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Economy – USSR (5)
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Economy – USSR (5)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Economy - USSR (5)
Box: 25
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/6/2005
File Folder
USSR-ECONOMY 5/10
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
25
YARHI-MILO
2506
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9667 CABLE
131503Z JUL 82
3 7/13/1982 B1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
9668 MEMO
HUGH MONTGOMERY/ROBERT
1 7/14/1982 B1
BLACKWILL RE SOVIET VULNERABILITY
TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ACCORDING TO
THE CENSUS BUREAU
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9659 PAPER
CENSUS STUDY RE USSR TRADE
1 7/14/1982 B1
R 10/23/2018 M2018/1
9669 PAPER
USSR: ECONOMY SPUTTERS ALONG
1 8/16/1982 B1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9660 COVER SHEET ROGER ROBINSON RE AGRICULTURAL
1 10/29/1982 B3
EXPORTS
PAR 5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9661 MEMO
TO ROGER ROBINSON RE EUROPEAN
1 10/29/1982 B3
COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO
USSR
PAR 5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9662 PAPER
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: AGRICULTURAL
5 10/29/1982 B1
B3
EXPORTS TO THE USSR
PAR 5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/6/2005
File Folder
USSR-ECONOMY 5/10
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
25
YARHI-MILO
2506
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9663 MEMO
PIPES TO CLARK RE EUROPEAN
1 11/18/1982 B1 B3
INVOLVEMENT IN BUILDING IN SOVIET
UNION THE WORLD'S LARGEST SULFUR
PLANT
PAR 5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9671 CABLE
161836Z NOV 82
1 11/16/1982 B1
9672 CABLE
071648Z JAN 83
1 1/7/1983 B1
9673 CABLE
171221Z JAN 83
4 1/17/1983 B1
9664 PAPER
USSR: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MIXED
1 2/2/1983 B1
IN 1982
R 10/23/2018 M2018/1
9665 CABLE
032225Z FEB 83
1 2/3/1983 B2 B3
PAR 3/16/2011
F2006-114/7
9666 PAPER
ANDROPOV ON ECONOMICS AND
1 2/24/1983 B1
IDEOLOGY
R 10/23/2018 M2018/1
9670 CABLE
231830Z FEB 83
3 2/23/1983 B1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
suret
MESSAGE CENTER
ecuromy
PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 3921
DTG: 131503Z JUL 82 PSN: 002257
EOB775
AN001213
TOR: 194/2115Z
CSN: HCE754
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 STER-01 GAFF-01 MYER-01 GREG-01 KRAM-01
LEVN-01 NAU-01 PIPE-01 RENT-01 RUSS-01 WEIS-01
E
FILE-01 LINH-01 ROBN-01 BOV-01 /016 A2
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST
D
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: CKLS
EOB:
S
DECLASSIFIED
ROUTINE
STU6545
DE RUFHFR #3921/01 1941505
R 131503Z JUL 82
NLRR F06-114/7' $9667
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
BY Cit NARADATE 7/7/08
X
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9485
ALL EC CAPITALS
D
S E CRE T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 23921
S
EXDIS
STATE FOR JAMES BUCKLEY, PASS TO NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK,
COMMERCE FOR OLMER, DEFENSE FOR FRED IKLE
E.O. 12065: GDS 7/12/88 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G. , OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, ETRG, FR
SUBJ: THE STRATEGIC JUSTIFICATION FOR PIPELINE SANCTIONS
REF: PARIS 23676
1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM CONVERSATIONS I HAVE HAD IN
FRANCE THAT THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF OUR PIPELINE
SANCTIONS IS NOT WIDELY UNDERSTOOD. I SET FORTH
MY ANALYSIS OF OUR STRATEGY, INVITING COMMENT.
S
3. THE BACKGROUND IS THAT THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS IN
TROUBLE. APART FROM THE SYSTEM ITSELF THERE ARE
SEVERAL PROBLEMS: THERE IS A SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF
FOREIGN CURRENCY IN RELATION TO THEIR EXPANSIONARY FIVE
YEAR PLANS. IN COMMERCIAL TERMS A RAPID EXPANSION
WAS COMMITTED FOR BASED ON A CASH FLOW WHICH HAS
E
NOT MATERIALIZED, I.E. LIKE BRANIFF AIRWAYS THEY
X
EXTENDED THEMSELVES AT THE WRONG TIME. THE CASH
FLOW IS DOWN BECAUSE OF THE DROP IN SPOT OIL PRICES,
D
AS WELL AS PRICES OF DIAMONDS, GOLD AND OTHER RAW
MATERIALS. POOR HARVESTS, POLAND, AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN RESCHEDULING HAVE AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION.
S
CONSEQUENTLY, THE CREDIT STANDING OF THE SOVIET UNION
IS UNDER SEVERE SCRUTINY AND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS LOAN BASED ON THE CREDIT OF THE
SOVIET UNION COULD BE ARRANGED TODAY.
4. THE CURRENT SOVIET PLAN IS TO INCREASE THEIR GAS
PRODUCTION BY ABOUT 50 PCT. ONLY ABOUT 15 PCT. OF
THIS INCREASE WILL GO TO WESTERN EUROPE, WHILE 85 PCT.
WILL BE USED TO ENERGIZE SOVIET INDUSTRY WITH GAS.
THIS CHANGEOVER TO GAS WILL NOT ONLY COMPENSATE
FOR FALLING OIL PRODUCTION AND ALLOW FOR OIL TO
BE EXPORTED, IT WILL SET THE BASE FOR FURTHER
INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE
POSSIBLE. IN OTHER WORDS THE SOVIET EXPORTS OF GAS
ARE GOING TO PAY FOR THE PIPELINE WHICH WILL TRANSFORM
AND EXPAND THE SOVIET ENERGY BASE WHICH IN TURN
SHOULD HAVE A PROFOUND BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON SOVIET
INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY CAPABILITY. I REALIZE I MAY
BE OVERSTATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PIPELINE AND
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 3921
DTG: 131503Z JUL 82 PSN: 002257
THAT MANY OTHER FACTORS CAN DETERMINE THE ECONOMIC
SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE SOVIET UNION,
BUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NATURAL GAS IS
E
WITHOUT DOUBT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS IN
X
THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION.
D
5. THE SOVIET SYSTEM IS STRAINED AND TO BUILD THIS
PIPELINE THE SOVIETS MUST IMPORT MATERIALS SUCH
AS LARGE PIPE AND LARGE COMPRESSORS. DENYING THEM
S
PRODUCTS SUCH AS ROTORS WHICH COME FROM GE TECHNOLOGY
REQUIRES THE SOVIETS TO DO SOMETHING ELSE LIKE
REDESIGN, REDIRECT THEIR OWN CAPACITIES, PROCURE
ELSEWHERE, ETC.; THIS MEANS DELAYS, AND WHEN THEIR
CASH FLOW IS DOWN AND THEIR CREDIT STANDING IS
FADING, DELAYS COULD MEAN SERIOUS PROBLEMS. THE
PIPELINE COULD BE DELAYED BEYOND THE PERIOD NEEDED
E
TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ROTORS. THE QUESTION I POSE
IS WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BAIL THE SOVIET
X
UNION OUT OF ITS PROBLEMS BY ALLOWING IT THE USE OF
OUR TECHNOLOGY?
D
6. THE CONTRACTED-FOR GAS EXPORTS TO EUROPE WILL
PROBABLY BE MET EVEN THOUGH THE PIPELINE IS DELAYED
S
BUT ONLY BY DRAWING GAS FROM SOME OTHER USE IN
THE SYSTEM, ALL OF WHICH ADDS TO THE OVERALL STRAIN.
NOR WILL THE CASH THAT COMES FROM THESE EXPORTS OF
GAS SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS BECAUSE MOST OF IT WILL
BE DEVOTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO PAYING FOR THE
NEW PIPELINE.
E
7. I DO NOT LOOK UPON THIS ISSUE AS ONE OF
EUROPEAN DEPENDENCY (UNLESS THERE IS A THIRD
X
SOVIET TRANCHE TO EUROPE, I.E., A SECOND PIPELINE).
D
NOR IS THE DOLLARS 8 TO 10 BILLION NEW CASH GENERATED BY
GAS SALES TO EUROPE THE RANKING PRIORITY OF CONCERN,
BAD AS IT IS, BECAUSE THAT CASH WILL BE USED FOR
S
SEVERAL YEARS TO PAY FOR THE IMPORTED MATERIALS. THE
IMPORTANT POINT IS THE SOVIETS ARE IN ECONOMIC
TROUBLE BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN DOING AND THEIR
OWN SYSTEM AND THE UNITED STATES IS PERFECTLY JUSTIFIED
IN NOT CHOOSING TO HELP THEM MAKE THE QUANTUM LEAP
FORWARD THAT WILL COME FROM THEIR EXPANDED USE OF
GAS. OUR POLICY NEED NOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS ECONOMIC
E
WARFARE; IT IS SIMPLY A DECISION NOT TO BAIL THEM OUT
X
BT
D
S
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
PARIS 3921
DTG: 131503Z JUL 82 PSN: 002260
EOB776
AN001217
TOR: 194/2115Z
CSN: HCE756
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 STER-01 GAFF-01 MYER-01 GREG-01 KRAM-01
LEVN-01 NAU-01 PIPE-01 RENT-01 RUSS-01 WEIS-01
E
FILE-01 LINH-01 ROBN-01 BOV-01 /016 A2
X
D
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: CKLS
EOB:
S
ROUTINE
STU6548
DE RUFHFR #3921/02 1941507
R 131503Z JUL 82
E
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
X
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9486
ALL EC CAPITALS
D
S
CRE T SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 23921
S
EXDIS
STATE FOR JAMES BUCKLEY, PASS TO NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK,
COMMERCE FOR OLMER, DEFENSE FOR FRED IKLE
OF THEIR TROUBLE OR SUPPORT THEIR EXPANSION, TAKEN
AT A TIME WHEN THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS AROUND THE WORLD
CONTINUES.
E
8. I THINK IT IMPORTANT EUROPEANS UNDERSTAND
WHAT WE HOPE TO GAIN BY AN ECONOMICALLY WEAKENED
X
SOVIET UNION. IN MY OPINION THEIR ABILITY TO
D
SUPPORT EXTERNAL SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION, I.. E.G.,
CUBA, ETHIOPIA, YEMEN, VIETNAM, EL SALVADOR,
NICARAGUA, AFGHANISTAN COULD BE SEVERELY LIMITED.
SECOND, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE FORCED BY INTROSPECTION
S
AND COMPARISON TO MODIFY THE NATURE OF THEIR
ECONOMIC SYSTEM.
GALBRAITH
BT
E
X
D
S
SECRET
Mc Namar
36605
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Course
INFORMATION memorandum
S:S
Smel cummy
CONFIDENTIAL
July 14, 1982
TO:
The Acting Secretary
FROM:
INR - Hugh Montgomery
EUR - Robert D. Blackwill, Acting
SUBJECT: Soviet Vulnerability to Economic Sanctions According
to the Census Bureau
The Census Bureau's press release (July 12) citing the
results of a study (which concludes that Soviet imports in
1980, if expressed in domestic prices, would be equal to 20
percent of Soviet national income) exaggerates the USSR's vul-
nerability to trade sanctions.
