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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Conference: USSR [09/14/1984-
09/15/1984 - Hoover Institution]
Box: 21
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/25/2005
File Folder
CONFERENCE: USSR [9/14-15/84-HOOVER
FOIA
INSTRUCTIONS]
F06-114/6
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
21
2115
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
8997 MEMO
RAYMOND TO MCFARLANE RE
2 10/2/1984 B1
CONFERENCE ON THE USSR
[1 -2 - 1
R
12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8998 MEMO
CONFERENCE ON THE USSR
7 10/2/1984 B1
[3 -9 1
R
12/13/2007 F06-114/6
8999 MEMO
LINHARD/LEHMAN/KRAEMER TO
1
ND
B1
MCFARLANE RE TOR FOR ARMS
CONTROL WORK
[ 15 - 15 ]
R
12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9000 MEMO
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR UPCOMING
2
ND
B1
WORK PROGRAM
[ 16 - 17 1
R
12/13/2007 F06-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
7438
mattock,
MEMORANDUM
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
File
SECRET
Conference
INFORMATION
October 2, 1984
Inst
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
WALTER RAYMOND, JR. we
SUBJECT:
Conference on the USSR
I attended a two day conference on the USSR, sponsored by the
Andrei Sakharov Institute from 14-15 September at Hoover in
California. The subject of the conference was "How to open
the closed society". The participants included 11 recent
Soviet emigres and approximately the same number of American
academics and officials. Vladimir Bukovsky served as the
principal spokesman for the Sakharov Institute. Panels were
chaired by Charles Wolf of Rand, Dick Pipes of Harvard, Bob
Conquest of Hoover and Herb Ellison, Director of the Kennan
Institute in Washington. I have attached to this memorandum a
summary of the conference.
Several key points emerged from the conference. Bukovsky
underscored that whatever program was developed it should
involve Americans, Soviet emigres in the US and the peoples of
the USSR in a joint effort to help promote democratization.
He commented that changes in the Soviet bloc have not yet
represented democratization. Polish Solidarity, Hungarian
private markets and the Soviet second economy operate outside
of the system. The Soviet emigres at the conference were
exploring ways in which to initiate systemic changes.
Bukovsky and others made the point that a key element was the
creation of independent public opinion within the USSR. This
should be sought outside of any "official exchanges", but
should be built via a tissue of contacts and arrangements that
are not subject to regime control and are independent. This
calls for support to Soviet dissidents in the West, the
reproduction of more samizdat and infiltration back in, the
increase of direct contact with the USSR, the infiltration of
cassettes, tapes, VTRs etc--i.e. all steps designed to break
the information/propaganda monopoly the Soviets exercise over
their own people. A breakdown of the information monopoly
increases pressures within for change. Such change might
first focus on ways to improve the system; later it would
represent a direct challenge to the system itself.
Several Soviets highlighted that Western information flow can
not be solely negative--i.e. what is wrong with the system--it
must also show them a way to the future. Ex: Describe the
use and virtues of free trade unions and private enterprise.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#8997
SECRET
Declassify
on:
OADR
SECRET
BY
LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
SECRET
SECRET
A number of themes were developed during the course of the
conference, particularly focussed on breaking the information
monopoly, but also considering the impact of nationalities
issues, the growth of a large second economy--operating
-
parallel to, but outside of the state controlled system. (In
some sections of Central Asia the second economy yields more
than 50% of the production.) All participants recognized that
the rich collection of Soviet emigres now in the West had been
under utilized as a source of information and as a vehicle to
communicate to and open up the USSR.
While the program ideas transcend what can be done by the
Sakharov Institute, the directors of the Institute will draw
together some of the better plans discussed and submit them in
a major project proposal for the National Endowment for
Democracy to consider at its December board meeting. I will
include the points raised at the conference in the delib-
erations of the interagency Soviet Political Action Working
Group, which I chair, to see what programs should be pursued
by the USG. It was a worthwhile session.
