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Diplomatic – USSR (4)
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Diplomatic – USSR (4)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Diplomatic - USSR (4)
Box: 22
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/26/2005
File Folder
USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 4/8
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
22
YARHI-MILO
2206
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9160 MEMO
MATLOCK TO CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER
3 8/8/1983 B1
FOR CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK
PAR 5/15/2013 F2006-114/12
9172 MEMO
HILL TO CLARK RE STRATEGY PAPER FOR
1 8/5/1983 B1
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
ON ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULATES IN
KIEV AND NEW YORK
9161 PAPER
STRATEGY PAPER KIEV AND NEW YORK
6
ND
B1
CONSULATES
PAR 5/15/2013 F2006-114/12
9162 PAPER
KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES:
2
ND
B1
TERMS OF REFERENCE
9173 MEMO
KIMMITT TO HILL RE STRATEGY PAPER
2 8/8/1983 B1
FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF
CONSULATES IN KIEV AND NEW YORK
9187 MEMO
DORNAN TO DOBRIANSKY
1 8/16/1983 B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9174 PAPER
STATE DEPARTMENT INPUT TO "HOSTILE
3
ND
B1
PRESENCE" STUDY
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/26/2005
File Folder
USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 4/8
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
22
YARHI-MILO
2206
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9175 PAPER
COUNTERING THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
3 10/8/1982 B1
THREAT STATE DRAFT
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
9176 CHARTS
HOSTILE OFFICIALS AND NON-OFFICIAL
2
ND
B1
PRESENCE IN THE U.S.
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9177 MEMO
PROPOSALS REGARDING HOSTILE
2
ND
B1
PRESENCE/TRAVEL CONTROLS
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9178 PAPER
DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS ON HOSTILE
6
ND
B1
DIPLOMATS
PAR 3/14/2011 F2006-114/6
9163 PAPER
RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL OF SOVIET
3
ND
B1
AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS
9164 MEMO
LIMITATIONS ON HOSTILE FOREIGN
3 8/30/1982 B1
PRESENCE IN THE U.S.
9165 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #9164
3 8/30/1982 B1
9179 MEMO
FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT
2
ND
B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
4/26/2005
File Folder
USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 4/8
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
22
YARHI-MILO
2206
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9166 MEMO
DISTRIBUTION OF MEMO LIST
1
ND
B1
9167 MEMO
DEGRAFFENREID TO PIPES RE STATE
1 11/10/1982 B1
DEPARTMENT PAPER ON TRAVEL
CONTROLS ON SOVIET/BLOC
9168 COVER SHEET BREMER TO CLARK TRAVEL CONTROLS RE
1 11/9/1982 B1
SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
DIPLOMATS
R 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
9180 MEMO
BREMER TO CLARK RE TRAVEL CONTROLS
1 11/9/1982 B1
ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
DIPLOMATS
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9181 MEMO
A PLAN FOR SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AT
2
ND
B1
EMBASSY MOSCOW
D 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9182 MEMO
STEPS WHICH SHOULD BE INITIATED IN
1
ND
B1
THE PRESENT CHANCERY
D 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9183 MEMO
PROPOSED POST POLICY WITH REGARD TO
1
ND
B1
ACCESS OF SOVIET STAFF IN THE NEW
CHANCERY COMPLEX
D 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 4/26/2005
File Folder
USSR-DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS 4/8
FOIA
F06-114/6
Box Number
22
YARHI-MILO
2206
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9169 MEMO
COBB TO KIMMITT RE POSSIBLE
2 8/11/1983 B1
DEFECTION BY SOVIET YOUTH
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9158 LETTER
ANDY BEREZHKOV TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
1
ND
B6
9159 LETTER
SAME TEXT AS DOC #9158
1
ND
B6
9170 MEMO
KIMMITT TO FIELDING
1 8/12/1983 B1
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9184 MEMO
SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
1 8/12/1983 B1
POSSIBLE SOVIET EMBASSY DEFECTOR
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
9171 FAX COVER
LENZKOWSKI RE USSR
1 8/15/1983 B1
SHEET
PAR 11/16/2015 F2006-114/6
9186 REPORT
USSR
1 8/18/1983 B1
D
11/16/2015
F2006-114/6
9185 MEMO
INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI
2 8/14/1983 B1
BEREZHKOV SITUATION REPORT NO. 5
R 12/13/2007 F06-114/6
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
USSR-Mipli
SYSTEM II
9160
90965
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
August 8, 1983
FOIA(b)
ACTION
13526
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
E.O. 12958
As Amended
FROM:
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)
JACK MATLOCK Am
SUBJECT: Strategy Paper for Consulates in Kiev and New York
State's memorandum outlining recommended strategy for
negotiating an opening of consulates in Kiev and New York is
attached at TAB A.
Background: Following agreement at the 1974 Nixon-Brezhnev
summit, steps were taken to open consulates general in Kiev
and New York. The Soviets had long resisted an American
office in Kiev, offering instead less advantageous
locations, but finally agreed to Kiev under the pressure of
reaching agreements for the 1974 summit. Subsequently, the
Soviets were allowed to purchase a building in New York (the
location of which was approved by the FBI) for their
consulate general and we were offered the choice of several
properties in Kiev for rental (no sale of real estate is
permitted by Soviet law). We selected a large building,
with NSA's concurrence, had American architects design the
reconfiguration for our use, and both sides sent small
"advance parties" to oversee preparations for formal open-
ings, which we insisted be simultaneous, so that the Soviets
could not open in New York before our building was ready in
Kiev.
We had invested $1.5 million in the renovation of the
building when we ordered the withdrawal of both advance
parties in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The Soviets still have title to their building in New York,
while we have continued to pay rent on three apartments
(previously occupied by our advance party) in Kiev. We have
not paid rent on the building we had selected for the office
and a number of staff apartments, and our understanding is
that, after holding it for us for more than a year, the
Soviets are now using it. Its status, therefore, is not
entirely clear.
This complicated background is relevant to some of the
questions raised in the strategy paper. Broadly speaking,
our options are to aim for an opening as quickly as
possible, and thus establish our presence in the capital of
the largest non-Russian republic, or to attempt to improve
on the arrangements already negotiated, which could entail
considerable delay with little prospect of significant
improvement.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/6 # 9160
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
BY KAL NARA DATE 5/16/13
2
SECRET
- 2 -
Issues: There is general interagency agreement on the
negotiating plan except for the following three points:
A. Office Site: State and NSA believe that we
should accept the old building if it is available. The FBI
believes that we should press for a new one.
B. Staffing: State and NSA believe that the
staffing level should be set according to need; the FBI,
supported by CIA, believe that we should insist that the
Soviets staff their consulate from the current personnel
allowed them in Washington, or from their mission to the UN.
C. Status of Property: State and NSA believe
that we should seek more advantageous rental arrangements
(i.e., a long-term lease with guarantees on the rent), while
the FBI wants us to demand either the right to purchase the
building in Kiev, or divestiture of the building owned by
the Soviets in New York, followed by a rental arrangement.
