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Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl 04/29/1986 (2)
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Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl 04/29/1986 (2)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl
04/29/1986 (2)
Box: 29
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/13/2005
File Folder
USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
FOIA
1986 (2/9)
F06-114/8
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
29
2908
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10395 CABLE
301217Z AOR 86
2 4/30/1986 B1
[1 - 2 - 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10396 CABLE
301648Z APR 86
1 4/30/1986 B1
[ 18 - 18 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10393 CABLE
300233Z APR 86
5 4/30/1986 B1
[ 19 23 1
10394 CABLE
SAME TEXT AS DOC #10393
2 4/30/1986 B1
[ 24 25 1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/13/2005
File Folder
USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
FOIA
1986 (2/9)
F06-114/8
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
29
2908
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10397 CABLE
300511Z APR 86
2 4/30/1986 B1
[ 26 27 1
R
9/30/2008 F06-114/8
10405 CABLE
301027Z APR 86
1 4/30/1986 B1
[28 28 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10398 CABLE
301548Z APR 86
2 4/30/1986 B1
[ 29 30 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10399 CABLE
301331Z APR 86
1 4/30/1986 B1
[31 31 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/13/2005
File Folder
USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
FOIA
1986 (2/9)
F06-114/8
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
29
2908
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10406 CABLE
300925Z APR 86
1 4/30/1986 B1
[ 32 32 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10400 CABLE
300218Z APR 86
1 4/30/1986 B1
[ 33 33 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10401 CABLE
301729Z APR 86
2 4/30/1986 B1
36 37 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10402 CABLE
301805Z APR 86
1 4/30/1986 B1
[ 38 38 1
R
9/30/2008 F06-114/8
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/13/2005
File Folder
USSR: NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: CHERNOBYL APRIL 29,
FOIA
1986 (2/9)
F06-114/8
YARHI-MILO
Box Number
29
2908
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10403 CABLE
011637Z MAY 86
1 5/1/1986 B1
[ 39 - 39 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
10404 CABLE
011712Z MAY 86
5 5/1/1986 B1
[ 40 44 1
R
9/30/2008
F06-114/8
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
CONF IDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
po
SECRETARIAT
Return
PAGE 01
WARSAW 4452
DTG: 301217Z APR 86 PSN: 012973
EOB455
AN002527
TOR: 120/1324Z
CSN: HCE030
ABOUT 0.07 REMS OR ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF THE 0. 170 REM
to
DOSAGE DESIGNATED AS THE MAXIMU PERMISSIBLE BY THE US
SB
DISTRIBUTION: DOBR-01 WRIT-01 MAT-01 /003 A1
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS
REPORT NO. 39. ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE LITERATURE,
SUCH A LEVEL OF ABSORBED DOSE DOES NOT POST A HEALTH
fufill
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
HAZARD FOR THE POPULATION AS A WHOLE. OBVIOUSLY, THIS
SIT: SIT
ESTIMATE DEPENDS ON THE ACCURACY OF INFORMATION THE
EOB:
SOURCE HAS PROVIDED ON THE EXPOSURE RATE. THE POLISH
GOVERNMENT HAS YET TO BE HEARD FROM WITH REGARD TO
SPECIFIC EXPOSURE RATES. IT HAS, HOWEVER, URGED THE POPULATION
NOT TO DRINK MILK FROM COWS PASTURING ON GREEN FODDER,
OP IMMED /ROUTINE
AND IT IS WITHDRAWING SUCH MILK FROM THE MARKET. POTASSIUM
UTS6664
IODIDE IN LIQUID FORM UNDER THE NAME "LUGO" IS BEING
DE RUDKRW #4452/01 1201223
DISPENSED TO INFANTS AND SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN. (WE
0 R 301217Z APR 86 ZFF-4
UNDERSTAND FROM MFA THAT FOREIGN CHILDREN WILL BE
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
INCLUDED IN THIS PROGRAM.) THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS
ISSUED A STATEMENT POINTING TO THE "ABSOLUTE NECESSITY"
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0736
FOR CAREFUL WASHING OF ALL SPRING VEGETABLES.
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA 3031
4. POST CONCERNS. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WHAT THE GOP IS
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
SAYING ABOUT THE EFFECTS IN POLAND OF THE CHERNOBYL' DISASTER
IS CONSERVATIVE AND POSSIBLY EVASIVE. WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS
SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 04452
THAT THE LUGO IODINE COMPOUND IN FACT MAY NOT BE WIDELY
AVAILABLE (AND AS OF MID-DAY APRIL 30 THE POLES HAVE
GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT SUCH MEDICATION MAY BE AVAILABLE
E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TO US AND OTHER FOREIGN CHILDREN HERE). THERE ARE TWO
TAGS: AMED, PL, UR
PREGNANT WOMEN AT POST, AND SEVERAL SMALL INFANTS UNDER
SUBJECT: CHARNOBYL NUCLEAR DISASTER: MISSION CONCERNS
ONE YEAR OF AGE. IN THESE AND OTHER FAMILIES THERE IS
WIDESPREAD CONCERN OVER THE HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF THE
REF: WARSAW 4398 (NOTAL)
DISASTER. EVEN THOUGH OUR INFORMATION TO DATE SHOWS
NO IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR ALARM, IT IS--AS INDICATED
ABOVE--POSSIBLE THAT THE GOP IS WITHHOLDING VITAL DATA.
1.
ENTIRE TEXT.
BT
2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY AND CONSULATES ARE NEAREST FOREIGN
SERVICE POSTS TO THE CHERNOBYL' SITE (AND WERE APPARENTLY
DIRECTLY IN THE PATH OF THE INITIAL RADIATON CLOUD).
RELIABLE (BUT UNOFFICIAL) POLISH SOURCES REPORT
EXPOSURE RATES IN POLAND RANGED BETWEEN 5 AND 20
TIMES BACKGROUND LEVELS. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS
URGED THE POPULATION NOT TO DRING MILK FROM THE COWS
PASTURING ON GREEN FODDER, AND IS ORDERING IODINE DOSAGE
FOR CHILDREN. THE GOP HAS STRESSED THE "ABSOLUTE
NECESSITY" OF CAREFULLY WASHING ALL VEGETABLES. WITHOUT
INDEPENDENT MONITORING CAPABILITY EMBASSY IS UNABLE
TO VERIFY RADITION LEVELS. WE HAVE OFFERED TO ASSIST
GOP WITH MEDICAL SUPPLIES, POWDERED MILK, ETC. ACTION
REQUESTED: WE URGENTLY REQUIRE A USG ASSESSMENT OF THE
HEALTH SITUATION HERE, USING INTELLIGENCE MEANS AS
NECESSARY. CAN A MONITORING DEVICE BE SHIPPED ASAP FOR
EMBASSY USE? REGARDING IODINE, MFA HAS INDICATED
FOREIGN CHILDREN ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE IODINE
PROGRAM, BUT WE HAVE HEARD OF SHORTAGES. DEPT. IS REQUESTED
TO ASSESS ASAP THE NEED FOR IODINE AND, IF IT IS
REQUIRED, TO PROCURE ADFQUATE SUPPLIES FROM THE NEAREST SOURCE.
(THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE--MISSION'S MEDICAL SUPPORT--
HAS NONE AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH A SUPPLY IS REPORTEDLY ON
THE WAY.) END SUMMARY.
3. RADIATION LEVELS. REPORTS ON RADIATION EXPOSURE RATES
DECLASSIFIED
FROM A RELIABLE SCICOUNS CONTACT (BUT ONE SPEAKING
UNOFFICIALLY) INDICATED THAT RADIATION RANGED BETWEEN 5 AND
20 TIMES BACKGROUND DEPENDING ON LOCATION IN THE COUNTRY.
NLRR F06-114/8#10395
ACCORDING TO THE POLISH MEDIA, THE NORTHEASTERN PART OF POLAND
EXPERIENCED THE HIGHEST EXPOSUURE RATE BASED ON THAT DATA
AND ASSUMING THAT A RATE OF 20 TIMES BACKGROUND WERE
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
TO PERSIST FOR TEN DAYS, SCICOUNS ESTIMATES THAT THE
TOTAL ABSORBED DOES IN THE GENERAL POPULATION WOULD BE
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
WARSAW 4452
DTG: 301217Z APR 86 PSN: 012975
EOB458
AN002526
TOR: 120/1325Z
CSN: HCE031
DISTRIBUTION: DOBR-01 WRIT-01 MAT-01 /003 A1
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:
OP IMMED /ROUTINE
UTS6677
DE RUDKRW #4452/02 1201243
O R 301217Z APR 86 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0737
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA 3031
EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
SECTION 02 OF 02 WARSAW 04452
5. EMBASSY HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH REGIONAL MEDICAL
OFFICER IN VIENNA, WHO RECOMMENDED AGAINST PRESCRIBING
IODINE MEDICATION PENDING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVELS OF
RADIOACTIVE IODINE CONTAMINATION. POST MEDICAL ADVISOR
(A TDY-BRITISH CONTRACT DOCTOR) AND LONDON CONTACTS ALSO
RECOMMEND AGAINST PRESCRIBING SUCH MEDICATION, EVEN THOUGH,
AS NOTED ABOVE, THE GOP IS GOING AHEAD WITH SUCH A PROGRAM
FOR POLISH CHILDREN. IN ANY EVENT, THE POST CONTRACT
MEDICAL FACILITY (AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY) HAS NO IODINE
MEDICATION, ALTHOUGH REPORTEDLY A SUPPLY IS ARRIVING
THIS EVENING.
6. IN THIS SITUATION, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT
FOR THE USG TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT
CAPABILITY WHICH WILL PERMIT THE DEPARTMENT AND MISSION TO
REACH SENSIBLE DECISIONS ON WHAT IF ANYTHING TO DO REGARDING
EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS AT THE POLAND POSTS AND
VISIITING US CITIZENS, WE URGE THAT SUCH AN EFFORT BE
COMMENCED, ONE COMPONENT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO SHIP ASAP
A MONITORING DEVICE TO THE EMBASSY. WE LIKEWISE NEED
THE BEST MEDICAL OPINION AVAILABLE ON WHETHER SOME SORT
OF IODINE TREATMENT IS APPROPRIATE FOR OUR CHILDREN AND,
IF SO, WHAT IT IS, WHERE QUICKEST TO PROCURE IT AND SHIP
IT TO WARSAW, ETC. (THIS ISSUE NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED
EVEN IF A BRITISH SHIPMENT ARRIVES.)
7. FINALLY, IN A MEETING THIS MORNING AT MF A ON ANOTHER
MATTER, CHARGE EXPRESSED THE USG' SYMPATHY OVER THE
SITUATION THAT HAS ARISEN IN POLAND BECAUSE OF THE CHERNOBYL' S
DISASTER AND OFFERED US ASSISTANCE WITH MEDICATIONS AND/OR
OTHER PRODUCTS SUCH AS POWERED MILK. MF A REP. WAS
GRATEFUL FOR THIS GESTURE AND SAID HE WOULD BE BACK IN
TOUCH IF US ASSISTANCE IS DESIRED.
8. ACTION REQUESTED: URGENT DEPARTMENT ATTENTION TO THE
CONCERNS AND SUGGESTIONS RAISED IN PARAS. 4-6 ABOVE.
DAVIS
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
United States Department of State
3
Washington. D.C. 20520
MEMORANDUM
April 30, 1986
TO:
OES/N - Mr. Devine
FROM:
L/N
- Jonathan B. Schwartz dBs
SUBJECT: Soviet Duty to Warn Neighbors
L has advised the Press Office this morning that
customary international law requires the Soviet Union to
notify other states of the possibility of transboundary
effects of the incident and to furnish them with the
information necessary to address these effects. (We have
not identified any specific treaty binding upon the Soviet
Union which imposes this requirement. However, we believe
that state practice and environmental declarations evidence
this as a principle of customary international law. This
issue of "notice" should be kept distinct from the issue of
"state responsibility" for environmental damage. At present,
we are giving no guidance on the latter, very sensitive
subject.)
CC: OES/NTC - Mr. Prochnik/Mr. Congdon
L
- Mr. Matheson
L/OES
- Mr. Colson/Ms. Kennedy
L/EUR
- Ms. West
EUR/SOV
-
Mr. Bean
4
Inofficial Translation
As 4 result of the measures taken within the last 24 hours,
the discharge of redioactive substances has decreased and the
level of radiation in the area of the incident has lowered.
Measurements taken demonstrate that fission chain reaction
of the atomic generator is not occuring. The reactor is in an
inactive ("saglushennom") state.
Active work for cleaning the contaminated unit is in
progress.
The Soviet Union possesses sufficient material, scientific
and technical possibilities for the works to liquidiate the
consequences of the secident and at the present moment the need
does not arise for sesistant from other states. We are
appreciative for the proposals of aid to us.
Foreign citizens located in the Soviet Union (in particular
specialists or tourists) have not approached competent Soviet
organisations in connection with the accident at the Chernobyl
A.E.S. (stomic energy station).
5
Unofficial Translation
In Moscow there 18 appreciation for President Reagan's
expression of sympathy in connection with the accident at the
Chernobyl A.E.S. (atomic energy station), and also tc: the
expressed readiness to render assistance in liquidating its
consequences, We are undertaking all necessary efforts to
localize the accident and keep its consequences to a minimum.
At the present moment there is no need for assistance from
other states.
A6 fat " the facts of the situation, the President OF to
USA has been informed of them.
United States Department of State
1
Washington, D.C. 20520
mum
Hard Camed Hand- Camed
MEMORANDUM
copies L all
AB
5/1
April 30, 1986
TO:
OES/N - Mr. Devine
FROM:
L/N
- Jonathan B. Schwartz dBD
SUBJECT: Soviet Duty to Warn Neighbors
L has advised the Press Office this morning that
customary international law requires the Soviet Union to
notify other states of the possibility of transboundary
effects of the incident and to furnish them with the
information necessary to address these effects. (We have
not identified any specific treaty binding upon the Soviet
Union which imposes this requirement. However, we believe
that state practice and environmental declarations evidence
this as a principle of customary international law. This
issue of "notice" should be kept distinct from the issue of
"state responsibility" for environmental damage. At present,
we are giving no guidance on the latter, very sensitive
subject.)
CC:
OES/NTC
- Mr. Prochnik/Mr. Congdon
L
- Mr. Matheson
L/OES
- Mr. Colson/Ms. Kennedy
L/EUR
- Ms. West
EUR/SOV
- Mr. Bean
Sevel Rodman copies to:
6
Pugliaresi Steinen / Mandel
Thousand
Wright
Cobb
Purnell
Sestamonih
UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION
8
CIRCLE ONE BELOW
MODE
PAGES 4
14
IMMEDIATE
SECURE FAX #
DTG 0122239
PRIORITY
ADMIN FAX # 03
RELEASER
ROUTINE
RECORD #
Jack - some
FROM/LOCATION
1. USIA
Imported given
TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
Mandi
1. SEE ATTACHED
18 will
2. 3 (McDanrel) Forten
9ath The
4.
Matlock
Staff comment
5.
Sestanovich
and in of you
6.
Mandel
conced 08/
INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME Reymond OF RECEIPT
7.
back : WOA
today,
1.
2.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION
WHCA FORM 8. 15 OCTOBER 84
9
Room
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION/SLUG FOR:
MR. DONALD FORTIER
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
DR. SESTANOVICH
MS. JUDYT MANDEL
MR. WALTER RAYMOND
10
NUCLEAR DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL
Anner:
Next, a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.
Voice:
Worldwide attention is focused on Chernobyl, a complex of nuclear power
plants sixty miles north of Kiev in the Soviet Ukraine, where a meltdown of
Naily
Name
the central core of a nuclear reactor has apparently taken place causing an
explosion and fire that released dangerous quantities of radiation in the
stmosphere.
This Hime to betheworst accident in history in annever
This This may be the worst nuclear secident in history Official Soviet press
statements have termed it a "disaster," and because Soviet authorities rarely
publicize news about any domestic catastrophies--even earthquakes or
floods-their use of the word "disaster" is especially significant.
Nuclear radiation in the stmosphere doesn't respect national borders, it
disperses into the air of the planet and is therefore an international
concern. The failure of the Soviet Union to supply all the details about the
Nearly two & ars often
Chernobyl event is particularly disturbing. Within hours of the accident,
radiation reaction readings in Scandinavia were one hunsdred times higher than
normal, but the Soviets didn't alert the world for more than a day, and then
only after they received inquiries from Sweden and other governments.
untile after
foreign to
raise questions
You 200mg after thousing
11
-2-
the
Officially, the Soviete claim that the situation at Chemobyl has
stablized, yet they have asked Sweden and West Germany for help. The United
States has expressed regret to the Soviet government over this tragedy, and
has offered to provide humanitarian and technical aid as soon as possible.
The Soviets say they appreciate our offer, but are equipped to handle the
have Some
problem themselves. Nevertheless, American specialiste want to share their
in
knowledge and experience with Soviet experts, for they kow that sealing the
damaged reactor, cleaning up the surrounding environment, and treating the
thousands of people potentially affected by radiation, is 4. difficult and
extensive process. In 1979, there was a partial meltdown at the Three Mile
Island nuclear power plant n Pennsylvania. Most of the escaping radiation was
plant
contained, and there were no deaths or associated illnesses amont the nearby
population, American investigations ors informed Soviet scientists about Three Mile
Island as soon as the incident occurred, and & presidential commission later
issued an exhaustive report to the public. All industrial a circlents in
the us are reported ted in they and investigations 2 the
cause are coucle public - with in results
The extent of the Chernobyl catastrophe is not yet known, mainly because ava
the Soviet government has released so little information. Rumors and
took
speculation abound, and will continue as long as the Soviets refuse to set the
record straight. Moreover, the people of the Soviet Union have been left in
the dark about An accident that my seriously affect their well-beins.
adopt a F by of open wess and full disclosur
Isn't it time for all government to
whin accidents occur? Particularly when the
consequincial planet can health a feet so out all to of us there an persons this
whose lives have Recal discuss tob by this
disaster. We prayfar their spring recovery,
12
-3
When it comes to nuclear safety, no one can stand OR ceremony. The
potential dangers of human radiation poisoning and irreversible damage to the
environment are of worldwide concern, regardless of the Soviet government's
desire to avoid embarrassment. America wants to help.
Anner:
That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.
And we hope that the So
will
In For their their sahe, 12 aret, and for we the hope safe that -dwn the at
interest and in
Soviet us an Southment this will the a to
this the public hoppehed. of the crusial de tails
late date - make
infarmat Alwha has
UNCLAS
13
CLASSIFICATION
CIRCLE ONE BELOW
MODE
PAGES 4
P7
IMMEDIATE
P7:14 SECURE FAX #
DTG 0122237
PRIORITY
ADMIN FAX # 03
RELEASER
ROUTINE
RECORD #
FROM/LOCATION
1. USIA
TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT
1. SEE ATTACHED
3 2. (McDanrel) Fortner
4.
Matlock
/
5.
Sestanouch
6.
Mandel
7.
INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME Raymond OF RECEIPT
1.
2.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:
UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION
WHCA FORM 8. 15 OCTOBER 84
14
Room
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION/SLUG FOR:
MR. DONALD FORTIER
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK
DR. SESTANOVICH
MS. JUDYT MANDEL
MR. WALTER RAYMOND
15
NUCLEAR DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL
Anner:
Next, a voa Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.
Voice:
Worldwide attention is focused on Chernobyl, a complex of nuclear power
plants sixty miles north of Kiev in the Soviet Ukraine, where a meltdown of
the central core of a nuclear reactor has apparently taken place causing an
explosion and fire that released dangerous quantities of radiation in the
atmosphere.
This may be the worst nuclear accident in history. Official Soviet press
statements have termed it a "disaster," and because Soviet authorities rarely
publicize news about any domestic catastrophies--even earthquakes or
floods-their use of the word "disaster" is especially significant.
