Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
215872159
label
NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) and Talking Points [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva] (1)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
215872159
contentType
document
title
NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) and Talking Points [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva] (1)
citationUrl
collections
Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
215872159
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
6f69343c6067fec2
ocrText
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: NSDD (National Security Decision
Directive) & Talking Points [Shultz-Gromyko
Meeting in Geneva] (1)
Box: 29
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/13/2005
File Folder
NSDD AND TALKING POINTS [SHULTZ-GROMYKO
FOIA
MEETING IN GERMANY] (1/2)
F06-114/8
Box Number
29
YARHI-MILO
2904
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10351 LETTER
CASEY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE USSR
6 12/21/1984 B1 B3
PAR 3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
10352 PAPER
US CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR SOVIET
4 2/15/1983 B3
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCE
LIMITATIONS COVER SHEET AND TABLE
OF CONTENTS
PAR 3/16/2011
F2006-114/8
10353 MEMO
ADELMAN TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
9 12/26/1984 B1
PROPOSED STRATEGY AND POSITIONS FOR
SHULTZ UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH
GROMYKO
PAR
2/25/2008
NLRRF06-114/8
DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
LINHARD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Jack Matlock O OF
EYE3 ONLY
"
PRESERVATION.COPT
CHECK
US 7/29/12
HE WHITE HOUSE
7/29/20 Casey Memo
WASHINGTON
Septer 10
matlock
3
Matlock
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
December 20, 1984
FYI--attached is a copy of Bud's
backgrounder from today.
Karna
4
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
January 3, 1985
STATEMENT BY ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
ON GENEVA TALKS
Room 450
Old Executive Office Building
12:00 P.M. EST
MR. SPEAKES: I want to welcome you to the briefing that
will be, more or less, a scene-setter for the upcoming talks in
Geneva between Secretary Shultz and the U.S. party and the Soviet
Foreign Minister and the Soviet party.
The briefing today will be in two parts. The first part
will be an on-the-record statement by the President's Foreign Policy
Advisor, Robert P. McFarlane; and the second will be a background
briefing by a senior administration official.
We have a number of press materials here in a kit that
includes reproductions of these charts, a new booklet on the
President's Strategic Defense Initiative, which is being released for
the first time today, and I want to particularly call your attention
to it. It includes the Presidential statement at the beginning of
the book.
Do we have any questions prior to the beginning?
Q Larry?
MR. SPEAKES: Yes?
Q
Can't you have the whole briefing on the record?
MR. SPEAKES: No.
Q Larry, are you aware of the fact that the briefer's
name has already been published as the person giving this briefing?
MR. SPEAKES: I'm aware it's been published in The New
York Times this morning, but I don't know whether that constitutes a
license for anyone else, but you have to make your own moral
judgments on this.
Q Will the briefer appear saying substantially the
same things in front of a television camera in the next several days?
MR. SPEAKES: There are no plans for the briefer to
appear on television in the next several days.
a
Larry, those charts aren't in --
MR. SPEAKES: Aren't what?
Q Aren't in the book.
MR. SPEAKES: Oh, they will be brought in. You'll get
them on the way out.
All right. Anybody else anywhere? Everybody feel pretty
comfortable with the rules?
MR. MCFARLANE: Good morning. In the course of the past
year, the President has directed and managed a review of the full
family of United States arms control positions, covering the spectrum
MORE
5
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
January 3, 1985
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO TALKS
Room 450
Old Executive Office Building
12:05 P.M. EST
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The balance of my
remarks, now, will be on background; and I will be brief and take
your questions.
Q
But you just said on the camera that the balance of
his remarks would be on background. You're not thinking that he
identified himself? As the background briefer?
MR. SPEAKES: No. The background -- or, the
on-the-record part ended, as I said, with the conclusion of the
statement.
Q Oh, all right. (Laughter.)
MR. SPEAKES: Smooth operation here -- there are no
impulses in this operation. (Laughter.)
Q
Questions?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll be very brief and
I'll get to your questions in a moment. I wanted to rehearse,
briefly, remarks that I've made before to most of you concerning the
evolution and the underpinnings of strategic deterrence which have
played a significant role in influencing the United States' position
going into these talks.
For the past 20 years our assumptions on maintaining
deterrence have been based on the concept that if each side were able
to maintain the ability to retaliate against any attempt that it
might face and impose costs which were unacceptable, this would
suffice to prevent conflict. This "balance of terror," if you will,
relies upon the ability to threaten the other side with offensive
power.
It was this assumption that underwrote the SALT I
agreements -- the concept that vulnerability was a good thing and
that if each side maintained equal forces, this mutual capability to
retaliate would ensure both stability and deterrence.
The corollary to that assumption was that neither side
would seek to gain unilateral advantage -- to alter the balance -- by
the building of offensive or defensive forces which could remove its
own vulnerability or increase that of its adversary. Further, it was
generally recognized then that deterrence, based on offensive forces,
were not only sensible, but necessary, since neither side could, at
that time, develop a defensive system which could effectively deter
the other side. The ground-based anti-ballistic missile systems then
under contemplation were both expensive and uncertain. The state of
the art simply wasn't that far advanced.
I summarize these basic assumptions which underwrote the
concept of deterrence because the record of history suggests that
those assumptions are being called into question. Do they remain
valid or not?
MORE
6
- 2 -
At the very outset the notion that a country is better
off in a circumstance in which it is unable to defend itself is,
think, subject to question on its face. The corollary, that neither
side would seek to alter that condition, has been undermined by the
Soviet Union which has gone beyond equality to establish a superior
position in key measures of the strategic balance.
In addition, it has conducted an extensive research and
development program and deployments of defensive systems which raise
serious questions about the preservation of stable deterrence in the
years ahead.
Similarly, the Soviet Union has sought to establish
further advantage through development of defensive systems able to
counter or reduce our ability to retaliate effectively. They have
maintained an advanced ballistic missile research and development
program. They've maintained and upgraded, around Moscow, the world's
only operational ABM system. And they have improved their national
air defenses and early warning systems to a degree that calls into
question the spirit, if not the letter, of the ABM treaty.
Indeed, if you look at their activities over the course
of the past 20 years, you'll find that the Soviet expenditures on
strategic defensive systems have been roughly equal to their
expenditures on offensive systems; and both, of course, have been
quite large.
Finally, the emergence of new technologies suggests the
possibility that, by the turn of the century, that each side may be
able to turn to greater reliance upon defensive systems which don't
threaten anyone systems which are oriented against military
systems, weapons, and not people, and which could not threaten either
country or its society.
It's for these reasons that the President, a year and a
half ago, proposed the opening of a serious research effort fully
compatible with treaty commitments to see whether, for the 1990's and
beyond, some future President might not be in a position to move us
away from a strategy based on threatening, with offensive power, and
toward one which threatens no one.
I'll be glad to take your questions now.
Dan?
Q I'm confused by one underpinning here to your whole
statement. The -- Governor Reagan, when he campaigned, spoke of a
window of vulnerability and circumstances under which it was
fruitless to try to negotiate with the Soviet Union. More recently
the President has said that that window has been closed and now that,
thanks to a defense build-up, inequality has now been redressed, and
now it is possible to negotiate.
Your statement, then, that the Soviet Union has gone
beyond equality to establish superiority in key weapons -- if that is
true, why are you negotiating with them? Why don't you redress that
balance first?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The statement I made was
that the Soviet Union has established superiority in key measures of
the strategic balance, notably, in prompt, hard-target-capable
systems -- ICBMs.
In addition, notwithstanding the very substantial
advantage they have, new systems nearing deployment, now being
tested, raise questions as to the overall size and quality of their
forces in the coming years. Now, one has to hope that you cannot
only restore a balance through building, but by the preferred method
of reducing to an equal balance on both sides. And that can only
come about through negotiations.
MORE
7
- 3 -
It's important to realize that the modernization program
that has been underway in the United States for four years has
already gone far toward making clear the day will come when the
balance can be restored, and making possible the meetings that will
occur next Monday, and Tuesday, and hopefully beyond, that will
involve a serious effort on our part to reduce these systems to a
stable level on both sides.
Q
Can you --
Q
When Shultz is in Geneva, will he say to the Soviets
that we think they have violated the ABM treaty and use that as an
argument for going forward with our Star Wars program?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If arms control
agreements are to have any meaning, both sides, both parties have to
comply with them. Now it is in this context that our own concerns,
which are a matter of public record, over Soviet practices and
compliance with past agreements be reaffirmed on the record so that
we can establish a climate and a commitment to compliance as a basis
for some confidence that we can conclude a satisfactory agreement in
the future. And so our concerns over compliance, generically, are a
reasonable matter for discussion with the Soviet Union. In fact,
they have been for some time at the SCC and we'll remain active in
that channel in the future.
Q
But you specifically said here that we think they
have violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the ABM treaty. Will
that become a major part of Shultz's presentation? And will it be
our argument for going ahead with Star Wars?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My remarks then were
keyed to -- not Geneva, per se -- but to why we have concluded, as we
have, that we have to find a way to restore a balance that we think
can be enhanced by the integration of defensive systems. But an
important part of making that feasible is confidence on both sides of
compliance. And, in that context, it is relevant to our talks. Your
implication of a precondition, or of a specific focus -- I would not
think likely.
Sam?
Q Will you take another try at telling us to what
extent we're going to be willing to talk to the Soviets about SDI,
and at what stage of any future talks we might be willing to talk to
them with an eye toward reaching some accommodation, either directly
on defensive weapons, or on trade-offs of offensive, defense systems?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our foremost purpose in
Geneva is to come to terms on format, on procedures, for formal
follow-on talks. Now, in that context, if one looks at the family of
strategic systems, they fall logically into those which are used for
offensive purpose and those which are used for defensive purpose.
Secondly, in considering those families of systems,
MORE
- 4 -
8
within the context of current Soviet advantages and levels of
offensive power. It is reasonable for the United States to ask how a
stable balance can be restored. And it has been our conclusion that
one way in which deterrence can be substantially strengthened is by
integrating defensive systems into the forestructure.