Attachment
Tab I
Conference summary
CC: Matlock
Sestanovich
Lenczowski
SECRET
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
3
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
October 2, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Conference on the USSR
A two day conference on the Soviet Union, sponsored by the
Andrei Sakharov Institute took place from 14-15 September at
the Hoover Institution in California. The subject of the
conference was "How to open the closed society". The partici-
pants included 11 recent Soviet emigres and approximately the
same number of American academics and officials. Vladimir
Bukovsky served as the principal spokesman for the Sakharov
Institute. Panels were chaired by Charles Wolf of Rand, Dick
Pipes of Harvard, Bob Conquest of Hoover and Herb Ellison,
Director of the Kennan Institute in Washington.
Bukovsky set the tone for the conference. In his opening
remarks he said our goal would be to develop a joint program
involving the United States, the Soviet peoples and Soviet
emigres to help promote democratization in the USSR. Bukovsky
NLS F06-114/6*8998
BY NARA, DATE 12/13/07
said in his judgement traditional democratic institutions,
such as parties, labor and the judiciary can not be free
within the Soviet system. For example Polish Solidarity does
not reflect a democratization of Poland; Solidarity is an
DECLASSIFIED
alternative power center. The system has not changed.
Similarly, in Hungary private enterprise exists, but it exists
outside the system; it is tolerated but does not reflect
systematic change. This led Bukovsky to raise the rhetorical
question: when does the tolerance of activities outside the
system change the system?
In Bukovsky's judgement, democratization can start only with
the appearance of independent public opinion. It is important
for the West to recognize and assist underground writers and
other groups to resist the regime. The West, particularly
private elements representing the "people", should help
provide a surrogate free press. Western public opinion is
very important in the absence of internal public opinion. In
this context the radios are vital. But he added we must also
sponsor interest groups and help families of prisoners. He
regretted that Western support tends to be through the medium
of "regime identified" exchanges. To reopen a closed commu-
nist society we must go beyond the official exchange programs
and provide direct assistance to the "private sector.' We can
stimulate internal activity by infiltrating cassettes, tapes,
typewriters, VCRs, etc. In summary we must develop an in-
dependent public opinion by feeding it with material, we must
stimulate resistance through the flow of ideas, we must reopen
these countries and foster economic change.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Charles Wolf of Rand Corporation tried his hand at defining
the basic purposes of the meeting and the program.
To improve information and understanding of how things
work in the USSR from the many sources that are now available
in the West.
To improve the circulation and access/availability of
this information within the USSR.
To prepare positions and ideas on how to improve the
situation inside--how to teach them, how to develop a positive
program. In sum, how to create a program of democracy to be
brought to the Soviet people.
I. Soviet Propaganda:
Lidiya Voronina of VOA spoke about Soviet internal propaganda.
She underscored that we must counter Soviet internal propaganda
effectively if we are to promote democratization. She traced
the development of Marxist ideology from its initial role as a
theology into what it is now; a means of control over the
population. It is not a belief, it is a system of control.
She described the existence of 13 layers of communication
designed to deliver the message to the Soviet peoples. She
underscored that for our policy to be effective we have to
consider how the message can be delivered to the Soviet
people. For example, she noted that President Reagan's
military buildup was preempted by Moscow who used it to
further exert their control over the Soviet people. We must
develop a means to communicate that our military buildup has
been directly related to a commitment to world peace. Further
discussion highlighted the fact that we should try to break
the propaganda link between the Soviet leadership and its
people by selective communication and also by seeking to
redefine key words and concepts which the Soviets have pre-
empted, such as peace and security. The Soviet emigres felt
that the regime was vulnerable if its information monopoly
could be cracked.