*
*
*
*
The figures used in the study must be placed in perspective.
--First, Soviet national income (Marxist concept) was
about 75 percent of Soviet GNP (Western concept) in
1980. Thus, total Soviet imports would be equivalent
to 15 percent of Soviet GNP in 1980, according to the
methodology used in the study. In comparison, imports
--Second, more than 53 percent of Soviet imports in 1980
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/7 #9668
BY as NARADATE 7/7/08
accounted for about 10 percent of US GNP in 1980.
were from other communist countries. Another 15 percent
were from countries that are not likely to go along with
trade sanctions against the USSR: 6.7 percent from the
four European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Sweden, and
Switzerland) ; 4.4 percent from seven less developed
countries (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, India,
Libya, and Syria) that are closely alligned with or
sympathetic towards the USSR; and 3.6 percent from three
LDCs (Argentina, Brazil, and Thailand) that took advantage
of the partial US grain embargo to promote their own
agricultural exports. Another 3.5 percent of Soviet
imports came from more than thirty-five LDCs.
--This leaves only about 29 percent of Soviet imports
in 1980, the equivalent of roughly 4 percent of Soviet
GNP, that originated in eighteen "non-neutral Developed
CONF IDENTIAL
RDS-3, 7/14/88 (Montgomery, Hugh)
9659
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
Western nations" (including the United States). Recent
efforts have demonstrated the difficulty--if not impossi-
bility--of arriving at a unified trade policy toward
the USSR even within this latter group.
As CIA noted in its critique of the press release, much
of the estimated rise in the share of imports in Soviet national
income--from 9 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1980--resulted
from a faster rate of inflation in Soviet foreign trade than
in Soviet domestic production. (Soviet domestic prices were
not adjusted for inflation). CIA concluded that if 1970 prices
were used for the entire period, imports probably would not have
accounted for more than 12 percent of Soviet national income
in 1980 (or 9 percent of Soviet GNP).
Accordingly, imports from the eighteen non-neutrals in 1980
would have been the equivalent of only 2.6 percent of Soviet
GNP. This does not make a convincing case for Soviet vulnerability
to economic sanctions, even if all eighteen countries were to
cooperate in trade sanctions.
From what we have seen of the Census study, we agree with
CIA that on balance it makes a significant contribution to re-
search on Soviet foreign trade pricing. But it is worth noting
that the authors themselves caution that any comprehensive
analysis of the role of foreign trade in the Soviet economy
is beyond the scope of their study, and that any attempt to
assess the real importance of foreign trade "is probably impossible
or at least very difficult because of the absence of the necessary
data."
DECLASSIFIED
Drafted by: INR/EC/CER:JTDanylyk:bjm If
NLRR M2018 #9659
x29128 7/14/82
BY RW NARA DATE 10/23/18
Clearance: INR/EC - Emil P. Ericksen
EUR/SOV - Thomas W. Simons
SOV. Economy 6
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS AUGUST 16, 1982
1. USSR: ECONOMY SPUTTERS ALONG
Soviet industry turned in another disappointing performance
during the first half of the year with output growing by 2.7 per-
cent, little more than half the planned annual rate. The like-
lihood of a fourth consecutive harvest failure points to more
problems ahead, particularly for Soviet consumers. But Moscow
also improved its hard currency position during the first quarter
and maintained access to needed credits despite heightened East-
West tensions.
*
*
#
Industrial output accelerated during the second quarter to
help close the gap between planned and actual performance. Con-
tinued improvement is possible during the remainder of the year.
It will not be enough, however, to overcome the USSR's serious
systemic problems or the chronic difficulties in key industries
(e.g., coal and metallurgy), whose shortcomings have a ripple
effect throughout the economy. Nonetheless, the Soviet economy
should register real growth this year.
The USSR continues to have difficulty with its energy sector.
Oil production has leveled off at roughly 12 million barrels per
day since September 1980. Coal output has picked up marginally
this year but is unlikely to emerge from the doldrums of the past
three years. Natural gas continues to account for nearly all the
USSR's incremental energy output.
CIA currently projects this year's Soviet grain harvest at
165 million metric tons (mmt), some 70 mmt below plan. Moscow
is expected to import some 45 mmt in the marketing year ending
BY Gr NARADATE 7/7/08
June 1983, matching last year's record grain imports. This will
not be enough to prevent distress slaughtering, with ominous
implications for Brezhnev's food program. The supply situation,
particularly for meat and dairy products remains poor, and spon-
DEVENUOII
taneous demonstrations are reported to have occurred in a number
of cities protesting food shortages.
On the positive side, Soviet hard-currency exports jumped
NLRR
50 percent in value during the first quarter while imports fell
somewhat. The resulting $1.3 billion trade deficit was only one-
third the size of the deficit incurred during the first quarter of
1981. Meanwhile, Moscow's net debt to Western banks, as reported
by the Bank for International Settlements, rose only $0.5 billion
during the first quarter compared with end of year 1981. (This
contrasts with a $3.6-billion increase a year earlier.)
Because of continuing soft prices for oil and gold, the Soviets
are increasingly dependent on short-term credits to finance grain
imports. They already have obtained $100 million of the $500 mil-
lion currently being sought from US banks to finance purchases from
the US and have an offer for another $20 million at attractive
rates. Most notable among other offers are the $1-billion package
with government guarantees from Canada and a $150 million commercial
form
the
R 1
AM-SOVIETS 10-23
> sov. ECONOMY 7
JIETS SUFFER 9-MONTH SLUMP IN ECONOMY
BY MATHIS CHAZANOV
MOSCOW (UPI) -- OFFICIAL FIGURES RELEASED SATURDAY IN THE OFFICIAL
NEWSPAPER PRAVDA CONFIRMED SOVIETS HAVE SUFFERED A 9-MONTH SLUMP IN
THE GROWTH OF THEIR ECONOMY.
WESTERN ANALYSTS SAID THE PRAVDA REPORT WAS IN LINE WITH FIGURES
THE SOVIETS PUBLISHED EARLIER THIS YEAR, WITH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
GROWING ONLY 2.7 PERCENT COMPARED WITH 3.4 PERCENT LAST YEAR. THE
PLAN TARGET FOR 1982 WAS 4 PERCENT.
ANOTHER KEY FACTOR, PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOR, WAS ALSO BELOW
EXPECTATIONS, GROWING AT 2 PERCENT.
WESTERN EXPERTS SAY PRODUCTIVITY DF LABOR -- WHICH MERSURES HOW
EFFECTIVELY THE AVERAGE WORKER IS DOING HIS JOB -- WILL HAVE TD
INCREASE IF SOVIET INDUSTRY IS TO COPE WITH A DECLINE IN GROWTH OF
THE RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATION.
THERE WERE BRIGHT SPOTS IN THE 9-MONTH REPORT ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL STATISTICAL BOARD OF THE U.S.S.R., ESPECIALLY THE ENERGY
SECTOR.
OUTPUT OF NATURAL GAS TOTALLED 386 BILLION CUBIC METERS, 108
PERCENT OF WHAT IT WAS AT THE SAME POINT LAST YEAR.
ELECTRICITY WAS 997 BILLION KILOWATT-HOURS, 103 PERCENT DF THE
1981 FIGURE, AND COAL WAS 539 MILLION TONS, 102 PERCENT OVER THE
PREVIOUS MARK.
OIL HELD STEADY AT 456 MILLION TONS, DR NINE MILLION BARRELS R
DAY, JUST TWO-TENTHS OF R PERCENTAGE POINT OVER 1981.
BUT OTHER IMPORTANT SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY WERE DOWN, INCLUDING
THE TROUBLED TRANSPORTATION SECTOR, WHERE OUTPUT OF RAILRDAD FREIGHT
CARS WAS 97 PERCENT OF WHAT IT WAS IN SEPTEMBER 1981.
PRODUCTION OF MINERAL FERTILIZER WAS 103 PERCENT OF THE PREVIDUS
FIGURE RND CHEMICAL HERBICIDES ALSO REGISTERED AN INCREASE OF FIVE
PERCENTAGE POINTS, REFLECTING THE HIGH PRIORITY OF THE AGRICULTURAL
SECTOR AFTER FOUR BAD GRAIN HARVESTS IN A ROW.
DESPITE THE INCREASE, MINERAL FERTILIZER PRODUCTION DID NOT MEET
ITS PLANNED TARGETS.
R STATEMENT BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS R WEEK AGD CALLED FOR
STRICT CONSERVATION OF ENERGY RESOURCES DESPITE THE INCRERSES IN GAS,
COAL AND ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION.
IT SAID THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY WAS NOT FULFILLING ITS OBLIGATIONS
FOR FREIGHT HAULING.
ANALYSTS SAID THIS INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION, THE WORLD'S
LARGEST PETROLEUM PRODUCER, WAS CONCERNED ABOUT LEVELLING-OFF OF
PRODUCTION AS SUPPLIES BECAME HARDER TO FIND AND EXPLOIT.
THE MINISTERS SAID "EXISTING INADEQUACIES IN LERDERSHIP" AND
"WEAKENED CONTROLS" WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR SHORTFALLS IN VARIOUS
TIME TRANSMITTED
WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER
DATE/TIME RECEIVED Kpes
USSR-
122
Economy RECEIVED
C I A
Пст 23 5 11 PM 82
OPERATIONS CENTER
32 OCT 29 P5: 19
SITE A
WHITE DUSE
WASHFAX MESSAGE RECEIPT
SITUATION ROOM
ROM
FOIA(b) (3)
JBJECT
Agricultural EXPORTS.
ASSIFICATION
PAGES
CONF
H
ENT TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION
ROOM
C
Ragel Robinson
3915
3622
3B
EMARKS:
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/7 # 9660
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
⑉44
CONFIDENTIAL
9
Central Intelligence Agency
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/7 9661
Wishington.D. C.20905
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
29 October 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Roger Robinson
Staff Member
National Security Council
FOIA(b) (3)
FROM
:
SUBJECT
: European Community Agricultural Exports
to the USSR
1. In response to your request of 27 October, I am
forwarding the attached paper, European Community: Agricultural
Exports to the USSR. In addition to explaining recent export
trends and the Community's export subsidy system, the paper
includes tables showing EC and US agricultural exports to the
Soviet Union for the period 1971-1981. As you suspected, the EC
sold more agricultural goods to the Soviet Union than did the
United States in both 1980 and 1981.
2. If you have any further questions on this subject,
please call me
Attachment:
As Stated
Memorandum is CONFIDENTIAL
when separated from attachment
EUR M 82-10118
CONFIDENTIAL
HR23
CONFIDENTIAL
Central Intelligence Agency
ROUNG
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
and
-
NLRR (506-114/7#9662
Washington,DrC.20505
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 October 1982
FOIA(b) (1)
European Community: Agricultural Exports to the USSR
FOIA(b) (3)
Introduction
Traditionally the European Community has been a relatively
small supplier of agricultural goods to the USSR. Prior to 1980,
the EC accounted for less than 5 percent of total Soviet
agricultural imports. By the end of 1981, the share had risen to
about 10 percent. US exports, on the other hand, have
declined. In the late 1970's, the United States provided roughly
20 percent of Soviet agricultural imports; by 1981, this share
had dropped to less than 10 percent. As a result of these
trends, EC sales of agricultural goods to the USSR exceeded sales
by the United States in both 1980 and 1981.