Now, one cannot conclude that today. It is sensible to
research that possibility as we are. And, should the time come when
technologies are validated as holding the promise of enhancing
deterrence, that would surely be a matter for discussion, not only
with the Soviet Union, but with our allies.
We are, at this point, conducting a research program
fully compatible with our treaty commitments and it will remain for
some future administration to make a decision as to whether this
research warrants a development program, at which time it is our
presumption it would be our intention to discuss such integration of
those systems on a -- with the Soviet Union and our allies.
Q May I follow up? You and others have made it pretty
plain that at this point we will not give up the capability of
researching this program. What if Gromyko says, "Well, in that case,
we see no reason to go forward with talks of any variety?" Is that a
likely response of his and if so, what will we do?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Taking the last part
first, it seems to me that the assertion that a focus upon "the
militarization of space" is a bit disingenuous. I say that because,
as I think our chart on the left here portrays, defense is -- and
defensive systems -- are very well established Soviety priority. The
chart depicts in red the scale of Soviet development of defensive
systems as compared to the United States in the blue.
Now we are -- and the President, personally -- committed
to discussing defensive systems. It is essential that we come to
terms on the role which defensive can -- systems can play in
improving deterrence and we shall. Defensive systems encompass
systems that are on the ground, it could be in space. I'd remind you
again that the Soviet actual capability today far exceeds our own,
that their investment does as well. And, still in all, we're ready
to discuss the family of defensive systems with them and hopefully,
to get agreement that nonnuclear defensive systems integrated into
our forestructures hold far greater I romise of stable deterrence than
the current situation.
Barry?
or The sense of what you're saying seems to be that
you're prepared to discuss with the Soviets building up defensive
systems. But it's fair to assume they're interested in preventing
the United States from proceeding with SDI. Is that a fair
assumption? In other words, you're -- you put the two weapon systems
into different categories, as reports have suggested. You're
interested in cutting back offensive weapons but want their consent
-- or their acquiesence to your buildup of defensive weapons -- call
it integration, if you will. But, isn't that sort of asymmetrical?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is asymmetrical for
them to make such an assertion. For them to say, in effect, that
what's Soviet is Soviet and what's U.S. is negotiable is no basis for
negotiation. Now, it is reasonable, intellectually, to examine the
family of defensive systems and to say whether or not, and if so,
how, any or all can contribute to stable deterrence and we are
willing to do that.
To isolate defensive systems in space is to ignore and
deintellectualize the leading elements of a stable balance and it
just is not sensible to do SO. It is hard to imagine that our
readiness to discuss the family of defensive systems and offensive
systems could be a matter for Soviet objection. We are ready to talk
MORE
- 5 -
9
about the full family.
Don?
Q
I -- If I recall the President's speech of March 23,
1983, he said that he was ordering a research and development
program. If I understood you a minute ago, you said we have a
research program and development is to be ordered by some future
President. Could you explain the difference, or what has changed in
the interim in -- on that -- in that respect?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A better term perhaps
for the downstream decision is deployment. Research and development
encompasses the activities of research per se as opposed to putting
operational systems out into the field. And it is that latter
component which will be for some future President to decide.
Yes?
Q Without asking you about the substance and the
matter of procedure, could you tell us whether the United States and
the Soviet Union have been in consultation privately about the
procedure with which they will enter the Geneva talks? Have there
been any prior discussions to give each side an opportunity to have
some foreknowledge as to the general approach which each side is
taking in Geneva?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, since the
Thanksgiving Day announcement, the diplomatic exchanges between
ourselves and the Soviet Union have gone on. I won't characterize
nor deal with the substance of what those talks have included. But,
we believe there is a satisfactory basis going in for -- for a
positive outcome.
Yes, Bob?
Q
What would be your utmost optimistic outcome? What
would you guess would be the best outcome you could hope for from
these talks?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Bob, I think
that's the kind of strawman that is really not helpful to construct.
Our hope is that we come away ith a framework process for formal
negotiations and the sooner the better. Whether that comes
immediately or requires another meeting or SO is less important than
if we make some progress toward that end.
Yes?
Q Assistant Secretary Perle was quoted in the Post
yesterday as saying that he disagrees with the idea that the United
States and Soviet Union can propose their differences, reduce them to
treaty constraints, enter into agreements, treaties, and work out a
system of compliance. He said that "I don't agree with any of that."
Where does the President come down on that sort of thing?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President clearly
believes that it is essential that we seek to establish a stable
relationship with the Soviet Union in broad terms, bilaterally on
regional issues, and importantly in the vario-strategic balance and
that stable deterrence be preserved. And that it is essential that
we negotiate with them toward getting arrangements to preserve a
stable balance in the years ahead and that that can be done.
The President has gone through in some detail the history
of negotiations with a view toward drawing lessons as to what has
worked and what has not worked. Clearly, some things have worked,
and others haven't. He believes that the United States is in the
best position today that it has been in for a generation to get real
progress toward reduction of nuclear systems. And he's committed to
MORE
- 6 -
10
succeeding in that effort in the years ahead.
Q
Does he disagree with Perle then, or does he agree
with the basic world view? I mean, is there a difference in this --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's
commitment and strong feelings are as I have presented them.
Richard's are his own and speak for themselves.
John?
Q Who will be in the room for the United States and
who do you anticipate will be on the other side of the table?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The participates --
participants on the U.S. side -- those travelling to Geneva -- will
include the Secretary of State, myself, Ambassador Paul Nitze,
Ambassador Ed Rowny, Assistant Secretaries Rick Burt, Richard Perle.
Q
Will they all be at the table?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me get my list
together here.
Ambassador Art Hartman, Director of Political Military
Affairs John Chain, Director Adelman of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs Jack Matlock, Vice Admiral Art Moreau, Assistant to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Special Assistant to the President
Ron Lehman of the National Security Council staff, and other
representatives of the interested agencies of government here.
Q Who will be in the room?
Q
Shultz indicated he would like a five or six-man
delegation in the room. Is that no longer a valid -- these guys will
physically be in the room when they talk ?
MORE
- 7 -
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The formatting of who is
in and who is outside the room is a matter dependent upon the
composition of the other side's delegation, which I cannot address
right now, and I'd refer you to the Soviet Union for that. But a
corresponding number, in general, is a safe assumption, at the table.
Yes.
Q I want to come back to this question of what is
negotiable in terms of SDI. You say it's on -- you say we will
discuss SDI with the Soviets. Others in the administration say it's
on the table to discuss and describe but not on the table to trade.
Yet, your preparatory remarks, you said you'd be flexible. Now,
where does SDI fall in there? DO you just want to talk about it but
it is not a bargaining chip, or is it?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is not a
bargaining chip. The United States' treatment of defensive systems
will be serious and detailed, thorough. But I wouldn't go beyond
that to disclose the specific presentation that we will make. It
will be a thorough-going exchange with the Soviet Union on the full
family of defensive systems as well as offensive systems.
Hank.
Q Do I understand you to say that you have not heard
from the Soviets about the makeup of their delegation?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't say that.
But it's not for us to announce or publish that and --
Q On deep background. (Laughter.)
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'd refer you to
them.
Do you have follow-up?
Q
I just want to find out if the SDI is so essential
to your position that you can't afford to bargain it, that you don't
have any other chips going here on the defensive side? If you're
going to split this thing into offensive and defensive, all you seem
to have on defense is SDI.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there are other
elements on the U.S. side in the defensive basket, as well. But I
won't characterize or treat in detail the U.S. position.
Andrea.
Q You said there was constructive work done on the
offensive side, ideas that the President has reviewed. Can you say
how much we are willing to how far we are willing to go in Geneva
on suggesting new ideas on what used to be known as START and INF?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The past year, and
particularly the springtime, involved an awful lot of work and man
and woman years on our START and INF position, but to go beyond
saying we do have constructive ideas on how we can bridge the
differences between us, I think would be out of place right now. In
saying that we do have ideas and are prepared to deal flexibly on
that family of issues, I intend just that.
Q Will there be some hints or indications of what new
numbers might be possible?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't treat that
publicly right now.
Yes.
MORE
12
- 8 -
Q
It's been reported that our preference is for two
separate sets of negotiations, post next week's meeting; one dealing
with offensive systems and the other with defensive systems. If the
Soviets come back and insist on a single set of negotiations because
they have in mind trade-offs between defensive and offensive weapons,
would we have serious trouble acceding to that request?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States goes
into these talks flexible on the formats that might be established
beyond January 8th. We do think that the family of systems can be
considered conveniently and from a militarily sensible point of view
in an offensive context and a defensive context while concurrently
discussing the relationship between those two. And we're prepared to
discuss that or alternative formats and are not wedded to a
particular outcome. Some are better than others and we're willing to
discuss them.
David.
Q
Well, could I just ask the trade-offs question one
more time? Are there concessions that the Soviets could offer in the
area of offensive systems that would lead the U.S. to decide that the
stability of deterrence had been restored and, therefore, would lead
the administration to scale back its plans as you outlined them on
SDI?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, our objective is a
stable balance and stable deterrence. Now, you can get that in many
ways. Reducing offensive systems, integrating defensive systems,
both. We do believe and we think that it is -- it is sensible on its
face, that if we can find an outcome that moves us away from
offensive power which threatens human beings and toward defensive,
non-nuclear power, that that's a very sensible thing to do. And that
will be our purpose in Geneva and beyond.
Yes.
Q
Have you found any have you received any
indication from the Soviets that they would be willing to go along
with the kind of two-track approach, two separate negotiations -- one
offensive and one defensive? Have you had any indication from them
whether that would be all right by them?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a matter for the
diplomatic channels. I wouldn't comment on the Soviet position.
Q
And, secondly, by separating it that way, does that
mean that you would merge the -- both the strategic and intermediate-
range talks into one?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The offensive
basket, as I said, encompasses strategic offensive,
intermediate-range offensive. But we wouldn't presume that those
have to be merged. In fact, the Soviet public position several
months ago I think was rather a disinclination to go in that
direction.
