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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Interim Restraint
Box: 28
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
DTG: 231439Z MAY Resestrant 86 PSN: 056769
PAGE 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
SIT926
TOR: 143/1527Z
DISTRIBUTION: SIT MATL LINH /004
OP IMMED
STU2861
DE RUEHMO #8877/01 1431441
0 231439Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5261
INFO USIA WASHDC 4843
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD
USNMR SHAPE BE//POLAD
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD
HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO//POLAD
DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 08877
STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR CDE; GENEVA FOR USCD
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, SALT, START, INF, CTB
SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL: PRESS CONFERENCE ON SALT 11,
- -
MAY 23
SUMMARY
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
2
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
DTG: 2314397 MAY 86 PSN: 056769
1. SOVIET OFFICIALS DEFENDED THE SALT II TREATY
AS A BARRIER TO THE ARMS RACE AT A MAY 23 PRESS
CONFERENCE. THEY ADVOCATED RECIPROCAL OBSERVANCE AND
WARNED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD TAKE MEASURES TO
SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY IF THE UNITED STATES WRECKED THE
TREATY. A LARGE CHART GAVE SOVIET STATISTICS ON DIS-
MANTLING UNDERTAKEN TO STAY WITHIN SALT LIMITS. DURING
THE QUESTION PERIOD, THE SPEAKERS:
- - CHARGED THE U.S. WITH VIOLATING SALT II BY INF
DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND CONCEALMENT ACTIVITIES AT
WARREN AIR FORCE BASE;
-- -DEFENDED THE SOVIET COMPLIANCE RECORD WITH RESPECT
TO TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND THE NEW TYPE RULE;
--TOUTED THE DRAFT INF AGREEMENT TABLED IN GENEVA
ON MAY 15; AND
- ARGUED THAT POLITICAL ADVANTAGES JUSTIFIED EXTENSION
OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MORATORIUM IN SPITE
OF MILITARY DISADVANTAGES
END SUMMARY
2. CHIEF OF STAFF AKHROMEYEV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
BESSMERTNYKH, AND MFA PRESS DEPARTMENT HEAD LOMEIKO
HELD THE BRIEFING. COL. GEN. NIKOLAI CHERVOV, MAJ. GEN.
YURIY LEBEDEV, AND THE CHIEF OF THE ARMS CONTROL
SECTION OF THE MFA USA DEPARTMENT, YEVGENIY КОСНЕТКОѴ,
SAT TOGETHER IN THE AUDIENCE BUT DID NOT SPEAK.
OPENING STATEMENT
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
3
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
DTG: 231439Z MAY 86 PSN: 056769
3. BESSMERTNYKH'S OPENING STATEMENT SAID THAT
THE UNITED STATES WAS CONSIDERING ITS FURTHER
ATTITUDE TO THE SALT II TREATY, BUT THAT ALL THE
OPTIONS IN ESSENCE INVOLVE "ONE WAY OR THE OTHER,
TODAY OR TOMORROW, TO FLING THE GATE FULLY OPEN
FOR A RACE IN THE MOST POWERFUL ARMS.
BESSMERTNYKH SAID THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERED THE
TREATY "A LIVING, EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT" IN SPITE
OF ITS FORMAL EXPIRATION. " OF COURSE, SUCH A STATUS
FOR THE TREATY CAN CONTINUE ONLY SO LONG AS THE U.S.
SIDE ALSO REFRAINS FROM ACTIONS UNDERMINING THE BASIC
PROVISIONS
" BESSMERTNYKH CHARGED THAT THE U.S.
WILL BE RESPONSIBLE IF THE TREATY IS WRECKED: "THE
SOVIET UNION, IN THIS CONTEXT, WILL DRAW THE
NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS AND TAKE STEPS EFFECTIVELY
TO SAFEGUARD ITS SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF ITS
ALLIES."
4. A LARGE CHART OCCUPIED THE WALL BEHIND THE
SPEAKERS. IT GAVE THESE TOTALS FOR STRATEGIC
DELIVERY SYSTEMS DISMANTLED TO STAY WITHIN THE
SALT I AND SALT II AGREEMENTS:
- -
SALT I
SALT II
- -
......
- -
USSR
US
USSR
US
- -
----
- -
----
- -
ICBM LAUNCHERS
192
24
72
0
SLBM LAUNCHERS
255
128
0
0
MIRV'D SLBM
LAUNCHERS
0
0
0
16
HEAVY BOMBERS
0
0
21
0
TOTALS
447
152
93
16
A FOOTNOTE ASSERTED THAT AS OF MAY 23, 1986, THE SOVIET
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFI
&
WHITE HOUSE SITUAT 11 ROO
PAGE 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
DTG: 231439Z MAY 86 PSN: 056769
UNION HAD 2504 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
AND THE UNITED STATES 2210.
BT
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
DTG: 231439Z MAY 86 PSN: 056771
SIT927
TOR: 143/1529Z
DISTRIBUTION: SIT MAT LIN /004
OP IMMED
UTS2432
DE RUEHMO #8877/02 1431442
0 231439Z MAY 86
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5262
INFO USIA WASHDC 4844
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD
USNMR SHAPE BE//POLAD
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD
HQ AFSPACECOM PETERSON AFB CO//POLAD
DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 08877
STOCKHOLM ALSO FOR CDE; GENEVA FOR USCD
E.0. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, SALT, START, INF, CTB
SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL: PRESS CONFERENCE ON SALT 11,
5. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE QUESTION PERIOD FOLLOW:
UNCLASSIFIED
6
UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
DTG: 2314397 MAY 86 PSN: 056770
AMERICAN SALT II VIOLATIONS
6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT AMERICAN VIOLATIONS, AKHROMEYEV SAID
THEY HAD BEEN OUTLINED IN A JANUARY 1984 AIDE MEMOIRE
AND A JUNE 1985 TASS STATEMENT. AS EXAMPLES, HE CITED
U.S. INF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND CONCEALMENT
ACTIVITIES AT WARREN AFB. HE SAID THE SOVIET
COMPONENT IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC)
HAD INQUIRED ABOUT THE LATTER IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR
BUT HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY.
SOVIET SALT II VIOLATIONS
7. JOURNALISTS ASKED ABOUT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE
TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION AND NEW TYPE PROVISIONS OF SALT 11.
ON TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION, AKHROMEYEV SAID THE
SOVIET UNION HAD PROPOSED TO SPECIFY THE TELEMETRY
CHANNELS WHICH WERE NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION, BUT THE
UNITED STATES REFUSED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET UNION
CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT WANT TO
RESOLVE THE ISSUE. SIMILARLY, HE SAID THE SOVIET
SCC COMPONENT HAD FULLY EXPLAINED THAT THE "RS-12M"
IS NOT A NEW TYPE BUT RATHER A PERMITTED MODERNIZATION OF
THE "RS-12." HE ASSERTED THAT THE UNITED STATES
IMPROPERLY CALCULATED THE THROWWEIGHT OF THE TWO
MISSILES BECAUSE IT INCLUDED THE WEIGHT OF
TEST INSTRUMENTS FOR THE RS-12M, BUT NOT FOR THE RS- 12.
HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED THAT THE PROBLEM
HAD BEEN CREATED TO JUSTIFY U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND
NEW TYPE, THE MIDGETMAN.
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBSERVE SALT II
UNCLASSIFIED
1
UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROO!
PAGE 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
DTG: 231439Z MAY 86 PSN: 056770
8. WHEN ASKED FOR A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. FAILURE TO OBSERVE
SALT II, BESSMERTNYKH CITED A QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE ARMS RACE, IMPEDED DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS.
AND A DECLINE IN TRUST.
INF AGREEMENT
9. BESSMERTNYKH JUSTIFIED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ANSWER
A QUESTION ABOUT THE NEW DRAFT INF AGREEMENT BY SAYING
THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE IT PUBLIC AND DISTORTED
ITS MEANING. HE SUMMARIZED THE DRAFT BY SAYING,
--ITS - CENTRAL PROVISION IS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF
SOVIET AND AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN
EUROPE;
--IT ALSO INVOLVES MEASURES FOR NON-TRANSFER OF
"MEDIUM-RANGE AND STRATEGIC SYSTEMS" TO OTHER
COUNTRIES;
--IT INCLUDES A WIDE RANGE OF VERIFICATION MEASURES,
INCLUDING ON SITE INSPECTION.
NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM
10. AKHROMEYEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EXTENSION OF
THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS MORATORIUM WHILE THE UNITED
STATES CONTINUED TESTING GAVE THE UNITED STATES A
MILITARY ADVANTAGE. HE ASSERTED, HOWEVER, THAT
THE MORATORIUM GAVE THE SOVIET UNION A POLITICAL
ADVANTAGE. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR
"THE PARTY AND GOVERMENT" IN THIS POLICY.
COMBS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASS 70
8
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
PAGE 04 OF 04 MOSCOW 8877
DTG: 231439Z MAY 86 PSN: 056770
BT
UNCLASSIFIED
D
9
SB # Keep Act. an file the d - we - to
do Passified take
do Joh
Marlock
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 27, 1986
SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY
The President has decided to retire two older POSEIDON submarines as
the eighth TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials tomorrow. This means
the U.S. will stay in technical observance of SALT for some months.
This gives the Soviet Union still more time to correct their erosion
of SALT. If they do, the President will take this into account.
Our attempt to use the structure of SALT as the basis for interim
restraint until a START agreement can be achieved has always been
based on the assumption of Soviet reciprocity. It makes no sense for
the U.S. to continue to hold up the SALT structure while the Soviet
Union undermines the foundation of SALT by its continued, uncorrected
noncompliance. Therefore, the President believes we must now look to
the the future, not to the past. The primary task we now face is to
build a new structure, one based on significant, equitable and
verifiable reductions in the size of existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals. This is what we are proposing in the ongoing Geneva
negotiations.
Until this is achieved, the United States will continue to exercise
the utmost restraint. Assuming no significant change in the threat
we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the
U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or
strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.
Therefore, in the future, the United States will base decisions
regarding its strategic forces on the nature and magnitude of the
threat posed by the Soviet Union, rather than on standards contained
in expired SALT agreements unilaterally observed by the United
States.
It is high time that the Soviets honor their obligations, match U.S.
restraint, and get down to negotiating seriously in Geneva. If they
do, we can move together now to build a safer and more secure world.
PRESS GUIDANCE
May 27, 1986
U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY:
RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS
THE DECISION
Q1. What is new about this decision?
Al. The decision involves several major elements:
--
While the U.S. has gone the extra mile in trying to use the
SALT structure as a basis for interim restraint until we can
replace it with a START agreement, Soviet noncompliance has
steadily undermined that structure.
--
There is an increasing national security risk caused by
continued Soviet failure to meet the fundamental criteria of U.S.
interim restraint policy established by the President on June 10,
1985, when he decided to go the extra mile to give the Soviets
further opportunity and adequate time to join us in an interim
framework of truly mutual restraint.
--
In the face of continued Soviet noncompliance, the U.S. will
make future decisions about its strategic programs not on the
basis of the expired SALT I or SALT II agreements on strategic
offensive weapons, but in terms of U.S. and Allied security
requirements, which in turn will be largely dependent upon what
the Soviet Union does.
-- The U.S. will dismantle, rather than refurbish, two older
U.S. POSEIDON submarines now, due to current economic and
military considerations of cost effectiveness.
-- However, later this year the U.S. will deploy U.S. B-52
bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without
compensatory dismantlements under SALT II. The U.S. will remain
in technical observance of SALT II for some months, until that
time. If the Soviets use this time to take the constructive steps
necessary to alter the current situation, we will certainly take
this into account. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. were not
to retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical
observance with its terms for several years until the 10th
TRIDENT SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)
-- The U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, and
will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize
incentives for a continuing Soviet buildup. We will continue to
retire older forces as our national security requirements permit
and we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S.
strategic forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we
face, as we implement our needed strategic modernization program,
the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
2
vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does
the Soviet Union.
--
The President also stressed the importance of the
Administration's Strategic Modernization Program, including all
100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs, as well as full funding for the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). These vital programs will be buttressed
by a study assessing options for the US ICBM programs (including
the Small ICBM program and basing of the PEACEKEEPER), as well as
by acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) Program.
