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Dissidents (18)
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Dissidents (18)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Dissidents (18)
Box: 24
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/2/2005
File Folder
DISSIDENTS (18/23)
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
YARHI-MILO
24
2402
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9477 MEMO
MATLOCK/RAYMOND/STEINER TO
2 5/11/1984 B1
MCFARLANE RE SAKHAROV SITUATION
[1 -2 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9491 MEMO
PRESS STATEMENT ON SAKHAROV
1
ND
B1
SITUATION
[9 -9 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9478 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE NEXT
1 5/19/1984 B1
STEPS ON SAKHAROV
[ 23 - 23 1
R 6/25/2009 F2006-114/7
9479 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
1
ND
B1
RE NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV
24 - 24 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/2/2005
File Folder
DISSIDENTS (18/23)
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
YARHI-MILO
24
2402
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9492 MEMO
SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
3 5/18/1984 B1
NEXT STEPS ON SAKHAROV
[ 25 - 27 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9480 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #9479
1 5/21/1984 B1
[ 28 28 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9493 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #9492
3 5/18/1984 B1
29 - 31 1
R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7
9481 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #9478
1 5/19/1984 B1
[ 32 32 1
R
6/25/2009 F2006-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/2/2005
File Folder
DISSIDENTS (18/23)
FOIA
F06-114/7
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
24
2402
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9482 MEMO
POINDEXTER TO MCFARLANE RE
1 6/1/1984 B1
SAKHAROV
[ 33 33 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9483 MEMO
MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE
1 6/1/1984 B1
MEETING WITH ALEXEI SEMYONOV
JUNE 1, 1984
34 34 ]
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9484 MEMO
TELEPHONE CALL TO DOBRYNIN RE
1
ND
B1
SAKHAROV
[ 36 36 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9485 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #9482
1 6/1/1984 B1
[ 38 38 1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/2/2005
File Folder
DISSIDENTS (18/23)
FOIA
F06-114/7
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
24
2402
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9486 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE
1 6/12/1984 B1
SAKHAROV/BONNER LETTERS
39 - 39 1
R
6/25/2009 F2006-114/7
9487 E-MAIL
E-MAIL PROFS MCFARLANE TO
1 6/12/1984 B1
MATLOCK RE SAKHAROV
[ 40 - 40 1
R 7/7/2008 NLRRF06-114/7
9488 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
2
ND
B1
RE JESSE JACKSON AND SAKHAROV
[ 43 - 44 1
R
6/25/2009
F2006-114/7
9489 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #9488
1
ND
B1
[ 49 - 50 1
R
6/25/2009
F2006-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/2/2005
File Folder
DISSIDENTS (18/23)
FOIA
F06-114/7
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
24
2402
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9490 MEMO
BILL ECKERT TO
1 8/25/1984 B6
MCFARLANE/MURPHY/GREGG RE
TELEPHONE CALL, AUGUST 25, 1984,
GEORGE BUSH TO TANYA
YANKELEYEVICH
[ 58 - 58 1
PAR
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
Sakharov
CONFIDENTIAL
(Dissident)
MEMORANDUM
Spoth
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL May 11, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION
Filt
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK, JR
DECLASSIFIED
WALTER RAYMOND, JR.
STEVEN E. STEINER Stave
NLRR fob-114/7 #9477
SUBJECT:
Sakharov Situation
BY CH NARA MOTE 7/7/08
We face a volatile and potentially dangerous situation with
the Sakharov case, which may require Presidential action on
short notice. Sakharov has been on a hunger strike since May
2 protesting the continuing refusal by the Soviet authorities
to permit his wife to travel to the West for needed medical
treatment. To make matters worse, the Soviets have indicated
an intention to bring criminal charges against her and have
confined her to to Gorky with him -- possibly under house
arrest.
This seems to be the most serious situation faced yet by
Sakharov and Bonner, due to their weakened health and the
increasing inflexibility of Soviet authorities. Further,
because of the authorities' efforts to cut off information
about them, things could break quickly and we could be behind
events.
We have already taken numerous actions. State issued a strong
statement on Tuesday (Tab I) expressing our concern and
refuting the spurious Soviet charge that our Embassy has been
involved in a conspiracy with Mrs. Bonner. We have instructed
all of our embassies in Western Europe to request intervention
by their host governments. We have asked Western leaders
going to Moscow in the near future to raise the issue, and we
made an approach to the Vatican as well. We are in touch with
Sakharov's family here (daughter and son-in-law), who have
released a statement of their own but -- like us -- lack
up-to-date information.
Shultz and Eagleburger raised this matter with Dobrynin on
behalf of the President and received a particularly unpleasant
Soviet reply. A Presidential Statement (Tab II) was produced
by Dodie Livingston's office in connection with Sakharov's
coming birthday, but it failed to mention the current
situation. We see no need for further action now at the
Presidential level, as this could needlessly subject the
prestige of the President to the kinds of answers the Soviets
are giving these days. But we need to watch this very closely
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
JUNE IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
and to stay on the high ground. If Sakharov's condition is
deteriorating rapidly or if the Soviets start forcefeeding him
(which under Soviet law could begin on Tuesday), we may need
to issue a Presidential Statement quickly. If things get even
worse, we should consider a live Presidential appearance.
A proposed Presidential Statement, reflecting our information
to this moment, is at Tab III for your consideration. We are
still working it with State and the Speechwriters. We will
keep you informed and will be prepared to move quickly.
Attachments
Tab I
State Department Statement of May 8, 1984
Tab II
Presidential Statement issued May 7, 1984
Tab III
Proposed Presidential Statement on Current Situation
CC: Karna Small
Bob Sims
NOTE: We are reviewing on a close-hold basis with State the
advisability and possible elements for suggesting a trade to
secure Sakharov's release from the Soviet Union. Jack would
like to discuss this with you tomorrow morning.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State
F- P5
May 8, 1984
STATEMENT ON THE SAKHAROVS
Sakham
The Department of State is strongly concerned about press
reports that Andrei Sakharov has been on a hunger strike since
May 2 and that his wife, Elena Bonner, has been charged with
slandering the Soviet state, which could lead to as much as
three years' confinement. The refusal of the Soviet
authorities to reveal any information about the present welfare
and whereabouts of the Sakharovs lends credence to these
reports. Dr. Sakharov has been trying for many months to
obtain permission from the Soviet authorities for his. wife to
travel abroad for medical treatment, something she has been
allowed to do twice before. He has apparently been driven to
this extreme action by the continued refusal of the authorities
to even respond to his requests.
The Soviet handling of this matter has been inhuman and
incomprehensible. Rather than simply allowing Mrs. Bonner to
go abroad for medical treatment, they have placed criminal
charges against her, threatened her with even more serious
treason charges and made totally false allegations about
involvement in the current situation by the U.S. Embassy. The
circumstances of Dr. Sakharov, a recipient of the Nobel Peace
Prize and numerous other accolades, is a legitimate matter of
concern for all persons interested in promoting human rights
and international peace. Soviet silence about Dr. Sakharov and
Mrs. Bonner is totally unacceptable.
I
We urge the Soviet authorities to provide truthful
information about the present situation of Dr. Sakharov and
Mrs. Bonner. We also urge them as a matter of simple humanity
to end Dr. Sakharov's exile, and allow Mrs. Bonner to travel
abroad for medical treatment. Finally, we ask that all
like-minded persons in the West press the Soviets for
information on the fate of the Sakharovs, and for an end to
Soviet persecution of these two brave individuals.
draft:EUR/SOV:JFSchumaker
clear:EUR/SOV:RFSmith
EUR/SOV:TWSimons
EUR: MPalmer
HA : GMatthews
Wang#0044A X21712
Statement Issued 5/7/84
STRAIGHT WIRE - OR TELEX
-
MAY 7, 1984
TELEX: 429 439 FREEDOM
Mr. Ed Lozansky
F SalCham p5
Freedom House
20 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018
Nancy and I are delighted to join all those gathered to pay
homage to Dr. Andrei Sekharov on this special occasion.
When judged against the backdrop of world events, Andrei
Sekharov, it is clear, is one of those rare individuals who has
transcended difficult challenges to become part of history. A
renowned physicist, Dr. Sakharov has repeatedly demonstrated his
overriding commitment to international peace and the human rights of
the peoples of the Soviet Union. In recognition of these singular
qualities, Dr. Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.