Nuclear radiation in the atmosphere doesn't respect national borders, it
disperses into the air of the planet and is therefore an international
concern. The failure of the Soviet Union to supply all the details about the
Chernobyl event is particularly disturbing. Within hours of the accident,
radiation reaction readings in Scandinavia were one hunmdred times higher than
normal, but the Soviets didn't alert the world for more than a day, and then
only after they received inquiries from Sweden and other governments.
16
-2-
Officially, the Soviets claim that the situation at Chernobyl has
stablized, yet they have asked Sweden and West Germany for help. The United
States has expressed regret to the Soviet government over this tragedy, and
has offered to provide humanitarian and technical aid as soon as possible.
The Soviets say they appreciate our offer, but are equipped to handle the
problem themselves. Nevertheless, American specialists want to share their
knowledge and experience with Soviet experts, for they kow that sealing the
damaged reactor, cleaning up the surrounding environment, and treating the
thousands of people potentially affected by radiation is & difficult and
extensive process. In 1979, there was a partial meltdown at the Three Mile
Island nuclear power plant n Pennsylvania. Most of the escaping radiation was
contained, and there were no deaths or associated illnesses amont the nearby
population American investigations informed Soviet scientists about Three Mile
Island as soon as the incident occurred, and a presidential commission later
issued an exhaustive report to the public.
The extent of the Chernobyl catastrophe is not yet known, mainly because
the Soviet government has released so little information. Rumors and
speculation abound, and will continue as long as the Soviets refuse to set the
record straight. Moreover, the people of the Soviet Union have been left in
the dark about an accident that my seriously affect their well-being.
17
-3- -
When it comes to nuclear safety, no one can stand on ceremony. The
potential dangers of human radiation poisoning and irreversible damage to the
environment are of worldwide concern, regardless of the Soviet government's
desire to avoid embarrassment. America wants to help.
Anner:
That was a VOA Editorial, reflecting the views of the U.S. Government.
CONFIDENTIAL
INCOMING
18
TELEGRAM
UNITED STATES
INFORMATION AGENCY
PAGE 01
047810 ICA708
047810 ICA708
30/1652Z
OES/N.
ACTION OFFICE VBE-01
5. IN SUMMARY, WE SUGGEST WE STICK TO THE
INFO ACO-01 DSO-02 DIS-01 AC-01 EU-03 DR-01 VBB-01 VBR-01
FACTS, AVOID NEEDLESS SPECULATION THAT WILL
VOA-02 /014 A3 1
FRIGHTEN OUR AUDIENCE, AND PUT PUBLIC
PRESSURE UPON THE SOVIETS TO LET THE WORLD
0 301648Z APR 86
KNOW WHAT REALLY HAS HAPPENED.
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
HARTMAN
TO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4550
BT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4262
#7407
RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7208
RUEHXE/EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS
BT
MOSCOW 07407
USIA FOR VOA, VOA/BRE, VOA/BRU, VOA/BX, VOA/BXE,
STATE FOR EUR/SOV, OES/N
LENINGRAD FOR P&C-ALLIN
E.O. 12356: DECL: QADR
SUBJECT: VOA COVERAGE CHERNOBYL REACTOR INCIDENT
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO VOA COVERAGE OF
THE INCIDENT AT THE NUCLEAR REACTOR IN
CHERNOBYL, USSR. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT VOA
COVERAGE, PARTICULARLY SPECULATORY COMMENT BY
"INFORMED" EXPERTS, THAT SAYS, ESSENTIALLY,
THE OBVIOUS: THAT RADIATION IS EXTREMELY
DANAGEROUS AND THE EFFECTS OF THIS INCIDENT
WILL BE LONG LASTING. WE STRONGLY SUGGEST
THAT SUCH COVERAGE IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE: WE
ARE SCARING PEOPLE, YET WE OURSELVES DO NOT
KNOW THE FACTS ABOUT THIS INCIDENT.
Directorate
3. WE WOULD RECOMMEND ANOTHER APPROACH. WE BELIEVE
OUR COVERAGE SHOULD STRESS THE CONTRADICTION
Associate acicarting
BETWEEN THE WAY THE SOVIETS HAVE HANDLED THIS
INCIDENT -- THE FACTS ARE WELL KNOWN -- AND
X-
THEIR RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT "OPENNESS"
("GLASNOST'"). INTERDEPENDENCE, AND EACH
/Director
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO ITS CITIZENS
Director
AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HANDLE NUCLEAR
MATERIALS IN AN OPEN, SAFE, AND MATURE FASHION.
IN THIS CONTEXT WE NOTE A COMMENT BROADCAST
ON THE MOSCOW WORLD SERVICE IN ENGLISH AT 1710 GMT
29 APRIL (MONITORED FBIS LONDON 291811Z APR 86) "MAJOR
a
BREAKDOWNS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS SUCH AS
THE THREE MILE ISLAND PLANT ACCIDENT IN THE
UNITED STATES OR THE ONE AT CHERNOBYL IN THE
D/VOR/P 6/VOA/R
UKRAINE CALL FOR A GREATER DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL
BRE
COOPERATION RATHER THAN AN IMMEDIATE SHUT-DOWN
BBU
OF ALL SUCH FACILITIES." WE SHOULD ALSO STRESS
BXE
THAT NNA EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY
SWEDEN AND FINLAND ARE ALSO CALLING FOR MORE
VIAK
X
INFORMATION FROM THE SOVIETS.
BX
4. ADDITIONALLY YOU WILL RECALL THAT ABOUT TWO YEARS
AGO THE USSR JOINED THE IAEA "INIS" SYSTEM FOR
EXCHANING INFORMATION (VIA COMPUTER NETWORK)
ON SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS WITH A VIEW TO ITS USE-
FULNESS IN CASE OF A MAJOR ACCIDENT. WE SUGGEST
DECLASSIFIED
THAT AMONG THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE USSR HAS
THEREBY ACCEPTED IS A PROCEDURE FOR INFORMING
THE PUBLIC AND OTHER AFFECTED GOVERNMENTS OF NUCLEAR
ACCIDENTS. PLEASE PROVIDE US WITH INFO ON THE
NLRR F06-114/8±10396
IAEA SYSTEM; IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO CHECK WITH
CONFIDENTIAL
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
SECRET
26
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4219
DTG: 300511Z APR 86 PSN: 012927
EOB428
AN002529
TOR: 120/1257Z
CSN: HCE017
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1
E
X
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
D
SIT: SIT
EOB:
S
OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #4219 1200512
O 300511Z APR 86
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
E
TO AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 2114
X
S E CRET STATE 134219
D
EXDIS
S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENRG, TRGY, PARM, SW
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
REF: STOCKHOLM 03311
E
1. (U) THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS UNCLASSIFIED
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT,
X
WHICH THE EMBASSY CAN SHARE WITH SWEDES WITH THE CAVEAT
D
THAT WEIGHTS AND NUMBER OF CHANNELS ARE ESTIMATES, NOT
PRECISE FIGURES:
-- THE CHERNOBYL SITE CONSISTS OF FOUR POWER REACTORS,
S
EACH RATED AT ONE THOUSAND ME GAWATTS ELECTRIC. THIS
KIND OF A REACTOR ESSENTIALLY CONSISTS OF A LARGE BLOCK
OF GRAPHITE WEIGHING SOME 1,000 METRIC TONS. WITH
VERTICAL HOLES WHICH ALLOW THE PLACEMENT OF SOME 1, 600
CHANNELS FOR LOW-ENRICHED (1.1 TO 1.8 PERCENT U-235)
URANIUM FUEL. THE FUEL IS CONTAINED WITHIN A CAPSULE
INSIDE A TUBE, WITH WATER FLOWING THROUGH THE TUBE AND
E
AROUND THE CAPSULE FOR COOLING AND HEAT TRANSFER.
X
-- WE DO NOT KNOW HOW THE ACCIDENT SEQUENCE WAS
D
INITIATED. HOWE VER, IF IN SOME MANNER THE WATER FLOW
IN THE CHANNEL WAS INTERRUPTED, THE FUEL WOULD MELT AND
S
BURN THROUGH THE TUBE, AND EITHER IGNITE THE GRAPHITE
OR CAUSE A STEAM-GRAPHITE INTERACTION, WHICH COULD ALSO
SET THE GRAPHITE ON FIRE.
-- ONCE THE GRAPHITE IGNITED, IT WOULD BURN AT A VERY
HIGH TEMPERATURE AND MELT OTHER FUEL CHANNELS. THUS A
LARGE PART OF THE REACTOR CORE COULD BE AFFECTED. IN
ADDITION, HYDROGEN AND OTHER COMBUSTIBLE GASES SUCH AS
METHANE COULD BE GENERATED AND EXPLODE.
2. (S) FOLLOWING ARE SECRET TALKING POINTS EMBASSY
SHOULD USE IN DISCUSSING SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT WITH
SWEDISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:
-- WE HAVE DETERMINED THAT REACTOR BUILDING NUMBER FOUR
AT CHERNOBYL AND THE ADJACENT GENERATOR HALLS HAVE
SUSTAINED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE, PROBABLY THE RESULT OF AN
EXPLOSION.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/8#10397
SECRET
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
SECRET
27
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 4219
DTG: 300511Z APR 86 PSN: 012927
-- SPECIFICALLY, THE UPPER PORTION OF THE REACTOR
BUILDING IS LARGELY DESTROYED. WE BELIEVE THE EVENT
E
WAS PROBABLY INITIATED BY A LOSS OF COOL ANT ACCIDENT,
X
WHICH CAUSED FUEL MELTING. ASSOCIATED HIGH TEMPERATURES
PROBABLY PRODUCED HYDROGEN AND METHANE, WHICH CAUSED
D
THE EXPLOSION. A LARGE PLUME OF SMOKE COMING FROM
THE REACTOR INDICATES THE GRAPHITE IN THE REACTOR CORE
I
IS STILL BURNING.
S
-- THE THREE OTHER REACTORS HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN, BUT
CONDENSERS CONTINUE TO OPERATE TO REMOVE RESIDUAL
HEAT. ALL COOLING WATER PUMPING ACTIVITY TO BUILDING
NUMBER FOUR HAS CEASED. SOME COOLING WATER IS BEING
DIVERTED TO ADJACENT OVERFLOW BASINS.
E
-- COMMAND AND CONTROL AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OPERATIONS
HAVE BEEN SET UP A FEW KILOMETERS FROM THE PLANT. WHITEHEAD
X
BT
D
I
S
E
X
D
I
S
E
X
D
I
S
SECRET
28
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
STOCKHOLM 3340
DTG: 301027Z APR 86 PSN: 012776
EOB363
AN002536
TOR: 120/1126Z
CSN:HCE978
THE AREA OF CHERNOBYL.
-
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1
3. OUR CONTACT ANTICIPATES A SHIFT IN WINDS IN THE NEXT
WHSR COMMENT: SUM
THREE TO FOUR DAYS WHICH COULD CARRY A NEW PLUME IN THE
DIRECTION OF SWEDEN. THE CLOUD'S RADIOACTIVE CONTENT
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
WOULD DEPEND ON THE SUCCESS OF EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE
SIT: SIT PUBS
CHERNOBYL FIRE, BUT OUR SMHI CONTACT THOUGHT THAT, IF
EOB:
HEAT AND EMISSIONS AT THE SITE WERE REDUCED, CHANCES FOR
A LOW AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVITY WERE GOOD. NEWELL
BT
OP IMMED
UTS6249
DE RUFHSK #3340 1201028
0 301027Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2193
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3377
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 0501
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0745
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 2736
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0104
AMEMBASSY OSL 0 1833
AMEMBASSY PARIS 6451
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 2236
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 03340
VIENNA FOR IAEA
USEC
USOECD
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ESCA, TRGY, SENV, UR, SW
SUBJECT: SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
REF: A) STOCKHOLM 3318, B) STOCKHOLM 3311, C) STOCKHOLM
3296
1. AN EMBASSY OFFICER HAS SPOKEN TO THE OFFICE IN THE
SWEDISH METEOROLOGICAL AND HYDROLOGICAL INSTITUTE (SMHI)
MAKING WIND MEASUREMENTS OVER SCANDINAVIA AND TRACKING
THE MOVEMENT OF THE CLOUD OF NUCLEAR DEBRIS FROM THE
CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. SMHI CONFIRMS THAT THE FIRST PLUME
CARRYING RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS MOVED OVER EASTERN SWEDEN ON
SUNDAY AFTERNOON AND THAT BY THEIR CALCULATIONS THIS
WOULD TIME THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT AS OF EARLY SATURDAY,
APRIL 26. WEAK WINDS KEPT THE CLOUD HANGING OVER MUCH
OF SOUTHERN SCANDINAVIA THROUGH MONDAY AND TUESDAY. AT
THE MOMENT (A.M. ON APRIL 30), WESTERLY WINDS ARE
PICKING UP AND DISPERSING THE CLOUD. RADIATION READINGS
ARE ACCORDINGLY COMING DOWN.
-
2. AFTER SUNDAY, A SECOND AND HIGHER PLUME SWEPT FIRST
WESTWARD TOWARDS POLAND AND LATER TO THE SOUTH TOWARDS
ROMANIA. THE SWEDES ANTICIPATE THE RADIATION IT IS
NLRR DECLASSIFIED F06-114/8# 10405
CARRYING TO BE LIGHT SINCE WINDS IN THE AREA OF
CHERNOBYL ARE WEAK AND MUCH OF THE RADIOACTIVE PARTICLES
ARE PROBABLY STILL SUSPENDED OVER THE ACCIDENT SITE.
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
SMHI BELIEVES THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL RAINFALL IN
CONF IDENTIAL
29
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
COPENHAGEN 3025
DTG:301548Z APR 86 PSN:013411
E0B578
AN002609
TOR: 120/1711Z
CSN:HCE104
MEASURABLE CONTAMINATION THERE.
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
C. EXAMINATION OF THE AIR SAMPLE COLLECTED ON GLASS
MAT-01 /007 A1
FIBRE FILTERS OVER THE PERIOD APRIL 24-28 SHOWS BOTH
PARTICULAR AND GASEOUS SPECIES OF ISOTOPES IN THE
FOLLOWING CONCENTRATIONS:
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
IODINE 131 - 0.26 BQ PER CU.M.
EOB:
CESIUM 137 - 0.06 BQ PER CU.M.
CESIUM 134 - 0.03 BQ PER CU.M.
OTHER GAMMA SPECTRUM CONTAMINATION PRESENT IN THIS
OP IMMED
SAMPLE IN LESSER QUANTITIES, FOR WHICH RISØ AS YET
VSK000 STU7197
CANNOT PROVIDE QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT:
DE RUFHCP #3025/01 1201550
0 301548Z APR 86
ZIRCONIUM 95
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
NIOBIUM 95
RUTHENIUM 103
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6785
RUTHENIUM 106
IODINE 132
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2176
IODINE 133
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0260
BARIUM 140
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 6939
LANTHANUM 140
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7633
CERIUM 141
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6068
CERIUM 144
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 0146
NEPTUNIUM 239
TELLURIUM 132
EN
SECTION 01 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 03025
MOLYBDENUM - 99
-
D. OTHER AIR SAMPLES TAKEN SUBSEQUENTLY AT RISO SHOW
CORRECTED COPY (ADDING SECTION INFO)
LESSER CONCENTRATIONS OF IODINE 131 RANGING FROM
0.004 BQ. PER CU.M. ON APRIL 28-29 TO 0.014 BQ PER CU.M.
E.O. 12356: DECL : OADR
ON APRIL 29. PRIOR TO THE APRIL 28 MEASUREMENT
TAGS: TNUC, TRGY, UR DA
THE RECORDED CONCENTRATIONS HAD BEEN NIL, WITH THE
SUBJECT: SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
EXCEPTION OF CESIUM 137 AT 5 MICRO BQ PER CU. M.
REFS: (A) STATE 132741
-
-
(B) COPENHAGEN 2999 (NOTAL)
E. BASED ON THEIR ANALYSIS RIS0 BELIEVES IT "ALMOST
CERTAIN" THAT THE CONTAMINATION RESULTS FROM A FUEL
FAILURE AT HIGH TEMPERATURE OF A BRMK 1000 MW REACTOR.
1. THIS is AN ACTION CABLE; SEE PARA 4.
-
-
2. (C) MFA NUCLEAR AFFAIRS SPECIALIST FINN ERSKOV
4. ACTION REQUESTED.
INFORMED US THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE
SOVIETS APRIL 29 THROUGH THE DANISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW
A) THE MFA HAS EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN ANY INFORMA-
THAT SOVIET FAILURE PROMPTLY TO NOTIFY THE DANES OF THE
TION THE USG CAN MAKE AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE CHERNOBYL
CHERNOBYL REACTOR ACCIDENT WAS "NOT SATISFACTORY."
ACCIDENT. EMBASSY URGES THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT,
THE EMBASSY ALSO REQUESTED FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT
PRESUMABLY THROUGH THE DANISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON,
THE ACCIDENT. IN RESPONSE THE SOVIETS REFERRED THE
BE PROVIDED THE FULLEST POSSIBLE BRIEFING.
EMBASSY TO THAT DAY'S TASS RELEASE.
-
BT
-
3. (LOU) RIS0, THE DANISH NATIONAL RESEARCH LABORATORY,
APRIL 30 PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE
TO THE QUESTIONS REF A:
A. THE FIRST INDICATIONS OF CONTAMINATION WERE DETECTED
IN A ROUTINE EXAMINATION OF A GRASS SAMPLE TAKEN ON THE
RISO GROUNDS, NEAR ROSKILDE ON THE ISLAND OF SJAELLAND.
IT SHOWED A DEPOSITION OF IODINE 131 ISOTOPE IN A
CONCENTRATION OF 200 BQ PER SQ.M. SAMPLES TAKEN SINCE
DECLASSIFIED
HAVE SHOWED CONCENTRATIONS RANGING FROM 100 TO 1000 BQ
PER SQ.M.
NLRR F06-114/8#10398 10398
B. ALL GRASS SAMPLES WERE GATHERED ON SJAELLAND.
WITHIN THIS LIMITED AREA THERE APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT
GREATER CONCENTRATIONS IN THE NORTH OF THE ISLAND.
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
A COLLEAGUE IN HAMBURG HAS TOLD RIS0 THAT THERE IS NO
CONF IDENTIAL
30
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
COPENHAGEN 3025
DTG: 301548Z APR 86 PSN: 013414
EOB579
AN002608
TOR: 120/1711Z
CSN: HCE105
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
E OB:
OP IMMED
STU7198
DE RUFHCP #3025/02 1201550
O 301548Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6786
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2177
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0261
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 6940
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 7634
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 6069
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 0147
C
N
SECTION 02 OF 02 COPENHAGEN 03025
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: TNUC, TRGY, UR DA
SUBJECT: SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
B) RISO RESEARCHERS HAVE REQUESTED EARLY NOTIFICATION
OF RECORDED CONTAMINATION IN THE U.S. AS THE RESULT OF
THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT. WE HOPE THIS INFORMATION CAN
BE PROVIDED IN TIMELY RECIPROCATION AND SUGGEST IT BE
PASSED DIRECTLY BY PHONE TO SENIOR RESEARCHER IN HEALTH
PHYSICS DR. ASKER AARKROG. (TELE: 45-2-37-12-12).
-
-
5. (LOU) COMMENT: THE DANISH MEDIA HAS RESPONDED TO
CHERNOBYL WITH INTENSE COVERAGE, DETAILED REF B.
SOME DEMONSTRATIVE ACTIVITY AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY
IS EXPECTED AND THE USSR WILL BE UNDER SEVERE
CRITICISM FOR ITS HANDLING OF THE AFFAIR.