Q2. What were the criteria for gauging future Soviet performance
that the President established in going the extra mile in June
1985?
A2. The President indicated in his decision last June that as
future U.S. strategic deployment milestones were reached, he
would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S.
actions on a case-by-case basis in light of U.S. programmatic
options and of Soviet actions in: (1) correcting Soviet
noncompliance, (2) reversing the unparalleled and unwarranted
Soviet military buildup, and (3) seriously pursuing arms
reductions agreements at the negotiations in Geneva.
Q3. Have we really given the Soviets adequate time, and is the
President's decision consistent with the Administration's policy
announced last June?
A3. As first announced by the President in 1982, U.S. interim
restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet
reciprocity, i.e. we would not undercut the strategic arms
agreements so long as, or to the extent that, the Soviet Union
exercised equal restraint. The U.S. has for several years
remained in a state of scrupulous compliance with its
obligations, while the Soviet Union has not. During the past two
and a half years the President has sent three comprehensive
Administration reports to the Congress (the most recent one last
December) making clear the serious U.S. concerns about Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements, including those
involving strategic arms.
Last June, the President once again laid out our legitimate
concerns about the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance. He
stated that he was directing the dismantlement of a U.S. POSEIDON
submarine later that year in order to give the Soviet Union
adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual
restraint. He explicitly rejected a double standard of
unilateral treaty compliance for the United States, and he made
clear that at the next U.S. strategic deployment milestone, which
we have now reached, he would evaluate the situation in terms of
Soviet behavior in meeting the specific criteria of correcting
their noncompliance, reversing their arms build up and promoting
13
3
progress in Geneva. He reaffirmed this message in his December
1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance and also
raised these concerns with General Secretary Gorbachev at last
November's summit meeting in Geneva. During the same period, our
concerns have also been raised repeatedly, and in great detail,
at the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission.
The President believes that these clear Administration statements
and efforts seeking to resolve our compliance concerns, and the
period of nearly one year which has passed since he announced the
step of going the extra mile last June, have in fact provided
more than adequate time and opportunity for the Soviet Union to
have demonstrated by concrete steps its readiness to exercise
truly mutual restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets clearly did not
use this time for that purpose. Instead, they have failed to
correct their noncompliance, to respond constructively to our
diplomatic approaches and to our continued unilateral
self-restraint, or to negotiate seriously in the ongoing Geneva
negotiations.
The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing
the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the
Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by
their noncompliance.
Q4. Does this mean that we are at the end of the "extra mile"
the President announced last year?
A4. The President's Statement indicates that in the face of
continued Soviet disregard of their obligations, U.S. security
requires that in the future we must base decisions regarding our
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the
threat posed by Soviet strategic programs, not on standards
contained in a flawed agreement which was never ratified, and
which is continuing to be violated by the Soviet Union.
The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing
the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the
Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by
their noncompliance.
Q5. But what about the next few months, before the 131st
ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber is deployed by the U.S. near the end of
this year?
A5. The President's Statement notes that the United States will
remain in technical observance with the terms of SALT II for some
months. He continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this
time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the
current situation. The President's Statement indicates that
should the Soviets do so, we will certainly take this into
account.
4
Q6. Why did the President decide to dismantle two more U.S.
POSEIDON submarines now? Why not refurbish these boats?
A6. The President's Statement indicates that had he been
persuaded that refueling and retaining these two older POSEIDON
submarines would have contributed significantly and
cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed
that they be overhauled and retained. However, in view of
present circumstances, including current military and economic
realities and considerations of cost effectiveness, he directed
their retirement and dismantlement.
Q7. Doesn't this decision contradict the Administration's goal
of seeking an interim framework of mutual restraint? Won't this
just accelerate an arms race?
A7. No, restraint cannot be one-sided; it requires Soviet
reciprocity. The United States simply cannot continue
unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim
restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of
that structure by their noncompliance.
Nor should this decision accelerate an arms race. For the future,
the President's Statement makes clear that the United States will
make future decisions about its strategic programs on the basis
of its security requirements in the face of existing threats,
which will in turn be largely dependent upon the Soviet Union.
The President's Statement makes clear that the U.S. will continue
to exercise utmost restraint, seeking to meet our strategic needs
by means that minimize incentives for a continuing Soviet
buildup. For example: the U.S. will continue to retire older
forces as our national security requirements permit; we do not
anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic
forces; and, assuming no significant change in the threat we
face, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does
the Soviet Union.
Q8. Does the President's statement represent a commitment that
the U.S., under all conditions, will not exceed the SNDV and
ballistic missile warhead levels of the Soviet Union? Doesn't
that allow the Soviet Union to determine U.S. force size?
A8. As the President stated, given the lack of Soviet response
to our call to join us in establishing an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint, the United States in the future must base
decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature
and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the U.S.
and our Allies. To that extent, Soviet actions do determine U.S.
strategic force size.
19
5
At the same time, the President has indicated that we will
continue to retire older forces as our national security
requirements permit -- I repeat, as our national security
requirements permit.
And, as the President stated, assuming no significant change in
the nature of the threat that we face, as we implement the needed
strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more
SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the
Soviet Union.
Q9. What about the nuclear arms reductions negotiations in
Geneva?
A9. The President's Statement makes clear that no policy of
interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep
reductions in offensive nuclear arms, providing we can be
confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions
continues to be the President's highest priority. It is his hope
that the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement
he reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve
early progress in the negotiations, in particular in areas where
there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent
reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries,
appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.
We are disappointed that in the most recent round in Geneva, the
Soviets did not act to carry out this mutual commitment. If the
Soviet Union applies itself seriously in the current negotiating
round, we can together move promptly toward agreement on real
reductions in nuclear arms, as well as toward achieving greater
strategic stability and a safer world.
SALT I and SALT II
Q10. What have been the U.S. legal obligations under the
unratified SALT II Agreement? What about our political
obligations?
A10. SALT II was signed in June 1979, but was never ratified by
the U.S. Senate and, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in December 1979, President Carter asked the Senate not to act on
it. In 1981, after the U.S. made clear to the Soviet Union that
the U.S. had no intention of ratifying the SALT II Agreement,
legal obligations not to defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty pending ratification no longer applied. Subsequently, in
1982, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. undertook a political
obligation not to undercut the provisions of SALT II. This U.S.
commitment of interim restraint has always been conditioned on
Soviet reciprocity. However, the U.S. has scrupulously adhered
to its obligations, while the Soviet Union has not, and the
6
Soviets have failed to resolve our serious concerns about their
noncompliance.
Q11. What was so bad about SALT II? Hasn't it significantly
restrained the Soviet strategic buildup?
All. The President's Statement points out that the unratified
SALT II Agreement (which was clearly headed for defeat in the
Senate and which the President's predecessor asked the Senate not
to act on) was considered by a broad range of critics, including
the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and
unverifiable in important provisions, and that its most basic
problem was that it codified major arms buildups rather than
reductions.
As spelled out in the Statement, SALT II, for example, permitted
each side substantially to increase MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820
at a time when the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 and when
the Soviet Union possessed only about 600. It permitted a buildup
to 1,200 MIRVed strategic ballistic missile launchers (ICBMs and
SLBMs) when the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviets had
only about 750. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet strategic
ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of
the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over
9,000 warheads today. It permitted the Soviets to retain all 308
of their heavy missiles. (The U.S. at that time had none, and
still has none.) Its high limits applied to launchers rather
than to missiles or to warheads, whose numbers will continue to
grow very significantly even under the agreement's limits, in the
continued absence of Soviet restraint.
Q12. Is it not true that the Soviets are in a better position to
increase their nuclear forces in the absence of SALT restraints?
The Soviets have said that they would "take measures effectively
to ensure their own security". Could this set off an arms race?
A12. The Soviet Union has undertaken a massive build-up in their
offensive nuclear forces over the past twenty years. As a result,
they today already have numbers of nuclear weapons far in excess
of any legitimate defensive need. While the Soviets could add
still more weapons, it is difficult to understand what practical
purpose such further expansion could serve.
What is more, the Soviets would be able to undertake substantial
growth in their offensive forces even under SALT II. In the
absence of SALT II, this would not necessarily be appreciably
different from that which would occur if they were in compliance
with the Agreement.
We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva for deep,
equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and
intermediate-range offensive nuclear forces. We hope that the
7
Soviets will work, in practice, toward the mutual goals for these
negotiations that were expressed at the summit in Geneva in
November, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of
nuclear weapons. We believe that they will find it in their
interest, politically and militarily, to work with us toward
significant reductions at the confidential negotiating table in
Geneva, rather than to continue their unwarranted buildup.
Q13. Will we be the first to break a numerical limit associated
with SALT II when we deploy the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber
this fall?
A13. No. The Soviets have already broken a numerical limit
associated with SALT II. As pointed out in the President's
December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the
Soviets are in violation of their SALT II commitment to abide by
a cap on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) at the level
of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet
Union has deployed SNDVs above this 2,504 cap, an activity
inconsistent with their political commitment under SALT II.
Q14. What about the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms?
Will the U.S. continue to comply with it?
A14. U.S. interim restraint policy has always involved both the
SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms and SALT II. Both
agreements have expired and are being violated by the Soviet
Union. While we will no longer unilaterally observe these two
agreements, the President has emphasized that the U.S. will
continue to exercise the utmost restraint in determining our
strategic programs. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. did not
retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical
observance of its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT
SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)
Q15. What is the legal status of the SALT I Interim Agreement?
A15. The SALT I Interim Agreement on the Limitations of
Strategic Offensive Arms entered into force between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing
the Agreement were concluded in 1974. It was, by its own terms,
of limited duration and it expired as a legally binding document
in 1977.
The applicability of the Agreement to the actions of both
Parties, however, was extended through a series of mutual
political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982
statement, that the U.S. would refrain from actions which would
undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet
Union showed equal restraint. The Soviets have told us that
they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and any actions
17
8
inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political
commitment with respect to the Agreement and its implementing
procedures.
Q16. How have the Soviets violated SALT I?
A16. As indicated in the President's December 1985 report to the
Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the Soviets' use of former SS-7
ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the
SS-25 mobile ICBMs, is in violation of the SALT I provision which
prohibits the use of facilities remaining at dismantled or
destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMS.
017. What was wrong with the SALT I Interim Agreement? The
President's statement says it was unequal. How was it?
A17. Basic flaws in the agreement were that it froze rather than
reduced arsenals and for its intended 5 year duration it froze
numbers of U.S and Soviet ICBM and SLBM launcher at asymmetrical
levels to the advantage of the Soviet Union.
Under the Agreement the U.S. was limited to only 1,054 ICBM
launchers and 656 SLBM launchers. The Soviets, however, were
permitted to have 1,607 ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM launchers. In
addition, both sides were permitted to to expand their SLBM
launcher numbers up to 710 and 950 respectively, by dismantling
an equal number of older ICBM launchers or launchers of SLBMs on
older submarines.
Because of concern about these inequities, the Congress passed a
resolution at the time of SALT I in 1972 urging the President
to assure that any future SALT agreements provide for U.S. levels
(understood in terms of numbers and capabilities) not inferior to
those permitted to the Soviet Union.
Q18. What about the ABM Treaty? Will we continue to observe this
treaty even though the Soviets are violating it?
A18. Our obligations under the ABM Treaty of 1972 remain
unchanged. The President has made clear that U.S. programs are,
and will continue to be, in compliance with these obligations.
The President's statement today makes clear that we remain deeply
concerned over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast
with SALT I and II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or
unratified agreement. One of our priority objectives in the
Geneva negotiations, therefore, is to reverse Soviet erosion of
this Treaty.
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9
Q19. Even though the U.S. will no longer consider itself bound by
the SALT II and SALT I agreements, will you still be trying to
get the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance with those
agreements?
A19. We have indicated that if the Soviet Union alters its
behavior we will take this into account, especially during the
period of several months that we will remain in technical
observance of the SALT II Treaty. Following the decision to
dismantle two POSEIDON submarines at this point, we will be in
technical observance of SALT I for several years.
