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Pipeline – Forced Labor – USSR (2)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Pipeline - Forced Labor - USSR (2)
Box: 31
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
HET 5/18/2005
File Folder
USSR: PIPELINE - FORCED LABOR 2/7
FOIA
F06-114/9
Box Number
31
YARHI-MILO
3104
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10775 PAPER
USSR: CONVICT LABOR ON PIPELINES
1 9/1/1982 B1
10779 CABLE
011514Z SEP 82
1 9/1/1982 B1 B3
D
9/25/2012
F2006-114/9
10776 CABLE
011656Z SEP 82
1 9/1/1982 B1
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
10780 CABLE
152220Z SEP 82
1 9/15/1982 B1 B3
PAR 9/25/2012
F2006-114/9
10777 PAPER
USSR: FORCE LABOR ON PIPELINE
1 9/18/1982 B1 B3
PAR 9/25/2012
F2006-114/9
10781 CABLE
201520Z SEP 82
1 9/20/1982 B1 B3
PAR
9/25/2012
F2006-114/9
10782 CABLE
221508Z SEP 82
2 9/22/1982 B1 B3
PAR 9/25/2012
F2006-114/9
10778 CABLE
232323Z SEP 82
3 9/23/1982 B1
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
R
9/3/82
FILE-
SANCTIONS
VIETNAMESE LABORERS IN THE USSR & EASTERN EUROPE
PiPECiNE
An agreement now exists between Vietnam and the USSR, dating from
March 1981, for the export of Vietnamese labor to the Soviet Union.
Similar agreements exist between Vietnam and several East European
countries. Existence of the agreemnt has been confirmed in recent
Soviet press reports.
Our information on the nature of the program is still very incomplete
and is not internally consistent. Thusfar all is second-hand. What
we do know, however, provides ample ground for concern. The Vietnamese
and Soviet press have described the program as "work-study" or as
"technical training" for Vietnamese workers. It has been claimed that
Vietnamese will be sent to areas of the USSR with favorbale climates
and that Vietnamese will enjoy the same rights and privileges as their
Soviet counterparts. Some reports suggest that participation in the
overseas labor program is viewed as a desirable option by many in
northern Vietnam.
Other reports exist, however, which paint a less benign picture. In
particular, there are many refugee reports (admittedly second-hand)
suggesting that involuntary labor will be drawn from Vietnam's
"re-education camps". Other reports state that "unemployed"
southerners will be sent. One report has said that people in Saigon
are being given the choice of being sent to the USSR, or being sent
out of Saigon to a New Economic Zone, in which they would not be
permitted to pracitice their profession (one can assume that this
would mean an indefinite period of manual labor under the most
primitive conditions).
We do not know enough at present to level hard charges. At the minimum,
however; the circumstances of this program readily lend themselves to
abuse by Soviet authorities, and call for close scrutiny. Some critical
questions are:
-Is there perhaps a two-track program here, with reliable cadre being
sent voluntarily from North Vietnam to desirable factory locations in
Eastern Europe, and şoutherners being sent involuntarily to locations
in Siberia? north, 4040 appear 100 mountain)
-If, as is likely, many or most of the persons concerned will be sent
to construction or other projects in Siberia, would tropical Vietnamese
voluntarily undertake to leave both family and country for a country
with such temperature extremes?
-If "unemployed" southerners are to be sent, are they unemployed because
they have been released from reeducation camps and denied employment?
-Will involuntary Vietnamese labor be used to build the gas pipelines
linking Soviet Siberia with Western Europe?
At the least, some degree of coercion in this program is very likely.
A number of aspects of the program merit our concern: 1) human and
labor rights (what are the conditions under which these Vietnamese will
work? Do they confrom to acceptable international standards? To what
extent is Vietnamese participation coerced?) 2) the pipeline connection
involuntary
CONF IDENT IAL
PIPELINE
3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10776
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
PARIS 9991
DTG: 011656Z SEP 82 PSN: 014205
EOB045
AN010530
TOR: 244/1719Z
CSN:HCE362
LABOR NEEDED IS RECRUITED FROM NEIGHBORING VILLAGES,
AND (4) THEY ARE VERY HIGHLY PAID. TO QUOTE: "I TOLD
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 STER-01 MYER-01 GUHN-01 NAU-01 PIPE-01
THEM THAT SOME OF THE MEDIA WERE CALLING THEM PRISONERS.
RENT-01 SIMS-01 /008 A2
MOST OF THEM LAUGHED, SOME OF THEM WERE ANNOYED: WE
COULD CARE LESS ABOUT REAGAN'S RUMORS. A YOUNG ENGINE
DRIVER SIMPLY RESPONDED THAT HE LOVED HIS WORK, AND
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
WAS PROUD." THE FOLLOWING MONDAY, HUMANITE CARRIED A
SIT: PUBS
PIECE ON PAGE 6, TITLED: "AN AMERICAN VISITS THE GAS
EOB:
PIPELINE," WHICH ATTEMPTS TO CONFIRM THE ARTICLE BY
STREIFF, WITHOUT GIVING THE NAME OF THE AMERICAN
JOURNALIST SIMPLY IDENTIFYING HIM AS BEING FROM
ASSOCIATED PRESS, AND SAYING THAT HE HAD NOT MET ANY
OP IMMED
PRISONERS.
STU3081
DE RUFHER #9991 2441658
3. TO DATE, THIS HAS BEEN THE EXTENT OF PRESS COVERAGE.
0 011656Z SEP 82
AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THE FOCUS HAS BEEN ON THE USG
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
SANCTIONS OF FRENCH FIRMS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE MEASURES
AGAINST OTHER EUROPEAN COMPANIES INVOLVED IN PIPELINE
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3726
CONTRACTS. IF THESE CHARGES ARE VERIFIABLE, IT IS OUR
IMPRESSION THAT THEY WOULD SPARK A LIVELY DEBATE IN THE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2238
FRENCH PRESS ON THE MORALITY OF SUPPORTING SUCH
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 9763
PRACTICES. HEDGES
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1514
BT
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 8552
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2993
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0043
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 9620
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4847
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 6452
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 8889
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 9590
CDR USAJFKCEN FT BRAGG IMMEDIATE
PARIS 29991
USIA FOR EU, PGM; BRUSSELS PASS ALSO USEC, FT BRAGG FOR
LEW PATE
E. 0. 12356: DECL 9/1/88
TAGS: PINT, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR ON PIPELINE
CONSTRUCTION
REF: (A) PARIS 26757, (B) PARIS 26931, (C) PARIS 27333-C
(NOTAL), (D) PARIS 28254, (E) USIA 44653-C
1. POST HAS BEEN REPORTING SIGNIFICANT MEDIA REACTION TO
THIS SUBJECT SINCE THE STORY FIRST BROKE HERE IN FRANCE
IN A FRONTPAGE ARTICLE IN POPULAR, CONSERVATIVE FRANCE-
SOIR ON AUGUST 6, 1982 (REFTEL A). REFTELS B AND D
ALSO REPORTED ON EDITORIALS IN THE FRENCH PRESS ADDRESSING
THIS ISSUE. ON AUGUST 11, 1982, EMBASSY REPORTED (REFTEL
C) ON GOF ACTIONS IN LIGHT OF REVELATIONS MADE BY INTER-
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT
PRESS COVERAGE.
2. RECENT COVERAGE OF THE PIPELINE HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO
THE ISSUE OF SANCTIONS AND VERY LITTLE ATTENTION HAS BEEN
GIVEN TO THE USE OF PRISONERS, POLITICAL OR OTHERWISE,
IN ITS CONSTRUCTION. THE COMMUNIST DAILY, HUMANITE, OF
FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 1982, THE DAY FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCE-
MENT OF USG SANCTIONS OF TWO FRENCH FIRMS, FRONTPAGED A
REPORT FROM ITS SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT TITLED: "OUR
SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT TO THE PIPELINE." GERARD STREIFF,
MOSCOW-BASED CORRESPONDENT, REPORTED THAT THE RUSSIANS
ARE WORKING AT A FASTER RATE TO COMPLETE "THEIR" PIPELINE
THAN THE AMERICANS DID IN ALASKA, AND THAT THEY WISH TO
SHOW THE WORLD HOW THEY WILL MEET "MR. REAGAN'S CHAL-
DECLASSIFIED
LENGE." IN A PARAGRAPH SUBTITLED "REAGAN'S RUMORS"
STREIFF MAINTAINS THAT (1) THERE ARE ONLY 20, 000 MEN
WORKING ON THE PIPELINE, (2) THEY ARE ALL YOUNG, (3) THEY
NL.RF06-114/9#10776 #10776
ARE ALL HIGHLY QUALIFIED SPECIALISTS AND ANY UNSKILLED
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011
CONF IDENT
5
(is coerced labor going to be used to build the Soviet gas
pipelines?), 3) refugee implications (Will the expectation or
the reality of coerced exile to Siberia lead to a new wave of
Vietnamese refugees to Southeast Asia and ultimately the US?)
*Early reports indicated that 60% of the workers' wages would
be deducted to pay Vietnam's Soviet debt. One recent, but
unverified, report has indicated that one-third of their
wages would be retained by Vietnamese workers, one-third
deducted by the Soviet government, and one-third by the
Vietnamese government. The number of workers who will
participate in the program is uncertain, but could total
between 100,000 and 500,000 between now and 1985. Approximately
20-50,000 Vietnamese are reportedly in the USSR and Eastern
Europe at this time. As the program is still relatively new,
the ultimate numbers involved and distribution of personnel
geographically will not be known for some time. The fact that
the program is still in its early stages also accounts in part
for the lack of moreconcrete evidence (as there has not yet
been sufficient time for Vietnamese to go to the USSR, return,
and leave Vietnam for the West).
(someof)
newest reporting indicates that those
who have game -perhaps voluntarily -to
The USSR arein factberg weed on heavy
construction projects, and are boal
disibilusioned with then working
conditions exterent allowed to
unite home freely about their experiences.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
GAS 7/24/02
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
still hund
&
LINITED STATES OF
(U)
VIETNAM: LABOR "EXPORT" TO THE
Vietwan
USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEL
Laborer
BUREAU OF
Summary
INTELLIGENCE
Although differing considerably in details,
available reports make it clear that Vietnam is
AND RESEARCH
sending laborers to the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe for periods of three to six years under the
guise of "labor cooperation" or technical training.
The importation of "guest workers" into the
labor-short USSR and Eastern Europe is not new.
ASSESSMENTS
But the Vietnamese, who have received training in
Soviet bloc countries for many years, had not been
AND
involved so strictly as laborers before 1981.
Estimates of the numbers involved in the new
RESEARCH
Vietnamese program vary: some communist sources
privately project that between 100,000 and 500,000
will be sent abroad by 1985. Many reports say that
a portion of the worker's salary is being withheld
to cover Vietnam's debts, and another part sent
home to increase foreign currency holdings.
Participants apparently consist of "reliable"
northerners and unemployed southerners. Indirect
forms of coercion may have been involved in
recruiting some candidates, but there are also
reports that the program has been popular--a means
to escape depressed conditions in Vietnam. There
is as yet no firsthand evidence to confirm earlier
rumors, reported by refugees, that active dissi-
dents or former reeducation camp inmates are prime
targets for export.
At the end of March, Moscow and Hanoi finally
reacted publicly to Western press reports that the
Vietnamese were essentially "slave" laborers being
1/ Information in this report may be used for
unclassified briefings on an unattributed basis.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Report 413-AR
June 17, 1982
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
1
- ii -
sent mainly to Siberia. Both have continued to claim that the
Vietnamese receive wages and benefits comparable to those in the
host country and work in areas where the weather is suitable.
