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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: KAL (Korean Airlines) (1)
Box: 28
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/11/2005
File Folder
KAL 1/3
FOIA
F06-114/8
Box Number
28
YARHI-MILO
2812
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10216 MEMO
TRANSCRIPT OF SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007
5
ND
B1
D 2/22/2008 NLRRF06-114/8
10217 MEMO
TRANSCRIPT OF SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007
6
ND
B1
IN RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
D 2/22/2008 NLRRF06-114/8
10220 MEMO
SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE U.S.
4 9/1/1983 B1
RESPONSE TO SOVIET ATTACK ON
KOREAN AIRLINER: CURRENT STATUS
AND NEXT STEPS
R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8
10218 MEMO
SOVIET DECISION MAKING
1
ND
B1
R 9/30/2008 F06-114/8
10219 MEMO
CLARK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE NSPG
5
ND
B1
MEETING: SOVIET SHOOT-DOWN OF KAL
AIRLINER
R
3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
S/S 8326665
12
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
INCEIVED
WASHINGTON
September 1, 1983
9
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
George P. Shultz
ups
SUBJECT:
U.S. Response to Soviet Attack on Korean
Airliner: Current Status and Next Steps
As you return for Saturday's NSC meeting, I want to review
for you the situation with regard to the Korean airliner and
the next steps we are working on for your consideration.
The Current Situation
The Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian aircraft resulting
in the deaths of two hundred sixty-nine people, including
approximately thirty-five Americans, was a callous and brutal
act that is certain to have far-reaching international impact.
It is obvious that our own bilateral relations with the Soviet
Union cannot remain unaffected by a fresh and particularly
irresponsible Soviet resort to force and violence. Indeed, we
have already taken some unilateral punitive steps, and we will
need to consider other possibilities in the days and weeks
ahead. At the same time, we must also ensure that the Soviets
pay the full political costs of their actions in ways which go
well beyond the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. Thus, it is
essential that we work to build and sustain the broadest
possible international response to this appalling act.
Twenty-four hours after the Korean aircraft was shot down
there remain a number of gaps in our knowledge of- the events
leading up to the attack. For example, it remains unclear how
the Korean flight crew could have strayed so far off course and
within Soviet airspace. It is not entirely certain whether the
pilots of the Soviet interceptors knew that the Korean aircraft
was a civilian airliner, although some evidence suggests that
they did. The extent of involvement in the incident by Soviet
ground controllers and higher authorities in Moscow is also
unclear. However, it is clear beyond any doubt that Soviet
aircraft did move into close proximity before firing at the
airliner and that the attack was carried out in disregard for
the loss of life that resulted. By any recognized standards of
international law and conduct, the Soviet attack must be
regarded as deliberate and unjustified.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
NLRR F06-114/8461022
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 2 -
Moreover, the Soviets have sidestepped our diplomatic
efforts to elicit an explanation of the incident. As you know,
Larry Eagleburger called in Soviet Chargé Sokolov this morning
to demand an explanation. This afternoon Sokolov telephoned
Rick Burt to convey a "personal message" from Gromyko to me
that acknowledges Soviet. interception of the airliner but not a
Soviet role in its destruction. I instructed Rick to inform
Sokolov that Gromyko's response was totally inadequate and to
reiterate our insistence on a satisfactory explanation of the
affair. We have issued a public statement to this effect.
As you know, CINCPAC is already conducting a search and
rescue mission in the area where the aircraft appears to have
gone down. We plan to request access to Soviet territorial
waters to facilitate this search, and to pave the way for
possible salvage operations later on.
Elements of a U.S. Response
As you know, we have formed an interagency task force to
examine the various aspects of the case, and to consider
different responses that the U.S. and other concerned nations
could take. The U.S. response must involve both steps in our
bilateral relationship and a far-reaching effort to build and
sustain a strong international response. We have thus far
identified the following general areas for action.
A. Bilateral Steps
1. We have already notified the Soviets that the U.S. will
not move forward with the planned extension of the bilateral
agreement on cooperation in Transportation. This agreement
provides for cooperation in various areas of transportation
technology, including civil aviation safety and high-speed
water-borne transport.
2. We will have to consider urgently what impact this
incident should have on my planned meeting with Gromyko at
Madrid. I intend to go forward with the meeting and to use it
as a vehicle for conveying to the Soviets at Politburo level
our strong revulsion at their actions and our determination to
respond vigorously.
3. We are in contact with a number of prominent Americans
who are planning to travel to the USSR in the near future,
including Congressmen Gray, Boxer, and Solarz. We are not
actively discouraging their travel, but are recommending that,
if they feel they must go ahead with their trips, they convey
their views on this incident to the Soviets in the strongest
terms.
SECRET SENSITIVE
14
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 3 -
4. We are instructing our delegation to the international
communications conference in Soviet Central Asia this week to
spotlight this incident in what they say, and to refuse all
Soviet social invitations.
5. We are examining a number of other options for steps
across the gamut of our bilateral relations, including in the
economic area. For instance, we might consider reviewing all
outstanding equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry,
while pressing our allies to undertake similar steps.
B. Multilateral Initiatives
1. We have called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security
Council and will use this forum to condemn the Soviet attack in
the strongest possible terms and seek a resolution calling for
a special international investigation. In particular, we intend
to use the Council debate to expose Soviet efforts to evade
responsibility for the attack by including in the U.S. statement
verbatim excerpts from the communications of Soviet pilots who
fired the missiles. We will be pressing other nations to join
with us in issuing condemnatory statements both in the Council
debate and outside it.