Even as we exercise utmost restraint on our own part we will
certainly continue to look for concrete steps by the Soviet Union
in terms of our earlier interim restraint criteria: 1) correction
of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military build
up and 3) serious pursuit of arms reductions agreements at the
Geneva negotiations.
CONGRESS
Q20. Did you consult with the Congress? What do you think their
reaction will be?
A20. We have consulted with numerous members of Congress and
would note that there are different views among the members on
various aspects of this complex issue. However, we are certain
that the Congress shares the President's serious concern about
the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance and about the
requirement to assure U.S. and Allied security needs, as well as
the President's hope that the Soviet Union will take concrete
steps to correct its noncompliance, reverse its military build up
and pursue serious progress at the negotiating table in Geneva.
We would also note that the Congress has specifically expressed
its sense (in the FY 1986 DoD Authorization Act) that the U.S.
"should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union its resolution of
concerns of the U.S. over Soviet compliance with existing
strategic arms control agreements" and that the Congress would
not endorse "unilateral United States compliance with existing
strategic arms agreements" or actions "prohibiting the United
States from carrying out proportionate responses to Soviet
undercutting of strategic arms agreements".
ALLIES
Q21. What about the Administration's consultations with our
Allies? What do you think their reaction will be?
A21. We have consulted very closely with our Allies and friends
in Europe and Asia and have taken their views into account.
While we cannot purport to speak for them, we believe they share
10
our concern about Soviet violations of existing agreements, and
they understand the rationale for the decision. They continue to
strongly support our efforts to achieve deep, equitable and
verifiable arms reductions in Geneva. This will remain our
highest priority objective.
Q22. How has Soviet noncompliance affected U.S. Allies? Can you
give any examples?
A22. Like previous administrations, we believe U.S. and Allied
security to be indivisible. Since U.S. strategic forces are an
essential part of Western deterrent capability, Soviet
noncompliance affects the security of our alliance as a whole.
The specific areas of Soviet noncompliance that we have reported
to the Congress and discussed with our Allies, clearly have the
potential, if left uncorrected and without a response, of
undermining the essential strategic balance and the credibility
and viability of our deterrent.
To give an example, Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty with the
construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, along with other Soviet
ABM activities that call into question Soviet commitment to that
treaty and suggest the possibility of a future Soviet
establishment of a nationwide ABM system, also have potentially
threatening implications for the strategic balance and therefore
for alliance security as a whole.
On the broad political level, the continued pattern of Soviet
noncompliance with existing arms control agreements (including
chemical weapons conventions, the Helsinki Act, and nuclear
testing agreements) seriously undermines the integrity of the
entire arms control process and thereby undermines as well the
prospects for developing greater mutual confidence in East-West
relations.
THE SOVIETS
Q23. Did you consult with the Soviets before the decision was
made?
A23. We have been in touch with the Soviets through diplomatic
channels, but I am not going to comment on the substance of our
diplomatic contacts.
Q24. Did you inform the Soviets of the decision before it was
made public? What was their reaction?
A24. Yes, we have informed them of the decision, but I am not
going to comment on our diplomatic exchanges.
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11
025. Did you anticipate how the Soviets would react?
A25. A wide range of possible Soviet reactions was taken into
consideration in making the decision.
Q26. Do you think the Soviets might walk out of the Geneva
negotiations because of the U.S. decision?
A26. Such a move would be unjustified and in no one's interest.
The Soviet Union walked out of the arms control negotiations in
1983, and a year and a half of valuable negotiating time was
lost. We hope the Soviet Union will not make the same mistake
again, and that they will instead start to apply themselves
seriously at the negotiating table.
Our objectives at the Geneva negotiations remain the same as
stated at the U.S./Soviet summit last November: to seek common
-ound in negotiating deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions
: strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals
d to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance
terrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we
uld no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear
taliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will
negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals.
Q27. What about the impact of the decision on a summit this year?
A27. At last November's summit meeting, General Secretary
Gorbachev and the President agreed that the Soviet leader would
meet with President Reagan in the United States this year. We
believe that such a meeting should take place. It would give the
o leaders an opportunity to discuss the broad US/Soviet agenda
- including arms control issues, regional problems, bilateral
atters, and human rights.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 27, 1986
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT
On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I
decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I
Interim Offensive Agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long
as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action,
despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to
foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious
negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required
reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security
interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.
Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I
found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain.
As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most
recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I
noted last June that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their
existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national
security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the
integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot
be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious
about compliance.
In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that
it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try,
once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint
on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our
objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go
the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to
give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join
us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones
were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future
U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in
exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their
non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and
seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.
Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea
trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our
options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet
actions since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security
interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options.
The situation is not encouraging.
While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two
areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns
with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major
arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious
and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The
deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union
continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile
testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar
remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic
force build-up. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see
the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General
Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva
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negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground,
including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic
nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an
interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).
Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only
conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions
that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the
programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall
net impact on U.S. and Allied security.
When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military
plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented.
The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for
altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will
take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous
assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face.
These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best
possible use of our resources.
The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the
oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted.
Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON
submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to
the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON
submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However,
in view of present circumstances, including current military and
economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement
as planned.
As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would
take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our
own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my
view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard
of their obligations.
Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet
noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic
modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the
continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research
program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable
basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic
modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50
PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive
force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be
adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet
noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future
in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of
defensive systems that threaten no one.
It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these
programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet
noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our
negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to
negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It
would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet
Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their
noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our
security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must
remain the full implementation of these programs.
Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM
forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has
deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet
Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under
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SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of
deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to
restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term
program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S.
ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the
100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER
and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including
the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed
the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an
assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive
ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50
PEACEKEEPER missiles and specific alternative configurations for the
Small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.
Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program
be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total
program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more
efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the
availability of additional options for the future.
This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a
fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would
have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate
in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the
Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in
important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical
to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States
and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was
clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to
act on it.
The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms
buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time
the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550
MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600,
SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to
820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers
(both ICBMs and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, SLBMs) even
though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only
about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to
retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited
ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried
by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet
ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each
of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000
warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to
constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet
ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under
the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.
In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to
undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the
Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the
Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected
Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last
June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go
the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with 01
abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet
Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to
join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint
The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.
Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the Unite
States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on
the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic
forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has
been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed
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SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had
been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.
Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON
submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the
terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy
bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year.
However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend
at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with
cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response
without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the
terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in
technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for
some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this
time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current
situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into
account.
The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet
build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet
offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major
motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we
modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national
security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable
numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no
significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic
modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the
United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads
than does the Soviet Union.
In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while
protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary
atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both
sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet
Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a
substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in
offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet
compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and
continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union
will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular
in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50
percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries,
appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the
Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve
greater stability and a safer world.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 27, 1986
FACT SHEET
U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY:
RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS
SUMMARY
The U.S. has completed a comprehensive review of its interim restraint
policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of
Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Based on this
review, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies,
we have been forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has not,
as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us
in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that
in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat
posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in
the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement
of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified,
which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues
to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim
Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also
being violated by the Soviet Union.
After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the
President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON
submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in
observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our
131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of
this year. The President has determined that given the decision that
he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S.
will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with
cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling
additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II
Agreement.
The President has also called for: renewed bipartisan support for the
Administration's full strategic modernization program including all
100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs; full funding of our research under the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ; an assessment of options on future
ICBM programs, including PEACEKEEPER basing and the Small ICBM; and
acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) program.
The President has determined that in carrying out this policy, the
United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint. We will seek
to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for
continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will
continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements
permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the
number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the President
has emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat we
face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the
U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more
strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.
The President indicated that since the U.S. will remain in technical
observance with the terms of the expired SALT II Agreement for some
months, the Soviet Union will have even more time to change the
conditions that now exist. The President hopes that the Soviet Union
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will use this time constructively; if they do, the United States wil
certainly take this into account. (Concerning the SALT I Agreement,
even without any U.S. retirement of older systems, the U.S. could
remain in technical observance of its terms for several years until
the 10th TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials in mid-1989.)
Finally, the President has reiterated that his highest priority in
the nuclear arms control area is to obtain Soviet agreement to a new
and more durable arms control framework -- one built upon deep,
equitable and verifiable reductions in the offensive nuclear forces 0
the United States and the Soviet Union. He therefore calls upon the
Soviet Union to carry out in the ongoing Geneva negotiations the
agreement which he and General Secretary Gorbachev reached at the
November summit, calling for 50 percent reductions, appropriately
applied, in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and an interim
agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. If Moscow instructs its
negotiators to apply themselves seriously and flexibly toward these
goals, as the U.S. negotiators are prepared to do, we can move
together now to build a safer and more stable world.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two and a half years, the President has sent three
reports to the Congress detailing the serious realities of Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements, including major agreement:
on strategic arms. The United States has unsuccessfully pressed the
Soviet Union in the U.S. -Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
and through other diplomatic channels to resolve our concerns.
In spite of this pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the President
decided last June to go the extra mile in dismantling a U.S. POSEIDON
submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to
take the opportunity to join the United States in an interim framework
of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms. He stated that
such a framework required that the Soviets correct their
noncompliance, reverse their unwarranted military buildup, and make
progress at the Geneva negotiations. In addition, he indicated that
the United States, which has scrupulously complied with its arms
control obligations and commitments, would be required to develop
appropriate and proportionate responses to assure U.S. and Allied
security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance. He directed
that all programmatic responses be kept open, and he requested
specific programmatic recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In recent months, the President has reviewed these issues in great
detail with his senior advisers and has consulted extensively with
Members of Congress and Allied leaders. He announced his decision in
the Statement issued today. This Fact Sheet reports on the
President's decision.
BACKGROUND
O 1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START), the President decided that the United States
would not undercut the expired SALT I Agreement or the unratified SALT
II Agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.
Despite his serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I
Agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II Agreement, he took this
action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force
deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. He
made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not
adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the
continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a
policy commitment not to undercut these agreements.
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3
O. 1985 Decision. In a decision reported to the Congress on
June 10, 1985, the President reviewed the status of U.S. interim
restraint policy concerning strategic agreements in light of the
continuing pattern of the Soviet Union's noncompliance with its arms
control obligations and commitments. He found that the United States
had fully kept its part of the bargain and had scrupulously complied
with the terms of its obligations and commitments.
By contrast, he noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly
violated several of its major arms control obligations and
commitments. His three reports to the Congress on Soviet
noncompliance in January 1984, February 1985, and December 1985
enumerate and document in detail the serious facts and U.S. concerns
about Soviet violations. The overall judgment reached by the
President in his June 1985 decision was that while the Soviets had
observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had
violated important elements of those agreements and associated legal
obligations and political commitments.
The President noted that these are very crucial issues, for to be
serious about effective arms control is to be serious about
compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our
national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the
near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they
raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control
process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and
viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a
secure and stable future world.
The President also noted that the United States had repeatedly raised
our serious concerns with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels,
including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. His
assessment was that, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve
these issues, the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory
explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet
violations had expanded as the Soviets continued to modernize their
strategic forces. U.S. interim restraint policy has always been
conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. In his June assessment, the
President was consequently forced to conclude that the Soviet Union
was not exercising the equal restraint upon which U.S. interim
restraint policy had been conditioned, that we could not accept a
double standard of unilateral U.S. compliance coupled with Soviet
noncompliance, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally
inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of our
country and that of our Allies.
At the same time, given the goal of reducing the size of Soviet and
U.S. nuclear arsenals, the President made the judgment that it
remained in the interest of the United States to go the extra mile in
seeking to persuade the Soviet Union to join us in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive
arms, as we pursued with renewed vigor, through the negotiations in
Geneva, our goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in
existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.
The President made clear, however, that the U.S. could not establish
such a framework alone. Movement toward an acceptable framework
required the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to
correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and
reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted
military buildup. Although the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a
willingness to move in this direction, the President announced that in
the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the
secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, he was prepared to go
the extra mile.