We go into these talks flexible and open to suggestion.
Yes.
Q Earlier, you criticized the Soviet Union for
violating the spirit of some of the arms control agreements. Do you
believe that satisifactory agreements can be reached in the future
without such an adherence to the spirit of it, in view of the fact
that the Soviets regard what we say are violations as simply
stretching to the limit the terms of the agreements and seeking
loopholes?
MORE
- 9 -
13
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, clearly, that
any agreement to be viable and strengthen deterrence must be adhered
to by both sides and both sides must have the confidence that the
terms of the agreements and the arrangements for compliance are
satisfactory and meet their interest. And that will remain an
enduring requirement.
Chris?
Q Yes. I just want to get back to Star Wars for a
minute. You were making a big distinction between the research and
the development that's going on, probably into the next decade, and
the deployment which would have to be decided by a future President.
Is President Reagan willing to negotiate deployment now, or does he
feel that that's a decision that can only be made by a future
President negotiating it after we understand what the technology is
in the early '90s?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it would probably
be impossible to negotiate the terms of deployment right now since it
will be a number of years until any of the several areas of research
prove their feasibility for adding to deterrence. And SO it will be
for some future President to deal with that.
Q Is there any change in your basic attitude toward
the strategic balance as a result of your recent assessments? I'm
asking because in your assertion earlier that the Soviets have gained
superiority, it seemed to me that the administration in general has
taken the position that there has been a kind of effective parity
even though the system is different. I want to be sure to understand
whether in your assertion today about Soviet superiority whether that
represents any kind of a change in your general assessment of the
strategic balance on the eve of these talks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the last background
session and today, I said then and reaffirm now that effective
deterrence exists. One worries about the continuity of stable
deterrence when you see changes in key measures of the strategic
balance, such as in the balance in prompt hard-target capability,
ICBM warheads.
The chart over here points out that right now the ICBM
warhead capable of prompt hard-target destruction favors the Soviet
Union by about two to one. The overall ICBM warhead balance is about
three to one in their favor. And these are the systems that are most
relevant during crisis situations to preserving stable deterrence.
So it's important to try to get a handle on those, to reduce those
systems, and that will be and remain our leading priority.
The back.
Q
A little while ago, you said that your hope from the
results of the September 7th and 8th talks would be a framework
process for formal negotiations, the sooner the better. My question
is, do you hope for a framework process for formal negotiations, the
sooner the better, on SDI?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The framework that we
seek is one which will encompass the full family of strategic
systems, offensive and defensive. In the defensive context,
strategic defense, ballistic missile defense, ground-based,
space-based, anti-aircrařt defense, all fall within that basket of
strategic systems. And it is with that expectation that we hope we
can open formal talks soon.
Yes.
Or
You've indicated that you -- fairly clearly, that
you'd be reluctant to scale back the research, the SDI research, or
even to end it. What would you would the administration be
MORE
14
- 10 -
willing to entertain restrictions on testing on the space-based
components of the SDI in exchange for sufficient incentives by the
Soviet Union, or is that so clearly out of the ball park you won't
even entertain it?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's premature to
comment on that at this point.
Roger?
Q
If you're so hopeful and if you're so flexible about
these talks, what is it that makes you and the administration so
reluctant to be enthusiastic about them? (Laughter.)
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: History is replete with
examples of high hopes and great expectations which have gone
unfulfilled. That said, we have profited from the lessons of those
past examples and remain committed and determined, but leavened by
that history, patient and without illusion.
We are committed and hopeful because it is imperative
that we succeed. It is the right thing to do. But it won't be easy.
Yes.
O Aren't you really saying that the Soviet Union
already has a very extensive strategic defense initiative program,
directed energy three to five times the United States effort, and
that their efforts also are not negotiable or not bargaining chips
and that you're really going there to discuss with them something for
the future, that just lay the defensive systems on the table and
discuss them, but they are not negotiable from either side?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That remains to be seen
whether the Soviet Union is prepared to address the full family of
strategic offensive and defensive systems that both of us must do if
we're to establish a stable balance. And I wouldn't prejudge that.
We'll see.
Yes.
Q
What does SDI testing come under? Development or
deployment? Would it be negotiated now or left to a future
administration?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the line is drawn
essentially between the proving out of a technologies capability,
things involved in proving that feasibility being in the research and
development context; and involving testing. However, once a decision
is made to go to deployment, that becomes a matter of deployment and
these matters are governed by, right now, the ABM Treaty, among other
things. And our program is compatible with and will remain
compatible with that Treaty commitment.
Q
Under the Treaty then we're free to go ahead and
test SDI all the way up to the point of actually deploying?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I refer you to the
Treaty, but it becomes a little arcane. We can follow up afterward,
if you like. But there is authority exercised by the Soviet Union in
some considerable tests of their own to conduct feasibility studies
of defensive technologies.
Yes.
Q
Well, under that what you just said, where does
the defending test of an anti-satellite weapon fall? Is that a
negotiable item at these talks?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The U.S. program is
MORE
- 11 -
compatible with and in complete compliance with the ABM Treaty
commitments. And that's all I have to say on it.
Yes.
Q There are those who say that the testing of the
homing overlay vehicle was in violation of the ABM. Do you believe
that it was not a violation, and in future test of things of that
nature that the Soviets might consider or claim is a violation, do
you think their violations that you have cited justify continued U.S.
testing in that area?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to take the last
point first, I think when you look at the scale of the Soviet program
which is not a, in all cases, a research program, but involves
hardware functioning on the ground, that it is prudent for the United
States to conduct at least a research program as a prudent hedge
against the ability of the Soviet Union to break out promptly from
its current level of effort.
And, no, with regard to your earlier point, the United
States programs have been and are in compliance with its treaty
commitments.
Q
May I follow up on that. If the homing overlay was
on a Minute Man booster, wouldn't that be a violation?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States
program will remain, under this President, fully compliant with its
treaty obligations.
Yes.
Q
To follow up on that, is a moratorium on testing of
anti-satellite weapons a possibility? Do you think that, in fact, an
agreement on limiting both sides from developing effective
anti-satellite weapons might be in U.S. interests?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two points -- first of
all, the President, in his United Nations speech and separate
statements, has made clear that the United States is prepared to
discuss what restraints might be appropriate in the context of formal
negotiations. And we remain faithful to that pledge.
I think it is useful to think back over the history of
other moratoria. You recall, for example, that in the late years of
President Eisenhower's administration, that a moratorium was adopted
by the United States and the Soviet Union on atmospheric testing.
And then in 1961, without notice, the Soviet Union unilaterally
opened a very intense testing program which clearly had been
preplanned for some time or couldn't have been conducted with the
intensity that it was. And then after completing what they had
planned, a moratorium was restored and -- but the United States had
not had -- had not planned, because it was operating in good faith,
to conduct any tests of its own and was unable to.
We prepared and became able to. But the lesson was
pretty clear, that you have to be pretty darn careful about moratoria
or you can get snookered. (Laughter.)
Yes.
Q
It's a diplomatic word. (Laughter.)
Q
The President, in one of his debates, raised the
possibility of sharing Star Wars technology with the Soviets. Is
that something that might be discussed in these talks as a way of
making Star Wars a bit more palatable to the Soviets?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President
MORE
- 12 -
16
stands by that statement which is on the public record, and we
believe, we think probably that because of the public positions the
Soviets have taken, that it's going to take a certain amount of --
kind of -- discussion of fundamentals and of the role of various
systems and of the problems associated with various systems to where
you can reach some kind of conceptual agreement at the outset of what
is stability and how do you preserve it and what systems are good and
bad, in that context. And so I would think that, should that day
come, and it would be for some future President, that the President's
sense is that that would be in order.
Right now, I expect that we're going to be talking more
fundamentals than that.
Q But we're not going to be willing now to talk about
sharing the technology at this early stage?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President's
agreement in principle to that is clear. As I said on another
question, right now, when it is impossible to define which technology
you're going to find promising to say that you're going to share this
or that one right now is a little premature. But the commitment in
principle is there.
Sam.
Q Look ahead. If the technology is possible and both
sides should move to defensive systems so that neither could impose
unacceptable damage offensively on the other's homeland, does that
make war less likely or does it make theatre warfare by conventional
means more likely?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That question is really
very perceptive. It goes to the heart of what has been -- (laughter)
-- a debate. Let me withdraw that. (Laughter.)
Q Thank you. You saved both our reputations.
(Laughter.)
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Close call.
Q But I want your views on that.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think for the past ten
years, really, since the time came when the balance between strategic
forces between the United States and the Soviet Union reached a
condition of parity, and when the allies and we recognized that when
you looked at the conventional balance beneath it, which was very out
of balance, in favor of the Soviet Union, that the historic
confidence that enabled them to live with that conventional
imbalance, relying on strategic superiority of the United States,
required that we rethink how we could maintain stable deterrence at
lower levels as well.
Those analyses have
MORE
- 13 -
17
created the consensus within NATO, that was reaffirmed most recently
when Secretary Weinberger was at the DPC this past December, on the
need for an improvement in conventional strength in NATO. And the
precise expression of how you establish the necessary strength
involves the integration of high technology and the exploitation of
advantages that inure to the NATO side. There are other ways in
which you can prove your own conventional capability, but that need
is clear. And it is being endorsed by the NATO allies.
The corollary, however, is that you must, as well, try at
the strategic level to maintain stable balance at the lowest possible
levels and avoid future programs which will alter that balance. But
we have conducted these preparations with a view toward both its
regional implications and its strategic, global implications. And we
believe that both our strategic modernization program and our
conventional program will meet, can meet, the needs in the coming
years.
or What would keep the peace then is a balance in
conventional forces -- is that what you're saying? If, in fact,
their homelands are relatively secure from offensive destruction?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First, the overriding
commitment of the United States is to the security of our allies and
that will endure. And that engages the full panoply of U.S. power at
all times -- strategic and conventional. It is sensible -- we think,
and our allies think -- that, within that framework, we strengthen
our forces at conventional levels as well as strategic, as we're
doing. But deterrence which has been maintained, we believe can be
maintained, under the strategy which has been pursued for the past
four years.