2. We are urgently considering steps to organize and
support international action against Soviet civil aviation
interests, particularly Aeroflot international operations and
flights by third-country airlines to the Soviet Union. For
example, we could seek immediate allied and third-country agree-
ment to refuse to accept Aeroflot flight plans for a specified
period. We would pursue actions of this kind within organiza-
tions such as the International Civil Aviation Organization,
but much work will also have to be done in bilateral consul-
tations with other nations. In this connection, we are studying
ways to exploit the building condemnation of the Soviet attack
by private organizations, such as the International Pilots
Association.
3. We have looked at the possibility of bringing a case
before the International Court of Justice, but this procedure
would be time-consuming at best, and probably inconclusive.
C. Public Diplomacy
1. The statements already issued by you and me put us in
the correct position of condeming in strongest terms the Soviet
attack, while calling on them to explain it if they can. By
contrast, the weak and evasive Soviet statements issued thus
far will only fuel international skepticism of whatever line
Moscow may ultimately adopt to "explain" its actions.
SECRET SENSITIVE
15
SECRET SENSITIVE
- 4 -
2. We have already approached our European and Japanese
allies to urge that they issue similar condemnatory statements.
The British have already made a strong statement, and we will
continue pressing others to follow suit.
3. We will be developing on an urgent basis a public
diplomacy strategy to exploit this incident. As we implement
this strategy, we must recognize that U.S. leadership will be
essential. However, we will want to avoid repetition of the
"Olympic Boycott" syndrome in which the U.S. role overshadowed
that of other nations and private interests. Instead, the U.S.
should encourage initiatives by others and adopt a supporting
and facilitating role where possible and appropriate.
ii
I believe that, taken together, these steps put us on the
right track in developing the U.S. response to the Soviet
attack. We will be constantly reevaluating and exploring new
possibilities in the days and weeks ahead, and offering
recommendations for your review.
SECRET SENSITIVE
16
Soviet Decision Makin
- Don't know level
- would be shoching if could be done
- Pal decision also shocking.
w/o pol decision
- But precedent in '78
operatily Nothing done in interval,
Prospects for Soviet compleance
- dar position not based on
an assessment of libelihool
of for complainced
feel civ Est who has at to inquist
Based on minim which we
Reparations facts
-IfSors refuse, then what will stand
expositt for they are.
Soviet lying - why.
Good question. Not sure J know
why (Sgn only speculete).
But we know they do.
the admission
for deneging
would he embarrasing.
DECLASSIFIED IRELEASED
NLRR F06-114/8#/0218
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
We anticipate that the President will make a brief statement following
his meeting with Congressional leaders Sunday morning September 4.
A draft statement is needed by 3 p.m. Saturday, September 3.
In addition, a draft summary of the actions being announced by
the President in fact sheet format is needed for release to the
White House press corps at the time of the President's statement.
That fact sheet should also be provided by 3 p.m. Saturday.
Another requirement in connection with the statment by the President
may be a background briefing for the White House press corps.
(FYI, we anticipate Secretaries Eagleburger and Burt being on
national television interview programs at about the time of the
statement. They should have the information that the President
will be announcing, and be authorized to go into detail on these
programs. This will probably eliminate them as briefers at the
White House. We need, therefore, a recommendation from State
as to who should brief; and whether an expert on aviation safety
issues like Lynn Helm should also be available at the briefing.)
A notional outline for the Presidential statement is as follows:
--Just met this morning in an unusual but necessary
Sunday meeting with the bipartisan leadership of Congress
on two matters of national security concern.
--With regard to the Middle East, the leadership was briefed
on the current diplomatic and military situation in the
region and heard from Ambassador McFarlane, whom I asked
to return from Beirut for today's session.
--Our policy on Lebanon remains one of firm support for
the government of Lebanon in its efforts toward national
reconciliation and the extension of its authority over
all of the country's territory. Commitment to the security
if Israel's norther border and to the overall Middle East
peace policy remains a fixture of our policy. Our Marines
are in Lebanon as part of a Multinational Force to help
keep the peace. They will defend themselves with vigor
if attacked.
--With regard to the Korean airliner incident, Congressional
leaders were provided detailed information available to
the U. S. government. Will also present this at the U.N.
--We continue to call for a full accounting by the Soviets.
The world is owed an explanation, and apology, and just
restitution.
--After these important Congressional consultations, I am
today announcing these actions:
--Secretary Shultz to go to Madrid, why, and agenda.
-Asking Congress for a resolution expressing its
sentiments about this incident.
2
-Continuing arms reductions negotiations, with even greater
sense of urgency.
Taking actions affecting US/Soviet bilateral relations
as follows. (detail)
- Seeking multilateral actions with others in the international
community as follows. (detail)
-Summary and conclusions, again calling for the Soviets
to explain this action to the world, and make amends, and
join willingly in initiatives that will assure the safety
of international air travelers.
NOTE: State/Defense draft radio speech (attached), which was not
used, has excellent rhetorical content and could be used in
preparation of the presidential statement, particularly its concluding
paragraph. Presidential statement should be 7-10 minutes length maximum.
19
Draft Presidential Radio Speech
My fellow Americans, I want to talk with you today about &
subject which I know has weighed heavily on your hearts and
minds in the past few days -- as it has on mine. Last
Wednesday, Soviet military aircraft without warning attacked
and destroyed an unarmed and defenseless commercial airliner,
thus killing 269 innocent people.