THE ACCIDENT HAS ALSO FOCUSSED ADDITIONAL POPULAR
ATTENTION ON HE BARSEBAECK REACTOR, VIRTUALLY WITHIN
SIGHT OF COPENHAGEN ACROSS THE ORESUND IN SWEDEN.
FINALLY, THE ACCIDENT HAS GIVEN RISØ A MUCH-NEEDED
OPPORTUNITY TO PROFILE ITSELF AS THE REPOSITORY OF
USEFUL, EVEN ESSENTIAL EXPERTISE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS.
WITH ITS NUCLEAR RESEARCH ACTIVITIES UNDER RECURRING
POLITICAL ATTACK FROM DENMARK'S MANY NUCLEAR-PHOBES,
RISØ'S LONG-TERM PROSPECTS STAND TO BENEFIT GREATLY
FROM THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THEIR MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT ROLE. TODMAN
BT
CONF IDENTIAL
31
CONF IDENT IAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 7374
DTG:301331Z APR 86 PSN: 013044
EOB483
AN002548
TOR: 120/1354Z
CSN:HCE047
EMBASSY OF POSSIBLE URGENT REQUEST FOR VISAS FORTH-
COMING. NOTIFICATION THAT DEPARTMENT APPROVES PLAN
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
FOR THREE-MAN TEAM TO COME TO MOSCOW WOULD BE SIGNAL
MAT-01 /007 A1
FOR EMBASSY BONN TO REQUEST VISAS, FOR MOSCOW TO SUPPORT
VISAS AT MFA AND FOR EUCOM TO SECURE RESERVATIONS ON
NEXT AVAILABLE FLIGHT TO MOSCOW.
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
5. (U) WE BELIEVE THAT PRESENCE OF TEAM TDY TO
EOB:
EMBASSY WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO ANXIETIES AMONG INTER-
NATIONAL MOSCOW COMMUNITY WITH WHOM WE COULD SHARE
INFORMATION IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE.
HARTMAN
OP IMMED
BT
STU6560
DE RUEHMO #7374 1201333
0 301331Z APR 86 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4241
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0251
INFO CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAREUR DCSI HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE//
DIA WASHDC//DR/AT/AT-4// IMMEDIATE
CONFILENTIAL MOSCOW 07374
USCINCEUR FOR GEN LAWSON FROM AMBASSADOR HARTMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL:0ADR
TAGS: AMED, KSCA, TRGY, SENV, UR
SUBJECT: REACTOR ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL AND RADIATION
MONITORING (U)
REF: PHONCON DATT, USDAO MOSCOW/CDR TULL, USCINCEUR
30 APR 86.
1. (C) THE SOVIET REACTOR ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL
HAS RESULTED IN WIDESPREAD DISTRIBUTION OF RADIOACTIVE
CONTAMINATION AND INCREASED CONCERN WITHIN THE MOSCOW
AMERICAN COMMUNITY CONCERNING POSSIBLE PUBLIC HEALTH
RISK TO FAMILIES LIVING IN MOSCOW. WE ARE AWARE, FOR
EXAMPLE, OF ACTIONS BEING TAKEN IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
TO RESTRICT OR CURTAIL CONSUMPTION OF DAIRY PRODUCTS,
OUT OF CONCERN FOR CONSUMER SAFETY.
2. (C) IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ACCURATE DATA OR
DEPENDABLE ADVICE WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT WHICH ONLY ADDS TO THE GROWING CONCERN HERE.
SUCH DATA AND ADVICE ARE NEEDED NOW.
3. (U) PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES PER REF INDICATE
THREE-MAN TEAM FROM USEUCOM ASSETS IS AVAILABLE TO
HELP US. TEAM
WOULD STANDBY TO DEPART FROM FRANKFURT. RAPID
RESPONSE FROM EUCOM TO INFORMAL QUERY MUCH APPRECIATED.
REQUEST EUCOM COLLECT VISA APPLICATION INFORMATION ON
THREE-MAN TEAM AND STAND BY FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUCTIONS
DECLASSIFIED
TO REQUEST SOVIET VISAS. VISA INFORMATION IS NAME,
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, AND PASSPORT NUMBER.
NLRR F06-114/8# 10399
4. (U) REQUEST EUCOM TELEPHONE VISA INFORMATION
TO AMERICAN EMBASSIES BONN AND MOSCOW. BACKUP WITH
BY LDJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
TELEGRAM. FURTHER REQUEST AMEMBASSY BONN TELL SOVIET
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
AMCONSUL
LENINGRAD
0972
DTG:
300925Z
APR
86
PSN:
012672
EOB324
AN002443
TOR: 120/1011Z
CSN:HCE959
CONCERN OVER THE INCIDENT, SINCE VILNIUS IS MUCH CLOSER
TO CHERNOBYL' THAN LENINGRAD. ONE STUDENT REPORTED
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
THAT A YALE PHYSICS PROFESSOR HAD ADVISED HER TO
/006 A1
HAVE HER CLOTHES CHECKED BY A GEIGER COUNTER AS A PRE-
WHSR COMMENT: SUMMARY ITEM
CAUTIONARY MEASURE. WE ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
TWO OF THE STUDENTS TO BE CHECKED AT A SOVIET HOSPITAL
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
FOR POSSIBLE RADIATION EXPOSURE, TO ENSURE THEIR OWN
SIT: VP SIT PUBS
PEACE OF MIND AND THAT OF THEIR PARENTS. ACTION
EOB:
REQUEST: WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY EVALUATION OR ADVICE
EMBASSY OR DEPARTMENT MAY BE ABLE TO GIVE CONCERNING
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF CIEE STUDENTS TO HIGHER LEVELS
OF RADIATION WHILE IN VILNIUS.
OP IMMED
STU5734
DE RUFHLG #0972 1200925
5. MOST TOUR GROUPS ARE RELATIVELY CALM ABOUT
0 300925Z APR 86
THE SITUATION, BUT A FEW APPEAR TO BE REACTING BADLY
FM AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
TO THE CHERNOBYL' NEWS. ONE TOUR GROUP OF 70
AMERICANS (LED BY BRITISH TOURGUIDES), HAS REQUESTED
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4612
ASSISTANCE IN LEAVING LENINGRAD DUE TO WHAT THEY PER-
CEIVE AS A RADIATION THREAT. HOWEVER, THEY ARE IN A
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5862
QUANDRY ABOUT WHERE THEY WANT TO GO, SINCE THE MOST
USIA WASHDC 1125
EASILY AVAILABLE FLIGHTS GO TO FINLAND, WHICH THEY
BELIEVE IS CONTAMINATED TOO. WE HAVE TRIED TO QUIET
CONFIDENTIAL
THEIR FEARS.
6. WE HAVE RECEIVED A SMALL NUMBER OF PRESS INQUIRIES
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LENINGRAD 00972
FROM THE UNITED STATES. ONE REPORTER WHO WORKS ON A
NEWSPAPER SERVING THE THREE-MILE ISLAND AREA CALLED
E.O. 12356: N/A
TO ASK WHAT THE "EMBASSY" IN LENINGRAD KNEW ABOUT THE
TAGS: CASC, TRGY, UR, US
DISASTER AND WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY ILL-EFFECTS
SUBJECT: LENINGRAD REACTIONS TO THE CHERNOBYL -NUCLEAR
THERE. WE INFORMED HER THAT MOSCOW WAS THE CAPITAL
-
ACCIDENT
OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ASKED THAT SHE CALL OUR EMBASSY
THERE FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.
REF: MOSCOW 7267
MAGEE
BT
1. SEE PARA 4 FOR ACTION REQUEST.
2. SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT THE
CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN ALMOST TOTALLY
UNCOMMUNICATIVE, NOT EVEN VOLUNTEERING DETAILS THAT
MOSCOW HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED ABOUT THE ACCIDENT. AT A
RECEPTION ON APRIL 29, LENINGRAD ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
DEPUTY FOREIGN RELATIONS CHIEF IGOR BALLOD SAID THAT
HE HAD RECEIVED NO INFORMATION ON THE ACCIDENT OTHER
THAN WHAT HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED. BALLOD BECAME
EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE WHEN REMINDED BY A WESTERN
CONSULAR COLLEAGUE THAT THE LENINGRAD NUCLEAR POWER
COMPLEX WAS VERY SIMILAR IN DESIGN TO THAT OF CHERNOBYL',
SINCE BOTH CONTAINED FOUR RBMK-1000 (GRAPH ITE-MODERATED) -
REACTORS. BALLOD DEFENSIVELY NOTED THAT THE LENINGRAD
NUCLEAR POWER COMPLEX WAS PERFECTLY SAFE, AND "ANYWAY
IT IS 100 KILOMETERS AWAY, IN ESTONIA." BALLOD THEN
SOUGHT TO MAKE HIMSELF SCARCE FOR THE REST OF THE EVENING.
OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED OFTEN
MENTIONED THE THREE-MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT, APPARENTLY
UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS AT LEAST OF EQUAL
SERIOUSNESS TO THE ACCIDENT AT CHERNOBYL'.
3. WE HAVE RECEIVED A NUMBER OF TOURIST INQUIRIES
ABOUT THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT AND HAVE RESPONDED
DECLASSIFIED
ALONG THE LINES USED BY EMBASSY MOSCOW (REFTEL). WE
ARE ALSO TAKING STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE AMERICAN
COMMUNITY IN LENINGRAD (IREX'ERS, CIEE, ETC.) ARE
KEPT INFORMED OF THE SITUATION.
NLRR F06-114/8#10406
4. THE CIEE STUDENTS (APPROXIMATELY 40) WERE IN VILNIUS
BY has NARA DATE 9/30/08
OVER THE WEEKEND AND SOME HAVE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE
CONFIDENTIAL
33
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
SECSTATE WASHDC 4124
DTG 300218Z APR 86 PSN. 012077
EOB173
ANDD2355
TOR: 120/0223Z
CSN:EHA363
3. ISAKOV SAID THE MESSAGE WAS TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 RODM-01 LENC-01
GORBACHEV. WHEN ASKED IF THIS WAS A DIRECT RESPONSE TO
MAT-01 /007 A1
OUR EARLIER REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, ISAKOV SAID THE
WHSR COMMENT: SENT TO JP
MESSAGES PROBABLY CROSSED IN TRANSMISSION. ISAKOV SAID
THAT IN ADDITION TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS NOTE, SOVIET
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
TV NEWS PROGRAM VREMYA WAS CARRYING MORE INFORMATION ON
SIT: SIT MART LINK MATL VP MCD FORT
THE ACCIDENT (IN FACT THE VREMYA BROADCAST ADDED
EOE
NOTHING TO THE MESSAGE WHEN ASKED WHAT "STABILIZED"
MEANT IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS NOTE, ISAKOV SAID HE DID NOT
KNOW. WOESSNER THANKED ISAKOV AND INDICATED THAT OUR
OFFER OF ASS STANCE STILL STANDS. WOESSNER REPEATED OUR
OP IMMED
HOPE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE SCALE AND
DE RUEHC #4124 1200219
NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT.
0 3002182 APR 86 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ISAKOV SAID THE MESSAGE WAS FROM
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7510
GORBACHEV, IT BEARS THE EARMARKS OF A STANDARD RELEASE
FOR WIDE DISTRIBUTION BY SOVIET EMBASSIES.
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 1136
WHITEHEAD
USDEL SECRETARY 5495
BT
WHITE HOUSE 1078
C
T STATE 134124 TOSEC 080173
E.C 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: US, UR,
SUBJECT: SOVIETS DEL LIER MESSAGE ROM GORBACHEV
TO THE RESTDENT
1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT
2. SOVIET MINISTER-COUNSELOR ISAKOV CAME TO DEPAR MENT
AT 6: 00 PM TUESDAY AFTERNOON TO DELIVER WHAT HE
CHARACTERIZED AS A MESSAGE FROM GORBACHEV TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT. HE
PRESENTED FOLLOWING TEXT TO EUR SENIOR DEPUTY WOESSNER:
BEGIN TEXT
-- 1.) AS IT HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED IN THE SOVIET
PRESS, AN ACCIDENT TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 26 IN ONE OF THE
POWER BLOCK ROOMS OF THE CHERNOBYL ATOMIC POWER STATION,
130 KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH OF KIEV. THE ACCIDENT HAS
DECLASSIFIED
RESULTED IN DESTRUCTION OF A PART OF THE REACTOR BUILDING
STRUCTURE, CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE REACTOR AND SOME LEAK OF
RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCE. THREE REMAINING POWER BLOCKS HAVE
NLRR F06-114/8-10400
BEEN STOPPED, THEY ARE IN ORDER AND ARE IN OPERATION
RESERVE.
PV HOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
-- 2. ACCORDING TO THE MEASUREMENTS WHICH ARE
CONTINUOUSLY BEING TAKEN BY SOVIET SERVICES, THE
RADIATION SITUATION IN THE REGIONS IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT
TO THE PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT HAS REQUIRED PARTIAL
EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION. DUE TO THE MEASURES TAKEN
THE RADIATION SITUATION HAS BEEN STABILIZED. ADDITIONAL
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT
ARE BEING TAKEN.
--3. ACCORDING TO THE DATA OF THE SOVIET COMPETENT
AUTHORITIES, DISSEMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION
IN THE WESTERN, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN DIRECTIONS HAS BEEN
DETECTED THE LEVELS OF CONTAMINATION ARE SOMEWHAT ABOVE
THE PERMISSIBLE NORMS, BUT NOT TO AN EXTENT THAT WOULD
REQUIRE SPECIAL MEASURES TO PROTECT THE POPULATION.
END TEXT
UNCLASSIFIED
34
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
SECSTATE WASHDC 4000
DTG: 300007Z APR 86 PSN: 011864
EOB137
AN002317
TOR: 120/0050Z
CSN: HCE804
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/006 A1
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: SIT
EOB:
OP IMMED
DE RUEHC # 4000 1200007
O 300007Z APR 86 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 5476
ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
JAMES R GORSON
IIR OF FAC
ATA WASGDC
PLUS 134 OTHERS
SLNO SAIPAN 1179
TREASURY WASHDC 1314
ALL USDOC DISTDIR
ZEN/BEIRUT POUCH
zen/kabul POUCH
ZEN/BAGHDAD POUCH
UNCLAS STATE 134000 TOSEC 080166
INFORM CONSULS
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS:
OTRA, CASC
SUBJECT:
TRAVEL ADVISORY FOR THE KIEV AREA
1. A SOVIET GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS INDICATED THAT DUE
TO THE RECENT ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT
TRAVEL TO KIEV MAY BE DANGEROUS.
THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE THEREFORE ADVISES THAT TRAVEL TO THAT
CITY AND ADJACENT AREAS IS NOT RECOMMENDED UNTIL FURTHER
NOTICE.
2. EXPIRATION DATE: INDEFINITE. WHITEHEAD
BT
UNCLASSIFIED
35
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
HELSINKI 2047
DTG: 301427Z APR 86 PSN: 013149
EOB513
AN002553
TOR: 120/1451Z
CSN: HCE061
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 /003 A1
WHSR COMMENT: SUMMARY ITEM
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
SIT
EOB:
OP IMMED
STU6778
DE RUFHNK # 2047 1201427
0 301427Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8529
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 6598
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 6638
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 3629
AMEMBASSY stockholm IMMEDIATE 7641
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6272
CON
E
N
I
A
CAS
7/01/02
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE HELSINKI 02047
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: AMED, MNUC, TNUC, FI
SUBJECT: INFORMATION RE RADIATION LEVELS IN HELSINKI
REF: HELSINKI 2046
1. FINNISH NUCLEAR EXPERT PROFESSOR JORMA MIETTINEN
TOLD EMBASSY ON THE AFTERNOON OF APRIL 30 THAT
THE CURRENT 'BACKGROUND RADIATION" IN HELSINKI
IS 100 MICRORADS, THAT IS FIVE TIMES NORMAL
BACKGROUND LEVELS. HE SAID THAT IN RAIN WATER
WHERE THERE HAS BEEN RECENT RAIN RADIATION
LEVELS ARE 50 TIMES NORMAL, EXPLAINING THAT
NORMALLY THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO RADIATION IN RAIN
WATER.
2. HE SAID THAT THE RADIATION TRACES ARE
"HIGHLY EFFLUENT FISSION PRODUCTS OF A NUCLEAR
REACTOR" I. E., HE SAID A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT
IN THE USSR. HE STRESSED THAT CURRENT BACKGROUND
RADIATION LEVELS ARE NOT DANGEROUS TO HUMAN BEINGS.
3. EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT THE OFFICE OF RADIATION
PROTECTION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR WILL
BE ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT MOMENTARILY ON
THE RADIATION SITUATION IN FINLAND. EMBASSY
WILL REPORT RELEVANT DATA.
SCHNABEL
BT
DENTI
36
CONF IDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
BONN 3854
DTG: 301729Z APR 86 PSN: 013512
E0B614
AN002594
TOR: 120/1806Z
CSN:HCE120
SUCH A MATTER. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DID NOT PROVIDE
RUHFUS WITH ANY DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT.
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1
3. IN A SECOND CALL MADE LATER THAT EVENING ON FRG
INTERIOR MINISTER FRIEDERICH ZIMMERMANN, KWISINSKIJ
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
DELIVERED A STATEMENT WHICH REPEATED SOME OF THE
SIT: VP SIT DOAN
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN AN EARLIER TASS PRESS
EOB:
RELEASE. ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENT, THE REACTOR
ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN ONE OF THE FOUR BLOCKS OF THE
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THEREBY A PORTION OF
THE BUILDING WAS DESTROYED AND RADIOACTIVITY WAS
OP IMMED
RELEASED. THE OTHER THREE BLOCKS OF THE PLANT WERE
STU7545
NEVERTHELESS INTACT AND HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN IN THE
DE RUFHOL #3854/01 1201729
MEANTIME. SOME AREAS TO THE NORTH, SOUTH, AND WEST OF
0 301729Z APR 86
THE PLANT WERE CONTAMINATED AND THE POPULATION HAD BEEN
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
EVACUATED. THE LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVITY MEASURED AT AN
UNSPECIF IED DISTANCE FROM THE PLANT EXCEEDED NORMAL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0454
LEVELS, BUT NOT SIGNIFICANTLY. FURTHER MEASURES TO
PROTECT THE POPULATION WERE NOT NECESSARY. THE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8936
SITUATION WAS STABILIZED AND UNDER CONTROL.
OE CD COLLECTIVE
FRG COLLECTIVE
4. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DID NOT PROVIDE DATA ON THE
RADIATION LEVELS AT THE SITE, THE CAUSE OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 13854
ACCIDENT, THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE, OR THE COURSE OF THE
SUSPECTED GRAPHITE FIRE. FOR HIS PART, INTERIOR
MINISTER ZIMMERMANN REITERATED THE FRG'S OFFER OF
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
ASSISTANCE, AND REQUESTED THAT THE FRG BE INFORMED OF
TAGS: GE, KSCA, TRGY
ALL DEVELOPMENTS.