******
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
GAS
7/2/102
8
"Labor Cooperation" Agreements
Vietnam signed its first public bilateral agreement on "labor
cooperation" in April 1981 with the USSR. A Vietnamese-Czecho-
slovak agreement signed in September followed a proposal made in
the summer to Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach which
was reported in the Prague press. No details of the agreement
were published at the time, however, and subsequent accords were
likewise uninformative. For example, another agreement with the
USSR (November 1981) was described only as being on "labor
cooperation and intensified training of technical workers."
Agreements with Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
were signed in Hanoi in November 1981 and January 1982,
respectively. A Soviet-Vietnamese accord "on the movement of
citizens" between the two countries, signed last July, may have
been intended to handle substantially increased movements of
Vietnamese.
An indication that the current program is qualitatively
different from past vocational training abroad is the fact that
these are independent "labor cooperation" agreements. Previous
training was subsumed under traditional technical, scientific, and
educational exchange accords, even though some of those vocational
trainees may have been little more than common laborers.
Varying Estimates of Numbers Involved
The number of people involved in the export program appears
significantly greater than that of any previous known arrangement
between Vietnam and Soviet bloc states. Communist sources
privately have estimated that between 100,000 and 500,000
Vietnamese workers could be sent to Eastern Europe and the USSR by
1985. Others have claimed that 20,000 to 50,000 already are in
place. A Prague press report said that 14,000 Vietnamese workers
were laboring in Czechoslovakia in addition to 3,000 trainees.
TASS reported that 7,200 Vietnamese workers were in the USSR. A
November 1981 British press report quoted a Vietnamese Embassy
spokesman who said that the number of workers to be sent to the
Soviet bloc under the 1981 agreements might reach 100,000 over the
course of the current five-year (1981-85) plan. This figure is
the same one used privately by some Vietnamese sources as well as
by a pro-Hanoi Vietnamese publication in Paris. The latter,
however, treated the program as simply an expansion of past
vocational training arrangements.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
- 2 -
Purpose: Debt Repayment and Training
"Guest workers" in the USSR and Eastern Europe are not a new
phenomenon. In 1972, for example, Bulgaria signed an agreement--
though never implemented--with Egypt to import Egyptian labor. An
agreement with Yugoslavia in 1973 brought Yugoslav construction
workers to Bulgaria. Bulgaria, among the least developed of the
European members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA), for years has exported labor to the USSR (thousands of
Bulgarians still cut timber in the Komi ASSR), Czechoslovakia, and
East Germany. And in the mid-to-late 1970s, the USSR contracted
for workers from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
and Poland to help build the Orenburg natural gas pipeline (a
CEMA-wide investment project on Soviet territory).
Although the Vietnamese stress the benefits of such "labor
cooperation" in training underskilled workers, an important
motivation for the program probably is repayment of the sub-
stantial debts Hanoi has incurred for imports and developmental
assistance. The vehicle for repayment reportedly is the partial
withholding of the laborers' wages, which, according to many
reports, are comparable to local salaries. Some reports mention a
Vietnamese "tax" which, in fact, may be credited against Hanoi's
debt. Estimates of the ratio vary. Forty percent for the worker
to 60 percent for debt repayment has been mentioned, but other
sources list a third for debt repayment, a third for local use,
and a third to be remitted home. The latter would increase
foreign currency holdings. Consumer goods also may be sent to the
workers' families.
Participation Mixed; Coercion Difficult To Document
Available information on participation in the program comes
almost exclusively from refugee sources, which are often
conflicting. According to this information, workers for the
program are drawn mainly from two categories: northern Vietnamese
considered "reliable," and unemployed southerners. None can take
their families. For northern Vietnamese, the program is evidently
an expansion of previous training arrangements and, according to
some reports, it is popular. Some say that young Vietnamese
choose to go to work in the USSR or Eastern Europe rather than
face unemployment at home, transfer to a new economic zone, or
military conscription, possibly for the Vietnamese occupation army
in Kampuchea. Potential participants prefer assignment in Eastern
Europe rather than the USSR but have no choice.
For participants from the south, the program is more aptly
described as the export of labor. These individuals are drawn
from the large pool of skilled and unskilled unemployed workers
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
- 3 -
for use in a purely labor capacity which, nevertheless, may
provide some training benefits. Several reports say that
southerners with ties to the old regime have been excluded; but
standards may have been relaxed.
Although the possibility exists that the program includes
political dissidents and individuals drawn from reeducation camps,
there is no firm evidence of this. Nor is there information to
substantiate refugee rumors earlier this year that the program is
designed as a punitive measure targeted against such groups.
Because it is highly doubtful that the Soviet Union or any other
bloc country would be willing to accept large numbers of "unreli-
able" workers within its borders, it seems improbable that dissi-
dents or reeducatees would form a significant portion of the
"guest workers."
Nonetheless, some degree of coercion may be involved in
"recruitment" of southern participants for the program. The
extent is difficult to determine, however, because of the scarcity
of good information. The degree of future coercion probably will
be directly related to the strictness of quotas for the program
and the ease with which they can be filled. Vietnamese cadre in
both parts of the country are faced with competing demands for
labor--for the draft as well as for the "New Economic Zones" being
revived. Neither program is popular and may have even less appeal
to segments of the populace than labor abroad.
Vietnamese and Soviet Sensitivity
Both the Vietnamese and the Soviets clearly are sensitive to
press reports that Vietnamese indentured or "slave" laborers are
being sent to the USSR, mainly Siberia. In the past two months
Hanoi and Moscow have publicly--if belatedly--rebutted these
allegations, which have been published occasionally since last
fall. Hanoi first used the anniversary of the April 1981 labor
cooperation agreement with Moscow to claim that the basic aim was
training, in areas where weather conditions were "suitable," and
that the wages and benefits for the Vietnamese were comparable to
those of their Soviet counterparts. At the same time, several
broadcasts admitted that the program benefited the host country as
well. Hanoi has avoided specific figures for the numbers
involved. Thus, Hanoi's Labor Minister spoke only of "thousands"
going to the USSR under the 1981 agreement, with an expansion
envisaged for 1982.
During his recent European tour, Foreign Minister Thach
derided (but did not directly deny) Western reports that the
program was designed to repay Vietnam's debts. Hanoi's
propagandists have not revealed how the worker may dispose of his
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
- 4 -
wages. Sensitivity on this issue is suggested by Hanoi's failure
to report a Soviet statement that remittances could be sent home.
Soviet propagandists treat the program exclusively (and
somewhat patronizingly) as another example of "selfless" aid to
Vietnam, ignoring the benefit of some four to five years' work
that the Vietnamese will provide to a labor-short economy. In his
April 30 TASS interview, Soviet Labor Minister Leonid Kostin
claimed that the 7,200 Vietnamese who had arrived in the USSR over
the past year for "training and work" enjoyed more privileges than
their Soviet counterparts and were assigned to southern districts
compatible with the Vietnamese climate. An Izvestia article
called Western reports on the program fabrications and contrasted
the Vietnamese situation to the "oppressed position of foreign
workers in capitalist countries." Subsequent Soviet propaganda
has sounded similar themes, particularly emphasizing that
favorable working conditions allegedly are enjoyed by the
trainees. But, as with Soviet personnel in Vietnam, they are kept
relatively isolated.
Prepared by Dorothy Avery, x22277
Marc Berkowitz
Approved by Weaver Gim, x21338
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Bankrolling the
Trade?
The Soviet gas pipeline deal with
Vietnamese owe the Soviets some $1.6
Western Europe is often portrayed by
billion in war loans, and exporting la-
its proponents as nothing more than a
bor is one way to repay them.
marriage of convenience, matching
One of the most extensive reports
Soviet energy with European cash.
on the worker-export program is an
WSJ
But now Sen. William Armstrong is
article written for these pages last
3,
calling for hearings on whether it may
March by Doan van Toal, now asso-
also marry Western capital to Soviet
ciated with the Fletcher School. He
slave labor.
cited reports of plans to export some
The possibility is by no means far-
500,000 Vietnamese to Siberia by 1985,
fetched. The Soviet Union already suf-
and that most of them were being cho-
fers from a severe labor shortage,
sen from among those suspected of po-
which has hampered its construction
litical disloyalty. Hanoi saves itself
plans, and the development of its Sibe-
the cost of feeding half a million
rian gas fields will further tax its
mouths and rids itself of dissidents,
available labor pool: For instance, the
while the Soviets get cheap labor.
pipeline planned for Western Europe
We cannot absolutely confirm that
is only one of six which will tap the
these Vietnamese are going to work on
Urengoi field in the harsh terrain of
the Siberian gas pipeline, but Sen.
Northwest Siberia; the total length of
Armstrong does have two letters from
the pipelines will be 20,000 kilometers,
Vietnamese in "re-education camps"
or about four times the width of the
in the South telling of plans to send the
U.S. Where will the Soviet Union get
inmates to Siberia on construction
the labor to complete such a mam-
projects. Could that be the pipeline?
moth project?
The letters don't say. But given the
The Soviets, of course, have a long
Soviet Union's current labor shortage
history of doing massive construction
and its long history of using concen-
with concentration camp labor. The
tration camp labor, it is an obvious
writings of Solzhenitsyn describe the
supposition.
barbarity involved. During the Stalin
era, imprisoned intellectuals and
Will there be moral protests in Eu-
other inmates were forced to build a
rope's streets, we wonder, if it is
wide variety of major construction
learned that slaves are building the
projects from the Moscow-Volga Canal
pipeline? How much will cheap Gulag-
to the famed Moscow subway. One dis-
produced energy add to the cash flow
sident now in the West has films of
of European businesses? Will the Eu-
concentration camp laborers working
ropeans sleep better knowing their
on the Belomor Canal in the 1930s, and
homes are heated by gas arriving
he also found bones buried along the
thanks to Vietnamese chain gangs?
waterway indicating where prisoners
Will the lenders take the attitude ex-
died on the spot.
pressed during the Polish crisis by
These practices were no mere ab-
Thomas Theobold? "Who knows which
erration confined to the Stalin years.
political system works?" the Citibank
The Brezhnev regime, too, employed
international head said. "The only test
concentration camp labor as recently
we care about is: Can they pay their
as the late 1970s in building an exten-
bills?"
sion of the Baikal Amur (BAM) Rail-
These questions are certainly
way near the Chinese border. A defec-
worth asking in Senate hearings, espe-
tor from the MVD-the paramilitary
cially since American cooperation is
police of the Soviet Ministry of Inte-
still needed to expedite the pipeline
rior in charge of running Soviet con-
project. Four European concerns are
centration camps-has said that his
making compressor turbines for the
regiment guarded about 200,000 in-
project under licenses from General
mates working on the railway; his
Electric, and at least three of them
regiment, moreover, was only one of
will need explicit export approvals
six guarding laborers along the route,
from the U.S. Department of Com-
which gives some idea of the magni-
merce. Sen. Armstrong and Sen. Jake
tude of prison labor used.
Garn plan to introduce a sense of the
The suspicion is growing that the
Senate resolution urging President
Soviets. finding their own Gulags in-
Reagan to do all in his power to stop
sufficient to the present task, are
the deal.
going into the slave trade. The best-
So far the administration has been
stocked Gulags in the world are cur-
reluctant to do anything serious to
rently those in Vietnam. And in recent
impede the European plans. But
months there have been repeated re-
surely there is some limit to cynicism.
ports-by UPI, the Economist Foreign
Is Europe, with tacit approval from
Report, L'Express and even China's
the Reagan White House, now about to
France Probes Reports
pressed into slave gangs to work on the
Money Rates
Venez
mammoth project.
Friday. August 6. 1982
Involving Slave Labor
The humanitarian organization has is-
The key U.S. and foreign annual interest rates below
sued a list of political prisoners who, it as-
Gets$
are a guide to general levels but don't always represent
actual transactions.
serted, were forced to work on the pipeline.
PRIME RATE: 15%. The base rate on corporate
loans at large U.S. money center commercial banks.