This outrage came as shock to the entire civilized world,
but it did not come as a surpise to this Administration or to
the American people. This is only the latest in a series of
Soviet atrocities around the world, from Afghanistan, to
Poland, to the camps of the Soviet Gulag itself. Since we case
to office. my Administration has expressed a clear and
consistent view of the Soviet Union.
Because we have had no illusions about the nature of the
Soviet Union or its behavior, we have put in place a policy
based on realism, strength, and negotiation. The recovery of
our economic, military. and spiritual strength gives us renewed
confidence in America's ability to deal firmly with threats to
the peace and to resist Soviet expansionism. Soviet acts of
force and violence, such as this week's attack on a civilian
airliner. remind us anew how critical it is that we persevere
in the course we have set.
It's worth remembering that this is not the first time that
Soviet trigger-happiness has threatened the safety of innocent
air travellers. In 1978. Soviet aircraft intercepted another
civilian airliner which had strayed off course, attacked it,
damaged it, and forced it to land. On that occasion, disaster
was averted. This time the innocent travellers on Korean Air
Lines Flight 007 were not so lucky. The men, women, and
children who died last Wednesday were as surely the victims of
Soviet agression and brutality as the hundreds of thousands of
Afghans who have died or been forced into exile by the Soviet
invasion of their homeland.
The world cannot and will not ignore a crime of such
monstrous proportion. Voices of outrage have been raised
around the globe, both by officials of numerous governments and
by a wide variety of private groups and individuals. Indeed it
is no exaggeration to say that the entire world is demanding
that the Soviet Union give a full explanation of its behavior.
In the face of this broad outpouring of international
condemnation, the Soviet response has been not to explain their
actions, but to cover them up. Despite overwhelming evidence
20
to the contrary, the Soviets continue to refuse even to
acknowledge that they shot the airliner down. Instead they
have resorted to fabrications of some sort of U.S. intelligence
connection with the aircraft. These clumsy Soviet efforts to
make the tragic events of last week into simply another in the
tiresome catalogue of Soviet complaints about our policy would
be laughable if they were not so callous and offensive.
This indefensible attack on innocent people is not
primarily an issue between the Soviet Union and the United
States. It is an international issue in which all civilized
governments and peoples have a stake. Just as the concern is
worldwide, so is the response. The United Nations Security
Council met yesterday, with nations from across the globe
expressing their outrage. The Republic of Korea, which lost
more people than any other nation, put the demands of the world
succinctly and well. It called on the Soviet Union to offer a
full account of what happened, to apologize, to punish those
directly responsible, to guarantee unimpeded access to the
crash site, and to offer full compensation and credible
guarantees against a recurrence of violence against civil
airliners.
We believe this focus on civil aviation is appropriate.
Pilots from many countries are expressing their concerns and
considering their responses. Families which suffered such
terrible losses are demanding that the Soviet Union neet its
responsibilities. The entire international community is noving
to ensure that the Soviet Union is made to understand that it
cannot look the other way. It is appropriate that one of the
first actions this government took was not to proceed with
renewal of our bilateral transportation agreement with the
Soviet Union.
Tomorrow I will be meeting with the leadership of the
Congress to consider how America can best participate in this
global effort. I am confident the Congress will agree that we
need a strong, dignified and sustained response, one which
keeps the focus where it should be -- on the Soviet Union
against the world and not the Soviet Union against the United
States.
We will remain the peacemakers and the peacekeepers. We
will not abandon our efforts to achieve substantial reductions
in nuclear arms in Geneva. we will continue to work for peace
in the Middle East, Central America, and elsewhere -- despite
Soviet efforts to fuel conflict. We will sustain the policies
we have established; sadly reminded of the difficulty of making
a nation which rules its own people through force cease using
force against the rest of the world.
21
THE U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET
DESTRUCTION OF THE KAL AIRLINER
The United States shares with all other nations of the civilized
world a deep feeling of repugnance toward the heinous act of the
Soviet Union in shooting down a Korean Airlines civil airliner, an
act that resulted in the loss of 269 innocent lives.
For the U.S. the issue is one of preserving the standards of a
civilized international community against this thoughtless act of
violence. In cooperation with other civilized nations, the U.S.
demands justice in this matter. It demands from the USSR a full
account of what happened, information on the search operation,
assurances that the USSR will not use destructive force against
unarmed civilian aircraft in the future, and compensation for the
victims of this tragedy.
In order to realize these objectives, the United States has taken
or will take specific actions in the areas of international
diplomacy, aviation security and safety, and bilateral relations,
including the following:
The U.S. immediately told the world the shocking facts. We
did so honestly, responsibly, and carefully, as we determined
the facts ourselves.
We are conducting and assisting search efforts in inter-
national waters near the tragedy. We and Japan have asked
the Soviets to extend the search into their territorial
waters, but so far, the USSR has not agreed. We will
continue to press the Soviet Union for cooperation in this
effort, including immediate access to any wreckage or bodies
recovered;
The U.S., along with South Korea and Japan, called an
emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council,
where nations from across the globe already have registered
their outrage in the face of disingenuous Soviet efforts to
avert blame;
The U.S. will further expose the Soviet action tomorrow when
Ambassador Kirkpatrick makes public the tape of the Soviet
pilot discussions as they downed the Korean airliner;
The President is sending Secretary Shultz to Madrid to demand
an explanation directly from Foreign Minister Gromyko;
We have notified the Soviets we will not renew our bilateral
agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation;
22
- 2 -
We have told the Soviets we are suspending negotiations on
several bilateral arrangements which we had under
consideration;
The U.S. is working with other nations to seek reparations
for all who were killed. We will put forward an omnibus U.S.
claim against the Soviet Union within the next week for
compensation for the loss of life and property, for the
benefit of the victims' survivors.