Historical Trends
Throughout most of the 1970s, the USSR was an insignificant
agricultural market for the EC. Annual agricultural sales to the
Soviet Union usually amounted to only $200-$300 million and
accounted for only about 2 percent of total EC agricultural
exports outside the Community. At the turn of the decade,
however, EC agricultural exports to the Soviet Union ballooned.
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of European Analysis, in response
to a request from Roger Robinson, National Security Council.
Questions and comments may be addressed to the Chief
EUR M 82-10118
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
By 1981, sales reached nearly $2 billion. Although EC
agricultural exports to other countries also grew considerably
over the past few years, the share going to the Soviet Union
expanded to about 8 percent by 1981. The USSR is now the
Community's second largest export market. The United States is
still the largest, but only by about $100 million.
The jump in EC agricultural exports to the USSR has occurred
primarily for two reasons: (a) the growth in EC agricultural
production has outpaced domestic consumption, causing the
Community's exportable surplus of agricultural commodities to
continue to grow; (b) beginning with the US embargo of grain
exports to the USSR in 1980, the Soviets have diverted grain
orders to other suppliers.
EC agricultural production has been stimulated both by
structural improvements in the use of land, labor, and capital
and by the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the
overall goal of which is to improve self-sufficiency in essential
foodstuffs. From the early 1960's to the late 1970's, the yield
of wheat per hectare climbed 57 percent in the EC, with France's
gain-70 percent--being the largest. Primarily through continual
increases in CAP minimum price supports for pork and poultry,
production of these commodities has grown more than 60 percent
and 250 percent respectively over the past 15 years.
By the late 1970's, the EC had largely achieved self-
sufficiency in foodstuffs for human consumption. Substantial
surpluses, which are purchased and stored at Community expense,
have developed in dairy products, meat, sugar as well as
grains. In an attempt to reduce costs, the EC has increased
efforts to sell surplus products in international markets, and
the Soviet Union has become an important outlet. In dairy
products, for example, the Soviet Union is the only major
commercial world market willing to buy surplus EC butter.
The US grain embargo of 1980 and 1981 also led to increased
EC agricultural sales to the USSR. By international standards
the EC remains only a marginal grain exporter. Nevertheless, EC
grain exports to the USSR grew from .2 million tons in 1979 to
almost 2 million tons in 1981 and likely will rise again in
1982.
Grain is only one of a number of agricultural goods the EC
exports to the USSR. Traditionally, sales of sugar, meat and
meat products, and dairy products together have been much more
important than have sales of grain. The 1979 jump in EC farm
sales was composed entirely of increases in these three commodity
- 2 -
CONFEDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
groups while grain exports declined to less than half of 1978
levels. In 1980, however, EC grain exports increased nearly
tenfold but were still less than half of United States grain
exports that year. Agricultural goods make up about 20 percent
of total EC exports to the USSR.
France is the single lårgest EC exporter of farm goods to
the USSR, constituting 35-40 percent of the total, and is by far
the largest EC exporter of wheat and a sizable exporter of
sugar. Germany's exports, in second place, are composed largely
of animal feeds, other cereals, sugar, and meat. Dutch export
data should be viewed with some caution; sizable transshipments
through Rotterdam may distort country of origin information.
In contrast, an average 95 percent of U.S. farm sales to the
USSR are grains, and agricultural sales accounted for about 70
percent of total U.S. exports in 1980. The United States has not
exported any meat or dairy products and only very small amounts
of sugar to the Soviet Union in recent years.
Recent Developments
The Subsidy Issue
Nearly all EC agricultural exports receive substantial
subsidies, and exports to the Soviet Union are no exception.
These non-discriminatory export refunds are offered by the Ten to
enable EC goods to compete on world markets; they are not
- 3 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
intended to subsidize the economic development of the importing
country or to bring EC agricultural export prices below the
prevailing world market price.
Export subsidies are an integral element of the EC's Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), a comprehensive program designed to
support farm income within the Ten. The Community annually sets
minimum support prices on many agricultural products and pledges
to buy any farm production at this intervention price.
Agricultural export subsidies offset the difference between the
internal EC farm prices and generally lower world market
prices.
Although export refunds are only one type of aid available
to EC farmers, they now account for nearly one-half of all EC
spending on agriculture. For the past three years EC export
refunds have cost the Community over $5 billion annually. Nearly
40 percent of these refunds subsidize the export of dairy
products. Other subsidies go to grains (25 percent), sugar (15
percent), oils and fats (7 percent) and meat products (6
percent). We estimate that in 1981 the EC provided more than
$400 million in export subsidies on agricultural goods sold to
the USSR.
Eastern European Connection
Since the Soviet Union can buy directly from EC countries,
it has no need to indirectly purchase EC agrícultural goods vía
Eastern Europe. Moscow does not recognize politically the EC
Commission, but instead deals directly with the individual EC
countries. Nevertheless, the Commission has been forthcoming in
awarding export subsidies on annual, one-time sales to the USSR.
In 1981 EC agricultural exports to Eastern Europe reached
almost $1.4 billion--about $400 million less than agricultural
exports to the USSR that year. Almost 60 percent of EC
agricultural exports to Eastern Europe consisted of grains and
meat; fish accounted for another 20 percent. Poland took just
over 50 percent of agricultural sales to Eastern Europe; Romania
15 percent; East Germany 13 percent; and Czechoslovakia 10
percent.
CONFIDENTIAL
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO THE USSR
1971-1981
3000
$
2500
U
S
2000
US
Q
m
1 1500
EC
1000
500
8
0
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
year
Table 1
European Community¹: Agricultural Exports to the USSR
By Major Commodity Group, 1971-1981
Million US $
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
19812
otal
38
99
233
203
206
257
285
214
560
1510
1780
rains
4
64
109
43
51
55
20
95
41
398
781
eats, Fish
18
2
8
95
75
42
80
20
190
268
250
ruit, Vegetables
9
8
3
7
7
11
11
8
10
13
31.
airy
1
3
94
1
3
12
46
23
174
288
62
offee, Cocoa
1
3
7
20
22
24
24
4
0
1
7
ugar
0
10
0
0
1
82
75
16
67
428
436
ils
0
0
3
4
13
3
5
8
22
34
28
ther
5
8
9
32
35
28
23
39
55
79
184
Excludes Greece
Figures for 1981 do not include Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom; these countries accounted for only
7 percent of EC agricultural exports to the USSR in 1980.
his table is UNCLASSIFIED
Table 2
European Community: Agricultural Exports to the USSR
By Country, 1971-1981
Million US $
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
iropean Community
38
99
233
203
206
257
285
214
560
1510
1780
2
elgium/Luxembourg
3
7
30
16
15
32
17
8
32
100
209
enmark
4
2
9
5
3
8
27
9
33
26
NA
:ance
8
63
132
92
88
141
127
48
221
624
649
reland
0
0
0
18
20
2
4
2
38
43
NA
:aly
10
9
3
13
24
8
11
53
33
54
112
therlands
10
11
22
27
29
34
66
26
92
261
391
ited Kingdom
4
2
1
3
5
5
7
53
41
37
NA
ermany
0
6
35
29
21
28
26
15
70
366
419
Excludes Greece
Total excludes Dermark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
is table is UNCLASSIFIED
Table 3
European Community¹: Grain Exports to USSR, 1971-1981
Million US $
1971.
2
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
otal Grains
4
64
109
43
51
55
20
95
41
398
781
eat
0
17
27
0
0
0
0
0
1
110
NA
los
0
0
0
5
15
0
4
43
9
22
NA
orn
3
0
0
0
0
0
10
l
2
4
NA
ed
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
0
7
116
NA
rybeans
0
0
1
0
0
0
3
0
0
3
NA
:her Cereals
1
47
80
36
35
55
0
51
22
143
NA
ixcludes Greece.
Figures for 1981 do not include Dermark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
is table is UNCLASSIFIED
Table 4
United States: Agricultural Exports to the USSR
By Major Commodity Group, 1971-1981
Million US $
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981.
tal
17
425
916
288
1131
1484
1037
1680
2852
1048
1665
ains
14
421
905
278
1108
1472
1009
1634
2754
1048
1563
ats, Fish
0
0
0
0
0
3
7
1
0
0
0
2
1
5
8
7
9
19
21
19
29
29
uit, Vegetables
iry
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
ffee, Cocoa
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
gar
o
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
16
ls
0
2
6
0
14
0
0
19
73
28
56
her
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
5
3
0
is table is UNCLASSIFIED
Table 5
United States:
Grain Exports to USSR, 1971-1981
Million US $
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
tal Grains
14
421
905
278
i108
1472
1009
1634
2754
984
1563
eat
1
159
555
124
667
250
427
356
812
336
773:
ce
0
0
0
0
9
15
25
6
9
0
0
rn
12
167
239
141
424
1078
397
1056
1402
602
782
ed
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
7
0
0
ybeans
0
52
67
0
3
125
159
216
493
46
8
her Cereals
2
43
43
13
5
3
0
0
31
0
0
is table is UNCLASSIFIED
20
sov.
UNCLASSIFIED
Economy
- 2 -
11/9/82
2. USSR: ECONOMY SLOWS BUT EXPORTS SURGE
The Soviet economy is expected to grow by 1-2 percent in
1982. The increase in industrial production will be the lowest
since the end of World War II, and agricultural performance will
be poor for the fourth consecutive year. Soviet consumers face
the grim prospect of continued hard times, while Kremlin leaders
confront difficult economic decisions.
According to official statistics, Soviet industrial produc-
tion increased by 2.7 percent during the first nine months of
1982, well below the planned annual rate of 4.7 percent. The
economy was affected by chronic difficulties in key industries--
oil, coal, metallurgy--and lagging construction. Labor produc-
tivity increased only 2 percent during this period (about half the
planned annual rate). The persisting decline in the growth rate
of productivity reflects the USSR's continuing failure to install
new and more efficient equipment on schedule.
Oil production has remained at roughly 12.2 million barrels
per day since September 1980. To achieve the 1982 target of 614
million metric tons, output will have to exceed V2.5 million
barrels per day throughout the last quarter of the year. We doubt
that such an increase can be sustained. Coal output is growing,
but it is unlikely to attain the levels reached in 1977-78 any
time soon.
Natural gas continues to be the one bright spot in the energy
sector, if not the entire Soviet economy. Natural qas production,
up 8 percent this year, accounts for nearly all of the USSR's
incremental energy output. The Soviets should have little diffi-
culty surpassing their 1982 target of 492 billion cubic meters.
To help ease their tight hard-currency position, the Soviets
have increased exports by 37 percent--largely through increased
oil sales to Western Europe and the recovery of trade with Iraq--
while they have reduced the value of imports by 1 percent. As a
result, the USSR narrowed its hard-currency trade deficit during
the first half of this year to $2.2 billion, a sharp improvement
over the mid-year 1981 deficit of $6.0 billion. If mid-year
trends continue, the Soviets should end the year with a hard-
currency trade deficit substantially below last year's level of
$4 billion.