Arkady Polishchuk, a Soviet journalist, struck me as an
excellent resource who should communicate with a range of
audiences in the United States and Europe. He demonstrated,
with graphics, how effectively Soviet military propaganda is
used to brainwash pre-school and first graders in the Soviet
Union. The briefing pointed up the difficulty of our task as
this information is unchallenged and tends to be translated
into basic belief when poured into the minds of the 4-9 year
olds. This thought control is intensified by the fact that in
the Soviet Union the State plays a major direct role in the
upbringing of children. Perhaps the key benefactor of the
Soviet propaganda is the Soviet military man. The army, more
than anything else, is placed on a pedestal as the guardian of
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
peace. Children's books view the Soviet military role as
benign and yet one of vigilance. Soviet soldiers are charac-
terized as "planting trees and building houses.' After 1981
Soviet magazines for children described Soviet soldiers in
Afghanistan as "planting trees and building houses.'
Polishchuk thought there would be a vulnerability to the
Soviets by broadcasting first hand experiences by Soviets
captured in Afghanistan back to the Soviet people.
Yarim-Agaev commented on Soviet propaganda designed to exploit
the intense fear of war. He did not think the regime could
indefinitely keep people under this type of tension. Sooner
or later if there is no ware the people will stop believing
the propaganda.
Edward Kuznetsov, a senior staff member at Radio Liberty and a
former Gulag associate of Bukovsky, elaborated on ways to
counter Soviet propaganda. He said a special group should
watch every move by the Soviet propaganda machine with an eye
to the appropriate response. He added that we must find a way
to reach the Soviet citizens and produce information in a
manner acceptable to them. He sounded a theme which other
spokesman repeated throughout the conference; it is not enough
to simply show the Soviet that they have a "bad life" without
showing them a way to the future. One strategy is to ensure a
much more significant flow of information, including books to
the USSR. He stressed the need to create an ability to
communicate directly with individuals within the USSR.
Richard Pipes of Harvard said that Soviet propagandists had
been very effective in keeping peace and the issues of human
rights and democracy separate. It is essential that our
information programs to the Soviet Union uphold western values
and be more broadly gauged than simply anti-communist.
Bukovsky responded that peace and democracy should be inter-
linked--peace should be viewed as an elemental part of democ-
racy. The information program should make clear that the
continued state of international tension and danger results
from the absence of democracy in the USSR. In effect, it is
the Soviet system that is the threat to world peace, not
western democracy.
II. Market Relations as a Step to Democratization?
Yuri Yarim-Agaev presented a paper on the "development of
market relations as a way to democratize the Soviet Union.
He underscored the importance of the "second economy" both in
terms of its contribution to overall economic activity in the
USSR as well as to its continued existence as a form of
activity operating outside of the system. Philosophically
speaking Yarim-Agaev noted that any process that permits
individual expression or action outside the system can provide
a focus for dissatisfaction which could create an opposition.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
If those in dissatisfaction join others, it can serve as the
basis for a movement. Yarim-Agaev noted that there have been
moves toward institutional opposition within the Soviet bloc
including religious groups, Helsinki Watch groups and Soli-
darity. In the Soviet Union there has been little evidence of
labor opposition. Workers have not yet transposed their
personal dissatisfaction into organized opposition. Workers
are objectively underpaid but they still can moonlight. The
worker gets a good salary for the low productivity of his
work. While Yarim-Agaev noted that a study of real wages
could yield interesting information, the second economy tends
to permit the worker to meet his minimal needs. Strikes for
higher salaries would result in workers being deprived of
certain social benefits, higher prices, restricted access to
apartments, etc. Therefore Yarim-Agaev does not see the
elements present for labor unrest because laborers have found
a way to meet their needs via the second economy outside the
system. They can not safely crush the second economy without
serious alienation. Yarim-Agaev acknowledged the Soviet labor
would be vulnerable to outside radio broadcasts which could
underscore the level of labor exploitation. Such broadcasts
should provide information about western trade union experi-
ences.
Leonid Khotin described his efforts to collate information
concerning the Third Wave emigration as a source of informa-
tion. His briefing confirmed a view that a large number of
Third Wavers have important information which has not been
exploited. In his detailed compilation and analysis of
information about which a number of emigres have considerable
knowledgeability, he highlighted several key areas:
--
The role of the party at all levels.
The role of financial institutions.
Efforts to adopt western management techniques.
Comparison of Soviet-Western management styles.
