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Europe – USSR
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Europe - USSR
Box: 25
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/9/2005
File Folder
USSR-EUROPE
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
25
YARHI-MILO
2514
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9807 CABLE
241711Z FEB 81
5 2/24/1981 B1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9808 CABLE
050315Z MAR 81
1 3/5/1981 B1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9815 MEMO
PRAVDA SEES FRICTIONS BETWEEN U.S.,
1 5/6/1981 B1
NATO ALLIES
R
3/16/2011
F2006-114/7
9809 PAPER
USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: NEW SOVIET
1 5/27/1981 B1
POLITICAL MOVES AGAINST TNF
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9810 PAPER
BREZHNEV ON THE NORDIC NUCLEAR
1 6/30/1981 B1
WEAPONS-FREE ZONE
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9811 PAPER
MALTA: SOVIETS TO OPEN EMBASSY
1 9/23/1981 B1
9805 PAPER
SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES" IN THE
1 10/17/1981 B1 B3
NETHERLANDS
D
5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9812 CABLE
061748Z NOV 81
2 11/6/1981 B1
PAR 7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/9/2005
File Folder
USSR-EUROPE
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
25
YARHI-MILO
2514
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9814 [PAPER
SOVIET "PEACENICKS:" SEDATED BUT
1 1/22/1983 B1
STILL EMBARRASING
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9806 MEMO
USSR: MOSCOW "PEACE MARCHES"
1 10/2/1983 B1
9813 PAPER
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE NORDIC
6 11/15/1983 B1
STATES
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
ALLIES
893
*******C_ONFIDENTIAL*******E COPY
OP IMMED
STU6839
DECLASSIFIED
DE RUFHNA #1102/01 0551713
0 2417117 FEB 81
NLRR F06-114/7 #9807
FM USMISSION USNATO
BY City NARADATE 7/7/08
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5246
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID 3683
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8875
FYI (Hest European
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3005
Perception of
6 ONFIDENTIAL SECTION. 1 OF 2 USNATO. 11 2
Brezhneu's Speech)
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
E.0.12 65: RDS-1. 2 24. 1 (GLITMAN, MAYNARD W.) OR-P
TAGS: NATO, UR
SUBJECT: (c) POLADS DISCUSSION OF BREZHNEV SPEECH
REF: STATE 45953
1. 10- - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: IN PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF BREZHNEV SPEECH
AT POLADS FEBRUARY 24, ALLIES SAW A MIXTURE OF PREDICTABLE
THEMES AND OLD PROPOSALS MIXED WITH ONE OR TWO INTERESTING
NEW ELEMENTS. FRENCH AND GERMAN REPS SAW SOVIET WILLING-
NESS TO CONSIDER GEOGRAPHIC EXTENSION OF CBM'S AS THE MOST
INTERESTING NEW ELEMENT AND ONE WHICH REPRESENTS A DEPART-
URE FROM PAST SOVIET RIGIDITY ON THE ZONE OF APPLICATION.
GERMAN REP NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BREZHNEV SPEECH, WITH ITS
EMPHASIS ON PEACE AND DETENTE, WAS ONLY HALF OF THE
FAMILIAR CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH AND SHOULD BE READ
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE HARD-LINE USTINOV SPEECH BEFORE
THE PARTY CONGRESS. ITALIAN REP CAUTIONED THAT BREZHNEV
PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON EUROPEAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS,
WHILE SELF-SERVING AND NOTHING NEW, COULD NONETHELESS
COMPLICATE THE DELICATE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION ON
TNF IN SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES. POLITICAL COMMITTEE AGREED
TO MEET MONDAY, MARCH 2 FOR FURTHER EXCHANGE OF NATIONAL
ANALYSES OF BREZHNEV SPEECH. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARA
9. END SUMMARY.
*WHSR COMMENT
NAN COL VP
EOB:EURE,EURW,DEPOL
PSN: 015179 PAGE 01
TOR:055/17:36Z
DTG:241711Z FEB 81
2
*******CONFIDENTIAL*******E
COPY
3. FRENCH REP FOUND IN BREZHNEV SPEECH A NUMBER OF PRE-
DICTABLE THEMES, NOTABLY THE REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AND
THE PORTRAYAL OF THE USSR AS PEACE-LOVING AND MODERATE.
TO HAVE DONE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THE
FAILURE OF BREZHNEV'S EMPHASIS ON DETENTE. THE SEVERAL
PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE BREZHNEV SPEECH SEEMED INTENDED
TO PROMOTE A RETURN TO DETENTE; HOWEVER, THEY WERE FOR THE
MOST PART REPETITIONS OF OLD SOVIET PROPOSALS AND DO NOT
SEEM TO REFLECT ANY NEW FLEXIBILITY. IN THIS CASE, ALSO,
THE APPROACH WAS TO HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, IN THAT IT WAS
UNLIKELY THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT TO CONCEDE ANY OF THE
ADVANTAGES THEY HAD WON IN RECENT YEARS.
4. THE INDICATION OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO EXTEND THE
GEOGRAPHIC ZONE OF APPLICATION OF CBM'S IS THE MOST IM-
PORTANT NEW PROPOSAL. HE NOTED THIS SOVIET WILLINGNESS
WAS CONDITIONAL ON WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND THE CBM
ZONE ACCORDINGLY AND IT WAS NOT YET CLEAR WHAT THIS MEANT.
NONETHELESS, THIS REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM
PAST SOVIET POLICY, DESTROYING THE EARLIER RIGID LINE THAT
THE GEOGRAPHIC ZONE OF APPLICATION HAD BEEN SET "ONCE AND
FOR ALL" BY THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT (I.E., 25 KM). FRENCH
REP COMMENTED THAT THIS SHIFT IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON
CEM'S DEMONSTRATED THE WISDOM OF THE WESTERN POLICY OF
FIRMNESS ON THIS SCORE.
5. FRENCH REP ALSO COMMENTED ON BREZHNEV'S LINKING OF
AFGHANISTAN TO THE SOVIET PERSIAN GULF SECURITY PROPOSAL,
SUGGESTING THIS DEMONSTRATED CONTINUED SOVIET STRATEGIC
PUSH TOWARDS THE STATES OF THE PERSIAN GULF/SOUTHWEST
ASIA. IN THIS REGARD, HE RECALLED HIS EARLIER COMMENTS
ON THE IOZP (USNATO 639), NOTING THAT THE WEST WOULD HAVE
TO BE CAUTIOUS IN OPPOSING AN IOZP CONFERENCE THIS YEAR
so AS NOT TO APPEAR so NEGATIVE AND INFLEXIBLE THAT AREA
STATES INTERESTED IN THE IOZP CONCEPT MIGHT BE ATTRACTED
TO THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL.
6. CANADIAN REP AGREED THAT MUCH OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH
WAS PREDICTABLE AND A REPETITION OF OLD PROPOSALS. AT
THE SAME TIME HE CAUTIONED THAT SOVIET EMPHASIS ON PEACE,
DETENTE AND NEGOTIATIONS WAS INTENDED TO PLAY ESPECIALLY
TO EUROPEAN AUDIENCES WHO ARE NERVOUS ABOUT A DETERIORA-
TION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND WESTERN CALLS FOR AN ARMS
BUILDUP. THE BREZHNEV FLEXIBILITY ON CBM'S, FOR EXAMPLE,
WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO PUT THE BALL IN THE WEST'S COURT,
BY A DEMONSTRATION OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, PROVIDING THE
WEST RECIPROCATED. WHILE IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE
PSN: 15179 PAGE. 2
TOR: 55 17:36Z
DTG:241711Z FEB 81
*******C ONFIDENTIAL*******E COPY
3
CONFIDENTIAL COPY
BREZHNEV CONDITION OF RECIPROCITY MEANT, IT COULD MEAN
THE EXTENSION OF CBM'S TO CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES.
ON THE BREZHNEV PROPOSAL FOR A FREEZE ON EUROPEAN MISSILE
DEPLOYMENTS, CANADIAN REP SAID HE SAW NOTHING NEW HERE
AND POSSIBLY EVEN A RETROGRESSION FROM THE OCTOBER 1979
OFFER.