USSR 21
7980
MEMORANDUM
Economy
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONF I DENTIAL
November 18, 1982
FOIA(b) (1)
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
FOIA(b) (3)
FROM:
RICHARD PIPES N
SUBJECT:
European Involvement in Building in Soviet Union
the World's Largest Sulfur Plant
The attached intelligence report (Tab I),
discusses a major Soviet project,
the world's largest sulfur plant to be built in Astrakhan. From
it transpires that:
--
The French will get the bulk of the contracts, the Germans
and the Italians the remainder.
--
On Soviet insistence, U.S. technology will be shut out.
--
The European firms involved will provide "host government
concessionary project financing" which will come to one-
quarter of a billion dollars or more.
CC: Norman Bailey
William Martin
Roger Robinson
Attachment:
Tab I
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRRF06-114/7#9663
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
CONF IDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
sov. SOV.ECON.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CVU
- -
7/16/02
11/29/82
3. USSR: 1983 ECONOMIC PLAN SIGNALS RETREAT FROM MID-TERM GOALS
The Soviets appear to have accepted that the goals of the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-85) are unattainable. Whether the
new leadership will now face UD to the tough decisions it must
make on resource allocations remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the
very "inertia" that Andropov has attacked as a major ohstacle to
needed changes in planning and management will provide the momen-
tum to keep the economy moving slowly.
The planned increases in national income (3.3 percent) and
industrial production (3.2 percent) for 1983 clearly indicate that
MOSCOW is abandoning the growth rates previouslv targeted under
the Five-Year Plan (FYP). Last year--in an effort to put the
Plan back on track after a disappointing first vear--the Soviets
adopted growth rates for 1982 that were higher than those origin-
ally envisaged in the FYP. The growth rates now slated for 1983,
however, are below those originally projected and well below what
would be needed to make up lost production.
In announcing the new goals, Gosplan Chairman Baybakov
pointed to problems in agriculture, steel, chemicals, and rail-
road transport as some of the major factors behind the economy's
disappointing performance. He also echood Andropov's remarks
last Monday on the unimpressive increase in labor productivity,
which the Soviets were counting on to provide 90 percent of the
increase in production during the current FYP. Baybakov indi-
cated that the Soviets do not expect to make up lost ground in
this key area.
In the critical energy sector, the 1983 tarqet for coal pro-
duction has been scaled back from this year's goal. The 1983
target for oil production is consistent with the FYP, but Moscow
is having difficulty meeting even this year's lower goal. This
means increased reliance on natural qas ( 28 percent of primary
energy output in 1981) to take UD the slack in energy supplies.
Moscow obviously is hoping for a rebound in agriculture,
where output is slated to increase 10.5 percent next year.
Andropov has reaffirmed that measures related to Brezhnev's Food
Program are central to Soviet plans. He could change his mind,
however, when the Food Program is discussed in forthcoming plenary
and other meetings.
While continuing to give lip service to consumer welfare,
Bayhakov made clear in his announcement of 1983 plan targets that
the goals for consumer goods in general--and meat and dairy prod-
ucts in particular--will have to slip because of arrearages in
production and the fourth consecutive harvest failure.
sov. ECON.
2d
The Soviet Economy Within A Global Framework:
Input-Output Projections to the Year 2000
weiss ewf
by
Wassily Leontief, Jorge Mariscal, Ira Sohn
Institute For Economic Analysis
New York University
martin
December 1982
ABSTRACT
This study provides a structural description of the
current state of the Soviet economy, a methodology for viewing
it within the broader context of the World economy and a
number of alternative projections of its future course up to
the year 2000.
The main methodological tools used for the projections
were the 1972 Reconstructed Soviet Input-Output Table and the
World Input-Output Model.
The main conclusions are that Soviet economic growth to
the end of the century, even at a relativly high rate of 4%
per annum, will not be constrained by foreign exchange
considerations in light of the projected growth in Soviet gas
exports to Western Europe. However, low growth in the
projected labor force and lagging productivity growth appear
to be serious impediments for achieving even an annual 3%
rate of growth in economic activity.
CONF IDENTIAL
Sov. ECON.
30
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG: 241526Z JAN 83 PSN: 013568
EOB300
AN008122
TOR: 024/1558Z
CSN:HCE337
RELATIVELY WELL. BUT RESULTS WERE MIXED IN THE "PROGRES-
SIVE" CHEMICALS SECTOR, AND DECIDELY NEGATIVE IN THE
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 NATO-00 ECON-00 /001 A2
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIAL BRANCHES THAT ARE STILL CRITICAL
WHSR COMMENT: GOOD GOOD NOTE
TO THE SOVIET ECONOMY: FERROUS METALLURGY, CONSTRUCTION
MATERIALS, AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT. AS IN 1981, THE OUTPUT
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
OF CONSUMER GOODS PURPORTEDLY GREW A LITTLE FASTER THAN
SIT: PUBS
PRODUCER GOODS, BUT THIS CLAIM DESERVES A CLOSE LOOK IN
EOB:
LIGHT OF THE RESULTS OF SPECIFIC LIGHT AND FOOD INDUSTRY
BRANCHES. AS IN 1981, NO GRAIN HARVEST FIGURE IS DIVULGED.
END SUMMARY.
-
OP IMMED
BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS
STU1468
DE RUEHMO #0924/01 0241544
2. (Low "IZVESTIYA" JANUARY 22 CARRIES SOVIET ECONOMIC
0 241526Z JAN 83
STATISTICS FOR 1982. NATIONAL INCOME REPORTEDLY GREW
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
2.6 PERCENT LAST YEAR, LESS THAN THE 3.0 PERCENT PLANNED
OR THE 3.2 PERCENT GROWTH ACHIEVED IN 1981. (ANALYSTS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2640
WILL REMEMBER THAT IN HIS NOVEMBER SUPREME SOVIET SPEECH,
GOSPLAN CHIEF BAYBAKOV ESTIMATED 1982 NATIONAL INCOME
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0377
GROWTH AT 2 PERCENT. WE HAVE NO EXPLANATION FOR THIS
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8448
DISCREPANCY.) THE 2.8 PERCENT GROWTH RATE FOR INDUSTRIAL
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4534
PRODUCTION INDICATES THAT IN CONTRAST TO 1981, PERFORMANCE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8842
IMPROVED DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR: THE MID-YEAR
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7938
FIGURE WAS 2.7. NEVERTHELESS, THE YEAR-END RESULT IS WELL
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8600
BELOW PLAN (4.7) AND THE LEVEL ACHIEVED IN 1981 (3.4).
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7915
SEE SEPTEL FOR AGRICULTURE RESULTS.
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0059
-
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2046
3. (Tow WHAT IS SLOWING THE ECONOMY DOWN? THERE ARE THREE
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1890
OBVIOUS CULPRITS. LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IS DECLINING EVEN
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3530
AS SOVIET ECONOMIC STRATEGY ASSIGNS IT THE CENTRAL ROLE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4671
IN SPEEDING ECONOMIC GROWTH. TRANSPORT IS STRUGGLING,
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5668
WITH TOTAL FREIGHT TURNOVER IN 1982 GROWING ONLY 1.2
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2078
PERCENT AND PRODUCTION OF TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT FALLING
AMEMBASSY BONN 4229
WELL BELOW THE LEVELS OF 1981.
THE RAW MATERIALS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2894
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1949
SECTORS ARE UNDERNOURISHING AN INDUSTRIAL MACHINE THAT
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1335
STILL NEEDS A HEAVY DIET. THE OUTPUT OF IRON ORE IN 1982
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5906
WAS ONLY 0.8 PERCENT ABOVE 1981, AND THE PRODUCTION OF
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0610
STEEL, ROLLED STEEL, AND STEEL PIPE ALL DECLINED AFTER
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2068
BT
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1464
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1895
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3082
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0580
AMEMBASSY ROME 8305
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1714
USMISSION USBERLIN 5990
USMISSION USNATO 3150
C
IMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION. 01 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
CAS 7/16/02
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS ECON, ENRG, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIETS ANNOUNCE 1982 ECONOMIC RESULTS
1. (Low SUMMARY. ECONOMIC RESULTS FOR 1982, RELEASED HERE
ON JANUARY 22, CONFIRM THAT GROWTH CONTINUED TO DECLINE
IN THE SECOND YEAR OF THE ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN. GROWTH
RATES FOR NATIONAL INCOME, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, AND
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY WERE ALL LOWER THAN DECREED BY PLAN,
AND FELL BEHIND THE ALREADY DISAPPOINTING RESULTS OF 1981
AND 1980. THE ENERGY SECTOR WAS BRIGHTENED BY THE RAPID
AND ABOVE-PLAN GROWTH OF NATURAL GAS OUTPUT, AND SLIGHT
OVERFULFILLMENT OF THE ELECTRICITY TARGET. HOWEVER, OIL
OUTPUT BARELY GREW AND WAS SLIGHTLY BELOW PLAN, WHILE
REVERSAL OF THREE YEARS OF DECLINE IN COAL EXTRACTION STILL
LEFT THIS BRANCH -- ON WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE PLACED GREAT
HOPES -- BELOW PLAN AND BELOW THE LEVEL OF 1978. IN
HEAVY INDUSTRY, MOST MACHINE-BUILDING BRANCHES PERFORMED
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
31
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG: 241526Z JAN 83 PSN: 013569
ECB801
AN008123
TOR: 024/1600Z
CSN:HCE338
PRODUCTIVITY OF THE GIANT WEST SIBERIAN FIELD, WHOSE SHARE
IN TOTAL OUTPUT IS INCREASING AS OIL PRODUCTION ELSEWHERE
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
DECLINES. IN 1983 WEST SIBERIA IS SCHEDULED TO BETTER
THIS YEAR'S ACHIEVEMENT BY 18 MMT, WHILE PRODUCTION WILL
SLUMP IN MOST OTHER MAJOR FIELDS; AND WEST SIBERIAN OIL
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
WILL COME TO CONSTITUTE 60 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET TOTAL.
SIT:
EOB:
6.
(LOU) THE PROSPECTS FOR NATURAL GAS ARE BRIGHTER. THE
FINAL 1982 PRODUCTION FIGURE OF 501 BILLION CUBIC METERS
IS AN IMPRESSIVE 8 PERCENT ABOVE 1981 PRODUCTION.
OP IMMED
MASSIVE SOVIET INVESTMENT AND THE ABUNDANCE OF THIS
STU1471
RESOURCE ENSURE GOOD PERFORMANCE IN THE GAS INDUSTRY
DE RUEHMO #0924/02 0241545
FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO COME AS THE MAJOR PIPELINE SYSTEMS
0 241526Z JAN 83
COME ON LINE. HERE, AS WITH OIL, RAPID EXPLOITATION OF
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
WEST SIBERIA ACCOUNTS FOR THE INCREASE IN OUTPUT.
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2641
7.