Exiled to the closed city of Gorky in 1980, he and his wife have
been subjected to continuous harassment and attempted intimidation.
Even in the face of his declining health, the Soviet government has
refused to permit him to enter the Academy of Sciences Hospital in
Moscow. Nor have the Soviets allowed him to emigrate to another
country.
In his strivings for peace and freedom, his life and work serve
as testimony to the power of moral courage to inspire people around
the globe. By forcefully speaking out and aiding the victims of
severe repression, he has with his valor brought light and meaning to
the very heart of liberty.
II
?
At this critical time in history, it is incumbent upon us to bring
deserved attention to the plight of the Sakharovs. It is easy to
identify with their fate, for they seek the fundamental freedoms that
all Americans cherish.
As Andrei Sakharov approaches his sixty-third birthday, we
fervently hope that the coming years will see the realization of the
progress and liberty he has so devotedly sought.
RONALD REAGAN
RR: Wells VS
cc: K.Osborne/D.Livingston/B.Rimmitt,NSC/L.Speakes(FYI)/CF
EVENT: MAY 8
THE ANDREI SAKHAROV INSTITUTE
3001 Veazey Terrace, N.W.
Executive Board
Suite 332
President
Washington, D.C. 20008
*Sheldon Lee Glashow
Tel. (202) 364-0200
Executive Director
Edward D. Lozansky
Financial Director
March 19, 1984
Charles W. Sutherland
* Andrei Sakharov
Secretary
World Renowned Physicist
Sanford A. Gradinger
Ms. Carolyn Sundseth
Peace Nobel Laureate
Members
The White House
Exiled to Gorki, U.S.S.R. Since 1980
Vladimir Bukovsky
Washington, D.C.
Earl Callen
Edward A. Clark
Arthur S. Davis
Efrem Yankelevich
Dear Carolyn:
Advisory Board
*Philip W. Anderson
It was a pleasure to talk to you on the phone. I am
"Christian B. Anfinsen
sending you the information about our project and the
*Julius Axelrod
*Baruj Benacerraf
request for a Presidential Proclamation on the occasion
*Paul Berg
of the International Andrei Sakharov Day.
"Hans A. Bethe
*Konrad Bloch
"Nicolaas Bloembergen
If this proclamation will be issued I think that it
*Baruch S. Blumberg
should be addressed to four major groups which are doing
Derek C. Bok
*Herbert C. Brown
this project:
*Owen Chamberlain
"Leon N. Cooper
Dr. Edward D. Lozansky, Executive Director,
"Carl F. Cori
Andrei Sakharov Institute
"Allan M. Cormack
*Andre Cournand
Larry E. Craig
Rev. Hans Stuckelberger, President
*Gerard Debreu
Robert Dole
Christian Solidarity International
Sidney Drell
*Renato Dulbecco
Mr. Vladimir Bukovsky, President
Pierre Emmanuel
Millicent Fenwick
Resistance International
Herman Feshbach
"Val Fitch
Mr. David H. Barron, Chairman of the Board
*Paul J. Flory
Alexander Ginsburg
The Jefferson Educational Foundation
"Donald A. Glaser
Marek Halter
Margaret M. Heckler
*Gerhard Herzberg
I think that the proclamation should mention not only
*Robert W. Holley
Sakharov but all persecuted christians and jews fighting for
Jack Kemp
their basic religious and other human rights.
Donald Kennedy
"Arthur Kornberg
Eduard Kuznetsov
Thank you very much for your support. Please do what
Leon Lederman
you can to make sure that we will have the Andrei Sakharov
Louis Leprince-Ringuet
Bernard Henry Levy
Day in the White House on May 16 or 17. Linas is working on
*Andre Lwoff
that. Hoping to see you at this day in the White House
Nikolaus von Mach
I remain,
Vladimir Maximov
Zubin Mehta
"Edwin M. McMillan
Louis Michel
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
"Robert S. Mulliken
Richard Pipes
*James Rainwater
Edward Edward Sincerely, D. Lozansky Lozaning
"Paul A. Samuelson
*Glenn T. Seaborg
"Herbert A. Simon
"George D. Snell
Michael I. Sovern
Valentin Turchin
"Torsten N. Wiesel
*J.D. Watson
"George Wald
Allan Wynn
*Nobel Laureate
tax
organization
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PRESS STATEMENT ON SAKHAROV SITUATION
I want to express my profound concern over a potentially
tragic human situation. Dr. Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Peace
Prize Laureate and one of the most courageous defenders of
international human rights, entered on a hunger strike several
days ago to protest the continuing refusal by the Soviet
authorities to permit his wife -- Elena Bonner -- to receive
urgently needed specialized medical treatment in the West. To
make matters even more ominous, the Soviet authorities --
rather than granting Mrs. Bonner's request on a humanitarian
basis -- have indicated an intention to bring criminal charges
against her. And they have restricted her to the provincial
city of Gorky, where Dr. Sakharov himself has been confined
since 1980.
Both Dr. Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner are in a state of seriously
weakened health. Dr. Sakharov, who will be 63 this month, has
been repeatedly refused specialized medical treatment at the
Academy of Sciences Hospital in Moscow. Mrs. Bonner suffers
from serious eye problems and a heart condition. Wounded three
times defending her country in World War II, she was permitted
in earlier years to go abroad three times for medical
treatment and each time returned to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet authorities are clearly trying to shut off Dr.
Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner from the rest of the world, as if
their fate would then be forgotten. But Americans will not
forget these two brave individuals and the tragic plight they
now face. If this threatening situation is carried further or
if the health of either of them seriously deteriorates, the
Soviet authorities will bear a deep and onerous responsibility
before the community of nations and East-West relations will
obviously suffer another serious setback. Frankly, it just
makes no sense to treat two such noble persons in this manner,
particularly in light of their failing health. Surely, the
interests of a powerful country like the Soviet Union can in
no way justify this.
We have conveyed our great concern over this situation
directly to the Soviet leadership and asked for a humanitarian
resolution. But thus far our pleas have been ignored, as have
those of other governments and private individuals. I know
that I speak for all Americans in calling on the leaders of
the Soviet Union, in the name of humanity, to avoid a
potential tragedy by permitting Mrs. Bonner to receive the
needed medical treatment in the West and by dropping the
unfounded criminal charges against her. We ask them as well
to bring an end to Dr. Sakharov's forced exile and to permit
him to live the rest of his life in dignity in a place of his
own choosing.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRR F06-114/7 ± 9491
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
BY
CN
NARA
DATE
7/7/08
10
original 10/4/84 to NSC/S
MAY 16, 1984
NOTE TO TOM SHULL
FROM:
TOM GIBSON Ab.
RE:
CREED - Christian Rescure Effort for the Emancipation
of Dissidents
I was active in the establishment of this group three years
ago. Recently my good friend and former mentor Dr. Ernest
Gordon sent me the attached materials. I think you will find
them interesting.
Of particular interest is the letter form the Ukraine. Dr.
Gordon writes sermons that are regularly broadcast into the
Soviet Union via V.O.A. and Radio Liberty. I saw the original
letter, and though I am no authority on such matters, it looked
to be a genuine item.
Two summers ago I directed a lobbying effort against MFN for
Romania, given its human rights record. Ernest's report on his
trip there is most illuminating.
Dr. Gordon was the Dean of the Chapel at Princeton University
for 25 years before retiring and establishing CREED.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
5/21
Paula
tracking this ime ?
Have you been
should we do any-
thing ? Thanks
For the record: for
OBE. (Per
conversation H.R. with Tom Shuu.)
(most A cases resolved; Gondon has.
spoken already to NSC & state
re: his ideas.)
PD 10/1/84
CREED
P.O. Box 8007
Washington, DC 20024
703-549-0047
PRESIDENT
Christian Rescue Effort
for the Emancipation of Dissidents
Dr. Ernest Gordon
April 16, 1984
FOUNDERS
The Honorable and Mrs.