SUBJECT: FRG INFORMATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER
REF: MOSCOW 94829
5. DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS, SOVIET DIPLOMATS HAVE
ALSO INFORMALLY CONTACTED SEVERAL INDIVIDUAL
RESEAR HERS AT FRG NUCLEAR FIRMS AND INDUSTRY
1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT
ORGANIZATIONS FOR INFORMATION ON THE PROPERTIES OF
GRAPHITE AND ON METHODS OF EXTINGUISHING GRAPHITE
FIRES. THE SOVIETS ALSO REQUESTED INFORMATION ON
2. (SUMMARY) FRG OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THAT THE
MANUFACTURERS OF NUCLEAR SAFETY EQUIPMENT, AND THE
SOVIET UNION HAS OFFICIALLY REQUESTED OR ACCEPTED FRG
TYPES AND SPECIFICATIONS OF FRG NUCLEAR DECONTAMINATION
ASSISTANCE TO DEAL WITH THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR
EQUIPMENT, RESPIRATORS, RADIATION SUITS, AND MONITORING
ACCIDENT. SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO BONN JULIJ KWISINSKIJ
EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS ASKED FOR THE
DID CALL ON FRG INTERIOR MINISTER FRIEDERICH ZIMMERMANN
NAMES OF PHYSICIANS SPECIALIZING IN NUCLEAR MEDICINE,
APRIL 29 TO ASSURE HIM THAT THE ACCIDENT POSED NO
DECONTAMINATION, AND TREATMENT OF RADIATION POISONING,
DANGER TO THE FRG. IN ADDITION, SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN
AS WELL AS THE NAMES OF SPECIALISTS IN
THE FRG HAVE INFORMALLY CONTACTED INDIVIDUALS AT
RADIATION-MONITORING TECHNIQUES.
NUCLEAR FIRMS AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR INFORMATION ON HOW
TO EXTINGUISH GRAPHITE FIRES. IN THESE MEETINGS, THE
SOVIETS REQUESTED INFORMATION ABOUT FRG MANUFACTURERS
6. INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYING INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED BY THE
OF NUCLEAR SAFETY EQUIPMENT, AND THE TYPES AND
SOVIETS INCLUDE A NUCLEAR INDUSTRY LOBBYING GROUP
SPECIFICATIONS OF FRG NUCLEAR DECONTAMINATION
EQUIPMENT, RESPIRATORS, RADIATION SUITS, AND MONITORING
BT
EQUIPMENT. THE SOVIETS ALSO ASKED FOR THE NAMES OF
PHYSICIANS SPECIALIZING IN NUCLEAR MEDICINE,
DECONTAMINATION, AND TREATMENT OF RADIATION POISONING.
(END SUMMARY)
2. FRG FOREIGN OFFICE, INTERIOR MINISTRY, AND RESEARCH
MINISTRY SOURCES HAVE DENIED WIDESPREAD PRESS REPORTS
THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS OFFICIALLY REQUESTED FRG
ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT. ACCORDING TO DR. ADOLF VON WAGNER, NEWLY
APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S OFFICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF
DECLASSIFIED
NUCLEAR ENERGY, NONPROLIFERATION, AND SPACE
EXPLOITATION, STATE SECRETARY DR. JUERGEN RUHFUS
MI
OFFERED EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING
F06-114/8#/0401
AN INITIAL APRIL 29 CALL BY THE NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR
TO BONN JULIJ KWISINSKIJ (GERMAN SPELLING). KWISINSKIJ
LOJ
REPORTEDLY REACTED COOLLY TO THE OFFER AND INDICATED
9/30/08
THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENT IAL
37
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
BONN 3854
DTG: 301729Z APR 86 PSN: 013513
EOB615
AN002593
TOR: 120/1807Z
CSN: HCE121
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
MAT-01 /007 A1
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: VP SIT DOAN
E OB:
OP IMMED
UTS7613
DE RUFHOL #3854/02 1201730
O 301729Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0455
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8937
OE CD COLLECTIVE
FRG COLLECTIVE
CONFIDE NTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 13854
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: GE, KSCA, TRGY
SUBJECT: FRG INFORMATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER
(DEUTSCHE ATOMFORUM), A PRINCIPLE FEDERAL NUCLEAR
REGULATORY AGENCY (GESELLSCHAFT FUER REAKTOR
SICHERHEIT), A STATE-LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITY
(TECHNISCHE UEBERWACHUNG VEREIN OR TUEV), AND SEVERAL
PRIVATE COMPANIES WITH EXPERIENCE IN GRAPHITE MATERIALS.
7. ONE FRG NUCLEAR REGULATORY OFFICIAL AT THE TUEV
CONFIDED THAT HE WAS ASTOUNDED BY THE LACK OF BASIC
KNOWLEDGE OF SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND EQUIPMENT IMPLIED
BY THE SIMPLE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT BY
SOVIET EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOW
ASKING BASIC QUESTIONS ABOUT RADIATION DETECTION
EQUIPMENT AND DECONTAMINATION GEAR, WHICH IS TAKEN FOR
GRANTED AT WESTERN NUCLEAR PLANTS, CAME AS A SHOCK TO
THE STAFF.
8. IN A RELATED DEVELOPMENT, THE FRG WEATHER SERVICE
HAS ANNOUNCED THAT MEASUREMENTS TAKEN BY A WEATHER
STATION AT OFFENBACH (NEAR FRANKFURT) ON THE MORNING OF
APRIL 30 SHOW DOUBLE NORMAL LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY IN
THE AIR. THE ELEVEN OTHER MEASURING STATIONS IN THE
FRG SHOW NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY AND THE WEATHER SERVICE
IMMEDIATELY STATED THAT THE HIGHER LEVEL PRESENTS NO
DANGER TO THE POPULATION.
9. THE FRG FOREIGN OFFICE IN A PRESS CONFERENCE HAS
RECOMMENDED' THAT FRG TOURISTS AVOID THE KIEV AREA.
THE FOREIGN OFFICE AVOIDED RECOMMENDING THAT GERMANS
LIVING IN THE KIEV AREA RETURN TO THE FRG.
NEVERTHELESS, THE FOREIGN OFFICE ADDED THAT IT
CONSIDERS A MEASURE TAKEN BY ONE FRG CONSTRUCTION FIRM
WORKING IN KIEV TO REPATRIATE EMPLOYEES' FAMILIES TO BE
SENSIBLE.
BURT##
BT
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
38
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 7427
DTG: 301806Z APR 86 PSN: 013573
EOB183
AN002357
TOR: 120/1844Z
CSN: HCE127
TRAVEL INTO KIEV AND SURROUNDING AREAS.
DISTRIBUTION: MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01 MAT-01
/006 A1
4. KIEV. ACCORDING TO A WEST GERMAN BUSINESSMAN
RESIDENT THERE, THE CITY MAINTAINS SOME SENSE OF
NORMALCY; TOURISTS OF VARIOUS NATIONALITIES CONTINUE
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
TO CHECK IN AND OUT OF THE HOTELS AND A LARGE
SIT: VP SIT DOAN
BICYCLE RACE SCHEDULED FOR THE MAY FIRST HOLIDAY
EOB:
PERIOD IS SO FAR ON TRACK. FRENCH STUDENTS,
HOWEVER, REPORT THAT THEY HAVE DETECTED SOME
NERVOUSNESS AMONG THE POPULACE; KIEV RADIO IS
REPORTEDLY REFERRING TO THE ACCIDENT AS A
OP IMMED
"CATASTROPHE" A DESCRIPTION CONSISTENT WITH
UTS7724
THAT GIVEN TO A VISITING FRENCH JOURNALIST BY A CC
DE RUEHMO #7427 1201807
CPSU MEMBER WHO CHARACTERIZED IT AS A "MAJOR
0 301806Z APR 86 ZFF-4
DISASTER." FRENCH CONTACTS ALSO NOTE THAT
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
UNIVERSITY OF KIEV STUDENTS HAVE BEEN TOLD, "DO
NOT BATHE, DO NOT DRINK WATER, DO NOT FISH IN THE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4274
DNEPR, AND DO NOT EAT ANYTHING CAUGHT IN THE
DNEPR." WE HAVE RECEIVED OTHER REPORTS WHICH IN
INFO AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 7214
SPITE OF THEIR VARIATIONS, ALL POINT TO ALREADY-
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4556
MODEST LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION OF THE
USDOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DNEPR AND KIEV WATER RESERVOIR. A RELIABLE
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 1448
SOVIET SOURCE REPORTS THAT A SMALL TOWN NE AR THE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0257
EASTERN SIDE OF THE RESERVOIR IS IN A STATE OF
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2811
PANIC. DESPITE SOME EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY,
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5167
INTOURIST APPEARS TO BE DISCOURAGING TRAVEL TO
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1105
KIEV.
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 2412
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 3488
AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 3687
5. SWEDISH EMBASSY OFFICERS SAID TODAY THAT THEIR
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 2387
MISSION WILL SOON BEGIN BRINGING IN IODIDE TABLETS
FOR THEIR COMMUNITY. ALSO, LATE THIS AFTERNOON,
CONF PRENTIAL MOSCOW 07427
SWEDISH NUCLEAR AUTHORITIES INFORMED THEIR EMBASSY
HERE THAT RADIATION LEVELS IN SWEDEN HAD BEGUN TO
INCREASE AGAIN AND HAD REACHED LEVELS MUCH HIGHER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
THAN EARLIER THIS WEEK; NUMBERS SUCH AS GREATER
TAGS: KSCA, TRGY, SENV, CASC, UR
THAN ONE HUNDRED TIMES AMBIENT LEVEL ARE BEING
SUBJECT: CHERNOBYL' NUCLEAR ACCIDENT: REPORT NO. 4,
REPORTED IN SWEDEN.
-
AS OF 1530 GMT APRIL 30
REF: (A) MOSCOW 7333, (B) MOSCOW 7317, (C) MOSCOW 7231
6. THIS AFTERNOON DURING HIS CALL AT THE MFA ON
THE CHERNOBL' INCIDENT, THE FINNISH AMBASSADOR
WAS TOLD THAT THE ACCIDENT BEGAN SATURDAY,
1. CONF IDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
APRIL 26. HARTMAN
BT
2. AN INTENSE DAY OF CONTACTS WITH FOREIGN
EMBASSIES AND NON-OFFICIAL SOVIET CONTACTS HAVE
YIELDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT THE
SITUATION IN KIEV AND THE MOSCOW DIPLOMATIC
DECLASSIFIED
COMMUNITY'S REACTION TO THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT.
NLRR 714/8# 10402
3. EVACUATIONS. THE FRENCH EMBASSY IS ARRANGING
FOR THE RETURN TO MOSCOW OF THE FOUR LANGUAGE
BY 405 NARA DATE 9/30/08
INSTRUCTORS NOW PRESENT IN KIEV ALONG WITH THEIR
STUDENTS. BECAUSE RAIL TRAVEL WOULD ROUTE EVACUEES
NORTH OF THE CITY INTO POSSIBLY HIGHLY CONTAMINATED
AREAS, THE EMBASSY IS FLYING MANY OTHER FRENCH
CITIZENS DIRECTLY TO PARIS. THE BRITISH ARE
and
ADVISING THEIR CITIZENS TO LEAVE KIEV AND MINSK
AND IN THE CASE OF A GROUP OF EIGHTY STUDENT
TOURISTS, ARRANGING FOR A PLANE TO ARRIVE IN
Wather
MOSCOW ON MAY 2 TO FLY THEM TO ENGLAND. THE U.K.
HAS ISSUED A TRAVEL ADVISORY AGAINST VISITING
THE WESTERN PARTS OF THE USSR. THE AUSTRIAN
EMBASSY HAS BEGUN PULLING OUT ALL FAMILIES LOCATED
IN THE KIEV REGION. THE CANADIANS, ON THE BASIS
OF THEIR TRAVEL ADVISORY, ARE STRONGLY DISCOURAGING
CONFIDENTIAL
39
CONF DENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
THE HAGUE 3361
DTG: 011637Z MAY 86 PSN: 015714
E0B461
AN002927
TOR: 121/1651Z
CSN: HCE554
3. THE MFA OFFICIAL SAID THE SOVIETS REJECTED
DISTRIBUTION: COBB-01 MAN-01 DOBR-01 WRIT-01 SOMM-01 LENC-01
THE OFFER OF ASSISTANCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT
MAT-01 /007 A2
THE ACCIDENT IS UNDER CONTROL AND ASSISTANCE
THEREFORE IS NO LONGER NEEDED. THE INITIAL
SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FOR
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
INFORMATION "RIDICULED" THE EC REQUEST,
SIT: SIT
ACCORDING TO THIS OFFICIAL, WHO WAS READING
EOB:
FROM A REPORTING CABLE, AND IN THE END
OFFERED NO FURTHER INFORMATION. THE EC
INTENDS TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE IAEA IN
VIENNA TOMORROW ASKING SECRETARY GENERAL BLIX
OP IMMED
TO INITIATE A CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON THE
UTS9658
CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET ACCIDENT. THE
DE RUFHTH #3361 1211638
EC WILL PRESS FOR A TIGHTENING OF IAEA
0 011637Z MAY 86
REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBER STATES' REPORTING
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS. THE EC
WILL TWIST THE KNIFE IN SOVIET WOUNDS BY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2065
STRESSING THE PRECEDENT SET BY THE U.S.
COOPERATION ON DISCUSSING THE THREE MILE
INFO EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
ISLAND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN WHICH THE SOVIETS
UNVIE MISSION VIENNA IMMEDIATE
LED THE CHARGE OF THOSE CRITICAL OF U.S.
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2083
SAFETY PROCEDURES. BREMER
BT
CONF ENTIAL THE HAGUE 03361
L FOR SCHWARTZ, OES FOR PROCHNIK
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENRG, PREL, TRGY, IAEA, NL
SUBJECT: EC DEMARCHE ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DUTCH MFA OFFICIAL INFORMED US THAT THE
NETHERLANDS, AS PRESIDENT OF THE EC, DELIVERED
A DEMARCHE AT 1 A.M. THIS MORNING IN MOSCOW
IN REGARD TO THE SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER.
THE WORDING OF THE DEMARCHE IS AS FOLLOWS:
-
THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
WISHES IN THE FIRST PLACE TO EXPRESS TO THE
PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION
ITS FEELINGS OF SINCERE SYMPATHY ON THE PART
OF THE 12 MEMBER STATES IN CONNECTION WITH
RECENT DISASTEROUS EVENTS IN CHERNOBYL.
-
THIS AFTERNOON THE PRESIDENCY EXPRESSED TO THE
CHIEF OF THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT THE REQUEST
OF THE 12 MEMBER STATES THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES
PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO CITIZENS
DECLASSIFIED
OF THE EC WHO ARE IN THE REGION OF THE ACCIDENT
AND TO THOSE WHO INTEND TO LEAVE.
-
NLRR F06-114/8# 10403
IN ADDITION TO ITS EARL IER REQUEST, THE
PRESIDENCY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO IMPRESS ON
PY LOT NARA DATE 9/30/08
SOVIET AUTHORITIES THE NECESSITY OF FULLY
INFORMING EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE FULLEST
DETAIL AND WITHOUT DELAY ABOUT THE ACCIDENT
IN CHERNOBYL AND NOTABLY ABOUT CONSEQUENCES
OF THE INCIDENT.
-
FINALLY, THE 12 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EC
DECLARE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO OFFER TO THE
USSR SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MIGHT BE DESIRED IN
DEALING WITH THE INCIDENT.
CONF RENTIAL
40
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WHSR COMMENT: 5 LINER
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O 011712Z MAY 86 ZFF4
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8614
X
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8939
D
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3274
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 7485
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4290
S
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7531
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5122
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 6640
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6385
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7647
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 6976
E
CONFIDENT I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 03143
X
D
EXDIS
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 10404 F06-114/8#1040404
LONDON FOR RMO ARNOLD WEBER AT MED CONFERENCE
S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
BY LOJ NARA DATE 9/30/08
TAGS: ENGR, TRGY, PREL, AMED, RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA REQUESTS SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE ON
-
RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT
-
REF: (A) BUCHAREST 3102, (B) STATE 136047
E
X
1.
- ENTIRE TEXT)
-
D
2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING A SUDDEN INCREASE IN RADIO-
ACTIVITY ON MAY 1, GOR LEADERSHIP HELD AN EMERGENCY
S
MEETING, WHICH DECIDED TO FORM A SPECIAL COMMITTEE,
REVIEW THE ALARMING MEASUREMENTS, AND SEEK U.S.
SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE. ACTION REQUESTED: AN IMMEDIATE
REPLY TO THE ROMANIAN REQUEST, INCLUDING THE POSSI-
BILITY OF SENDING AN EXPERT ON RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT
TO ROMANIA. IF SERIOUS DAMAGE TO DAIRY OR OTHER
FOOD SUPPLIES SEEMS LIKELY, USG SHOULD BEGIN
CONSIDERING WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE IN OUR INTEREST
TO OFFER EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE. END SUMMARY.
-
3. FOREIGN MINISTER VADUVA CALLED IN DCM TO AN " URGENT"
MEETING ON MAY 1, IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR WHO IS
TRAVELLING IN ROMANIA. IOAN URSU, FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN
OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
ACCOMPANIED THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND LED THE DISCUSSION.
MARIN IVASCU, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR
NUCLEAR ENERGY, JOINED LATER. RACEANU (MF A) WAS ALSO
PRESENT. URSU NOTED THAT THE EMBASSY HAD INQUIRED ABOUT
CONF IDENTIAL
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RADIATION LEVELS ON APRIL 30 (REF A), AND EXPRESSED
APPRECIATION FOR OUR INTEREST.
-
E
X
4. URSU SAID THAT AS SOON AS GOR LEARNED ABOUT THE
CHERNOBYL INCIDENT, IT HAD ALERTED ITS NATIONAL NETWORK
D
OF MONITORING STATIONS TO MEASURE AIR, WATER AND SOIL
RADIOACTIVITY. UNTIL THE NIGHT OF APRIL 30/MAY 1,
THERE HAD been NO SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN RADIOACTIVITY
WHICH HAD RESULTED IN A "COMMUNIQUE" OF THE NATIONAL
S
COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THAT EFFECT ON
APRIL 30. (NOTE: WE HAVE NOT seen THIS REPORT. ,
-
5. DURING THE NIGHT OF APRIL 30/MAY 1, THERE WAS A
GREAT INCREASE IN RADIOACTIVITY IN SEVERAL REGIONS OF
E
ROMANIA, ESPECIALLY IN THE NORTHEASTERN PART, URSU
CONTINUED. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU CHAIRED A MEETING OF
X
THE LEADERSHIP TO REVIEW THE RESULTS, WHICH URSU
ATTENDED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND AS A PHYSICIST.
D
THE LEADERSHIP DECIDED TO FORM A PARTY/STATE GROUP,
HEADED BY ACADEMICIAN ELENA CEAUSESCU TO IMPLEMENT THE
NECESSARY MEASURES TO PROTECT THE POPULATION, LIVE-
S
STOCK AND THE COUNTRY IN GENERAL. THE LEADERSHIP
ALSO ASKED TO PASS TO U.S. AUTHORITIES, IN CONFIDENCE,
THE KEY RADIOACTIVE MEASUREMENTS, AND A REQUEST FOR
ASSISTANCE BY SPECIALISTS OR APPROPRIATE MATERIALS
TO HELP ANALYZE THE SITUATION IN ROMANIA. URSU SAID
THAT SINCE IT WAS A HUMANITARIAN MATTER, GOR DID NOT
OBJECT TO SHARING THE INFORMATION WITH OTHER STATES,
E
BUT ASKED REPEATEDLY THAT IT BE HELD CONFIDENTIALLY.
-
X
D
6. MEASUREMENTS OF RADIOACTIVITY AT 4:30 TO 5: 00 A. M.
ROMANIAN TIME, MAY 1 (AFTER NEGLIGIBLE REPORTS UP TO
NIGHT OF APRIL 30):
S
A. IASI (MOLDAVIA):
-
-- SOIL RADIOACTIVITY SLIGHTLY OVER ALARM LEVEL
-
(50,000 PICO CURIES PER SQUARE METER).
-
-- AIR: CLOSE TO NORMAL, NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.