Analysis: My judgment on the three issues above is as
follows:
A. Since the building already selected and
partially reconfigured for our use is acceptable, and we
already have a substantial sum invested in it, no useful
purpose would be served by demanding another one. The
State-NSA position seems sound.
B. If we insisted that the Soviets staff their
consulate from their current quota in Washington and New
York, we would have to staff Kiev from our Embassy in
Moscow. The sixteen persons necessary for Kiev could not be
spared from Moscow without seriously impairing the Embassy's
ability to perform its functions. Therefore, it seems
preferable to set our staff at the level we need, and then
impose an identical quota on the Soviets in New York. This
would preserve reciprocity, and while the FBI's task in New
York would be increased, its additional problems would be no
greater than those faced by the KGB in Kiev.
C. Although it is unfortunate that the Soviets
were allowed to purchase their consulate building in New
York, it will be most difficult to turn the clock back on
this arrangement. In the interest of moving as rapidly as
possible to establish our presence in Kiev (a net gain for
us, since we have no one there now) in return for a small
incremental gain for the Soviets (they already have hundreds
of officials in New York), I would recommend using the
Soviet ownership of their building in New York as leverage
to insist upon favorable long-term rental arrangements in
Kiev.
I believe that two other points should be covered specif-
ically in the NSC response:
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
(1) State should be instructed that any staffing
arrangement provide for strict reciprocity of numbers at the
two consulates. This need not be the subject of nego-
tiation, but simply a statement of U.S. policy, comparable
to that used in imposing personnel ceilings on the Soviet
Consulate General in San Francisco.
(2) Before proceeding to plan for 12 local
employees, a close study should be made of the feasibility
of staffing Kiev entirely with American citizens.
The foregoing recommendations are incorporated in a memoran-
dum to State at TAB B.
III
Paula Dobriansky and John Lenczowski concur.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the memorandum at TAB B.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab A State's Memo
Tab B Memo to State
SECRET
9161
5
FOIA(b) (1)
13526
E.O. 12958
SECRET
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)
Strategy Paper
Kiev and New York Consulates
Summary:
1. Initial Step: There is agreement that we should inquire
officially of the Soviets whether the previously designated office
site will be available to us in Kiev.
2. Issues for Decision:
A. Office Site. If the Soviets say the building is not
available, all agencies agree that we should press for a new and
better site. If the Soviets tell us the old site is available,
State and NSA believe we should accept it, and send an inspection
team to determine its adequacy and assess further work needed on
both apartments and office site. FBI believes we should press for
a new site, whether or not the old site is available.
B. Staffing. State and NSA believe we should set staffing
patterns according to need, without imposing demands that the
Soviets would counter with unacceptable reciprocal requirements.
FBI, supported by CIA, believes we should initially insist that the
Soviets staff New York under the present 320 ceiling in order to
maintain existing levels of coverage, recognizing that if the
Soviets refuse we will have to revert to the State/NSA approach.
C. Purchase VS. Lease. State and NSA believe we should
seek more advantageous long-term rent arrangements without
insisting on purchase in Kiev, and hence on full reciprocity, which
Soviets certainly would turn down. (The legality of requiring
Soviets to sell their present building and lease it instead is
questionable. Legal action in any case would result in prolonged
delays if we adopted this course.) FBI believes we should make the
demand despite the probability that the Soviets would turn it down,
forcing us to fall back on a demand for long-term leasing
arrangements.
Recommendation:
NSC concurrence with the interagency proposal to inquire
officially of the Soviets as to the availability of the previous
site; and NSC concurrence with the State/ NSA positions on office
site, staffing and purchase VS. lease.
SECRET
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06- # 9161
BY KML NARA DATE 5/15/13
SECRET
-2-
BACKGROUND
Secretary Shultz informed Ambassador Dobrynin on June 18 that
the President had approved in principle the establishment of new
Consulates in Kiev and New York. Judge Clark subsequently
requested the State Department to convene an interagency meeting
to draft the terms of reference and develop a negotiating
strategy. At the July 1 meeting called by the State Department,
representatives of CIA, FBI, and NSA accepted the attached terms
of reference (Tab A) and agreed to reconvene with the objective of
forwarding an agreed negotiating strategy to the NSC. The group,
augmented by USIA representatives, met on July 26, and it did not
prove possible fully to reconcile agency views. Divergent views
are set forth, where appropriate, in this paper.
POLICY OBJECTIVES
In noting that the USG should seek to reach agreements which
"protect and enhance US interests and are consistent with the
principle of strict reciprocity", NSDD-75 provides the fundamental
policy framework for establishing the new Consulates. A Consulate
in Kiev will
mark a major new US penetration in a key
geographical area, which contains the second largest Soviet
nationality group and significant numbers of religious
minorities. In addition, it will give us a unique vantage point
for economic and political reporting, a base in the Soviet
agricultural heartland for crop monitoring, a facility to provide
on-the-spot consular protection and assistance to American
visitors in the area, and the opportunity to initiate new
cultural, informational, and educational exchanges, thereby
heightening awareness of US values and goals in the region.
MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS
On July 15, Secretary Shultz received a positive Soviet
response on the Consulates from Ambassador Dobrynin. Assistant
Secretary Burt will work out with Chargé Sokolov the modalities of
the negotiations. The State Department will handle the actual
negotiations using normal diplomatic channels, in coordination
with interested agencies.
The Department anticipates opening the talks in Washington as
soon as is mutually convenient. Technical discussions may
subsequently take place in Moscow. Since our logistical problems
in Kiev may well prove greater than those of the Soviets in New
York, it might be advantageous to hold such talks at closer range.
SPECIFIC GOALS
1. Early Establishment of U.S. Presence: Our first agenda
item in negotiating with the Soviets will be to obtain agreement
on the terms under which we will send advance parties to the two
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
consular sites. The fact that we and the Soviets have both had
previous advance teams in Kiev and New York, respectively, under
mutually agreed arrangements, should ease our negotiations with
them on this matter, but it would be unrealistic not to expect
problems. Nevertheless, our retention of three apartments in Kiev
from the time of the original Advance Party should enable us to
put an advance team into place rather quickly (within three
months). Having personnel on the spot will be a key to gaining
movement from the Soviets on housing and office facilities, as
well as support from the home front on logistics and funding.
2. Acquisition of Suitable Housing and Office Facilities:
Concurrently, we must ascertain whether the Soviets are still
holding for our use the previously designated office building and
Consul General residence.
State and NSA agree that if the Soviets tell us they have kept
the building available, we should accept it. We have already
invested $1.5 million in renovation, which would be lost if we
refused the building. Moreover, the negotiations for a more
desirable site would be long and the end result would not
necessarily be a site preferable to the one we now have. If the
current site remains available, State and NSA believe that we
should send a team to Kiev as soon as possible for an inspection
and evaluation of the work and time that will be required to put
it into suitable condition. The FBI, on the other hand, would
prefer that we seek new facilities whether or not the Soviets are
willing to make the previously designated office site available,
in order not to set our sights too low at the outset.