Roger W. Jepsen
U.S. Senate
The Honorable and Mrs. Jack Kemp
U.S. Congress
President Ronald Reagan
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The White House
John Crossley
East Watch International
Washington, D. C. 20500
Joanne Kemp (Mrs. Jack)
Congressional Wives for Soviet Jewry
My dear Mr. President,
John A. Nevius
Lawyer
Your recognition of the Soviet Union and its empire as a ruthless
Thomas Wasinger
atheistic tyranny, and the summing up of your diplomatic policy as that
Lawyer
of strength, realism, and dialogue is a great help to me in my mission
ADVISORY BOARD
of freedom. Your revokation of the MFN status for Romania last year
Honorable Don Bonker
strengthened my position enormously in my negotiations with Romanian
U.S. Congress
authorities for the liberation of persecuted believers.
Rev. Michael Bourdeaux
Keston College of England
Ctr. for Study of Religion in
I enclose a brief report of my recent mission to Romania, and a
USSR/Eastern Europe
copy of a letter from the Ukraine thanking CREED for its Sunday broad-
Dr. Armando C. Chappelli, Jr.
casts entitled, "Life in Christ." We communicate as well by corres-
The Washington Consulting Group
pondence, and also by personal missions. We are cooperating with
Alexander I. Ginzburg
Christian intellectuals in Eastern Europe who are granted freedom of
Russian Christian Dissident
movement within the Soviet Union because of their expertise in "high
Rev. T. Robert Ingram
technology." Conferences have been arranged so that I may meet with
St. Thomas' Episcopal Church
some of them in order to teach them over a period of two weeks at a
and School
time. Thus, I am able to help them in the vital missions they under-
Martha Paxton Franchot
take.
Westminster Schools
Father Victor S. Potapov
Committee for Defense of
In gratitude for your courage and witness,
Persecuted Orthodox Christians
Gary Potter
I have the honor to remain,
Catholics for Christian Political Action
His Grace. Bishop Basil Rodzianko
Ever sincerely yours,
Holy Trinity Cathedral
Col. and Mrs. Paul Roush
former Embassy, Moscow
Emest Gadant
Dr. Francis Schaeffer
Dr. Ernest Gordon
L'Abri Fellowship
President
Harry Seggerman
International Investment Advisors
Enclosures
Virginia Scott Watson
Episcopal Church Women
of Virginia
Mr. John Whitehead
The Rutherford Institute
АВИА
PARAVION
list
CREED House.
310S. Lee St
Alexandriv VA
22314
C ПРАЗДИНОМ, ДОРОГИЕ ЖЕНЩИНЫЙ
11. NAC april .........................
M WILL -
Hames
2. коргінгряноем 9:8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15.
CREED House
Cepderno благодарю Господа 30 psenause
310 S. Lee Street
экениее Bannx cepders Brow благоде-
Alexandria, VA 22314
***** XNX
SH2121 Koropoe bu имияно
XXX XXX **** XXX X XIX.
XXXXXXXXX
brew ишеется нужда. BCё ETO делает
Kharkov, Ukraine
Soviet Union
roenods коблагу машемъ. это On roenods
2 Corinthians 9:8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15.
побуждоет capdya yeten cboser general
I heartily thank the Lord for turning your hearts to
добрие дела Eop.2:10.3tc TOT numer Ha
this charity which you are doing, namely in helping where
there is such a need. This is all done by the Lord for
Katoporo agpeesere S THe пережии IK.89.10
our good, for it is the Lord Who touches the hearts of
His children to do good things. Eph. 2:10. Such is written
сятшаю barner програши прд-раесвехом
about the one to whom you are addressing and I have
already experienced. *Psalm 89:10. I listen to your
beare motro переслино whe grbae
programs before dawn. If all that I receive comes from
you then I am getting it. If it is from some other radio
mo пользно, a ecass это or драгоет
transmission, then you would probably be able to find
Kakozi padnonepedata Tabu можете
out which one and pass on my gratitude. In any case,
I would like to know where this gift comes from, from
HOLUTH 21 передать мою благодарность
which church. My gratitude is great and grateful is
the one who has received with joy. Heb. 10:34. May
вобгцем xoty 340176 e какой церквг
the Lord bless you. 1 Cor. 15:58.
3 March 1984
Rpsimon подарок. благодарность Benuka
благодарит TOT которий EBP. 10:54. принбае cpad
yawsurocmoberr bac Foenods I.Kop 15:58.
oerno
Translator's note:
1. In Russia, the Psalms are calculated differently,
and this reference is probably Psalm 90:10.
3,3,84 aog,
2. There is no signature, only the name and address
on the envelope. Though it is sent from the Ukraine,
it is written in Russian.
Human Rights and M.F.N. for Romania
Because of President Reagan's temporary suspension of Romania's M.F.N.
status last year the cause of human rights for believers was greatly advanced.
Since May 1983 His Excellency Mircea Malitza, the Romanian Ambassador in
Washington, has cooperated most graciously with my organization, the Christian
Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents, in behalf of Romanian be-
lievers harassed by government authorities. He facilitated two trips to his
country for me, and a colleague, in order to negotiate with Mr. Ian Rosianu in
behalf of certain believers.
I. Last August our negotiations resulted in permission to emigrate for
three priests of the Romanian Orthodox Church and a lady teacher of English,
who is a baptist. All four had been subject to cruel mental torture and
physical harassment over many years.
II. From March 9-15, 1984, I responded to the plea of Ian Stef and Beni
Cocar in Medias and Buni Cocar (his brother) in Bucharest, to identify with
them as a representative of the Christian community in the U.S.A., to preach
to their congregations, and to plead for their freedom. Because of their
successful ministries, particularly with young people, their state licenses
had been revoked and their congregations ordered to evict the buildings. The
services I attended, and preached in, were well conducted, the people kindly,
responsive, and non-rebellious. The building was crammed with people most of
whom were in the 20-35 year old age bracket.
On March 13 and 14 I met with the President of the Ministry of Culture
and Religion to negotiate with him for the freedom of the three pastors
threatened with arrest. I was told I should not have visited such people.
Mr. Rosianu made it clear that freedom of religion is permitted only in
conformity to the laws of the State. He laid great stress on the fact that
Jonestown could not have happened in Romania.
I also interceded for the well known Gheorghe Calciu who has now served
five of a ten year sentence. The alleged crime was that of being a Fascist.
In fact it was that of influencing young people by his faith and teaching.
An attempt is being made to identify him with the infamous Valerian Trifa
who was deported from this country for atrocities committed in World War II.
Ambassador Malitza continues to be extremely helpful, and very conscious
of the importance for Romania of receiving the M.F.N. status. An annual
appraisal of Romania's performance in human rights is obviously desirable.
Its beneficial influence would be even greater if the Jackson-Vanick amend-
ment were enlarged to include freedom of conscience as well as freedom of
movement.
REPORT OF VISIT TO ROMANIA, MARCH 9-15, 1984
Purpose:
a. To verify freedom of religion with approval of Ministry
of Culture.
b. To identify with pastors Ion Stef and Beniam Cocar in
Medias, and with Buni Cocar in Bucharest. The approval
of government authorities not requested. These three
pastors had their licenses revoked, ordered not to
continue the leadership of their congregations. In the
case of the congregation in Medias, it was technically
evicted, but having refused to obey the eviction order
continues to hold services although subject at times
to severe harassment.
The pastor in Bucharest had been informed that he
would have his license renewed if he agreed to inform
the secret police of the activities of the individuals
in his congreation. This he refused to do. Since
then he has been subject to acute harassment.
C. To plead with the President of the Ministry of Culture
and Religion for the release of Father George Calciu
now serving a 10 year sentence. He has completed five
of those years.
Report on trip:
a. Freedom of worship is practiced in Romania. But it is
only permitted in conformity to the laws of. the State.
"Scientific materialism" is the official ideology, one
which claims sovereignty over the lives and consciences
of the citizens. The goal of the State is to ensure that
this ideology controls every aspect of the national
life. At present there are no indications that religion
will wither away as state socialism flourishes. In
general, religion is thriving. Not only is it thriving,
it is seen as the only possible alternative. One member
of the communist party indicated that no one believed
in its avowed principles, but only went along with it
to ensure having favored treatment.
b. During September, 1982, I learned that the licenses,
or "authorizations", of Pastors Ion Stef and his son-in-
law Beni Cocar, both pastors of the Baptist congregation
in Medias, had been revoked. The reason seems to have
been due to the success of their youth work. In their
behalf I interceded with the Ministry of Culture and
Religions through the offices of Ambassador Malitza in
Washington. Apart from continuous harassment, the two
pastors continued their ministry with the enthusiastic
support of their rapidly growing congregation. During
the month of February I received a request to visit
Medias, preach to the congregation, and plead its case
before Mr. Ion Rosiana, the President of the Ministry
of Culture.