The U.S. is conducting intensive discussions on measures to
secure coordinated international actions. We want to find
better means to ensure the safety of civil aviation;
We have joined with other countries to press the International
Civil Aviation Organization to investigate this crime at an
urgent special session of the Council;
The U.S. has reaffirmed its previous order denying the Soviet
Airline -- Aeroflot -- the right to fly to the United States,
and are examining whether there are steps which can be taken
to end other Aeroflot activities in this country. Unless and
until the Soviets satisfy the cries of humanity for justice,
Aeroflot should not be accepted by the world as a normal
member of the international civil air community.
Consistent with our law and policies, the U.S. will support
appropriate measures by private groups who have a special
interest in civil air safety to improve the security of air
transport;
The U.S. will redouble its efforts with our Allies to end the
flow of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union, a
need now made even more pressing by this unjustifiable Soviet
use of its military forces.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT:
NSPG Meeting: Soviet Shoot-Down of KAL Airliner
INTRODUCTION
The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious
international response. The scale of the tragedy is
dramatic--surely one of the worst in civil aviation history.
The Soviets have a long history, beginning in 1946, of shooting
down unarmed aircraft near their borders. Moreover, they have had
a policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids
which have lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be
shot down. This is the second time they have shot down a Korean
airliner. In April 1978, the Soviets shot down a Korean Boeing
707 which had inadvertently entered this airspace over the Kola
Peninsula. The airliner was subsequently intercepted, identified
as a KAL 707 civil airliner, and shot down. Significantly, the
Soviet pilot repeatedly questioned the order to fire on a civilian
airliner, and subsequently received confirmation of the command to
fire. The aircraft was hit and subsequently crash-landed on a
frozen lake in the Soviet Union. Because of SALT II, nothing was
done by the U.S. at the time.
Some to want to view this incident in a narrow context. It is
worth noting that, in addition to turbulence in Central America,
Chad and Lebanon, the Soviets may now have decided to create a
serious incident in Asia. This means that for the first time in a
long while serious trends are unfolding in every principal
theater. We have to soberly consider whether this may in fact be
a deliberate message from the Soviets on the eve of the talks in
Madrid: "Do business with us or we will make things infinitely
worse for you in areas where it will be difficult for you to
react." Given what we know about the Soviet system, it is
entirely likely that the decision to attack the airliner was made
at a very high level.
It is important that you focus the discussion at today's meeting
on the broader ramifications of this incident. What does it say
about how far the Soviets may now be prepared to go in trying to
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOG- 114/8#10219
BY
RW
NARA
DATE
3/16/11
intimidate our Asian allies - who, like the Japanese, have shown
some greater willingness to take new steps for effective defense -
or our European allies on the verge of INF deployments? What does
it say about the growing cynicism and boldness of the current
Soviet leadership? And, based on the answer to this question,
what does it say about the character and possibilities for our
bilateral relationship in the immediate future?
The chief dilemma over the near term is how to translate the
concern of the world into meaningful actions without making it
appear that we are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself.
How to devise measures that can be sustained? How to focus the
existing rage in ways that enable us to influence domestic and
international reaction of others on important issues before us;
e.g., Soviet supported terrorism, use of chemical biological
weapons, etc.
In past cases where the Soviets have committed egregious crimes
they and their apologists have attempted through disinformation
and lies to turn the force away from their actions and somehow
blame the U.S. or its allies. Unless we take the offensive they
will try to put us on the defensive.
We need to think hard about an appropriate response. One of the
things that seemed to me unfortunate about .announcing a decision
to go to Madrid--before all the relevant information on the
incident was even at hand--is that it has possibly removed an
important tool for trying to leverage an effective allied
response. A collective Allied rejection of meeting with Gromyko
at the CSCE should be pursued with vigor.
OBJECTIVES
Our immediate concern is to achieve some benefit from this tragic
event. Your personal statement and early return have already set
the tone of our concern. We must now ensure that follow on
actions are directed and structured to achieve recognizable and
coherent objectives. These objectives must be shared by the
American people, the Congress, our major allies and reflect our
status as leader of the free world. We believe that our actions
in the coming days and weeks must be designed to achieve the
following objectives:
O Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register an Appropriate
Political Protest. The indident presents us with the
opportunity to reverse the false moral and political
"peacemaker" perception that the Soviets have been
cultivating. Their active propaganda in this regard has cast
the Soviet Union as flexible, legitimate and searching for
peace. This has, in turn, created severe problems in our
efforts to convince the free world of their true objectives.
Actions to achieve this objective should be aimed at securing
domestic and international support for your programs to
strengthen western security.
O Justice. We must be seen as a leader (but not alone) in the
international community in calling for justice. Civilized
societies demand punishment and restitution as deterrents to
further activity which exceed the norms of acceptable
behavior. Despite numerous incidents of this kind, the
soviets have never acceptably investigated , reported or
identified their victims. In order to be effective the
action, we take to achieve this objective should be tailored
and proportional to the crime. We cannot be perceived as too
harsh, too weak or ineffective in the sanctions we call for or
endors.
O Bolster the confidence of Intimidated States. What we do or
fail to do in supporting the Koreans and Japanese in the days
and weeks ahead will be a telling signal to friends and allies
alike. We must be responsive and cooperative, without
appearing excessive, particularly in the case of military
support. A carefully structured security enhancement which is
not perceived as "warlike" or "threatening" will enhance our
international credibility.
ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES
O Actions to Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register
Political Protest.
-- A major Presidential speech addressing the objectives and
methods of Soviet grand strategy.
Review the degree to which our presence at negotiating
tables with the Soviets reinforces the idea that the
26
Soviets are good-faith negotiators. Consider withdrawal
from variour or all negotiations.
-- Diplomatic effort to secure public statements and
resolutions condemning the Soviet Union in relevant
international fora.
-- Major information campaign by USIA.
-- Cancel the forthcoming Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Such a
meeting should be boycotted until the Soviets provide an
explanation for the incident, an apology and reparations.
-- Consider closing the Soviet consulate in San Francisco; it
is a center for their spy network against the U.S.
electronics industry.
O Actions to secure justice.
-- Soviets grant unimpeded Western access to crash site.
-- Soviets publicly document to world-wide aviation bodies
their procedures in the case of airliners crossing into
Soviet airspace.
-- Soviets provide specific assurances against destructive
force being used again against straying airliners.
-- Soviets document that no future incidents of electronic
desception of radio air navigation signals will occur.
-- Soviets must provide full reparations to Korea and to the
families of the dead on accepted international scales.
-- Options should be prepared concerning internationally
implementable procedures to impede Aeroflot activities,
world-wide, and discourage flights to the Soviet Union for
a specified period of time.
-- Review all outstanding U.S., allied and third country
equipment sales to the soviet aviation industry and seek
immediate agreement from as many coutnries as possible to
terminate or suspend indefinitely these deliveries.
27
O Actions to Bolster Confidence of Intimidated States
-- Lease or sell AWACS to Japan to help defend regional air
routes.
-- Possible acceleration of F-16 deployment in Japan.
-- Carrier battle group deployment to the region.
-- Discussions with allies in the area to bolster regional
security arrangements.
The NSPG meeting tonight will be too brief to discuss all of these
matters. This paper, however, provides you with some thoughts to
guide the discussion. Most importantly, in whatever we decide to
do or not to do, we should keep these objectives in mind.
The Agenda for the NSPG meeting is attached. All principals have
been advised.
RECOMMENDATION
That you use the points above in discussing our options at
tonight's NSPG meeting.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
Attachment
NSPG Agenda
URGENT
LDX TO:
JOHN HUGHES, STATE PA
HENRY CATTO, DEFENSE PA
CHUCK WILSON, CIA
But
FROM:
BOB SIMS
Following the Congresisonal leadership meeting September 4
Congressman Wright made an erroneous statement to the press to
the effect that the Soviet pilots on the Korean airliner shoot-
down tape he heard had twice referred to their target as U.S.
RC-135 aircraft.
At about the same time TASS reported a Soviet official's claim
that they had thought the Korean aircraft to be a U.S. "spy plane.
Larry Speakes dealt with these issues in his on-the-record briefing,
which I will LDX to you as soon as it is available.
Later on September 4, we confirmed on background that a U.S.
RC-135 had been in international air space in the vicinity of the
Korean airliner when the airliner was initially detected by the
Soviets. The background information we provided, attributed to
"White House officials" or "Administration officials," took the
following approach:
A U.S. RC-135 aircraft was in the vicinity of the Korean
airliner on August 31 when the airliner was initially
detected by Soviet radar. Both aircraft were then in
international air space, and the U.S. aircraft never
entered Soviet air space. The U.S. routinely conducts
unarmed RC-135 flights in international air space off
the Kamchatka peninsula to monitor by national tech-
nical means Soviet compliance with the SALT treaties.
The Soviets conduct similiar monitoring activities near
U.S. missile testing areas. The Soviets are aware of
our flights and track them routinely. They know that
our aircraft do not enter their air space. The Korean
aircraft's inadvertant entry into Soviet territory should
have been an early and strong indication to them that
the flight was not a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.
The Soviets tracked the Korean aircraft and the U.S.
aircraft separately and knew there were two aircraft in
the area, so we do not think this was a case of mistaken
identity. The closest point of approach of the two
aircraft was approximately 75 nautical miles, while the
U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit. Later, the U.S.
aircraft crossed the path taken by the Korean airliner,
but by then the airliner was almost 300 miles away.
Still later, as the Korean airliner strayed off course and
overflew the Kamchatka peninsula, it was initially iden-
tified by the Soviets as an RC-135 and then as an uni-
dentified aircraft. Approximately two and a half hours
after the U.S. and Korean aircraft were near each other
in international air space, the Soviets shot down the
Korean airliner as it was exiting (or had exited) their
territory west of Sakhalin Island, some 1,000 miles from
the operating area of the U.S. aircraft.
During the two and one half hours of Soviet surveillance
of the Korean aircraft, the Soviets had radar images
(both ground and air) of the Korean 747. The two
aircraft are distinctly different in shape and size.
Their fighter aircraft also had visual contact with the
Korean aircraft. The SU-15 and MIG-23 aircraft pilots
whose voices are on the tape obtained by the U.S. and
played for the Congressional leadership never refer to
the Korean aircraft as an RC-135, only as "the target."
They made no serious effort to identify the aircraft or
to warn it. They did not appear to care what it was.
Instead, they were intent on killing it. If the Soviets
made a mistake in identification, which stretches the
imagination, they have not said so to date. In fact,
they have not to date admitted shooting down the Korean
commercial aircraft with 269 people aboard. We continue
to ask the Soviets for their full accounting of this
incident.