Finally, with regard to terms of occupancy we should note that
the previous agreement on establishing Consulates permitted the
Soviets to purchase property in New York in return for short-term
leasing rights in Kiev. This situation was clearly not reciprocal
and cannot be allowed to recur. Further negotiations on the
reopening of our respective Consulates will include insistence on
greater reciprocity vis-a-vis our housing and office space
requirements. The FBI has suggested that we try to purchase
property in Kiev. Since, to the best of our knowledge, the
SECRET
SECRET
-4-
Soviets have never permitted a foreign mission to own property and
there is no chance that they would reverse this long-standing
policy in this instance, State's view is that no purpose is served
by making such a demand. Although we could theoretically insist
that the Soviets divest themselves of their property and require a
lease arrangement, such an approach would be quite problematical.
The Office of Foreign Missions has indicated that a forced
divestiture of this type could be legally contested and if so
could involve legal proceedings.
We should instead concentrate on obtaining what is possible --
long-term leases at reasonable prices. The Soviets will have a
strong incentive to move on our requirements. We fully expect
them to seek immediate occupancy of the building that they
previously purchased in New York for their Consulate.
Consequently, State believes our approach should be to insist on
an agreement to the effect that the Soviets may only occupy their
building when we have obtained the following in Kiev: adequate
temporary offices for the Consulate, an official agreement on our
permanent facilities, and approved construction plans for
necessary renovations.
3. Reciprocal Agreement on Staffing Patterns: As soon as we
have decided on the number of persons we wish to send to Kiev both
as a TDY-Advance Team and as a permanent staff (recommendations on
these issues follow below), we will raise the issue of a
reciprocal staffing arrangement with the Soviets. We will need to
proceed cautiously on this point, with strict reciprocity as a
goal. The FBI, concerned about increases in the size of the
Soviet diplomatic establishment in New York, prefers that the
Consulate there be staffed by personnel transferred from the
Embassy or SMUN. State anticipates strong Soviet resistance to
such a proposal. Having frequently decried the existence of the
current ceilings, the Soviets will balk at a perceived attempt to
reduce staffing levels at existing posts as a precondition to an
agreement on opening Kiev and New York. If pressed, they would
probably demand a similar arrangement in Kiev, which would prove
extremely costly in terms of staffing at our Moscow Embassy. The
Department and NSA believe that we should negotiate on the basis
of our requirements - consular, political, and intelligence -- in
Kiev and insist on reciprocity in any final decision on staffing
patterns.
4. Resolution of Long-Range Issues and General Problems:
Although Kiev's location is ideal in certain respects, its
isolation, coupled with the absence of a large diplomatic
community, may produce a difficult work environment for consular
personnel, as well as create numerous logistical problems. In our
negotiations we shall also address these general issues and
attempt to arrive at mutually agreed solutions to both existing
and potential problems. Specifically, we shall strive to obtain
clearly defined privileges and immunities for American personnel;
SECRET
9
SECRET
-5-
an expansion of exit/entry points to facilitate shipment of
requisite materials to put our facilities into shape for the final
opening (we are currently limited to entry at Moscow, Leningrad,
and Vyborg near Leningrad); a relaxation of travel controls in the
area; and a commitment to provide a suitable recreational facility
for the permanent staff.
5. Implementation of USG Scenario: An interagency group will
have to make some immediate decisions with regard to timing,
personnel, and funding. It will also have to address questions of
logistical support and the acquisition of financial and other
resources. For preliminary planning purposes, we propose the
following timetable and base our discussion of estimated costs and
resource requirements on this opening scenario, which assumes that
we will obtain the previously designated office building.
1. Fall 1983 - Initial TDY Advance Team takes up residence
in Kiev;
2. Summer 1984 or earlier - Permanent Advance Staff arrives
in Kiev;
3. Summer 1985 - Consulate is officially opened.
A. Funding:
State has already presented to Congress its FY-84 budget
submission, which does not include a request for funds or
positions for the opening of Kiev. Therefore, the estimated
$200,000 operating costs needed to support the initial TDY
presence in Kiev would have to be secured either by amendment to
the FY-84 budget, or reprogrammed from within State's existing
budget.
State anticipates an additional outlay of $2.5 million
annually (for two years) to prepare for the opening of the
Consulate (total estimated cost of $5.2 million). Not included in
this estimate is the cost of a suitable recreational facility for
the permanent staff assigned to Kiev, which would contribute
substantially to improving morale and the quality of life at an
extremely isolated post (roughly another $1.0 million).
Ultimately, any decision to move ahead on establishing a
Consulate in Kiev is conditioned on our ability to secure
supplemental funding from Congress. In view of budgetary
stringencies, we should anticipate questions from Congress as to
why we are taking this step at the present time. We should be
prepared to brief key members whose support will be necessary in
order to obtain the requisite funds.
B. Personnel:
In selecting an Advance Team, we will try to identify
personnel for permanent assignment, but may initially have to use
SECRET
10
SECRET
-6-
personnel from Embassy Moscow and appropriate Washington offices
on a 1-3 month TDY basis. The initial Advance Team should include
a Team Leader, an Administrative Officer, and a Political/Consular
Officer with reporting responsibilities.
In tandem with these arrangements, we need a prompt decision
on the size of our permanent advance team. Language training and
the vagaries of the assignment process will make it difficult to
assign people to Kiev for regular tours prior to the summer of
1984. Even meeting that deadline will require speedy action to
obtain positions, identify individuals for particular slots, and
secure funding. We believe that with the addition to the advance
team of a General Services Officer and a secretary we will have
the personnel necessary to prepare for the official opening of the
Consulates.
We suggest that the consular staff consist of 16 Americans
plus 12 Soviet National employees. In the past, this was
considered the right size to advance our interests in Kiev and it
still appears to meet our needs. We intend, however, to schedule
interagency meetings as soon as feasible to determine whether
their personnel requirements for the Consulate warrant a larger or
smaller staff. We will also solicit Embassy Moscow's views on
both the question of timing and its ability to provide personnel
and logistical support. The following are the proposed permanent
positions for Kiev:
Principal Officer
Deputy Principal Officer
Consular Officer
Administrative Officer
Agricultural Officer
Press and Culture Officer
Communications Program Officers (2)
Secretaries (2)
Marine Security Guards (6)
SECRET
15
I
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
August 16, 1983
TO:
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
FROM:
DIANE DORNAN
Returned for your files.
16
State Dept. input to "Hostile "resence" study
17 Sept. 1982
Ken - FYI.
17
dus.