Soviet market economy--free market practices in the USSR.
Khotin's efforts to inventory the Third Wave requires finan-
cial support. It is the best clearing house available in the
private sector to permit us to identify and utilize the
talents of the recent Soviet emigration.
Khotin also described a valuable compilation which he produces
on the Soviet and East European emigre press. Such a com-
pilation is helpful in judging what does exist and, if proper-
ly utilized, to provide a credible basis on which to select
some of the best material already written by Soviet emigres
for further distribution/circulation in the USSR. Khotin
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7
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noted that there are a sufficient number of Soviet profession-
als in the emigration to facilitate research, in collaboration
with Western scholars, covering almost any other Soviet
discipline. In this manner Soviet emigres and Western schol-
ars can produce material, which subsequently should be sent
into the USSR, which would represent the basis for true
dialogue with Soviet counterparts still in country.
John Moore of the Hoover Institution reflected on why the
Soviets tolerate the second economy. He concluded that the
market is tolerated to make the system work. He said that
market relations which recognize the role of private property
can lead to democracy, but this will not happen if the state
controls the means of production. Economic freedom would
threaten the leaders but the Soviets have given no indication
of tolerating systematic change and without systematic change
there will not be political change. Moore thought that more
economic liberalization would be possible only if the economy
deteriorates further. Clearly the essentials of economic
freedom are in our interest and can only be carried out by
restricting the exercise of centralized political power. His
policy prescription was: maintain pressure on the USSR; do
not provide cheap access to Western technology, and tell
people of the virtues of a free economy.
Vladimir Bukovsky summarized this portion of the discussion as
an examination of ways in which to begin a process--the
activation of public opinion--which could ultimately lead to a
democratization process. He noted that the second economy is
forcing the regime to raise prices and this could cause
consumers to be further alienated by the purchasing power as
the ruble shrinks. Moore added that the Soviets are faced
with the dilemma of how far to let the second economy extend
into the system. If it is to push it back it will require
repression and a consequent drop off in economic performance.
Yarim-Agaev said the potential for increased tension between
the market and the government could stimulate nascent labor
union activity and/or a further expansion of the market
sector. Such tension would initially be on a personal level
which he felt was significant as it is at that level in which
opposition to a totalitarian state must start. He thought
that Andropov's anti-corruption campaign was partially de-
signed to restrict the second economy.
III. Central Asia: How can this region influence the
democratization process?
Dr. Nancy Lubin of the Congressional Research Office noted
that half the people entering the work force will be Central
Asians by the year 2015. Rapid population growth will cause
ethnic tensions. Lubin was very reluctant to generalize; the
Central Asians are a very diversified lot. The second economy
is very strong in Central Asia and as a result Central Asians
CONFIDENTIAL
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8
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have access to more rather than less. Indeed, some Central
Asians hold a position superior to the Soviets. A crackdown
on religious particularism or the economic second market could
stimulate discontent.
Sergei Zamascikov of the University of California commented on
the Central Asian problem as gleaned from detailed interviews
with Central Asians who have emigrated to Israel. He focussed
on the Central Asian experience in the Soviet military. He
was impressed by the very poor language and technical training
of the Central Asians. Over 50 per cent of the Central Asians
are able to avoid military service by bribing Soviet offi-
cials. Those who do serve are generally sent to construction
units where they speak their native language. The Soviet army
does not serve as a racial integrator; in fact, this experi-
ence tends to reenforce ethnic differences. Very few officers
in the Soviet army are from Central Asia. The Central Asians
stated that the majority of income comes from the second
economy.
Michail Bernstam of the Hoover Institution said that the
problem may not be with the Central Asians but the Russians.
Welfare colonialism has made the Central Asian relatively well
off economically. The Central Asians benefit by being in the
empire because of subsidies. A greater percentage of taxes
raised in Central Asia is spent in Central Asia as opposed to
taxes raised in the RSFSR. Bernstam speculated that this can
cause heightened tension as the Russians seek a greater slice
of the economic pie. Lubin cautioned that if investments in
central Asia were shifted from heavy industry to consumer
industry, less money could be spent with more local impact.