On Siberian Pipeline
They included dissident psychiatrtst Semyon
A WALL. S
FEDERAL FUNDS: 10% high, 10% low, 10%%
Gluzman and Ukrainian writer Zinovi Kras-
Corp. Ven
near. closing bid, 10% offered. Reserves traded among
commercial banks for overnight use in amounts of $1
sinski.
elan governn
million or more. Source: Mabon. Nugent & Co., N.Y.
Special to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
million, one-y
DISCOUNT RATE: 11%. The charge on loans to
p.
member commercial banks by the New York Federal
PARIS-France said it has instructed its
ch
Reserve Bank.
Canadian Housing Starts
ternational b
Proceeds
CALL MONEY: 12½. The charge on loans to bro-
Moscow embassy to investigate reports that
it-
kers on stock exchange collateral.
COMMERCIAL PAPER placed directly by General
the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western
OTTAWA-Canadian housing starts de-
that CVF ot
clined to a seasonally adjusted annual rate
Europe is being built with slave labor.
loan carries
Motors Acceptance Corp.: 10%% 30 to 149 days: 10%%
n,
150 to 270 days.
of 111,000 in July, off 2.6% from 114,000 in
above the
COMMERCIAL PAPER: High-grade unsecured
The International Association for Human
ig
notes sold through dealers by major corporations in
June, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corp.,
offered rate
a-
multiples of $1,000: 111/0% 30 days: 111/4% 60 days:
Rights, based in West Germany, previously
a government agency, said.
13 11/16.
113/6% 90 davs.
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT: 10% one month;
had warned European countries involved in
The July figure was the lowest level of
Rosenthal
11% two months; 11.40% three months; 12½ six
the controversial project that tens of thou-
housing starts since last October when the
is the lead n
months: 121/4% one year. Typical rates paid by major
e
banks on new issues of negotiable C.D.'s. usually on
sands of Soviet political prisoners had been
annual rate slumped to 105,000.
financial Inst
or
amounts of $1 million and more. The minimum unit
is $100.000.
BANKERS ACCEPTANCES: 10.90% 30 days; 11.10%
d
60 days: 11.20% 90 days: 11.75% 120 days: 11.95% 150
days: 11.95% 180 days. Negotiable, bank-backed busi-
ness credit instruments typically financing an Import
order.
EURODOLLARS: 117/6% to 113/6% one month;
S
12 5/16% to 12 3/16% two months: 12 11/16% to 12 9/16%
three months: 133/16% to 13 1/16% four months:
This announcement is neither an offer
P
139/16% to 13 7/16% five months: 13 15/16% to
1.
13 13/16% six months. The rates paid on U.S. dollar de-
posits in banks in London. The higher rate for each ma-
turity is LIBOR, the London Interbank offered rate.
FOREIGN PRIME RATES: Canada 17%: Germany
111/2%; Japan 6.35%: Switzerland 7%; Britain 111/2%.
These rate indications aren't directly comparable; lend-
ing practices vary widely by location. Source: Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co.
TREASURY BILLS: Results of the Monday, August
2 1982, auction of short-term U.S. government bills.
sold at a discount from face value in units of $10,000 to
$1 million: 9.633% 13 weeks; 10.671% 26 weeks.
MERRILL" LYNCH READY ASSETS TRUST:
15.48%. Annualized average rate of return after ex-
penses for the past 30 days: not a-forecast of future re-
turns.
Moody's Cuts Ratings
NCNB
For Zenith Radio Corp.,
Corporation
N
Rexnord and GTE Unit
Bya WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter
$50,000,000
NEW YORK-Moody's Investors Service
Inc. lowered ratings on securities of three
With Warrants to Purchase 2,7
concerns, Zenith Radio Corp., Rexnord Inc.
and General Telephone Co. of California, a
unit of GTE Corp.
Each Unit consists of one 73/4% De
Moody's, a subsidiary of Dun & Brad-
street Corp., cut Zenith's commercial paper
Warrants for the pur
rating to Prime 3 from Prime 2, and the rat-
Debentures and Warr:
ing on its convertible debentures to Ba-2
may not be exerciser
from Ba-1. The credit rating agency attrib-
determined by the Corporation wit
uted the move to "a deteriorating financial
condition. as evidenced by increased debt
Each Warrant entitle
levels and recent operating losses."
The Glenview, III., maker of television
Common Stock at,a
sets. radios and other electronic products
had a loss of $4.1 million in the second quar-
The Debe
ter. compared with earnings of $2.1 million,
may b.
or 11 cents a share, a year earlier. Short-
term debt rose to $138 million as of June 30
from $75 million March 31.
A Zenith spokesman said that adequate
14
nfidential
Foreign Report
blished by The Economist Newspaper Limited
St James's Street, London SWIA 1HG
15 September 17, 1981
ntents
uest workers" in the Soviet Union
effect of a nuclear holocaust
engthening the "Portuguese triangle"
uiet hand to Somoza's men
geria runs short of cash
wing crisis for Marcos
niers
Guest workers" in the Soviet Union
: secretary-general of Vietram's Communist party, Le Duan, and the deputy
ne minister, To Huu, visited Moscow last week. They met President Brezhnev
other Soviet leaders and discussed their growing economic difficulties, including
high cost of supporting an army of over 1m men, one fifth of them based in
nbodia. Vietnam is increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union.
e Duan informed the Russians that the monthly food ration has dropped from 13
S of rice to eight kilos of rice, sweet potatoes or maize. For meat, 100 grams is the
athly norm. One kilo of meat of the black market costs about two weeks' wages.
rezhnev promised Le Duan to increase Soviet economic support as well as
tary aid to Vietnam. Within the next five years the Russians will support 40 more
istrial projects and will intensify oil exploration. The leaders may also have talked
at a new means by which the Vietnamese government is planning to offset its
sive debts to the Soviet block: the provision of large:numbers of Vietnamese
est workers".
stimates of numbers vary, but authoritative east European sources say that up to
000 Vietnamese may work in eastern Europe between 1981 and 1985. Most are
ined for the Soviet Union, where they will live in segregated communities with
contact with the local population. This scheme, quite separate from the training
arty cadres, was hatched at the 34th session of the Communist world's trade
ping Comecon in Prague last year. The Vietnamese workers are due to receive
of their wages in local currency and the remaining 60% would be credited
nst Vietnam's trading debts with the Comecon countries.
nce the Vietnamese cannot afford to send skilled labour or technicians, the "guest
ters" are unskilled labourers who are expected to work in remote development
ects in Siberia and elsewhere. According to official Soviet statements, there were
nd 2m unfilled job vacancies in the Soviet Union last November and Brezhnev
said that up to 400,000 additional workers will be needed in the next few years to
1
is
evelop new oil and gas fields in western Siberia.]
This is the background for the Soviet and Vietnamese decision in July to sign an
greement "on the movement of citizens of Vietnam and the Soviet Union between
he two countries". Scheduled air services from Hanoi to Prague began in June. A
egular service from Hanoi to Sofia will start in October. Since some 15,000
Vietnamese are expected to travel to Bulgaria for periods of between three and five
ears from 1981 to 1985, the new air service can expect to be busy. There are already
egular flights between Hanoi and Moscow.
The Comecon countries have struck a hard bargain but the Vietnamese had little
hoice. Indentured labour will help to offset the country's debts and reduce
memployment, which the chairman of the state planning commission, Nguyen Lam,
dmitted in February was around Im. The total external debt, according to
previously unpublished Vietnamese government figures, is now S3 billion of which
ome $1.4 billion is in convertible currencies and $1.6 billion is in non-convertible
urrencies like roubles. Debt servicing cost S25m in 1976 and has grown to about
240m this year. In 1980, debt servicing amounted to 57% of Vietnamese exports.
The Soviet Union pumps the equivalent of S6m 2 day into Vietnam's economy but
: is tied to the provision of Soviet goods and services. Soviet wool arrives in Hanoi for
he manufacture of carpets which are exported back to the Soviet Union. Russian
nfluence over the Vietnamese economy is growing steadily.
JT
Soviets defend 'new form of cooperation' -
Vietnamese workers in USSR
By Ned Tewko
The Initial Sovlet statement came In the
being credited against Vietnam's debt to Mos-
Staff correspondent of
form of a lengthy dispatch from the official
cow. The Tass report does not tackle this Is-
The Christian Sclence Monitor
news agency Tass, marking-the first "annl-
sue directly. It says that the "Vielnamese
Moscow
versary" of an agreement not previously pub:
citizens, at their discretion, can remit part of
The Savlet Union, a year after the fact, has
licized. The accord Is termed a "new form of
their earnings for their familiès at home."
announced a "governmental agreement"
cooperation In the sphere of training skilled
Estimates of the Victnamese debt to Mos-
bringing thousands of Vlelnamese civillans to
cadres for the Socialist Republic of Vlet-
cow vary. But official figures for what
this country for "training and work."
nam." In the past year, 7,000 Victnamese are
amounts to one form of Spviet subsidy for
The. Vietnamese, according to the Soviet
sald to have arrived here under the terms of
Vietnam's troubled economy - the states'
report, are to stay for periods of "up la live
the agreement.
trade relationship - show a Vietnamese dell-
years" - the first year for language and Ip.
"In accordance with the wishes" of the
cit for 1981 of some 560 million rubles. At offi-
bor training. and the remainder on the Job.
Vietnamese government, the Sovlet account
clal hard-currency exchange rates, this would
The Soviets' April 30 disclosure of the ac-
says, most of the Vietnamese are sent to "ma-
equal about $800 million.
cord followed foreign reports that Vielnam, In
chine bullding enterptises, the chemical and
A US congressional report esimates that
economic crisis, was exporting labor to help
textile Industries, (and) projects of Irrigation
1981 Soviet hard-currency subsidles to Vict-
dent its enormous state debt to the Sovlet
and land reclamation."
nam totaled slightly more than $1 billion.
Union. The reports suggested that Vietnam-
The Sovlet report seems almed partly at
Given the scale of subsidy Involved, the
ese workers could also help the Sovlet Unlon
dispelling the Image created by some foreign
presence of 7,000 Vielnamese workers here
case a shortage of damestic labor In some sec-
reports of difficult working conditions for the
could involve, at most, a token repayment, In
tors of the economy.
Vietnamese.
the view of diplomats.
Moscow's version does not explicitly re-
Countering suggestions that many of the
The Sqviets tend to avoid any public sug-
fute any of this, but portrays the Sovlets in the
Vietnamese are doing battle with the wilds of
gestlon of displeasure at the size of transfers
role of selfless, benefactors, helping train
Siberia, Tass says: "Taking into consider-
made to states like Vietnam. Laos. or Cuba.
Vietnamese. and taking scrupulously good
atton the Victnamese climate, young people
Yet one hint of possible Soviet uneaslness
care of them while they are here.
from Vletnam are sent mainly to southern
came when President Brezhnev coupled a re-
(A second Soviet mention of the agree-
districts of the European part of the USSR."
cent pledge of further aid to Laos with a call
ment, on the evening of May 3 In the govern-
The Tass dispatch quotes a Sovlet official
for more timely and extensive Implementa-
ment newspaper Izvestia, went further,
as saying the Vietnamese get the same pay
tion of existing aid projects.
branding as "slander" Western reports that
and benefits as Soviet workers. and eyen
the accord was part of Vietnamese debt pay-
"vouchers for rest homes,
free medical
ment. Izvestia did not address suggestions
care, and state social Insurance benefits."
that the Vietnamese workers might be meant
According to the foreign news reports,
to help alleviate shortages of Sovlet labor.)
part of the Vietnamese workers' earnings Is
VIETNAM
not have the right to dispose of their entire
salaries - part of which may be retained
by the Soviet Union as repayment of Viet-
Now, the 'flot' people
namese debt. Interestingly. the Vietnam
News Agency. which published excerpts
from the Tass article, omitted the refer-
Vietnam feels obliged to reply to allegations that it is exporting
ence to remittances.