Q Can I follow up Sam's perceptive question?
(Laughter.) Apart from the counterposing of conventional warfare
against nuclear warfare, there's another side that hasn't been
touched upon -- is that, if the strategic defense initiative works,
and if you do develop some measure of invulnerability in strategic
weapons, what you also leave open is the cruise missiles which cannot
be spotted by that, and possibly the intermediate weapons like the
Pershings or the SS-20s. And, are you not opening up Europe as a
theatre, not only for conventional warfare, but also for the only
available nuclear warfare? And isn't that why our major allies,
Britain, France and Germany, all seem to be so nervous about SDI?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The full family of
nuclear weapons is being treated in various negotiations -- in INF,
in the past, and START, in the past, and that does encompass cruise
missiles as well. And we expect, and intend, that cruise missiles
will remain an important part of the agenda of the talks which,
hopefully, follow Geneva. But your point is correct, that cruise
missiles, and ultimately probably defenses against them, are part of
maintaining a stable deterrent. And you can't overlook those. But I
think that's clear to the allies as well as to us. And we intend to
do that.
Q
Does the President feel that the Strategic Defense
Initiative, or Star Wars-like systems could be successful --
technically feasible and successful -- if the Soviets do not reduce
their offensive weapons? Or are some reductions in offensive weapons
on the Soviet side essential to its potential success some time in
the future?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President believes
very strongly that as a matter of security, and as a moral
proposition, that reducing nuclear weapons is essential. And he
believes that that must be the leading priority -- to do that. As a
separate, but related matter, he believes that as that process takes
place,
- 14 -
18
that the integration of defensive, and I stress, nonnuclear defensive
systems over time can lead us to a more stable world. Now the pace
and character of the reductions in offensive systems and the
introduction of defensive systems is a matter many years away. We
hope the offensive side of that will happen right now.
And, you can't predict though, with any precision right
now, how precisely that evolution would take place.
Q May I ask a follow up? May I ask a follow up,
please? Can -- the question though was really, can the Star Wars
systems succeed technically without offensive reduction -- reductions
in offensive weapons on the Soviet side. And the reason I ask is --
that it helps determine who has the most bargaining power at this
point in time?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's -- clearly a
reduction in offensive systems is essential and that can be done
right now. Those systems exist today. The defensive systems on the
Soviet side exist today. SDI doesn't. So let's get on with what is
a clear and present danger and that is reducing what exists and
determining how these nonnuclear systems can help keep the world a
safe place.
Your point about Star Wars, I mean, I guess we are stuck
with this, but there is a perception -- a couple of people have made
it in the past couple of weeks -- that these are systems which would
be in space and are going to rain down destruction on human beings in
the Soviet Union. And it's important to recognize how these things
differ from other systems. And that is that they wouldn't do that at
all.
We're talking about not threatening any people, but being
able to prevent ballistic missiles from arriving in this country.
And one can examine dealing with that problem and the boost-phase
post-boost, mid-course and terminal stages of ballistic missile
flight. But at no point are we talking about a system which attacks
people.
Yes?
a
Some members of Congress figuratively have already
conducted the last rites for MX. If Congress should decline to
appropriate funds for the production of this missile, which you say
would be -- have an adverse affect on our negotiating position,
would it make it more or less likely that the administration would be
willing to modify the pace and the program for SDI during these
talks?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States
Strategic Modernization Program was keyed to replacing obsolescent
systems in each leg of the triad -- in land-based, sea-based, and
bomber-delivered strategic systems. The MX is a key part of that and
it makes an important contribution to deterrence and is the key
ingredient in what has brought us to where we are today and that is
the prospect of renewing talks with the Soviet Union.
So, it is both militarily essential and important to
sustaining our arms control position, and it will remain so. And it
is important that the success and it -- sustaining it these past four
years, be carried on into the future. It is extremely essential.
Q
What would --
MR. SIMS: -- one or two more --
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- back -- please.
or
If there were -- if you should fail in the larger
objectives in these talks, is it possible that you could make
MORE
- 15 -
progress in some less significant area such as threshhold test --
test ban treaty, or the other unratified treaties?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we believe that
it's important that we try to make progress on the big issues and
we're hoping to try to make progress on the subordinate issues as
well. We have made proposals, the President in his U.N. speech
offering the invitation for Soviet technicians visiting our test site
as a prelude to improving verification and making possible
ratification of those treaties. So, we will continue to pursue every
avenue we can to agreement on terms which make possible arms control,
great or small.
MR SIMS: Last question, please?
Q Do you invision the follow up to these talks being
further ministerial level or do you anticipate they would be at a
lower level? Will there be a need for further ministerial level
talks?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's simply not possible
to judge that. It depends upon the Soviet Union and however the
United States is prepared -- flexible, hopeful, determined, patient.
(Laughter.)
MR. SIMS: Thank you.
END
12:57 P.M. EST
20
ARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, DC 20520
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
U.S.MAH
POSTAGE AND fees PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
STA-501
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300
"
Amt. Mathock
PRESERVATION.CO
89b
I
ROUTING
To
Name and Address
Date
Initials
21
1
R. LEHMAN
12/24
TOP SECRET
2
K. deGRAFFENREID
12/24
3
J. MATLOCK
12/24
4
S. KRAEMER
12/24
5
D. DORNAN
12/24
NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 401275
6
/
ACTION
FILE
COPY NO. 1
OF 5
APPROVAL
3-5
INFORMATION
2
COMMENT
PREPARE REPLY
CONCURRENCE
RECOMMENDATION
DIRECT REPLY
RETURN
DISPATCH
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
HANDLE VIA SYSTEM IV CHANNEL ONLY
Advance cy to R.C McFarlane
Attachments to voluminous
to xerox, orig with Ron
Lehman
NSC INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28,
By as
NARA, Date 7/29/02 1997 TOP SECRET
National Security Council
The White House
System # IV
Package # 401275
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson
Bob Kimmitt
1
1
John Poindexter
Tom Shull
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
NSC Secretariat
2
strff
Situation Room
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC:
VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Achm Rhehman
cmt deg
info Matlock
Dornan
Kraema
The Director of NO. 401275
Washington, D.C. 20505
23
21 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The attached as promised in our meeting today.
There is a copy for you as well as the original
for the President.
Bill
William J. Casey
Attachment:
Letter to President
from DCI, dtd 21 Dec 84
TOP SECRET
On Verification
FOIA(b) (1)
(3)
The Director of Central Intelligence
24
Washington. D. 20505
21 December 1984
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
As you make decisions on the Shultz-Gromyko talks and the negotiations
to follow, I want to share with you some observations and judgments I have
reached in the past four years on arms control verification. Essentially
I urge that now, at the beginning of a new chapter in your Administration's
efforts to set US-Soviet relations on course of stability and security, an
extra effort be made to integrate a realistic view of the verification
problem into our arms control policy.
In INF and START, we deferred verification while asserting, both publicly
and privately, in the Administration and the Congress that we will insist on
arms control agreements that are fully verifiable and will accept nothing less.
If we expect an acceptable and ratifiable agreement, we must bridge the
gap between rhetoric of fully verifiable treaties and the realities laid out
in my 1983 National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet approach to arms
control and on US monitoring capabilities. You may want to browse through
these and I attach them.
Failure to deal explicitly with the imperfections of monitoring and
verification at the beginning of an arms control process sets us up for great
political and diplomatic trouble nearer the end of negotiations and in
ratification. I worry, further, that an excessively exacting standard of
verification, out of tune with real capabilities, may lead to one or both
of two errors: we may reject sensible arms control approaches because they
are not susceptible to exact verification (but may not have to be); and we
may embrace strategically useful but less than comprehensive arms control
approaches because they seem easily verified.
Let me assure you, Mr. President, that this is not a case for weak veri-
fication. Past administrations have gotten into this position by arguing
for "adequate" or "satisfactory" verification, as opposed to more exacting
standards. You have rightly criticized this as rationalizing sloppy or
irrelevant agreements. The fact is, however, that across the broad range of
arms activity which valuable agreements would seek to constrain, this reasonable-
sounding standard is hard to achieve in many areas, and in some virtually
impossible.
US intelligence has never been, and is not likely to ever be, completely
certain of being able to detect Soviet violations of each and every element
of an agreement. We are not likely in many cases to be sufficiently confident
that we can do more than detect Soviet activities indicating the kind of a
violation that would give them major military advantages in terms of offensive
forces, defensive countermeasures, or new capabilities.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/8#10351
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
TOP SECRET
Cy 1 of 6
TOP SECRET
25
It is my preliminary view, although it needs careful and continuing
study, that in fact it is unlikely in an initial agreement on offensive
weapons that the Soviets can cheat enough, and not be detected soon enough,
to make a big difference to our national security quickly. This is largely
because of the size of current forces, for both us and the Soviets, and
because we will not likely achieve deep reductions under an initial agreement.
A point of departure for our thinking about this question of Soviet gains
from cheating is our 1983 NIE on capabilities to monitor Soviet offensive forces.
We need to formulate specific arms control objectives that are realistic
and consistent from the standpoint of what the Soviets will be doing, what
actions are militarily significant, and what we can monitor. In the past,
we worked to get limitations on Soviet missile modernization into the Treaty--
such as limiting a missile's throw weight increase to 5 percent when realistically
differences of 25 percent or so are more in tune with what we would want to be
able to detect for national security purposes. The difference in the demands
on intelligence system performance is enormous
Problems like these are likely to get worse, despite our budget growth
and our considerable efforts to "work around" these problems and protect our
secrets better.
2
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
26
There will be increasing blurring of distinctions between theater versus
intercontinental weapons, between air defense versus ballistic missile defense,
and between nuclear versus non-nuclear strategic systems.
In the face of this what do we really need to know? We must have the
ability to track the progress of major new types of capabilities, qualitative
changes, shifts in Soviet emphasis, and not be caught by surprise in ways
that affect the military balance significantly. We must have early warning
of rapid force expansion, and knowledge of the potential for such expansion.