7. GERMAN REP AGREED THAT THE BREZHNEV SPEECH WAS LARGELY
A COLLECTION OF OLD IDEAS AND PROPOSALS, WITH ONLY A FEW
NEW ELEMENTS. HE CAUTIONED THAT BREZHNEV'S EMPHASIS ON
BT
PSN: 015179
PAGE 03
OF. 3
TOR: 55 17:36Z
DTG:241711Z FEB 81
*******C 0 N F I D E N TI I A [*******E COPY
894
0 N F I D E N T I [*******E COPY
OP IMMED
STU6848
DE RUFHNA #11 2. 2. 551718
O 241711Z FEB 81
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5247
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID 3684
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8876
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3006
C 0 N Fry I D E N T I A L SECTION. 2 OF 02 USNATO 01102
MADRID FOR USDEL CSCE
DETENTE AND THE CLEAR ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY THE USSR AS
MODERATE, FLEXIBLE AND PEACE-LOVING MUST BE CONSIDERED
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT OVERALL SOVIET ATTITUDE ON
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. HE VIEWED THE BREZHNEV SPEECH AS
THE CARROT" HALF OF THE CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH
WHEREAS THE HARD-LINE USTINOV SPEECH JUST PRIOR TO THE
PARTY CONGRESS WAS THE OTHER HALF OF THE STORY. CONCERN-
ING THE CBM AREA OF APPLICATION QUESTION, FRG REP ACKNOW-
LEDGED THIS WAS "AN INTERESTING NEW ELEMENT IN THE SOVIET
POSITION BUT ADDED IT WAS CONDITIONAL ON TWO THINGS: (1)
RECIPROCITY; AND (2) ANY SUCH EXTENSION WOULD BE WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FINAL ACT. THE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET
POSITION HAD NOT YET BEEN SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL NOR
PRESENTED AT MADRID so IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS POINT
TO ASSESS ITS SIGNIFICANCE. IN ANY EVENT, ITS INTENT WAS
CLEAR; TO LAY THE BLAME ON THE WEST IN MADRID FOR INFLEX-
IBILITY WHILE THE SOVIETS PORTRAY THEMSELVES AS MODERATE
AND WILLING TO COMPROMISE.
8. ITALIAN REP COMMENTED THAT THE BREZHNEV PROPOSALS FOR
A FREEZE ON EUROPEAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS, WHILE OLD AND
SELF-SERVING, COULD NONETHELESS PRESENT DOMESTIC POLITICAL
DIFFICULTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE WHERE TNF WAS A DELICATE
ISSUE. ON CBM'S, ITALIAN REP AGREED THE SOVIET MOVE
DEMONSTRATED THE VALIDITY OF WESTERN FIRMNESS. HE NOTED
THAT THE BREZHNEV REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTEND-
ING CBM'S TO THE FAR EAST, COUPLED WITH THE HINT OF
RECIPROCAL EXTENSION TO NORTH AMERICA, WENT FAR BEYOND
PSN:015185
PAGE 01
TOR: 55 17:4 Z
DTG:241711Z FEB 81
*******C 0 N F I D E N I A [,*******E COPY
5
*******CONFIDENTIAL*******E
COPY
THE SCOPE OF CSCE; IT APPEARED THE SOVIETS WERE ATTEMPTING
TO ESCAPE SERIOUS COMMITMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT BY
RUSHING FORWARD TO A BROADER FRAMEWORK.
9. DUTCH REP SAID HE WAS STRUCK NOT ONLY BY THE STRONG
EMPHASIS ON DETENTE IN THE BREZHNEV SPEECH BUT ALSO BY
THE ATTITUDE IMPLICIT IN THE SPEECH THAT THE SOVIET UNION
WAS NOW SPEAKING FROM A PERCEIVED POSITION OF STRENGTH,
ONE MARKEDLY ENHANCED FROM THE PAST. THE SOVIET ATTEMPT
TO PORTRAY ITSELF AS THE GUARANTOR OF WORLD PEACE WAS
LINKED TO A SOVIET PERCEPTION OF EQUILIBRIUM IN EUROPE
BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO AND STRATEGICALLY BETWEEN
THE USSR AND THE US. AMONG OTHER THINGS, SOVIET CONFID-
ENCE IN ITS POWER PERMITTED IT TO APPEAR FORTHCOMING ON
ARMS CONTROL AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE EMPHASIS IN
THE SPEECH ON REASONABLENESS AND DETENTE WAS CLEARLY
ADDRESSED TO A EUROPEAN AUDIENCE AND WAS AN ATTEMPT AT
WEDGE-DRIVING BETWEEN EUROPEAN ALLIES AND THE US.
10. US REP NOTED PRESS GUIDANCE (REFTEL) PROVIDED BY
DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ON BREZHNEV COMMENTS AND CDE.
11. ACTION REQUESTED: FOLLOWING THE INITIAL EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ABOVE, POLADS AGREED TO HOLD A SEPARATE MEETING
MONDAY, MARCH 2 TO SHARE FURTHER VIEWS FROM CAPITALS, WITH
A VIEW TO POSSIBLE, SUBSEQUENT PREPARATION OF INFORMAL
PAPER ANALYZING MAJOR ELEMENTS OF SPEECH FOR PRESENTATION
TO PERMREPS. IT IS ASSUMED IN ADDITION THAT SPEECH WILL
BE DISCUSSED BY SOVIET/EASTERN EUROPEAN EXPERTS MARCH 3-5,
AND ANY WRITTEN REPORT WOULD DRAW ON PRESENCE OF EXPERTS.
ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV SPEECH
WHICH WE CAN DRAW ON FOR MARCH 2 MEETING. BENNETT
BT
PSN:015185
PAGE 02
OF 02
TOR:055/17:40Z
DTG:241711Z FEB 81
0
N
E
I
COPY
USSR Europe 6
SECRET
OUTGOING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
STATE 055444
3539
STATE 055444
(MACTA)
ORIGIN EUR-12
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON.
INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 SS-15 CIAE-00 EB-08
ICA-11
DODE-00
H-01
10-14
NEA-06
NSC-05
NSAE-00
MALTA IS ALSO ENGAGED IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
COME-00
L-03
DL0S-09
DOE-10
TRSE-00
PM-09
PA-01
ON OTHER MATTERS, SUCH AS CIVIL AVIATION AND FREIGHT
DOTE-00
SMS-01
CG-00
FMC-01
SIG-03
OES-09
ACDA-12
TRANSSHIPMENT AGREEMENTS, WHICH COULD RESULT IN AN EVEN
SP-02
SPRS-02
/151
R
GREATER SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE ISLAND. MOSCOW HAS LONG
SOUGHT AND MAY FINALLY GAIN PERMISSION TO OPEN A
DRAFTED BY EUR/WE/SP: TECROCKER: SR
RESIDENT EMBASSY IN MALTA AFTER THE 1982 MALTESE GENERAL
APPROVED BY EUR:LSEAGLEBURGER
ELECTIONS. IN ADDITION, WE UNDERSTAND MINTOF? HAS BEEN
EUR/WE: JMARESCA
PRESSING THE SOVIETS TO GIVE A "SECURITY GUARANTEE" TO
EUR/SOV: WWARREN
MALTA.
P:MPATTERSON (INFO)
S/S:RGHSEITZ
-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VIEWS THESE DEVELOPMENTS
EUR:RLBARRY
WITH CONCERN. TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THEY REPRESENT A
337062 050428Z /17
FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT BY MINTOFF AWAY FROM THE POLICY OF
P R 050315Z MAR 81
TRUE NON-ALIGNMENT THAT MALTA HAS PURSUED UP TO NOW AND
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
WHICH WE HAVE SUPPORTED.
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
3. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE POINTS, YOU SHOULD TELL
INFO AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
YOUR FRENCH INTERLOCUTORS THAT:
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
-- WE PASS THIS INFORMATION ALONG AS A MATTER OF INTEREST
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO FRANCE AS IT CONSIDERS ITS RELATIONS WITH MALTA.
USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY MADRID
-- WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING FRENCH VIEWS ON
AMEMBASSY BONN
THIS MATTER.
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
WE BELIEVE THAT A FRENCH DEMARCHE TO MALTA, IF ONE
HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN MADE (REFTEL), WOULD HELP REGISTER
SECRET
STATE 055444
WESTERN DISPLEASURE AND MIGHT HELP AVERT FURTHER DEALS
WITH MOSCOW THAT MINTOFF IS CONTEMPLATING. (IF ASKED
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/4/01 (EAGLEBURGER, L.S.), EUR
YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE DO NOT PLAN A DIRECT DEMARCHE TO
MALTA OURSELVES BECAUSE OF COMPLICATIONS RELATING TO THE
TAGS: PEPR, MT, UR, US
PRESENCE OF A SOVIET REFUGEE IN OUR EMBASSY IN VALLETTA
AND BECAUSE WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO
SUBJECT: (S) SOVIET-MALTESE MARITIME AND BUNKERING AGREE-
INVOLVE THE "SUPERPOWERS" FURTHER. WE HAVE MADE A
MENTS
DEMARCHE ON THIS SUBJECT TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT,
HOWEVER, AND HAVE ISSUED A PRESS STATEMENT REFLECTING
REF: VALLETTA 292
OUR CONCERN.)