The presence of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on a
routine monitoring mission to assure Soviet compliance
with treaty obligations some 1,000 miles and 2½ hours
flight time from the scene of the shootdown in no way
excuses or explains this act, which speaks for itself.
(Asked why the RC-135 information had not been made
public earlier, we cited the fact that this information
was developed as part of a detailed after-the-fact analysis
of all information available to us from all sources, and
our expectation that the Soviets would provide an honest
accounting, which they have not yet done.)
Please pass the above information to appropriate offices so that
they may prepare press guidances for on the record use at State
Department, Defense Department, and White House press briefings
tomorrow.
We do not expect the President to have to address the RC-135 in
his television talk tonight unless the story escalates with the
presentation of new information today. Mention of it is,
30
however, under consideration. It will undoubtedly have to be
dealt with if there is a backgrounder at the White House prior to
the President's speech. If the Soviets or others raise the issue
in the UN Security Council session, it would seem that our
responses regarding the RC-135 should be as forthcoming as
possible, in keeping with our posture of asking the Soviets for a
full and open accounting of their actions that relate to the
shootdown.
copy to:
Judge Clark
Dave Gergen
Larry Speakes
Jack Matlock
Chris Lehman
Ken de Graffenreid
Bob Lilac
31
What we are doing
Bilaterally -- on our own:
-- As sunin soon as we knew, we immediately told
the 10 world and told them in terms we thought would be convincing.
Did it carefully - JLt brother
-- We also informed the Soviets that we would not
renew a transportation agreement with them. That agreement provides
for
.
-- We have put a hold on the opening of new consulates
in New York City and Kiev that were to be opened soon;
-- We have also delayed talks on a new exchange
agremment that would send various groups 10 from one country
to the other.
-- And We have reaffirmed our prohibiton of
Aeroflot flights to the U.S. Those flights were first cut
off after Afghanistan. We have told the Suix Soviets again
that they X are not being renewed, and I have directed that
steps be taken to make it more difficult for KHASE anyone to
purchase tickets on Aeroflot whilexxin here in U.S. (Note: RR
is anxious to close down Aeroflot office in NY and perhaps elsewhere
that are still open for business, selling tix out of Montreal, etc.)
32
-- Absolutely need to get in the point that this
is not a controveryy between Soviets and the United States -
this is one where Soviets have offended the entire world with
their behavior.
-- As you know, NSC is sending along more information
about the 1978 incident (more concrete details) and about
a Volga boat incident. Forfier working. * I'm giving you
transcript of tapes. Need to work in Atwater-type material,
too, хинк of course.
- I argee with you that we ought X to have X some
detail up front about scenario of events. One key at set of
facts is that we asked them 3 times for to be able to go
into area, look for pussible wreckage and possible survivors.
Only Sunday * did they respond -- янихки several days after
event -- and unly then they wanted to know more precisely what
we would send in. We also ought to harp
on fact not only of incident but of cover-up.
Remain: we still
has to live - same
planet as Society
33
are doing
For our part, we shall do the following:
First, disclosed
are
First, we will continue to press the Soviet leaders to
follow the honorable course of investigating and disclosing
the facts, taking corrective action, making restitution, and
providing concrete assurances that such wanton acts will not
be repeated. (Add on restitution)
Second to make clear to the Soviets our deep feelings
on this tragedy, we will not renew our bilateral agreement
for cooperation in the field of transportation, will
with
reaffirm our exclusion of the Soviet airline from the United
States, and will suspend negotiation of several bilateral
arrangements. shitts to Leneva (?)
Multi
Think, Conquesional Resolution
24N
are
3) Third, we will cooperate with other countries in
2)
per section
seeking better means to insure the safety of civil aviation.
One aspect of this effort should be a clear recognition
that, if the Soviet leaders refuse to satisfy the cries of
humanity for justice, their airline should not be accepted
as a normal member of the international civil air community.
And the issue is one which should draw the concerned
attention of international organizations which deal with
civil aviation.
are
ing
Fourth, we will listen carefully to the views of
private groups, both American and international, who have a
special interest in civil air safety--airline pilots,
passenger associations and others--so that we can work in
concert with them to improve the security of air transport.
on tech transfer.
Fifth, also will reclaule own efforts
34
Other points to be made along the way
- To this day, the Soviets have not told their own
public that the plane went down and with 269 aboard, Namexwaky
much less admit their compliet responsibility
on it.
- RRXWXRK On question of culpability, X RR wants
to point K out that they have never even acknowledged that
they shot the plane down.
-- Major transition point
in speech is to idea that true test of our resolve is ***
make
pursue x policies over the long run that make
us safer. Skengkk Get to peace thru strength theme. And
make strong pitch for deployment, defense budget, MX vote,
etc. -- concrete actions over the next few yKaK months and
years that will make the world safer.
-- Bobby Byrd makes the point that warld West
should better understand now that if the Soviets attack
a defense airliner -- if their system permits that - then it
is not beyond realm of X belief that if a city is unarmed
or nation is unarmed, they might permit an attack upon it.
He makes this argument in k order to bolster carse for
Pershing deployment.
-- Also need to work into bilateral actions the fact
that RR is asking Congress for a joint resolution of condemnation.
Should talk about need k for bipartisanship, the good consultation
he has had with them.
35
-- Working with both our allies
and on our own, we also intend to continue pressing Soviets
for a full explanation and an apology. Sect. Shultz leaving
tomorrow for Madrid ин to meet iwth Foriegn Minister Gromyko
and I have directed him to make this incident the first
item on the agenda. These talks will not be business asx usual.