(LOU) COAL PRODUCTION IN 1982 INCREASED OVER THE PREVIOUS
YEAR FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE 1978. NEVERTHELESS, THE
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0378
OUTPUT OF 718 MILLION METRIC TONS REMAINED BELOW THE 1978
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8449
LEVEL (723.6 MMT), AS THE INDUSTRY FAILED TO MEET ITS
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4535
1982 PLAN TARGET (728.3 MMT). NEW CAPACITY, PARTICULARLY
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8843
THE OPEN PIT MINES IN THE SIBERIAN EKIBASTUZ REGION, OFFSET
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7939
THE PRECIPITOUS DECLINE IN PRODUCTION IN OLD COAL-PRODUCING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8601
AREAS LIKE THE DONETS BASIN. BUT GROSS MEASUREMENTS ARE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7916
MISLEADING: EKIBASTUZ COAL, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS A LOW HEAT
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0060
CONTENT AND IS UNSUITABLE FOR COKING.
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2047
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1891
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3531
8.
GOSPLAN HEAD BAYBAKOV'S NOVEMBER PROJECTION OF
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4672
YEAR-END RESULTS FOR ELECTRICITY OUTPUT (1359 BILLION
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5669
KILOWTT-HOURS) WAS CLOSE: 1366 BILLION KWH OF ELECTRICITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2079
WERE ACTUALLY GENERATED IN 1982 FULFILLING THE PLAN.
AMEMBASSY BONN 4230
FOR FUTURE GROWTH IN THIS SECTOR THE SOVIETS WILL BE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2895
RELYING DECREASINGLY ON FOSSIL FUELS: TWO-THIRDS OF NEXT
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1950
YEAR'S PLANNED 1405 BILLION KWH OF ELECTRICITY IS SUPPOSED
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1336
TO BE GENERATED IN ATOMIC AND HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANTS.
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5907
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0611
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2069
9. (U). BASIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1465
BT
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1896
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3083
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0581
AMEMBASSY ROME 8306
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1715
USMISSION USBERLIN 5991
USMISSION USNATO 3151
CONFIDENTIAL
IMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ENRG, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIETS ANNOUNCE 1982 ECONOMIC RESULTS
MARGINAL INCREASES IN 1981. ALL THREE BRANCHES OF CON-
STRUCTION MATERIALS (TIMBER, CEMENT AND CONCRETE) POSTED
ABSOLUTE DECLINES IN 1982, AFTER MARGINAL GROWTH IN 1981.
4. LOW AS FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR THAT FUELS THE ECONOMY,
A BARRAGE OF PRESS REPORTS IN 1982 SIGNALLED SHORTAGES
AND TOUTED CONSERVATION. DOMESTIC SUPPLY IS BARELY
KEEPING UP WITH DEMAND, AND ONLY NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
GIVES REASON FOR OPTIMISM.
-
5. (LOU) 1982 OIL AND GAS CONDENSATE OUTPUT WAS 613 MILLION
METRIC TONS (12.25 MILLION BARRELS A DAY), AN INCREASE
OF ONLY 4 MMT OVER THE 1981 FIGURE AND SLIGHTLY BELOW THE
PLAN TARGET OF 614 MMT. BOTH PAST GROWTH AND FUTURE GOOD
PERFORMANCE IN THE OIL SECTOR DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
32
INCOMI NG
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG:241526Z JAN 83 PSN:013571
EOB802
AN008124
TOR: 024/1602Z
CSN:HCE339
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
102
103
NUMBER OF WORKERS AND
101.1
101.4
DISTRIBUTION: SEC-01 /001 A2
EMPLOYEES
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY:
IN INDUSTRY
102.1
102.7
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
IN AGRICULTURE (PUBLIC
106
98
SIT:
SECTOR)
EOB:
IN CONSTRUCTION
102.0
102
IN RAILROAD TRANSPORT
98.5
100.8
PROFITS IN THE ECONOMY
103.5
101
REAL INCOME PER CAPITA
100.1
103.3
OP IMMED
WAGES FUNDS IN THE ECONOMY
103.9
103.6
STU1473
DE RUEHMO #0924/03 0241546
1982 AS
1981 AS
0 241526Z JAN 83
PERCENT
PERCENT
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OF 1981
OF 1980
-
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2642
AVERAGE SALARIES:
WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES
102.8
102.1
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0379
KOLKHOZ FARMERS
104
104
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8450
PAYMENTS TO THE POPULATION OUT
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4536
OF SOCIAL CONSUMPTION FUND:
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8844
TOTAL
104.8
104.2
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7940
PER CAPITA
103.9
103.4
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8602
RETAIL TURNOVER: STATE
100.3
104.4
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7917
AND COOPERATIVE TRADE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0061
BT
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2048
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1892
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3532
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4673
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5670
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2080
AMEMBASSY BONN 4231
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2896
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1951
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1337
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5908
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0612
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2070
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1466
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1897
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3084
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0582
AMEMBASSY ROME 8307
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1716
USMISSION USBERLIN 5992
USMISSION USNATO 3152
DENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ECON, ENRG, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIETS ANNOUNCE 1982 ECONOMIC RESULTS
1982 AS
1981 AS
-
PERCENT
PERCENT
OF 1981
OF 1980
NATIONAL INCOME USED FOR
102.6
103.2
CONSUMPTION AND ACCUMULATION
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION TOTAL
102.8
103.4
OF WHICH:
PRODUCER GOODS
102.8
103.3
CONSUMER GOODS
102.9
103.6
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
104
98
FREIGHT TURNOVER ALL
101.2
102.3
TRANSPORT
FIXED ASSETS PUT INTO USE
105
102
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
34
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG: 241526Z JAN 83 PSN: 013583
EOB811
AN008133
TOR: 024/1611Z
CSN:HCE347
COAL
63
2.03
718
102
100
102
99.8
(MILLION METRIC
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
TONS)
COLUMN HEADINGS:
(1) PRODUCTION IN DECEMBER 1982.
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
(2) DAILY PRODUCTION RATE IN DECEMBER 1982.
SIT:
(3) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION 1982.
EOB:
(4) OVERALL PRODUCTION IN 1982 AS A RATIO OF PRODUCTION
I
IN 1981.
(5) PERCENT OF PLAN FULFILLMENT FOR 1982 BY VOLUME OF
- PRODUCTION BY MINISTRY.
OP IMMED
(6) VOLUME OF PRODUCTION BY MINISTRY AS A RATIO OF 1982
STU1474
-
OVER 1981.
DE RUEHMO #0924/04 0241547
(7) LABOR PRODUCTIVITY BY MINISTRY AS A RATIO OF 1982 OVER
0 241526Z JAN 83
-
1981.
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
-
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2643
11.
(W)
SOVIET INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT AND HISTORICAL COMPARISON
-
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0380
COLUMN HEADINGS:
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8451
(1) 1982 OUTPUT
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4537
(2) 1981 OUTPUT (AS PUBLISHED IN JANUARY 1982)
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8845
(3) 1982 OUTPUT AS A PERCENTAGE OF 1981 OUTPUT
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7941
-
(NB: AS PUBLISHED ON JANUARY 22, 1983. FIGURES HERE
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8603
-
DO NOT ALWAYS JIBE WITH COLUMNS 1 AND 2)
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7918
-
(1)
(2)
(3)
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0062
(A) FERROUS METALLURGY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2049
-
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1893
BT
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3533
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4674
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5671
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2081
AMEMBASSY BONN 4232
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2897
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1952
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1338
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5909
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0613
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2071
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1467
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1898
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3085
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0583
AMEMBASSY ROME 8308
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1717
USMISSION USBERLIN 5993
USMISSION USNATO 3153
0
N
F
D
E
N
A
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 04 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
VOLUME OF EVERYDAY SERVICES
104.7
106.1
PERFORMED FOR THE POPULATION
NEW HOUSING INTO USE
100.5
101
FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER
108.4
117
-
10.
(U)
ENERGY OUTPUT DATA
-
-
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
ELECTRICITY
132
4.26
1366
103
101
103
100.7
(BILLION KWH)
OIL (INCLUDING
53
1.71
613
100.6
100.7
101
99
GAS CONDENSATE)
(MILLION METRIC
TONS)
GAS
46
1.48
501
108
102
105
105
(BILLION CUBIC
METERS)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTI
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG: 241526Z JAN 83 PSN: 013573
EOB803
AN008125
TOR: 024/1603Z
CSN:HCE340
(1)
(2)
(3)
(C) CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
TIMBER (MILLION CUBIC
270
274
98
METERS)
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
CEMENT (MILLION TONS)
124
127
97
SIT:
REINFORCED CONCRETE
123
123
99
EOB:
(MILLION CUBIC METERS)
(D) TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES
3.6
3.8
96
OP IMMED
(MILLION HORSEPOWER)
UTS1110
ELECTRIC LOCOMOTIVES
3.7
3.5
108
DE RUEHMO #0924/05 0241547
(MILLION HORSEPOWER)
0 241526Z JAN 83
FREIGHT CARS (THOUSANDS)
58.6
61.0
96
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUCKS AND CARS (THOUSANDS)
2173
2197
99
- OF WHICH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2644
TRUCKS
780
786.6
99.1
BT
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0381
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8452
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4538
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8846
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7942
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8604
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7919
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0063
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2050
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1894
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3534
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4675
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5672
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2082
AMEMBASSY BONN 4233
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2898
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1953
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1339
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5910
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0614
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2072
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1468
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1899
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3086
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0584
AMEMBASSY ROME 8309
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1718
USMISSION USBERLIN 5994
USMISSION USNATO 3154
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 05 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
STEEL (MILLION TONS)
147
149
99.1
ROLLED STEEL (MILLION
102
103
99.3
TONS)
STEEL PIPE (MILLION TONS)
17.9
18.3
98
IRON ORE (MILLION TONS)
244
242
100.8
(B) CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
MINERAL FERTILIZER
26.7
26.0
103
(MILLION TONS)
HERBICIDES/PESTICIDES
533
504
106
(THOUSAND TONS)
SULFURIC ACID (MILLION
23.8
24.1
99
TONS)
PLASTICS MILLION TONS)
4.1
4.1
99.2
SYNTHETIC FIBERS
1.2
1.2
102
(THOUSAND TONS)
TIRES (MILLION)
61.7
60.5
102
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTI
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG:241526Z JAN 83 PSN: 013574
EOB804
AN008126
TOR: 024/1604Z
CSN:HCE341
(MILLION RUBLES)
EXCAVATORS (THOUSANDS)
42.7
42.3
101
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
EQUIPMENT FOR LIGHT INDUSTRY
1.5
1.4
103
AND FOOD PRODUCTION
(BILLION RUBLES)
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
(F) HIGH-TECH. MACHINES
SIT:
EOB:
AUTOMATED PROGRAMMABLE
5.4
NP
161
MANIPULATORS (THOUSANDS)
INSTRUMENTS (BILLION
4.8
5.6
107
RUBLES)
OP IMMED
COMPUTORS
2.9
5.0
112
UTS1111
(BILLION RUBLES)
DE RUEHMO #0924/06 0241548
-
0 241526Z JAN 83
(G) AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
(1)
(2)
(3)
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2645
TRACTORS
47.9
47.9
100
(MILLION HORSEPOWER)
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0382
AGRIC. MACHINERY
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8453
BT
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4539
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8847
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7943
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8605
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7920
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0064
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2051
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1895
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3535
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4676
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5673
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2083
AMEMBASSY BONN 4234
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2899
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1954
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1340
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5911
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0615
AMEMBASSY. MADRID 2073
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1469
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1900
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3087
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0585
AMEMBASSY ROME 8310
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1719
USMISSION USBERLIN 5995
USMISSION USNATO 3155
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 06 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
- CARS
1307
1324
99
- BUSES.