'slave labour' to the Soviet Union, but doubts remain
sourçes. who declined to be iden-
tified, told the REVIEW that the export of
labour to the Soviet Union was aimed
By Nayan Chanda
principally at solving the unemployment
S
tung by Western allegations of Viet-
training Vietnamese workers "in such,
problem, earning foreign exchange for the
namese "slave labour" being sent to
branches and jobs as decided by the Viet-
country and at the same time enhancing
the Soyiet Union to repay debts, the Viet-
namese side. In other-words, Vietnam
the technical skills of Vietnam's work-
namese and Soviet media have produced
was not simply providing labour for facto-
force. The sources said that despite the Iz-
some details of a hitherto unpublicised la-
ries where it was needed.
vestia claim of regular wages Vietnamese
bour cooperation agreement. But these
Vietnamese reports were followed by
trainees received only board lodging clo-
defensive accounts do not tell the full story
an article in the Soviet daily Izvestia and a
thing and a small amount of pocket money
behind Vietnam's new policy of manpow-
Tass newsagency interview on the subject
for the first three years Then the workers
er export.
of Vietnamese labour in the Soviet Union.
are allowed a home leave before returning
A recent stream of probably well-coor-
The Izvestia article said that 7,000 Viet-
to work for three more years on full
dinated articles from Vietnamese and So-
namese students were being trained in fac-
wages. The sources said that part of the
viet newsagencies and newspapers admit
tories in the Soviet Union for a year and
wages would be taken by the Vietnamese
that thousands of young Vietnamese men
they were earning normal Soviet wages.
Government, but they claimed not- to
and women have gone to the Soviet Union
The article stressed that the Vietnamese
know the exact percentage, or to what use
to be trained, but they deny there is any
enjoyed "all rights and freedoms provided
the rouble earnings would be put by the
exploitation involved. These denials come
by Soviet law" and received housing and
government. Sources, however, pointed
after a spate of stories originating from
other facilities similar to those granted to
out that the Philippine Government re-
refugees that unwanted Vietnamese have
Soviet workers. The Tass article, how-
tains 40% of the earnings of Filipino
been sent to Siberia and other places in the
workers abroad. It was
labour-short Soviet Union to help repay
clearly implied that it
Hanoi's massive debt to Moscow. Viet-
would be natural for the
nam's total outstanding debt in non-con-
Vietnamese Government
vertible currencies such as roubles was
to retain part of the wages
US$1.6 billion in 1981 a major part of it
that its citizens earned
owed to the Soviet Union.
abroad for the construc-
Observers think that the sudden atten-
tion of socialism.
tion shown by the Vietnamese media to
Sources laughed at the
what some Vietnamese émigrés call "flot
suggestion in some foreign
people" (because they are sent to the So-
press stories that the Viet-
viet Union aboard the Soviet airline Aero-
namese workers may be
flot) is designed not only to respond to
sent to the Soviet Union
critical foreign press reports but also to
against their wishes.
reassure people in Vietnam about the na-
"Everybody wants to go
ture of the relationship with Moscow.
abroad, get a job, buy
Vietnam's Minister of Labour, Dao Thien
something and send mo-
Thi, thought it necessary to write a piece
ney home," said one.
in the party daily Nhan Dan on April 5
Vietnamese electrician with Soviet colleague:
NOVOSTI AGENCY
While admitting that the
stressing that the labour cooperation
guest worker or wage slave?
pocket money received by
developed with the Soviet Union since
workers in their first three
early 1981 is actually in Vietnam's own in-
ever, said that the Vietnamese spent one
years was small, the sources said that
terests. Such cooperation, he said, "will
year in training and four at work-a point
thrifty Vietnamese can still save and send
ensure the basic and advanced training of
not mentioned by Izvestia. More curious-
small gifts to their needy families. In fact,
many skilled workers for Vietnam, en-
ly, Thi said in his article that the Viet-
a recent article in a Hanoi daily, Hanoi
hance the quality of such training, prolong
namese workers will receive vocational
Moi, claimed that there are more appli-
the time for learning skills through actual
training and improve their skills "over a
cants for work in socialist countries than
labour and broaden the range of trades
period of five to six years."
there are vacancies. The newspaper indi-
and professions as required by Vietnam's
cated that being sent to work in the social-
socialist construction.
W
hile Izvestia said the Vietnamese were
ist countries- Vietnam reportedly has la-
In an obvious allusion to reports about
working in areas with a suitable cli-
bour-supply agreements with the Soviet
Vietnamese being sent to the frozen
mate, the Tass article left open the possi-
Union, East Germany, Bulgaria and Cze-
wilderness of Siberia, Thi said the Vietna-
bility that a small proportion of the Viet-
choslovakia - - is clearly a privilege.
mese were working in localities with "suit-
namese workers was stationed in regions
According to Hanoi sources, the total
able weather conditions" and named cities
with a harsh climate. It said that the "great
number of Vietnamese workers now in the
in the south-central region of the Soviet
part of them [Vietnamese workers] have
Soviet bloc countries is 50,000 and in the
Union such as Astrakhan, Volgograd,
been sent to the south European part of
next four years the number is expected to
Rostov and Zhdanov. He also stressed
the Soviet Union where the food and cli-
double. While the number is significantly
that "the Soviet Union gives equal treat-
mate better suit them." The article also
higher and the arrangement is little more
ment to Vietnamese and Soviet workers.
mentioned that some Vietnamese were in-
honestly called labour cooperation, des-
Vietnamese workers enjoy the same rights
volved in irrigation and land-reclamation.
patching Vietnamese trainee workers to
and interests as their Soviet colleagues in
The Tass article also claimed that the
the Soviet bloc countries for long stints is
the same job with regard to wages, social
Vietnamese "at their discretion can remit
nothing new. As early as 1967 there were
welfare and insurance." A Hanoi Radio
part of their earnings to their families at
6,000 Vietnamese workers in the Soviet
broadcast on the same subject a week later
home." This cryptic reference to limited
Union supposedly for vocational training
also claimed that the labour cooperation
remittance has been interpreted by some
but in fact providing cheap labour for So-
agreement involved the Soviet Union
observers as indication that workers do
viet factories. Very often the skills they
However, with the signing of Labour
operation agreements with the Soviet bloc
countries last year. Hanoi is clearly trying
The masquerade is over
to regularise and expand the existing ar-
rangement that went under the heading of
Mahathir makes it clear that if the Cambodian resistance groups
vocational training. In early 1977 Vietnam
wish to meet in Malaysia, they must agree to agree
promulgated a foreign investment code
which. Hanoi planners hoped. would lure
Western investors into Vietnam to make
By John McBeth
use of the country's abundant labour and
Bangkok: The formation of a coalition of
Sources close to the KPNLF say Sann
natural resources. Developments in Viet-
anti-Vietnamese Cambodian resistance
has softened his position significantly over
nam's foreign relations and economic fac-
groups still hangs in the balance. but one
the past two months and now seems com-
tors have since dashed those hopes. Insuf-
thing is clear: if the three sides do decide
mitted to the inevitability of a coalition.
ficient Soviet assistance in developing in-
to attend an expected tripartite confer-
despite the distaste he and most of his fol-
dustry has also made it impossible rapidly
ence in Kuala Lumpur. they will have to
lowers feel for a working relationship with
to absorb Vietnam's growing army of over
produce a concrete outcome.
the Khmer Rouge. Sann and Khmer
a million-unemployed.
In making the Malaysian capital availa-
Rouge leader Khieu Samphan have met at
As Hanoi officials point out. many
ble as a venue for such a conference.
least once on the Thai-Cambodian border
Third World countries - South Korea.
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Mahathir Mo-
since the KPNLF president returned from
the Philippines. Thailand and even China
hamad will have it no other way. "If they
talks in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur,
- are trying to solve their unemployment
want to go to Kuala Lumpur. it must be ac-
where he pronounced himself ready to
problems by exporting labour. China is
tually to sign an agreement,' an Asean dip-
make a further attempt to form a joint pol-
currently estimated to have 13,000
lomatic source told the REVIEW. "Malay-
itical force.
workers abroad. mainly in the Middle
sia won't be placed in the position of act-
Thai Foreign Ministry sources say there
East. The main difference, of course, is that
ing as a forum for another round of bicker-
have been subsequent contacts between
Chinese workers receive full wages, part
ing and Idon't think anyone wants a re-
the two sides at lower levels. "We've all
of which is then taken by the government,
peat of that kind of masquerade. An un-
been optimistic because the three factions
while the Vietnamese provide free labour
derstanding has to be reached before they
see the importance of getting the Vietna-
for three vears before earning wages.
go to the conference table."
mese out of Cambodia," said one official.
Mahathir's no-nonsense attitude is ob-
I think the optimism comes from the fact
Ton Long writes from Washington:
viously born of Thailand's bitter expe-
that Son Sann has been more forthcom-
A labour cooperation agreement similar
rience last year when the Khmer Rouge.
ing."
to the one with the Soviet: Union exists
former premier Son Sann's Khmer Peo-
with Czechoslovakia. which reportedly
ple's National Liberation Front (KPNLF)
employs about 14,000 Vietnamese.
W
hat may be agreed is still unclear,
and the Moulinaka faction led by former
though current signs point to a vague
Several anti-communist Vietnamese
head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk
compromise between the loose coali-
groups abroad have rushed to condemn
failed to reach an accord after a series of
tion formula proposed by Singapore and
the sending of Vietnamese to work in So-
nine often-vitriolic ad hoc committee ses-
the Khmer Rouge's insistence on equal
viet-bloc countries. They maintain that
sions
power-sharing and decision-making
the Vietnamese Government is trying by
The date for a Kuala Lumpur resistance
through consensus on important issues —
this method to get rid of dissidents.
summit has been variously given as late
presumably those to do with military and
But as some analysts point out. the
this month or early June: in itself a reflec-
foreign-policy matters.
charge blithely ignores a crucial factor: the
tion of the renewed optimism within
The most common prediction appears
Soviet Union and its allies would never ac-
Asean. that an agreement is in sight. If
to be a coalition led by a titular president
cept troublesome elements from Viet-
there is a deadline, it is June 14, the open-
or head of state (Sihanouk), a prime min-
nam. much less allow them to live in their
ing day of the annual Asean foreign minis-
ister (Sann) and a deputy prime minister
society and work in their factories.
ters' conference.
(Samphan) and comprising a nine-man
Dacca's first oasis of luxury
Come experience the opulent
Sonargaon. With 350 thor-
oughly contemporary guest-
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lobby, dramatic restaurants
and a state-of-the-art executive
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hotel
G.P.O. Box 3595
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Telex: 642426
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FAE EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
MAY 14 '982
29
DRAFT
(5TH DRAFT)
9/1/82?
PIPEZINE
SOVIET PIPELINE
9/9
In his Christmas message in support of the Polish people
on December 23, 1981, President Reagan announced, under the
authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, that he was
applying limited economic sanctions against the Polish military
government and that these sanctions would be gradually increased
unless substantive progress was made in restoring the internationally
guaranteed rights of the Polish people. The President specifically
called for three reforms: freedom for "those in arbitrary detention
(the lifting of) martial law, and (the restoration of) the
internationally recognized rights of the Polish people to free
speech and association."
The President also announced that "we're proposing to our
allies the further restriction of high technology exports to
Poland." At the same time, President Reagan informed President
Brezhnev that unless the Soviet Union permitted the restoration
of basic human rights in Poland guaranteed by the Helsinki Accords,
"the United States will have no choice but to take further concrete
political and economic measures affecting our relationship."
On December 29, 1981, President Reagan further declared that
he had not received a satisfactory reply from the Soviets and
therefore was implementing his pledge to take additional measures.