SECRET
x
1. Rationale for Maintaining the Ceiling of 320 on Soviet
Diplomatic and Consular Personnel in the U.S. The ceiling on
Soviet diplomatic personnel in the United States was enacted as
an Afghanistan sanction in January of 1980. The ceiling was
set at 320 in order to be roughly equivalent to the total
number of persons employed by the U.S. at Embassy Moscow and
ConGen Leningrad. About 180 members of our Embassy and ConGen
staff were U.S. citizens, and about 140 were locally-hired
Soviet citizens in non-sensitive jobs. The Soviets do not hire
local U.S. employees, so all their positions at Washington and
San Francisco were (and still are) filled by Soviet nationals
with diplomatic status. Since the sanction was put in place,
320
the number of Soviet employees has stayed at 320, while the
187
number of U.S. positions in the USSR has grown to 401 (187 U.S.
citizens, 214 Soviets and third-country nationals).
Any U.S.-imposed reductions would certainly be met with
Soviet retaliation on a reciprocal basis, and would have a
disproportionately harmful impact upon the smaller number of
American diplomats now in the USSR. The Soviets could also
increase the damage by reducing our Soviet locals back to
pre-Afghanistan numbers, thus reducing our total staff in the
USSR by 81 personnel, plus the amount by which we reduced the
Soviet ceiling. Any substantial reductions in U.S. diplomatic
staff would seriously detract from our ability to manage
Soviet-American relations and to monitor the internal Soviet
scene, and would have a direct and further negative effect on
the conduct of our relations with the USSR. It is for these
reasons that we believe that such reductions should not be
contemplated solely on counterintelligence grounds -- the
foreign policy implications of such a step should also be
considered.
Finally, there is a more tangible and practical reason why
a reduction in the Soviet ceiling should not be undertaken:
such a reduction would not achieve the objective of reducing
overall Soviet presence in the U.S. Any reductions which the
Soviets would suffer in terms of their personnel accredited to
the U.S. could be fully offset by a compensatory increase in
their presence at the United Nations, which is not subject to'
ceiling limitations. Attempts to place a ceiling on Soviet UN
Personnel -- particularly Secretariat employees - would be
extremely controversial politically and probably would also go
counter to U.S. treaty obligations. It would in any event cause
very significant diplomatic and political difficulties for the
U.S.
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#9174 # 9174
SECRET
BY
LOI , NARA, DATE 12/13/07
18
2. Soviet Commercial Representation -- why present numbers
should be retained.
Presently there are seven non-diplomatic Soviet commercial
organizations operating in the U.S. with a total of 70
employees against a ceiling of 72 (current staff numbers and
visa categories in parentheses):
1. Aeroflot (7, L-1)
2. Amtorg (39 L-1)
3. Belarus (7. L-1 and B-1)
4. Intourist (4, L-1)
5. Sovfracht (3, L-1)
6. US-USSR Marine Resources (1, B-1)
7. US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (9, B-1)
This total represents a sharp reduction from the total of
99 in 1980. In an effort to reduce Soviet commercial presence
to the level necessitated by actual business conducted we
eliminated 17 positions in 1981. The most recent USG reduction
in Soviet commercial representation was made by the President
on December 28, 1981, when, as a Poland-related sanction, he
ordered the closing of the Soviet Purchasing Commission and the
departure of the 10 staff members. We oppose further reduction
of Soviet commercial representation at this time.
Control over the number of Soviets in the U.S. is an
important foreign policy tool. Should the situation in Poland
deteriorate or Soviet behavior elsewhere mandate U.S. sanctions,
the reduction of Soviet commercial representatives in the U.S.
could convey a political message to the Soviets. However, the
effectiveness of that message would be greatly diminished if the
USG had already reduced Soviet staff for reasons unrelated to
foreign policy. In addition, we are presently not pursuing a
policy of economic warfare against the Soviet Union, despite
Soviet claims, and are with great difficulty convincing our
Allies that the Poland-related sanctions are not a form of
economic warfare. A reduction of Soviet commercial staff would
work counter to our efforts.
Soviet commercial representatives are in the United States
for two reasons: 1) they facilitate trade between our two
countries, and 2) they encourage the Soviets to reciprocate by
theyare spies
19
SECRET
allowing U.S. businessmen to reside in Moscow. As noted above,
we are not engaged in cutting off all US-Soviet trade. On the
contrary some of the trade is of significant importance to the
U.S. economy, witness our almost $2 billion trade surplus with
the Soviets in 1981 and the large amounts of U.S. grain sold to
the Soviets.
There are about 30 U.S. firms currently represented in the
Soviet Union with permanent U.S. employees. The businessmen who
reside and travel in the Soviet Union are not only necessary for
the conduct of trade, but also provide the USG with valuable
information on the Soviet Union. These representatives and
visiting U.S. businessmen on occasion are permitted to travel to
areas that are inaccessible to USG employees. Should the U.S.
reduce the Soviet commercial presence in the U.S., it is likely
that the Soviets would reciprocate by cutting back on the number
of. U.S. businessmen in the Soviet Union and by applying stricter
travel controls.
3. Why Soviet Journalistic Representation in the U.S.
should not be reduced.
According to our count, the Soviets currently have 37
correspondents in the US, not counting Melor Sturua, Chief
Izvestiya Correspondent in Washington, DC, who will not be
permitted back into the US'in retaliation for the expulsion of
Newsweek correspondent Andrew Nagorski. According to our Embassy
in Moscow, the Soviets currently count 36 American correspondents
in the USSR, including correspondents of Pilot and The Daily
World. Our count (30) is lower, allowing for the fact that the
Soviets count as "American correspondents" the following: a
Soviet photographer with UPI, a West German cameraman with CBS,
an NBC technician stationed in Berlin but accredited in Moscow,
and three currently empty offices (Newsweek, ABC, and Chicago
Tribune).
While we acknowledge the hostile intelligence threat which
some Soviet correspondents may pose, we do not believe, on
balance, that a cutback in the number of Soviet correspondents
here would be beneficial to U.S. interests. Due to the closed
nature of Soviet society, our correspondents in Moscow are far
more valuable to the USG and the public as information gatherers
than are their Soviet counterparts in the U.S. US correspondents
provide one of our few windows into the Soviet world, and our
real objective should be to get more U.S. news organizations to
send correspondents to Moscow, not to cut down Soviet strength
here. Therefore, we believe that we should not encourage
Soviet retaliation which might reduce our Press Corps in Moscow
further. We should instead seek to put adequate security
measures into effect so that those Soviet correspondents who do
pose an intelligence threat are thoroughly monitored, and thus
neutralized.
SECRET
20
SECRET
STATE DRAFT
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#9175
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
October 8, 1982
Countering The Hostile Intelligence Threat
Summary
In seeking ways to counter the hostile intelligence threat
we should focus on approaches that do not involve disproportionate
foreign policy and intelligence collection costs. Rather than
arbitrary unilateral demands for cuts in personnel and unilateral
insistance on travel notification by Soviet, Bloc, and PRC diplomats
in the US, we should seek an avenue that will permit us to keep
track of these people without costs to our other interests. The
newly enacted Foreign Missions Act offers such an alternative.
The Problem
There is presently a rough parity in numbers between US
and Communist Embassy and Consulate presence here and in the
target countries, except for the UN presence, unique to NY.