The President thus decided last June that to provide the Soviets a
further opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, the
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4
United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing
strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union
exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union
actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space
Talks in Geneva. Further, he stated that the United States would
constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long
term security interests of the United States and its Allies. He
indicated that in doing so, the U.S. would consider Soviet actions to
resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance,
continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union
and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.
As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, the
President announced that the U.S. would take those steps made
necessary by Soviet noncompliance to assure U.S. national security an
that of our Allies. He noted that appropriate and proportionate
responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it perfectly
clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail
real costs. He stated clearly that the United States would therefore
develop appropriate and proportionate responses and would take those
actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against, the military
consequences of uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms contro.
agreements.
The President decided last June that to provide still more time for
the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us
in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the U.S. would
deactivate and dismantle, according to agreed procedures, an existing
older POSEIDON submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class TRIDENT
submarine put to sea in August 1985. However, the President also
directed that the U.S. keep open all future programmatic options for
handling such strategic deployment milestones as they occurred in the
future. He made it clear that, as these later milestones were
reached, he would assess the overall situation and make a final
determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in
light of Soviet actions in meeting the criteria which he cited.
U.S. COMPLIANCE
In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to
build an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United
States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing
agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms
control agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements. For
example, we have fully dismantled one POSEIDON and eight POLARIS
missile-carrying submarines, and 27 TITAN II ICBM launchers, as new
TRIDENT missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. Unfortun-
ately, while the U.S. has been attempting to hold to the structure of
SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union,
through its continued noncompliance, has undermined the very
foundation of that structure.
SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE
In the most recent of his three reports to the Congress on Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements, issued on December 23,
1985, the President confirmed that the Administration's continuing
studies supported the conclusion that the pattern of Soviet
noncompliance continues, largely uncorrected. As documented in the
President's reports, particularly the detailed classified versions,
the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligations under, or
political commitments to the SALT II Agreement of 1979, the SALT I
Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty of 1972, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical
Weapons of 1925, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In addition, the
U.S.S.R. has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.
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In his December 1985 report to the Congress, the President noted that
through its noncompliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet
Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arm
as well as chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The President
added that in the area of strategic defense, the possible extent of
the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance with
the ABM Treaty is also of increasing importance and serious concern t
the United States.
The President noted in his December report that in a fundamental sens
all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. He made clea:
that as violations of legal obligations or political commitments, the
cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control and
darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being
conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.
In another sense, the President noted, Soviet violations are not of
equal importance. Some Soviet violations are of significant military
importance -- like the illegal second type of new ICBM, telemetry
encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar. While other violations are of
little apparent military significance in their own right, such
violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are
permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening
violations. Moreover, some Soviet actions that individually have
little military significance could conceivably become significant when
taken in their aggregate. Finally, even if a specific violation does
not contain an inherent military threat, it still undermines the
viability and integrity of the arms control process.
SPECIFIC SOVIET VIOLATIONS
Concerning SALT II, the President's December report, in addition to
citing the Soviets' SS-25 ICBM development and extensive encryption of
telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests as violations, also enumerated
additional clear Soviet violations of SALT II, including exceeding the
numerical limit of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and
concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its
launcher. In addition, the President's report cited three areas of
ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or
inconsistencies with regard to SALT II -- SS-16 ICBM activity, the
BACKFIRE bomber's intercontinental operating capability and the
BACKFIRE bomber's production rate.
Concerning the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the
President's December 1985 report cited a violation in Soviet use of
former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation
of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs.
Concerning the ABM Treaty of 1972, the President's December 1985
report indicated that in addition to illegal construction of the
ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, the
combination of other Soviet ABM-related activities involving missile
mobility, testing, rapid reload, etc., also suggested that the Soviets
might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory, which
is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Such an action, if left without a
U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the
East-West balance that has kept the peace.
Three key Soviet violations of strategic arms agreements enumerated
below are particularly disturbing -- the SS-25 ICBM, encryption of
telemetry, and the Krasnoyarsk radar:
O SALT II: SS-25 ICBM. The President stated in his December
1985 report that the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a clear and irreversible
violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment and has important
political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this
missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Agreement, which
was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The Agreement permits
only one new type of ICBM for each Party. The Soviets have informed
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us that their one new ICBM type will be the SS-X-24, which is now
undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS-25 is a
permitted modernization of their old silo-based SS-13 ICBM. The
President also concluded that the technical argument by which the
Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, calling it "permitted
modernization,' is also troublesome as a potential precedent, as the
Soviets might seek to apply it to additional prohibited new types of
ICBMs in the future.
O SALT II: Telemetry Encryption. The President stated in his
December report that Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S.
verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision
of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment
measures, including encryption, which impede verification of
compliance by national technical means. This deliberate Soviet
concealment activity, he explained, impedes our ability to know
whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements.
It could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess
accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.
Since the SALT I Agreement of 1972, the President reported, Soviet
encryption practices have become more extensive and disturbing. The
President noted that these Soviet practices, Soviet responses on this
issue, and Soviet failure to take corrective actions which the United
States has repeatedly requested, demonstrate a Soviet attitude
contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements,
undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new
agreements, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be
effectively verifiable.
0 ABM Treaty: Krasnoyarsk Radar. The President stated in his
December 1985 report that the radar under construction near
Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military
reasons. First, it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the
siting of an ABM radar, or the siting and orienting of a ballistic
missile detection and tracking radar, in the way the Krasnoyarsk radar
is sited and oriented. Politically, he said, the radar demonstrates
that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and
commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or
when they know we will detect a violation.
Militarily, he noted, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the
heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs) like that
under construction near Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM
Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a
nationwide ABM defense.
When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the
President concluded, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential
to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the
central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining
gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage.
Together with other Soviet ABM-related activities it suggests, as
noted above, that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of
its national territory, which is prohibited by the Treaty and would
have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has
kept the peace.
THE CURRENT U.S. DEPLOYMENT MILESTONE
On May 28, the eighth U.S. TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins its
sea trials. As called for by the U.S. interim restraint policy
announced last June, the President has carefully assessed our options
with respect to that milestone. He has considered Soviet behavior
since his June 1985 decision to go the extra mile and he has
considered U.S. and Allied security interests in light of that Soviet
behavior and our own programmatic options.
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Since the President made his decision in June 1985 to dismantle a
POSEIDON, USS SAM RAYBURN, in order to give the Soviets adequate time
to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim
restraint, the situation has not been encouraging with respect to the
three criteria that the President established for gauging constructiv
Soviet action -- i.e. 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2)
reversal of the Soviet military buildup, and 3) promoting progress in
the Geneva negotiations.
While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or
two areas of U.S. concern, for example with respect to the production
rate of BACKFIRE bombers, there has been no real progress by the
Soviets in meeting the most serious U.S. concerns. The deployment of
the SS-25, a second new ICBM type forbidden by SALT II, continues.
The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its
ballistic missile testing and impedes SALT II verification. The
Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of
the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, after a hopeful meeting
in Geneva last November between the President and General Secretary
Gorbachev, we have yet to see the Soviet Union follow-up in
negotiations on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by
the two leaders to seek common ground, especially through the
principle of 50 percent strategic arms reductions, appropriately
applied, and through an agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF). In light of these circumstances, it is the President's
judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions
that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of
truly mutual interim restraint.
As the President has considered options associated with the current
deployment milestone with the sea trials of the eighth TRIDENT, he has
also carefully reviewed the military programmatic options available to
the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied
security. It should be noted in this context that when the President
issued guidance on U.S. policy in June of last year, the military
plans and programs for Fiscal Year 1986 were about to be implemented.
The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for
altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning
will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous
assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction
made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a
shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face,
makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our
resources.
It had long been planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest
POSEIDON submarines. The President indicated in the decision announced
today that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these
particular two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed
significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would
have directed their overhaul and retention. However, in view of
present circumstances, including current military and economic
realities, it is the President's judgment that at this particular
juncture, the proper course with respect to these two older POSEIDON
submarines, is to retire and dismantle them, according to agreed
procedures.
PROPORTIONATE U.S. RESPONSES
In announcing his decision last June, the President made clear at the
same time that the U.S. would take appropriate and proportionate
actions when needed to assure U.S. and Allied security in the face of
Soviet noncompliance. It is the President's view that, while two
POSEIDON submarines should be dismantled for military and economic
reasons, certain new programmatic U.S. steps focused on the
Administration's strategic modernization program are now necessitated
by the continued lack of Soviet action up to this point in meeting the
criteria established by the President's interim restraint policy
decision last June.
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Strategic Modernization Program. The Administration's highest
priority in the strategic programs area remains the full
implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program to
underwrite deterrence today, and the full pursuit of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) research program to seek to provide better
alternatives in the future. The President's decision to retire the
two older POSEIDON submarines at this point is fully in accordance
with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization
program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation
always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our
security and that of our Allies -- nothing more and nothing less.
This goal ensures that the appropriate, best and proper use is made of
our national resources.
The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of
the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles to the full program of 100
missiles, which was called for in 1983 by the Scowcroft Commission, is
fully supported by our military leadership. The Administration's full
strategic modernization program has been very carefully crafted by our
best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S.
strategic program options and provides a solid basis which can and
will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued
Soviet noncompliance. The President believes it absolutely critical
that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst
way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance,
would increase the risk to our security and that of our Allies, and
would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing
arsenals that we seek. It, therefore, would send precisely the wrong
signal to the Soviet leadership.
O Bipartisan Support for the U.S. ICBM Program. Soviet actions
to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of
great concern. Last June, the President cited the Soviet Union's
flight-testing of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM
prohibited under the SALT II Agreement, as a clear and irreversible
violation and noted that deployment would constitute a further
violation. He noted that since the noncompliance associated with the
development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the
Soviet Union, the United States reserved the right to respond
proportionately and appropriately. At that time, he also noted that
the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard.
Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the
Soviet Union's deployment of over 70 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, the President
calls upon the Congress to join with him in restoring bi-partisan
support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore
both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program.
0 PEACEKEEPER (MX). The program we require should include the
full 100-missile deployment of the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. It is sometimes
forgotten by critics of the Administration's 100 missile PEACEKEEPER
program that this represents a number only one half that requested by
the previous Administration. The PEACEKEEPER missile has just
completed another flawless flight test. It makes both good military
and economic sense fully to exploit the great technical success that-
we have had with this missile.
O Small ICBM. The President believes that our ICBM program must
also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM
requirements in the future. Our Small ICBM program makes a
significant contribution not only in this regard, but also as an an
appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet
violation associated with their SS-25 mobile ICBM.
O A Comprehensive Program. To ensure that he has a more robust
range of options as he approaches future milestones, the President has
in the decision announced today directed the Department of Defense to
provide to him by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for
carrying out a comprehensive ICBM program.
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O. Advanced Cruise Missile. Finally, the President has also
directed the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, workin
with the Congress, to accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruis
Missile (ACM) Program. The President is not, at this time, directing
any increase in the total ACM program procurement, but rather is
establishing a more efficient program that both saves money and
accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.
U.S. AND SALT
Having completed a comprehensive review of U.S. interim restraint
policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of
Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, and following
consultations with the Congress and key allies, the President has beer
forced to conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those
actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim
framework of truly mutual restraint.
Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that
in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat
posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in
the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement
of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified,
which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues
to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim
Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also
being violated by the Soviet Union.
After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the
President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON
submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in
observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our
131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of
this year. The President has determined that given the decision that
he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S.
will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with
cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling
additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II
Agreement.
CONTINUED U.S. RESTRAINT
The President emphasized that the United States will continue to seek
to meet its strategic needs, in response to the Soviet buildup, by
means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force
growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our
pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The President pointed
out that as the U.S. modernizes, it will continue to retire older
forces as our national security requirements permit. Therefore, he
does not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic
offensive forces. The President also emphasized that, assuming no
significant change in the threat that we face, as we implement the
needed strategic modernization program the United States will not
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic
ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.
Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON
submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of
the terms of the SALT II Agreement until the U.S. equips its 131st
B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this
year. However, given the decision that the President has been forced
to make, he announced today that, at that time, he intends to continue
deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the
131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as
compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement. of course,
since the U.S. will remain in technical observance of the terms of the
expired SALT II Agreement for some months, the President continues to
hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive
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steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so,
the President noted that the U.S. will certainly take this into
account.
In sum, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost
restraint, while ensuring the credibility of our strategic deterrent,
in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant
reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides. This is
the urgent task that faces us.
THE ABM TREATY
Our obligations under the ABM Treaty remain unchanged. The President
has made it clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in
compliance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. The President's
statement today also makes it clear that we remain deeply concerned
over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and
SALT II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified
agreement. One of our priority objectives remains to have the Soviet
Union return to compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.
HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS
Time has not altered the basic truth that a policy of interim
restraint is not a substitute for an agreement on deep, equitable and
verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such
reductions has received, and continues to receive, our highest
priority.
It therefore remains our hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary
steps to give substance to the agreement which President Reagan
reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50
percent reductions in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied,
and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the
Soviets agree to take those steps with us, we can together achieve
greater stability and a safer world.
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os
THE WHITE HOUSE
7/30/02
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 27, 1986
SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY
Since the President came into office, he has done everything that he
could to try to persuade the Soviet Union to meet its obligations
with respect to SALT, and to agree to significant reductions in U.S.
and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In 1982, he said the United States
would continue not to undercut the flawed SALT agreements so long as
the Soviets exercised equal restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets
didn't.
In June, 1985, the President tried again. He once again stated his
great concern that Soviet noncompliance was ever more deeply
undermining the SALT structure. He called upon the Soviet Union to
join us in building an interim framework of truly mutual restraint
until a START agreement replaces the SALT structure. He went the
extra mile by dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to
give the Soviets even more time to hold up their side of the SALT
structure. It has been almost a year, and the Soviet Union still has
not responded.
Today, the President announced that the U.S. cannot continue to
support unilaterally a flawed SALT structure that Soviet
noncompliance has so grievously undermined and that the Soviets
appear unwilling to repair. Therefore, in the future, the United
States will base decisions regarding its strategic forces on the
nature and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, rather
than on standards contained in expired SALT agreements unilaterally
observed by the United States.
The President has decided to retire two older POSEIDON submarines as
the eighth TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials tomorrow. This means
the U.S. will stay in technical observance of SALT for some months.
This gives the Soviet Union still more time to correct their erosion
of SALT. If they do, the President will take this into account.
Our attempt to use the structure of SALT as the basis for interim
restraint until a START agreement can be achieved has always been
based on the assumption of Soviet reciprocity. It makes no sense for
the U.S. to continue to hold up the SALT structure while the Soviet
Union undermines the foundation of SALT by its continued, uncorrected
noncompliance. Therefore, the President believes we must now look to
the the future, not to the past. The primary task we now face is to
build a new structure, one based on significant, equitable and
verifiable reductions in the size of existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals. This is what we are proposing in the ongoing Geneva
negotiations.
Until this is achieved, the United States will continue to exercise
the utmost restraint. Assuming no significant change in the threat
we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the
U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or
strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.
It is high time that the Soviets honor their obligations, match U.S.
restraint, and get down to negotiating seriously in Geneva. If they
do, we can move together now to build a safer and more secure world.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
By
White House Guidelines, 7/30/02 1997
CAS
NARA,
Date
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 27, 1986
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT
On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I
decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I
Interim Offensive Agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long
as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action,
despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to
foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious
negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required
reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security
interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.
Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I
found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain.
As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most
recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I
noted last June that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their
existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national
security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the
integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot
be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious
about compliance.
In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that
it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try,
once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint
on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our
objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear
arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go
the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to
give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join
us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones
were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future
U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in
exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their
non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and
seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.
Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea
trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our
options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet
actions since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security
interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options.
The situation is not encouraging.
While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two
areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns
with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major
arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious
and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The
deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union
continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile
testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar
remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic
force build-up. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see
the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General
Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva
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2
negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground,
including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic
nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an
interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).
Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only
conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions
that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the
programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall
net impact on U.S. and Allied security.
When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military
plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented.
The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for
altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will
take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous
assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face.
These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best
possible use of our resources.
The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the
oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted.
Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON
submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to
the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON
submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However,
in view of present circumstances, including current military and
economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement
as planned.
As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would
take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our
own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my
view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard
of their obligations.
Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet
noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic
modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the
continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research
program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable
basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic
modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50
PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive
force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be
adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet
noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future
in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of
defensive systems that threaten no one.
It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these
programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet
noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our
negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to
negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It
would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet
Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their
noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our
security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must
remain the full implementation of these programs.
Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM
forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has
deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet
Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under
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SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of
deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to
restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term
program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S.
ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the
100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER
and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including
the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed
the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an
assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive
ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50
PEACEKEEPER missiles and specific alternative configurations for the
Small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.
Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program
be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total
program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more
efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the
availability of additional options for the future.
This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a
fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would
have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate
in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the
Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in
important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical
to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States
and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was
clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to
act on it.
The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms
buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time
the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550
MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600,
SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to
820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers
(both ICBMs and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, SLBMs) even
though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only
about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to
retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited
ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried
by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet
ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each
of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000
warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to
constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet
ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under
the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.
In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to
undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the
Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the
Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected
Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last
June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go
the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with or
abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet
Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to
join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.
Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United
States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on
the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic
forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has
been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed
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SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had
been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.
Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON
submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the
terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy
bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year.
However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend
at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with
cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response
without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the
terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in
technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for
some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this
time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current
situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into
account.
The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet
build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet
offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major
motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we
modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national
security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable
numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no
significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic
modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the
United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads
than does the Soviet Union.
In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while
protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary
atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both
sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet
Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a
substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in
offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet
compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and
continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union
will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular
in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50
percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries,
appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the
Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve
greater stability and a safer world.
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PRESS GUIDANCE
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May 27, 1986
U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY:
RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS
THE DECISION
DECLASSIFIED
Q1. What is new about this decision?
By
White House Guidelines, August 7/30/02
CLS
NARA,
Date
Al. The decision involves several major elements:
-- While the U.S. has gone the extra mile in trying to use the
SALT structure as a basis for interim restraint until we can
replace it with a START agreement, Soviet noncompliance has
steadily undermined that structure.
-- There is an increasing national security risk caused by
continued Soviet failure to meet the fundamental criteria of U.S.
interim restraint policy established by the President on June 10,
1985, when he decided to go the extra mile to give the Soviets
further opportunity and adequate time to join us in an interim
framework of truly mutual restraint.
-- In the face of continued Soviet noncompliance, the U.S. will
make future decisions about its strategic programs not on the
basis of the expired SALT I or SALT II agreements on strategic
offensive weapons, but in terms of U.S. and Allied security
requirements, which in turn will be largely dependent upon what
the Soviet Union does.
-- The U.S. will dismantle, rather than refurbish, two older
U.S. POSEIDON submarines now, due to current economic and
military considerations of cost effectiveness.
-- However, later this year the U.S. will deploy U.S. B-52
bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without
compensatory dismantlements under SALT II. The U.S. will remain
in technical observance of SALT II for some months, until that
time. If the Soviets use this time to take the constructive steps
necessary to alter the current situation, we will certainly take
this into account. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. were not
to retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical
observance with its terms for several years until the 10th
TRIDENT SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)
-- The U.S. will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, and
will seek to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize
incentives for a continuing Soviet buildup. We will continue to
retire older forces as our national security requirements permit
and we do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S.
strategic forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we
face, as we implement our needed strategic modernization program,
the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
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vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does
the Soviet Union.
-- The President also stressed the importance of the
Administration's Strategic Modernization Program, including all
100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs, as well as full funding for the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). These vital programs will be buttressed
by a study assessing options for the US ICBM programs (including
the Small ICBM program and basing of the PEACEKEEPER), as well as
by acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) Program.
Q2. What were the criteria for gauging future Soviet performance
that the President established in going the extra mile in June
1985?
A2. The President indicated in his decision last June that as
future U.S. strategic deployment milestones were reached, he
would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S.
actions on a case-by-case basis in light of U.S. programmatic
options and of Soviet actions in: (1) correcting Soviet
noncompliance, (2) reversing the unparalleled and unwarranted
Soviet military buildup, and (3) seriously pursuing arms
reductions agreements at the negotiations in Geneva.
Q3. Have we really given the Soviets adequate time, and is the
President's decision consistent with the Administration's policy
announced last June?
A3. As first announced by the President in 1982, U.S. interim
restraint policy has always been conditioned on Soviet
reciprocity, i.e. we would not undercut the strategic arms
agreements so long as, or to the extent that, the Soviet Union
exercised equal restraint. The U.S. has for several years
remained in a state of scrupulous compliance with its
obligations, while the Soviet Union has not. During the past two
and a half years the President has sent three comprehensive
Administration reports to the Congress (the most recent one last
December) making clear the serious U.S. concerns about Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements, including those
involving strategic arms.
Last June, the President once again laid out our legitimate
concerns about the continued pattern of Soviet noncompliance. He
stated that he was directing the dismantlement of a U.S. POSEIDON
submarine later that year in order to give the Soviet Union
adequate time to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual
restraint. He explicitly rejected a double standard of
unilateral treaty compliance for the United States, and he made
clear that at the next U.S. strategic deployment milestone, which
we have now reached, he would evaluate the situation in terms of
Soviet behavior in meeting the specific criteria of correcting
their noncompliance, reversing their arms build up and promoting
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progress in Geneva. He reaffirmed this message in his December
1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance and also
raised these concerns with General Secretary Gorbachev at last
November's summit meeting in Geneva. During the same period, our
concerns have also been raised repeatedly, and in great detail,
at the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission.
The President believes that these clear Administration statements
and efforts seeking to resolve our compliance concerns, and the
period of nearly one year which has passed since he announced the
step of going the extra mile last June, have in fact provided
more than adequate time and opportunity for the Soviet Union to
have demonstrated by concrete steps its readiness to exercise
truly mutual restraint. Regrettably, the Soviets clearly did not
use this time for that purpose. Instead, they have failed to
correct their noncompliance, to respond constructively to our
diplomatic approaches and to our continued unilateral
self-restraint, or to negotiate seriously in the ongoing Geneva
negotiations.
The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing
the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the
Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by
their noncompliance.
Q4. Does this mean that we are at the end of the "extra mile"
the President announced last year?
A4. The President's Statement indicates that in the face of
continued Soviet disregard of their obligations, U.S. security
requires that in the future we must base decisions regarding our
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the
threat posed by Soviet strategic programs, not on standards
contained in a flawed agreement which was never ratified, and
which is continuing to be violated by the Soviet Union.
The United States simply cannot continue unilaterally observing
the SALT structure as the basis of interim restraint if the
Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of that structure by
their noncompliance.
Q5. But what about the next few months, before the 131st
ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber is deployed by the U.S. near the end of
this year?
A5. The President's Statement notes that the United States will
remain in technical observance with the terms of SALT II for some
months. He continues to hope that the Soviet Union will use this
time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the
current situation. The President's Statement indicates that
should the Soviets do so, we will certainly take this into
account.
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Q6. Why did the President decide to dismantle two more U.S.
POSEIDON submarines now? Why not refurbish these boats?
A6. The President's Statement indicates that had he been
persuaded that refueling and retaining these two older POSEIDON
submarines would have contributed significantly and
cost-effectively to the national security, he would have directed
that they be overhauled and retained. However, in view of
present circumstances, including current military and economic
realities and considerations of cost effectiveness, he directed
their retirement and dismantlement.
Q7. Doesn't this decision contradict the Administration's goal
of seeking an interim framework of mutual restraint? Won't this
just accelerate an arms race?
A7. No, restraint cannot be one-sided; it requires Soviet
reciprocity. The United States simply cannot continue
unilaterally observing the SALT structure as the basis of interim
restraint if the Soviets continue to undermine the foundation of
that structure by their noncompliance.