1.
ENTIRE TEXT)
FRANCE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER WEIGHING IN WITH THE
ITALIANS TO FORESTALL RATIFICATION OF THEIR "NEUTRALITY
2. FOR PARIS: DEPARTMENT REQUESTS THAT YOU APPROACH THE
GUARANTEE" AND AID AGREEMENT WITH MALTA AS A SIGN OF
QUAI AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING
CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET AGREEMENTS.
INFORMATION ON, AND OUR CONCERNS ABOUT, GROWING SOVIET
INFLUENCE IN MALTA:
4. FOR BRUSSELS: YOU SHOULD PASS THE INFORMATION IN
PARA 2 ONLY TO PIERRE DUCHATEAU, EC DIRECTOR FOR RELA-
IN LATE JANUARY, MALTA AND THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED
TIONS WITH NORTHERN, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN EUROPEAN
MARITIME AND FUEL OIL BUNKERING AGREEMENTS. THE FORMER
COUNTRIES, AS A MATTER OF INTEREST AS THE EC CONSIDERS
PERMIT SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS TO CALL AT MALTA WITHOUT
ITS NEGOTIATIONS WITH MALTA ON RENEWAL OF THE ASSOCIA-
PRIOR PERMISSION. THE LATTER ACCORD PROVIDES FOR STORAGE
TION AGREEMENT AND THE NEW FINANCIAL PROTOCOL. HAIG
OF UP TO 200,000 TONS OF FUEL AT THE FORMER NATO BUNKERING
FACILITIES IN MALTA.
ALTHOUGH THE ACCORD IS OSTENSIBLY COMMERCIAL IN NATURE,
IT IN FACT ALLOWS THE SOVIETS TO PRE-POSITION SIGNIFICANT
QUANTITIES OF THEIROWN FUEL INMALTA WITHOUT HAVING TOPAY
HARD CURRENCY FOR THE OIL, AS THEY DO IN BUNKERING
ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.
DECLASSIFIED
THE MALTESE HAVE NO CONTROL OVER DISPOSITION OF THIS
OIL ONE IT LEAVES MALTESE TERRITORIAL WATERS, AND
NLRR Fob-114/7 79808
MALTA'S PRIME MINISTER MINTOFF HAS IN FACT SUGGESTED
THAT WHAT THE SOVIETS DO WITH THE OIL OUTSIDE MALTESE
WATERS IS OF NO CONCERN TO HIS GOVERNMENT.
BY Cit NARADATE 7/7/08
THE NET EFFECT OF THE SOVIET-MALTESE AGREEMENTS
COULD BE TO ENHANCE THE OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY OF THE
SECRET
USSR /ENROPE
6
FBIS 24
PRAVDA SEES 'FRICTIONS' BETWEEN U.S., NATO ALLIES
LD060628 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 0545 GMT
6 MAY 81
(TEXT) MOSCOW, 6 MAY (TASS)--"THE SHOWS OF 'UNITY'
MANIFESTED IN THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS
AND HEADS OF STATES WHO HAVE RECENTLY VISITED WASHINGTON
CANNOT HIDE THE FRICTIONS IN NATO," PRAVDA WRITES TODAY.
NOTING THAT "WASHINGTON IS MANEUVERING WHILE BEING FORCED
TO RECKON WITH THE OPIONS OF ITS ALLIES," THE NEWSPAPER CONTINUES:
"THIS CAN ALSO BE SEEN IN THE U.S. POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE
PEACE INITIATIVES PRESENTED AT THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS. AS THE
AMERICAN PRESS IS NOTING, 'THE FEAR OF IRRITATING THE WESTERN
ALLIES' IS FORCING WASHINGTON' TO PROMISE TO SIT DOWN AT THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THE RUSSIANS." ACCORDING TO THE NEW YORK
TIMES, AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERIAL NATO COUNCIL SESSION IN ROME,
U.S. SECRETARY OF TATE HAIG "HAS COME UNDER STRONG PRESSURE
FROM THE WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH ARE DEMANDING THAT HE
AGREE TO A MOST SPEEDY RESUMPTION OF TALKS WITH THE USSR."
"AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, BANKING ON THE USE OF MILITARY MIGHT
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IS ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE ITS FALTERING
POSITIONS IN THE WORLD AND AGAIN IMPOSE ITS INDISPUTABLE LEADERSHIP
ON THE ALLIES. HOWEVER, THE DISCORD IN THE WESTERN CAMP IS NOT
DYING DOWN," PRAVDA CONCLUDES.
6 MAR 1042Z MJO/TN
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/7#9815
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
USSR/EUROPE USSR EUROPE
1
NSC/S PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8102462
RECEIVED 06 MAY 81 18
TO
ALLEN
FROM BLAIR
DOCDATE 06 MAY 81
KEYWORDS: EUROPE WEST
USSR
NATO
TNF
SUBJECT: WHITHER WESTERN EUROPE PUBLIC OPINION ON KEY SECURITY ISSUES
ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO
DUE: 08 MAY 81 STATUS X FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR COMMENT
FOR INFO
ALLEN
RENTSCHLER
SCHWEITZER
STEARMAN
PIPES
DOBRIANSKY
COMMENTS
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(J/)
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
MEMORANDUM
2462
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
May 6, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM:
DENNIS C. BLAIR
JCB
SUBJECT:
Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on
Key Security Issues
I forwarded to you recently an excellent USICA piece on
Western European public attitudes, along with my own summary
of the article. In a marginal annotation (Tab II) you
requested copies for the President, Vice President, and
other White House staff. You said you would personally
highlight the copy sent to the President.
At Tab I is a memorandum for the President for your signature
forwarding to him the article and the summary. It was
unclear in your note whether you wished to forward the article
itself, the summary, or both. The Vice President and Messrs.
Meese, Baker and Deaver are "copy to" addressees on the memo
to the President.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I and forward
to the appropriate White House officials.
Approve
Disapprove
Tab I
Memo to the President
A
ICA article
B
NSC staff summary
Tab II
Original memo with marginal comments
9
(H)
MEMORANDUM
2462
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT:
Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on
Key Security Issues
For many years the United States International Communication
Agency (USICA) has been conducting polls in foreign countries
on issues of importance to this country. Recently one of the
USICA analysts wrote an excellent article summarizing trends
of the past 5 years in opinion surveys conducted in Western
Europe. I am forwarding to you at Tab A a highlighted copy
of the article and a summary at Tab B which one of my staff
members prepared.
The important point of the article is that most Europeans
recognize the menace posed by the Soviet Union, but have not
decided what to do about it. They favor neither accommodation
with the USSR on the one hand, nor increasing their defense
budgets, on the other. Sooner or later, they will have to
choose.
Guiding that choice is the challenge not only of European
leaders, but of this Administration. We must be both strong
and sophisticated in our approach in order to bring European
public opinion to the same stage we have brought American
public opinion.
CC: Vice President
Meese
Baker
Deaver
B
12
SUMMARY
Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on Key Security Issues
Attached is an excellent analysis of 5-8 years of public
opinion polls commissioned by the ICA in Western Europe. It
traces the trends in informed public thought on key security
issues. The conclusion is that European opinion is schizophrenic:
it understands the Soviet threat, but it has not yet drawn
the logical corollary of the need for greater mutual efforts
to deal with it.
Part of the blame for this attitude lies with the United
States: for pushing detente, and failing to provide the
consistent leadership by example and management which an
alliance of free nations requires. This administration has
an opportunity to cure this European schizophrenia through a
strong yet sophisticated set of policies.
The entire 9-page analysis is worth reading if time permits
but below is a 1-1/2 page summary:
Attitudes toward the Soviet Union
--
In a 1980 survey substantial pluralities of the French,
German and British publics consider Soviet and East European
socialism a failure in terms of respect for individual
liberties, improving living standards, economic development,
reducing social inequalities, and worker participation in
management of industry. In 1972 pluralities felt that
Soviet-style socialism had been successful by these same
criteria.
--
Large majorities in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden
regard the Soviet Union as a danger to world peace, or still
pursuing the goal of worldwide communist domination. The
size of these majorities has increased in recent years.
The Strategic Balance
--
In 1980 surveys, the British and West German publics
believe the Soviet Union stronger "in overall power" than
the United States. The French consider the US stronger.