To the extent that ceilings and travel restrictions have been
imposed by us (currently only the Soviets, the Cubans, and
the PRC are affected) they are reciprocal, i.e., imposed on
them in retaliation for their imposition on us. In this and
other areas, reciprocity has been and remains the keystone to
our treatment of foreign officials. As for the UN, we cannot,
as a practical matter, unilaterally impose limitations or con-
straints on hostile UN Secretariat staff nor on hostile UN mission
representation. The former would violate the UN Headquarters
Agreement and the latter would not only have undesirable bilateral
reciprocity consequences but would bring us into conflict with
the entire UN system and possibly involve us in unwanted compulsory
arbitration by the World Court. We can and do impose travel
restrictions on certain hostile UN Mission personnel on a reciprocal
basis.
We can, of course, impose whatever restrictions we choose
on hostile Embassies and Consulates in the US, be they staff
reductions, travel reductions, and/or notification, or whatever.
Doing so unilaterally, however, would inevitably result in similar
restrictions being imposed on our own representatives. Such actions
on our part would, firstly, signal a downgrading of relations, a
very serious matter that should be a result only of the most
thoughtful examination of the foreign policy considerations in
all their ramifications, not just counter-intelligence concerns.
This is of particular relevance with respect to the PRC, in view
of the President's stated interest in building a strong and lasting
relationship with that country which he considers vital to our
long-term national security interests. Secondly, inevitably
retaliation for our moves would seriously degrade our ability
to conduct our own foreign relations. As an example, we would
lose the ability we now have to travel at will in Eastern Europe.
SECRET
DECL OADR
SECRET
- 2 -
Over the years we have slowly pried open each of the Eastern
European countries by patient insistence on a policy of easing
restrictions on them only in return for their easing them on
us. In such closed communist societies our ability to travel
freely greatly helps us in obtaining the information we need.
Conversely, cuts by us in their personnel here would have less
impact on their ability to acquire information openly in our
free society. We must carefully weigh our ability to close
an open society as opposed to trying to open a closed one.
A Proposed Solution
The recognized need for US counter-intelligence agencies
(primarily the FBI) to have greater knowledge of and control
over the activities of hostile agents requires a more imaginative
solution. Rather than attempting largely counter-productive
and perhaps ineffective unilateral impositions of reductions
and restraints, we believe a different, two pronged attack
should be tried. Firstly, there should be a very serious effort
to increase US counter-intelligence strength and resources,
including an improved data retrieval system and improved liaison
both with State and with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. We think our own bureaucracy can function much more
effectively. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the newly
enacted Foreign Missions Act offers great counter-intelligence
possibilities which, if fully exploited, should result in the
desired increase in control over the hostile presence.
The Foreign Missions Act empowers the Secretary of State
to regulate the activities of all official missions of foreign
governments in the US on the basis of reciprocity and national
security. Under the Act, an Office of Foreign Missions is being
established by the Department of State with, we anticipate,
liaison officers from the FBI, DIA, NSA and the Intelligence
Community Staff. This office will be charged with carrying out
the provisions of the Act and will be initially exploring the
following: procedures to control real estate acquisition by
foreign missions; possibilities for agreements on limitations
in numbers of personnel assigned to embassies, consulates, and
missions; establishment of a "travel agency" through which all
ticketing must be accomplished and itineraries filed; use of
surcharges; providing for a centralized, compulsory agency for
"service companies", e.g., plumbers, electricians, heating/AC
maintenance, cleaning personnel, etc.; coordination with state
and local agencies on motor vehicle registration and licensing,
zoning, building codes, etc.; coordination with private sector, e.g,
public utilities; use of notification requirements. As can be
seen, the possibilities under the new Act for greatly improving
control and surveillance by US counter-intelligence officials of
the hostile presence are limited only by the ingenuity of its
administrators and the resouurces made available. Of equal
importance, as the target countries all require that we utilize
centralized, purchasing, rental, ticketing, and service agencies,
reciprocity should not be a significant problem.
22
SECRET
- 3 -
Recommendation
That the IG-CI, in seeking means to counter the hostile
intelligence threat, give immediate attention to:
1) Identifying and resolving problems of data retrieval
and information exchanges within our bureaucracy to strengthen
the effectiveness of the system.
2) Assuring that the counter-intelligence potential of
the new Foreign Missions Act is fully exploited as the prime
tool for exercising enhanced control over the hostile presence.
TO that end, the IG-CI should, within 60 days, provide
the SIG/I with a detailed action plan.
SECRET
October 1982
Hostile Official and Non-Official Presence in the US
Country
Embassy/Consulate
UN Mission
UN Secretariat
Other
(NY only)
(NY only)
USSR
287*
277
312
171
Bulgaria
30
27
0
20
Czechoslovakia
30
19
4
24
East Germany
34
34
4
18
Hungary
28
24
3
23
Poland
66
15
13
124
Romania
19
17
3
23
Cuba
28
53
1
3
Total Soviet Bloc
522
466
340
406
PRC
277
134
44
**
Total Hostile Presence
799
600
384
406
It Does not include 62 working spouses (all wives)
** Not available
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#9176
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
23
SEGRE
U.S. OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL PRESENCE IN HOSTILE COUNTRIES
AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS
October
1982
U.S. Embassy/Consulates
U.S. Mission to UN
U,S. Employees
Other (commercial,
to UN Secretariat
media, students, etc.
USSR
2601,
4
48
Bulgaria
331
116²
Czechoslovakia
36
6812
East Germany
411
N/A
Hungary
401
1800²
Poland
851
1000²
6
Romania
531
2952
Cuba
20
N/A
Total
5681
39402
PRC
129
1100
Total
6971
110
18973
5040²
1 Includes dependents employed part-time or as contractors.
?Includes large number of elderly pensioners.
3 Includes 508 officers.
N/A = Not available.
4Does not include 140 Soviet loçal employees
SECRET ,
24
#
25
nied 8 Sept 82 26
SECRET
from MAC S.