Nor should this decision accelerate an arms race. For the future,
the President's Statement makes clear that the United States will
make future decisions about its strategic programs on the basis
of its security requirements in the face of existing threats,
which will in turn be largely dependent upon the Soviet Union.
The President's Statement makes clear that the U.S. will continue
to exercise utmost restraint, seeking to meet our strategic needs
by means that minimize incentives for a continuing Soviet
buildup. For example: the U.S. will continue to retire older
forces as our national security requirements permit; we do not
anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic
forces; and, assuming no significant change in the threat we
face, the U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads, than does
the Soviet Union.
Q8. Does the President's statement represent a commitment that
the U.S., under all conditions, will not exceed the SNDV and
ballistic missile warhead levels of the Soviet Union? Doesn't
that allow the Soviet Union to determine U.S. force size?
A8. As the President stated, given the lack of Soviet response
to our call to join us in establishing an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint, the United States in the future must base
decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature
and magnitude of the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the U.S.
and our Allies. To that extent, Soviet actions do determine U.S.
strategic force size.
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At the same time, the President has indicated that we will
continue to retire older forces as our national security
requirements permit -- I repeat, as our national security
requirements permit.
And, as the President stated, assuming no significant change in
the nature of the threat that we face, as we implement the needed
strategic modernization program, the U.S. will not deploy more
SNDVs or strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the
Soviet Union.
Q9. What about the nuclear arms reductions negotiations in
Geneva?
A9. The President's Statement makes clear that no policy of
interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep
reductions in offensive nuclear arms, providing we can be
confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions
continues to be the President's highest priority. It is his hope
that the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement
he reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve
early progress in the negotiations, in particular in areas where
there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent
reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries,
appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces.
We are disappointed that in the most recent round in Geneva, the
Soviets did not act to carry out this mutual commitment. If the
Soviet Union applies itself seriously in the current negotiating
round, we can together move promptly toward agreement on real
reductions in nuclear arms, as well as toward achieving greater
strategic stability and a safer world.
SALT I and SALT II
Q10. What have been the U.S. legal obligations under the
unratified SALT II Agreement? What about our political
obligations?
A10. SALT II was signed in June 1979, but was never ratified by
the U.S. Senate and, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in December 1979, President Carter asked the Senate not to act on
it. In 1981, after the U.S. made clear to the Soviet Union that
the U.S. had no intention of ratifying the SALT II Agreement,
legal obligations not to defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty pending ratification no longer applied. Subsequently, in
1982, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. undertook a political
obligation not to undercut the provisions of SALT II. This U.S.
commitment of interim restraint has always been conditioned on
Soviet reciprocity. However, the U.S. has scrupulously adhered
to its obligations, while the Soviet Union has not, and the
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Soviets have failed to resolve our serious concerns about their
noncompliance.
Q11. What was so bad about SALT II? Hasn't it significantly
restrained the Soviet strategic buildup?
All. The President's Statement points out that the unratified
SALT II Agreement (which was clearly headed for defeat in the
Senate and which the President's predecessor asked the Senate not
to act on) was considered by a broad range of critics, including
the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and
unverifiable in important provisions, and that its most basic
problem was that it codified major arms buildups rather than
reductions.
As spelled out in the Statement, SALT II, for example, permitted
each side substantially to increase MIRVed ICBM launchers to 820
at a time when the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 and when
the Soviet Union possessed only about 600. It permitted a buildup
to 1,200 MIRVed strategic ballistic missile launchers (ICBMs and
SLBMs) when the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviets had
only about 750. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet strategic
ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of
the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over
9,000 warheads today. It permitted the Soviets to retain all 308
of their heavy missiles. (The U.S. at that time had none, and
still has none.) Its high limits applied to launchers rather
than to missiles or to warheads, whose numbers will continue to
grow very significantly even under the agreement's limits, in the
continued absence of Soviet restraint.
Q12. Is it not true that the Soviets are in a better position to
increase their nuclear forces in the absence of SALT restraints?
The Soviets have said that they would "take measures effectively
to ensure their own security". Could this set off an arms race?
A12. The Soviet Union has undertaken a massive build-up in their
offensive nuclear forces over the past twenty years. As a result,
they today already have numbers of nuclear weapons far in excess
of any legitimate defensive need. While the Soviets could add
still more weapons, it is difficult to understand what practical
purpose such further expansion could serve.
What is more, the Soviets would be able to undertake substantial
growth in their offensive forces even under SALT II. In the
absence of SALT II, this would not necessarily be appreciably
different from that which would occur if they were in compliance
with the Agreement.
We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva for deep,
equitable, and verifiable reductions in strategic and
intermediate-range offensive nuclear forces. We hope that the
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Soviets will work, in practice, toward the mutual goals for these
negotiations that were expressed at the summit in Geneva in
November, with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of
nuclear weapons. We believe that they will find it in their
interest, politically and militarily, to work with us toward
significant reductions at the confidential negotiating table in
Geneva, rather than to continue their unwarranted buildup.
Q13. Will we be the first to break a numerical limit associated
with SALT II when we deploy the 131st ALCM-carrying B-52 bomber
this fall?
A13. No. The Soviets have already broken a numerical limit
associated with SALT II. As pointed out in the President's
December 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the
Soviets are in violation of their SALT II commitment to abide by
a cap on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) at the level
of 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed. The Soviet
Union has deployed SNDVs above this 2,504 cap, an activity
inconsistent with their political commitment under SALT II.
Q14. What about the SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms?
Will the U.S. continue to comply with it?
A14. U.S. interim restraint policy has always involved both the
SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive arms and SALT II. Both
agreements have expired and are being violated by the Soviet
Union. While we will no longer unilaterally observe these two
agreements, the President has emphasized that the U.S. will
continue to exercise the utmost restraint in determining our
strategic programs. (Concerning SALT I, even if the U.S. did not
retire older systems, the U.S. could remain in technical
observance of its terms for several years until the 10th TRIDENT
SSBN begins sea trials in mid-1989.)
Q15. What is the legal status of the SALT I Interim Agreement?
A15. The SALT I Interim Agreement on the Limitations of
Strategic Offensive Arms entered into force between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union in 1972. Dismantling procedures implementing
the Agreement were concluded in 1974. It was, by its own terms,
of limited duration and it expired as a legally binding document
in 1977.
The applicability of the Agreement to the actions of both
Parties, however, was extended through a series of mutual
political commitments, including the President's May 31, 1982
statement, that the U.S. would refrain from actions which would
undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet
Union showed equal restraint. The Soviets have told us that
they would abide by the SALT I Interim Agreement and any actions
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inconsistent with this commitment are violations of its political
commitment with respect to the Agreement and its implementing
procedures.
Q16. How have the Soviets violated SALT I?
A16. As indicated in the President's December 1985 report to the
Congress on Soviet noncompliance, the Soviets' use of former SS-7
ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the
SS-25 mobile ICBMs, is in violation of the SALT I provision which
prohibits the use of facilities remaining at dismantled or
destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or launch of ICBMS.
Q17. What was wrong with the SALT I Interim Agreement? The
President's statement says it was unequal. How was it?
A17. Basic flaws in the agreement were that it froze rather than
reduced arsenals and for its intended 5 year duration it froze
numbers of U.S and Soviet ICBM and SLBM launcher at asymmetrical
levels to the advantage of the Soviet Union.
Under the Agreement the U.S. was limited to only 1,054 ICBM
launchers and 656 SLBM launchers. The Soviets, however, were
permitted to have 1,607 ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM launchers. In
addition, both sides were permitted to to expand their SLBM
launcher numbers up to 710 and 950 respectively, by dismantling
an equal number of older ICBM launchers or launchers of SLBMs on
older submarines.
Because of concern about these inequities, the Congress passed a
resolution at the time of SALT I in 1972 urging the President
to assure that any future SALT agreements provide for U.S. levels
(understood in terms of numbers and capabilities) not inferior to
those permitted to the Soviet Union.
Q18. What about the ABM Treaty? Will we continue to observe this
treaty even though the Soviets are violating it?
A18. Our obligations under the ABM Treaty of 1972 remain
unchanged. The President has made clear that U.S. programs are,
and will continue to be, in compliance with these obligations.
The President's statement today makes clear that we remain deeply
concerned over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast
with SALT I and II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or
unratified agreement. One of our priority objectives in the
Geneva negotiations, therefore, is to reverse Soviet erosion of
this Treaty.
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Q19. Even though the U.S. will no longer consider itself bound by
the SALT II and SALT I agreements, will you still be trying to
get the Soviet Union to correct its noncompliance with those
agreements?
A19. We have indicated that if the Soviet Union alters its
behavior we will take this into account, especially during the
period of several months that we will remain in technical
observance of the SALT II Treaty. Following the decision to
dismantle two POSEIDON submarines at this point, we will be in
technical observance of SALT I for several years.
Even as we exercise utmost restraint on our own part we will
certainly continue to look for concrete steps by the Soviet Union
in terms of our earlier interim restraint criteria: 1) correction
of Soviet noncompliance, 2) reversal of the Soviet military build
up and 3) serious pursuit of arms reductions agreements at the
Geneva negotiations.
CONGRESS
Q20. Did you consult with the Congress? What do you think their
reaction will be?
A20. We have consulted with numerous members of Congress and
would note that there are different views among the members on
various aspects of this complex issue. However, we are certain
that the Congress shares the President's serious concern about
the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance and about the
requirement to assure U.S. and Allied security needs, as well as
the President's hope that the Soviet Union will take concrete
steps to correct its noncompliance, reverse its military build up
and pursue serious progress at the negotiating table in Geneva.
We would also note that the Congress has specifically expressed
its sense (in the FY 1986 DoD Authorization Act) that the U.S.
"should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union its resolution of
concerns of the U.S. over Soviet compliance with existing
strategic arms control agreements" and that the Congress would
not endorse "unilateral United States compliance with existing
strategic arms agreements" or actions "prohibiting the United
States from carrying out proportionate responses to Soviet
undercutting of strategic arms agreements".
ALLIES
Q21. What about the Administration's consultations with our
Allies? What do you think their reaction will be?
A21. We have consulted very closely with our Allies and friends
in Europe and Asia and have taken their views into account.
While we cannot purport to speak for them, we believe they share
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our concern about Soviet violations of existing agreements, and
they understand the rationale for the decision. They continue to
strongly support our efforts to achieve deep, equitable and
verifiable arms reductions in Geneva. This will remain our
highest priority objective.
Q22. How has Soviet noncompliance affected U.S. Allies? Can you
give any examples?
A22. Like previous administrations, we believe U.S. and Allied
security to be indivisible. Since U.S. strategic forces are an
essential part of Western deterrent capability, Soviet
noncompliance affects the security of our alliance as a whole.
The specific areas of Soviet noncompliance that we have reported
to the Congress and discussed with our Allies, clearly have the
potential, if left uncorrected and without a response, of
undermining the essential strategic balance and the credibility
and viability of our deterrent.
To give an example, Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty with the
construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, along with other Soviet
ABM activities that call into question Soviet commitment to that
treaty and suggest the possibility of a future Soviet
establishment of a nationwide ABM system, also have potentially
threatening implications for the strategic balance and therefore
for alliance security as a whole.
On the broad political level, the continued pattern of Soviet
noncompliance with existing arms control agreements (including
chemical weapons conventions, the Helsinki Act, and nuclear
testing agreements) seriously undermines the integrity of the
entire arms control process and thereby undermines as well the
prospects for developing greater mutual confidence in East-West
relations.
THE SOVIETS
Q23. Did you consult with the Soviets before the decision was
made?
A23. We have been in touch with the Soviets through diplomatic
channels, but I am not going to comment on the substance of our
diplomatic contacts.
Q24. Did you inform the Soviets of the decision before it was
made public? What was their reaction?
A24. Yes, we have informed them of the decision, but I am not
going to comment on our diplomatic exchanges.
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Q25. Did you anticipate how the Soviets would react?
A25. A wide range of possible Soviet reactions was taken into
consideration in making the decision.
Q26. Do you think the Soviets might walk out of the Geneva
negotiations because of the U.S. decision?
A26. Such a move would be unjustified and in no one's interest.