However, in military power alone, since about 1977 publics
in all three countries consider the Soviet Union stronger
than the United States and the Soviet bloc stronger than the
Western Alliance by increasingly wider margins.
2
--
The perception of relative strength between the US and
the Soviet Union has important policy implications. Recent
surveys show that those who consider the US more powerful
than the USSR are more confident that the US will come to
Europe's aid than those that believe the USSR is the stronger
nation. The same phenomenon is true on the question of
strong sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion
of Afghanistan: Those who believe the US is stronger favor
the sanctions to a much greater extent than those who consider
the Soviet Union stronger.
"Finlandization" versus "Detente"
-- According to a 1980 survey, only 5 percent of the
public in six NATO countries agree that "reducing defense
efforts and relying on greater accommodation with the Soviet
Union is an appropriate way to assure their defense."
-- Europeans, however, draw a distinction between accommodation
and detente. Majorities in Germany and France favor detente
and consider that the West benefits from it as much as the
Soviet Union.
NATO
:
Surveys in the fall of 1980 show that large majorities
of West Germans and Dutch, pluralities of Italians and
Belgians and 31 percent of Frenchmen consider NATO "essential." "
-- Despite the lukewarm support for specific Afghanistan
measures, on the general question of out-of-area responsibilities,
a majority in Britain and large pluralities in France and
West Germany believe that "NATO should also protect (its)
vital interests in other parts of the world.
Defense Spending
-- Among six European NATO countries, majorities in Great
Britain and West Germany support maintaining or increasing
defense expenditures. In France, Italy, Belgium and the
Netherlands, one-third to one-half of those surveyed support
existing levels, about a third favor cuts, and 10 percent
favor increases.
--
"Denmarkization:" The survey data shows that there is
an increasing tendency among smaller NATO countries to favor
reduced military budgets on the grounds that their military
contributions do not make a critical difference.
14
3
Summary
Several quotations of perceptive European observers capture
the essence of this survey data:
-- "(the " USSR) represents less a terrifying menace or a
radiant future than a massive, cumbersome presence, as
embarrassing as it is disconcerting. " (Pierre Hassner)
-- "The Europeans recognize the danger of the Soviet
buildup, but they are pretending to disregard it because
they are doubtful of the present strength of the United
States." (Raymond Aaronn)
-- The author concludes himself: "West Europeans are
simultaneously strong and aggressive, weak and fearful.
U.S. policy toward the Continent will have to take full
account of these ambiguities."
51
A
)
Research Memorandum
International Communications United America
Washington C 20547
Office of Research
USICA
April 9, 1981
WHITHER WESTERN EUROPE: PUBLIC OPINION ON KEY SECURITY ISSUES
Overview: This profile of West European public opinion at the
beginning of the 1980's reflects changes which have occurred in the
world and in West Europe's relationship with the U.S. during the
past decade. On balance, the prevailing opinion climate -- to the
extent it influences official positions -- presents the Reagan
administration with more problems than promise.
What West Europeans are telling themselves, according to a recent
study by Michel Crozier, is: "There is no more Big Brother Amer-
ica will never be what it was. We [West Europe] have ceased to be
provincials exercising only limited regional responsibilities
"
There is a variety of reasons for this more self-reliant outlook
on the part of West Europeans. Over the past 15 years they have
become increasingly sceptical about relying on a protector who in
their eyes either turns out faulty leaders (Johnson, Carter) or
destroys the good ones (Kennedy, Nixon), who is unable to implement
an energy program, whose foreign policy is crippled by a recalci-
trant Congress, who allows his military advantage to be dissipated
and who abandons crucial allies such as Iran with seeming equanimity.
More positively, the steady strengthening of West European economic
power during the 1970's has considerably enhanced the Continent's
political influence in the world. This has been accompanied by
greater intra-West European political and economic cooperation, par-
ticularly between West Germany and France, leading to a more asser-
tive West Europe seemingly bent on distancing itself from Washington
where it is profitable and prudent to do so.
The apparent desire of many West Europeans that the Continent play
a more independent role in the world is heightened by the increas-
ing realization that while the U.S. and West Europe still share com-
mon broad interests -- containment of Soviet expansionism and secure
energy supplies, for example -- there are increasingly differing
perceptions on how to accomplish these ends. West Europe's concern
with preserving detente, its hesitations about deployment of thea-
ter nuclear weapons and its policy toward the Mid-East -- dictated
by energy needs -- are just a few examples of where the West Euro-
pean approach differs from that of the U.S. Widespread perceptions
of the growing military might of the Soviet Union have intensified
West European concerns about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
- 2 -
On the positive side, there is less today of the visceral anti-
Americanism of earlier years. Even a significant proportion of the
French look to the U.S. as a good friend. Moreover, West Europeans,
keenly aware of the USSR's global and regional military might, do
recognize that the U.S. is vital to the security of the Continent.
Whatever ideological appeal the USSR once held for West Europeans
seems irredeemably lost and the threat of "Eurocommunism," so
strongly felt only a few years ago, also appears on the wane.
In brief, the prevailing climate of opinion in West Europe contains
a unique mixture of pluses and minuses for U.S. policy-makers. West
Europeans are simultaneously strong and aggressive, weak and fearful.
U.S. policy toward the Continent will have to take full account of
these ambiguities.
The data which follow are a synthesis of various public opinion
surveys sponsored by the International Communication Agency (USICA)
during the past 18 months on central issues of U.S.-West European
relations. Also included are data provided by the European Commun-
ties (EC) research services and surveys made public by others. This
synthesis tries to provide a benchmark on West European public atti-
tudes early in the crucial decade ahead. The data are organized in-
to the following areas: (1) public perceptions of the USSR and its
military challenge to the West and (2) how West Europeans respond
to this challenge.
This report, while based on public opinion findings, reflects the
interpretive views of the author. The reader should also be re-
minded that in some instances, findings from one or several coun-
tries have been used (albeit cautiously) to make generalizations
about "West European" opinion.
THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union
In the wake of World War II and for many years thereafter, many West
Europeans -- particularly those on the left and center-left of the
political spectrum -- viewed the USSR as a model to emulate, or, per-
haps less happily for some, the inevitable wave of the future.
What are their attitudes today? Pierre Hassner, the noted French
political analyst, recently observed: "Except for a few extremists
on one side or the other, it [the USSR] represents less a terrify-
ing menace or a radiant future than a massive, cumbersome presence,
as embarrassing as it is disconcerting." He added that, while West
Europeans perceive the Soviet Union as a success on the military
level, "there is a consensus that it represents a failure on various
levels ranging from economic well-being to the ideological model."
- 3 -
A measure of the decline in favorable public attitudes toward the
USSR emerges from a comparison of surveys conducted in France in
1972 and in October 1980. In the most recent survey, four times
as many (59% to 14%) expressed a negative view of "socialism" in
the USSR and East Europe than held a positive opinion. Negative
perceptions also predominated in 1972, but by a much narrower mar-
gin (43% to 28%).
In the 1980 study, majorities or substantial pluralities of the
French public held that Soviet and East European "socialism" was
a failure in terms of: respect for individual liberties (70%),
improving living standards (53%), economic development (46%), reduc-
ing social inequalities (43%) and worker participation in management
of industry (42%). By contrast, in 1972 positive opinions prevailed
over negative views on four of these five indices, and on the fifth
(individual liberties), the public was less negative.
Additionally, almost three times as many (57% to 21%) thought that
the "popular democracies" of East Europe survived only by the pres-
ence of Soviet troops on their soil than believed these regimes
represented the will of their citizens.
There are no comparable data for Britain and West Germany. However,
given the absence of a large communist party in these two countries
and their long-standing antipathy toward the USSR, it is quite
likely that negative views of the Soviet Union are even more wide-
spread in Britain and West Germany than in France.
In addition to rejecting the Soviet experience as a failure, more
West Europeans, in the wake of the Afghanistan and Polish crises,
have come to see the Soviet Union as a threat to world peace than
previously. For example, in neutral Sweden many more (59%) in
September 1980 perceived the USSR as pursuing a policy which "con-
tinually" or "often" endangers peace in the world as thought that
about Soviet policy only a year earlier (43%).
Seventy-one percent of the West Germans described the USSR as a
danger to world peace. The proportion believing West Germany is
threatened by the Soviet Union nearly doubled (from 35 to 63%) be-
tween 1979 and 1980. In Britain, the already very high percentage
considering the USSR a military threat to their country increased
further (from 77 to 85 %) from 1979 to January 1980.