Limited U.S. economic sanctions were imposed upon the Soviet Union,
including a suspension of export licenses for high technology
and oil and gas equipment. Noting that he will be watching events
20
2
in Poland closely, President Reagan added: "Further steps may
be necessary, and I will be prepared to take them. American
decisions will be determined by Soviet actions."
After repeated warnings to the Soviet Union and after
extensive consultations with our European and Japanese allies,
President Reagan on June 18, 1982, again reviewed the sanctions
on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union
which were originally imposed on December 29, 1981 and announced
his decision "to extend these sanctions through adoption of new
regulations to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of US
companies abroad, as well as equipment produced abroad under
licenses issued by US companies." The President has made it
clear that he regards this issue as "a matter of principle."
The foreign companies involved all knew in advance that
this kind of action might be taken at some point in the future.
All of them had voluntarily signed contracts placing themselves
under US export controls insofar as they received US licenses
to produce certain technological products.
At a subsequent press conference, President Reagan explained:
We tried to persuade our allies not to go forward with the
pipeline for two reasons. One, we think there is a risk that
if they become industrially dependent on the Soviet Union
for energy -- and all the valves are on the Soviet side
of the border -- that the Soviet Union can engage in a
kind of blackmail when that happens.
21
3
(Secondly) the Soviet Union is very hard pressed
financially and economically today They (have) poured
all of their resources into the most massive military
build-up the world has ever seen. And the Soviet
Union, now hard pressed for cash because of its own
actions, can perceive anywhere from 10 to 12 billion
dollars a year in hard cash payments in return for the energy
when the pipeline is completed -- which I assume, if they
continue the present policies, would be used to arm further
against the rest of us and thus force more cost for
armaments for the rest of the world.
The Issue: Should the West subsidize the Siberian Pipeline?
The underlying issue is whether the West should subsidize
the building of a Siberian pipeline which will enable the
Soviet Union, in effect, to transform natural gas into tanks
and guns, thus increasing the risk of war and the costs of
Western defense.
The US Government believes that, generally speaking, trade
with the Soviet bloc should be governed by market principles.
Since technology determines what can be done and interest rates
determine what will be done, it is important that such trans-
actions be made at market rates of interest, without subsidies
from taxpayers either here or abroad. Otherwise there is no
way of knowing whether or not any particular transaction ought to
be concluded. Subsidies (including government guaranteed loans
at below-market rates of interest) divert scarce resources
from more worthwhile activities which would better serve the needs
of more people.
22
4
The Siberian Pipeline: Origins and Financing
In the last decade Soviet energy exports have become more
and more important to the economies of both the Soviet Union
and Western Europe.
West European imports of Soviet oil increased more than 50
percent in the 1970s -- from 680,000 barrels a day in 1971 to
just over a million barrels a day in 1979. Imports of Soviet
natural gas increased ten-fold, from 200 million cubic feet
a day in 1972 to 2.2 billion cubic feet a day in 1980.
Soviet energy exports have therefore become critical to
their sagging economy. In 1980, oil sales accounted for two-
thirds of all foreign exchange dollars earned by the Soviets.
Oil sales now account for 70 percent of all Soviet trade outside
of their own bloc.
Western countries, especially European but also the United
States and Japan, have been very helpful to the Soviet economy.
They have enabled the Soviets to earn badly needed hard currency
by assisting in the financing and in supplying equipment needed
to exploit Soviet energy, making up for Soviet weaknesses in
energy technology. The proposed Siberian Pipeline is the latest
and largest example of this recent historical trend.
Soviet officials, possibly over-enthusiastically, have described
the pipeline as the "largest project in recorded history." It
is certainly their largest East-West trade agreement in history
23
5
The line was planned to originate in the undeveloped Yamburg
fields, in the Yamal region of Western Siberia. If the pipeline
is eventually built, the route is likely to be to the Czechoslovak
border where it will continue through an existing trunkline to
Bavaria, fanning out to the Western European customers. The
proposed 3600 mile pipeline would send an estimated 40 billion
cubic meters of natural gas worth between $10 and $12 billion
each year; if other lines are built supplies could later rise to
70 billion cubic meters or higher.
The Soviets originally planned to start the flow of gas in
1984 and to finish the project in 1986, but it is now unlikely
that this will happen on schedule, despite Soviet claims to the
contrary.
The financing of the pipeline is being arranged by a consortium
of European firms who will provide the Soviet Union with low
interest loans (hovering around 7.8 percent -- about half the
market rate); without this below-market finanancing it is unlikely
the pipeline will ever be built. The Soviets will purchase from
the West approximately $10 to $15 billion worth of equipment,
materials and technology. Defenders of the pipeline argue that the
Soviets will provide the gas at below market prices and will pay
higher prices for the equipment and thus, in reality, will pay
market interest rates. The truth, however, is that the project
consists of such an intricate maze of open subsidies and hidden
subsidies that no one can say with any certainty what the real
prices of the Soviet purchases are or will be.
6
The piepline project was first conceived after the OPEC
price jump at a time when most observers believed that it was
essential for Western Europe to diversify its sources of
energy. At that period, the energy reserves in the North Sea
were throught to be much less than present estimates. With recent
changes in the international energy markets, it is now likely that
the West Europeans could secure cheaper and more reliable energy
supplies elsewhere. Basically, it is very difficult to forecast
what prices or economic (and political) are likely to be even a
few years into the future.
What is certain at present is that the project is being
financed with heavy assistance from Western European taxpayers
through government subsidies and government guarantees of loans.
Because of the great uncertainties involved (and because of the
Soviet bloc's towering unpaid debt, now held by worried Western
banks) the fact that the West German government, through its
insurance agency, Hermes Credit Insurance Company, is guaranteeing
85 percent of the $1.6 billion in commercial credits pledged by
the West German banking consortium is significant. Would the
Western banks have made this loan at such a low interest rate
without the government guarantee?
The French government is underwriting its share of the package
in a more straightforward manner -- government loans at 7.8 percent.
West European taxpayers are more and more having second thoughts
on the effects on their own long-range economic and political
futures of "investment" in the planned pipeline. The results
7
As Scott Thompson, Associate Director for Programs of the
International Communication Agency, has recently pointed out:
"In purely economic terms, does it make sense for Western
governments to borrow in the capital markets at 15 percent and
re-lend to the Soviet Union at half that price? Much has
been made in Europe of the effect of U.S. budget deficits in
contributing to high world interest rates. But, does not massive
lending to the Soviet Union at subsidized rates also reduce the
supply of available capital and help drive up interest rates?
Enlightened leadership must look at the long-term economic
costs to the West of subsidizing the Soviet economy, not just
the immediate benefits of such actions
Reviewing the results
of the past decade, can it not be argued that expanded East-
West economic relations have done more to induce Western restraint
in the face of Soviet misconduct than to discourage Soviet
misbehavior?"
It is becoming increasingly clear tht such arguments are
beginning to have an effect on West European public opinion.
Despite the views of the governments and of those powerful interests
who will benefit directly if the pipeline is built it is fair
to say that European taxpayers are divided in their opinions
on the pipeline.
According to recent polls, in 1981, 18 percent of the British
and 20 percent of the West Germans believed that increasing
energy dependence on the Soviet Union would make their nations
political the USSR. Bv April of
8
1982, 32 percent of the British and 32 percent of the West
Germans shared this concern.
When asked if they believe their own country should make
special concessions, such as low interest loans and credits,
in order to promote trade with the Soviet Union, only 10 percent
of Britons and 17 percent of West Germans approved of such a
policy.
In addition, 60 percent of Britons and 37 percent of West
Germans think that their own countries would be better off if they
coordinated trade policy more closely with the United States,
even if it means trading less with the Soviet Union.
Judging by these surveys, there is at least a substantial
amount of support among West European taxpayers for United States
policy toward the Soviet Union on this issue.
What Will Happen IF The Pipeline Is Built?
The US Government anticipated three major negative effects
if the Pipeline is built. As President Reagan has pointed out,
building the Pipeline with Western subsidies will:
O Send the wrong signal to the Soviets, the Poles and the
whole world. People will think that the West is not being
serious about human rights.
27
9
O Result in the transfer from West to East of large sums
of badly needed hard currency to the Soviets, with which
they can buy high technology from the West, thus driving
up the cost of allied defense.
o Ensure that Soviet energy will become more important to
the West European economy, leaving our allies more dependent
on the Soviet Union and creating opportunities for the
Soviets to exercise increased political pressure.
Despite repeated expressions of concern by all the NATO
nations (including the United States) and indeed, most of the
world, the violations of internationally guaranteed human rights
in Poland have been diminished only slightly.
Specifically, on January 11, 1982, the NATO allies agreed
to impose economic sanctions against the Polish military regime
and the USSR as each government saw fit; all agreed that no
government would interfere with the effectiveness of any other
government's sanctions until three conditions in Poland were
fulfilled: (1) the end of martial law; (2) the release of political
prisoners; and (3) the resumption of a genuine dialogue between
the State, the church, and eventually Solidarity.
28
9 A
Before sanctions were expanded on June 18, 1982,
President Reagan and other senior administration officials
held extensive consultations with the allies. He stressed
that all Western governments were united in their opposition
to events in Poland. At some point it would become
necessary to match words with deeds. Unless we did so, the
Soviets would rightly view the West as hypocritical
and more concerned with business-as-usual than with the
moral principle of internationally - guaranteed human
rights and the freedom of an opressed European people.
Those who argued for the policy of detente in the 1970's
stressed that increased trade and interdependence with the
Soviet Union would further the cause of human rights in
Eastern Europe-- including the USSR itself. As events have
amply demonstrated, however, the opposite result has
taken place. Despite the crowning achievement of the detente
policy-- the Helsinki Accords signed by all the nations of
Europe-- the Soviet Union is as oppressive now as it has
ever been.
29
10
As Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Policy, has: recently noted:
The notion that an increased volume of trade would lead
to a lessening of political conflict and diminished
Soviet emphasis on military power has been disproved.
Political conflict has continued, largely unabated.
The growth of Soviet military power has been relentless.
Afghanistan has been invaded and continues to be occupied
by Russian troops. Poland struggles to find a workable
internal political order in the shadow of Soviet, Czech,
Hungarian and East German divisions. A Yellow rain of
toxic agents has descended on hapless tribesmen in South-
east Asia
It is simply no longer convincing to
suggest that trade will moderate Soviet behavior or deflect
it from its build-up of military power. If anything, the
reverse has proven true: increased trade has enabled the
Soviet Union to accomplish its military expansion faster
and at a lower cost as Western technology and industrial
assistance has become increasingly available.
Taking into account all these considerations, the President
decided that moral leadership was required. The Russians respect
consistency and firmness; on the issue of commerce versus liberty
they know where the United States stands and so does the rest
of the world.
Looking beyond the mutually agreed-upon sanctions, however,
there is an underlying reason why the Weat should be gravely
concerned about the pipeline -- a reason which would remain valid
even if Poland should become a model of democracy tomorrow.
As we have seen, the pipeline will enable the Soviets to
convert natural gas into tanks and guns -- with the help of the
West.
30
11
Both the below-market-cost finance packaging and the
expected hard currency income from the sale of gas will free
scarce Soviet capital for more military spending. The Soviets
will also be able to use this Western money to buy critically
needed high technology for their military-industrial complex
which, in turn, will save them billions in research and development
costs.
As Lawrence Brady, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Trade Administration, has pointed out: "One of the first actions
taken by President Reagan when he assumed office was to request
the Central Intelligence Agency to assess ways in which the
USSR was legally and illegally acquiring sophisticated Western
technology and applying it to its military industrial base. The
results of this study
provide a shocking picture of the
degree to which the West's security has been eroded by technology
transfers to the Warsaw Pact countries. In industry after
industry in the USSR -- computers, microprocessors, and semi-
conductors -- Western equipment, design and manufacturing processes
have enabled Soviet planners to save billions and billions of
dollars on research and development. Substantial Soviet progress,
especially in the area of advanced electronics, now requires
the allies to increase sharply their own defense budgets."