This would be consistent with the continuation of current
cultural patterns in Central Asia where there is no trend
toward urbanization. None of the spokesmen felt that the
Islamic fundamentalist issue had had much impact in Soviet
Central Asia as yet. They also were cautious about the
potential impact of the Soviet supression of Afghanistan.
IV. How to Open a Closed Society
Yuri Yarim-Agaev sought to summarize the basic strategy
of the Sakharov Institute. He underscored that the center
would seek to combine research and action. The research will
be goals oriented. Each program should be considered in terms
of what could move the "democratization process" forward. He
noted that the Soviet regime, in seeking to keep society
closed, treats the crackdown and subsequent isolation as
virtually a "military expenditure." He noted that internal
security had been tightened under Andropov with little re-
action from the US. He particularly commented on laws con-
cerning communicating with foreigners, inviting foreigners to
homes, greater penalties for receiving materials from abroad,
reduced emigrations etc.
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9
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--
Yarim-Agaev identified specific actions which would
foster the program goals, including:
O Keep open channels between the West and independent
peoples in the USSR. Be prepared to react to requests from
internalists. (Ex: Provide assistance to families of prison-
ers.)
o Help internalists communicate better among themselves.
This will conclude distribution of VTRs, reproduction capabil-
ities, etc. The publication of material in the West and
infiltrated back in assists this effort.
o The Sakharov Institute can provide a defacto "free
university" by bringing together select Soviet emigres and US
scholars to comment on exfiltrate Samizdat and then return the
Samizdat in multiple copies to the USSR with comments devel-
oped in the free environment of the West. Elements of
Khotin's program could be absorbed which would permit the
Sakharov Institute to have access to the rich inventory of
Soviet emigres for program use.
o Sponsor exchange programs between independent groups
in East and West. Promote the flow of ideas and people across
borders outside of any official exchange program. Yarim-Agaev
made the point that his group knows of several hundred in-
dependent scholars scattered throughout the USSR who want
outside contacts. (NB. Phillip Siegelman cautioned the
Sakharov Institute to select discrete and limited goals. He
noted that many American institutions are now actively engaged
in exchanges with Soviet institutions and that these contacts
are in an appalling mess. He thought NED should assess these
existing institutional relationships. He was particularly
concerned by the lack of true reciprocity.)
o Collect information which comes from inside to help
publicize events in the USSR. This includes letters from
dissidents, information from recent emigres and debriefing of
travelers to the USSR. The basis of this information then
should be a strong public campaign to protect the dissidents.
O Every effort should be made to promote official means
of communications--mail, telephone, etc. International
communications should be systematically examined as a means to
stimulating a more open exchange.
Walter Raynond
Walter Raymond, Jr.
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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Ms. Elizabeth Arrens
U.S. Senate
Dr. Michail Bernstam
Hoover Institution
Mr. Vladimir Bukovsky
Stanford University
Dr. W. We Glenn Campbell
Heover Institution
Dr. Robert Conquest
Hoover Institution
Dr. Milorad Drachkovitch
Hoover Institution
Mr. Vladimir Dremluga
Journalist
Dr. Peter Duignan
Hoover Institution
Dr. John B. Dunlop
Hoover Institution
Dr. Herbert T. Ellison
Kennan Institute
Dr. Lewis Gann
Hoover Institution
Dr. Boris Gasparov
University of California
Dr. Robert Hessen
Hoover Institution
Dr. Leouid Khotin
University of California
Mr. Eduard Kuznetsov
Radio Liberty
Dr. Seymour Martin Lipset
Hoover Institution
Dr. Edward Lozansky
The Andrei Sakharov Institute
Dr. Nancy Lubin
U.S. Congress
Mr. Steve Mann
State Department
Dr. John H. Moore
Hoover Institution
Mr Michail Pillsbury
U.S. Sr Senate
Mr. Robert Pickus
World Without War Council
Dr. Richard Pipes
Harvard University
Mr. Mark Planter
National Endowment for Democracy
Mr. Arkady Polishchuk
Journalist
Mr. Walter Raymond
National Security Council
1
P TO
Dr. Phillip Siegelman
San Francisco State University
Dr. Richard F. Staar
Hoover Institution
Ms. Lidiya Voronina
Voice of America
.Dr. Robert Wesson
Hoover Institution
Dr. Charles Wolf, Sr.