A spring 1980 survey in France showed that large majorities of the
French perceived the USSR as an expansionist power and considered
that the prime Soviet objective remains worldwide communist domina-
tion. In February 1981, 61 percent said they mistrust Soviet for-
eign policy. Only 12 percent -- far fewer than one might have ex-
pected in a country where 20 percent vote Communist -- said they
trust Soviet policy. Interviews with more than 700 candidates to
- 4 -
the European Parliament in Spring 1979 showed that only two per-
cent advocated closer ties between the European Community and the
Soviet Union. Among the French and Italian candidates who ran
under the Communist banner, not one favored closer EC-USSR ties.
The Strategic Balance
March 1980 surveys conducted in Britain, France and West Germany
revealed that the publics in these three major countries differed
in their perceptions of the overall power balance between the U.S.
and the USSR.1 The British and, by a more narrow margin, the West
Germans, perceived the Soviet Union as generally stronger than the
U.S. The French took the opposite view.
What is most striking is the change in perceptions which occurred
in all three countries -- and in Japan as well -- since 1972 when
a broadly similar question was last asked. Since then, the propor-
tion seeing the U.S. as the "most powerful [country] in the world"
declined by about 20 percent in all three countries and those giv-
ing the edge to the USSR increased by about the same proportion.
In brief, during the past eight years the Soviet Union has advanced
from a position of clear "strength" inferiority to one of equival-
ence with the U.S. in the view of these European publics.
When the strength balance is tested in strictly military terms,
the findings for the U.S. are even more bleak. A majority (54%)
in Britain (July 1979) thought the USSR ahead in nuclear military
power, only 18 percent named the U.S. In France and West Germany,
more gave the nuclear edge to Russia than to the U.S. However,
substantial pluralities in these two countries perceived the two
superpowers as about equal in nuclear strength, thus endorsing the
claim that essential equivalency was being maintained. On this di-
mension as well, perceptions of U.S. nuclear strength have declined
considerably since 1972 when the publics in all three countries
gave the edge to the U.S.
On total military strength, the same pattern of increasing Soviet
power also emerged as early as 1977. Even at that early date,
twice as many Frenchmen and West Germans and five times as many
Britons considered the USSR the strongest as thought the U.S.
ahead.
Very recent findings published in the French weekly Le Point (March
9, 1981) reveal that French and West German perceptions of Soviet
¹The wording of this question allowed the respondents to judge the
overall power balance, including, but not necessarily limited to,
military power.
20
- 5 -
military superiority have further increased since 1977 and are far
more widespread in these two countries than in the United States.
While Americans were not too far from evenly divided (44% to 33%)
on whether the East or the West was militarily strongest, the West
Germans (68% to 27%) and the French (51% to 14%) overwhelmingly
viewed the Soviet bloc as militarily superior.
There are no more recent measurements for Britain since 1977, but
even at that time more in the U.K. thought the balance would con-
tinue to shift in favor of the USSR than toward the U.S. The
continuing Soviet military buildup since then is likely to have
confirmed them in this outlook.
Many West Europeans, as measured in the three leading countries,
clearly have perceived the Soviet Union over the past decade as the
emerging dominant military power and the U.S. as a once dominant
power in decline. Other survey data indicate that these publics
are seriously concerned by this trend and tend to attribute offen-
sive as well as defensive motives to the Soviet buildup. They fear,
in particular, that the USSR will use its military superiority to
blackmail their leaders into political and economic concessions.
How do West Europeans react to the Soviet military buildup? "They
do recognize the danger,' observed Raymond Aron, "but they are pre-
tending to disregard it because they are doubtful of the present
strength of the United States." As seen in other surveys, percep-
tions of the superpower strength balance also influence West Euro-
pean views on U.S. reliability and their willingness to follow U.S.
policy leads.
Among the British, French and West Germans who saw the U.S. as the
most powerful country today and into the future, about twice as
many expressed "great confidence" that the U.S. would come to their
defense than did those who believed the USSR to be the most powerful
nation. Similarly, a slightly higher proportion of those perceiving
the U.S. to be the most powerful nation favored strong actions in
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan than did those who
thought the USSR strongest.
THE WEST EUROPEAN RESPONSE
"Finlandization" vs. "Detente"
West European public perceptions of a Soviet military advantage
have so far not induced substantial proportions to consider "self-
Finlandization" as an appropriate policy for their country. Only
five percent of those interviewed in six NATO countries last fall
thought that "reducing our defense efforts and relying on greater
21
- 6 -
accommodation with the Soviet Union" was an appropriate way to
assure their defense. The proportion would be even smaller if one
excluded from the analysis the French (21%) and Italian (14%) Com-
munist Party voters, who more than others adhered to that position.
In answer to a roughly similar question, as many as 23 percent of
the European Parliamentary candidates interviewed in spring 1979
preferred the "accommodation" option. Again, however, it was only
among the Communist (62%) and to a much lesser degree the Socialist
(36%) candidates that "accommodation" was seen as an attractive
solution. Among the other four major Community political groups
(Christian Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and Gaullists) less
than a tenth favored "accommodation."
While only a tiny minority of the West European public appears sus-
ceptible to Soviet political pressure, there is overwhelming public
support for detente with the USSR. As noted above, West Europeans
are mistrustful of the Russians. However, the perceived need for
detente with the USSR appears to override their suspicions.
An example of this comes from a recent French survey in which 73
percent of the public condemned the USSR for not living up to its
Helsinki commitments but about as many (68%) agreed that France
should participate in the Madrid CSCE conference because it is
necessary "at all costs to compromise with the USSR in order to
maintain detente." Four West Germans in five thought the continu-
ation of detente an "appropriate" way to safeguard peace, freedom
and independence despite their misgivings about Soviet objectives.
A second example is the widespread support expressed by the British,
French and West Germans in mid-1979 for SALT-II ratification des-
pite their reservations about what the treaty would accomplish and
doubts that the Soviets would honestly implement it. This suggests
that whatever their doubts about the intrinsic merit of the treaty,
many in West Europe obviously viewed it as the centerpiece in the
already badly torn fabric of detente.
The French and West Germans are also far apart from Americans in
their views of what policy their country should follow toward the
USSR. A majority (57%) of Americans commended a policy of "firm-
ness" vis-a-vis the Soviets and only a third advocated "concilia-
tion." By contrast, majorities in West Germany (67%) and France
(52%) favored a conciliatory approach. Moreover, far more West
Germans (65%) and French (54%) than Americans (34%) thought that
the West has benefited as much as the Russians from detente. There
are no data from other countries on these issues, but it is likely
that support for a conciliatory approach toward the USSR and san-
guine views about detente are at least as prevalent elsewhere on
the Continent as in France and West Germany.
22
- 7 -
In fact, the crucial issue dividing the U.S. from its European
allies in the Afghanistan crisis was the relative priority each
side gave to detente. Even before that crisis, Peter Corterier,
West Germany's Social Democratic Party spokesman on defense observ-
ed: "Europeans tend to underestimate the danger, even for them, of
Soviet global policies. Americans underestimate the very real re-
sults that Europeans -- particularly Germans -- get out of detente."
NATO
"What Kind of Alliance is This Anyway?" "Is the Western Alliance
Really in Selfish Disarray?" "Disjointed Alliance." These and
equally provocative headlines were the daily fare of major U.S. and
West European newspapers during the first six months of 1980. With
few exceptions, the accompanying articles argued that while the
NATO alliance had undergone crises in the past, the one ushered in
by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was unprecedented in severity
and consequence.
This Atlantic discord, severe as it was, does not appear to have
seriously diminished West European public perceptions of NATO as vi-
tal to the Continent's security. Surveys conducted in half a dozen
European NATO countries in the fall of 1980 revealed that majorities
or pluralities in most countries considered NATO still essential to
their security, a slight decline from two years earlier but on a par
with a 1976 measurement. Perceptions of- NATO's essentiality were,
however, far from uniform. The West Germans (80%), the British
(70%) and the Dutch (61%) were far more sensitive to NATO's impor-
tance than were the Italians (49%), the Belgians (45%) and the
French (31%).
About 60 percent of the West Europeans surveyed also preferred con-
tinued military ties with the U.S. over other possible security
arrangements. However, at least a third of these supporters of
military ties to the U.S. wanted a modified NATO structure giving
the Europeans more say. And, it was in Belgium, France and Italy
-- the three countries where NATO's essentiality was least often
perceived -- that desires for a greater European voice were most
frequently expressed.
The evidence concerning West European public support for a NATO
role outside the Atlantic area is mixed. West Europeans were gen-
erally opposed to having their country back specific U.S. measures
against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, a major-
ity in Britain (63%) and large pluralities in France (47%) and West
Germany (48%) believed that "NATO should also help protect vital
interests in other parts of the world." Only one Briton and French-
man in five and one West German in three held that NATO's only role
was to provide security for West Europe.