We will learn to live with, and can probably tolerate for broad national security
purposes, significantly greater uncertainty in the number, characteristics,
and locations of major strategic weapons, provided we have a reasonable
approximation of these. The test of adequacy of our knowledge must ultimately
be a determination of what we would seek to do differently in our strategic
policies, in our weapon system development and deployment decisions, and in
our employment and targeting policies if we had greater knowledge and less
uncertainty in the estimates of Soviet strategic forces.
In the past, arms control and strategic force assessment needs used to
more or less coincide. Now they appear to me to be diverging. That is,
there is an increasing gap between what we need to know, and can reasonably
expect to be able to know, for basic intelligence and threat assessment
purposes, as opposed to what we think we need to know for fashioning arms
control proposals and for dealing with current and prospective Soviet compliance.
while recent arms control needs given current trends and proposed agreements,
require more detail and precision, and a high degree of certainty.
In short, we will more frequently know enough about a Soviet system to
make reasonable assumptions about its capabilities for defense and response
In the light of budget realities
and strategic needs this argues strongly for simpler agreements. They would
be less satisfying to those who think arms control ought to impose stringent
limits on Soviet strategic forces and modernization. But simpler agreements
are likely to be more consistent with our current and projected capabilities
to monitor, and if they satisfy our national security concerns they will be
more publicly acceptable and more ratifiable in the Senate.
And beyond all that, while we have noted these problems and are working
on them, we, as a government, have not actually analyzed in detail how militarily
significant any undetected cheating could be and what we could do about it.
In the search for fully verifiable accords, there has been a tendency
to equate monitoring, which is the intelligence capability to keep track of
Soviet activities, with verification, which is supposed to include the
evaluation of the significance of Soviet actions for our national security.
3
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
2'
These other elements include:
-- The extent to which the US can take countervailing measures to
limit damage from Soviet actions that are not in compliance with the accord
and that this very fact--in and of itself--can act as a deterrent Soviet
cheating. But the US has to act, not study issues forever.
-- An assessment as to whether US national interests, broadly defined,
are served better with an accord than without an accord.
In the search for a fully verifiable agreement, we have also placed undue
and unsustainable emphasis on monitoring that goes beyond the use of National
Technical Means; for example, on-site inspection. On-site inspection can serve,
in certain circumstances, to improve monitoring confidences and is a useful
political precedent in itself as we seek to open the USSR to the greatest
extent possible. Moreover, on-site inspection could also serve, to an extent,
to complicate Soviet cheating efforts and, therefore, might have some small
deterrent effect, but we cannot count on it. The Soviets are generally
conservative in evaluating the risks of detection and might regard as too
risky some forms of cheating activity for which we have low confidence in
detecting.
Hear/
hear
The value of any on-site inspection system is
dependent on the rules governing the manner in which the inspections are to
be conducted and the way the Soviets decide to implement the agreed-upon
procedures. On-site inspection may range from random demand inspections, in
which roving teams of inspectors travel around the USSR and have the right
to demand inspections, to voluntary inspections which the Soviets have the
right to reject. Soviet society and government are well suited to placing
delays and frustrations in the path of foreign inspectors. Even if the
Soviets were to agree to some of the more ambitious on-site inspection regimes
that we have contemplated which would be implemented in both our countries,
the net result would, at best, be modest improvements in monitoring confidences
and a considerable worsening of the hostile foreign intelligence problem we
already have.
The fact remains that the bedrock of our monitoring capabilities is now,
and will in the future be, those unilateral US technical intelligence platforms
that collect information on Soviet strategic weapon systems. And by that I
mean satellites
airplanes, ships
At bottom, the issue of effective verification is not in reality that
of preventing any and all possible Soviet cheating but, rather, the detection
of compliance problems, how to assess their significance, and our readiness
to respond with self-protective measures. As a result, key policy decisions
4
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
28
which go beyond the narrow issue of monitoring confidences need to be made,
based on the inputs of all members of the Executive Branch. These inputs
would be included in the following assessments which have not been made but
which need to be undertaken as quickly as possible:
-- Our ability to detect Soviet violations as a function of the size
and significance of Soviet acts. For example, a covert deployment of a
handful of missiles is of little military significance, given the size of
the overall force likely to result from an agreement. We need to determine
our threshold, in both size and time, for declaring such an action to be
"significant," and hence, essential to detect at that level of activity.
-- We need to carefully lay out the types of US actions, in terms of
military programs and operational procedures, that should be taken in response
to Soviet violations, and especially those of military significance. (We
commonly describe such programs as "safeguards.") We need to know whether US
actions could be taken quickly enough to keep up with Soviet actions. The
heart of the issue is whether the Soviets could get a significant jump on us
by cheating and how long they could maintain any such advantage.
Safeguards as a policy and in fact--can help us. Safeguards can keep
R&D alive, maintain a production base, and support a monitoring program. They
can help get Congressional support, through votes for programs and funds, and
then help maintain it. Moreover, safeguards will help the public feel comfortable
with any additional strategic arrangements with the USSR.
Actually, the necessity of having safeguards or hedges against major
actions by the Soviets is independent of arms control. These actions are
possible regardless of whether they are prohibited by agreements or not.
The difference is that without arms control we have no possible illusions
about Soviet propensities, but historically euphoria about arms control has
caused us to drop our guard.
An issue, then, is how to remain vigilant against troublesome Soviet
actions. But "safeguards," too, must be more than just rhetoric. Congress
must be persuaded, early in the process of designing and negotiating arms
control agreements, that US safeguard programs must be funded, so that we will
not be caught short in the event of future violations.
In the final analysis, arms control agreements are negotiated with
enemies and not friends. Consequently, we must be ready for the worst when
it comes to Soviet intentions and, at the same time, must be ready for
unilateral measures to assure our security. That prescription, however,
does not require that for our military security we need be able to detect
every possible type of Soviet violation. The realities of verification and
monitoring must be a central element of our policy design and negotiating
postures as we prepare for the next four years. As we consider what we
want, we have to assess what will be tolerable to the US, attainable at
acceptable political and military costs, and then temper those ideas with
honest and prudent verification proposals before we make decisions and act.
5
TOP SECRET
TUP SECRE
29
The issue of verifiability is not in reality that of preventing any and
all possible Soviet cheating as prevailing rhetoric would imply, but our
ability to detect and measure the acts' significance and then protect against
any Soviet violation which is strategically significant.
All this needs further study and evaluation, but especially in a period
of more readily concealable missiles, a broader concept of verifiability is
necessary to protect our national security now, keep alive the hope of
subsequently achieving still larger reductions in nuclear weapons, maintain
bipartisan support for our national security programs, and keep the NATO
Alliance solid.
Respectfully yours,
all Cany William J. Casey
Attachments
6
TOP SECRET
FOIA(b) (3)
VEHICE CCENTRAL AGENCY &
Director of
Top Secret
30
Central
Intelligence
NSC/1CS CONTROL NO. 401275
US Capabilities To Monitor
Soviet Strategic Offensive
Force Limitations
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I-Key Judgments
WARNING: The material in this document
is sensitive. Distribution of this NIE should
be strictly limited to those officials who re-
quire access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties.
Top Secret
NIE 4/11-83X
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
15 February 1983
NLRR F06-114/8#10352
Copy 088
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
Director of
ACENCY CENTRAL 133 ATELLICENT
Top-Secret-
3
Central
Intelligence
SERVICE OF
OMNI/ NARIS/PRISM
NSC/1CS CONTROL NO 401275
US Capabilities To Monitor
Soviet Strategic Offensive
Force Limitations
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume II-The Estimate
WARNING: The material in this document
is sensitive. Distribution of this NIE should
be strictly limited to those officials who re-
quire access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties.
-Top Secret
NIE 4/11-83JX
15 February 1983
Copy 078
TOP SECRET
32
NSC/1CS CONTROL NO. 401275
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL IN THE MID-TO-LATE 1980s
16 November 1984
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
33
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL IN THE MID-TO-LATE 1980s
Table of Contents
Key Judgments
i
I. Fundamental Soviet Strategic Force Policies
1
II. Soviet Perceptions of US Forces and US Arms Control Policies
2
A. Soviet Perceptions and Foreign Policy Calculations
2
B. Strategic Challenges
4
III. Trends in Development of Soviet Strategic Force Structure
5
A. Major Features of Future Soviet Strategic Forces
5
B. Offensive Force Developments
6
C. Defensive Force Developments
9
IV. Soviet Military R&D: Implications for the Future
12
A. Prospects for Soviet Technologies
12
B. Military Implications of Soviet Technologies
13
V. Assessment of Soviet Arms Control Objectives Over the
Next Four Years
14
A. General Objectives and Approach
14
B. Arms Control Outlook
15
C. Domestic Factors for Change
17
D. What Will the Soviets Seek to Protect?
18
E. Possible Areas of Flexibility
20
F. Denial and Deception
22
G. Attitudes Toward Verification and Cheating
22
VI. Soviet Options, Decision Points, and Key Indicators of
Soviet Intentions
23
A. Attitude Toward Linkage of Arms Control
Issues--Response to President Reagan's "Umbrella"
Proposal
23
B. Interim Restraint
25
C. ABM Treaty Adherence
26
D. Verification and Compliance Issues
26
E. Space Weapons Talks
28
F. INF Politics in Europe
29
TOP SECRET
34
SYSTEM II PROFILE
SECRET/CODEVORD)
ID 8491342
RECEIVED 26 DEC 84 19
TO
PRESIDENT
FROM ADELMAN, K
DOCDATE 26 DEC 84
DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By
CVS
NARA, Date 7/29/02
KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL
USSR
SHULTZ, G
GROMYKO, ANDREI A
SUBJECT: PROPOSED STRATEGY & POSITIONS FOR SHULTZ MTGS W/ GROMYKO
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES
DUE: 28 DEC 84 STATUS S FILES
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
LEHMAN, R
MATLOCK
KIMMITT
COMMENTS ** URGENT ACTION
URGENT
RLF#
LOG
NSCIFID
(B/ )
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
SECRET SENSITIVE
SYSTEM II
91342
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON
BI
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
December 26, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Proposed Strategy and Positions for Secretary Shultz'
Upcoming Meetings with Gromyko
We should make clear at Geneva that arms control is an important
part of the US-Soviet relationship, but that we also want a more
productive dialogue on other critical global, bilateral, regional,
and human rights issues.