85.7
86.9
99
(E) MACHINES FOR INDUSTRY AND ENERGY
(1)
(2)
(3)
ELECTRIC MOTORS
53.3
53.2
101
(MILLION KILOWATTS)
TURBINES (MILLION KILOWATTS)
17.3
15.6
118
MACHINE TOOLS (MILLION
2068
2045
106
RUBLES)
(OF WHICH HAVING NUMER-
523
10.0
115
CAL PROGRAMMED DIRECTION)
(THOUSAND ITEMS 1981)
PRESSES (MILLION RUBLES)
612
596
102
OIL EQUIPMENT MILLION
211
198
100.2
RUBLES)
CHEMICAL EQUIPMENT
761
712
102
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG: 241526Z JAN 83 PSN:013578
EOB806
AN008130
TOR: 024/1607Z
CSN:HCE343
PAPER (MILLION TONS)
5.4
5.4
100.7
OF WHICH FOR NEWSPAPERS
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
(BILLION SQUARE METERS)
30.7
N.P.
102
TEXTILE (BILLION SQUARE
11.1
11.0
101
METERS)
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SEWED PRODUCTS
24.1
24.1
99.5
SIT:
(BILLION RUBLES)
EOB:
KNITWEAR (BILLION RUBLES)
1.6
1.6
98
LEATHER FOOTWEAR
730
739
99.3
(MILLION PAIRS)
WATCHES (MILLIONS)
69.9
68.6
102
OP IMMED
RADIOS (MILLIONS)
8.9
8.7
102
STU1481
TELEVISIONS (MILLIONS)
8.3
8.2
102
DE RUEHMO #0924/07 0241548
OF WHICH COLOR (MILLIONS)
3.1
2.7
115
0 241526Z JAN 83
REFRIGERATORS (MILLIONS)
5.8
5.9
98
FM. AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
WASHING MACHINES (MILLIONS)
4.0
3.9
102
MOTORCYCLES (MILLIONS)
1.1
1.1
101
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2646
FURNITURE (BILLION RUBLES)
6.7
6.4
105
BT
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0383
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8454
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4540
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8848
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7.944
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8606
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7921
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0065
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2052
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1896
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3536
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4677
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5674
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2084
AMEMBASSY BONN 4235
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2900
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1955
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1341
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5912
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0616
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2074
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1470
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1901
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3088
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0586
AMEMBASSY ROME 8311
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1720
USMISSION USBERLIN 5996
USMISSION USNATO 3156
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 07 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
(BILLION RUBLES)
3.3
2.8
103
MACHINERY FOR LIVESTOCK
AND FODDER PRODUCTION
2.3
2.1
106
(BILLION RUBLES)
GRAIN COMBINES
112
106
105
(THOUSANDS)
CORN COMBINES
1.6
N.P.
129
(THOUSANDS)
POTATO COMBINES
10.6
N.P.
103
(THOUSANDS)
BEET GATHERING
9.7
N.P.
104
MACHINES (THOUSANDS)
COTTON GATHERING
9.9
9.6
103
MACHINES (THOUSANDS)
(H) LIGHT INDUSTRY
(1)
(2)
(3)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG:241526Z JAN 83 PSN: 013580
EOB810
AN008132
TOR: 024/1609Z
CSN:HCE345
MARGARINE (MILLION TONS)
1.4
N.P.
105
VEGETABLE OILS (MILLION TONS)
2.6
2.6
100.7
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
SUGAR-GRANULATED
12.1
9.5
127
(MILLION TONS)
CONFECTIONARY PRODUCTS
4.0
4.0
102
WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
(MILLION TONS)
SIT:
TEA (THOUSAND TONS)
221
186
114
EOB:
CANNED GOODS (BILLIONS OF
16.6
15.9
105
CONVENTIONAL CANS)
OF WHICH:
FRIT/VEGETABLE)
11.6
N.P.
107
OP IMMED
STU1483
DE RUEHMO #0924/08 0241549
12.
THE TRANSPORT SECTOR
0 241526Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
1982 AS PERCENT
1982
1981
OF 1981
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2647
FREIGHT TRANSPORTED
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0384
(MILLION TONS)
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8455
BY: RAILROAD
3725
3746
99
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4541
BT
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8849
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7945
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8607
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7922
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0066
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2053
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1897
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3537
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4678
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5675
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2085
AMEMBASSY BONN 4236
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2901
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1956
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1342
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5913
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0617
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2075
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1471
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1902
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3089
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0587
AMEMBASSY ROME 8312
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1721
USMISSION USBERLIN 5997
USMISSION USNATO 3157
A
OFFICIAL USE SECTION 08 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
PORCELAIN/MAJOLICA WARE
840
773
105
(MILLION RUBLES)
GLASS/CRYSTAL QUALITY
1.3
1.1
103
PLATEWARE (BILLION RUBLES)
(1) FOODS
(1)
(2)
(3)
MEAT TOTAL (MILLION TONS)
15.24
15.2
100.2
OF WHICH:
INDUSTRIALLY PROCESSED
9.2
9.2
99.1
SAUSAGE (MILLION TONS)
3.1
3.1
100
EDIBLE FISH PRODUCTS
6.4
5.1
106
(BILLION RUBLES)
ANIMAL FATS/OILS
1.3
1.2
107
(MILLION TONS)
WHOLEMILK PRODUCTS
26.4
25.7
103
(MILLION TONS)
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENT
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 0924
DTG:241526Z JAN 83 PSN: 013579
EOB809
AN008131
TOR: 024/1608Z
CSN:HCE344
AND GREW BY 1.2 PERCENT COMPARED TO 1981. THE PUBLISHED
1981 FIGURE FOR TOTAL FREIGHT TURNOVER (ECON. GAS NO. 5,
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
1/82) WAS 6.3 TRILLION, AND PRESUMABLY DID NOT INCLUDE
GAS PIPELINES. HARTMAN
BT
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:
OP IMMED
STU1486
DE RUEHMO #0924/09 0241550
0 241526Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2648
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 0385
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 8456
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4542
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 8850
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 7946
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 8608
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 7923
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 0067
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2054
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 1898
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3538
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4679
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5676
AMEMBASSY ATHENS 2086
AMEMBASSY BONN 4237
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2902
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1957
AMEMBASSY LISBON 1343
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5914
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0618
AMEMBASSY MADRID 2076
AMEMBASSY OSLO 1472
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 1903
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3090
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0588
AMEMBASSY ROME 8313
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1722
USMISSION USBERLIN 5998
USMISSION USNATO 3158
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 09 OF 09 MOSCOW 00924
RIVER TRANSPORT
604
595
102
AUTOMOBILE
6739
6631
101
OIL PIPELINE
645
638
101
FREIGHT TURNOVER
(BILLION TON-KILOMETERS)
IN: RAILROAD
3465
3507
99
RIVER TRANSPORT
263
255
103
- AUTOMOBILE
143
140
102
- OIL PIPELINE
1307
1263
103
- GAS PIPELINES
772
N.P.
113
OF MINGAZPROM
PASSENGER TURNOVER
941
926
101.5
(BILLION PASSENGER-KILOMETERS)
.
13.
$
IZVESTIYA REPORT SAYS FREIGHT TURNOVER OF ALL
TYPES OF TRANSPORT (PRESUMABLY MEANING THE ABOVE PLUS
AIR AND SEA) IN 1982 REACHED 7.1 TRILLION TON-KILOMETERS
CONFIDENTIAL
USSR ECON.
40
2/2/83
SECRET/NOFONN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
(x RP)
DECLASSIFIED
- 2 -
NLRR M2018 # 9664
2. USSR: ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MIXED IN 1962
BY RW NARA DATE 10/23
Last year's economic performance was a major disappointment
to the Kremlin. Although the USSR markedly improved its hard-
currency position, GNP increased only 1.0 percent and agricul-
tural output rose about. 2 percent, according to CIA estimates.
with the possible exception of a rebound in agriculture, and
some improvement in transportation and services resulting from
Andropov's discipline canpaign, the outlook for a cajor improve-
ment in 1983 is not promising.
Official Soviet statistics confirm that the USSR's economic
growth rate continues tc decline. Às a consequence of shortages
of raw materials, fuels, and power, industrial output in 1982
(01 2.C percent) failed to neet the planned increase (4.7 per-
cent) or to match the previous year's performance (3.4 percent).
Perennial transportation bottlenecks contributed to the disrup-
tion of industrial production.
It is increasingly difficult for the USSR to squeeze out
gains in labor productivity, the key to meeting economic growth
targets. Labor productivity in industry increased only 2 per-
cent, about half the planned annual rate; it fell 1.5 percent in
rail transport. Motivated perhaps as nucl. by trustration as by
the necd to improve efficiency in this troubled sector, Andropov
fired the Minister of Railrcads last November. This action was
a harbinger of Andropov's campaign to hold managers and workers
accountable for poor performance.
Soviet officials recognize the difficult path ahead.
According to & clandestine source, a Gosplan official expressed
concern aLout the effects of a potentially worse hard currency
situation in the years ahead on investment opportunities. lie
stressed the need to increase the production and export of
natural gas to offset a projected decline ir. revenues from oil
salec.
Nine-nonth data for 1982 show that the USSR continued to
reduce its hard-currency trade deficit and rebuild its deposits
in Western banks. The trade deficit narrowed to $1.6 billion
from the $5.3 billion deficit a year earlier. Deposits in
Western banks increased to nearly $7.5 billion Curing the third
quarter. This improvement occurred because of Moscow's
increased export of goods--particularly oil--to the West at the
expense of domestic requirements and exports to its allies.
Moscow also reduced its imports of Western grain and capital
goods. Notwithstanding this improvement, we believe that the
likelihood of lower world oil prices will adversely affect the
Soviet Union's financial condition in 1983.
SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
sov. ECON,
CONF IDENTIAL
INCOMING
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
DIA WASHINGTON DC/ /
DTG: 032225Z FEB 83 PSN: 029895
FOIA(b) (z)
EOB937
TOR: 034/2354Z
CSN: CRI581
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 LEVN-01 NAU-01 MINN-01
/006 A2
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:
ROUTINE
48581
DE RUEKJCS #9485 0342327
R 032225Z FEB 83
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC//
TO DIACURINTEL
NOFORN
SERIAL: DIADIN 34-3A
SUBJ: USSR: 1982 ECONOMIC RESULTS. (U)
DOI: 3 FEB 83 (AS OF 1410 EST)
TEXT: 1. (C/NOFORN) SOVIET STATISTICS FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE
CURRENT 5-YEAR PLAN CONFIRM THE GENERAL ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN OF THE
SOVIET ECONOMY.