B. SUCEAVA:
E
-
-- SOIL ABOVE WARNING LEVELS (20,000 PICO CURIES
X
-
PER SQUARE METER)
D
C. TIRGU MURES (TRANSYLVANIA) :
-
-- SOIL CLOSE TO WARNING LEVEL (10, 000 PICO
-
CURIES)
S
BT
CONF IDENTIAL
42
CONF DENT IAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
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/006 A2
E
X
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
D
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E OB:
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OP IMMED
UTS9698
DE RUFHBC #3143/02 1211720
O 011712Z MAY 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
E
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8615
X
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8940
D
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3275
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 7486
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4291
S
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7532
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5123
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 6641
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6386
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7648
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 6977
E
CONFIDENT I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BUCHAREST 03143
X
D
EXDIS
LONDON FOR RMO ARNOLD WEBER AT MED CONFERENCE
S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENGR, TRGY, PREL, AMED, RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA REQUESTS SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE ON
D. TULCEA (DANUBE DELTA) :
-
-- INCREASE IN ATMOSPHERIC RADIATION, 600 PICO
-
CURIES PER CUBIC METER.
E
-
X
7. AFTER FORMING THE COMMITTEE, THEY OBTAINED THE
D
FOLLOWING HIGHER LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY AT 1:00 P.M.
MAY 1 :
A. IASI:
S
1
-- SOIL: OVER 200, 000 PICO CURIES
-
-- AIR: FOR FIRST TIME, SMALL READING AT ABOUT
-
WARNING LEVEL
-
(ABOUT 1000 PICO CURIES PER CUBIC METER)
B. SUCEAVA: LEVELS SAME AS EARLIER
C. TULCEA: AIR RADIOACTIVITY REACHED 3000 PICO CURIES
-
PER CUBIC METER, THEN DROPPED A LITTLE.
D. GALATI DANUBE, NEAR SOVIET BORDER):
-
-- AIR RADIOACTIVITY REACHED ABOUT 2000 PICO
-
CURIES.
E. THERE WAS ALSO A SMALL INCREASE IN RADIOACTIVITY IN
SEVERAL OTHER PLACES IN ROMANIA, INCLUDING BUCHAREST,
BUT NOT A CAUSE FOR CONCERN.
-
CONE IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
43
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SECRETARIAT
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8. ASKED WHY THERE MIGHT BE SUCH A SUDDEN INCREASE IN
RADIATION, AFTER NORMAL READINGS, URSU SAID HE HAD NO
E
OFFICIAL CONCLUSION. HOWEVER, IT LOOKED TO HIM AS IF
X
ROMANIA HAD BEEN LUCKY AT FIRST, WITH THE WIND HEADED
TOWARD POLAND; BUT UNFORTUNATELY THE WIND SHIFTED.
D
HE ATTRIBUTED THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN SOIL RADIOACTIVITY
TO AN ACCOMPANYING LIGHT RAIN -- "NOT MUCH RAIN, BUT
ENOUGH. "
-
S
9. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. URSU AND IVASCU SAID
ROMANIAN SCIENTISTS WANTED INFORMATION FROM U.S.
SCIENTISTS ON PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF HARM FROM
THE VARIOUS ISOTOPES. THEY WERE AWARE OF RADIOACTIVE
IODINE AND THE THREAT TO THE THYROID; THEY WERE LESS
E
ACQUAINTED WITH CESIUM AND STRONTIUM. WHAT WERE THE
ANTIDOTES? WERE THERE NOT ANTIDOTES MORE SOPHISTICATED
X
THAN POTASSIUM IODIDE (WITH WHICH THEY WERE FAMILIAR)
WHAT TREATMENT WAS THERE FOR ANIMALS? WERE THERE OTHER
D
ISOTOPES? so FAR, ROMANIA HAD NEVER HAD ANY CASES OF
RADIATION POISONING, AND URSU REALIZED THAT THE U.S.
HAD A GREAT BODY OF EXPERIENCE. THEY THEREFORE
S
REQUESTED WHATEVER WRITTEN MATERIALS OR INSTRUMENTS
WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. THEY WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY
SPECIALISTS. THEY WANT KNOWLEDGE, NOT BROAD ADVICE.
URSU THEN ADDED, ALMOST AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT, THAT
ROMANIA HAD NO INFORMATION WHATSOEVER ABOUT THE REACTOR
INCIDENT ITSELF, OTHER THAN THAT AVAILABLE THROUGH
THE PRESS, AND SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION
E
THE U.S. COULD PROVIDE, ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.
-
X
D
10. COMMENT: APPARENTLY GOR HAS NOT BEEN BRIEFED AT
ALL BY THE SOVIETS, AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE USSR
WILL BE IN A POSITION TO SPARE EXPERTS. WE HAVE A
S
UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A HUMANITARIAN AND SCIENTI-
FIC CONTRIBUTION THAT WILL BE APPRECIATED AT THE
HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVELS HERE. THE INFORMATION MAY
ALSO BE OF VALUE TO US. WHILE WE SHOULD RESPECT THE
GOR REQUEST FOR CONFIDENTIALITY -- OBVIOUSLY INTENDED
TO AVOID PANIC, AS WELL AS OFFENSE TO THE SOVIETS --
WE CAN EXPECT EVENTUALLY TO HAVE A STRONGLY POSITIVE
E
IMPACT ON THE ATTITUDES OF ORDINARY ROMANIANS AS
WELL, ONCE THEY LEARN THE U.S. PROVIDED PROMPT HELP.
D
11. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL FOR USG TO GAUGE HOW
BADLY FOOD SUPPLIES WILL BE CONTAMINATED HERE. IF
S
BT
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
44
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
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DE RUFHBC #3143/03 1211722
O 011712Z MAY 86 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
E
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8616
X
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 8941
D
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 3276
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 7487
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4292
S
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 7533
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 5124
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 6642
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 6387
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 7649
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 6978
E
CONFI DE NT I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BUCHAREST 03143
X
D
EXDIS
LONDON FOR RMO ARNOLD WEBER AT MED CONFERENCE
S
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENGR, TRGY, PREL, AMED, RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA REQUESTS SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE ON
THIS TURNS OUT TO BE SERIOUS, WE MAY ALSO WANT TO
CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING A MAJOR POLITICAL
DEMONSTRATION BY PROVIDING RELIEF ASSISTANCE, AS WE
E
DID FOLLOWING FLOODS AND THE EARTHQUAKE IN THE 1970S.
X
END COMMENT.
D
12. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE
ANSWER TO THE REQUEST FOR SCIENTIFIC ASSISTANCE.
S
PLEASE ALSO ADVISE WHAT DATA WE CAN SHARE WITH GOR
ON THE CHERNOBYL INCIDENT ITSELF. KIRK
BT
CONF IDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01 OF 10 STATE 135824
7927 EUR5606
STATE 135824
7927 EUR5606
ORIGIN EUR-00
A: WHILE THE EMBASSY DOES NOT YET HAVE AN EXACT
ORIGIN OFFICE PA-02
COUNT OF THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE KIEV
INFO PMP-01 EUR-05 PMA-01 PMD-01 REA-01 RPE-01 OECD-01 EWEA-01
AREA, IT IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO IDENTIFY AND CONTACT
EEC-02 GC-01 EEY-03 CA-02 SOEC-01 NO-01 El-01 NE-02
THEM. THE EMBASSY HAS ESTABLISHED REGULAR CONTACT WITH
GE-01 UK-02 SOV-01 F1-01 CE-01 SOML-01 SOBI-01 OCT-01
A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS THERE, ADVISING THEM
PO-02 IT-02 MT-02 FR-02 WE-02 SP-02 PMS-01 PL-02 HU-02
OF THE DEPARTMENT'S TRAVEL ADVISORY, PASSING REQUESTS
PM-01 AL-01 BU-02. Y0-02 RO-02 BE-01 GR-01 TU-01 CY-01
AND MESSAGES FROM THEIR RELATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES
SE-01 AU-01 SW-01 CZ-02 NL-01 LU-01 IC-01 SZ-01 DA-01
AND FROM THE DEPARTMENT, AND RELAYING THEIR RESPONSES.
/075 A1 JS
ALL AMERICANS CONTACTED THUS FAR REPORT THAT THEY ARE
FINE AND THE SITUATION IS NORMAL.
INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 CIAE-00 EB-08 H-01
MMO-01
10-17
NSAE-00
COME-00
L-03
PM-10
PA-02
WE ARE AWARE OF NO LONG TERM RESIDENTS IN THE KIEV
EPAE-04 OCS-06 CA-02 SIG-03 OES-09 ACDA-12 SP-02
AREA, AND HAVE BEEN ADVISED BY USIA THAT THERE ARE NO
DOEE-00 NRC-02 SNP-01 PRS-01 /095 R
AMERICAN EXCHANGE STUDENTS THERE IN ANY OF ITS PROGRAMS.
DRAFTED BY: EUR/P: AHUMPHREY
Q: ARE THERE ANY PLANS TO EVACUATE AMERICANS FROM KIEV?
APPROVED BY: EUR/P: DJDONCHI
PA/PRESS: ASTOCKMAN
A: -- THERE ARE NO PLANS AT THIS TIME TO UNDERTAKE
364221 010257Z /70
SUCH AN EVACUATION. BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE
0 010215Z MAY 86 ZEX
APPROPRIATE ACTION IF THE NEED SHOULD ARISE. AN
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INTOURIST STUDENT GROUP THERE WHICH HAS AMERICAN
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
MEMBERS IS PLANNING TO LEAVE EARLY. THE EMBASSY HAS
EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE
REQUESTED INTOURIST IN MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD TO ASSIST
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
AMERICAN TRAVELLERS IN MAKING CHANGES IN THEIR TRAVEL
AMCONSUL MUNICH IMMEDIATE
PLANS TO AVOID KIEV AND RETURN TO THE U.S. EARLY IF
USDEL NST GENEVA IMMEDIATE
THEY WISH. THE EMBASSY ADVISES US THAT MOST OF THOSE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
WHO HAVE REQUESTED SUCH CHANGES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
MAKING THEM.
INFO US ELEMENT LIVE OAK IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
Q: HAS INTOURIST PROVIDED A COUNT OF AMERICANS IN KIEV?
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE
A: -- THE EMBASSY IS IN CONTACT WITH INTOURIST FOR
ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE KIEV
UNCLAS STATE 135824
AREA.
INFORM CONSULS, FOR PAOS, PASS TO NSC FOR HINCKLEY
Q: WHAT ADVICE IS THE DEPARTMENT GIVING TO AMERICANS
ELSEWHERE IN THE SOVIET UNION?
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OPRC
A: -- THE EMBASSY HAS REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM THE
SUBJECT: EUR DAILY PRESS GUIDANCE 4/30/86.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE SAFETY OF AIR AND
WATER IN THE KIEV AREA. YESTERDAY WE REQUESTED THE
1. THE FOLLOWING PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND CONTINGENCY
SOVIETS TO PROVIDE ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION ON THE
PRESS GUIDANCES WERE PREPARED FOR USE BY THE DEPARTMENT
ACCIDENT. WE ARE AWAITING THEIR RESPONSES. MEANWHILE,
SPOKESPERSON ON APRIL 30, 1986. ALL OF THE GUIDANCES
WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN AS MUCH
WERE USED IN THE BRIEFING TODAY.
INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE FROM ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES.
2. SOVIET NUCLEAR DISASTER
4. USSR: NUCLEAR INCIDENT AND SOVIET INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
Q: WHAT HAS BEEN THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR OFFER OF
ASSISTANCE AND OUR REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ABOUT THE
Q: WHAT ARE THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE
CHERNOBYL ATOMIC ENERGY STATION ACCIDENT?
SOVIET UNION TO INFORM OTHER PEOPLES OR COUNTRIES OF
SUCH AN INCIDENT?
A: IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, SOVIET OFFICIALS
HAVE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR OUR OFFER OF
A: -- WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOTIFY OTHER
ASSISTANCE. WE HAVE INDICATED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE
STATES OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS OF
SITUATION AND REQUESTED DETAILS REGARDING THE SCALE AND
THE INCIDENT AND TO FURNIS# THEM WITH THE INFORMATION
NATURE OF THE ACCIDENT.
NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THESE EFFECTS.
-- THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED US WITH PRELIMINARY
WHILE THERE ARE NO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PER SE,
INFORMATION WHICH PARALLELS THAT AVAILABLE IN THE
IT IS A PRINCIPLE ACCEPTED IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW THAT AN INCIDENT LIKELY TO HAVE TRANSBOUNDARY
SOVIET MEDIA. WE ARE, HOWEVER, AWAITING A FORMAL
EFFECTS SHOULD BE NOTIFIED AND IN A TIMELY FASHION.
RESPONSE TO OUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL DETAILS.
Q: WHAT KIND OF INTERNATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM EXISTS?
3. USSR: WELFARE/WHEREABOUTS OF AMCITS
A: THERE IS AN INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM THAT IS
COORDINATED THROUGH THE PARIS-BASED OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY
Q: DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE AN ACCOUNTING OF THE
AGENCY, BUT THIS ONLY INCLUDES OECD MEMBERS (WESTERN
NUMBER OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE KIEV AREA?
EUROPE, U.S., CANADA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
OUTGOING
Department of State
TELEGRAM
46
PAGE 02 OF 10 STATE 135824
7927 EUR5606
STATE 135824
7927 EUR5606
ZEALAND). THE NEA HAS AGREEMENTS TO EXCHANGE DATA WITH
SOVIET UNION.
THE VIENNA-BASED INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, OF
WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS A MEMBER. HOWEVER, SOVIET
I HAVE WITH ME, IN ORDER FROM MY IMMEDIATE LEFT DOWN,
-ESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR TIMELY INFORMATION HAVE NOT
HAROLD DENTON, WHO IS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR
BEEN GOOD IN THE PAST.
REACTOR REGULATION WITH THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION; DR. LESTER MACHTA, WHO IS DIRECTOR OF AIR
Q: WHAT IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN THIS
RESOURCES LABORATORY WITH THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
COORDINATING PROCESS WITH THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION; SHELDON MEYERS -- SHELDON,
IF YOU WOULD CHANGE PLACES WITH DALE BUNCH SHELDON
A: THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH (EPA)
MEYERS, WHO IS DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF RADIATION
ADMINISTRATOR THOMAS IN COORDINATING OUR INTERNATIONAL
PROGRAMS WITH THE UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
POSITION ON THE ISSUE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCEANS
PROTECTION AGENCY; AND DALE BUNCH, WHO IS THE DEPUTY
AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR REACTOR DEPLOYMENT WITH THE
JOHN NEGROPONTE HAS SET UP AN INFORMAL WORKING GROUP
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. THESE GENTLEMEN ALL
THAT MEETS DAILY TO MONITOR THE SITUATION AND MAINTAIN
REPRESENT AGENCIES THAT ARE MEMBERS OF THIS TASK GROUP.
DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH OUR OVERSEAS POSTS.
WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO TRY 10 DO IN THIS BRIEFING THIS
Q: IS THE CHERNOBYL REACTOR INCLUDED IN THE LIST OF
MORNING IS BOTH EXPLAIN THE PROCESS WE WILL USE FOR
SOVIET NUCLEAR FACILITIES OPEN FOR INSPECTION BY THE
INFORMATION COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION WITH THIS TASK
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY?
GROUP WHICH WE WILL TRY TO HAVE ON A TIMELY AND
CONTINUING UP-DATED BASIS, AT LEAST DAILY. ALSO TO
A: -- THE IAEA INSPECTION SYSTEM EXAMINES SAFEGUARDS
EXPLAIN TO YOU WHAT WE KNOW TODAY ABOUT THE EVENT AND
FOR THE PHYSICAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT, AND THEN RESPOND TO
NON-PROLIFERATION PURPOSES, NOT FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY
QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE.
PURPOSES. HAVING MADE THAT POINT, IT IS OUR
UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS REACTOR WAS INCLUDED IN THEIR
IT'S DIFFICULT TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ON MANY ISSUES
OFFER OF FACILITIES, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW AT THIS TIME IF
BECAUSE OF THE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION AND DATA GAPS
IT HAS BEEN INSPECTED.
THAT WE HAVE THIS MORNING. I THINK WE CAN DRAW SOME
CONCLUSIONS BUT IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTIONS, DON'T BE
5. USSR: TRAVEL ADVISORY FOR THE KIEV AREA
FRUSTRATED IF WE CAN'T DRAW COMPLETE CONCLUSIONS AT
THIS POINT. BUT, HOPEFULLY, OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL
-- A SOVIET GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN HAS INDICATED THAT DUE
DAYS, AS INFORMATION COMES IN, BETTER ANALYSIS IS
TO THE RECENT ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL POWER PLANT,
PERFORMED, THOSE CONCLUSIONS WILL BECOME FIRMER AND
TRAVEL TO KIEV MAY BE DANGEROUS. THE DEPARTMENT OF
MORE EXPANSIVE.
STATE THEREFORE ADVISES THAT TRAVEL TO THAT CITY AND
ADJACENT AREAS IS NOT RECOMMENDED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.
WHAT I'D LIKE TO DO IS GIVE YOU A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF
WHAT WE KNOW, AND THEN I'D LIKE FOR EACH OF THREE OF
6. USSR: WELFARE OF AMERICANS (TAKEN QUESTION)
THESE EXPERTS TO GIVE YOU A BRIEF TECHNICAL
PRESENTATION. THEN I'D LIKE TO OPEN IT UP FOR
Q: HOW MANY U.S. CITIZENS ARE IN THE AFFECTED AREA
QUESTIONS.
A: -- WE DO NOT HAVE A COUNT OF THE AMERICANS IN THE
WE KNOW THAT A MAJOR ACCIDENT OCCURRED AT THE CHERNOBYL
KIEV AREA, SINCE TOURISTS ARE UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO
NUCLEAR FACILITY. WE KNOW THAT THAT MAJOR ACCIDENT
ADVISE THE DEPARTMENT OR THE U.S. EMBASSY OF THEIR
RESULTED IN AN EXPLOSION AND MAJOR DAMAGE TO UNIT 4 AT
WHEREABOUTS.
THAT FACILITY. WE KNOW THAT A FIRE OCCURRED, AND THAT
WE HAVE A CONTINUING FIRE AT THAT FACILITY AND THAT WE
EMBASSY MOSCOW HAS NO REPORTS OF AMERICANS AFFECTED
HAVE DAMAGE AND THE FIRE AT THAT ONE UNIT.
BY THE ACCIDENT. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REQUESTS FOR
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, EVACUATION OR OTHER ASSISTANCE BY
WE KNOW THAT AS THE FIRE CONTINUES, WE DO HAVE
AMERICANS IN THE USSR.
CONTINUING EMISSIONS, RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS, BUT THEY
WOULD BE DIMINISHED RELEASES OVER TIME FROM THE INITIAL
7. FOLLOWING IS AN EDITED TEXT OF THE EPA CHAIRED
EMISSION RELEASE.
BRIEFING HELD AT 11:00 A.M. APRIL 30 AT THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE.
WE KNOW THAT AS FAR AS METEOROLOGY IS CONCERNED, AT THE
TIME OF THE EVENT THE EMISSIONS WOULD HAVE MOVED
SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
AIRBORNE -- NORTHWEST. WE KNOW FROM THE TENTATIVE
READINGS THAT HAVE OCCURRED, THE ELEVATIONS THAT HAD
MODERATOR: YESTERDAY, AS MANY OF YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT
BEEN DETECTED IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES,
REAGAN ANNOUNCED A TASK FORCE REGARDING THE NUCLEAR
SPECIFICALLY SWEDEN, WE WOULD BACK CALCULATE THE EVENT
ACCIDENT IN THE SOVIET.UNION. EPA ADMINISTRATOR LEE
TO SATURDAY.
THOMAS HAS BEEN NAMED TO HEAD THE GROUP. TODAY, HE AND
MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE WILL MAKE A PRESENTATION WITH
WE KNOW THAT THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES IN WIND CONDITIONS
REGARD TO WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THOSE MATTERS. AND AFTER
AND METEOROLOGY SINCE THE EVENT, WHICH WOULD INDICATE
THAT PRESENTATION, WE'LL BE HAPPY TO ENTERTAIN YOUR
THAT IN ADDITION TO THE MOVEMENT NORTHWEST, WE ALSO
QUESTIONS.