Indeed, the whole purpose of the Madrid meetings of vari-us
foreign ministere is to work on и human rights, and the
¥ atrocity of kkis last week is one of the grossest violations
of human rights in recent memory.
36
Note on punishment:
Can ha note before going to laundry listx that Soviets are
already paying a heavy price in the XXMXX court of world X
opinion. In the past
few years, the Soviess have rigged up one of the most elaborate
and expensive propaganda machines in the world. X Wx Our
spending on international information is outstripped by
Soviets by about 4-to-1 (??), as they have assiduously
sought to XXX portray themselves as peacemakess. That
carefully cultivated imaged has been shap shattered fax now.
XXXXXXXXXXX Recognizion that their
bureaucracy is secretive, paranoid, and cutthroat now
seared into world's memory. Cannot forget it.
37
The Soviets face a clear choice in dealing with this
tragedy. If they have any concern for innocent human
life--as they repeatedly claim--they will immediately and
publicly investigate the incident, explain to the world how
it came about, punish those guilty of this heinous crime,
cooperate in efforts to find the wreckage and recover the
bodies, offer compensation to the bereaved families, and
change the orders given to their military units to prevent
calculated attacks on civilian aircraft, whatever the
circumstances.
continue to
If, on the other hand, they refuse to face the facts
publicly and instead deny them and attempt to confuse the
public with fabrications, distortions and innuendo--as their
controlled media and diplomatic representatives have done up
to now--then they will stand exposed to the world as callous
brutes who recognize no limits on the use of violence, so
long as it can be used with impunity.
Not long ago, in a tragic accident, a Soviet passenger
boat struck a bridge while travelling down the Volga River.
Hundreds of Soviet citizens died. The Soviet Government
immediately had one of its most senior officials lead an
inquiry. Within a very short time the government announced
its findings. Negligence was found and procedures were
instituted to prevent further accidents. Certainly the
Soviet Government bears a heavy responsibility for launching
a similar investigation of the attack on the Korean
38
airliner. Or do they believe that a Korean, Japanese or Recommend
12
Naturall
American life is worth less than a Russian life?
Delde
But the world must not stand still and allow violence
to be used against humanity without exacting a penalty and
taking steps to protect itself. That is why I spent this
weekend consulting with my advisers, Congressional leaders,
representatives of other countries and the public regarding
the steps we should take.
(Value of Compressional consultution)
For our part, this is what we are doing:
-- we immediately told the world of the shocking
determined facts. We the did so responsi bly and curefully, as use
facts ourselves.
in international We are waters conducting man and the tragedy. assisting search efforts
--We are continuing to press the Soviet leaders to
follow the honorable course of investigating and disclosing
the facts, taking corrective action, making restitution, and
providing concrete assurances that such wanton acts will not
be repeated. And let me say here that I believe
this
compensation to the relatives of the victims is a moral duty
which the Soviets must assume.
--To make clear to the Soviets our deep feelings
on this tragedy, we will not renew our bilateral agreement
for cooperation in the field of transportation.
--We also will reaffirm our exclusion of the
Soviet airline from the United States, and will suspend
negotiation of several bilateral arrangements.
--I am asking Congress to pass a joint resolution
of condemnation of this Soviet crime.
--I have instructed Secretary Shultz to make this
matter the center of his meeting with Foreign Minister
Gromyko next week.
Some steps we can take ourselves, but the most
effective ones must be in concert with other concerned
nations. The issue is not one just between the Soviet Union
and the United States, but between the Soviet regime and
humanity.
Working in concert with other nations, we are doing the
following:
First, along with Korea and Japan, we called an
emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council.
Debate began Friday and there, many governments- Korea, Japan,
Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, France, China,
the United KingdomA New Zealand and Zaire- joined us in
Federal Republic of Germany Aioi already spoke out
withus expressing horror at the Soviet action. When the debute
resumes on Tuesday - more Nations will
Second, we will work with other nations to seek
reparations for those who were killed. Americans made up a
40
large contingent on the plane, but there were also citizens
on there from over a dozen other nations.
Third, we are cooperating with other countries to find
better means to insure the safety of civil aviation. One
repeatives end
aspect of this effort should be a clear recognition that, if
the Soviet leaders refuse to satisfy the cries of humanity
Acrafent
for justice, their airline should not be accepted as a
normal member of the international civil air community. And
the issue is one which should draw the concerned attention
of international organizations which deal with civil
aviation.
Fourth, we are listening carefully to the views of
private groups, both American and international, who have a
special interest in civil air safety--airline pilots,
passenger associations and others--so that we can work in
concert with them to improve the security of air transport.
Fifth, in the economic area in general, we will
redouble our efforts to work with our Allies to end the flow
of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union. We
have already made progress in this area. We hope for more.
We will pursue these courses of action vigorously and
will not flag in the effort to impress upon the Soviet
leaders the just demands of the world public. That is why I
have instructed Secretary Shultz to proceed with his
scheduled meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid
slize every
this week. We must not let slip any opportunity to
communicate our views directly to decision-makers in Moscow.
41
We will also continue our efforts to achieve balanced,
verifiable reductions of arms, since this is most important
for maintaining peace and security in the world. That is
why Ambassador Nitze has returned to Geneva for the next
round of negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons
in Europe. Our policy of seeking to reduce the arms burden
has not changed and will not change.