INTERAGENCY GROUP - COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Proposals regarding Hostile Presence/Travel Controls--
A. Minimum effectiveness (Likely agreement - low risk of foreign
policy problem/retaliation)
1. Discontinue multiple entry visas
2. Limiting stay of UNGA reps to one week before
and one week after meeting
3. Distinctive license plates
4. Consolidation of commercial offices (NY, for example -
Aeroflot/Intourist)
5. Gradual reduction of Chinese students
a. Chinese Government
b. Visa overstays
c. 12th Party Congress
d. Shoesmith briefing (paper)
6. Tightening controls on Soviets
a. Revise closed areas
b. Foreign Missions Act (mandatory central travel & hotel
reservation service)
C. Further restrict Soviet entry points
into U.S. from Canada & Mexico
d. Subject non-official Soviets, including
tourists to same travel restrictions as on Soviets
B. Moderate effectiveness (Some disagreement, possible foreign
policy problem/retaliation)
1. Polish commercial representatives
a. There are about 65 in U.S. in Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo,
Chicago, Detroit, Houston,
Los Angeles, Newark, New York,
Pittsburgh, & San Francisco
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6#9177
BY LOI NARA, DATE 12/13/07
b. Representing Polish American Machinery
Toolmex
Cepelia
Gdynia
Pekao Trading Corp
C. We are proposing a 50% reduction
d. State could tie to Bell/Zacharski
CONTINUED - OVER
SECRET
CLASS. BY
# 05
RESSONATIVE II 1.5 A 2
293
27
SECRET
2. Cuban Mission to the UN
a. Now 55
b. Reduce to 25-30 level of Bloc Missions (DOJ opinion re visa)
(27 & 29 of INA)
3. Soviet Correspondents
a. Agreed level is 36
b. Soviets have 35 - U.S. has 28
c. We propose a reduction to 30 level
4. The ceiling on Soviet commercial presence in the U.S. is now 72
Our examination shows that neither Intourist nor Aeroflot
are apparently counted in this ceiling. We will recommend
they be so counted. They have 20 here and this would have
effect if a 20 man reduction.
5. Finally Soviet Embassy & Soviet Consulate, San Francisco,
have a combined ceiling of 320. U.S. Embassy, Moscow,
and U.S. Consulate, Leningrad, have 187.
We are proposing a 10% cut in Soviet ceiling - or a
reduction by 32.
Total 109
C. Most effective - (Major disagreement, probable foreign
policy problem/retaliation)
1. Reduction through visa control of USSR Mission to
# equal that of the U.S. Mission to UN
2. Equal #'s in U.S. & each Eastern European Embassy
3. Equal #'s at U.S. & U.S.S.R. Embassies
4. Notification (48 hrs.) of travel by Bloc officials
a. Scanlan briefing
The above rankings as to effectiveness relate to lessening
the CI burdens. The more effective vis-a-vis CI, the greater
will be the probability of foreign policy problems/retaliation.
- 2 -
SECRET
H
28
29
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FOIA(b)
(1)
IV. DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS
A.
FBI
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B.
State
The numbers of U.S. official personnel in the Soviet Union and the PRC
are considerably less than the comparable representation in this country.
State's view is that further reductions in the current ceilings on Soviet and
PRC official personnel in the U.S. would invite one-for-one retaliation.
Since there are fewer Americans in Moscow, Leningrad, Beijing, and Shanghai to
19
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
SECRET
BY KML NARA DATE 3/14/2011
30
SECRET
No Then should
be taken by
with Them Y so
start with, the U.S. would suffer more from such action Again, considering
we
want
the comparative number of experienced specialists in the foreign services, the
re
ter
Soviets would be more capable of adjusting to a lower staffing level than
would the U.S. In most East European countries the U.S. official presence is
larger and reducing the number of East European personnel would invite one-
for-one retaliation at greater cost to the U.S. (S)
Consequences of limiting the Soviet, East European, and PRC official
how
presence and the expected retaliation would be fewer day-to-day diplomatic
use
much
contacts and a lessened ability for overt data gathering in those countries on
which to gauge their capabilities and intentions. In addition, the Soviets,
East Europeans, and Chinese at UN Headquarters would still represent a
you
substantial base in the U.S. from which to carry out intelligence
e
activities. (S)
con
American media organizations have indicated no interest in staffing
offices outside of Moscow, unlike the Soviets who have correspondents in
Washington, New York, and San Francisco. These organizations have, however,
unsuccessfully sought entry/exit visas and accreditation from the Soviets for
non-resident correspondents which would have made the numbers more equal. (U)
So
what
Further limitations on non-official Soviets, East Europeans, or Chinese
could face strong opposition from the U.S. business and academic communities,
as well as from the East European and Chinese ethnic community. In the case
Redication
of the PRC, limitations could be seen as a reversal of the policy which has
encouraged increased exchanges. (S)
what
U.S. actions to limit the number of Cubans at their UN Mission could be
so
used by Cuba to portray the U.S. as illegally frustrating its mission's proper
20
SECRET
3,
SECRET
functioning. The Cubans would probably also suggest to other countries whose
interests conflict with ours that similar actions may be aimed at them in the
so we let
future. (S)
out. the wor,
Nice
State is in the process of tightening travel controls in several areas:
1. Revision of designated areas closed to the USSR and PRC is under
them
way in consultation with the Departments of Defense and Energy.
2. Enactment of the Foreign Missions Act will make possible
implementation of a mandatory central travel and accommodations
reservation service. This will allow complete, flexible, and
discretionary control over the travel of all official Soviets (and other
country officials as decided on).
3. In consultation with INS and the FBI, State is studying
restrictions on Soviet entry points into the U.S. and institution of exit
controls on Soviet holders of A, G, and C-3 visas.
4. Also in consultation with INS and the FBI, consideration is
being given to implementing stricter travel controls on all Soviet
nationals. These would limit them to specific ports of entry and exit
and require non-officials, including tourists, to remain within a certain
radius of their destination unless approval was obtained to deviate from
their itinerary. (S)
Any further travel controls beyond those in force or under consideration
on Soviet officials and certain categories of non-officials are seen as posing
serious political problems and impacting adversely on the ability of U.S.
personnel to carry on their official activities in the USSR. State views
enforcement of existing travel restrictions as the key to controlling the
21
SECRET
SECRET
V.
CONCL US IONS
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36
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26
SECRET
37
SECRET
The issue then is what cost the U.S. is willing to bear in its foreign
policy and in its conduct of diplomatic activities in order to blunt the
hostile intelligence threat and satisfy U.S. foreign counterintelligence
concerns. (U)
After weighing all of the pros and cons involved in the proposals
detailed in Part III and discussed thereafter, the IG/CI recommends the NSC
should authorize the following actions:
(NOTE: To be prepared following receipt of comments on this draft
and concomitant IG/CI discussion at its next meeting.)
27
SECRET
AI
38
V
sh
SECRET
46
FOREIGN MISSIONS ACT P.L. 97-241
I.
Authorities Given to the Department
(1)
The Foreign Missions Act authorizes the Secretary of State to regulate
activities of official missions of foreign governments in the United
States, on the basis of (a) reciprocity and (b) national security.
(2)
The Act authorizes establishment of an Office of Foreign Missions,
under direction of an Under Secretary.
(3)
International organizations and missions to those organizations may
also be required to comply with the Act as appropriate, in view of
their differing status from foreign government missions.
(4)
Broad contracting authority, including personnel services, is provided
to enable the Department to respond timely to requirements which are
not normally encompassed by standard procurement or appointment
authorities.
(5)
"Foreign Missions" and "international organization" are broadly defined
to cover political entities such as the EEC, PLO, etc.
(6)
Authority vested in the Secretary may be subject to guidelines of the
President. (U)
II. Purposes
The Act is intended to accomplish five basic objectives:
(1)
Support USG missions abroad and send a strong signal to foreign
governments that USG diplomatic practice will be premised on
reciprocity; this may increase our ability to ameliorate adverse
conditions under which USG posts operate abroad to the extent that such
matters are under the control of receiving states.