2. (C/NOFORN) THE 1982 GROWTH RATES FOR NATIONAL INCOME (GNP LESS
SERVICES), INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY were ALL
LOWER THAN DECREED BY PLAN AND FELL FURTHER BEHIND THE ALREADY
DISAPPOINTING RESULTS OF 1981 AND 1980. IN THE ENERGY SECTOR,
ABOVE-PLAN GROWTH WAS ACHIEVED FOR NATURAL GAS, BUT OIL BARELY
SHOWED A GAIN, AND COAL EXTRACTION, WHILE INCREASING FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN 4 YEARS, IS STILL BELOW THE 1978 LEVEL. IN HEAVY
INDUSTRY, MOST MACHINE-BUILDING BRANCHES DID WELL, BUT IN THE
FERROUS METALLURGY, CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, AND TRANSPORTATION
BRANCHES THE FIGURES WERE DOWN. THE RESULTS IN THE CHEMICAL SECTOR
WERE MIXED, AND NO GRAIN HARVEST FIGURE WAS ANNOUNCED FOR THE
SECOND CONSECUTIVE YEAR.
3. (C) COMMENT: THESE DISAPPOINTING ECONOMIC STATISTICS COME AS
NO SURPRISE TO THE KREMLIN BOSSES, WHO HAVE seen A DOWNTURN IN THE
RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE THE MID-1970' S. GENERAL SECRETARY
ANDROPOV' S CONCERN FOR THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT THEME
SINCE HIS 22 NOVEMBER PARTY plenum speech, AND HIS PERSONAL
INTEREST WAS MOST RECENTLY DISPLAYED IN A 31 JANUARY VISIT TO A
MACHINE-TOOL FACTORY IN MOSCOW. THE SYMBOLISM OF THE TOP PARTY
LEADER QUESTIONING WORKERS ABOUT THEIR SITUATION INDICATES THE HIGH
PRIORITY ANDROPOV ATTACHES TO THE ECONOMY, AND IT ALSO seeks TO
CONVEY THE IMAGE OF THE PARTY' S ACCESSIBILITY AND CONCERN FOR
COMMON LABORERS. ALTHOUGH NO NEW POLICY INITIATIVES WERE ANNOUNCED
DURING ANDROPOV' S VISIT, HE STATED THAT, "THE GREATER OUR
SUCCESSES, THE STRONGER OUR ECONOMY, THEN THE STRONGER OUR
INTERNATIONAL POSITION WILL BE." TO DATE, ANDROPOV HAS STRESSED
DISCIPLINE AS THE MAIN FOCUS FOR STRENGTHENING THE ECONOMY.
DESPITE THE VALUE OF SUCH AN APPROACH, GREATER DISCIPLINE HAS ITS
LIMITS. THE IMPLICATION OF HIS REMARKS AND THE LATEST ECONOMIC
RESULTS SUGGEST SOME TOUGH CHOICES LIE AHEAD REGARDING BOTH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR BASIC ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE GROWTH OF DEFENSE
FOIA(b) 12 ),(3)
PROGRAMS.
PREP:
DECL: OADR
BT
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/7#9665
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
CONF IDENTIAL
9466
SOV , ECOW,"
CONFIDENTIAL
2/24/83
- 3 -
3. ANDROPOV ON ECONOMICS AND IDEOLOGY
In a major article, Andropov has indicated that he favors
some structural changes to make the Soviet economy more effi-
cient. But the Kremlin leader implied that political dissent
would still not be tolerated. Andropov's emergence as party
theorist is again suggestive of his relatively strong power
position.
Andropov's article, marking the centenary of the death of
Karl Marx, was published in the Soviet party journal Kommunist.
It addressed such key issues of the Soviet economy as low return
on capital investment and slow introduction of new technology.
The fault was said to lie in backward methods of management.
Andropov urged that more use be made of price and profit incen-
tives rather than centralized planning orders.
Ironically, Andropov used the Marx anniversary to argue for
even more organized social inequality under socialism. He
attacked instances of wage leveling and asked for still further
use of higher pay differentials for more skilled employees.
Stress was put on higher productivity rather than the shifting
of investment priorities as the remedy for consumer goods
shortages.
Andropov clearly intends to keep the lid on political non-
conformists inside the USSR. He alluded to dissidents as people
who tried to "oppose their own egotistic interests to those of
society and its other members." The reeducation of such people
was not a violation of human rights but "real humanism and
democracy," according to Andropov. He also took a dim view of
revising Soviet theory with the aid of Western social science.
The only real surprise about Andropov's article is that he
penned it, rather than letting the honors be done by Party
Secretary (for ideology) Chernenko. Soviet elites are aware of
Chernenko's recent meeting with a top ideologue from East Berlin
to prepare for the upcoming centenary of Marx's death. They are
accordingly likely to assume that it is Andropov who is really
calling the shots in this sensitive area of party politics. By
flaunting his authority in Kommunist, Andropov may hope to lower
bureaucratic resistance to the limited changes in economic
management that he seems to be formulating.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRRM 12018 # 96666
BY RW NARA DATE 10/23/18
SECRET
US-USSR
43
UP109
CECON.)
R i
SOVIETS
BY WALTER WISNIEWSKI
MOSCOW (UPI) -- THE SOVIET UNION ACKNOWLEDGED MONDAY IT SUFFERED
ACUTE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, BUT VOWED PRESIDENT REAGAN' ATTEMPTS TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THOSE PROBLEMS WOULD BACKFIRE.
WASHINGTON'S DECISION TO DEPRIVE MOSCOW OF CREDITS AND TO WITHHOLD
TRADE IS BASED EITHER ON BAD HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, "POLITICAL NAIVETE
OR COMPULSIVE WISHFUL THINKING," THE OFFICIAL PRAVDA NEWSPAPER SAID.
"WASHINGTON'S POLICIES HAVE RESULTED NOT IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE CONDUCT OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IN AN AGGRAVATION OF THE CRISIS
IN NATO," PRAVDA SAID.
'THIS HAS LED TO AN UNDERMINING OF TRUST IN THE UNITED STATES BY
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND, FINALLY, IN THE WORSENING OF THE
ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES ITSELF," IT SAID.
BUT IN ANOTHER REPORT ON THE NEWSPAPER'S FRONT PAGE, PRAVDA SAID
"URGENT MEASURES ARE REQUIRED" TO CORRECT PROBLEMS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION, TRANSPORTATION, FERTILIZER, FORESTRY AND AGRICULTURE
SECTORS.
SLOPPY AND INEFFICIENT WORK HAVE A DOMINO EFFECT ON OVERALL
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE NATION'S CENTRALLY PLANNED SOCIETY,
PRAVDA SAID IN A STORY CITING PRODUCTION SHORTFALLS IN THE FORESTRY
AND PAPER INDUSTRIES.
NBC TELEVISION REPORTED REAGAN HAS ISSUED A TOP-SECRET ORDER,
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE 75, THAT CALLS FOR WITHHOLDING
MOST CREDITS AND TRADE WITH THE U.S.S.R. ONLY GRAIN SALES TO THE
SOVIETS WERE EXEMPTED.
IN GENEVA, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE KENNETH DAM SAID WASHINGTON
WOULD LIKE TO AGREE WITH EUROPEAN ALLIES ON A COMMON OPEN TRADE
STRATEGY, AND ONE TO CONTAIN SOVIET MILITARY POWER.
"IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT ADVOCATE
ECONOMIC WARFARE," DAM SAID IN A SPEECH. "RATHER, WE SIMPLY BELIEVE
THAT TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHIN A COMMON
FRAMEWORK CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLITICAL AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES."
PRAVDA SAID U.S.-SOVIET TRADE RELATIONS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY A
SERIES OF SHARP UPS AND DOWNS EVER SINCE THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN
1917.
BUT WASHINGTON'S "INCONSISTENCY AND ARBITRARINESS* HAVE NOT
PREVENTED THE SOVIET UNION FROM BECOMING ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREAT
ECONOMIC POWERS, IT SAID.
SOVIET LEADER YURI ANDROPOV, WHO TOOK POWER ON THE DEATH OF LEONID
BREZHNEV LATE LAST YEAR, HAS PLACED A HIGH PRIORITY ON IMPROVING THE
SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE.
sov.
ECON. 44
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 2211
DTG:231830Z FEB 83 PSN: 058418
EOB949
AN002366
TOR: 054/1847Z
CSN:HCE729
HARBINGERS OF THINGS TO COME: REMOVAL OF MANAGERIAL
DEADWOOD AND CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR DISCIPLINE
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 FORT-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 LEVN-01
ON THE WORKERS. HOWEVER, ANDROPOV SAYS LITTLE ABOUT
NAU-01 LINH-01 ROBN-01 MINN-01 /010 A3
WHAT KIND OF REFORM HE HAS IN MIND, MENTIONING ONLY
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL AUTHORITIES IN
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 NATO-00 ECON-00 /001 A2
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES "PROVIDES VAST MATERIAL FOR
THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION." IT IS THEREFORE TOO SOON
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
TO SAY IF ANY REAL "REFORM" OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS
SIT: PUBS EOB
IN THE OFFING; IT IS CLEAR THAT MANAGERS AND WORKERS
EOB:
WILL CONTINUE TO FEEL THE HEAT OF THEIR DISSATISFIED
NEW PARTY BOSS. END SUMMARY.
3. ANDROPOV'S ARTICLE, ENTITLED "THE TEACHINGS OF
OP IMMED
KARL MARX AND SOME QUESTIONS OF BUILDING SOCIALISM
STU2825
IN THE USSR" IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC STATEMENT
DE RUEHMO #2211/01 0541837
BY THE NEW SOVIET LEADER ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE
0 231830Z FEB 83
SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE HIS SPEECH TO THE NOVEMBER 1982
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PARTY PLENUM. IT APPEARS IN THE PARTY JOURNAL
"KOMMUNIST" AND IS CLEARLY TIMED TO THE CENTENARY OF
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3633
MARX'S DEATH ON MARCH 14. (FULL TEXT ON TASS ENGLISH
WIRE. UNLIKE HIS SPEECH ON THE OCCASION OF THE
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3547
60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE USSR LAST
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 0832
DECEMBER, THE ARTICLE IS NOT A ROSY RECITAL OF THE
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8563
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE SOVIET STATE BUT RATHER A FORCEFULL
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4656
WORDED CALL FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LAGGING SOVIET
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 8968
ECONOMY
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 8059
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 8726
4. IN IDEOLOGICAL TERMS THE ARTICLE IS LARGELY
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 8037
UNEXCEPTIONAL. ANDROPOV CALLS MARX "A GREAT PRACTICAL
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0186
REVOLUTIONARY" IN ADDITION TO HIS THEORETICAL WORK,
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 3601
NOTES THAT MARX APPROACHED THE QUESTION ON INTERNATIONALISM
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1954
WITH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE "PECULIARITIES OF THE SITUA-
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 9577
TION IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES" AND HE REJECTS THE IDEA THAT
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 4430
THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA WAS OUT OF KEEPING WITH MARY'S
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3298
THEORY OR PREDICTIONS. HOWEVER, HE NOTES THAT THE
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6077
OCTOBER REVOLUTION TOOK PLACE IN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 6905
NOT EXISTING IN MARX'S LIFETIME, THUS JUSTIFYING THE
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3319
IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF LENINISM.
C
0
SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 02211
5. MUCH OF THE ARTICLE IS A CRITICISM OF THE CONTINUED
EXISTENCE IN SOVIET LIFE OF ATTITUDES AND "INDIVIDUALISTIC
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
HABITS" INHERITED FROM THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD.