Rand Corporation
Mrs. Ella Wolf
Hoover Institution
Dr. Yuri Yarim-Agaev
The Andrei Sakharov Institute
Dr. Sergei Zamascikov
University of California
2
12
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Lydia Voronina
Graduated Moscow University in 1971.
Worked in the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Participated in the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.
Continued her studies at Catholic University of America and Boston
University.
Ph. D. in philosophy.
Currently with the "Voice of America."
In her paper "The Development of Soviet Ideology and the Structure of
Internal Propaganda" Voronina comes to the conclusion that through the
history of the Soviet state the social functions of Marxist ideology have
been constantly changing so that at least six profoundly different forms
can be distinguished: Marxism as a political idea; as an alternative
economic plan; as a quasi-religious doctrine; as juridical norm; as a
nationalistic ideal; and as a means of social integration. Taken as a
sequence these forms demonstrate how powerful a dead idea can be, and how
it is implemented in everyday Soviet internal propaganda. It is also shown
that there is a variety of forms this propaganda takes, and how one can
learn its structure to counter it efficiently through available means.
Arkady Polyshchuk
Graduated Moscow University, Department of Philosophy. He became a leading
Soviet journalist, was managing editor of the monthly magazine "Asia and
Africa Today", had many publications in "Pravda", "Izvestia", and
broadcasted on radio and television. He has forsaken his career through
involvement in the dissident and Pentecostalist movements. He is currently
working on the Russian Bible Project and lecturing on human and religious
rights in the USSR.
In his paper "The Children and the War: Soviet Military Propaganda for
Preschoolers and First Graders" Polyshchuk simultaneously presents both one
of the most important forms of Soviet internal propaganda as well as a
particular propaganda campaign which was generally overlooked by outside
observers.
Freeder Hour
Yuri Yarim-Agaev
Graduated from Moscow Physical Technical Institute, Ph.D. in physics and
chemistry.
Worked in the USSR Academy of Sciences, MIT, Stanford University.
Member of Moscow Helsinki Watch Group.
Author of papers in physics, chemistry, mathematics and Soviet affairs.
In his paper "The Development of Market Relations as an Avenue for
Democratization in the USSR", Yarim-Agaev shows that market relations
provide both a proper analytical tool to study tensions between labor and
government in a socialist economy, as well as contributing to the
development of those tensions themselves.
In the paper "How to Open a Closed Society", Yarim-Agaev indicates the
(more)
13
- 2 -
main directions in which practical steps should be taken to make the Soviet
Union a more open country and describes several projects serving to
implement this goal.
Dr. Leonid Khotin
Worked at the Institute of Sociology, USSR Academy of Sciences and Moscow
University
Currently Research Associate at UC Berkeley and consultant for the project
"Soviet Economic Bureaucracy."
Editor of "Abstracts of Soviet and East European Emigre Periodical
Literature."
In his paper "The Third Emigration as a Source of Information," Khotin
indicates that 125,000 recent emigrants from the USSR to the US include
among them many specialists in various fields of industry, trade, medicine,
education and culture, who come from different areas of the USSR. He shows
that surveys of experts provide unqiue and reliable data on the Soviet
Union. He provides methods of finding experts among Soviet emigrants, and
speaks of an already existing network of experienced interviewers.
Examples of topics in economics and other fields which can be studied with
the help of such interviews are given. Another important way of collecting
such information is reviewing the numerous periodical emigrant literature.