John Crossley, of East Watch International, and I
arrived at Medias late in the evening of March 10 and
informed Pastor Cocar of our arrival. On our arrival at
the church we noted that the windows of the pastor's
study had been broken by a stone and three metal slugs
which were still lying on the floor among the shattered
glass. This stoning occurs regularly. The Sunday
morning service was jammed with people of all ages.
They were bright, clean, and attentive. There were over
600 worshippers in a building which normally seats about
400. The choir numbered about 75. The presence of
young people in the 20-35 year age bracket was noticeable.
Beni Cocar conducted the service reverently. He, by the
way, translated my sermon with obvious fluency. The
service lasted for approximately 4 hours. The same num-
ber of people attended the evening service, which lasted
from 5:00-9:00 p.m. At this service seven young people
indicated their desire to become members of the Church.
As John Crossley and I were leaving the church, we
were warned that a member of the secret police was ob-
serving us. We were followed by two secret police in a
car to the City of Sibiu. We had hoped to visit a poet
and hymn writer who had suffered imprisonment for his
writings, published unoficially. Our plans had to be
aborted as we were followed by a number of secret police
on foot and by car.
We tested the only two exits from the city and
found police cars waiting for us at each exit. We were
followed by one of them to the hotel in Pitest where
we arrived after 2:00 a.m. There we waved goodbye to
our guardian angels.
On Monday, March 13, I was given an appointment
with the President of the Ministry of Religion and
spent over six hours with him and the Patriarch. At the
ministry I brought up the case of the three pastors,
Ion Stef, Beni Cocar, and his brother Buni of Bucharest.
First of all, I was told that I should not have visited
the church in Medias as both the congregation and the
ministers had continued to hold worship services which
were illegal. Mr. Rosiana was adamant about the freedom
of religion in his country providing the church observed
the laws of the government and accepted its supremacy.
Only by obedience to the State could religious "freedom"
be maintained.
-2-
Pastors Ion Stef and Beni Cocar had, in fact, been
guilty of putting the law of God above the law of man.
My experience of the Medias church had been one of
highly dedicated and intelligent Christians who had been
soundly and wisely instructed in the Christian faith by
the pastors. Regrettably the head of the Baptist Union
had been used as an instrument of the State in the attempt
to discipline the pastors and the congregation. The
thriving nature of their church was the reason for the
State's punitive action.
Buni Cocar came to Bucharest from a church in the
country. His ministry in the city was an immediate
success. Like his brother in Medias, he was guilty of
influencing young people to the extent that several hun-
dred became Christians. His license was withdrawn, but
like his brother, he continued his ministry at the request
of his growing congregation. An official of the secret
police offered Pastor Cocar the return of his license if
he agreed to serve as an informer. This offer he refused.
He was obviously suffering from the strain of constant
surveillance. Along with his brother, he joined John
Crossley and myself in visiting the American Embassy.
When we left the building, the military guard went
through the motions of trying to arrest both brothers.
Mr. Crossley and I escorted them through their ranks.
Several days afterwards a minister of the Baptist Union,
who is also a secret agent, visited Buni Cocar to tell
him that he was a criminal, and that he must never visit
the Embassy again.
Those three pastors represent the vitality of the
Christian church in Romania. Their harassment represents
the response of the State officials to it.
I indicated to Mr. Rosiana that the State had
nothing to fear from such people as they did not engage
in revolutionary activities of a political nature, that
they were patriotic, and that they contributed enormously
to the moral fibre of the nation. In reply, Mr. Rosiana
accused them of illegal activities which, if allowed,
would result in a situation similar to that of Jonestown.
He pointed out the equivalent of Jonestown could never
happen in Romania because of the beneficial control of
religion by the State. A remark that Hitler might well
have made! It appears that the President of the Baptist
Union, Mr. Comel Mara and the Secretary, Pavel Barbatei,
both of whom are the appointees of the State and not of
the Baptist fellowship, are regarded by the authorities
as the type of religious leaders desired by the State.
They conform to the law of the State.
The example of Jonestown was mentioned several
times as an indication of anarchy in the U. S. No mention
was made, however, of the Rev. Jim Jones' advocacy of
the communist ideology.
When I asked why so many congregations were denied
permission to build places of worship, I was informed
that such permission was a matter of priorities according
to the following formula; first, State administrative
buildings such as the new one under construction in the
center of Bucharest, then schools, hospitals, housing
for the people and churches at the bottom of the list.
C. When I inquired about Father Gheorghe Calciu Dumitreasa,
I was informed that he was a fascist who identified him-
self with the former fascist regime. After his ordination
he taught French at the theological seminary. Instead
of teaching the doctrines of the Romanian Orthodox Church
he had been found guilty of teaching those of fascism
and therefore corrupting the minds of future priests.
No answer was provided to my inquiry about the nature of
the fascism he was alleged to espouse. The Patriarch
commented, "Why do you, and all the West ask about this
one bad priest, and not about the other 9,000 good ones?".
Before leaving for the visit to the convent on
March 13, I received a letter which had been delivered
by hand to the hotel. There were four signatures.
Those, it is claimed, were the signatures of representa-
tives of the Romanian Sefardit Jews (Sephardic, i.e.
descendants of the Jews from Portugual and Spain), The
letter described Father Calciu as "a Romanian fascist"
dressed in a clergyman's soutane." The support of him
by organizations in the West was alleged to be an
activity of rightists. His name was linked to that of
"the hateful Valerian Trifa". It is interesting that
this letter should have been sent to me on the day after
my visit to the Ministry of Culture, and to the address
known only to it.
Both Mr. Rosiana and the Patriarch made no other
charges against Calciu other than that he was a fascist.
He has been accused of having been a member of the Iron
Guard, a fascist organization which was abolished in
1941 when he was barely 14. For this alleged offense
he was imprisoned from 1947 (when he was 21) until 1964.
When he was arrested he was a third year medical
student. Because of the deepening of his faith in
prison, he turned to the study of French and Theology.
After his ordination in 1973 he was professor of French
and New Testament studies at the orthodox seminary at
Bucharest. He became very popular with the young people
he taught. The evidence of his fascism is that he
counselled his students to worship God rather than
Marxism; described communism as a "philosophy of despair";
and opposed the destruction of one of Bucharest's famous
church buildings.
He was dismissed from the theological faculty
on May 23, 1978. Shortly thereafter he and his wife
received death threats. He contributed his services
to the formation of the SLOMR, a free labor union
within the law. In May, 1979, he was arrested, tried
as a "neo-nazi", and sentenced to ten years of imprison-
ment. His personal property was confiscated and he was
fined 1,500 lei for court expenses.
Father Gheorghe seems to be another of those who
puts the law of God above the law of man, and does it
so strongly that he is perceived as a threat to the
hegemony of the State.
Conclusion:
The role played by Romania's need for the Most Favored Nation
status is a primary one in the support of human rights and the
defense of the prisoners of conscience. President Reagan's
threat to rescind this status in February of 1983 seems to have
had a salutary effect. The Romanian Ambassador in Washington,
Mr. Malitza, has been most cooperative in his efforts to maintain
the continuation of this status. He indicated privately to me
that he was concerned about the possibility of the Jackson-
Vanick amendment being enlarged to include as a requirement the
rights of free religious expression and acts of conscience.
-5-
CREED'S PRIORITY CASES
FATHER ALFONSAS SVARINKAS - LITHUANIA (USSR)
6/83
Soviet concern about the situation in Poland appears to be behind
the recent arrests in another predominantly Catholic country, Lithuania.
Although Lithuania was annexed by the USSR in 1940, strong national and
religious sentiment persists. On May 6. 1983, Father Alfonsas Svarinkas,
58, was sentenced to seven years in prison and three years internal exile.