- 8 -
Defense Spending
Past studies suggest that West Europeans generally prefer a super-
power military balance to superiority by one side or the other.
Accordingly, they would doubtlessly welcome a restoration of West-
ern military strength now perceived as inferior to that of the
Soviet bloc. Indications are, however, that the governments of our
NATO allies will have difficulty in rallying public support for the
increased defense spending required to achieve that goal.
Surveys conducted in six European NATO countries last October showed
that only the British and, to a lesser extent, the West Germans are
steadfast in support of defense expenditures. About a quarter in
both countries favored increased defense spending and another half
were prepared to support present defense spending levels.
In the other four countries surveyed -- France, Italy, Belgium and
the Netherlands -- from a third to a half supported existing levels
of defense spending. However, a third or more in these countries
wanted defense cuts while only 10 percent or less favored increases
such as those called for under the NATO goal of a three percent
real annual increase in allied defense spending. 2
Moreover, a survey taken in view of the Venice Economic Summit
(June 1980) suggests that increasing inflationary pressures could
adversely affect public support for defense expenditures. Reduced
defense spending to fight "worsening inflation" had wide appeal in
France and Italy. A majority (67%) in Britain and a plurality (47%)
in West Germany opposed such reductions even at the cost of rising
inflation. But, if push came to shove, far more even in these two
countries would oppose cuts in medical and social services than
would object to cuts in the defense budget.
In addition to the potential adverse effect on military expenditures
arising from inflation and other economic pressures, defense advo-
cates must contend with "Denmarkization" -- the increasing tendency
of the smaller NATO countries to reduce their military budgets,
which they justify on the grounds that their military contributions
will not make the critical difference. The contrast, noted above,
between the more pro-defense attitudes of the British and West
Germans and the reluctance of the Italians, Belgians and Dutch indi-
cates the extent of "Denmarkization" among the smaller allies.
The question wording = spending in support of NATO = could
conceivably have caused more of the respondents -- particularly in
France -- to vote in favor of cuts than would have been the case
if the question had been put in terms of national defense.
24
- 9 -
Personal interviews with 742 candidates to the European Parliament
(spring 1979), who perhaps reflect the views of other political
elites in their country, point in the same direction. Candidates
from the smaller NATO countries (Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and even Italy) were far less committed to defense
spending than candidates from Britain and West Germany. There was
also a high proportion of defense-minded candidates among the
French, including the communists, when defense was placed in the
national rather than the NATO context.
Arms Negotiations (TNF)
The NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Brussels in December 1979,
agreed, after much controversy over how to face up to the Soviet
theater nuclear buildup, on a compromise calling for simultaneously
modernizing NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces and initiating
TNF arms control negotiations with the USSR.
Despite the concessions made in order to bring the arms control ad-
vocates aboard, the NATO decision has encountered serious public
opposition. In West Germany, a survey conducted three months after
the NATO agreement, revealed that fully 60 percent of the public
opposed "the stationing of more and new nuclear weapons in the FRG."
In Britain, where there has been a resurgence of anti-nuclear senti-
ment, one third of the public opposed cruise missile stationing in
Britain "under any conditions" and another third said they would
accept them only after negotiations with the Soviets had either
been undertaken (19%) or had proven a failure (20%). Only 15 per-
cent would accept the missiles without prior negotiations with the
Soviets.
Equally strong public opposition is found in the smaller NATO
countries. In the Netherlands a majority (53 to 39%) opposed TNF
deployment. And in Belgium, a plurality (42% to 26%) opposed their
government's decision to proceed with TNF deployment on Belgian
soil even if efforts to reach prior agreement with the USSR do not
succeed.
Prepared by:
R. McLellan (PGM/REU)
M-4/9/81
724-0794
OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
April 30, 1981
The is some read they
MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM:
DENNIS BLA
325
SUBJECT:
Whither Western Europe: Public Opinion on
Key Security Issues
KO come. to me pls. clear j'd. her
mark for to
Attached is an excellent analysis of 5-8 years of public
opinion polls commissioned by the ICA in Western Europe.
It
sur vf. other
traces the trends in informed public thought on key security
issues. The conclusion is that European opinion is schizophrenic:
it understands the Soviet threat, but it has not yet drawn
the logical corollary of the need for greater mutual efforts
to deal with it.
Tread
5/4/81
In my opinion, part of the blame for this attitude lies with
the United States: we have pushed detente, and failed to
provide the consistent leadership by example and management
which an alliance of free nations requires. This administration
has an opportunity to cure this European schizophrenia
through a strong yet sophisticated set of policies.
I recommend you read the entire 9-page analysis if time
permits but provide the 1-1/2 page Reader's Digest version
below:
Attitudes toward the Soviet Union
--
In a 1980 survey substantial pluralities of the French,
German and British publics consider Soviet and East European
socialism a failure in terms of respect for individual
liberties, improving living standards, economic development,
reducing social inequalities, and worker participation in
management of industry. In 1972 pluralities felt that
Soviet-style socialism had been successful by these same
criteria.
-- Large majorities in Germany, France, Britain and Sweden
regard the Soviet Union as a danger to world peace, or still
pursuing the goal of worldwide communist domination. The
size of these majorities has increased in recent years.
The Strategic Balance
-- In 1980 surveys, the British and West German publics
believe the Soviet Union stronger "in overall power" than
the United States. The French consider the US stronger.
However, in military power alone, since about 1977 publics
in all three countries consider the Soviet Union stronger
than the United States and the Soviet bloc stronger than the
Western Alliance by increasingly wider margins.
27
2
-- The perception of relative strength between the US and
the Soviet Union has important policy implications. Recent
surveys show that those who consider the US more powerful
than the USSR are more confident that the US will come to
Europe's aid than those that believe the USSR is the stronger
nation. The same phenomenon is true on the question of
strong sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion
of Afghanistan: Those who believe the US is stronger favor
the sanctions to a much greater extent than those who consider
the Soviet Union stronger.
"Finlandization" versus "Detente"
-- According to a 1980 survey, only 5 percent of the
public in six NATO countries agree that "reducing defense
efforts and relying on greater accommodation with the Soviet
Union is an appropriate way to assure their defense."
-- Europeans, however, draw a distinction between accommodation
and detente. Majorities in Germany and France favor detente
and consider that the West benefits from it as much as the
Soviet Union.
NATO
-- Surveys in the fall of 1980 show that large majorities
of West Germans and Dutch, pluralities of Italians and
Belgians and 31 percent of Frenchmen consider NATO "essential."
-- Despite the lukewarm support for specific Afghanistan
measures, on the general question of out-of-area responsibilities,
a majority in Britain and large pluralities in France and
West Germany believe that "NATO should also protect (its)
vital interests in other parts of the world."
Defense Spending
--
Among six European NATO countries, majorities in Great
Britain and West Germany support maintaining or increasing
defense expenditures. In France, Italy, Belgium and the
Netherlands, one-third to one-half of those surveyed support
existing levels, about a third favor cuts, and 10 percent
favor increases.
-- "Denmarkization:" The survey data shows that there is
an increasing tendency among smaller NATO countries to favor
reduced military budgets on the grounds that their military
contributions do not make a critical difference.
3
Summary
Several quotations of perceptive European observers capture
the essence of this survey data:
-- " (the USSR) represents less a terrifying menace or a radiant
future than a massive, cumbersome presence, as embarrassing as
it is disconcerting. (Pierre Hassner)
-- "The Europeans recognize the danger of the Soviet buildup,
but they are pretending to disregard it because they are
doubtful of the present strength of the United States."
(Raymond Aaronn)
-- The author concludes himself: "West Europeans are
simultaneously strong and aggressive, weak and fearful. U.S.
policy toward the Continent will have to take full account of
these ambiguities.
CC: Rentschler
Schweitzer
Stearman
Pipes
Dobriansky
SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
USSR W. Europe
29
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 27, 1981
1. USSR-WESTERN EUROPE: NEW SOVIET POLITICAL MOVES AGAINST TNF
Recent letters to West European socialist parties from the
Soviet Communist Party underscore Moscow's determination to under-
mine European support for NATO's LRTNF plans. Rising opposition
within West European socialist circles was probably responsible for
Moscow's special pitch. The letter will fuel West German SPD oppo-
sition to TNF which was temporarily papered over when Schmidt won a
211-9 party vote endorsing his stance.
*
*
*
The letters argued the Soviet position on medium-range nuclear
weapons in Europe in surprising detail:
--The USSR wants to open talks on the limitation of nuclear
forces in Europe without delay.