There can be no doubt that the transfer of hard currency from
West to East in return for Soviet energy has helped the USSR to
continue to increase its military expenditures at annual growth
rates of 4 to 5 percent. At the same time, Soviet economic
IS
n
in
31
12
in the 1960s to 4 percent a year in the first half of the 1970s
and 3 percent a year in the second half of the 1970s. By 1980
the economic growth rate had fallen to .07 percent with prospects
for continuing decline throughout the present decade.
Despite the fact that Soviet capital investment, per capita
consumption growth and GNP growth rates all declined substantially
from 1960 to 1980, military spending sharply increased, reaching
an estimated annual rate of $223 billion in the 1970s. Many experts
believe that Soviet military spending now absorbs at least 15 percent
of their GNP -- more than half the share devoted to defense in
this country.
Our chief advantage over the Soviet Union lies in our advanced
technology which allows us to spend less on defense and keep
fewer soldiers under arms. The Soviet government expects to
earn $150 billion to $200 billion in hard currency over a 20
year
long
period from the sale of natural gas. Every dollar the
Soviets can spend on advanced equipment from the West, however,
weakens that advantage and forces us -- and our allies -- to spend
more to keep the military balance of power from turning decisively
against us.
Western banks and governments, in fact, are now deeply involved
in the Eastern European economy as a whole. In fact, the West
is increasingly being held hostage to mounting debts which Soviet
13
bloc governments are finding more and more difficult to repay.
Credit transfers from West to East are being made partly at the
expense of friendly nations in the Third World who desperately
need scarce capital for their own development.
The West has entered upon a massive foreign aid program of
government credits and guarantees which far exceeds U.S. credits
to Western Europe through the Marshall Plan -- allowing for
inflation. Approximately $80 billion: is now owed to Western
banks by Eastern bloc nations. This debt vastly exceeds the
annual amount of foreign currency being generated to service it.
Moreover, if the pipeline should prove to be economically
unsuccessful, West European taxpayers will be forced to pay the
bills when loans supported by government gurantees fall due.
Fundamentally, we have to ask ourselves whether or not this
increasing economic interdependence of Western and Eastern
nations is desirable.
Although it is true that only about 5 to 6 percent of Western
Europe's total energy consumption will come from the proposed
Siberian pipeline, it is necessary to look beyond this particular
pipeline -- which may be viewed as the camel's nose in the
tent -- to the broader picture.
Assuming that the Siberian pipeline does go into operation
in 1985 (as the Soviets claim it will) then it will carry $10.7
billion worth of natural gas a year, raising the share of Western
Europe's total energy needs met by the Soviet Union from 11 percent
14
Increasing East-West energy interdependence will offer
fertile ground for Soviet diplomatic initiatives. Although
each side will possess economic leverage over the other, it
remains true that, taking into account the differences in the
two political systems, democratic nations w-ll be more sensitive
to a threatened cut-off or slow-down in energy supplies than
the Politburo would be to a loss of hard currency.
We know historically (from their reaction to the Arab oil
boycott of 1973 and to subsequent Arab political pressure) that
the consumer-oriented nations of Western Europe are likely
future targets of similar energy pressures from a powerful state
like the Soviet Union.
As must necessarily happen in democratic societies, a large
and intricate network of interconnected constituency groups have
developed in the West European nations as a result of rapidly
increasing energy trade with the Soviets. Consumer demands
on Western European governments would thus be added to pressures
from banking, business and trade union groups who are naturally
deeply concerned about the possible loss (or decline) in jobs and
profits from the sale of steel pipe and other energy equipment
to the Soviets. In addition, as we Americans know from our own
experience, millions of other people -- friends and families
of those directly concerned -- can be expected to make their
views known at the ballot box and other places.
34
15
The political considerations will be heightened by the
fact that many large industries in Western Europe are either
government controlled or highly subsidized by the taxpayers.
The high unemployment currently prevalent throughout the
West is hardly a reassuring element in this politically sensitive
environment.
Then too, a centrally controlled economy like the Soviet
Union can place orders where it likes, and it can place them
(or not place them) for political reasons as much as for
economic ones.
The Soviet state ciuld also decide to eliminate future
còmpetition (such as North Sea natural gas). by simply lowering
the price of its own gas for a certain period.
In short, there is considerable reason to believe that the
West Europeans may have mortgaged themselves to dependence on
Soviet trade in the future. The real danger is that Soviet
hints of a cut-off or slowdown in energy deliveries could bring
about West European concessions on economic, political or even
military issues a few years from now.
There is ample historical precedence to justify these fears.
It is a fact that the Soviets have turned off (or threatened
to turn off) their energy supplies in order to influence political
events on at least eight major occasions.
16
In 1948, when Yugoslavia left the Soviet bloc.
In 1961, when Albania moved into the Chinese orbit.
In 1956, against Hungary and Israel.
In 1962, against China.
In 1968, against Czechoslavkia.
In 1980, the USSR stated that Western Europe and Japan
would risk losing Soviet fuel supplies if they joined the
American-led sanctions imposed after the invasion of
Afghanistan. This may well have been a factor in the
eventual West European decision that total support for
the sanctions would have unacceptable economic costs to
themselves.
o Only last year, the Kremlin threatened to disrupt Poland's
oil supply unless the government repressed the trade union
movement, which was threatening to turn Poland into a
Workers' State.
There seems little doubt that the potential for blackmail
on the part of the Soviet Union does exist. Many Europeans, both
in government and out, are keenly aware of these dangers.
In addition to the multiple problems and dangers noted above,
there is an overriding moral issue. There are, of course, no
free trade unions in the USSR and the rights of Soviet working
men and women have never been uppermost in the minds of the elderly
men of the Politiburo.
36
the International Association for Human Rights
17
Recently, however, the French and German governments
and other private groups, have been investigating
allegations that at least a substantial number of the workers
who are building the pipeline are being coerced.
The President of France, Francois Mitterrand, has been
quoted as saying that if these allegations are true then his
government could not possibly participate in such a project.
The existence of slave labor camps -- the so-called Gulag
Archipelago -- has been well known for years. The high hopes
of the 1917 Revolution have been replaced by a growing
institutionalized tyranny. An "ally" of the Soviet Union --
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam -- began a few years ago to
develop a new export trade with the Soviets as a means of paying
back its huge war debt. The new exports are human beings.
According to the best evidence available, the system works
like this. Somewhere between 100,000 and 500,000 Vietnamese
men and women are scheduled to be exported from Vietnam to the
USSR and Eastern European countries over the next few years.
According to the respected British publication The Economist
Foreign Report (September 17, 1981) "Estimates of numbers vary
but authoritative east European sources say that up to 500,000
Vietnamese may work in eastern Europe between 1981 and 1985. Most
are destined for the Soviet Union, where they will live in
segregated communities with little contact with the local population.
37
18
The Vietnamese workers are due to receive 40% of their wages
in local currency and the remaining 60% would be credited against
Vietnam's trading debts with the Comecon countries.
Since the Vietnamese cannot afford to send skilled labor
or technicians, the "guest workers" are unskilled laborers who
are expected to work in remote development projects in Siberia
and elsewhere. According to official Soviet statements, there
were around 2 million unfilled job vacancies in the Soviet Union
last November and Brezhnev has said that up to 400,000 additional
workers will be needed in the next few years to develop new oil
and gas fields in western Siberia."
The Soviet and Vietnamese governments claim that the workers
are participating in this "labor cooperation" project voluntarily.
High unemployment in South Vietnam is cited as a reason why many
Vietnamese are eager to travel to Siberia for periods of 6 years
without their families. Other sources maintain that there is some
choice involved. The worker may choose to labor inSiberia or to
fight in the army of occupation in Cambodia or to labor in one
of the "New Economic Zones" in Vietnam. There is considerable
evidence, however, that most of the workers being exported are
former officers of the Army of South Vietnam, released from
"re-education camps" so that their labor may pay back the Soviet
war debt owed by the North Vietnamese.
30
19
Under this insidious system, the Vietnamese government achieves
four objectives at once: (a) it removes dangerous dissidents
from its territory; (b) it lessens unemployment at home; (c) it
saves the cost of feeding the "re-educatees" (as they are called) ;
and (d) it earns valuable foreign currency to assist Vietnam in
paying its huge Soviet debt and in buying needed imports.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, gets some of its debt
repaid and receives badly needed workers to build project such as
the Siberian pipeline -- so that the Soviets, in turn, can earn
needed hard currency which can then be used to purchase advanced
technology from the West.
Information on this new triangular slave trade is scattered
and sometimes contradictory.
Some observers have argued, for instance, that the Soviet
Union would be unllikely to import large numbers of troublesome
dissidents into its territory. On the other hand, others have
pointed out that while the Soviet government may have its
weaknesses, lack of skill or experience in dealing with
dissidents is not one of them.
Doubtless with unintended irony, the Vietnamese Minister of
Labor, Mr. Dao Thien Thi, recently declared that "The Vietnamese
workers are being employed in accordance with the communist system,
and they enjoy the same rights as their Soviet colleagues who
are doing the same type of work."
20
As the facts gradually emerge, however, it is very likely
the West European governments will want to reconsider their
position. Free Europeans are hardly likely to finance a piepline
built with slave labor.
On June 25, 1981 the International Association for Human
Rights, based in West Germany, announced that "We have received
reports from various locations in the Soviet Union that more and
more prisoners sentenced to hard labor are being used to construct
the Siberian natural gas pipeline. The number of prisoners actually
working on the pipeline is estimated at 100,000
A nfmber of
well known political prisoners have likewise been forced into
laboring on the Siberian pipeline. Among these are the Ukranian
writer Sinovi Krassivski and the Baptist Ministers Vladimir Marmus
and Alexander Ussatjuk
During the past two years, many more
hard labor camps have been set up along the route of the Siberian
pipeline. In Ustj-Ischim alone eight such camps exist. Other
camps are located in Urengoi, Surgut, Tavda, Tjumen, Irbit and
Lysva."
In summation, it is becoming increasingly clear that the
Siberian pipeline with all its many ramifications is inimical
to the spiritual ideas, the material prosperity and the national
security of the peoples of Western Europe.
For all of the above reasons, the President concluded that it
was against the best interests of the United States for our
country to help the Soviets build the pipeline -- directly or
40
21
Effects of the Sanctions on the Pipeline
On December 29, 1981, the President announced the original
economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The following
restrictions were included:
O "The issuance or renewal of licenses for the export to the
USSR of electronic equipment, computers and other high
technology materials is being suspended."
O
"Licenses will be required for export to the Soviet Union
for an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of
such licenses will be suspended. This includes pipelayers."
On June 18, 1982, President Reagan extended these sanctions
to include "equipment produced by subsidiaries of US companies
abroad, as well as equipment produced under licenses issued by
US companies."
The original controls prohibited US companies on our territory,
such as General Electric and Caterpillar, from supplying gas
turbines and pipelayers for the project. As a result of the
sanctions, US firms have made sacrifices on behalf of the
Polish people. Over $850 million worth of contracts with the
USSR were lost. The additional controls mean that certain
European firms, such as France's Alsthom-Atlantique which
manufactures GE-designed rotors (under license), will be legally
41
22
forbidden to sell such products to the Soviet Union. The new
controls also prohibit all US subsidiaries from shipping any
parts for the pipeline, even though they are located outside
of the United States.
Assessments of the effect of the sanctions on the pipeline
vary. Most private and government experts expect the pipeline
to be delayed about two years, perhaps longer.
Other turbine designs are available, but firms in Europe
which could manufacture alternative motors are hindered by insufficient
production facilities and current production backlogs. In
addition, alternative motors are less powerful, would be more
costly and are not readily available in sufficient quantities to
meet the project's time schedule. They also raise major infra-
structure problems; electrical facilities would have to be established,
for instance.