Dr. Nancy Lubin
Currently with the Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress, and on the
adjunct faculty of Georgetown University. A Graduate of Harvard
University, she received her doctorate from Oxford University. She spent
one year conducting research in Soviet Central Asia on manpower and
nationality questions there, and has made several other research trips to
the USSR. Her book is scheduled to be out this year.
In her paper "The Role of Soviet Central Asia" Lubin indiates the
growing importance of this region to the USSR--demographically,
economically, militarily, socially, and in the area of foreign policy.
This paper briefly assesses key areas of potential tension in Soviet
Central Asia, the problems associated with analyzing them in the past, new
ways to approach these issues now; and the implications this might hold for
US policy makers interested in the democratization of the USSR.
Sergei Zamascikov
MA in Slavic Studies, 1973, USSR.
MA in Slavic Studies, 1982, USA.
MA in Political Science, 1984, USA.
Currently at UCLA.
Author of the book, "Political Organization in the Soviet Armed Forces" and
papers on military-civilian relations and ethnic problems in the Soviet
Union.
In his paper Moslem Recruits in the Soviet Army Zamascikov will
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present the results of his recent survey of emigrants from Soviet Central
Asia to Israel. He will consider whether the military training of recruits
from this area contributes to their sovietization.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Filei Am Cartrol ussr- 15
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ACTION
October 10, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
PL for
For
Sr,
FROM:
BOB LINHARD / RON LEHMAN / SVEN KRAEMER
SUBJECT:
TOR for Arms Control Work
Attached at Tab A are the NSC staff-recommended draft terms of
reference that you requested at last Thursday's SACPG meeting. We
have discussed this TOR on a close-hold informal basis with a
number of SACPG members and have incorporated their thoughts into
our draft.
Recommendation
That you approve the draft TOR provided at Tab A.
Concurrence: J.Matlock Sw
Attachment: Draft TOR (S)
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HOUSE HO
WAEHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR ARMS CONTROL POLICY GROUP PARTICIPANTS
SUBJECT:
Terms of Reference for Upcoming Work Program
Based upon the October 4 meeting of the Senior Arms Control Policy
Group, the following work program is directed.
Near-term Tasking. An interagency group chaired by Lt. General
John Chain should develop a paper for SACPG review which
recommends how best to follow up on the following specific
initiatives cited in the President's UNGA speech: the exchange of
defense plans, the exchanges of observers at exercises and other
military locations, and the proposed approach to improved yield
verification associated with underground nulcear testing. The
paper should draw upon previously accomplished interagency work
available on each of these three subjects, including the work of
the Nuclear Testing IG and the Confidence-Building Measures
Working Group. This paper should be available for SACPG review by
November 1, 1984.
Longer-term Tasking. In order to support a review of US arms
reduction options for the next term, the Intelligence Community
should provide for review by the Senior Group a paper which
addresses the following subjects:
- A review of Soviet strategic and INF force projections and
associated programmatic trends leading to an assessment of
Soviet force goals. This review should involve a balanced
and comprehensive treatment of Soviet forces, including
not only their ballistic forces, but also addressing
bombers, cruise missiles, defensive activities (including
strategic and air defenses), and Soviet LRINF and
associated SRINF forces.
- An overview of Soviet perceptions of U.S. strategic and
INF forces and related U.S. arms control/policies.
- Based upon the above, an assessment of the objectives that
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the current Soviet leadership and likely successor leaders
may have for Soviet arms control activity over the next
four years. The assessment should address questions
including the following. Will they pursue stabilizing
arms control agreements? Where might the Soviets show
some flexibility in making reductions? What elements of
their forces will they especially wish to fully protect
from the arms control process? To what extent are they
counting on concealment and deception to help mask their
programs and purposes?
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This paper will provide a basis for initiating a general review of
longer term U.S. arms reduction options. It should be completed
and provided for review by the Senior Group by November 15, 1984.
Additional Work. In addition, work should continue on projects
currently in progress including trade-offs and verification
issues. For example, a number of issues were identified for
future work by the recent interagency paper on ALCM limits. These
issues should be continued to be pursued to ensure that to the
extent possible the results are available to support the U.S.
options review cited above.
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