Our primary arms control objectives at Geneva are to resume
formal negotiations on offensive nuclear arms and to initiate a
serious dialogue on the offense-defense relationship.
A primary Soviet objective will be to limit US SDI and ASAT
programs through negotiations on space arms -- perhaps linking
"new" negotiations on offensive arms to some US commitment on
space arms. They will use the negotiations and other means to
influence public, Allied, and Congressional opinion to undercut
support for our defense programs. As agreed in our meetings,
we should not negotiate SDI away, nor give the Soviets an ASAT
monopoly for longer than need be.
Fora
We would prefer to take the focus off space per se. Drawing
on the Soviets' emphasizing "new negotiations" and "radical
measures," I am inclined to think that we should seek two sets
of new talks: one on offense (with separate working groups on
START and INF) and one on defense. Space could be discussed in
both, and we could stress nuclear systems in defense as well as
in offense. "Coordination" of offense-defense issues would be
through continued "umbrella" discussions (Secretary Shultz and
Gromyko).
The major advantage of this is to take some of the spotlight off
"space negotiations" as such, where the US has little to gain
and a lot to protect. It would also enable us to stay on the
high ground by stressing the need to move toward "a non-nuclear
world" while reexamining the overall offense-defense relationship.
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/8*10353
SECRET/SENSITIVE
BY as NARA DATE 7/25/08
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
SECRET SENSITIVE
36
-2-
At the same time, this approach will probably not appeal to
the Soviets and could be criticized by some as "walking back"
your Thanksgiving Day announcement, even though it really does
not. (This perception could possibly be reduced by reiterating
at the outset our willingness to begin serious negotiations on
space in the "new" fora.) This approach might also be bothersome
to our key Allies, but we have an Alliance management problem
whatever approach we take.
On balance, I think we should try to get an offense forum and a
defense forum. We would take up START and INF in the. former
with the thrust of our current proposals, and take up ASAT, SDI,
ballistic missile and other defense issues in the latter.
If it becomes clear that the Soviets just will not accept this
approach in any reasonable time, we could then go back to
accepting three negotiating fora (INF, START, space) and if
necessary reluctantly agree to two fora (nuclear and space with
two working groups under nuclear). The charter for the space
forum should not include any substantive restriction that would
affect SDI. Still, this fallback arrangement might make it more
difficult to manage the space issues.
Substance
We should not reveal any substantive movement in our positions if
the Soviets do not take a serious approach. We should, however,
make clear that we are ready to get into substance when they are.
If the Soviet approach seems serious, and if some movement could
- lead to a better outcome, we should consider the following:
On START, we could express our willingness (a) to accept
somewhat higher ceilings on ballistic missile warheads
and ballistic missiles (but agreed levels must be below
current levels), and (b) to trade off between the destruc-
tive capacity of heavy ballistic missiles and heavy
bombers, SO as to achieve an equitable balance on both
sides (details at Appendix I). We would also reemphasize
our concern about the destabilizing features of the
Soviets' large ICBMs and the need to reduce warheads and
the disparity in destructive capability.
On INF, we could say that the US proposals of September
1983 and the Soviet suggestion about equal reductions
could provide a basis for agreement if the Soviets are
willing to accept (a) the US right to de jure global
equality in LRINF missile warheads and (b) the right to
missiles in Europe to offset SS-20s or successor systems
targeted on Europe (details at Appendix II). We would
also say that our five basic criteria for an agreement
remain unchanged.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
37
-3-
On space, we could make clear our willingness to resume
that part of the 1979 US Soviet ASAT negotiations on
establishing "rules of the road and conduct" in space
when negotiations on nuclear forces are renewed (details
at Appendix III).
On mutual restraint in space, when asked what you meant
in your UN speech that "we would consider what measures
of restraint both sides might take while negotiations
proceed," we could say that when negotiations are resumed
we would consider (a) a test ban for high-altitude ASAT
interceptors (this would not affect the ASAT balance or
our SDI program plans) and/or (b) a moratorium on F-15
ASAT tests after making substantial progress with the
Soviets on offensive nuclear arms control. (This would be
after testing provided confidence in our ability to field
an operational system and the technology counted on to
support SDI.)
On the offense/defense relationship, we would suggest that the
role of arms control in achieving a stable transition to more
defense orientation in the long run is something which should
interest both sides. We would also point out that it is un-
reasonable to press for constraints on SDI -- a research program
permitted by and consistent with the ABM Treaty -- and that this
consistency is in sharp contrast to Soviet activities which are
not in accordance with the letter or intent of that agreement
in at least two respects: (1) deployment of the Krasnoyarsk
radar and other developments that appear to be steps toward a
nationwide defense, and (2) lack of Soviet willingness to limit
- offensive nuclear forces. We would reaffirm our intention not
to violate our ABM Treaty obligations while carrying out SDI
research and our willingness to discuss US and Soviet SDI and
ABM issues.
Ken
Kenneth L. Adelman
Attachments
As stated
SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
38
APPENDIX I - START
Consistent with the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission,
we should seek an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement
that would improve stability at reduced force levels. It should
exert pressure "to reduce the overall number and destructive
power of nuclear weapons and at the same time give each side an
incentive to move toward more stable and less vulnerable deploy-
ments." Conversely, it should not be biased against the develop-
ment of more survivable deterrent forces such as Midgetman.
To this end, we seek to distinguish between the differing capa-
bility of missiles (e.g., numbers of weapons and their size),
rather than have only a launcher limit. Our preferred frame-
work would take account of the fact that Soviet heavy missiles,
the SS-18s, have about seven times the destructive capability
of our Minuteman IIIs, or that a Minuteman III would have about
three times the destructive capability of a Midgetman. It
would not equate such missiles.
Similarly, it would also measure the destructive capacity of
bombers in a way that recognizes their differing payload capacity
(numbers of weapons and their size). For example, the B-52 is
almost twice as large and can deliver many more weapons of a
given size to intercontinental ranges (not counting attrition
by air defenses) than the Soviet Backfire.
Our preferred approach would also provide for explicit tradeoffs
between missile and bomber destructive capability to allow
- greater force planning flexibility and offsetting advantages
to ensure overall equality. This would result in a US advantage
in heavy bomber destructive capability to offset a Soviet
advantage in ballistic missile destructive capability.
Possible Near-Term Approach
We would prefer to adopt such an approach immediately. However,
it may well not be acceptable in the near-term if at all. Thus,
we should consider a near-term approach which could be a bridge.
It could have the following main elements as the end result:
o a ceiling on ballistic missile warheads of 7,000 (slightly
below current levels and 50 percent below allowed levels
under SALT II) and possibly* a direct limit on ALCMs in
either an unaggregated or aggregated framework (e.g., 9,000
ALCMs and warheads with the warhead subceiling of 7,000);
* In the near-term and longer-term approaches, we would include
a direct limit on ALCMs only if the Soviets want it and we
can gain useful reductions in ballistic missile warheads in
return. ALCM limits pose serious verification difficulties.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
39
-2-
an aggregate ceiling on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles
(SNDVs) of 1,800 (the Soviet proposed level), or preferably
a higher level or no SNDV limit at all;
a ceiling on the sum of heavy missiles and heavy bombers of
400 with a sublimit on heavy missiles of 200 -- to limit
Soviet throw-weight and provide the US with a heavy bomber
advantage to offset the Soviet heavy missile advantage;
Soviet Backfires and any other "light bomber" would be
included in some fashion;
O a limit designed to verifiably restrict Soviet ballistic
missile throw-weight and fractionation.
The above would result in 7,000 Soviet missile warheads and
Soviet missile throw-weight of about 3.5 Mkg, roughly midway
between the current US and Soviet proposals. It would also
result in rough equality in missile throw-weight in "light"
systems.
Longer-Term Approach
In the longer term we should seek to limit directly ballistic
missile warheads, throw-weight and bomber destructive capacity
by:
O
weighing the destructive potential of all missiles in
proportion to throw-weight (expressing the total in terms
of equivalent SS-18s);
weighing the destructive potential of all bombers in
proportion to their takeoff gross weight (expressing the
total in terms of equivalent B-52s); and
trading off equivalent B-52s for equivalent SS-18s at a
ratio that takes into account asymmetries in air defense
and the relative stability implications of fast-flying VS.
slow-flying systems.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
40
SECRET/SENSITIVE
APPENDIX II - INF
We continue to seek an INF agreement consistent with the
conditions inherent in the 1979 NATO INF decision:
Equal rights and limits for Soviet LRINF forces;
No compensation for British and French nuclear forces;
No export of the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia;
No reduction in NATO conventional force capability; and
An effectively verifiable agreement.
Any specific discussion of a new INF proposal would be reserved
for the resumption of concrete negotiations. To achieve our
objectives, we have considered a build-up/draw-down approach, the
Walk-in-the-Woods formula, and equal percentage reductions. In
these three options our strategy would be as follows:
Build-up/Draw-down: Indicate willingness to halt our deployments
at an agreed level "X", if the Soviets are willing to reduce
their warheads within range of Europe to that same level and also
reduce their global warhead numbers to an agreed level "Y". We
might suggest this be dome in parallel US and Soviet "statements
of national policy," resulting in an informal understanding
rather than a formal treaty.
Walk-in-the-Woods: State that, despite a number of defects, the
Walk-in-the-Woods would be an acceptable outcome to the US if the
USSR also accepted it as a final outcome to cut the Gordian knot
in INF. The principal elements are:
-- The US would deploy 75 GLCM launchers in Europe (300
warheads), and would remove all Pershing-IIs. The existing P-IIs
and remaining P-Is could be replaced by P-IBs.