But the barbarous Soviet act in deliberately shooting
down a defenseless airliner brings home to us once again the
need to rebuild and maintain our military and economic
strength, and to help our Allies and friends maintain
theirs. For we must have the means to defend ourselves and
maintain the peace in a world where some respect only
strength. We cannot rely on the good will and civilized
restraint of a power which shoots down civilian
aircraft. And without strength, we will never be able to
achieve the balanced, verifiable reductions in arms which we
so much desire.
Let us rededicate ourselves to achieving the goals we
have pursued from the beginning of this Administration. We
know our responsibilities. We know it will be hard to make
a nation that rules its own people through force cease using
force against the rest of the world. But that is the task
before us.
42
The Soviets face a clear choice in dealing with this
tragedy. If they have any concern for innocent human
life--as they repeatedly claim--they will immediately and
publicly investigate the incident, explain to the world how
it came about, punish those guilty of this heinous crime,
cooperate in efforts to find the wreckage and recover the
bodies, offer compensation to the bereaved families, and
change the orders given to their military units to prevent
calculated attacks on civilian aircraft, whatever the
circumstances.
If, on the other hand, they refuse to face the facts
publicly and instead deny them and attempt to confuse the
public with fabrications, distortions and innuendo--as their
controlled media have done up to now--then they will stand
exposed to the world as callous brutes who recognize no
limits on the use of violence, so long as it can be used
with impunity.
But the world must not stand still and allow violence
to be used against humanity without exacting a penalty and
taking steps to protect itself. That is why I returned to
Washington this weekend to consult with my advisers,
Congressional leaders, representatives of other countries
and the public regarding the steps we should take. Some
steps we can do ourselves, but the most effective ones must
be in concert with other concerned nations. The issue is
not one just between the Soviet Union and the United States,
but between the Soviet regime and humanity.
43
We will pursue these courses of action vigorously and
will not flag in the effort to impress upon the Soviet
leaders the just demands of the world public. That is why I
have instructed Secretary Shultz to proceed with his
scheduled meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid
this week. We must not let slip any opportunity to
communicate our views directly to decision-makers in Moscow.
We will also continue our efforts to achieve balanced,
verifiable reductions of arms, since this is most important
for maintaining peace and security in the world. That is
why Ambassador Nitze has returned to Geneva for the next
round of negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons
in Europe. Our policy of seeking to reduce the arms burden
has not changed and will not change.
But the barbarous Soviet act in deliberately shooting
down a defenseless airliner brings home to us once again the
need to rebuild and maintain our military and economic
strength, and to help our Allies and friends maintain
theirs. For we must have the means to defend ourselves and
maintain the peace in a world where some respect only
strength. We cannot rely on the good will and civilized
restraint of a power which shoots down loaded civilian
aircraft. And without strength, we will never be able to
achieve the balanced, verifiable reductions in arms which we
so much desire.
Let us rededicate ourselves to achieving the goals we
have pursued from the beginning of this Administration. We
For our part, we shall do the following:
First, we will continue to press the Soviet leaders to
follow the honorable course of investigating and disclosing
the facts, taking corrective action, making restitution, and
providing concrete assurances that such wanton acts will not
be repeated.
Second, to make clear to the Soviets our deep feelings
on this tragedy, we will not renew our bilateral agreement
for cooperation in the field of transportation, will
reaffirm our exclusion of the Soviet airline from the United
States, and will suspend negotiation of several bilateral
arrangements.
Third, we will cooperate with other countries in
seeking better means to insure the safety of civil aviation.
One aspect of this effort should be a clear recognition
that, if the Soviet leaders refuse to satisfy the cries of
humanity for justice, their airline should not be accepted
as a normal member of the international civil air community.
And the issue is one which should draw the concerned
attention of international organizations which deal with
civil aviation.
Fourth, we will listen carefully to the views of
private groups, both American and international, who have a
special interest in civil air safety--airline pilots,
passenger associations and others--so that we can work in
concert with them to improve the security of air transport.
45
know our responsibilities. We know it will be hard to make
a nation that rules its own people through force cease using
force against the rest of the world. But that is the task
before us.
46
From the very moment we learned of the tragedy, we have
been active.
First, we immediately told the world of the shocking
facts. We did so responsibly and carefully, as we
determined the facts ourselves.
Second, we supported a call for a meeting of the United
Nations Security Council, which gave many nations the
opportunity to express their outrage.
Third, we are conducting and assisting search efforts
in international waters near the tragedy.
Fourth, we informed the Soviet Union that we will not
renew the agreement to cooperate in the field of
transportation. Civil aviation is one of the areas which
that agreement covers and we clearly cannot cooperate with
47
Working in concern with other nations:
-- Along with Харян Korea and Japan, called emergency
meeting of the Nn U.N. Security Council. Debate began Friday
and many nations ******* - X name them - have already condemned
the Soviets. They ******** have offered only answers that
distort the evidence. Debate will resume tomorrow in NYC.
-- We want to work with other pmw.nations to
seek reparations for those who were killed. Soviets must pay
just compensation to families. Americans
made up large X contingent on plane -- over 50 U.S. citizens
on board -- but there were also citizens on there from over
a dozen other nations (identified so far). International
X Court of Justice may be forum for this (note, Ben: RR thinks
reparations and aviation are two key elements of response. He
is very hot on reparations).
-- We are working with allies on ways to isolate
Aeroflot flights. The This will be matter we will take up with
International Civil Aviation Organization X in Montreal.
-- In economic HE area, we at are also working with
allies on ways to ************* end flow of military and
strategic items to USSR. Have already made progress on this
front in past year; hope to make more now.