the harmful" in the reforms and
to solve "outstanding problems" in the coming year should supplement efforts,
it said, to study, experiment, and make "preparations for an important step
forward for the next year's reform."
30
CONFIDENTIAL
38
CENTRA, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NOTICE TO RECIPIENT
COURIER REC. NO.
DATE SENT
DOCUMENT RECEIPT
Sign and Return as Shown on Reverse Side
326037
21 Feb 86
SENDER OF DOCUMENT(S)
ROOM
BLDG.
DATE DOCUMENT(S) SENT
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HQS
21 Feb 86
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S SENT
CIA NO.
DOCUMENT DATE
COPIES
DOCUMENT TITLE (IN BRIEF)
ATTACHMENTS
CLASS
(b)(3)
86-10746
2-19-86
2
Bios (Gorbachev)
86-10758
2-20-86
2
Bios (Rgzhkov)
RECIPIENT
ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT
SIGNATURE YACK NOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENT(S))
Amb Jack Matlock, NSC
Rm 368, Old EOB
(Smither DATE OF RECEIPT
OFFICE
FORM
USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
(33)
5 72 615
DATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
24 Feb 86
TO:
Anh Jack Matlock NSC
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
368
OLD EQB
REMARKS:
FYI updated Gorbachev
& Ryzhkav profiles
File:-
Soviet Leaders-
B10
FROM:
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BUILDING
1G23
EXTENSION
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351-5864
FORM NO.
1 FEB 56 241
REPLACES FORM 36-8
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