-- The Soviets would reduce to 75 SS-20s (225 warheads)
based west of [800] 900* east longitude and 90 SS-20s (270
warheads) based in the Eastern USSR. The Soviets would deploy no
GLCMs.
*90° east longitude would include the SS-20 complexes in the
vicinity of Novosibirsk; 80° east longitude would exclude these
complexes.
SECRET SENSITIVE
-2-
-- The US and USSR would each be limited to 150 LRINF
aircraft in Europe (F-111 and FB-111, Badger, Blinder and
Backfire).
Equal Percentage Launcher Reductions: The Soviet "Walk-in-the-
Park" suggestion of equal warhead reductions in Europe was
conditioned on US reductions to zero. This would haye left the
Soviets with a monopoly of 360 SS-20 warheads targeted on Europe,
as well as their deployments in the Eastern USSR. While the equal
reductions proposals as formulated by the Soviets was
unacceptable, the equal reductions rationale might nevertheless
serve as a useful negotiating tool.
In theory, one could construct a wide range of options, using the
concept of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions of
either launchers or warheads. In view of the existing Soviet
superiority in both LRINF missile launchèrs and warheads over
planned US levels, none of these approaches would result in de
facto global equality. Depending, however, on the proportion of
P-II to GLCM, and on how Soviet SS-20 deployments were allocated
between East and West, certain variants could at least result in
de facto warhead equality in Europe.
A simple proposal that would achieve this outcome is as follows:
The US would be prepared to cut its planned number of LRINF
missile launchers by half, if the Soviet Union would be prepared
to cut its current number of SS-20s by half.
This approach would involve pocketing the dismantlement of SS-4s,
which the Soviets are now deactivating -- an equal percentage
reduction of 50 percent, in the planned number of P-II/GLCM
launchers (224) and the existing global level of SS-20 launchers
(currently 396). The US would retain the right, outside Europe,
to match the Soviet global warhead total. The Soviets would be
free to allocate their SS-20s between West and East as they saw
fit.
If each side reduced by 50 percent, the Soviets would be left
with 198 launchers worldwide (594 warheads) and might keep around
140 launchers/garages (440 warheads) targeted on europe. Ths US
could deploy 112 launchers/garages in Europe; if these were all
GLCMs, the US would have 448 warheads; if the US chose to keep
some P-IIs deployed, the warhead total would be reduced (e.g., 36
P-II launchers and 76 GLCM launchers would result in a total of
340 warheads in Europe).
SECRET/SENSITIVE
42
SECRET SENSITIVE
APPENDIX III - SPACE
Background
The key results of the President's report to Congress on ASAT
arms control and subsequent interagency studies were:
Hostile Soviet satellites create the need for a US ASAT
capability to protect US and Allied forces and to improve
deterrence of conflicts involving both space and
terrestrial weapon systems.
A comprehensive ban on all ASAT capabilities is
impossible, since many such capabilities are imbedded in
systems developed primarily for other purposes, including
ICBMs and space boosters as well as the Soviet Galosh
system and ground based lasers. .Such systems provide
opportunity for surreptitious ASAT development and
breakout.
ASAT/SDI technology overal is pervasive -- and effective
limitations n SAT capabilities would almost invariably
restrict aspects of the SDI program. In fact, no
verifiable, equitable, consequential limitation of ASAT
capability that does not restrict SDI has been
discovered.
Since satellites are few in number, cheating on even a
small scale could pose a disproportionate risk to the US.
For the arms control options considered, compliance with limits
on interceptor testing could be monitored with confidence ranging
from low to high, depending on the scenario -- very low to
moderate under plausible cheating scenarios. The only options
studied to date that plausibly could avoid impacting SDI are:
An Incidents-in-Space agreement on ASAT use (which would
clarify existing law, and add selected confidence
building measures, but not inhibit ASAT development);
A high-altitude ASAT test ban (with no low-altitude
collateral constraints) but it would not really inhibit
developing a high-altitude ASAT capability.
Limited duration restraints (which would formally expire
before planned SDI tests in the late '80s), that would
halt near-term ASAT testing, but could be politically
difficult to terminate.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE
43
-2-
Space Negotiations
In view of these facts, we could focus on the achievement of an
"incidents in space" agreement which would ban attacks on
satellites and regulate certain space activities. The Soviets
can be expected to resist this approach, at least initially,
asserting the US is only interested in legalizing an "arms race"
in space, not stopping it. When they do, we should quote back to
them their plenary statements from the 1978-79 ASAT talks express-
ing their skepticism about a "comprehensive" ASAT ban. In
addition, we can point out that such an approach picks up where
we left off in 1979. Furthermore, they have kept it in their
proposals (along with many undesirable provisions) ever since.
An Incidents in Space proposal could:
ban damaging or destroying, or changing the trajectory
of space objects of other Parties without authorization
(applicable in peacetime only);
reinforce consultative provisions of the Outer Space
Treaty by providing for: (a) consultation in case of
accidents or possible collisions in space; and (b)
consultation and exchange of data when a Party's
space object would deorbit in an uncontrolled manner
with significant risk;
formalize exchange of specified data on ASAT systems;
and
O require prior notification of ASAT tests.
Mutual Restraints
At some point we may decide that Soviet responsiveness and/or
public/Allied/Congressional pressures require something more in
the ASAT field. In such an event, we could consider offering an
additional less formal commitment along the following lines:
A ban on testing high-altitude ASAT interceptors which
would not prohibit high altitude point-in-space tests
or deployments of ASAT systems at high or low altitude
or on the ground.
Suspension of our F-15 and soviet interceptor ASAT
tests after a time which would not prohibit other
ASAT or SDI-relevant testing.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Matlock
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
5:00 P.M. EST DECEMBER 28, 1984
THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
FROM THE YOMIURI SHIMBUN
Q: The year 1985 marks the fortieth anniversary of the end
of World War II. At this date, how do you perceive the present
situation of the world, especially in regard to East-West
relations?
THE PRESIDENT: Those forty years have seen some remarkable
changes in the world. One of the most remarkable has been the
reconciliation between former adversaries, including the United
States and Japan. Today Japan and the United States are close
partners and good friends. We share the common values of freedom
and democracy. We are bound by a security treaty. Unfortunately,
Japan, the United States and other democracies continue to be
confronted by a system that stands for different values.
Q: Secretary of State Shultz will meet Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko on January 7 and 8 in Geneva. Could you tell us
something about your expectations of the meeting? What do you
hope to agree to at this specific meeting? Six major items on
the agenda of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations will be the status of
space, strategic, intermediate range, conventional and chemical
weaponry, as well as certain confidence-building measures. How
could these items be interrelated with each other in the
framework of an umbrella formula in the negotiations to follow up
the Shultz-Gromyko meeting?
THE PRESIDENT: I was encouraged that the Soviets agreed to
resume a dialogue on arms control issues and that we will have
the meeting in Geneva to try to get the process moving again.
But we must temper our expectations with realism. A two-day
meeting cannot solve the complicated issues before us. We hope
it will be a constructive beginning for further detailed
negotiations. But it isn't an easy job. Only time will tell how
rapidly the process moves, or in which specific framework.
Meaningful progress on arms control has a high priority in this
Administration. We have been working long hours to prepare for
Secretary Shultz's meeting with Mr. Gromyko. The Secretary will
enter those meetings with concrete suggestions on a full range of
arms control issues. We hope the Soviets will show a similar
constructive spirit.
The fundamental objective of our talks with the Soviets has to be
kept in mind. We are not looking for an agreement for its own
sake. We are striving to improve stability, reduce the risk of
war, and to lower the levels of nuclear arms. That involves hard
bargaining on issues of great mutual concern. The U.S. is
committed to conduct that process seriously, and creatively.
Q: Would you consider a summit meeting with General Secre-
tary Chernenko before the completion of arms control talks? If
so, what preconditions are necessary?
THE PRESIDENT: As long ago as last June, I said that I was
willing to meet at any time. Since then, I've met with Foreign
Minister Gromyko, and our discussions were useful. The Soviets
say they would want a very carefully prepared agenda for any
more
- 2 -
summit meeting. That makes sense to me. In the past, meetings
that were not carefully prepared often led to great expectations
and great disappointments, and I don't think we ought to go into
something of that kind.
Q: In what way may the Western Allies, including Japan,
support successful U.S.-Soviet negotiations? Do you support
independent action on the part of the allies for relaxation of
tensions with the USSR and the Eastern European nations?
THE PRESIDENT: The United States is fully committed to
reducing the threat of war. At the Williamsburg Summit the
Western leaders were united in their commitment to arms
reductions and continued thorough and intensive consultations.
Further, we noted that security is indivisible and must be
approached on a global basis. Prime Minister Nakasone was a key
participant in the discussions that led up to this united
commitment.
Alliance solidarity behind NATO's 1979 dual track decision on INF
modernization has prevented the Soviets from unilaterally
dictating Western security policy. This solidarity stems from
the extensive consultations which the U.S. conducts with its
European and Japanese allies on arms control issues. These
consultations have assured a consensus among the allies which is
essential in dealing with the Soviets on these vital issues.
Q: How do you view the development of current Sino-Soviet
relations? What will be the impact of the forthcoming
U.S.-Soviet arms control talks on the tripartite relations
between the U.S., USSR and China?
THE PRESIDENT: We welcome recent efforts by the Chinese and
the Soviets to put their relations on a more normal footing.
Differences between the Soviet Union and China run very deep,
however, and center on three major problems: massive Soviet
troop deployments along the Chinese border with the Soviet Union
and Mongolia; Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These are
serious impediments, it seems to me. The Chinese are very positive
about our forthcoming arms talks with the Soviets. They want
these discussions to bring a genuine reduction of nuclear weapons.
They don't want the Soviets merely to redeploy their missiles,
from West to East. We agree.
Q: As you prepare to receive Prime Minister Nakasone in Los
Angeles in early January, we would like to ask about your
fundamental assessment of U.S.-Japan relations today. For the
promotion of friendly and constructive relations, what do you
expect of Japanese policy in economic matters, defense and
foreign affairs?