His arrest sparked a dramatic protest in Lithuania where 38,000 people
signed petitions of protest to Andropov and nine believers asked to
take his place in prison. Father Svarinkas was ordained in a Soviet
labor camp where he spent ten years for protesting the Soviet annexation
of Lithuania. There he was loved by even the worst criminals for his
unfailing kindness and humility. After his release he was re-arrested
in 1958 for an anti-state sermon he allegedly delivered, although on the
day in question there was no sermon given in his church at all. He
was sentenced to six years. After his release he was assigned a series
of parishes, in each of which he transformed a deserted church into
an overflowing one. In 1978 he was one of five priests who founded
the Catholic Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights. Shortly
before his arrest in May, Father Svarinkas told a friend, "The KGB
in itching to get rid of me, but what can they do? Shut me up in
prison? Priests are needed there, also, Hang me? I would be closer
to heaven. Most of all, we need martyrs. Ideals people die for do
not die."
12/83
From a letter en route to prison, dated June 7, 1983:
"I left Vilnius May 27 at 8:00 p.m. At 9:00 a.m. Saturday, I was
in Pskov. In the afternoon, I was in the prison itself. Conditions
here are terrible. There are very many people here, and I wound up
in the cellar. My cell is dark, without flooring, and water seeps
up from beneath, through the clay. The bedbugs, mosquitoes and fleas!
Sixteen individuals in a small cell! I have been eaten up by bedbugs.
Last Friday, I got to a cell on the third floor. It was dry there.
On the train and in my cell, I am the only political prisoner, so the
talk and profanity are horrible. Sometimes, you can't even pray. Those
are terribly dehumanized individuals. Here I had some opportunity to
speak about God. Yesterday, I met a Latvian student. He was sentenced
for speculation to 2.5 years. I spoke about Christ. He is very interested.
It would be good for our atheists to see this crowd. Perhaps they would
understand where they are leading our people, to what terrible destruction
My spirits are evenly good. At this time, I am taken up with the priesthood
of Christ. From my heart, I repeat daily to the Lord, 'Fiat - Thy Will be
done!'"
USSR
Father Svarinkas' prison address: 618263 P. Kuchino
Chusovskogo r-n.
Permskoy obl.
Ucrezdenie VS-389/36
Father Alfonsas Svarinkas
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CREED'S PRIORITY CASES
Balys Gajauskas - Lithuania (USSR)
2/83
Balys Gajauskas is a fifty-seven year old Roman Catholic veteran
of anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania after World War II. Because of
his resistance activities, he spent 25 years in' a Soviet labor camp,
from which he was released in 1973. Upon his return to Lithuania, Balys
was denied legal residence in his homeland, and his mother was fined
for harboring an illegal resident each time he visited her. During
the next four years he was repeatedly harassed by the KGB for his
continuing efforts on behalf of religious and democratic rights in
Lithuania. On April 20, 1977 he was again arrested and one year later
was sentenced to ten years in a strict regime labor camp, to be followed
by five years of internal exile.
His prison address: USSR
His wife: USSR
618263 Permskaya obl.
Litoskaya SSR
pos. Kuchino
Kaunas
uch. VA - 389/36
ul Palangos 18/12
Balys Gajauskas
Irena Gajauskas
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Union of Soviet Soci
S
Republics
2/84
Recent letters smuggled to his aunt in California reveal Balys' deteriorating
health, including weakened eyesight, high blood pressure and stomach ulcers.
Because he fears he will not survive his present sentence, Balys has indicated
to his aunt his desire to emigrate to the U.S. with his wife, young daughter,
and aging mother. The KGB has promised his wife permission to emigrate if
she divorces her husband, but she refuses to leave without him.
Tom: The only way this good sauld carlo be
released would be if he were exchanged
for a Societ spy. Try to have their
brenght to the President attention
His intervention would move rescriptacins
D demonstrate the suncerely of his
cancem for belowers and patriots.
Emest.
CREED HOUSE
117 PRINCE STREET
ALEXANDRIA. 11. 22314
Sak haror
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 17, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR DODIE LIVINGSTON
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Andrei Sakharov's Birthday
The question of a possible message is being discussed with
State. Since it has major political implications, we will
do the drafting in coordination with State if it is decided
that a message would be useful at this time. We will of
course supply a draft to you in this event.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 17, 1984
TO:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT: Andrei Sakharov's Birthday
Attached is a suggested memorandum
from you to Dodie Livingston in
response to her memorandum on
above subject.
JACK MATLOCK
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
:
May 17, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT, NSC
FROM:
DODIE LIVINGSTON
D
SUBJECT:
Andrei Sakharov's Birthday
Tony Salvia, of the Department of State's Public Affairs office,
has requested that we prepare and send a Presidential message
to Andrei Sakharov on his birthday, May 21st.
Please advise us whether or not to proceed. If this message
is to be done, we would draft and clear with NSC. We
would appreciate a reply ASAP.
As always, many thanks for your courtesy and consideration.
SYSTEM II
90605
MEMORANDUM
F.le
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
May 19, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE
FROM:
Next Steps JSW on Sakharov
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President
reporting on past actions and plans for additional steps to
encourage the resolution of the Sakharov problem.
It is a useful run-down of our efforts, and I recommend that you
send it to the President for his information.
unevoifable
Walt Raymond concurs.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Memorandum to the President
Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of May 18, 1984
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR Fob-114/7 #9478
SECRET
BY CN NARA DATE 6/25/09
Declassify: OADR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Next Steps on Sakharov
George Shultz has sent you the attached memorandum reviewing the
steps we have taken to encourage the Soviet leadership to resolve
the Sakharov situation favorably, and also some steps which are
now underway.
George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public
statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is
moving -- in full consultation with us -- to activate other
statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their
interest to the Soviet leaders.
Attachment:
Tab A -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of May 18, 1984
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
CC: Vice President
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRR P06-114/7*9479
DECL: OADR
BY CH NARADATE 7/7/08
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
SYSTEM II
NLRR F06-114/7 *9492
90605
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
BY Cs NARADATE 7/7/08
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
From:
George P. Shultz
was
Subject:
Next Steps on Sakharov
Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth
day. In view of his fragile health, time is already running out
for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities
to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and
thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike.
According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr.
Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to
prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have
thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening
to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.
The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to
encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the
Sakharovs:
-- We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the
Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with
Dobrynin).
-- The Department has released two public statements
condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.
-- We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third
World capitals to request the help of host governments and
international political organizations in convincing the Soviets
to cease their pressure on the Sakharovs. Some governments have
already responded, and there is a possiblity that Mitterand may
precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's
case.
-- We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov
case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our
own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New
Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.
-- We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences
President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies
of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and
caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow
will not take place as planned.
-- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for
dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised
SECRET
DECL: OADR
SECRET
- 2 -
posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21)
and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents
on the situation.
-- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family
members in this country, and are advising posts where they can
be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to
other countries.
-- Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not
in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to
use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already
undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of
an upcoming trip to the USSR.
Action Plan for Additional Efforts
In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place
increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is
to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation
favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an
issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a
U.S. -Soviet political confrontation.
-- At this time we do not recommend that you make either a
private or a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since
this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As
you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your
behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response,
both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having
conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation.
The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on
Sakharov.
-- We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to
raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international
nature of concern about the Sakharovs.
-- We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer
Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades, to
determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in
trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the
Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited
prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide
the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation
short of tragedy.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3 -
-- We will also be going privately to other governments who
have persons the Soviets want (such the West Germans and the
Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their
part to trade for Sakharov.
--
We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last
week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where
appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public
efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.
-- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the
Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.
SECRET
Dissedent
90605
(Sakharor) MATUCK
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
File
May 21, 1984
SECRET
INFORMATION
RR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE pay
SUBJECT:
Next Steps on Sakharov
George Shultz has sent you the attached memorandum reviewing the
steps we have taken to encourage the Soviet leadership to resolve
the Sakharov situation favorably, and also some steps which are
now underway.
George agrees that it would be unwise for you to make a public
statement on the issue, to avoid further polarization, but is
moving -- in full consultation with us -- to activate other
statesmen and prominent private individuals to convey their
interest to the Soviet leaders.