The Soviet Union walked out of the arms control negotiations in
1983, and a year and a half of valuable negotiating time was
lost. We hope the Soviet Union will not make the same mistake
again, and that they will instead start to apply themselves
seriously at the negotiating table.
Our objectives at the Geneva negotiations remain the same as
stated at the U.S./Soviet summit last November: to seek common
ground in negotiating deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions
in strategic and intermediate-range offensive nuclear arsenals
and to discuss with the Soviet Union how we could enhance
deterrence and stability by moving toward a world in which we
would no longer rely exclusively on the threat of nuclear
retaliation to preserve the peace. We hope the Soviets will
negotiate seriously with us toward these important goals.
Q27. What about the impact of the decision on a summit this year?
A27. At last November's summit meeting, General Secretary
Gorbachev and the President agreed that the Soviet leader would
meet with President Reagan in the United States this year. We
believe that such a meeting should take place. It would give the
two leaders an opportunity to discuss the broad US/Soviet agenda
-- including arms control issues, regional problems, bilateral
matters, and human rights.
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House
Guidelines,
NARA, Date 7/30/02
By
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
May 27, 1986
FACT SHEET
U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY:
RESPONDING TO SOVIET ARMS CONTROL VIOLATIONS
SUMMARY
The U.S. has completed a comprehensive review of its interim restraint
policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of
Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Based on this
review, and following consultations with the Congress and key allies,
we have been forced to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has not,
as yet, taken those actions that would indicate a readiness to join us
in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.
Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that
in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat
posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in
the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement
of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified,
which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues
to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim
Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also
being violated by the Soviet Union.
After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the
President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON
submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in
observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our
131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of
this year. The President has determined that given the decision that
he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S.
will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with
cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling
additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II
Agreement.
The President has also called for: renewed bipartisan support for the
Administration's full strategic modernization program including all
100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs; full funding of our research under the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ; an assessment of options on future
ICBM programs, including PEACEKEEPER basing and the Small ICBM; and
acceleration of the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) program.
The President has determined that in carrying out this policy, the
United States will continue to exercise utmost restraint. We will seek
to meet our strategic needs by means that minimize incentives for
continuing Soviet offensive force growth. As we modernize, we will
continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements
permit. We do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in the
number of U.S. strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the President
has emphasized that, assuming no significant change in the threat we
face, as we implement the needed strategic modernization program, the
U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more
strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.
The President indicated that since the U.S. will remain in technical
observance with the terms of the expired SALT II Agreement for some
months, the Soviet Union will have even more time to change the
conditions that now exist. The President hopes that the Soviet Union
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will use this time constructively; if they do, the United States will
certainly take this into account. (Concerning the SALT I Agreement,
even without any U.S. retirement of older systems, the U.S. could
remain in technical observance of its terms for several years until
the 10th TRIDENT submarine begins sea trials in mid-1979.)
Finally, the President has reiterated that his highest priority in
the nuclear arms control area is to obtain Soviet agreement to a new
and more durable arms control framework -- one built upon deep,
equitable and verifiable reductions in the offensive nuclear forces of
the United States and the Soviet Union. He therefore calls upon the
Soviet Union to carry out in the ongoing Geneva negotiations the
agreement which he and General Secretary Gorbachev reached at the
November summit, calling for 50 percent reductions, appropriately
applied, in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and an interim
agreement on intermediate nuclear forces. If Moscow instructs its
negotiators to apply themselves seriously and flexibly toward these
goals, as the U.S. negotiators are prepared to do, we can move
together now to build a safer and more stable world.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two and a half years, the President has sent three
reports to the Congress detailing the serious realities of Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements, including major agreements
on strategic arms. The United States has unsuccessfully pressed the
Soviet Union in the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)
and through other diplomatic channels to resolve our concerns.
In spite of this pattern of Soviet noncompliance, the President
decided last June to go the extra mile in dismantling a U.S. POSEIDON
submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to
take the opportunity to join the United States in an interim framework
of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms. He stated that
such a framework required that the Soviets correct their
noncompliance, reverse their unwarranted military buildup, and make
progress at the Geneva negotiations. In addition, he indicated that
the United States, which has scrupulously complied with its arms
control obligations and commitments, would be required to develop
appropriate and proportionate responses to assure U.S. and Allied
security in the face of uncorrected Soviet noncompliance. He directed
that all programmatic responses be kept open, and he requested
specific programmatic recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In recent months, the President has reviewed these issues in great
detail with his senior advisers and has consulted extensively with
Members of Congress and Allied leaders. He announced his decision in
the Statement issued today. This Fact Sheet reports on the
President's decision.
BACKGROUND
O 1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START), the President decided that the United States
would not undercut the expired SALT I Agreement or the unratified SALT
II Agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint.
Despite his serious reservations about the inequities of the SALT I
Agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II Agreement, he took this
action in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint on force
deployments conducive to serious negotiation as we entered START. He
made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not
adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the
continuing Soviet military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a
policy commitment not to undercut these agreements.
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O 1985 Decision. In a decision reported to the Congress on
June 10, 1985, the President reviewed the status of U.S. interim
restraint policy concerning strategic agreements in light of the
continuing pattern of the Soviet Union's noncompliance with its arms
control obligations and commitments. He found that the United States
had fully kept its part of the bargain and had scrupulously complied
with the terms of its obligations and commitments.
By contrast, he noted with regret that the Soviet Union had repeatedly
violated several of its major arms control obligations and
commitments. His three reports to the Congress on Soviet
noncompliance in January 1984, February 1985, and December 1985
enumerate and document in detail the serious facts and U.S. concerns
about Soviet violations. The overall judgment reached by the
President in his June 1985 decision was that while the Soviets had
observed some provisions of existing arms control agreements, they had
violated important elements of those agreements and associated legal
obligations and political commitments.
The President noted that these are very crucial issues, for to be
serious about effective arms control is to be serious about
compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our
national security. But, perhaps even more significant than the
near-term military consequences of the violations themselves, they
raise fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control
process, concerns that, if uncorrected, undercut the integrity and
viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a
secure and stable future world.
The President also noted that the United States had repeatedly raised
our serious concerns with the Soviet Union in diplomatic channels,
including the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission. His
assessment was that, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve
these issues, the Soviet Union had neither provided satisfactory
explanations nor undertaken corrective action. Instead, Soviet
violations had expanded as the Soviets continued to modernize their
strategic forces. U.S. interim restraint policy has always been
conditioned on Soviet reciprocity. In his June assessment, the
President was consequently forced to conclude that the Soviet Union
was not exercising the equal restraint upon which U.S. interim
restraint policy had been conditioned, that we could not accept a
double standard of unilateral U.S. compliance coupled with Soviet
noncompliance, and that such Soviet behavior was fundamentally
inimical to the future of arms control and to the security of our
country and that of our Allies.
At the same time, given the goal of reducing the size of Soviet and
U.S. nuclear arsenals, the President made the judgment that it
remained in the interest of the United States to go the extra mile in
seeking to persuade the Soviet Union to join us in establishing an
interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive
arms, as we pursued with renewed vigor, through the negotiations in
Geneva, our goal of deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in
existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.
The President made clear, however, that the U.S. could not establish
such a framework alone. Movement toward an acceptable framework
required the Soviet Union to take the positive, concrete steps to
correct its noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and
reverse or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted
military buildup. Although the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a
willingness to move in this direction, the President announced that in
the interest of ensuring that every opportunity to establish the
secure, stable future we seek is fully explored, he was prepared to go
the extra mile.
The President thus decided last June that to provide the Soviets a
further opportunity to join us in establishing an interim framework of
truly mutual restraint which could support ongoing negotiations, the
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United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing
strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union
exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union
actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and Space
Talks in Geneva. Further, he stated that the United States would
constantly review the implications of this interim policy on the long
term security interests of the United States and its Allies. He
indicated that in doing so, the U.S. would consider Soviet actions to
resolve our concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance,
continued growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union,
and Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations.
As an integral part of the implementation of this policy, the
President announced that the U.S. would take those steps made
necessary by Soviet noncompliance to assure U.S. national security and
that of our Allies. He noted that appropriate and proportionate
responses to Soviet noncompliance are called for to make it perfectly
clear to Moscow that violations of arms control arrangements entail
real costs. He stated clearly that the United States would therefore
develop appropriate and proportionate responses and would take those
actions necessary in response to, and as a hedge against, the military
consequences of uncorrected Soviet violations of existing arms control
agreements.
The President decided last June that to provide still more time for
the Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us
in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the U.S. would
deactivate and dismantle, according to agreed procedures, an existing
older POSEIDON submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class TRIDENT
submarine put to sea in August 1985. However, the President also
directed that the U.S. keep open all future programmatic options for
handling such strategic deployment milestones as they occurred in the
future. He made it clear that, as these later milestones were
reached, he would assess the overall situation and make a final
determination of the U.S. course of action on a case-by-case basis in
light of Soviet actions in meeting the criteria which he cited.
U.S. COMPLIANCE
In accordance with U.S. interim restraint policy and our efforts to
build an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the United
States has not taken any actions which would undercut existing
agreements. We have continued scrupulously to live within all arms
control agreements, including the SALT I and II agreements. For
example, we have fully dismantled one POSEIDON and eight POLARIS
missile-carrying submarines, and 27 TITAN II ICBM launchers, as new
TRIDENT missile-carrying submarines have been deployed. Unfortun-
ately, while the U.S. has been attempting to hold to the structure of
SALT through our policy of interim restraint, the Soviet Union,
through its continued noncompliance, has undermined the very
foundation of that structure.
SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE
In the most recent of his three reports to the Congress on Soviet
noncompliance with arms control agreements, issued on December 23,
1985, the President confirmed that the Administration's continuing
studies supported the conclusion that the pattern of Soviet
noncompliance continues, largely uncorrected. As documented in the
President's reports, particularly the detailed classified versions,
the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligations under, or
political commitments to the SALT II Agreement of 1979, the SALT I
Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty of 1972, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical
Weapons of 1925, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. In addition, the
U.S.S.R. has likely violated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974.
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In his December 1985 report to the Congress, the President noted that
through its noncompliance with arms control agreements, the Soviet
Union has made military gains in the areas of strategic offensive arms
as well as chemical, biological and toxin weapons. The President
added that in the area of strategic defense, the possible extent of
the Soviet Union's military gains by virtue of its noncompliance with
the ABM Treaty is also of increasing importance and serious concern to
the United States.
The President noted in his December report that in a fundamental sense
all deliberate Soviet violations are equally important. He made clear
that as violations of legal obligations or political commitments, they
cause grave concern regarding Soviet commitment to arms control and
darken the atmosphere in which current negotiations are being
conducted in Geneva and elsewhere.
In another sense, the President noted, Soviet violations are not of
equal importance. Some Soviet violations are of significant military
importance -- like the illegal second type of new ICBM, telemetry
encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar. While other violations are of
little apparent military significance in their own right, such
violations can acquire importance if, left unaddressed, they are
permitted to become precedents for future, more threatening
violations. Moreover, some Soviet actions that individually have
little military significance could conceivably become significant when
taken in their aggregate. Finally, even if a specific violation does
not contain an inherent military threat, it still undermines the
viability and integrity of the arms control process.
SPECIFIC SOVIET VIOLATIONS
Concerning SALT II, the President's December report, in addition to
citing the Soviets' SS-25 ICBM development and extensive encryption of
telemetry on ICBM missile flight tests as violations, also enumerated
additional clear Soviet violations of SALT II, including exceeding the
numerical limit of Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and
concealment of the association between the SS-25 missile and its
launcher. In addition, the President's report cited three areas of
ambiguous Soviet behavior as involving possible violations or
inconsistencies with regard to SALT II -- SS-16 ICBM activity, the
BACKFIRE bomber's intercontinental operating capability and the
BACKFIRE bomber's production rate.
Concerning the SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, the
President's December 1985 report cited a violation in Soviet use of
former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation
of the SS-25 mobile ICBMs.