--There is now an approximate equilibrium in the number of
medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The US, UK, and
France together have about 1,000 launchers, and the Soviet
Union approximately the same.
--The US hopes to delay TNF negotiations and use them as a
smokescreen to hide plans to deploy Pershing II and GLCMs.
While the letters made no new proposals, they contained nuances
which were intended to give further play to Brezhnev's moratorium
proposal. The letters state that a moratorium would go into effect
with the opening of TNF negotiations. This would have to be agreed
upon before talks started and would remain in effect for the dura-
tion of the negotiations.
The SPD and the French Socialist Party have agreed to discuss
the letters at an informal meeting during the Finnish Social Demo-
cratic Party Congress in early June. Letters were also sent to the
British Labor Party and the Finnish, Belgian, and Italian Socialist
Parties.
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NLRR F06-114/7*989
BY as NARADATE 7/7/08
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- 3 -
3. BREZHNEV ON THE NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE
The Scandinavians have been trying to manage domestic pres-
sures for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NMWFZ) by focusing
on Soviet short- and medium-range systems in the Baltic and the
Kola Peninsula. In an apparent bid to deflect the Scandinavians,
Brezhnev has hinted that Moscow might consider some concessions
regarding nuclear weapons on its territory. Brezhnev's intent
apparently is to quicken Scandinavian interest in the NNWFZ by
dangling the bait of Soviet territory being included. Having
played this game for 20 years, the Nordics are not apt to be
deceived.
Moscow has long supported Finnish President Kekkonen's 1963
proposal for an NNWFZ and has stated for the record that it is
prepared to take part in "constructive discussion" of the pro-
posal and "to act with the other nuclear powers as a quarantor"
of such a zone. When any discussions on the subject not under-
way, however, the Soviets always carefully maintained a distinc-
tion between the area affected and the USSR itself, and
declined to allow consideration of Soviet nuclear weapons on the
Kola Peninsula in an NNFWZ context.
The interest in Brezhnev's new "answer" stems from its
deliberately ambiguous language on this score. He noted only
that the USSR "does not exclude" the possibility of "considering
some other actions" which would affect Soviet territory borderins
on the NNWFZ.
Coming in the wake of the recent Nordic Council reaffirma-
tion of their interest in an NNWFZ, provided it treated Soviet
nuclear weapons in the North European area, the Soviet bait
seemed intended to keep the issue alive. By stating that the
Soviet Union is willing to participate, and perhaps not merely
as "guarantor," Brezhnev not only strikes a statesmanly pose,
but attempts to force the Nordics to make the next move.
In the long run the Soviets presumably will prove as intract-
able as ever on any concession that would affect their Kola and
Baltic positions. This was ninted at by a Soviet nows agency com-
mentator who recently told a Finnish paper that the USSR "cannot
for strategic reasons give up a certain military use of a part of
its territory while the US
:-
to deploy nuclear weapons
on foreign soil."
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BY as NARADATE 7/7/08
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RELATIONS, WHICH HAS BEEN CIRCULATED IN CONNECTION WITH
SLATED NOVEMBER 10 POLADS EXCHANGE. PAPER ASSESSES
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THAT AGREEMENT PROVIDES SCOPE FOR SOVIET MEDDLING AT NO
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WITH STANDARD SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY WITH THIRD-WORLD
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POINTS OUT THAT, SINCE AEROFLOT REPRESENTS AN EXTENSION
OF THE SOVIET MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT (VTA), MALTESE PRO-
VISION OF LANDING FACILITIES HAS MILITARY IMPLICATIONS.
UK ASSESSMENT CONCLUDES THAT RECENT SOVIET-MALTESE
AGREEMENTS DO NOT APPEAR TO REPRESENT DRAMATIC SHIFT IN
MALTA'S ALIGNMENT, BUT DO FURTHER POINT UP CONTINUING
SOVIET INTEREST IN THE ISLAND. END SUMMARY.
BEGIN TEXT UK PAPER:
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1/22/83
3. SOVIET "PEACENIKS:" SEDATED BUT STILL EMBARRASSING
At a time when unofficial peace movements appear to be
spreading in Eastern Europe, most of the small group of peace
activists in the Soviet Union are now either in prison or
psychiatric wards. Quick intervention by the KGB prevented the
group from exploiting the anti-nuclear movement in the same way
the Moscow Helsinki Group used the CSCE Final Act to create an
independent organization with political potential. But the very
existence of independent peaceniks continues to embarrass the
regime, and any further action against them could undercut
Moscow's anti-nuclear campaign in Western Europe.
*
*
*
The Soviet peace group was formed in June of last year in
the wake of regime-staged peace demonstrations in the USSR. Its
proposals for a joint US-Soviet dialogue echoed official Soviet
proposals on many points, but the group's independent nature made
it unacceptable to the Kremlin. Just before Christmas, the wives
of several members of the Moscow group reported that their hus-
bands were undergoing psychiatric tests in Moscow's ill-famed
Serbsky Institute, and that the KGB was collecting evidence for
possible criminal charges. Earlier, the group's founder, Sergey
Batovrin, reportedly was receiving debilitating drugs in a
psychiatric hospital.
The Kremlin could, of course, indict peace activists on
criminal charges. But KGB threats to charge two members of the
group with "arrogation," illustrate how far the prosecutor would
have to stretch the law to make a case. Article 200 of the
Criminal Code defines "Arrogation" as "the unwarranted exer-
cise of one's actual or supposed rights, causing substantial
harm to citizens or to state or social organizations." Presum-
ably, the state could claim that the unofficial peace group had
harmed the reputation and interests of the official Soviet Peace
Council, which enjoys the legal status of a public organization.
Bringing the peaceniks to trial at this time, however, would
undermine the USSR's attempt to gain the support of the peace
forces in Western Europe. Consequently, the authorities are
likely to do little more than keep the activists heavily tran-
quilized until they decide what to do with them. In the mean-
time, similar peace groups apparently have been organized in
three other Soviet cities in spite of Moscow's repression.
Isolated groups of pacifists also are believed to exist in the
Baltic republics.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 606-114/7*9814
BY as NARADATE 7/7/08
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
USSR/EUROPE EUROPE
31
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
THIS PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO NOT APPROVAL
ADVANCE COPY IS provided FOR
YOUR WIDER DISTRIBUTION. DO
FOR FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR
*
*
CITE
UNITED STATES OF
(U)
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE NORDIC STATES1/
(C/NF) Summary
BUREAU OF
Moscow's current efforts to play on Nordic
INTELLIGENCE
security concerns and to dilute NATO's role in the
region center on promoting the idea of a Nordic
AND RESEARCH
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) and opposition to
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deploy-
ment. Since Finnish President Kekkonen proposed
the NNWFZ in 1963, the Soviets periodically have
refurbished the concept to generate Nordic inter-
CURRENT
est. They no doubt realize, however, that prog-
ress on that score peaked in 1980-82 when the
ANALYSES
ruling Norwegian Labor Party endorsed an NNWFZ
provided that it was part of Europe-wide arms
control negotiations and that Soviet weapons and
bordering territory were included.
In 1982, the Social Democratic Party regained
power in Sweden and Prime Minister Palme suggested
an NNWFZ if the USSR withdrew its nuclear missiles
from the Baltic. Moscow recognized at least an
opportunity to complicate Norwegian relations with
NATO and began casting out hints of possible Soviet
concessions.
Elections in Norway and Denmark of Conserva-
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06 714/7 #9813
BY Gr NARADATE 7/7/08
tive governments that opposed the NNWFZ concept
effectively sidetracked the issue. The grounding
of a Soviet submarine carrying nuclear missiles in
Swedish territorial waters in fall 1981, a spate of
submarine incursions in Swedish and Norwegian waters
in 1982 and 1983 and the ensuing April 1983 Swedish
Government report, and the September 1983 Korean
1/ (U) For a detailed study of Soviet-Nordic
relations, see "Soviet-Nordic Relations: An
Overview,' INR Report No. 408-AR, June 11, 1982
(SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)
Report 715-CA
November 15, 1983
31A
CONFIDENTIAL
- ii -
airliner incident further clouded Soviet-Nordic relations. Moscow
nevertheless is pursuing the NNWFZ idea, usually as a subsidiary
to its more immediate effort to stimulate greater anti-INF
activity by local peace groups as NATO INF deployments begin.
******
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CONFIDENTIAL
Cooling of Soviet-Nordic Relations
(e)
In 1980-82, signs of Scandinavian interest in some form
of NNWFZ seemed to promise an expanded Nordic-Soviet dialogue and
opportunities for Moscow to erode NATO's influence in the area.