Attachment:
Tab A -- Memorandum from Secretary Shultz of May 18, 1984
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
CC: Vice President
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
NLRR F06-114/7*9480
DECL OADR
BY Cer NARA DATE 7/7/08
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
SYSTEM II
NLRR F06-14/7#9498
90605
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
BY CN NARA DATE 7/7/08
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
From:
George P. Shultz
Subject:
Next Steps on Sakharov
Dr. Andrei Sakharov's hunger strike is now in its fifteenth
day. In view of his fragile health, time is already running out
for U.S. and Western efforts to persuade the Soviet authorities
to allow Mrs. Bonner to go abroad for medical treatment, and
thereby allow Dr. Sakharov to terminate his hunger strike.
According to relatives, Mrs. Bonner was scheduled to join Dr.
Sakharov in his hunger strike on May 12. Soviet efforts to
prevent news about the Sakharovs from reaching the West have
thus far been successful, and we do not know what is happening
to the Sakharovs or what their condition is.
The U.S. Government has already undertaken several steps to
encourage the Soviet authorities to relax their pressure on the
Sakharovs:
-- We have brought up the Sakharov situation with the
Soviets at a number of levels (including my May 10 meeting with
Dobrynin).
-- The Department has released two public statements
condemning Soviet behavior toward the Sakharovs.
-- We have instructed our Embassies in 21 Western and Third
World capitals to request the help of host governments and
international political organizations in convincing the Soviets
to cease their pressure on the Sakharovs. Some governments have
already responded, and there is a possiblity that Mitterand may
precondition his June trip to Moscow on resolution of Sakharov's
case.
-- We have initiated special discussions of the Sakharov
case with visiting foreign leaders or during the travels of our
own leadership overseas. For example, during his visit to New
Delhi, Vice President Bush raised Sakharov with Indian officials.
-- We have consulted with National Academy of Sciences
President Frank Press, who has in turn informed sister Academies
of other nations of his concern about the Sakharov situation and
caused the Soviets to worry that his mid-June trip to Moscow
will not take place as planned.
-- USIA is putting together a public affairs strategy for
dealing with the Sakharov situation, and has already advised
SECRET
'DECL: OADR
SECRET
2
posts to give their support to Sakharov Day observances (May 21)
and to distribute as widely as practicable key public documents
on the situation.
-- We are continuing our close contact with Sakharov family
members in this country, and are advising posts where they can
be of assistance to Sakharov relatives during their travels to
other countries.
-- Finally, we are consulting with prominent Americans not
in government who might have some influence with the Soviets to
use on the Sakharovs' behalf. George Kennan has already
undertaken to discuss Sakharov with Dobrynin in the context of
an upcoming trip to the USSR.
Action Plan for Additional Efforts
In the coming days we will be taking steps designed to place
increasing pressure on the Soviet authorities. Our objective is
to provide them additional avenues for resolving the situation
favorably should they so choose and make clear that this is an
issue of worldwide humanitarian concern, rather than a
U.S.-Soviet political confrontation.
--- At this time we do not recommend that you make either a
private or.a public statement on behalf of the Sakharovs, since
this could have the effect of further polarizing the issue. As
you know, we made a private approach to the Soviets on your
behalf to try to avert the present crisis. The Soviet response,
both in private and then in public, was to accuse us of having
conspired with the Sakharovs to create the present situation.
The same response is likely to any new Presidential statement on
Sakharov.
-- We will, however, encourage other U.S. officials to
raise the issue when appropriate, stressing the international
nature of concern about the Sakharovs.
-- We are making a discreet approach to East German lawyer
Vogel, who has brokered some past spy and dissident trades, to
determine whether there is any Soviet interest in principle in
trading for the Sakharovs. There is little chance that the
Soviets will trade for Sakharov. But despite the limited
prospects for success, this avenue should be tried to provide
the Soviets with another option to resolve the present situation
short of tragedy.
SECRET
SECRET
3 -
-- We will also be going privately to other governments who
have persons the Soviets want (such the West Germans and the
Norwegians) to determine if there is any willingness on their
part to trade for Sakharov.
-- We will be following up our 21-country demarche of last
week with additional demarches, at the Ambassadorial level where
appropriate, to encourage wider international private and public
efforts on behalf of the Sakharovs.
-- I am asking Foreign Minister Genscher to raise the
Sakharov matter during his May 20-22 trip to Moscow.
SECRET
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90605
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
May 19, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MOFARLANE
FROM:
Next Steps 96m on Sakharov
JACK MATLOCK
SIGNED
SUBJECT:
Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President
reporting on past actions and plans for additional steps to
encourage the resolution of the Sakharov problem.
It is a useful run-down of our efforts, and I recommend that you
send it to the President for his information.
unevoilable
Walt Raymond concurs.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I - Memorandum to the President
Tab A - Shultz-President Memorandum of May 18, 1984
DECLASSIMED
NLRR F06-114/7*9481
BY CH NARA DATE 6/25/09
SECRET
Declassify: OADR
Sekharov
June 1, 1984
SECRET/SENSITIVE
TO McFARLANE FROM POINDEXTER
I met with Semyonov, Sakharov son-in-law, this afternoon, and one
suggestion he made was that we try to obtain a statement at the
summit on the Sakharov situation. I doubt that a public
statement is either a good idea or something the Allied leaders
would agree to. However, it might be a good idea for the
President to raise the Sakharov matter with his colleagues, in
the spirit of consulting on how to proceed. He could point out
that if there is a tragedy, public opinion will hamper our
efforts to improve relations with the Soviets and ask whether
anything else can be done to avert a tragedy. Perhaps a private
message to the Soviet leadership from the summit participants?
He would thus avoid twisting arms, but would sensitize the other
participants to the importance of this issue to us (and
indirectly to them).
You also should be aware that in Moscow today Bessmertnykh (the
head of MFA's USA Division) told our DCM, Warren Zimmerman, that
Sakharov is in the hospital and well and Bonner is in her
apartment and is well. He added that "Your President has been
informed." He also observed that they were working on a response
to the President's last letter to Chernenko and that it would be
"responsive" on the things the President had raised. At the end
of the conversation, Bessmertnykh observed that it would be
"incorrect" to say that everything in our relationship had been
halted.
We are not sure what all this means. It will be well to wait for
Chernenko's reply to judge the quality of the Soviet response to
the President's letter. The fact that Bessmertnykh gave
information (whether accurate or not) on the Sakharovs is
interesting, since previously they have refused to discuss the
matter with us at all, other than accusing us of instigating the
whole affair. Perhaps it is only an effort to allay our concerns
regarding Sakharov's fate, but it conceivably could indicate that
serious consideration is being given to resolving the matter.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-14/7*9482
BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08
Sakharor
34
4433
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
June 1, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK fam
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Alexei Semyonov
3:00 P.M., June 1, 1984
Semyonov is a son-in-law of Mrs. Bonner (therefore step son-in-
law of Sakharov) and lives in Boston. He has been pressing hard
for actions to save Sakharov and has spoken to me on the
telephone several times. He has also met with Mark Palmer and
perhaps others at State.
Your meeting will be essentially a hand-holding operation, to
assure him that we are doing all we wisely can, and trying to
avoid actions which could make the situation worse.
Semyonov will probably float several ideas of steps we could
take. One he has mentioned would be to offer to delay INF
deployments if Bonner is allowed to travel. He probably has
others, most of which will be things that we have already done or
else are impractical, but I believe you should hear him out, let
him know if some are totally impossible (such as involving
deployments), but tell him we will give the most careful
consideration to the others.
A list of suggested general talking points is attached.
Attachment:
Tab I
Suggested Talking Points
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRR F06-114/7*9483
Declassify on: OADR
BY Cd Gt NARADATE 7/7/08
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR SEMYONOV
-- The President, and all of us, are deeply concerned about the
situation Academician Sakharov and Mrs. Bonner face.
-- We have been trying to do all we can to encourage a
humanitarian resolution.
-- We feel that it could make the situation worse if we make the
issue a test of strength between the U.S. and the Soviet
leadership, since this could make it more difficult for them to
make the right decision.
-- However, we have left no stone unturned to make sure the
Soviet government knows how strongly we feel about the situation
and the negative effects a tragedy would have for the US-Soviet
relationship.
-- We believe other countries can be very helpful and have done
all we can to encourage other governments to bring pressure to
bear.