WOULD HAVE MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTH, AS WELL AS TO THE
EAST. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT
MR. THOMAS: I AM LEE THOMAS, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
DISPERSION BECAUSE OF THE METEOROLOGY, AND WE'RE ABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND HERE TODAY AS THE
TO PREDICT, TO SOME DEGREE, WHAT THAT MEANS AS FAR AS
CHAIRMAN OF AN INTERAGENCY TASK GROUP WORKING TO REVIEW
DISPERSION PATTERNS ARE CONCERNED.
AND RESPOND TO THE SITUATION THAT'S OCCURRED IN THE
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WE ALSO KNOW THAT AS FAR AS MEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PRESSURE TUBES. IT BOILS IN THE LOWER HALF OF THE
CONSEQUENCES, THAT WE ARE NOT AT A POINT WHERE WE WOULD
PRESSURE TUBE AND THEN GOES DIRECTLY TO THE TURBINES.
FEEL THERE ARE ANY HEALTH OR ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
so, IN A SENSE, IT'S A DIRECT CYCLE, PRESSURE-TUBE
FOR THE UNITED STATES FROM THIS EVENT. WE HAVE FOUND
REACTOR AND IT'S UNIQUE TO THE RUSSIANS. THEY DESIGNED
THAT THE ELEVATED READINGS FROM SWEDEN INDICATE VERY
IT, AND I DON'T THINK IT'S BEEN BUILT OUTSIDE THEIR
LOW DEPOSITION OR FALLOUT AT THIS POINT IN TIME, WITH
AREA.
VERY SMALL MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES AS FAR AS THOSE
READINGS ARE CONCERNED.
WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ABOUT WHAT THE INITIATING EVENT
WAS. BUT IT'S QUITE CLEAR THAT WHATEVER HAPPENED
TO PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION, TECHNICAL INFORMATION,
CAUSED THE LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT IN THIS PLANT. THE
QUICKLY TO FILL IN ON THOSE POINTS, I'M GOING TO ASK,
FUEL WAS COOLING, THE CORE BEGAN TO HEAT UP,
FIRST, HAROLD DENTON, IF HE WOULD REVIEW FOR YOU THE
FUEL-MELTING BEGAN TO OCCUR. AS WATER AND STEAM GOT TO
FACILITY ITSELF AND WHAT WE FEEL OCCURRED AT THAT
THE FUEL, THERE WAS A REACTION BETWEEN THE STEAM AND
FACILITY, AND, TECHNICALLY, WHAT WE THINK IS OCCURRING
THE CLADDING; THE CLADDING IS ZIRCONIUM, THE TUBING IS
AT THIS POINT.
ZIRCONIUM. THIS LED TO METAL WATER REACTIONS. THE
CLADDING OF THE PRESSURE TUBE FAILED AND STEAM BEGAN TO
WE HAVE, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, I'M SURE, FOR YOU
ATTACK THE GRAPHITE. GRAPHITE WILL REACT WITH WATER
TO SEE, UNLESS WE COULD GET THE LIGHTS TURNED OUT, AN
AND PRODUCE HYDROGEN AND CARBON MONOXIDE, AND SOME
OVERVIEW WHICH IS A SCHEMATIC OF THE FACILITY ITSELF.
OTHER COMBUSTIBLE PRODUCTS.
IF WE CAN'T TURN THE LIGHTS OUT, THEN HAROLD WILL GO
THROUGH A DISCUSSION WITHOUT THAT OVERVIEW, BUT WE DO
THERE'S EVERY INDICATION THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS
HAVE THAT AVAILABLE.
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CLADDING AND THE GRAPHITE AND
THE STEAM AND AIR, A VIOLENT EXPLOSION OCCURRED INSIDE
HAROLD.
THE REACTOR CORE. THIS EXPLOSION LED TO BREACHING THE
CONTAINMENT AND DISPERSAL OF CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF
MR. DENTON: AS HAS BEEN SAID, THE INFORMATION IS
FISSION PRODUCTS.
RATHER SKETCHY so YOU SHOULD TAKE WHATEVER I SAY TODAY
YOU MAY RECALL AT TMI WE HAD A VERY LARGE CONTAINMENT
AS BEING PRELIMINARY.
THERE. ESSENTIALLY, ALL THE FISSION PRODUCTS STAYED
WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT.
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED IN UNIT NO. 4 AT CHERNOBYL.
THERE ARE THREE OTHER PLANTS ON THE SAME SITE. THIS
I THINK THE CONTAINMENT IS CERTAINLY BREACHED. A FIRE
PLANT BEGAN OPERATION IN L983. AND JUST BY WAY OF
FOLLOWED THE EXPLOSION. I WOULD EXPECT THAT TODAY THE
BACKGROUND, THERE ARE ABOUT L4 OTHER SIMILAR PLANTS
CHARCOAL IS STILL BURNING; IT'S PROBABLY BURNING FROM
OPERATING IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THERE'S ONE OTHER
THE TOP DOWN. THERE'S STILL VERY HIGH TEMPERATURES
PLANT OPERATING THAT'S EVEN BIGGER THAN THIS ONE.
EXISTING IN THE CORE. RADIATION LEVELS WITHIN THE
PLANT ITSELF ARE so VERY HIGH THAT I WOULD EXPECT IT
IT'S QUITE DIFFERENT THAN U.S. DESIGNS. IT'S WHAT WE
WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO TAKE ANY CORRECTIVE ACTION
CALL A GRAPHITE-MODERATED DESIGN. AND IF WE COULD SEE,
THERE.
IF THIS COULD BE SEEN MAYBE IF WE TURN DOWN THE
LIGHTS A BIT IN THE AUDITORIUM, PERHAPS WE COULD SEE
I THINK I'LL STOP HERE AND THEN TURN TO THE NEXT
THE SLIDE.
SPEAKER AND LET HIM DISCUSS THE DISPERSION OF THE
FISSION PRODUCTS THAT PROBABLY OCCURRED.
MR. THOMAS: COULD WE TURN THE LIGHTS FOR MAYBE ONE
MINUTE AND THEN WE COULD TURN THEM BACK UP JUST so YOU
MR. THOMAS: THANK YOU, HAROLD. I'M GOING TO ASK
COULD GET A VIEW OF WHAT THE FACILITY LOOKS LIKE.
LESTER MACHTA FROM NOAA IF HE WOULD DEFINE THE
IT'LL GIVE YOU A PICTURE OF IT.
METEOROLOGY, AS WE KNEW IT, WHEN THE EVENT OCCURRED.
MR. DENTON: I GUESS WE'LL GO WITHOUT.
LESTER.
MR. THOMAS: I GUESS WE'LL GO WITHOUT.
MR. MACHTA: WHEN THE FIRST EVENT OCCURRED, THE
MATERIAL WENT TOWARD THE NORTHWEST AND CAME TO SOMEWHAT
MR. DENTON: MAYBE WE CAN PASS OUT SOME COPIES OF THIS
OF A STOP BECAUSE OF VERY LIGHT WINDS IN NORTH CENTRAL
SLIDE LATER. WHAT IT SHOWS IS THAT THIS IS A VERY
SCANDINAVIA. AT THIS POINT, WE THINK IT'S BEGINNING TO
LARGE, IN PHYSICAL DIMENSION, PLANT. WHAT I WANTED TO
DRIFT EASTWARD AND SOUTHEASTWARD RATHER SLOWLY.
FOCUS ON WAS THE REACTOR CORE PART.
THE LATER MATERIAL THAT MAY HAVE BEEN RELEASED, IF ANY
THE REACTOR CORE IS A LARGE BLOCK OF GRAPHITE. THERE
WAS, WAS CARRIED, FIRST, TOWARD THE WEST A
ARE ABOUT A THOUSAND TONS OF GRAPHITE THAT COMPOSE THE
CORRECTION FIRST TOWARD THE EAST AND THEN SOUTH AND
REACTOR CORE. AS YOU KNOW, U.S. PLANTS ARE BASED ON A
THEN TOWARD THE WEST. so SOME OF THE REPORTS SAY
LIGHT-WATER REACTOR DESIGN; THEY ARE ENCASED IN A
RADIATION THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FOUND IN AUSTRIA OR TO
REACTOR VESSEL AND THEY USE WATER AS BOTH A MODERATOR
THE WEST OF CHERNOBYL PROBABLY CAME FROM LATER RELEASES
AND COOLANT. THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION, AS
FROM THE ACCIDENT.
YOU'LL LEARN.
THE COVERAGE OF THE RADIOACTIVE CLOUD IS REALLY QUITE
WITHIN THESE BLOCKS THERE ARE PRESSURE TUBES. THESE
LARGE, WE THINK, BASED ON PAST EXPERIENCE IN THE
PRESSURE TUBES ARE ABOUT 3-L/2 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND
MOVEMENT OF POLLUTION. so THAT, SAY, FROM THE INITIAL
WITHIN EACH PRESSURE TUBE IS A CLUSTER OF FUEL RODS. I
EVENT, OUR GUESS WOULD BE THAT IT'S COVERING PROBABLY A
THINK THERE ARE ABOUT L6 FUEL RODS PER CLUSTER. so
GOOD PART OF EASTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE; PROBABLY THE
COOLING WATER FOR THIS REACTOR GOES THROUGH THESE
NORTHWESTERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND MAY EXTEND
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WELL INTO THE ARCTIC BASIN.
AS WELL.
WE DON'T YET KNOW WHAT THE DISPERSION IS FROM THE MORE
THANK YOU.
RECENT RELEASES THAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED.
MR. THOMAS: THE PROCESS WILL BE FOR INFORMATION
I THINK AT THIS POINT PERHAPS WE CAN STOP. I MIGHT
COLLECTION FROM ALL U.S. SOURCES, INPUT FROM
MENTION THAT THE WAY IN WHICH WE'RE DETERMINING THE
INTERNATIONAL SOURCES. TO CONTINUE TO UPDATE THE
PATHS OF THE MATERIAL IS NOT BY ACTUAL MEASUREMENTS OF
INFORMATION THAT YOU JUST HEARD, WE WILL HAVE A DAILY
THE RADIOACTIVITY. WHAT WE'RE DOING IS USING OBSERVED
PROCESS FOR PROVIDING THAT INFORMATION TO YOU -- ANY
CONVENTIONAL WINDS THAT ARE REPORTED BY THE SOVIET
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR CONCLUSIONS THAT WE'RE ABLE
UNION AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CARRYING THE MATERIAL
TO DRAW, OR (TO) RESPOND TO QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE ON
AT ABOUT 5,000 FEET ABOVE THE GROUND.
A CONTINUING BASIS.
THANK YOU.
WITH THAT, THEN, BRIEF OVERVIEW, WHY DON'T I OPEN IT UP
AND SEE IF WE CAN RESPOND TO SPECIFIC ISSUES IN
MR. THOMAS: WE ASK SHELDON MEYERS IF HE WOULD GIVE US
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE MEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE.
CONSEQUENCES FROM WHAT WE KNOW AT THIS POINT IN THE
VICINITY OF THE INCIDENT.
Q: THIS IS TO MR. DENTON. YOU SAID THIS WAS BASICALLY
A LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT. COULD YOU JUST TAKE US
SHELDON.
THROUGH THAT SCENARIO YOU DESCRIBED SLOWLY AGAIN AND
STEP-BY-STEP AND DESCRIBE THIS LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT?
MR. MEYERS: I WANT TO EMPHASIZE WHAT LEE SAID EARLIER,
THAT WE HAVE VERY LIMITED DATA. BUT BASED UPON THE
MR. DENTON: I DON'T REALLY KNOW THE INITIATING EVENT.
DATA THAT WE DO HAVE, WE DON'T EXPECT THAT IF THAT
UNDER NORMAL OPERATION, EACH PRESSURE TUBE IS FED WITH
PLUME REACHES THE U.S. THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY
WATER. THERE ARE SOME L6,000 INDIVIDUAL PRESSURE
SIGNIFICANT HEALTH EFFECT ON THE POPULATION OF THE
TUBES. EACH PRESSURE TUBE HAS ITS OWN SOURCE OF
UNITED STATES. THAT IS BASED UPON A NUMBER OF
WATER. WATER BOILS IN THESE PRESSURE TUBES, TURNS TO
ASSUMPTIONS THAT WE'VE MADE, BASED UPON EXPERIENCE WITH
STEAM AND THEN EVENTUALLY DRIVES THE TURBINE. so WE
FALLOUT CONDITIONS MOSTLY FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING
DON'T KNOW WHAT CAUSED THE INITIAL UPSET.
IN THE PAST.
ONE UNIQUE FEATURE OF THIS PLANT ALSO IS IT REFUELS
THAT IS, THE LARGER PARTICLES GENERALLY TEND TO
ON-LINE, so THERE IS A REFUELING MACHINE WHICH IS ABLE
PRECIPITATE OUT WITHIN A HUNDRED MILES OF THE SOURCE.
TO PUT FUEL ELEMENTS IN AND TAKE FUEL ASSEMBLIES OUT
GENERALLY, AS A PLUME MOVES THROUGH THE ATMOSPHERE,
WHILE THE PLANT IS OPERATING AT FULL POWER.
THERE IS PRECIPITATION WHICH FURTHER REMOVES SOME OF
SOMETHING OBVIOUSLY OCCURRED. IT COULD HAVE BEEN A
THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. AND, LASTLY, IT WAS
PIPE BREAK, IT COULD HAVE BEEN A MALFUNCTION OF THE
PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF DILUTION
REFUELING MACHINE, IT COULD HAVE BEEN A LOST OF
THAT TAKES PLACE AS THE PLUME PASSES OVERHEAD.
ELECTRICAL POWER OR CONTROL. SOMETHING LED TO LOSS OF
COOLING IN ONE OR MORE CHANNELS. BASED ON THE SEVERITY
THERE WAS MENTION OF THE SWEDISH DATA. WE HAVE LIMITED
OF THE ACCIDENT AND THE SORT OF MEASUREMENTS THAT HAVE
INFORMATION FROM THEM, AND IT APPEARS THAT THEIR
BEEN MADE OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, THIS LED, THEN, TO
BACKGROUND LEVEL HAS BEEN EXCEEDED BY ABOUT ONE
UNDERCOOLING OF A LARGE NUMBER OF CHANNELS. THE FUEL
MILLIREM OVER THE SEVERAL DAYS THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN
OBVIOUSLY HEATED UP IN A LARGE NUMBER; FUEL MELTING
THOSE MEASUREMENTS. AND TO PUT THAT IN CONTEXT IN THIS
BEGAN, METAL WATER REACTIONS BEGAN, THESE PRESSURE
COUNTRY, THE AVERAGE BACKGROUND LEVEL DUE TO ALL
TUBES LOST THEIR INTEGRITY AS A RESULT OF INTERACTING
SOURCES, NATURAL AND OTHERWISE, IS ABOUT 90 TO A L00
WITH THE VERY HOT STEAM. THE GRAPHITE REACTS WITH THE
MILLIREM PER YEAR.
HOT STEAM, IT PRODUCES HYDROGEN AND CARBON MONOXIDE.
THESE ARE COMBUSTIBLE PRODUCTS.
so WE THINK THAT IF AND WHEN IT WILL EVENTUALLY GET
HERE, IT WILL BE HARDLY MEASURABLE AND RELATIVELY
MY SPECULATION IS THAT THESE COMBUSTION PRODUCTS
INSIGNIFICANT.
EVENTUALLY LED TO A CHEMICAL EXPLOSION WITHIN THE CORE
ITSELF. THIS PROVIDED A WAY FOR AIR TO GET IN THE
EPA DOES OPERATE WHAT WE CALL THE NATIONAL
CORE. AND ONE WAY TO THINK ABOUT THIS IS, THINK OF IT
ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM ERAMS
AS A GIANT COAL PILE THAT'S BURNING BUT WITH AN INTENSE
AND THAT SYSTEM IS IN PLACE AROUND THE COUNTRY IN ALL
HEAT SOURCE ONLY INSIDE. BUT THE INITIATING EVENT IS
5ø STATES. IT WILL BE THE FIRST INDICATOR OF ANYTHING
UNKNOWN.
COMING IN IN THE WAY OF INCREASES OVER OUR NORMAL
LEVELS. WE'VE ACCELERATED THE MEASUREMENTS OF
Q: HOW LONG WOULD THIS HAVE TAKEN FROM FIRST
PARTICULATES FROM TWICE A WEEK TO DAILY so THAT WE'LL
INDICATIONS OF LOSS OF COOLANT TO THE EXPLOSION AND
GET A VERY QUICK RESPONSE IF ANYTHING DOES COME IN; AND
THEN THE FIRE? HOW LONG WOULD IT HAVE TAKEN? CAN YOU
IF WE DO GET ANY INDICATION AT ALL, WE'LL SPEED UP THE
GIVE US SOME TIME PHASEMENT?
MEASUREMENTS OF THE OTHER KINDS OF MEDIA THAT WE DO
MEASURE.
MR. DENTON: FOR ANY ONE CHANNEL, IF YOU LOSE COOLING
IN ADDITION TO PARTICULATES, WE MEASURE SURFACE WATER,
IN ONE CHANNEL, YOU CAN GET FUEL DAMAGE VERY QUICKLY.
DRINKING WATER AND MILK SAMPLES. RIGHT NOW THOSE ARE
I WOULD THINK IN A MATTER OF MINUTES. BUT WHETHER THIS
ON THEIR NORMAL SCALE, BUT IF ANYTHING UNTOWARD SEEMS
STARTED AS ONE CHANNEL OR WHETHER IT WAS A TOTAL LOSS
TO BE COMING ALONG, WE'LL INCREASE THOSE MEASUREMENTS
OF FLOW TO THE REACTOR CORE ALL AT ONCE, I HAVE NO
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INFORMATION ON THAT; OR WHETHER IT WAS RELATED TO THE
REFUELING MACHINE.
MR. THOMAS: YES, RIGHT HERE.
YOU MAY RECALL THAT THERE'S ONE PLANT SOMEWHAT SIMILAR
Q: BASED ON WHAT YOU KNOW OF THE ACCIDENT, DO YOU FIND
TO THIS CALLED WINDSCALE THAT ABOUT 30 YEARS AGO HAD A
IT CREDIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS CLAIM THAT ONLY TWO WERE
PROBLEM, AND IT WAS RELATED SOMEWHAT TO THE ON-LINE
KILLED? WOULD THAT BE MR. MEYERS TO ANSWER THAT?
REFUELING.
MR. THOMAS: WE REALLY AND, SHELDON, YOU MAY WANT TO
Q: THERE IS SOME INFORMATION TODAY THAT PERHAPS THE
FILL IN BEHIND ME BUT WE DON'T HAVE, I THINK, ENOUGH
SECOND REACTOR AT THIS SAME LOCATION MAY BE SOMEHOW
INFORMATION ON BOTH WHAT OCCURRED, THE EXTENT OF THE
INVOLVED, MAY BE SOMEHOW GOING THROUGH A MELTDOWN.
RELEASE TO DRAW THE EXTENT OF ACTION THAT WERE TAKEN
WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THAT?