However, the submarine violations of Scandinavian territory and
leadership changes in Norway, Denmark, and Finland put a quick end
to any optimism in Moscow.
(C) In Norway, Labor Party Prime Minister Brundtland, who
had toyed with the idea of an NNWFZ, was replaced by the Conserva-
tive Willoch. Danish Social Democratic Prime Minister Jorgensen
was succeeded by a Conservative, Schleuter. Both Willoch and
Schleuter oppose negotiations with the Soviet Union on an NNWFZ.
Willoch's argument that only nuclear powers can set up nuclear
free zones prompted TASS to express "regret."
(e) After 25 years' reliance on Kekkonen's careful course of
friendly neutrality toward the USSR, Moscow in October 1981 faced
a successor. Although Mauno Koivisto has shown no signs of
altering Kekkonen's basic policy course and has restated Helsinki's
support of the "Kekkonen Plan,' Moscow still views him as an
unknown quantity. Helsinki has carefully avoided identification
with the Swedish or Norwegian Labor Party proposals.
(C)
After repeated violation of both Norwegian and Swedish
territorial waters by suspected Soviet submarines, particularly
invasion of Sweden's military base at Stockholm in October 1982,
the Swedish Government Commission on April 26, 1983, formally
charged the Soviet Union with such violations. Palme then gave
Moscow a stiff protest note asking that violations cease; the note
was rejected.
(C) The Swedish Commission's report proved the most damaging
development in the past year to Soviet credibility in the Nordic
area. The report alleged numerous violations of Swedish territo-
rial waters by Soviet submarines over the preceding two years and
prompted Palme not only to lodge the formal protest with the
Soviet Government but also to cancel all planned visits by Swedish
political and military officials to the USSR. The Soviets shortly
before had hailed Palme for his proposal of a nuclear free strip
in Central Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact lines and had been
heartened by his support of an NNWFZ.
(C) The Swedish population reacted with outrage to the Com-
mission's findings and was further incensed by Moscow's denial and
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38A
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charge that Stockholm was serving NATO interests by trying to
aggravate tension in the Nordic region. Soviet media for their
part dismissed the charges as paranoia and accused Sweden of using
the allegation as an excuse to build up Swedish defenses, increase
NATO's influence in the region, and neutralize the local peace
movements.
(C) Danish skepticism about Soviet peace propaganda also
increased markedly after the Swedish Commission's report, and the
Danish Social Democratic Party canceled a scheduled visit to
Moscow of a parliamentary delegation. Although Danish waters are
too shallow for normal submarine operation, stories about the
penetration abilities of Soviet "minisubs" have generated uneasi-
ness in the Danish public.
(C/NF) At their meeting on April 26, 1983, the Nordic
defense ministers declared that Soviet actions represented a
threat to all Nordic countries. The unique political position of
Finland and its mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union
inhibited the Finns from taking any stance against Moscow, and
President Koivisto's visit to the Soviet Union took place on
schedule in early June.
(C)
Sweden has not been alone in sighting suspected Soviet
submarines in its territorial waters. Intrusions into Norwegian
waters also have taken place periodically. Indeed, at the time
the Swedish Commission issued its report, the Norwegian Navy had
just dropped depth charges on a suspected foreign submarine in
Hardangerfjord. Norway's NATO membership and its proximity to the
Soviet Union traditionally have meant particular Soviet sensitivity
to any augmentation of NATO northern flank activity and the stock-
piling of NATO military equipment on Norwegian soil. Soviet media
often remind the Norwegian public of the risk entailed in allowing
any NATO buildup in Northern Europe. Soviet violation of
Norwegian waters thus was interpreted variously as a Soviet
reposte to Norway's more active role in NATO or as retaliation for
an earlier NATO warship visit to Norway's Haakonsvern Navy Base.
(C)
Moscow Persists in Promoting NNWFZ
Despite, or perhaps because of, the cooler atmosphere, Moscow
has persisted with NNWFZ promotion and made several attempts to
increase its attractiveness. Although Brezhnev in 1981 offered
merely to consider "some measures" applying to Soviet territory in
the region adjoining an NNWFZ, Soviet Defense Ministry arms con-
trol spokesman General Chervov went somewhat further last March
when he hinted at Soviet willingness to keep USSR nuclear-armed
submarines out of the Baltic area. Andropov on May 10 then told
a visiting Finnish group that the USSR was prepared to consider
"quite substantial" measures, implying inclusion of Soviet
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- 3 -
territory adjacent to an NNWFZ. At a June 6 dinner for Koivisto
he went even further, asserting that the Soviets also would be
prepared to discuss inclusion of the Baltic Sea in an NNWFZ.
The embellishments found little resonance in Scandinavia.
The Soviets can be expected to keep pressing the NNWFZ issue,
however, and courting the Scandinavian public as opportunities
arise. Even the mere start of discussions on the subject would
serve their interest because they would view it as a step in the
direction of their ultimate objective of clouding the Danish and
Norwegian role in NATO in time of crisis.
(C/NF) Exploiting Anti-INF Sentiment
Although the Nordic NATO members (Norway, Denmark, and
Iceland) are not basing countries in NATO's INF modernization
plan, Moscow has actively cultivated left-wing organizations and
peace activists in these countries in order to bring anti-INF
pressure to bear on the ruling governments. Prime targets have
been the INF opponents within Norway's Labor Party and Denmark's
Social Democratic Party (SDP).
Norway's opposition Labor Party almost succeeded in over-
turning a parliamentary vote in November 1982 on Norway's con-
tribution to INF infrastructure funding. But the Swedish
Commission's report, periodic searches for suspected Soviet
submarines, and the KAL downing have appreciably eroded popular
backing for the anti-nuclear movement. Moreover, Moscow's image
suffered further damage from a Norwegian commission's report
issued in August on the Hardangerfjord submarine intrusion.
This report recommended measures to enhance Norwegian ability
to respond to similar future occurrences.
Regardless of decreased popularity, Moscow will continue to
encourage the anti-nuclear movement in Norway but probably has
little expectation of altering the government's stand, at least as
long as Willoch remains in power. Willoch is a strong supporter
of the US position at the Geneva INF talks and has drawn heavy
criticism from Soviet media for that reason. Moscow was particu-
larly annoyed by his March interview with a Finnish newspaper in
which he claimed that the USSR had violated nonaggression pacts
with Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during World
War II. Soviet media accused him of resorting to anti-Soviet
statements aimed at marring Soviet-Finnish relations.
Moscow probably sees somewhat brighter prospects in Denmark.
The SDP has succeeded in blocking a Danish contribution to INF
deployment. Last May it pushed through a parliamentary resolution
calling on the government to seek postponement of INF deployment
while the Geneva talks continued and brought the Schleuter
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government near to collapse. Although Schleuter supports the NATO
double-track decision, he is compelled by this resolution to
advance the views of the opposition, weakening his own stand.
Moscow has hailed the SDP's success and depicts the public
opposition to deployment in Denmark (60 percent opposed) as signs
of Alliance disunity; but its effectiveness in promoting anti-INF
sentiment has been undercut in Denmark, as it has in the other
Nordic countries, by the KAL incident and submarine incursions.
(C/NF) Outlook
Recent Soviet actions seem to indicate that Moscow is taking
steps to repair some of the damage to its relations with the Nordic
states. Danish Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen's October 31-
November 1 visit to Moscow--at Soviet invitation--suggests some
forward movement, although Moscow seems to have profited more by
the Schleuter government's fear of being upstaged by an SDP delega-
tion's visit to the USSR before its own than by any Danish desire
to improve relations. (Hints at the time of Moscow's invitation
suggested a possible rescheduling of the SDP trip, which had been
canceled in May following issuance of the Swedish Commission's
findings on submarine intrusions.) Although Elleman-Jensen's
meeting with Soviet officials--including Gromyko--produced nothing
new, it did provide Moscow with a chance to reiterate its views on
international issues to both internal and foreign audiences.
The Soviets also are dropping hints about their "good inten-
tions" toward Sweden. In an apparent attempt to allay Swedish
fears about the submarine intrusions, Andropov included assurances
of Soviet respect for Swedish borders in a September letter to
Palme. The Swedes also have reported receiving assurances that
the USSR would punish any commander who violated Swedish territory.
In any event, Moscow welcomes such positive signs as Palme's
apparent interest in trying to improve Swedish-Soviet ties and the
Danish Foreign Minister's visit--the first of a NATO foreign
minister to Moscow since the KAL downing--as INF deployments
begin. Any significant improvement of ties, however, seems remote.
Prepared by Anita Friedt
632-8657
Approved by Martha Mautner
632-9536
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