Concerning the ABM Treaty of 1972, the President's December 1985
report indicated that in addition to illegal construction of the
ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, the
combination of other Soviet ABM-related activities involving missile
mobility, testing, rapid reload, etc., also suggested that the Soviets
might be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory, which
is prohibited by the ABM Treaty. Such an action, if left without a
U.S. response, would have serious adverse consequences for the
East-West balance that has kept the peace.
Three key Soviet violations of strategic arms agreements enumerated
below are particularly disturbing -- the SS-25 ICBM, encryption of
telemetry, and the Krasnoyarsk radar:
0 SALT II: SS-25 ICBM. The President stated in his December
1985 report that the SS-25 mobile ICBM is a clear and irreversible
violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II commitment and has important
political and military implications. Testing and deployment of this
missile violates a central provision of the SALT II Agreement, which
was intended to limit the number of new ICBMs. The Agreement permits
only one new type of ICBM for each Party. The Soviets have informed
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us that their one new ICBM type will be the SS-X-24, which is now
undergoing testing, and have falsely asserted that the SS-25 is a
permitted modernization of their old silo-based SS-13 ICBM. The
President also concluded that the technical argument by which the
Soviets sought to justify the SS-25, calling it "permitted
modernization," is also troublesome as a potential precedent, as the
Soviets might seek to apply it to additional prohibited new types of
ICBMs in the future.
o SALT II: Telemetry Encryption. The President stated in his
December report that Soviet use of encryption impedes U.S.
verification of Soviet compliance and thus contravenes the provision
of the SALT II Treaty which prohibits use of deliberate concealment
measures, including encryption, which impede verification of
compliance by national technical means. This deliberate Soviet
concealment activity, he explained, impedes our ability to know
whether a type of missile is in compliance with SALT II requirements.
It could also make it more difficult for the United States to assess
accurately the critical parameters of any future missile.
Since the SALT I Agreement of 1972, the President reported, Soviet
encryption practices have become more extensive and disturbing. The
President noted that these Soviet practices, Soviet responses on this
issue, and Soviet failure to take corrective actions which the United
States has repeatedly requested, demonstrate a Soviet attitude
contrary to the fundamentals of sound arms control agreements,
undermine the political confidence necessary for concluding new
agreements, and underscore the necessity that any new agreement be
effectively verifiable.
o ABM Treaty: Krasnoyarsk Radar. The President stated in his
December 1985 report that the radar under construction near
Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is disturbing for both political and military
reasons. First, it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prohibits the
siting of an ABM radar, or the siting and orienting of a ballistic
missile detection and tracking radar, in the way the Krasnoyarsk radar
is sited and oriented. Politically, he said, the radar demonstrates
that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control obligations and
commitments even when they are negotiating with the United States or
when they know we will detect a violation.
Militarily, he noted, the Krasnoyarsk radar violation goes to the
heart of the ABM Treaty. Large phased-array radars (LPARs) like that
under construction near Krasnoyarsk were recognized during the ABM
Treaty negotiations as the critical, long lead-time element of a
nationwide ABM defense.
When considered as a part of a Soviet network of new LPARs, the
President concluded, the Krasnoyarsk radar has the inherent potential
to contribute to ABM radar coverage of a significant portion of the
central U.S.S.R. Moreover, the Krasnoyarsk radar closes the remaining
gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection and tracking coverage.
Together with other Soviet ABM-related activities it suggests, as
noted above, that the Soviets might be preparing an ABM defense of
its national territory, which is prohibited by the Treaty and would
have serious adverse consequences for the East-West balance that has
kept the peace.
THE CURRENT U.S. DEPLOYMENT MILESTONE
On May 28, the eighth U.S. TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins its
sea trials. As called for by the U.S. interim restraint policy
announced last June, the President has carefully assessed our options
with respect to that milestone. He has considered Soviet behavior
since his June 1985 decision to go the extra mile and he has
considered U.S. and Allied security interests in light of that Soviet
behavior and our own programmatic options.
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Since the President made his decision in June 1985 to dismantle a
POSEIDON, USS SAM RAYBURN, in order to give the Soviets adequate time
to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim
restraint, the situation has not been encouraging with respect to the
three criteria that the President established for gauging constructive
Soviet action -- i.e. 1) correction of Soviet noncompliance, 2)
reversal of the Soviet military buildup, and 3) promoting progress in
the Geneva negotiations.
While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or
two areas of U.S. concern, for example with respect to the production
rate of BACKFIRE bombers, there has been no real progress by the
Soviets in meeting the most serious U.S. concerns. The deployment of
the SS-25, a second new ICBM type forbidden by SALT II, continues.
The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its
ballistic missile testing and impedes SALT II verification. The
Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of
the Soviet strategic force buildup. Finally, after a hopeful meeting
in Geneva last November between the President and General Secretary
Gorbachev, we have yet to see the Soviet Union follow-up in
negotiations on the commitment made in the Joint Statement issued by
the two leaders to seek common ground, especially through the
principle of 50 percent strategic arms reductions, appropriately
applied, and through an agreement on Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF). In light of these circumstances, it is the President's
judgment that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions
that would indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of
truly mutual interim restraint.
As the President has considered options associated with the current
deployment milestone with the sea trials of the eighth TRIDENT, he has
also carefully reviewed the military programmatic options available to
the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied
security. It should be noted in this context that when the President
issued guidance on U.S. policy in June of last year, the military
plans and programs for Fiscal Year 1986 were about to be implemented.
The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for
altering its planning is modest at best, and our military planning
will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous
assumptions. This shadow lengthens and darkens with each reduction
made in the funds available for our defense. Operating under such a
shadow, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face,
makes it essential that we make the very best possible use of our
resources.
It had long been planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest
POSEIDON submarines. The President indicated in the decision announced
today that had he been persuaded that refueling and retaining these
particular two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed
significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, he would
have directed their overhaul and retention. However, in view of
present circumstances, including current military and economic
realities, it is the President's judgment that at this particular
juncture, the proper course with respect to these two older POSEIDON
submarines, is to retire and dismantle them, according to agreed
procedures.
PROPORTIONATE U.S. RESPONSES
In announcing his decision last June, the President made clear at the
same time that the U.S. would take appropriate and proportionate
actions when needed to assure U.S. and Allied security in the face of
Soviet noncompliance. It is the President's view that, while two
POSEIDON submarines should be dismantled for military and economic
reasons, certain new programmatic U.S. steps focused on the
Administration's strategic modernization program are now necessitated
by the continued lack of Soviet action up to this point in meeting the
criteria established by the President's interim restraint policy
decision last June.
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Strategic Modernization Program. The Administration's highest
priority in the strategic programs area remains the full
implementation of the U.S. strategic modernization program to
underwrite deterrence today, and the full pursuit of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) research program to seek to provide better
alternatives in the future. The President's decision to retire the
two older POSEIDON submarines at this point is fully in accordance
with that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization
program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our nation
always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to underwrite our
security and that of our Allies -- nothing more and nothing less.
This goal ensures that the appropriate, best and proper use is made of
our national resources.
The U.S. strategic modernization program, including the deployment of
the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles to the full program of 100
missiles, which was called for in 1983 by the Scowcroft Commission, is
fully supported by our military leadership. The Administration's full
strategic modernization program has been very carefully crafted by our
best defense planners. It is the foundation for all future U.S.
strategic program options and provides a solid basis which can and
will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued
Soviet noncompliance. The President believes it absolutely critical
that this program not be permitted to erode. That would be the worst
way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet noncompliance,
would increase the risk to our security and that of our Allies, and
would undercut our ability to negotiate the reductions in existing
arsenals that we seek. It, therefore, would send precisely the wrong
signal to the Soviet leadership.
O Bipartisan Support for the U.S. ICBM Program. Soviet actions
to continue the accelerated development of their ICBM force are of
great concern. Last June, the President cited the Soviet Union's
flight-testing of the SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM
prohibited under the SALT II Agreement, as a clear and irreversible
violation and noted that deployment would constitute a further
violation. He noted that since the noncompliance associated with the
development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the
Soviet Union, the United States reserved the right to respond
proportionately and appropriately. At that time, he also noted that
the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this regard.
Given the events that have occurred since last June, including the
Soviet Union's deployment of over 70 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, the President
calls upon the Congress to join with him in restoring bi-partisan
support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore
both the survivability and effectiveness of our own ICBM program.
O PEACEKEEPER (MX). The program we require should include the
full 100-missile deployment of the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. It is sometimes
forgotten by critics of the Administration's 100 missile PEACEKEEPER
program that this represents a number only one half that requested by
the previous Administration. The PEACEKEEPER missile has just
completed another flawless flight test. It makes both good military
and economic sense fully to exploit the great technical success that
we have had with this missile.
O Small ICBM. The President believes that our ICBM program must
also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM
requirements in the future. Our Small ICBM program makes a
significant contribution not only in this regard, but also as an an
appropriate and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet
violation associated with their SS-25 mobile ICBM.
O A Comprehensive Program. To ensure that he has a more robust
range of options as he approaches future milestones, the President has
in the decision announced today directed the Department of Defense to
provide to him by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for
carrying out a comprehensive ICBM program.
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O Advanced Cruise Missile. Finally, the President has also
directed the Secretary of Defense to take the steps necessary, working
with the Congress, to accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruise
Missile (ACM) Program. The President is not, at this time, directing
any increase in the total ACM program procurement, but rather is
establishing a more efficient program that both saves money and
accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.
U.S. AND SALT
Having completed a comprehensive review of U.S. interim restraint
policy and of the required response to the continuing pattern of
Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements, and following
consultations with the Congress and key allies, the President has been
forced to conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those
actions that would indicate a readiness to join us in an interim
framework of truly mutual restraint.
Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, the President has decided that
in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its
strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat
posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in
the SALT II Agreement of 1979 or the SALT Interim Offensive Agreement
of 1972. SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified,
which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues
to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim
Offensive Agreement of 1972 was unequal, has expired, and is also
being violated by the Soviet Union.
After reviewing the programmatic options available to the U.S., the
President has decided to retire and dismantle two older POSEIDON
submarines this summer. The U.S. thus will thus remain technically in
observance of the terms of the SALT II Agreement until we equip our
131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of
this year. The President has determined that given the decision that
he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, the U.S.
will later this year continue deployment of B-52 heavy bombers with
cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft, without dismantling
additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II
Agreement.
CONTINUED U.S. RESTRAINT
The President emphasized that the United States will continue to seek
to meet its strategic needs, in response to the Soviet buildup, by
means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force
growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our
pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The President pointed
out that as the U.S. modernizes, it will continue to retire older
forces as our national security requirements permit. Therefore, he
does not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic
offensive forces. The President also emphasized that, assuming no
significant change in the threat that we face, as we implement the
needed strategic modernization program the United States will not
deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic
ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.
Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON
submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of
the terms of the SALT II Agreement until the U.S. equips its 131st
B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this
year. However, given the decision that the President has been forced
to make, he announced today that, at that time, he intends to continue
deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the
131st aircraft without dismantling additional U.S. systems as
compensation under the terms of the SALT II Agreement. Of course,
since the U.S. will remain in technical observance of the terms of the
expired SALT II Agreement for some months, the President continues to
hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive
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steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so,
the President noted that the U.S. will certainly take this into
account.
In sum, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost
restraint, while ensuring the credibility of our strategic deterrent,
in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant
reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both sides. This is
the urgent task that faces us.
THE ABM TREATY
Our obligations under the ABM Treaty remain unchanged. The President
has made it clear that U.S. programs are, and will continue to be, in
compliance with our obligations under the ABM Treaty. The President's
statement today also makes it clear that we remain deeply concerned
over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. In contrast with SALT I and
SALT II, however, the ABM Treaty is not an expired or unratified
agreement. One of our priority objectives remains to have the Soviet
Union return to compliance with their obligations under this Treaty.
HOPE FOR PROGRESS IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS
Time has not altered the basic truth that a policy of interim
restraint is not a substitute for an agreement on deep, equitable and
verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms. Achieving such
reductions has received, and continues to receive, our highest
priority.
It therefore remains our hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary
steps to give substance to the agreement which President Reagan
reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50
percent reductions in strategic nuclear arms, appropriately applied,
and an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the
Soviets agree to take those steps with us, we can together achieve
greater stability and a safer world.
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