-- We will not give up our efforts, and are always ready to
consider new ideas.
Dissidents - Sakharov 36
TELEPHONE CALL TO DOBRYNIN
-- Anatoly, I would have asked you to come and see me, but I know
what I have to say touches on a delicate subject, and I thought
it best to give you a call so we don't risk any press attention.
-- Would you let Chairman Chernenko know that I'm very concerned
over the situation that has developed with Mrs. Bonner and
Sakharov.
-- I've been careful not to make any public statements, because I
don't want anyone to get the idea that I am bringing public
pressure on your government.
-- But, you know, if a tragedy occurs, it could have the most
serious implications for our relationship. I wouldn't be doing
my duty if I didn't point this out while the situation can be
resolved.
-- The fact is that the American people will never be able to
understand why a sick woman shouldn't be allowed to travel abroad
to get an operation. And if either of the Sakharovs dies under
present circumstances, that will make a lot of things more
difficult than they are already. I think you will agree that
relations are bad enough as it is.
-- So I hope you'll pass these thoughts on to Chairman Chernenko.
Let him know also that I consider this a purely private
conversation. If he makes a humanitarian decision, he can be
sure that I won't mention this conversation in public and I
certainly won't try to claim any credit or use it politically.
-- You know, I had really hoped that our relations could be
improved. We have some real problems, but I've made a number of
decisions which I hoped could start us on a better road.
-- Right now I'm puzzled by your government's actions. I just
don't understand why we can't get down to business and settle
some of the problems between us.
-- Let your people know that I'm still willing to try to settle
our problems if they are. I keep being asked to make some new
gesture, but every time I make one, they slap me in the face.
And, you know, I could ask the same. But we'll never get
anywhere if we keep up this "Alphonse and Gaston" act.
DECLASSIFIED /RE/EASC)
NLRR +06-114/7*9414
BY CN NARADATE 7/7/08
us-Sov 37
File."Sakharov-
June 1, 1984
SECRET/SENSITIVE
TO McFARLANE FROM POINDEXTER
I met with Semyonov, Sakharov son-in-law, this afternoon, and one
suggestion he made was that we try to obtain a statement at the
summit on the Sakharov situation. I doubt that a public
statement is either a good idea or something the Allied leaders
would agree to. However, it might be a good idea for the
President to raise the Sakharov matter with his colleagues, in
the spirit of consulting on how to proceed. He could point out
that if there is a tragedy, public opinion will hamper our
efforts to improve relations with the Soviets and ask whether
anything else can be done to avert a tragedy. Perhaps a private
message to the Soviet leadership from the summit participants?
He would thus avoid twisting arms, but would sensitize the other
participants to the importance of this issue to us (and
indirectly to them).
You also should be aware that in Moscow today Bessmertnykh (the
head of MFA's USA Division) told our DCM, Warren Zimmerman, that
Sakharov is in the hospital and well and Bonner is in her
apartment and is well. He added that "Your President has been
informed." He also observed that they were working on a response
to the President's last letter to Chernenko and that it would be
"responsive" on the things the President had raised. At the end
of the conversation, Bessmertnykh observed that it would be
"incorrect" to say that everything in our relationship had been
halted.
We are not sure what all this means. It will be well to wait for
Chernenko's reply to judge the quality of the Soviet response to
the President's letter. The fact that Bessmertnykh gave
information (whether accurate or not) on the Sakharovs is
interesting, since previously they have refused to discuss the
matter with us at all, other than accusing us of instigating the
whole affair. Perhaps it is only an effort to allay our concerns
regarding Sakharov's fate, but it conceivably could indicate that
serious consideration is being given to resolving the matter.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/7*9485
BY CH NARADATE 7/7/08
SYSTEM II
MEMORANDUM
90688
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
June 12, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK Ism
SUBJECT:
Sakharov/Bonner Letters
Regarding the request of Mrs. Bonner's daughter for the letters
Mrs. Bonner left with an Embassy officer, I would advise not to
release them. If the family publicizes them in any way, this
could be used as evidence in a trial of Bonner. While the KGB
presumably has the text, direct evidence that they were passed to
a foreign government could be used to Bonner's disadvantage, and
furthermore could be played to support the claim that Bonner and
Sakharov were acting in complicity with us.
Although the family might be presumed to appreciate these same
considerations, in their desperate mood, they might well make a
misstep which could be dangerous in the long run.
Recommendation:
That you advise Secretary Shultz that you consider it unwise to
release the letters to Mrs. Bonner's relatives.
Approve
Disapprove
-
Attachment:
Tab I
Prompt note from RCM to Matlock
DECL
NLRR F06-114/7 *9486 *9486
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
BY Gr NARA DATE 6/25/09
MSG FROM: NSRCM --CPUA
TO: NSGVE --CPUA
06/12/84 15:25:47
To: NSPBT --CPUA
-- SECRET --
NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Note to Jack Matlock
On the way back from the Summit, Sec Shultz noted that he had received
requests from friends of the Sakharovs for the letters they (Bonner and
Sakharov) sent to the embassy surrounding their request for Bonner's travel
and our help, to be released? He must decide soon and would like your advice.
Please let me know as soon as possible.
CC: NSGVE --CPUA
NSJMP --CPUA
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 806-114/7 79487
BY CN NARA DATE 7/7/08
file Dessidents 41
5190
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
Nallocke
July
1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDENTER
FROM: I
JACK MATLOCK
4m
SUBJECT:
Jesse Jackson and Sakharov
Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this
subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.
I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he
agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.
W2
unevailable
Walt Raymond, Kanna Small and Bob Sims concur.
Recommendation:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
-
Attachments:
Tab I
I
Memorandum to the President
Tab a -
Suggested Talking Points
Bob,
The the President may be
OBE tatme it if you feel it is
The talking points
are still vatid
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
of
7/6/84
Passed to RR the
DECLASSIFIED
CVS House Guidelinez
MARA, Date August 7/15/02 1007
talling paints, which
he returned.
will
42
5190
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
July 5, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER
16M
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
SUBJECT:
Jesse Jackson and Sakharov
Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this
subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.
I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he
agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.
Walt Raymond, Karna er Small and Bob Sims concur.
WR
unavailable
Recommendation:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.
Approve
H
Disapprove
-
Attachments:
Tab I
-
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
-
Suggested Talking Points
Bob,
The memo to the President may be
OBE, but use it if you feel it is
appropriate The talking points
are still valid
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
f
DECLASSIFIED
By, CVS NARA, Date 7/15/02
Will Guidslines, August
CONFIDENTIAL
5190
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
Julyon
SUBJECT:
Jesse Jackson and Sakharov
Issue
Should you clarify your comments in the interview released
yesterday regarding Jesse Jackson's proposal to seek the release
of Sakharov?
Facts
The press has interpreted your remarks as suggesting that Jackson
may be violating the law if he seeks the release of Sakharov.
Members of the Sakharov family have publicly encouraged his
efforts and are likely to demand that you assume the responsibility
for securing his release if you appear to discourage efforts by
private individuals.
Discussion
Since we are unable to make public our private efforts on behalf
of Sakharov, and have no assurance that they will be successful,
it is important to keep the onus for Sakharov's condition on the
Soviet authorities and not allow public attention to be distracted
by a debate on who does what. The Soviets have given no indication
that there is any "give" in their position, and they would likely
deny Jackson a visa to go to Moscow to discuss Sakharov. Therefore,
any efforts Jackson would make are most unlikely to be successful.
We cannot totally exclude the possibility (though it seems
remote) that the Soviets would in fact release Sakharov in an
effort to embarrass you. In the unlikely event this should
occur, however, we believe the fall-out would be manageable. And
it would remove a major irritant in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
In any case, the situation will be more difficult to manage if
Jackson can claim that he is prevented from attempting to secure
Sakharov's release by your disapproval of his efforts. This
could be interpreted as your assumption of responsibility for
securing Sakharov's release, and if you failed some could reproach
you.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/7 *9488
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
BY Gs NARA DATE 6/25/09
CONEIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
For these reasons, it seems desirable to clarify your position by
indicating that you have no objection to Jackson making efforts
to free Sakharov, so long as he does not involve himself in
negotiation of matters which are the responsibility of the
government.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you respond along the lines of the attached
-
talking points when asked again by the press regarding
your attitude toward Jackson and Sakharov.