TAGS: PGOV, ECON, PINR, UR
ANDROPOV SAYS THAT THE PEOPLE NEED TO "SHAPE THEMSELVES"
SUBJECT: MAJOR ANDROPOV ARTICLE CALLS FOR BETTER
BT
MANAGEMENT AND MORE DISCIPLINE
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: IN A MAJOR ARTICLE TIMED TO THE CENTENARY
OF KARL MARX'S DEATH, SOVIET LEADER ANDROPOV FORCEFULLY
CALLS FOR REAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND FOR MORE DISCIPLINE
AND PRODUCTIVITY FROM THE LABOR FORCE. THE MAJOR THEME
OF THE ARTICLE IS THAT WAGES AND CONSUMPTION MUST BE
LINKED TO OUTPUT; RAISING WAGES MAY CREATE "A FAVORABLE
IMPRESSION" BUT IT RESULTS IN ULTIMATE SHORTAGES AND
RESENTMENT AMONG WORKERS. ANDROPOV DIRECTLY LINKS THE
PAST FOUR YEARS OF AGRICULTURAL DISASTER TO THE FAILURE
TO REORGANIZE THE ECONOMY AND DEMANDS MEASURES WHICH ARE
DECLASSIFIED
"CAREFULLY PREPARED AND REALISTIC." IN A SIGNIFICANT
PASSAGE, ANDROPOV ACKNOWLEDGES THAT SOVIET DEMOGRAPHICS
NLRR #9670
DO NOT PERMIT THE ECONOMY TO CONTINUE RELYING ON BRUTE
LABOR TO INCREASE OUTPUT AND HE IS CRITICAL OF THE FAILURE
TO INCREASE MECHANIZATION. ANDROPOV'S COMMENTS ARE THE
MOST BLUNT HE HAS YET USED TO IDENTIFY HIS CULPRITS
BY Cu NARADATE 7/7/08
OF THE CURRENT SOVIET ECONOMIC DILEMMA: POOR MANAGE-
MENT AND LACK OF DISCIPLINE. MANY OF HIS REMARKS CAN
(AND PROBABLY WILL) BE READ AS IMPLIED CRITICISMS OF
THE LAX ADMINISTRATION OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS AND AS
CONFIDENTIAL
45
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 2211
DTG: 231830Z FEB 83 PSN: 058421
EOB952
AN002367
TOR: 054/1851Z
CSN:HCE731
SATISFIED AT A GIVEN LEVEL OF PRODUCTION AND HAMPERS
STEPS TO ELIMINATE SHORTAGES WITH ALL ITS UGLY CON-
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 FORT-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 LEVN-01
SEQUENCES, JUSTLY RESENTED BY THE WORKING PEOPLE." THE
NAU-01 LINH-01 ROBN-01 MINN-01 /010 A3
"CORRECT SOLUTION" IS THAT "MONEY IN POSSESSION OF THE
POPULATION SHOULD BE MATCHED BY THE EXISTENCE OF
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
ADEQUATE AMOUNTS OF VARIOUS CONSUMER GOODS AND SERVICES."
THE "DETERMINING FACTOR" IS PRODUCTIVITY. ANDROPOV
IS BLUNT ABOUT THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT LINKING
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
WAGES TO WORK: "WE HAVE TO FACE UNEARNED INCOMES,
SIT: VP PUBS SIT EOB
SHODDY WORKMANSHIP, SO-CALLED ROLLING STONES, SHIRKERS,
EOB:
SLACKERS" AND SO FORTH "WHICH MUST NOT BE TOLERATED."
8. ANDROPOV IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF MEASURES SOMETIMES
USED TO MEET CURRENT CHALLENGES, SUCH AS "EXCESSIVE
OP IMMED
RELIANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS, FUSSING AND TALK
STU2828
INSTEAD OF WORK." HE CALLS ON THE PARTY TO "IMPROVE
DE RUEHMO #2211/02 0541838
MANAGEMENT RAISE THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION, EFFICIENCY,
0 231830Z FEB 83
DISCIPLINE IN MATTERS OF PLANNING, STATE AND LABOR
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
DISCIPLINE." HE IS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF THE "SLOW
RATE OF MECHANIZATION" AND NOTES THAT THE DEMOGRAPHIC
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3634
SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT PERMIT CONTINUED
USE OF NON-MECHANIZED LABOR. HIS ANSWER IS A MORE
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3548
INTENSIVE USE OF THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENCE, "FIRST
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 0833
OF ALL IN THOSE SECTIONS WHERE LABOR CONSUMPTION IS
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8564
PARTICULARLY HIGH."
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4657
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 8969
9. ANDROPOV IS MORE THAN A LITTLE VAGUE ABOUT WHAT
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 8060
KIND OF REORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMY HE HAS IN MIND.
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 8727
IN THIS PART OF HIS ARTICLE, THE SOVIET LEADER
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 8038
RETREATS INTO IDEOLOGICAL VERBIAGE ABOUT THE "DEMO-
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0187
CRATIC EXAMPLE" OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE CON-
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 3602
CEPT OF "DEVELOPED SOCIALISM." (HE ALSO NOTES THE NEED
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1955
FOR "RE-EDUCATION OF SOME PERSONS, FOR COMBATTING
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 9578
ENCROACHEMENTS UPON SOCIALIST LAW AND ORDER" BUT
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 4431
DENIES THE "BOURGEOIS PROPAGANDA" THAT THIS CONSTITUTES
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3299
A FLOUTING OF HUMAN RIGHTS.") HE DOES STATE THAT "THE
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6078
SCOPE OF ACTIVITY OF DISTRICT, REGIONAL, TERRITORIAL
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 6906
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3320
AND REPUBLICAN SOVIETS WILL BE INCREASING IN THE
FORMATION OF AGROINDUSTRIAL AMALGAMATIONS," BUT MAKES
CONFID T I L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 02211
NO COMMITMENTS TO ANY OTHER CHANGES IN THE EXISTING
ET
TO BE "WISE AND THRIFTY" IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY. HE LINKS THE ATTITUDINAL QUESTION DIRECTLY
WITH BASIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMY: THE RATE
OF SAVINGS, RATIONAL USE OF MATERIALS AND LABOR, AND
EFFICIENCY OF PRODUCTION. ANDROPOV ACKNOWLEDGES THAT
"THINGS ARE MOVING NOT so SUCCESSFULLY AS NECESSARY" IN
THIS REGARD.
6. ANDROPOV IDENTIFIES TWO CULPRITS AS RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY: MANAGE-
MENT AND DISCIPLINE. HE STATES THAT REORGANIZATION
OF THE ECONOMY AND OF MANAGEMENT IS FALLING SHORT OF
REQUIREMENTS AND SAYS THAT THIS HAS RESULTED IN AGRI-
CULTURAL "UNDERPRODUCTION OF CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES"
IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS AND IN THE "EVER INCREASING"
COSTS OF DEVELOPING ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS EXTRACTION.
HE DEMANDS THAT MEASURES TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS
SHOULD BE "CAREFULLY PREPARED AND REALISTIC" (I.E. NO
HARE-BRAINED SCHEMES) AND THAT THE TENDENCY OF SOME
OFFICIALS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BY "COMMUNIST DECREEING"
IS "NAIVE."
7. ANDROPOV DISCUSSES THE DISCIPLINE QUESTION IN BROAD
TERMS BUT CLOSELY LINKS WAGES AND BETTER DISTRIBUTION
OF GOODS TO IMPROVEMENTS IN WORKER PRODUCTIVITY. AN
INCREASE OF WAGES WITHOUT A PRIOR INCREASE IN OUTPUT
MAY PRODUCE "A FAVORABLE IMPRESSION" BUT IS "INADMISSIBLE,"
BECAUSE "IT ENGENDERS REQUIREMENTS WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY
CONF IDENTIAL
41
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 2211
DTG:231830Z FEB 83 PSN: 058419
EOB950
AN002368
TOR: 054/1849Z
CSN:HCE730
MANAGEMENT AND LABOR BE BETTER AND MORE PRODUCTIVE BUT
HAS NOT SUGGESTED STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO BRING FORTH
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 FORT-01 MYER-01 DOBR-01 KRAM-01 LEVN-01
THE IMPROVEMENTS HE SEEKS. IN PRAISING THE IDEOLOGY
NAU-01 LINH-01 ROBN-01 MINN-01 /010 A3
OF KARL MARX, YURI ANDROPOV HAS FORCEFULLY (IF ONLY BY
IMPLICATION) CRITICIZED THE ADMINISTRATION OF LEONID
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
BREZHNEV; HE HAS NOT, HOWEVER, OFFERED MUCH OF HIS OWN
AS A SUBSTITUTE. END COMMENT. ZIMMERMAN
BT
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP PUBS SIT EOB
EOB:
OP IMMED
STU2829
DE RUEHMO #2211/03 0541839
0 231830Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3635
INFO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 3549
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 0834
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8565
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4658
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 8970
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 8061
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 8728
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 8039
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0188
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 3603
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1956
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 9579
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 4432
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3300
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6079
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY 6907
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3321
N DENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 02211
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE. ALMOST IN PASSING, ANDROPOV COMMENTS
THAT "THE MULTIFORM EXPERIENCE OF THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES, WHICH IS NOT IDENTICAL IN EVERYTHING, PRO-
VIDES VAST MATERIAL FOR THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION."
(HARDLY A RINGING ENDORSEMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN OR
OTHER MODELS.)
10. FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, THERE IS NO FOREIGN POLICY
CONTENT TO THE ARTICLE, MERELY PASSING REFERENCES TO
"IMPERIALISM" AND THE NEED FOR PEACE.
11. COMMENT: SOVIETS WILL READ THIS ARTICLE WITH GREAT
CARE FOR WHAT IT FORETELLS ABOUT ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER
THE NEW REGIME. THEY WILL SEE THAT THE BOSS IS VERY
DISSATISFIED WITH THE ECONOMY HE HAS INHERITED FROM
LEONID BREZHNEV AND THAT HE EXPECTS IMPROVEMENTS FROM
THE SHOP FLOOR TO THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. HOWEVER,
THEY WILL LOOK IN VAIN THROUGH THIS ARTICLE FOR CLEAR
GUIDANCE AS TO THE DIRECTIONS THEY SHOULD PURUSE. THERE
IS PRECIOUS LITTLE FOR AN ADVOCATE OF "LIBERALIZATION"
OR A MORE MARKET-ORIENTED APPROACH TO TAKE HOPE FROM.
THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE WHETHER ANDROPOV WANTS MORE
OR LESS CENTRALIZATION OR, INDEED, WHAT KIND OF RE-
ORGANIZATION THE PARTY LEADER HAS IN MIND AT ALL. THE
GREATEST CLARITY IN THE PIECE COMES WHEN ANDROPOV LINKS
WAGES TO OUTPUT; THIS IS A SIGNAL THAT WAGES AND PRICES
WILL BE LOOKED AT IN A MORE RATIONAL WAY BY THE NEW
LEADERSHIP. OTHERWISE, ANDROPOV HAS DEMANDED THAT
CONFIDENTIAL