(2)
Assist the Department in reducing the operating costs of USG missions
abroad which are imposed arbitrarily or which can reasonably be
modified by receiving states.
(3)
Increase national security agencies' capability to perform oversight
functions in connection with foreign government activities in the
United States.
(4)
Increase coordination between State and NSC agency functions.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLS F06-114/6#9179
BY LOS NARA, DATE 12/13/07
JELKET
47
(5)
Comply with congressional concern that a meaningful policy of
reciprocity be established in the conduct of our diplomatic relations
and that domestic national security concerns be appropriately reflected
in that policy. (U)
III.
Implementation
The Office of Foreign Missions will commence operations on October 1.
The Office has requested assignments of liaison officials from DIA, CIA, FBI,
and NSA. (S)
The Office of Foreign Missions, in concert with concerned national
security agencies, is exploring "avenues" within the legislative
authorities. These will include:
(1)
Procedures for real estate acquisition by foreign nations.
(2)
Procedures for limitations on number of foreign personnel assigned to
embassies, consulates, and missions.
(3)
Establishing a "travel agency."
(4)
Reviewing opportunities for "service companies"--plumbers,
electricians, heating/AC maintenance, cleaning personnel, etc.
(5)
Advance travel plan notifications for approval/disapproval.
(6)
Use of surcharges.
(7)
Coordination with private sector--public utilities.
(8)
Coordination with state/local agencies--motor vehicle registration and
tags, zoning commissions, building code procedures, etc.
(9)
Opportunities using paper/notifications requirements. (S)
Suggestions for additional "avenues" from the IG/CI and IG/CM will be
welcomed. (U)
SECRET
NSC/S PROFILE
SECRET
ID 8207843
RECEIVED 09 NOV 82 1
TO
CLARK
FROM BREMER
DOCDATE 09 NOV 82
50
URGENT
DECLASSIFIED
KEYWORDS: USSR
INTELLIGENCE
NLRR FDG-114/6#9168 114/6
EUROPE EAST
LEGAL ISSUES
BY RW NARA DATE 11/16/15
SUBJECT: TRAVEL CONTROLS RE SOVIET & EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS REQUESTED
BY PFIAB
ACTION: MEMO WHEELER TO CAROL PATRICK DUE: 10 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
PIPES
DOBRIANSKY
ROBINSON
MYER
KIMMITT
DEGRAFFENREID
RYE
RAYMOND
COMMENTS
REF# 8234479
LOG 8206345
NSCIFID
(L/
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C
United States Department of State
51
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET
November 9, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Travel Controls on Soviet and Eastern European
Diplomats in the United States and on US Diplomats in
the USSR and Eastern Europe
Enclosed is a summary of the travel controls imposed on
American diplomats in the Soviet Union and on Soviet diplomats
in the United States, as requested by Carol Patrick of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
The situation for Eastern Europe is as follows. There are
no travel restrictions on American diplomats in the German
Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Romania. In Bulgaria, American diplomats must make travel
arrangements through the official state travel agency, but
travel is not otherwise restricted. There are no restrictions
on the travel of Eastern European diplomats assigned to the
United States.
Bremer,
Executive Secretary
Enclosures:
As stated.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLS F06-114/6#9180
DECL:
OADR
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
sorthiplo
55
NON-LOG
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
SENSITIVE
August 11, 1983
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT W. KIMMITT
FROM:
TYRUS W. COBB TWC
SUBJECT:
Possible Defection by Soviet Youth
1. ANDREI BEREZHKOV: Born 1967 (15 or 16 years old). Son of
the First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy and the USA Institute's
representative in Washington.
--
Apparently left family Chevy Chase home between 1:00 and
3:00 p.m., August 10. Took the family car; left without ID
cards or belongings.
2. Berezhkov family called the Soviet Desk at State about
4:30 p.m., who in turn called the local police. Police put out
missing persons report. (NOTE: Strange that he would call that
quickly unless this was a festering problem.) Berezhkov
indicated that he thought that foul play was possible.
--
Police and Soviet Embassy called State about 2:30 a.m.,
August 11, to report that the son had returned home. There
is no indication that he was brought home under coercion,
but not certain that he just returned voluntarily.
3. Department of State, EUR/SOV (Simons) received a call from
Les Gelb, New York Times (about 3:00 p.m.), who informed State
that the New York Times had a letter from an Andy Berezhkov
indicating that he planned to defect on August 11 (letter at Tab
I). He provided the letter to State on a privileged basis and
asked for State's reaction. Gelb also indicated that the New
York Times was considering publishing the letter. Simons called
me on secure at 4:37 p.m.
--
We agreed with State's recommendation that the New York
Times not publish now; particularly to hold off for a day.
--
The FBI reported that the wife and son were slated to leave
for New York City tomorrow (August 12) and from there
presumably to go to the USSR.
--
At 5:10 p.m. Gelb called to report that the New York Times
headquarters had not only decided to publish the letter, but
had called Minister Sokolov at the Soviet Embassy and read
the contents of the letter to him.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR
NLS F06-114/6#9169
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
56
SECRET
SENSITIVE
2
4. We checked Correspondence Office and found a letter
addressed to the President from the young man (Tab II), which he
indicated in the letter to the New York Times that he intended to
do.
5.
Copies of the letters and this memorandum have been provided
to Bob Sims per your instructions.
6.
The FBI has the Berezhkov's under tight surveillance. State
is consulting with their legal, human rights, and desk people to
decide on a course of action.
Attachments:
Tab I
Berezhkov letter to the New York Times
Tab II
Berezhkov letter to the President
CC: Bob Sims
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Ralph Bunch'e
13 AUG
Washington D.C. 20036 USA 20c
New YoRk Times Buzeau
News.
1000 Connecticut Ave. N.W
:
Ralph Bunche
00.
200
USA
Washington 1983 D.C. 20056 20e
MR. PResident.
White House
1600 Pennsyl vania Av. NW
CONFIDENTIAL
NON LOG
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR FRED FIELDING
August 12, 1983
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Berezhkov Incident
We understand you wanted the following information on the
Berezhkov incident:
-- Leslie Gelb from the New York Times received the letter
on August 11.
-- Gelb called Tom Simons, Director of Soviet Affairs at the
State Department, at about 3:45 to tell him about the
letter.
-- Gelb offered a copy of the letter to the State
Department; Annette Bohr, a State intern, picked it up and
hand-carried it back to State.
-- Tom Simons informed Ty Cobb of our staff of the Berezhkov
letter at about 4:30; shortly afterwards State delivered a
copy of letter to Cobb.
-- Anne Higgins' office received the separate letter
addressed to the President in the August 11 morning mail.
In response to a call from Tom Shull of our staff, Anne
hand-delivered the letter to me at around 5:00 p.m. At that
time, we provided a copy of the letter to the President to
Judge Clark's office.
For your further background, I have attached a copy of an
internal NSC memo on the Berezhkov situation as we knew of
it at 6:00 p.m. on August 11.