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. IN OTHER WORDS, AS HAROLD
DENTON MENTIONED, INCONCLUSIVE INFORMATION ON HOW LONG
MR. THOMAS: WE DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT
THE PROBLEM WAS WORKED BEFORE THERE WAS AN EXPLOSION
INDICATES THAT THERE IS A PROBLEM WITH A SECOND REACTOR
WHAT ACTION MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE DURING THAT PERIOD OF
AT THIS FACILITY. THERE ARE FOUR REACTORS THERE, AS
TIME, SUCH AS EVACUATION OF THE WORK AREA ITSELF OR
YOU KNOW. THEY ARE IN FAIRLY CLOSE PROXIMITY, UNIT 3
SURROUNDING AREAS, TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT
AND UNIT 4, UNIT 4 BEING THE ONE WHERE THERE WAS THE
CASUALTIES. so I THINK IT WOULD BE CONJECTURE THAT
PROBLEM. so THERE IS CONJECTURE ABOUT WHETHER THERE
WE'RE NOT PREPARED, BASED on THE DATA WE HAVE TO DATE,
ARE PROBLEMS WITH UNIT 3. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THE DESIGN
TO MAKE, TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CASUALTIES OR
OF THIS FACILITY ALSO INCLUDES SOME JOINT OPERATION OF
INJURIES.
THOSE TWO UNITS FROM A COMMON CONTROL AREA, AGAIN
LEADING TO CONJECTURE ABOUT THE POTENTIAL OF PROBLEMS
Q: IS IT POSSIBLE IT COULD BE ONLY TWO, OR IS THAT
AT THE OTHER UNIT.
PREPOSTEROUSLY LOW? OTHER REPORTS HAVE SUGGESTED THERE
MAY BE THOUSANDS KILLED.
BUT WE HAVE NO INFORMATION AT THIS POINT THAT WOULD
INDICATE THAT THERE ARE PROBLEMS AT THE OTHER UNIT.
MR. THOMAS: I JUST CAN'T CONJECTURE A GUESS AS TO WHAT
IT COULD BE, AND I THINK THE REASON YOU'VE GOT SUCH
Q: I WOULD LIKE TO PUT THE QUESTION TO DR. DENTON.
TREMENDOUS RANGES BEING GIVEN BY PEOPLE IS THE VERY
COULD YOU GIVE US A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT YOU THINK MIGHT
LACK OF DATA AS TO NOT ONLY WHAT OCCURRED, BUT OVER
BE GOING ON AT THIS REACTOR SITE NOW AND THE
WHAT PERIOD OF TIME AND WHAT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN DURING
ENVIRONMENT IMMEDIATELY AROUND IT? AND ARE YOU AT ALL
THAT PERIOD OF TIME.
CONCERNED THAT THESE OTHER PLANTS THAT HAVE BEEN PUT IN
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN MIGHT BE IN DANGER OF BECOMING
YES, BACK HERE.
INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT ITSELF?
Q: CAN YOU PROBABLY REFER TO MR. MACHTA ANY
MR. DENTON: WE'VE BEEN TOLD, I BELIEVE, THAT THE OTHER
INFORMATION ON WHAT THAT COULD MEAN TO SOVIET
THREE UNITS WERS SHUT DOWN AT ABOUT THE TIME THE
AGRICULTURE, AND HENCE, TO WORLD AGRICULTURE, THAT THIS
TROUBLES IN UNIT 4 OCCURRED. I GUESS I THINK THAT
CLOUD SHIFTS OVER A (INAUDISLE) AREA?
THERE'S PROBABLY STILL FIRE GOING ON IN THE UPPER PART
OF THE REACTOR GRAPHITE BLOCK INVOLVING THE GRAPHITE
MR. THOMAS: MAYBE WE OUGHT TO ASK LESTER TO FIRST TALK
AND THE FUEL; THAT THIS is BURNING ITS WAY DOWN THROUGH
ABOUT THE METEOROLOGY AND THEN SHELDON TALK ABOUT THE
THE ROUGHLY 20 FEET OR so OF GRAPHITE, AND THAT THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THAT KIND OF IMPACT ON
RADIATION LEVELS NEARBY ARE VERY HIGH. so I THINK THAT
AGRICULTURE.
THERE'S PROBABLY BEEN AN EVACUATION FROM THE CONTROL
LESTER.
ROOM OF UNIT 3, FOR EXAMPLE, BUT WITH THE EQUIPMENT
LEFT RUNNING TO KEEP IT COOL.
MR. MACHTA: ACCORDING TO ESTIMATES OF WHERE THE
RADIO ACTIVITY MAY HAVE MOVED, IT WOULD HAVE MOVED OVER
so I WOULD THINK THAT THIS ACCIDENT, PER SE, WOULD NOT
THE WESTERN PART OF RUSSIA, WHICH IS AN AGRICULTURAL
RESULT IN AN ACCIDENT IN ONE, TWO OR THREE. ASSUMING
AREA. IT'S NOW, WE THINK, MOVING BACK OVER THE
THE EQUIPMENT IS OPERABLE THERE, I WOULDN'T EXPECT THAT
NORTHERN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, AS FAR AS
THE SPREAD -- I GUESS THERE COULD BE A POTENTIAL FOR
WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES CONCERN, I'LL HAVE TO DEFER TO
CONVENTIONAL FIRES TO SPREAD, AND THAT'S PROBABLY OF
SHELDON.
CONCERN.
MR. MEYERS: AGAIN, BASED UPON LIMITED DATA, IT IS
MR. THOMAS: WE HAVE A QUESTION RIGHT OVER HERE.
POSSIBLE, DEPENDING UPON THE PLUME, IF SOME
RADIO-ACTIVE MATERIAL WERE DEPOSITED ON GRAZING LAND,
Q: HOW CERTAIN ARE YOU, THEN, THAT A MELTDOWN ACTUALLY
FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH HAD cows, AND THE COWS ATE THE GRASS
OCCURRED? AND IF IT DID OCCUR, WHY DIDN'T THE CHINA
AND PRODUCED SOME MILK, THAT MILK WOULD PROBABLY BE
SYNDROME SITUATION DEVELOP?
CONTAMINATED. IT'S NOT AT ALL CLEAR WHAT IT WOULD BE
TO A WHEAT CROP, FOR EXAMPLE. IT WOULD STRONGLY DEPEND
MR. DENTON: THIS PLANT DOESN'T HAVE WATER WHICH BOILS
UPON HOW IT WAS DEPOSITED, WHETHER IT RAINED, WHETHER
DRY. WHEN WE USE THAT WORD, WE THINK OF A MELTDOWN
THE GROWING SEASON WAS NEARLY COMPLETE. IF IT WERE THE
THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY COOLING, IT'S 200 TONS OF
KIND OF SETUP WHERE THE WHEAT WAS FULLY GROWN, FOR
FUEL THAT MELT DOWN AS A GLOB AND MELT THROUGH THE
EXAMPLE, IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THE CROP MIGHT NOT BE
REACTOR VESSEL. THIS WAS SURROUNDED BY, AS I SAID, A
DAMAGED UNCLEAR AT THIS TIME.
THOUSAND TONS OF GRAPHITE. so, IN A SENSE, TO COIN A
NEW WORD, YOU COULD CALL THIS A "BURN-UP" RATHER THAN A
MR. THOMAS: YES, RIGHT HERE.
CORE JUST BY ITSELF.
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Q: CAN YOU TELL US, WAS THIS PLANT ONE OF THE ONES THE
PRODUCTS, EVEN IN THE EVENT OF A SEVERE ACCIDENT. so
SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO OPEN TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION
THAT THE PURPOSE OF A CONFINEMENT IS BASICALLY TO MAKE
50
AS TO SAFEGUARDS? AND IF so, HAVE ANY U.S. OR IAEA
SURE THAT IF THERE IS AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE, IT'S
INSPECTORS RECENTLY VISITED THIS PLANT?
DIRECTED TO A BANK OF FILTERS WHICH FILTER OUT ALL, OR
ESSENTIALLY ALL THE HARMFUL MATERIALS.
MR. THOMAS: I DON'T HAVE THAT INFORMATION FOR YOU
TODAY. I WOULD INDICATE THAT AT THE NORMAL STATE
Q: BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE CONFINEMENTS?
DEPARTMENT BRIEFING, WHICH-1 BELIEVE IS GENERALLY
SCHEDULED FOR AROUND L2 OR L2:L5, THERE WILL BE MORE
MR. BUNCH: THEY DO HAVE CONFINEMENTS.
INFORMATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS THE ONE
YOU JUST ASKED ABOUT.
Q (INAUDIBLE)
YES.
MR. BUNCH: THAT'S CORRECT.
Q MR. DENTON, PLEASE, SUPPOSING THERE WERE A PARTIAL
Q: THEY DO NOT.
MELTDOWN OR WORSE AT ONE OF YOUR SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS,
OR THE ONE AT HANFORD, WASHINGTON, WHICH I UNDERSTAND
A: THEY DO NOT.
DO NOT HAVE CONTAINMENT BUILDINGS I KNOW YOU DON'T
THINK A PARTIAL MELTDOWN IS LIKELY, BUT SUPPOSING THERE
MR. THOMAS: WE HAVE A QUESTION RIGHT HERE.
WERE WHERE WOULD THE RADIATION GO?
Q: THIS IS A QUESTION FOR MR. MACHTA: JUST GOING BY
MR. DENTON: I THINK WE HAVE A MEMBER HERE FROM THE
EXPERIENCE ON HOW THESE CLOUDS DRIFT, CAN YOU TELL US
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. LET ME HAVE HIM RESPOND TO IT.
IF THE PLUME REACHES THE U.S., WHAT THE LOGICAL ROUTE
FOR REACHING THE U.S. WOULD BE AND ABOUT WHAT THE TIME
MR. THOMAS: YES.
FRAME MIGHT BE?
BOTH OF THOSE FACILITIES YOU WERE DISCUSSING ARE
MR. MACHTA: IN TERMS OF THE TIME FRAME, I THINK IT IS
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES. LET ME ASK DALE BUNCH
VERY MANY DAYS FROM NOW THAT THE BULK OF THE MATERIAL
IF HE'LL RESPOND TO THAT.
WOULD ARRIVE AT THE U.S. THE MOST LOGICAL WAY IN WHICH
IT MIGHT COME TO THE UNITED STATES IS ACROSS THE
MR. BUNCH (DOE) : I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT
PACIFIC AND REACH THE WEST COAST, BUT THAT, AS I SAY,
THE SAVANNAH RIVER REACTORS ARE NOT GRAPHITE REACTORS,
IS AT LEAST, I WOULD SAY, A WEEK OFF. THE ALTERNATE
AS THE PLANT AT CHERNOBYL. THERE IS A PRODUCTION
WAY WOULD BE GOING INTO THE POLAR BASIN AND REACHING
REACTOR AT HANFORD, WASHINGTON. IT'S QUITE DISSIMILAR
FROM THE FACILITY IN RUSSIA; IT BEARS NO RESEMBLANCE TO
THE STATE OF ALASKA, AND THEN PERHAPS HEADING
IT AT ALL. IT HAS BOTH SPECIAL SAFETY SYSTEMS TO SHUT
SOUTHWARD, BUT THAT IS NOT A TERRIBLY LIKELY THING, AND
DOWN THE REACTOR BEFORE YOU GET OVERHEATING OF THE
ONLY, IN MY OPINION, WOULD BE A SMALL PIECE OF THE MAIN
GRAPHITE, AND IT HAS SYSTEMS
BODY OF THE CLOUD.
Q COULD I JUST INTERRUPT FOR A SECOND? WE KNOW ABOUT
MR. THOMAS: WOULD YOU LIKE TO TALK ABOUT DISPERSION?
THE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND TMI HAD THEM, TOO. IF THERE
WERE SOME SORT OF MELTDOWN AT ONE OF THESE PLANTS,
Q: THAT HIGH ROUTE, THE POLAR ROUTE THROUGH ALASKA, IS
SAVANNAH RIVER OR HENFORD, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER
THAT AT A HIGHER ALTITUDE THAN THE ROUTE OVER THE
THEY'RE WHITE-WATER REACTORS OR GRAPHITE REACTORS, OR
PACIFIC?
WHATEVER, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE RADIATION, SINCE
THEY DON'T, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, HAVE CONTAINMENT
MR. MACHTA: IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE AT HIGHER
BUILDINGS?
ALTITUDES. THE ESTIMATES THAT WE'VE BEEN MAKING WAS
CARRYING THE MATERIAL AT ABOUT 5,000 FEET. SOME OF IT
MR. BUNCH (DOE) : THE POINT I WAS GETTING To, SIR, IS
DOES MIX UP, WITH LOWER CONCENTRATIONS AT HIGHER
-- IN FACT, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN WHAT HAPPENED AT
ALTITUDES, AND THOSE COULD BE CARRIED INTO THE BASIN
CHERNOBYL AND TMI. THE RADIATION WAS LARGELY CONTAINED
AND BE CARRIED.
IN TMI BECAUSE OF THE VERY ROBUST SYSTEMS IN THE PLANT
TO KEEP THE RADIATION INSIDE THE FACILITY. AT THE
Q: A PACIFIC ROUTE, THEN, AT A LOWER ALTITUDE, AS I
UNDERSTAND FROM WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, WOULD THAT THEN
PRODUCTION REACTOR AT HANFORD, WE HAVE A SPECIAL
CARRY A GREATER CHANCE OF DEPOSIT TO THE GROUND,
CONFINEMENT SYSTEM SPECIFICALLY DEVISED TO HANDLE
BASICALLY?
SEVERE ACCIDENTS, INCLUDING SUCH THINGS AS DELUGE-WATER
SPRAY SYSTEMS TO KEEP THE BUILDING COOL so THE GRAPHITE
MR. MACHT: IT WOULD HAVE A GREATER PROBABILITY, BUT IT
DOESN'T OVERHEAT AND SPECIAL FILTERS TO REMOVE FISSION
WOULD TAKE A VERY MUCH LONGER TIME; AND DURING THAT
PRODUCTS EVEN SHOULD YOU GET A BURNING EVENT.
TIME, THERE WILL BE MUCH, MUCH GREATER DISPERSION AND
MUCH GREATER DILUTION.
Q: COULD YOU TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE SAVANNAH
RIVER PLANTS AND WHY THEY DO NOT HAVE CONTAINMENTS?
Q: MR. THOMAS, IF THE SOVIETS TAKE US UP ON OUR OFFER
AND WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THEY WOULD HAVE AN ACCIDENT?
TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, WHAT
SPECIFICALLY COULD WE OFFER THEM? AND MORE
MR. BUNCH (DOE) : I'M, PERSONALLY, NOT REAL FAMILIAR
SPECIFICALLY, DO WE HAVE CIVILIAN AND GOVERNMENT
WITH THE SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS. THEY ARE PRODUCTION
EMPLOYEES TRAINED TO FIGHT REACTOR FIRES, DESPITE THE
FACILITIES; THEY HAVE CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS; THE
RADIATION HAZARD PROBLEM?
CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS HAVE SPECIAL FILTRATION DEVICES TO
PROTECT AGAINST THE ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF FISSION
MR. THOMAS (EPA): WELL, IN THAT OFFER OF ASSISTANCE
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THAT WAS MADE, WE HAD SPECIFIED A RANGE OF ASSISTANCE
THAT RANGES FROM MONITORING CAPABILITY TO TRAINED
Q: THERE WAS NOTHING ELSE THAT SOMETHING HAD HAPPENED
PERSONNEL AS FAR AS MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES ARE CONCERNED,
WHEN IT DID ON SATURDAY?
TO A FULL RANGE OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FROM U.S.
AGENCIES THAT ARE WELL VERSED AND WELL TRAINED IN
MR. THOMAS: NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.
DEALING WITH RADIOACTIVE ISSUES, ALL THE WAY FROM
MONITORING AND RESPONSE TO MEDICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Q: MR. DENTON, HOW LONG WOULD THIS FIRE TAKE TO BURN
CONSEQUENCES. AND THAT WAS SPECIFIED AS FAR AS THE
OUT IF NO EFFORTS TO PUT IT OUT ARE SUCCESSFUL?
OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS CONCERNED.
MR. DENTON: IT'S SPECULATIVE, BUT I GUESS WEEKS, IF
THE SPECIFIC QUESTION RELATING TO I THINK YOU'RE
THERE IS NO SUCCESSFUL EFFORT, BECAUSE OF THE
GETTING AT THIS PARTICULAR FIRE AND WHETHER THERE
ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD BE TRAINED TO DEAL WITH THIS,
Q: CAN YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC -- THREE WEEKS, FIVE WEEKS,
TEN WEEK?
I'D HAVE TO SEE IF DELL OR HAROLD HAVE ANY FEEL FOR
THAT.
MR. DENTON (DOE) : NO. NO, I'D JUST SAY WEEKS, AS
OPPOSED TO DAYS OR MONTHS.
MR. BUNCH (DOE) : 1 CAN GIVE YOU SOME GENERAL
INFORMATION. THERE IS A FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY
Q: IS THERE AN OUTSIDE LIMIT? COULD IT TAKE MORE THAN
RESPONSE PLAN. THERE ARE RADIOLOGICAL TEAMS WHICH ARE
A MONTH TO PUT THIS FIRE OUT?
POSITIONED AT VARIOUS PLACES AROUND THE COUNTRY AND
PERIODICALLY TRAINED TO RESPOND TO RADIOLOGICAL
MR. DENTON (DOE) : YOU KNOW, WE REALLY DON'T KNOW
EMERGENCIES. PART OF THAT TRAINING DOES INCLUDE COPING
ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT CONDITION THE CORE IS IN. THE
WITH FIRES IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OR NUCLEAR TEST
WEEKS ARE THE BEST ESTIMATE 1 CAN GIVE YOU. IT DEPENDS
FACILITIES.
ON HOW MUCH AIR IS GETTING TO THE CORE, AND THAT SORT
OF - I PERCEIVE
Q: COULD YOU BE MORE SPECIFIC IN TERMS OF ANSWERING THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER WE HAVE OFFERED INDIVIDUAL
Q: FOLLOWUP QUESTION, PLEASE?
PERSONNEL TO GO IN AND HELP PUT OUT WHAT (INAUDIBLE) IS
THE CONTINUING FIRE AND PROBLEM?
MR. DENTON (NRC) : I PERCEIVE IT LOOKS LIKE A CHIMNEY,
AND WILL BURN UNTIL IT BURNS ITSELF OUT OR THE AIR
MR. THOMAS: NO. WE MADE A GENERAL OFFER OF ASSISTANCE
SUPPLY IS TURNED OFF.
IN THE KIND OF CATEGORIES I INDICATED, AND WE HAVE NOT
RECEIVED A RESPONSE, TO MY KNOWLEDGE, TO THAT OFFER,
Q: I HAVE ONE FOLLOW-UP TO THAT. YOU SAID HERE THAT
ALTHOUGH AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING I THINK THEY
THE EMISSIONS OF RADIATION FROM THE FIRE WILL BE
CAN PROBABLY BRING YOU UP TO DATE MORE CURRENTLY IN
REDUCING. COULD YOU GIVE US SOME SCALE OF THAT? IS IT
THAT THEY ARE THE ONES WHO ARE MANAGING THAT SPECIFIC
HALF-WAY? WILL THE EMISSIONS BE CUT IN HALF AFTER A
REQUEST.
CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME?
YES, SIR.
MR. DENTON (NRC) : I THINK THE VOLATILE ELEMENT SUCH AS
NOBLE GASES, IODIDES, SILISIUMS HAVE PROBABLY LARGELY
QUESTION: TO FOLLOW THAT UP, DO YOU KNOW WHETHER ANY
ALREADY BEEN RELEASED, AND THIS OCCURRED WHEN THE
STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO CONTAIN THE DISASTER? HAVE
THE SOVIETS TAKEN ANY STEPS TO CONTAIN IT OUTSIDE OF
EXPLOSION OCCURRED, AND THERE WAS A DIRECT PATH TO THE
SHUTTING OFF THE OTHER THREE REACTORS?