Attachment:
TAB A -- Suggested talking points
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
CC: Vice President
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
Q.
Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the
Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?
A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private
individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to
resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.
--
What is important is that such private efforts be conducted
in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues
such as this one with matters which are properly subject to
negotiation between governments.
:
That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act.
Of course, I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this
particular problem solved, and if it can be done without
involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.
5
PE-10
Confedential
I
LASSIFICATION
CIRCLE ONE BELOW
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IMMEDIATE
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1.
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TOR/052320Z
KM
2
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3.
4.
INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
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CLASSIFICATION
47
as $ 100.00 up G.
Confestential
ASSIFICATION
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TOR/052320Z
KM
2
3.
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2
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
Pls delivery upon arinal
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Confidential
CLASSIFICATION
Dissidents 48
5190
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
July 5, 1984
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL POINDEXTER
FROM:
JACK MATLOCK
98m
SUBJECT:
Jesse Jackson and Sakharov
Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President on this
subject, with suggested talking points at TAB A.
I have discussed the matter with Mark Palmer at State and he
agrees that this would be an appropriate course to take.
Walt Raymond, Karna es Small and Bob Sims concur.
we
unavailable.
Recommendation:
That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
-
Memorandum to the President
Tab A
-
Suggested Talking Points
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
While House DECLASSIFIED Guidslines,
By US NARA, Date August 7/.5/02 28, 1997
CONFIDENTIAL
5190
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Jesse Jackson and Sakharov
Issue
Should you clarify your comments in the interview released
yesterday regarding Jesse Jackson's proposal to seek the release
of Sakharov?
Facts
The press has interpreted your remarks as suggesting that Jackson
may be violating the law if he seeks the release of Sakharov.
Members of the Sakharov family have publicly encouraged his
efforts and are likely to demand that you assume the responsibility
for securing his release if you appear to discourage efforts by
private individuals.
Discussion
Since we are unable to make public our private efforts on behalf
of Sakharov, and have no assurance that they will be successful,
it is important to keep the onus for Sakharov's condition on the
Soviet authorities and not allow public attention to be distracted
by a debate on who does what. The Soviets have given no indication
that there is any "give" in their position, and they would likely
deny Jackson a visa to go to Moscow to discuss Sakharov. Therefore,
any efforts Jackson would make are most unlikely to be successful.
We cannot totally exclude the possibility (though it seems
remote) that the Soviets would in fact release Sakharov in an
effort to embarrass you. In the unlikely event this should
occur, however, we believe the fall-out would be manageable. And
it would remove a major irritant in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.
In any case, the situation will be more difficult to manage if
Jackson can claim that he is prevented from attempting to secure
Sakharov's release by your disapproval of his efforts. This
could be interpreted as your assumption of responsibility for
securing Sakharov's release, and if you failed some could reproach
you.
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRR F06-114/7 #9489
Declassify on: OADR
CONFIDENTIAL
BY
as
NARA
DATE
6/25/19
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
For these reasons, it seems desirable to clarify your position by
indicating that you have no objection to Jackson making efforts
to free Sakharov, so long as he does not involve himself in
negotiation of matters which are the responsibility of the
government.
Recommendation
OK
No
That you respond along the lines of the attached
-
I
talking points when asked again by the press regarding
your attitude toward Jackson and Sakharov.
Attachment:
TAB A -- Suggested talking points
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
CC: Vice President
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
51.53
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
Q.
Why do you oppose Jesse Jackson's idea of approaching the
Soviets regarding the release of Andrei Sakharov?
A. I do not oppose any efforts he, or any other private
individuals, may make to persuade the Soviet authorities to
resolve this tragic situation in a humane way.
--
What is important is that such private efforts be conducted
in such a way that they do not confuse humanitarian issues
such as this one with matters which are properly subject to
negotiation between governments.
--
That is what I had in mind when I mentioned the Logan Act.
Of course, I am as interested as anyone else in seeing this
particular problem solved, and if it can be done without
involving other matters, no one would be happier than I.
USSR Dissident
5987
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT
FROM:
JACK F. MATLOCK $5m
SUBJECT:
Presidential Statement Re Soviet Dissident
Attached is a suggested reply to Marshall Breger regarding a
proposed Presidential statement on Alexander Yakir.
Walt Raymond concurs.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the attached memo.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachment
Tab A - Draft Statement
5987
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHALL BREGER
FROM:
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
SUBJECT:
Presidential Statement Re Soviet
Dissident
While we do not believe that the Yakir case is appropriate
for a statement by the President, we would have no
objection to a statement by a White House staffer along the
lines of the attached.
Attachment
Tab A - Draft Statement
5987
PROPOSED STATEMENT ON YAKIR TRIAL
We are disturbed by the report that the Soviet authorities plan
to put Aleksander Yakir, a Soviet Jewish refusenik, on trial in
Moscow tomorrow. We have been following his case closely and are
concerned that his trial may really be intended as a warning to
refuseniks to stay away from dissidents and foreigners.
We all know that the Yakir family has encountered much hardship
and harrassment since it first applied to emigrate 11 years ago.
This new development could further endanger their chances of
leaving.
We see this trial as part of a Soviet campaign of increased
harrassment of both foreigners and citizens of the USSR. These
additional violations of human rights will not pass unnoticed.
You may be assured that the United States Government has inter-
vened with the Soviet authorities to permit the prompt immigra-
tion of the Yakir family, and to acquit Aleksander of the draft
evasion charges against him. In the Yakir case, the Soviet
authorities have the opportunity to demonstrate in actuality the
respect for human rights and due process which they frequently
profess. We and many other throughout the world will be watching
the Soviet decision on August 9 with concern.
WHSR
ROUTE SLIP
the Time Stamp
STAFF
C/O
File's
McFarlane
C
Poindexter
C
Fredhin
Kimmitt
C
Sobhara
Shull
MURPHY
C
GREGG
C
MATLOCK
J
Thompson
Merchant
LDX
NSC S/S
Approval:
--
C : Copy
O : Original
August 25, 1984
Lennebunkport, ME
MEMORANDTH FOR RECORD
WDE
B6
FROM:
Bill Eckert
SUBJECT: Telephone Call, 0920 EDT, Sat 25 Aug 84
Vice President George Bush to Mrs. Tanya Yankeleyevich (sp?)-
A10:
57
daughter of Elaina Bonner. Her phone I in Kass. is
At the request of Gordon Zacks (by phone Aug 25), the Vice President celled
Tanya to receive a request from her. After noting that there is a letter coming
to the Vice President from the family, she asked for advice GII the following
situation.
A DI. Fradkin will depart the US today DI tomorrow for Moscow at the invitation
of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He is & Ph.D. in computer science, 2 professor
at HIT, and owner of a flourishing computer business. He would like to know if the
Administration would like for his to ask if the Soviets are interested in obtaining
anything from the US in exchange for Sakharov.
The Vice President told Tanya that the Administration has, through other
channels, tried to determine what it would take for the Soviets to free Sakharov.
Noting that President Reagan and be are very concerned, the Vice President said
be would get on the phone and see what kind of Administration reply might be
appropriate for Tanya and Dr. Fradkin.
Tanya said, "I do not think it would be wise to give the Soviets a definite
impression of what would be available to them, but just to tell Dr. Fredkin that
it would be all right for him to ask the Soviets that they night want in return."
Tarva said Fradkin lives in Massachusetts near her. His home phone is
"If be has left for Moscow already, 'surely the US Embassy there
could contact his if necessary."
Tanya said she would appreciate knowing what is done. The Vice President
thanked her for her suggestion and said an appropriate person would Let ber know.
The Vice President-then asked her what she thought of the recent release
of photos of the Sakharovs. She replied that this indicates the Soviets are
susceptible to pressure, which is good.
The Vice President called Bud McFarlane at 0940 to pass slong this information,
asking that a knowledgeable person call Tanya back this morning. The Vice President
wants the to tell him how it worked out, but does not wish to make follow-up calls
binself.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART /RE/DASO]
NLRR 14/7/7/7 "9490
Copy to: Bod McFarlane
BY CN
ATE 7/7/08
Admiral Murphy
Don Gregg