CC: Judge Clark
DECLASSIMED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLS F06-114/6#9170
Declassify on: OADR
BY LOS NARA, DATE 12/13/07
Lenez owsk,
National Security Council
12
1
The White House
II
System #
83 AUG 12 nto P 6:56
RECEIVED
D
Package# 90988
RA
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary
/
mus
John Poindexter
2
of
Bud McFarlane
Jacque Hill
Judge Clark
John Poindexter
Executive Secretary
NSC Secretariat
Situation Room
I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action
DISTRIBUTION
CC:
VP
Meese
Baker
Deaver
Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
an advance copy of TabA
has already gone the the Judge.
63
SYSTEM II
90988
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
SENSITIVE
August 12, 1983
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM:
JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL
SUBJECT:
Possible Soviet Defector
Attached at Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Shultz to the
President reporting on State's action on young Berezhkov.
At Tab I is a memorandum forwarding this report to the President.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove f
Attachments:
Tab I
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
Memorandum from Secretary of State Shultz,
dated August 12, 1983
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
SECRET
SENSITIVE
By LOJ
NARA, Date 2/17/05
Declassify on: OADR
PRESERVATION COPY
64
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90988
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT:
Possible Soviet Defector
Attached at Tab A is a progress report from George Shultz on
State's handling of the case of the Soviet Embassy official's
son. His main point is that State is insisting that we have the
opportunity to interview the young man and ascertain his true
intentions before we permit the Soviets to take him back to the
USSR.
Prepared by:
John Lenczowski
Attachment:
Tab A
Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, August 12
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
SENSITIVE
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By
LOJ
NARA, Date 2/17/05
Declassify on: OADR
PRESERVATION COPY
ES SENSITIVE
8324720
65
SYSTEM II
90988
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
August 12, 1983
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz
ups
SUBJECT:
Possible Soviet Embassy Defector
We have been working closely with the FBI and INS to ensure
that we have an opportunity to interview the son of the Soviet
Embassy official who wrote you saying he wanted to stay in the
United States. It is, of course, a matter of principle that we
ascertain his true intentions before we allow the Soviets to take
him back to the Soviet Union.
We have told the Soviets orally, and by note, that we insist on
the interview before he departs. The Soviets responded this
morning, saying they reject our right to hinder the departure of
the dependent of a Soviet Embassy official and protest our
actions. Soviet Charge Sokolov, in conversations with Rick Burt,
has complained about the heavy press and other activity around
their Embassy and housing compound. We have taken steps to ensure
outsiders are kept at least one hundred feet away from Soviet
property in order to reduce somewhat the possibility of Soviet
retaliation against our exposed Embassy personnel in Moscow. Rick
also told the Soviet Charge that we hoped to discuss this matter in
greater detail and exchange any information to see if there is some
way we could resolve the problem. Sokolov agreed to get back to
Moscow to see what further he could say.
We will follow this closely throughout the weekend and keep you
fully informed. There is obviously a great deal of press interest
in this case. We are saying that we have had several discussions
with the Soviet Embassy and exchanged notes on this issue and that
we are insisting that the young man not depart the United States
prior to an interview.
SECRET
NLS DECLASSIFIED F06-114/6#9184
BY LOT NARA, DATE 12/13/07
DECL: OADR
(b)(3)
66
DATE/TIME TRANSMITTED
WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER
DATE/TIME RECEIVED
488
83 AUG 15 A 8: 21
AUG 15 8 16 AM '83
CIA
OPERATIONS CENTER
WHITE USE
SITE A
SITUATION ROOM
KASHFAX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/6#9171
BY
RW
NARA DATE 11/16/15
FROM
OCR/USSR/P&M
SUBJECT
Biographic Report
CLASSIFICATION
PAGES 1
Secret
SENT TO: DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION
ROOM
John Lenzkowski, NSC, Old Executive Office Bldg
395-5646
368
NSC
REMARKS:.
Lenczowsk,
CONFIDENTIAL
J USSR dipo
68
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIST.
OPERATIONS CENTER
INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON ANDREI BEREZHKOV
D
P
SITUATION REPORT NO. 5
M
e
SITUATION AS OF 0500 EDT, AUGUST 14, 1983
A
H
PA
Press Coverage. Media coverage remains moderate, but is
INK
beginning to concentrate on the "superpower confrontation"
S/S-O (2)
angle. Sunday's Washington Post headlines its article
S/S-S
"Standoff Intensifies..." The Berezhkov story was the lead
S/S (3)
item on the CBS Evening News Saturday, which also emphasized
S/S-1
the confrontation element. CBS reported "no progress" in
SOTFO
Saturday's US-Soviet meeting at the State Department, and noted
MILREP
that the President was receiving reports on the situation.
EDITOR
This morning's Post also indicated the President's interest,
WORKING GROUP but quoted The White House as saying he is "leaving the
L
handling to the State Department." The Post quoted from a
RP
Cable News Network interview with Soviet Minister-Counselor
M/MO .
Isakov, who termed U.S. actions a "gross violation of
SP
international law." CBS carried a brief clip of the same CNN
PA/HO
interview and also showed film of the incident with the TASS
USIA
family at Dulles Airport Friday evening. CBS and the Post both
NSA (LDX)
noted US denials of harassing or enticing Soviet officials.
CIA (LDX)
NBC's Saturday evening news show quoted a Soviet diplomat
WHITE HOUSE
describing the Berezhkov affair as "just a case of a son angry
(LDX)
with his father," and concluded with a brief clip of KGB
EUR (5)
defector Stanislav Levchenko, who stated that "the boy's life
S/CPR
would be ruined" if he returned to the USSR. ABC's Nightline
CA
had little to add to the other two networks' earlier reports
SY
but raised the question of whether and how the Soviets might
HA
reciprocate towards American diplomats in Moscow. All three
networks showed film of Chargé Sokolov leaving the Department
Saturday. CBS and NBC also mentioned that the USG's legal
experts had determined that there is precedent for its position
in the 1980 Soviet ballerina incident. The New York Times this
morning leads off its front-page article with the Soviet
insistence that no interview take place, but concentrates
mainly on FBI surveillance efforts and attempts to verify the
authenticity of Andrei's two letters.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLS F06-114/6# 9185
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 12/13/07
69
CONFIDENTIAL
Contacts with the Soviets. Assistant Secretary Burt telephoned
Sokolov about Isakov's appearance on CNN, telling him that going to
the press and public at this point was not helpful. Sokolov
responded that Isakov's interview was "several days old," and that
the Soviets did not plan to give any more interviews on the subject.
Situation at Soviet residences. FBI reports that there has been no
unusual activity overnight, and that the situation is calm.
Situation in Moscow. Embassy Moscow reports no change in their
situation as of Sunday morning.
John M. Ordway Ordway
Burezhkov Working Group
7 K.A. Watch L. Randall Officer
Cleared: EUR: RBur tw
CONFIDENTIAL