ATMOSPHERE. THE VERY TOP OF THIS BUILDING IS A SORT OF
INDUSTRIAL GRADE CONTAINMENT SORT OF BUILDING; IT'S NOT
MR. DENTON (EPA) : TO MY KNOWLEDGE, I DON'T KNOW OF
A HIGH-STRENGTH CONTAINMENT. BUT WE HAVE FOUND
ACTIONS THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN BEYOND THE ACTIONS WHICH
OFF-SITE OTHER TYPES OF LESS VOLATILE FISSION PRODUCTS
HAVE ALREADY BEEN NOTED CONCERNING THE OTHER UNITS.
NEPTUNIUM, FOR EXAMPLE, NIOBIUM, ALL OF WHICH
INDICATE THERE WAS A VERY VIOLENT EXPLOSION AND
RIGHT HERE. THEN I'LL COME BACK TO YOU.
DISBURSED A LOT OF THIS MATERIAL INTO THE ATMOSPHERE,
AND THAT THEN TOOK THE PATH THAT YOU HEARD DESCRIBED.
Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA OF HOW MANY WORKERS WERE AT
THE SITE? I PICKED UP SOME INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS
Q: YES, RIGHT HERE.
PLACES TO SUGGEST THAT THEY HAD CONSTRUCTION CREWS WHO
WERE BUILDING ANOTHER REACTOR.
Q: WOULD A NORMAL CONTAINMENT DOME HAVE WITHHELD THAT
EXPLOSION?
MR. THOMAS: WE DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION, I DON'T
THINK, THAT WOULD GIVE YOU A GOOD RESPONSE TO THAT AT
MR. DENTON (NRC) : I DON'T KNOW BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW
THIS POINT.
THE FULL DETAILS ON REALLY WHAT OCCURRED. IT CERTAINLY
WOULD HAVE HELPED.
Q: WHEN DID THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FIRST DETECT
SOME KIND OF PROBLEM AT THE PLANT?
Q: HOW OFTEN -- ON THE QUESTION THAT MR. DENTON WAS
ASKED -- UPI IS NOW QUOTING U.S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
MR. THOMAS: THE INFORMATION I HAVE IS THAT THE FIRST
SAYING A SECOND MELTDOWN HAS NOW OCCURRED. I KNOW YOU
INDICATION WE HAD OF THE PROBLEM WAS THE INDICATION
DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THAT, BUT COULD SUCH
THAT WAS EVIDENCED BY THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES. IN
AN EVENT HAVE HAPPENED IF THE PLANT WAS IN COLD
OTHER WORDS, THE ELEVATED READINGS AS FAR AS SWEDEN IS
SHUTDOWN, OR HOW LONG WOULD IT TAKE TO SHUT DOWN NUMBER
CONCERNED, THAT WAS WHEN WE BEGAN TO GET INFORMATION AS
THREE, ASSUMING THEY STARTED TO SHUT DOWN? COULD YOU
OTHER COUNTRIES DID ABOUT THE PROBLEM.
GIVE US SOME SCENARIOS OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN
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HAPPENING THERE?
MR. DENTON (NRC) : I FEEL A LOT OF SYMPATHY FOR MY
MR. DENTON (NRC) : I GUESS I HAVE I HAVE NO
INDICATION ANYTHING IS GOING ON IN UNIT THREE.
USSIAN COUNTERPART. NO ONE FROM MY STAFF HAS EVER
EVERYTHING I KNOW ABOUT IS CONSISTENT WITH JUST THE
BEEN TO THE SITE, SO WE DON'T HAVE ANY FIRST-HAND
MELTDOWN, THE BURNING IN UNIT FOUR.
INFORMATION. SEVERAL, MANY YEARS AGO, WE DID HAVE AN
EXCHANGE PROGRAM AND WENT TO SOME SIMILAR UNITS. UNITS
Q: COULD YOU PLEASE CLARIFY THE POINT OF THE MELTDOWN
ONE AND TWO, I THINK, ARE FAR ENOUGH AWAY THAT THEY
BECAUSE YESTERDAY PROFESSOR ALAN BROMLEY OF YALE
WOULD NOT LIKELY BE AFFECTED IN ANY EVENT. UNIT THREE
UNIVERSITY WAS PRETTY SURE THE MELTDOWN COULD NOT HAVE
DOES SHARE SOME COMMON SYSTEMS. I DON'T KNOW HOW,
OCCURRED BECAUSE THERE WOULDN'T BE THE TEMPERATURE FOR
WHETHER THEY ARE BEING ABLE TO MAN UNIT THREE OR NOT.
IT?
I WOULD SUSPECT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MAN UNIT
THREE, so I ASSUME THAT UNITS THREE AND FOUR ARE BOTH
MR. THOMAS: YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE EVENT AT UNIT
EVACUATED AND SYSTEMS ARE RUNNING ON THEIR OWN IN UNIT
FOUR
THREE.
YES.
Q: BUT THEY'RE NOT MEANT TO RUN UNATTENDED INDEFINITELY
MR. THOMAS: AND CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER A
MR. DENTON: THAT'S RIGHT, BUT
MELTDOWN OCCURRED OR NOT?
Q: ISN'T THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS?
Q: YES, BECAUSE YESTERDAY, PROFESSOR BROMLEY OF YALE
MR. DENTON: THAT'S RIGHT, NOT INDEFINITELY, BUT IF
UNIVERSITY (INAUDIBLE)
THEY SHOULD, UNLESS THEY ARE AFFECTED SOMEHOW BY UNIT
FOUR, SHOULD RUN FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
MR. DENTON: OUR EVIDENCE COMES LARGELY FROM THE
MEASUREMENTS OF RADIONEUCLIDES (PHONETIC) IN COUNTRIES
MR. THOMAS: A QUESTION OVER HERE.
LIKE SWEDEN, AND FROM THE KINDS OF MEASUREMENTS BEING
MADE THERE, IT'S CERTAINLY CONSISTENT WITH A MELTDOWN
Q: YOU SAY THEY'RE TRYING TO SHUT DOWN UNIT THREE,
OCCURRING. IT TAKES EXTREMELY HIGH TEMPERATURES TO GET
WHAT ACTUALLY WOULD THEY DO TO SHUT IT DOWN? AND HOW
THESE FISSION PRODUCTS OUT.
LONG WOULD IT TAKE TO GET TO SHUTDOWN?
Q: ARE YOU FINDING ANY IONIUM (NIOBIUM?) AND NEPTUNIUM
MR. DENTON: SHUTDOWN NORMALLY MEANS PUTTING THE
IN THE SWEDISH (INAUDIBLE) HAS IT GOTTEN THAT FAR?
CONTROL RODS IN AND STOPPING THE FISSION PROCESS, PUT
STILL THERE'S THE K HEAT, AND THAT HAS TO BE REMOVED
MR. DENTON: THEY REPORTED THEIR MEASUREMENTS TO THE
FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME AFTERWARDS. so I THINK WE
U.S., YES.
USE THE TERM TO MEAN THAT THEY NO LONGER PRODUCE
ELECTRICITY, THEY ARE NOT RUNNING AT 3300 MEGAWATTS
Q: AND WHAT ARE THEY -- THOSE ELEMENTS, DO YOU KNOW?
THERMAL; IT'S JUST DOWN TO THE K HEAT LEVEL IN THE FUEL.
MR. DENTON: YES, THOSE PARTICULAR ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN
Q: BUT WITH K HEAT, (INAUDIBLE) -- IT TAKES A LONG
DETECTED. I DON'T HAVE THE MAGNITUDES WITH ME.
TIME TO CHECK.
Q: I THINK WHEN YOU WERE ANSWERING A QUESTION OVER
MR. THOMAS: YES, AND, BUT IT'S NOT NEARLY THE PROBLEM
HERE, WE NEVER QUITE GOT TO THE END OF IT ABOUT WHETHER
THAT IT IS AT FULL POWER, AND THEY ARE EVENTUALLY GOING
THE EMISSIONS WOULD DEMINISH. YOU STARTED TO SAY THAT
TO HAVE TO COPE WITH WHAT YOU DO WITH UNIT THREE IN
(INAUDIBLE).
CASE THERE ARE EQUIPMENT FAILURES.
MR. DENTON: I THINK THE VOLATILE ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN
Q: YOU ARE (INAUDIBLE) INSURING ABOUT THE FACT THAT
DRIVEN OFF, AND ARE LARGELY OUT IN THE ATMOSPHERE BEING
THE ACCIDENT WOULDN'T T HAVE A HEALTH IMPACT IN THE
DISBURSED, BUT THE BURNING IS STILL GOING ON.
UNITED STATES. WHAT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION? CAN YOU
THEREFORE, YOU WOULD CONTINUE TO EVOLVE WHATEVER GASES
GIVE US ANY ESTIMATE OF HOV MANY SOVIET CITIZENS MAY BE
ARE STILL PRESENT IN THE BOTTOM PERHAPS OF THE CORE,
EXPOSED TO RADIATION, DID THEY REALLY TAKE A TOLL IN
AND so I THINK AT A SLOWER RATE, AND PERHAPS AS THE
THE SHORT-RUN OR IN THE LONG-RUN?
BURNING AND THE TEMPERATURE, YOU MIGHT STILL GET
PARTICULATES IN THE SMOKE. so I THINK IT DEFINITELY IS
MR. THOMAS: WE JUST DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT
REDUCED FROM WHAT WOULD HAVE OCCURRED ON THAT VERY
CAN LET US DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS ON THAT KIND OF
FIRST HOUR OR TWO AFTER THE BREACH OF THE BUILDING.
QUESTION AT THIS POINT. ROPEFULLY, OVER THE NEXT
SEVERAL DAYS AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COMES IN, WE
Q: MR. DENTON, COULD YOU DISCUSS CONDITIONS AT THIS
WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU A BETTER ANSWER ON THAT
PLANT SITE? ARE YOU ASSUMING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE
QUESTION. WE JUST DON'T HAVE IT TODAY.
OTHER THREE REACTORS ARE FULLY-MANNED WITH PERSONNEL?
ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT RADIATION BOMBARDMENT MIGHT HAVE
Q: COULD YOU MAKE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGED SOME OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF THE OTHER REACTOR
RADIOACTIVITY RELEASED IN THIS EVENT AND THAT WHICH
PLANTS? I UNDERSTAND THOSE ARE NOT SHIELDED AS THEY
WOULD BE RELEASED THROUGH A NUCLEAR WARHEAD IN A TEST?
ARE IN THE UNITED STATES NOW.
AND ALSO THE AMOUNT OF RADIATION THAT WAS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE PRIOR TO THE '63 TESTBAN TREATY?
GIVE US SOME SENSE -- YOU HAVE HAD THIS UNIQUE
EXPERIENCE OF THREE MILE ISLAND. WHAT'S YOUR RUSSIAN
MR. THOMAS: I DON'T THINK WE'D BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO
COUNTERPART GOING THROUGH RIGHT NOW?
THAT QUESTION TODAY AS I LOOK DOWN ACROSS THIS PANEL.
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I JUST DON'T THINK WE HAVE THIS INFORMATION ON THIS
MR. THOMAS: WE'RE GOING TO TAKE PROBABLY ABOUT THREE
STAGE.
MORE QUESTIONS, IF I COULD. WE HAVE A FOLLOW-UP FOR
HAROLD DENTON.
Q: TO COME BACK TO UNIT THREE AGAIN, BECAUSE I THINK
THAT'S A LITTLE CONFUSING. WE BELIEVE THAT IN UNIT
Q: BACK TO THE ISSUE OF THE SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS.
THREE THEY PROBABLY SUCCEEDED IN GETTING IT OFF FULL
THEY DO HAVE CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS, MR. BUNCH, BUT AS I
POWER AND IN A SEMI-SHUTDOWN STATE, OR WHAT WOULD YOU
WANTED TO ASK YOU, THEY DON'T HAVE, AS MOST OF US
CALL THAT?
UNDERSTAND, BIG, STRONG REINFORCED CONCRETE CONTAINMENT
BUILDINGS. SINCE THEY DO NOT, DO YOU THINK THAT
THAT'S FOR MR. DENTON.
INCREASES THE RISK THAT IF THERE WERE SOME SORT OF
MR. DENTON: DEFINITELY, IT'S BEEN TAKEN OFF THE LINE;
MELTDOWN, THERE COULD BE LARGE RADIATION RELEASES, AND
IT'S NO LONGER PRODUCING ELECTRICITY. THE CONTROL RODS
I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU
ARE IN, AND THEY PROBABLY LEFT IT IN THEIR NORMAL
COOLDOWN PERIOD AND YOU DO HAVE TO COOL THE PLANT
MR. DENTON: WE HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THOSE
FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, UP TO MANY MONTHS BEFORE YOU
PLANTS, BUT I DO KNOW THAT WHEN THE ORIGINAL PRODUCTION
CAN TURN OFF ALL THE COOLING. BUT THE LONGER THE
PLANTS AT HANFORD AND SAVANMAH RIVER WERE SITED, THAT'S
PERIOD, THE LESS COOLING IS NEEDED. so IT WILL REQUIRE
WHY THEY HAD LARGE LAND AREAS. YOU KNOW, THERE'S
COOLING FOR A LONG TIME.
300-400 SQUARE MILES AT EAC# PLACE AND THAT WAS BACK
IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE TECHNOLOGY, SO TO SOME EXTENT,
Q: MR. THOMAS, DO YOU THINK IT WAS IRRESPONSIBLE OF THE
THEY MAY HAVE TRIED TO TRADE DISTANCE FOR CONTAINMENT.
SOVIET UNION NOT TO HAVE ALERTED ITS NEIGHBORS TO THE
BUT I'D REALLY HAVE TO REFER TO DALE -- WE HAVE NO
ACCIDENT EARLIER?
FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF EITMER SAVANNAH RIVER OR
HANFORD-TYPE PLANTS.
MR. THOMAS: I DON'T WANT TO DRAW THAT KIND OF
CONCLUSION. WE'RE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE
Q: BUT YOUR AN EXPERT ONE OF THE WORLD'S EXPERTS IN
NOTIFICATION ISSUE, AND I THINK THAT AS WE GET BETTER
THIS FIELD. BASED ON YOUR EXPERTISE, DO YOU FEEL IF
INFORMATION ABOUT EXACTLY WHEN THE EVENT OCCURRED, WHEN
THERE WERE SOME SORT OF MELTDOWN IN ONE OF THE PLANTS,
NOTIFICATION COULD HAVE BEEN MADE, I THINK WE'LL BE
THAT THERE WOULD BE POTENTIAL FOR LARGE RADIATION
ABLE TO DRAW MORE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THAT CONCERNED; BUT
RELEASE?
WE'RE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THAT ISSUE.
MR. DENTON: THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE THE POTENTIAL IN
YES, SIR.
ANY PLANT, AND IT DEPENDS HOW WELL ENGINEERED AND
DESIGNED THE CONFINEMENT SYSTEM IS, AND I REALLY DON'T
Q: MR. THOMAS, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE UNITED STATES
KNOW THAT SYSTEM. THE SAVANNAH RIVER PLANTS ARE HEAVY
IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS OCCURRED?
WATER-MODERATED, SO THAT'S * MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THOSE PLANTS AND THE RUSSI PLANT.
MR. THOMAS: IN THE UNITED STATES AND I COULD ASK
HAROLD DENTON TO RESPOND TO PART OF THIS -- BUT WE HAVE
MR. THOMAS: OVER HERE.
AN EXTENSIVE SYSTEM FOR BOTH ON-SITE SAFETY AND
OFF-SITE SAFETY. YOU HEARD REFERENCE, FOR INSTANCE, TO
Q: DR. DENTON, I WONDER IF YOU CAN GIVE US AN IDEA OF
THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AMONG FEDERAL AGENCIES. I
WHAT IS GOING TO BE LEFT AT THIS SITE AFTER THIS FIRE
USED TO COORDINATE, FOR INSTANCE, WHEN I WAS THE DEPUTY
IS OUT, WHAT KIND OF PROBLEM THE SOVIETS ARE GOING TO
ADMINISTRATOR AT THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
FACE AT THAT POINT?
AGENCY, THE OFF-SITE RESPONSE AUTHORITIES, AND WE HAVE
AN EXTENSIVE PLAN OF FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH STANDBY
MR. DENTON: I THINK THERE IS HEAVY CONTAMINATION ALL
TEAMS AND 24-HOUR NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS, WITH RAPID
AROUND UNITS THREE AND FOUR, AND I JUST DON'T KNOW
DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIES, FULL BACKUP CAPABILITY,
WHAT, WHETHER THEY WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO OPERATION
INTEGRATED WITH STATE HEALTH OFFICIALS FOR RESPONSE TO
OR NOT.
ANY KIND OF SITUATION THAT WOULD OCCUR.
IT'S OBVIOUSLY A LOT MORE DIFFICULT TO CLEAN UP THAT
AND THAT OFF-SITE RESPONSE IS TIED IN WITH THE ON-SITE
TYPE OF EVENT THAN IT WAS AT TMI WHERE THE RADIATION
SAFETY SYSTEM. YOU HAVE BOTH THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
WAS MORE OR LESS CONFINED, AND YOU RECALL THAT'S TAKEN
WHICH ARE EXTENSIVE, AND THEN YOU HAVE ANY KIND OF
YEARS AND YEARS, WHEN MOST OF THE RADIATION WAS STILL
RESPONSIVE SYSTEMS TO AN EVENT. AND I MAY ASK HAROLD
IN THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL. THIS HAS BEEN
IF HE WOULD RESPOND A LITTLE BIT FROM THE ON-SITE POINT
DISBURSED, NO DOUBT, THROUGHOUT THE UNIT FOUR BUILDINGS
OF VIEW.
AND THE SURROUNDING AREA.
MR. DENTON: AS YOU KNOW, AFTER TMI, WE CHANGED A LOT
MR. THOMAS: FINAL QUESTI RIGHT HERE.
OF THINGS BECAUSE UP TO THAT POINT WE HAD USED THE
DESIGN BASIS EVENT, ASSUMING ACCIDENTS WOULD NOT GET
Q: YES, A QUESTION OF DR. MACHTA: YOU SAY YOUR
ANY WORSE. TODAY PLANTS HAVE HYDROGEN IGNITERS, FOR
WINDSPEEDS AND DIRECTIONS DATA ARE COMING FROM SOVIET
EXAMPLE, JUST TO COPE WITH THE EVOLUTION OF HYDROGEN
SOURCES? IS THAT THE CASE? AND IF so, DO YOU FELL
GAS. THAT'S THE TYPE OF LESSON WE'VE LEARNED.
THOSE SOURCES ARE RELIABLE?
AND I THINK THE MAIN THING IS THE VALUE OF
MR. MACHTA: ENTIRELY. THERE'S NO INDICATION
CONTAINMENT. IN OTHER WORDS, IF YOU HAVE A BIG STRONG
WHATSOEVER THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE
CONTAINMENT, THEN YOU CAN COPE WITH A LARGE NUMBER OF
INFORMATION RECEIVED THROUGH THEM. IT'S THROUGH
EVENTS WITHOUT REALLY GETTING THE PUBLIC AFFECTED.
INTERNATIONAL CHANNELS.
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MR. THOMAS: IT'S A PART OF THE --
LES, YOU MAY WANT TO EXPAND, BUT THERE'S AN ONGOING AND
INTER-ACTIVE PROCESS, AS FAR AS METEORLOGICAL DATA IS
CONCERNED INTERNATIONALLY, UNRELATED TO THIS PARTICULAR
INCIDENT THAT LESTER WAS RELYING ON AND TALKING ABOUT
AS FAR AS METEROLOGICAL INFORMATION IS CONCERNED.
LET ME EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
UPDATE BRIEFING MAY HAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES THAT YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN, AND
ALSO THAT WE WILL PROVIDE UPDATE INFORMATION ON A DAILY
BASIS. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S PUBLIC
INFORMATION OFFICE IS COORDINATING THAT.
THANK YOU.
(THE CONFERENCE CONCLUDED AT L2:00 P.M.) WHITEHEAD
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