THE PRESIDENT: I'm looking forward to meeting again with my
friend and your Prime Minister. We've had excellent meetings
before. My visit to your country when he was my host was just
wonderful. I think U.S.-Japanese relations are as good as they
have ever been. When I meet with the Prime Minister on
January 2, I know that we will begin our talks on the basis of
our common desire to make the U.S.-Japan relationship even
closer. I don't think there's any confusion about what it will
take to succeed. Economically, we need to work hard to continue
and enhance the progress made after our talks in Tokyo in
November 1983. We have made progress in our security
relationship, which will continue to develop to the benefit of
both sides. But it is in foreign affairs that the real pay-off
of close U.S.-Japan relations can increasingly be found. As our
ability to cooperate and coordinate our policies increases, so
does the scope of what we can accomplish together. Our
more
46
- 3 -
international cooperation will reflect our ability to handle
problems in our bilateral relationship, including trade issues.
It is my hope that as leading democracies and as the leading free
world economies, Japan and America will be able to provide
solutions by putting our heads -- and our hearts -- together in a
partnership for the cause of good.
Q: Cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in a Pacific
Basin Initiative is said to be a leading topic of discussion in
the upcoming Los Angeles meeting. Could you elaborate on your
ideas about its realization?
THE PRESIDENT: Although the United States has long been a
two ocean nation, in the past we focused most of our attention on
our Atlantic coast because of our historic relationship with
Europe. But during the past decade or so, the growth of
democracy and the dynamic economic development of the Pacific
region also have earned our admiration and our very close
attention. As a result, while Europe certainly remains as vital
as ever to us, a new perspective has emerged toward the Pacific.
Japan, of course, plays a key role in this new American
perspective. Both our countries are prepared to devote our
resources and energies to seeking ways to cooperate with our
neighbors in the Pacific. But it is important that we not be
rushed in our eagerness to get started. Pacific Basin
cooperation, in whatever form it eventually emerges, will not be
successful and will not last unless it has the full support of
all our Pacific neighbors, and unless there is benefit for all.
The Pacific Basin will be a topic of conversation between the
Prime Minister and myself in Los Angeles, but it is too soon to
talk about or expect any specific announcements or agreements.
Q: The United States trade deficit with Japan may reach $35
billion this year. Renewed calls for import surcharges are
coming from Capitol Hill and industry circles. Will your present
position on free trade change in response to calls for the
protection of U.S. industries? And what are your expectations on
Japan in light of the current deficit? For instance, as yet
there are several unsettled matters concerning trade and the
opening of the Japanese market: 1) the expansion of voluntary
export restraints on '85 automobiles, 2) reduction of tariff
rates on wood products and 3) total liberalization of
agricultural products. We would appreciate any thoughts you
might give us about specific approaches to settling these and
other trade issues.
THE PRESIDENT: I believe that free trade is a powerful
force for progress and peace. The winds of commerce carry
opportunities that help nations grow and bring citizens of the
world closer together. Increased trade spells more jobs, higher
earnings, better products, less inflation and more cooperation.
The freer the flow of world trade, the wider the benefits of
economic progress.
Nowhere is free trade more important than in America's commercial
ties with Japan -- our largest overseas trading partner. And we
are Japan's most important market. This year $85 billion in
goods and services is flowing across the Pacific between our two
nations. But the potential would be even greater if it were not
for some trade barriers Japan still maintains which reduce
competitive foreign imports.
We've worked hard to encourage Japan to open its domestic market
fully to foreign products. We want American companies to have
the same opportunity to sell their goods and services and to
invest in Japan that your companies already enjoy in our market.
You have responded by reducing some trade barriers and we
more
- 4 -
appreciate these measures. The efforts by the Japanese
Government to open capital markets for foreign participation and
to liberalize the yen are also important steps in the right
direction.
But many U.S. companies still cannot compete in Japan on an equal
basis. High tariffs stymie our efforts to sell competitive U.S.
exports like processed forest products. While there has been
some liberalization of agricultural quotas, these should be
eventually eliminated so that Japanese consumers have the chance
to buy U.S. beef, citrus and other farm products in quantities
and at prices freely set in the marketplace. And I hope that the
transformation of Japan's government telecommunications monopoly
into a private company will allow U.S. suppliers of these
products a fair shot at your market, just as Japanese companies
already have here. Your question also refers to Japan's voluntary
export restraints on automobiles which expires at the end of
March. I think that it is premature for me to make any
comment on this and, in any case, this is a decision for the
Japanese government to make.
On the trade deficit with Japan -- it will approach $35 billion
by the end of the year -- I realize there is no easy answer to
this problem, but the sheer size of the deficit has generated
growing protectionist sentiment in this country. Therefore, I
urge the Japanese government and people to move even more quickly
to open Japan's market to competitive foreign products. If this
is done, our trans-Pacific trade relations can continue to expand
and flourish to the mutual benefit of our two countries.
Q: With the Olympic Games scheduled in Seoul in 1988, the
Korean peninsula may become a focus of international attention.
What is your evaluation of the current state of affairs on the
peninsula as the date approaches? Do you have any initiatives in
mind to maintain peace there? What role do you expect the
neighboring nations of China, the USSR, and Japan to play in
order to reduce tension on the peninsula?
THE PRESIDENT: There has been considerable tension on the
Korean peninsula since the North Korean invasion of the South in
1950. Such tension has at times grown even more serious, as, for
example, after the North Korean bombing in Rangoon in October of
1983, which almost killed President Chun and did kill several of
his key advisors. However, we have seen welcome signs of tension
reduction between the two Korean states recently. Talks on
economic cooperation and Red Cross talks on such matters as
family unification have taken place, and representatives of both
Korean governments will meet again in January to discuss these
topics. I think that peace initiatives or tension reduction
measures, like the economic and Red Cross talks, must properly
come from the two Korean governments themselves. They must be
the major interlocutors in any inter-Korean dialogue, but Japan,
China, the USSR and the U.S. all have an interest in seeing that
peace is preserved and that tension on the peninsula is reduced.
Q: Are you planning any initiatives in your second term for
the solution of problems in these specific areas of the world?
What contribution do you expect from the allied nations,
including Japan, to help solve regional conflicts?
THE PRESIDENT: One way to solve regional conflicts is to
convince the parties to the conflict that they have more to gain
by seeking peace. The United States is committed to the peace
process in the Middle East, Central America, Southern Africa and
elsewhere.
Another way to deal with regional tensions is to create an
environment of political stability and economic development that
deals with the source of the problem. Japan has increasingly
more
48
- 5 -
contributed to this process throughout the world through its
growing aid programs. I hope Japan will continue to exercise a
positive and increasingly visible diplomatic and economic role in
the Asian region and throughout the world.
Q: Could you elaborate on your principal ideas about
reducing the United States budgetary deficit and the high
interest rates which are also matters of concern to your allies?
Please comment on your position during the coming term.
THE PRESIDENT: As a result of our economic policies,
millions of jobs have been created, inflation has been cut
sharply, interest rates reduced, and in general the U.S. economy
has enjoyed a strong sustained recovery. In turn, America's
economic return has helped the economies of our trading partners,
including Japan.
Let's look at the record. The U.S. should enjoy a 4 percent
growth rate next year. Consumer incomes are rising at a steady
pace and consumer confidence is strong. Robust business
spending, spurred by our 1981 tax cuts, helped propel the current
expansion, and prospects for continued strength in capital
spending remain favorable. Inflation will remain low and under
control in 1985. This news is good for the U.S. as well as its
trading partners like Japan.
To ensure the strength and durability of economic expansion for
the longer term, we need to get the Federal deficit and the
growth in Federal outlays under better control. With the help of
the Congress, we are determined to do so. My goal is to reduce
the deficit to $100 billion by FY 1988.
There has been much criticism of the strength of the dollar by
many of our allies. Critics have charged that the dollar is
substantially overvalued because of high U.S. interest rates
resulting from large budget deficits. They contend that the high
dollar threatens the global recovery and the U.S. must "correct"
its value.
These arguments are not supported by the facts. While the levels
of interest rates have periodically played an important role in
determining exchange rates, this has not been generally the case
during this Administration. The improved U.S. business climate
and the sharp drop in our inflation are probably the key to the
dollar's performance. I am sympathetic to the view that the value
of the dollar is high, but I disagree that it is "overvalued".
Such a view implies that we can calculate the "right" rate
independent of market forces. I believe that we cannot do so.
Q: The forthcoming Bonn Summit marks the 40th anniversary
of the end of World War II. What are your thoughts on the
development of this organization as it convenes for the eleventh
time? What will be your basic position in the forthcoming talks?
THE PRESIDENT: The annual Economic Summits are a very
useful opportunity for the leaders of the seven main
industrialized countries to explain to each other their
perspectives and plans for their own economies and their
participation in the world economy. In addition, it is an
occasion to review the year ahead. Summits are not, and cannot
be, meetings at which we draw up detailed blueprints for solving
the world's problems. Whenever that was tried in the past, it
failed. But a summit can, and does, give each participant a
clearer understanding of how others see current problems and the
tasks before us, so that we can better determine how we should be
moving, both separately and together, to deal most effectively
with our common agenda.
more
- 6 -
sh
It is too early to say what will be the main themes of the Bonn
Summit. However, we have much unfinished business still before
us. We need to reaffirm our determination to promote sustainable
non-inflationary growth in each of our economies. We need to
move rapidly to begin a new round of trade negotiations as the
best assurance against resurgent protectionist pressures. We need
to continue the policies we outlined at the Williamsburg and
London meetings to deal in the longer term with the debt problem
and the need to integrate the developing countries more
effectively into the open world trade and finance systems. As
with previous economic summits, the Bonn Summit will provide an
opportunity for us to discuss informally the more important
international political issues facing all our countries, of which
the search for meaningful arms reduction is one of the most
pressing. In this search, I'm proud to know that Japan is our
ally and friend.
###