While the Soviets possess the general technology to produce
the necessary motors, it would require a major effort and the
diversion of substantial resources from other uses (in large part
military) for them to produce the turbines themselves. There
is a serious question as to whether the West European banks
would finance the pipeline on current terms if it were based upon
Soviet turbines -- which are, to say the least, a less known
factor compared to the American motors.
42
23
In short, without US cooperation, there is a good chance the
generous subsidies now offered the USSR by West European banks
and governments will be reduced, if not cancelled. If this
were to happen we could look forward to the following results:
O The cost and availability of new Western credit to the USSR
would be reduced.
O With less hard currency, the USSR would be able to buy less
advanced technology; they would have to choose between
devoting more of their scarce resources to building up their
weakening economy or to building up their military machine.
o A major step forward for the goal of arms control would
result. The Russians would have to reduce their arms build-
up, and we and our allies could afford to spend less on our
own defenses.
O The position of those in the Politburo who favor a less
adventurous foreign policy and a more conciliatory attitude
toward Poland would be strengthened since rational men will
conclude that aggression does not pay.
O People all over the world will see that the US means what
it says: that we do not value commerce over human liberty.
They will know our word can be relied on in the future.
43
24
O Future Soviet economic and diplomatic leverage over the
Atlantic alliance will be reduced.
O World stability and the prospects for a lasting peace
will be strengthened.
Foreign Policy Issues Between the US and Our Allies
Despite extensive consultations with our allies, in which
all of the above points (and more) have been fully explored by
the President and his senior officials, there remains a disagree-
ment between the US and its major allies on this issue.
Some observers have argued that the President proposes economic
warfare on the Soviet Union. This is not the case. Economic warfare
has been defined as the use of economic instruments, primarily
during a military conflict, to supplement other forms of warfare.
Such measures are aimed at disrupting the enemies' internal
financial and economic system and causing the disintegration of
commercial ties among members of the enemy alliance.
The limited sanctions imposed by the President hardly
constitute economic warfare. We are simply declining to help
the completion of a project we deem not to be in our own
interest -- or in the long-range interest of our allies and of
world peace. The Soviet Union, as we have seen, has employed
economic sanctions on numerous occasions in the past. It can
hardly complain now if the situation is reversed.
44
25
Our European allies argue that the US is selling grain to
the Soviets; that being the case, they say, how can we object to
their buying gas from the Soviets?
In the first place, President Reagan decided not to negotiate
a long-term grain agreement with the Soviets which would have
greatly increased our grain sales to them. We supplied 70 percent
of Soviet grain import needs in 1979, for instance, but only
filled about a third of the USSR's grain needs in 1982. This loss
of potential sales has meant a substantial sacrifice for American
farmers.
Secondly (and more importantly) there is a crucial difference
between selling grain and buying natural gas.
In the one case, the Soviets are using up large quantities of
scarce foreign exchange in order to buy grain from us at market
rates. In the second case, the Western Europeans are subsidizing
the building of the Siberian Pipeline (at below-market rate loans
often guaranteed by government agencies) in order to enable the
Soviets to buy critically important advanced Western technology.
This transaction will enable the Russians to save billions more
rubles and dollars since they will be spared expensive research
and development costs. As we have seen, this high technology will
enable them to compete with us militarily in one of the major
areas in which we have an advantage. This, in turn, will force
us and the allies to spend more on our own defense. In addition,
as
26
the Soviets can and will obtain the grain elsewhere; they can
only obtain advanced technology and the credits needed to buy it
from the industrialized West.
Even some Europeans who understand the President's position
on grain sales and support his sanctions against the Soviet
Union, have argued, however, that the US has (a) infringed their
sovereignty by forbidding European firms under US licenses to
sell to the Soviets and (b) broken commercial contracts.
Both are fale s issues, however, the result of misunderstanding?
When the US firms licensed some European firms to produce
certain equipment to which the US firms held the patent rights
both the American and the Europeans forms expressly and voluntarily
agreed that the contracts would be subject to US export control
laws. This is standard procedure for most business contracts;
when one of the parties is resident in a different state or
nationa, the contract specifies in advance the laws under which
the contract is to be construed. As the British columnist, John
O'Sullivan, has pointed out in the London Daily Telegraph.
"
the European companies licensing American technology for the
pipeline from General Electric signed contracts which explicitly
bound them to observe American export control legislation."
In short, the European firms and their governments knew that
in return for the licenses, the companies were voluntarily accepting
US export controls in this case. They knew in advance what
4b
27
This is not a sovereignty issue, it is simply a matter of
legally enforcing contracts voluntarily entered into on both
sides.
A look at the record will see considerable disregard for
contracts and solemn international agreemen-s over this
issue -- buy any breaking of contracts has been done by others,
not by President Reagan.
O Most important of all, the Soviet Union has not abided by
the Helsinki Accords in which certain minimal civil liberties
were guaranteed to all Europeans by international treaty. (In
return, the present borders of the USSR, including the formerly
free nations of the Baltic, were recognized.)
O The Soviet Union has encouraged (to say the least) the
Polish military government to break its public pledges to have
a serious and continuing dialogue with the Church and Solidarity
in order to restore at least minimal liberties to the Polish
people.
O The British, French and German governments have instructed
several firms affected by the US sanctions to ignore their
contracts with American firms and to ship to the Soviet
government.
41
28
O On the other hand, President Reagan has kept his word to
the Polish people and to the Soviet government. He has asked
our European allies only to allow their own firms to observe
the contracts they voluntarily signed with US firms.
In summation, as Under Secretary of State James L. Buckley
has recently noted:
The policies enacted by the Administration follow
common goals that have been proclaimed by our allies
to bring about change in Poland. The alliance is involved
in the complex process of shaping a common approach to
managing our economic relations with the East. The debate
over sanctions is only one element in this process, and while
we share with our allies the view that Soviet pressures on
Poland cannot be tolerated, there are differences over the
most effective tactics. We are working with our allies to
reconcile these differences and develop a unified spproach.
The strongest Western position vis-a-vis the Soviets will
result when we and our allies can work out our current
differences and agree on such a common approach.
Energy Source Alternative/to the Siberian Pipeline
Taking a more positive tack, there is a wide range of
alternatives, and most of them more commercially attractive, to
West European reliance on Soviet energy.
The Norwegian natural gas option wouldseem to be the most
attractive alternative. There is no doubt that Norway has
enormous reserves of both oil and natural gas. Total recoverable
reserves are estimated to be 95 Trillion Cubic Feet of natural
gas. Norway's gas reserves are thus 4.3 times the size of current
estimates of the gas reserves on Alaska's North Slope.
48
29
Norway's production is growing rapidly. In 1974, the
share of Norwegian exports accounted for by oil and gas was only
1 percent. In 1982 it was 27.5 percent. Experts believe that
Norwegian natural gas could become a permanent and reliable
substitute for the Soviet variety, probably at lower cost.
Apart from anything else, the distances involved are considerably
shorter.
Moreover, since all the construction of a Norwegian pipeline
would be done within Western Europe there would be many economic
advantages (including more jobs) for our friends on the continent.
Finally, Norway is a member of NATO and is most unlikely to use
natural gas for political leverage.
In addition to Norwegian gas, however, there are several
other viable alternatives. A substantial amount of the North
Sea oil and gas reserves are controlled by Britain, another
faithful ally. There is also the possibility of developing a
larger Algerian supply and the emergence of new sources in
Holland, West Africa, Canada, Mexico, Alaska and elsewhere in the
United States. American coal, in particular, exists in large
enough reserves to supply at least a third of Western Europe's
energy needs.
In view of declining demand for oil and natural gas, it now
seems questionable whether Western Europe needs to import natural
gas from the USSR on anything like the scale of the proposed
Siberian pipeline.
49
30
It turns out that the number of jobs in Western Europe
which will be created by the subsidized pipeline is not very
large. In any case, as many Europeans have pointed out, if their
taxpayers are going to subsidize jobs why should they not directly
subsidize jobs for their own people or for their friends and allies
in both the industrialized and developing worlds?
Summary
As President Reagan has pointed out, the question of whether
or not the US should help the Soviets build their pipeline is a
moral and human rights issue.
As the President has said, "The objective in imposing the
sanctions has been and continues to be to advance reconciliation
in Poland. Since December 30, 1981, little has changed concerning
the situation in Poland; there has been no movement that would
enable us to undertake positive, reciprocal measures."
The pipeline is also a security and arms control issue. If
the US and its allies are serious about reducing the arms race,
we should not assist the Soviet wqr machine in its quest for more
hard currency which they will transform into technology, tanks and
guns. We have now an opportunity to do something about the
increasing levels of armaments in this world. We will be able
to lower the level of our armaments as the Soviets are forced
to lower the level of theirs.
50
31
If we believe in human rights, arms control and world peace,
there is only one position we and the allies can take. We
must not subsidize the pipeline and thereby Soviet oppression and
their military build-up.
September 22, 1982
PRESS STATEMENT
Forced Labor in the USSR
We' have received a growing number of reports that the USSR
has used a large number of prisoners -- including, thousands of
political prisoners -- to work on massive labor projects.
According to at least one such report, for example, at least
100,000 such forced laborers are being used on the heavy
infrastructure work of clearing swamps, cutting timber and
buiding access roads for the Yamal gas pipeline. These forced
laborers reportedly include religious dissidents and other
prisoners of conscience.
These reports have come from a wide variety of individuals
and organizations, in Europe, Asia and the US. The sources
include human rights organizations; labor organizations;
laborers who have managed to emigrate from the Soviet Union
after working under these conditions; and letters reaching Asia
and the West from the USSR.
We are not claiming to have evidence resembling a "smoking
gun. " Given the closed nature of Soviet society and the
official control of the Soviet media, moreover, there may never
be a "smoking gun.' But the information being released by this
wide range of knowledgeable individuals and organizations
spanning three continents, some with first hand experience of
these labor conditions, goes into considerable detail and
deserves serious examination.
Reliable estimates place the total number of forced
laborers in the Soviet Union today at approximately 4 million.
Further, it is well established that the Soviet Union has a
history of using forced labor on a mass scale -- including
political prisoners -- on major projects, particularly in
Siberia -- where the official press has acknowledged that it is
difficult to persuade Soviet workers to go there voluntarily.
To cite only two examples, some 250,000 forced laborers are
believed to have perished during the 1930's while working on
the construction of the Bielomorsk Canal. And in the 1970's
thousands of forced laborers were reported to be building the
Baikal-Amur railway extension in Southeastern Siberia.
As regards foreign laborers, the official Soviet media
itself has admitted that several thousand Vietnamese and other
Southeast Asian laborers have been imported into the USSR and
has intimated that many thousands more. are likely to be
imported in- the near future. Information on the nature of this
55
-2-
program is fragmentary. We do not know whether or not the
Vietnamese laborers are working on the Siberian pipeline. But
we are very concerned about indications that Vietnamese may be
coerced into working in the USSR and Eastern Europe and that a
portion of the salary paid to them might be deducted to offset
Vietnam's debts to the host country. In addition, we have
received reports that the Soviet authorities are placing
limitations on the ability of these workers to communicate with
their families and friends outside the USSR. We believe it is
important that international attention be given to this
situation, given the obvious possibility of exploitation of
these workers.
The Soviet Government could contribute to establishing the
truth about these very serious charges by permitting an
objective examination of labor conditions on its various
Siberian projects, and the conditions in which Soviet political
prisoners live and work. We would welcome sucb an independent
international investigation, but the prospects for obtaining
this are probably not bright. For example, charges of use of
forced labor have been made in the past against the USSR in the
International Labor Organization (ILO). However the Soviet
authorities have consistently refused to allow an ILO mission
to visit the USSR to investigate these charges.
Because of the seriousness of these charges, and the
massive human rights violations which they imply, we believe
the international community has a responsibility to investigate
them. The USG, for its part, is thoroughly examining the
information being brought to bear on this issue, and we
understand that several other governments have indicated
similar intentions. As our examination proceeds, we will --
wherever possible -- make our findings available to the
public. We hope that other governments and private
organizations will do the same.
716A
PIPECi
FOIA(b) (i), (b)(3)
TOD Secret
10777
USSR: Forced Labor on Pipeline
Recent allegations in the Western press and by the International
Society of Human Rights about large-scale Soviet use of forced labor
in the construction of the Siberian gas export pipeline are not
supported by reliable evidence.
Several emigre sources indicate that some of the
estimated 2 million unconfined parolees and probationers
have been forced to work on large construction projects
in the past, including pipelines.
past use of parolees for compressor
station construction on major pipelines.
engoy
and could not confirm recent
allegations of use of prisoners from specific forced-labor
camps on the export pipeline.
Nearly 2 million additional prisoners confined to
1,100 heavily secured forced-labor camps work at secured
worksites near their camps. Preliminary analysis indi-
Ishim
cates that charges concerning new forced-labor camps at
seven locations along the export pipeline route lack
credibility:
none of the forced-
labor camps alleged to be at Urengoy, Ust'-Ishim,
or Irbit--the last two are not near any pipeline.
Old forced-labor camps exist at Lys'va, near
the proposed pipeline route, but prisoners are
engaged in logging.
--0ld forced-labor camps exist at Tyumen', Tavda,
and Surgut, but these are far from the pipeline
route.
Vietnamese laborers in the USSR number about 7,000
and will increase during the next five years. Evidence
indicates that they are volunteers engaged in low-skill
jobs or in training programs.
Comment: Some forced labor--parolees and proba-
tioners--will probably be used on selected tasks of the
export pipeline construction, in view of their use in
the past on similar pipelines and because of the current
labor shortage in the USSR. They are likely to be used
in isolated areas constructing compressor stations and
associated housing and support structures. Heavily
guarded prisoners and forced laborers from Vietnam are
not likely to be employed on the pipeline.
Top Secret
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
6
18 September 1982
NLRR F06-114/9 # 10777
BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12
CONFIDENTIAL
PIPECINE-
POLITICAL PRISONERS 51
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
10780
SUCH "DIRTY WORK" WAS RESERVED FOR THE CRIMINAL OVERSEER, EVEN THOUGH
THAT WORK WAS INDIRECTLY SANCTIONED BY THE MVD.
COMMENT: ON
ONE OCCASION AT THE GARELNIKI SITE OF FORCED LABOR CAMP 231-3 IN THE
KI DISTRICT OF THE KIROV REGION, A YOUNG AND INEXPERIENCED MVD OFFICER
IN THE PRESENCE OF TWO SENIOR MVD GUARDS, KICKED A POLITICAL PRISONER
VICIOUSLY IN THE BACK. WITNESSED BY SEVERAL OTHER PRISONERS, THREE
OF THE PRISONERS CHARGED THE MVD OFFICER AND BRUTALLY BEAT KIM WHILE
THE OTHER TWO MVD SENIOR GUARDS WATCHED PASSIVELY WITH MACHINE GUNS
IN HAND. IT WAS OBVIOUS THE SENIOR MVD OFFICERS WERE TEACHING THE
MVD RECRUIT A LESSON AS FAR AS TREATMENT OF PRISONERS WAS CONCERNED.)
3.
COMMENT: HVD GUARDS POSTED ON TOWERS TO OBSERVE
PRISONERS WERE CALLED "PARROTS" BY THE CRIMINALS BECAUSE THEY WOULD
YELL AT EACH OTHER -- TOWER-TO-TOWER -- EVERY FEW MINUTES TO MAKE
SURE THEY ALL REMAINED AWAKE. ALTHOUGH THE MVD USED THEIR "MIDDLEMEN"
TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOALS, THERE WERE OTHER WAYS TO MAKE THEIR POINTS.
ON ONE OCCASION, MVD OFFICERS WERE ADVISED BY A TEAM LEADER THAT THE
TEMPERATURE ON A CONSTRUCTION SITE WAS MINUS 50 DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
(F). UNDER MVD GUIDELINES, PRISONERS COULD NOT BE FORCED TO WORK
WHEN THE TEMPERATURE FELL BELOW MINUS 40 DEGREES F. ON THIS OCCASION,
HOWEVER, MVD OFFICERS COMPLCOHEY DID NOT HAVE ATGERMOMETER AND
EVEN IF IT WERE MINUS 50 DEGREES F, IT WOULD "CERTAINLY WARM UP
DURING THE DAY.")
4. AS FOR PROCUREMENT OF PRISONERS FOR SOVIET JAILS OR LABOR
CAMPS, THE MVD WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE GULAG TO SUPPLY A DESIGNATED
NUMBER TO A PARTICULAR CONSTRUCTION SITE. ALL PRISONS AND LABOR
CAMPS HAD "QUOTAS" AS TO THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PRISONERS ON HAND;
THE MVD WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING A LIST OF NAMES AND NUMBERS OF
PRISONERS AVAILABLE.
5.
DIST: 15 SEPT 82
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS
COUNTRY: USSR
SUBJECT: 1. INVOLVEMENT OF MVD IN THE USE OF FORCED LABOR
2. TREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS
1001. 1970' S-1981)
REF:
SOURCE:
FOIA(b) (b)(3)
1. DURING THE LATE 1970'S AND AS LATE AS 1981, GUARDS OF THE
USSR'S MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (MINISTERSTVO VNUTRENNYKH DEL
OR MVD) CLOSELY GUARDED, BUT ONLY ON RARE OCCASIONS PHYSICALLY
ABUSED POLITICAL PRISONERS ASSIGNED TO SOVIET FORCED LABOR CAMPS AND/OR
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN THE USSR. POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE AT TIMES
TORTURED, BEATEN, STARVED, AND DENIED WARM CLOTHING FOR VARIOUS
REASONS INCLUDING NOT WORKING UP TO "STANDARD" BUT GENERALLY SUFFERED
SUCH FATE AT THE HANDS OF THE "COMMON CRIMINALS" WHO SERVED AS
MIDDLE MEN FOR THE MVD. ORDERS TO PHYSICALLY ABUSE POLITICAL
PRISONERS, WHO WERE "ALWAYS" ASSIGNED THE MOST MONOTONOUS, MENIAL,
AND DEMANDING WORK AT CONSTRUCTION SITES, THUS MOSTLY ORIGINATED WITH
THE MVD, BUT WERE ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION CARRIED OUT BY THE
"COMMON CRIMINALS" WHO SERVED AS "OVERSEERS" AND "CREW LEADERS" ON
SUCH PROJECTS,
2. MVD GUARDS WERE GENERALLY RESPECTED AND FEARED BY POLITICAL
PRISONERS IN FORCED CABOR CAMPS.
AT ANY ONE CONSTRUCTION SITE, THE MVD WOULD POST MACHINE
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
GUN CARRYING GUARDS IN TOWERS TO WATCH PRISONERS WORK.
T,HESE GUARDS APPARENTLY HAD THE AUTHORITY AND DID SHOOT
KILL ANY PRISONER WHO. ATTEMPTED TO
# 10780
ESCAPE OR EVEN THOSE WHO INADVERTENTLY WANDERED BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES
ESTABLISHED BY THE MVD AS THE WORKING AREA FOR THAT PARTICULAR DAY.
BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12
MVD GUARDS WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PERSONALLY MISTREAT ANY PRISONER WORKING
ON THE PROJECT, BE THAT PRISONER A "COMMON" OR "POLITICAL" PRISONER.
CONFIDENTIAL
PiPECiNE -
53
CONF IDENTIAL
POLISONERS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10781
MESSAGE CENTER
THEM PERFORMED LABOR DETAILS WHICH REQUIRED RELATIVELY CLOSE
SUPERVISION BOTH BY GUARDS AND BY FOREMEN, SUCH AS OPERATING
SAWS AND OTHER MACHINERY IN SAWMILLS AND PLYWOOD PLANTS. THE
PRISONERS IN THE SMALLER CAMPS, ON THE OTHER HAND, PERFORMED
LABOR DETAILS WHICH ENABLED THEM TO MOVE ABOUT WITH k
RELATIVELY GREATER DEGREE OF FREEDOM. THESE DETAILS, SUCH AS
THE INITIAL CLEARING OF FORESTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF LOGGING
ROADS, WERE EXTREMELY DEMANDING PHYSICALLY.
COMMENT:
IT WOULD BE FAIR TO CHARACTERIZE ALL OF THE LABOR DETAILS AS
"DIRTY WORK," IN THE SENSE THAT THEY CONSISTED OF THINGS WHICH
FREE, HIRED LABORERS DID NOT LIKE TO DO. BUT THE "DIRTIEST"
WORK BY FAR WAS THAT PERFORMED BY PRISONERS WITHOUT CLOSE
SUPERVISION BY GUARDS OR FOREMEN.)
3. NONE OF THE PRISONERS IN THE CAMPS GUARDED BY THE MEN IN
REGIMENT NUMBER 581 WORKED ON OIL, GAS OR OTHER PIPELINES
DURING THE YEARS 1971-1973. SIMILARLY, THERE WERE NO RUMORS
AMONG THE SOLDIERS OF THE 581ST REGIMENT ABOUT PIPELINE WORK.
PERFORMED BY PRISONERS, WHETHER IN THE KOMI ASSR OR ELSEWHERE.
HOWEVER, SEVERAL UNIDENTIFIED OFFICERS OF THE REGIMENT TOLD THE
MEN THAT DURING THE 1960'S THEY HAD GUARDED PRISONERS WHO HAD
PERFORMED ALL OF THE INITIAL WORK ON THE ABAKAN-TAYSHET
RAILROAD IN THE BURYAT ASSR.
COMMENT: THIS WAS
TYPICAL OF THE "DIRTIEST" WORK THAT PRISONERS HAD TO PLRFORM.)
(FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT SPECULATE ABOUT A CONNECTION,
IF ANY, BETWEEN.THIS RAILROAD AND ENERGY RESOURCES. KOWLVER,
HE HAD FORMED THE BELIEF THAT ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE WAS TO
FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS TO THE CHINESE BORDER IN THE
EVENT OF HOSTILITIES, A VIEW WHICH HE SAID HE HAD PROBABLY
DEVELOPED AFTER LISTENING TO OFFICERS DISCUSS THE RAILROAD.
4.
5.
DIST: 20 SEPT 82
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
THIS 13 AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS
COUNTE UCSR
CUBJECT: USE OF PRISON LABOR IN XOMI ASSR FOR FOREST CLEARING
AND IN SAWMILLS 1001. 1971-1973)
REF:
SOURCE:
1. DURING THE PERIOD 1971-1973 THE KOMI ASSR WAS A MAJOR
FOIA(b) (1), (b)(3)
CENTER OF PRISON CAMPS. MOST OF THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSR WAS
COVERED WITH TAIGA AND A LARGE NUMBER OF CAMPS, PROBABLY MORE
THAN 100, WERE SITUATED DEEP IN THE TAIGA. CRIMINAL SENTRY
GUARDS REGIMENT NUMBER 581, WHICH WAS HEADQUARTERED TO THE
SOUTH OF THE KOMI ASSR IN THE CITY OF KIROV, CONSISTED OF
CRIMINAL SENTRY GUARD COMPANIES WHOSE MEN SERVED AS GUARDS AT
PERHAPS 10-20 PRISON CAMPS IN THE KOMI ASSR.
COMMENT:
SOURCE COULD NOT RECALL THE PRECISE LOCATIONS OF ANY OF THE
CAMPS BUT BELIEVED MOST OF THEM WERE IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF
THE ASSR. HE BASED THIS BEL IEF ON THE FACT THAT MANY OF THE
OFFICERS MADE DAILY TRIPS FROM HEADQUARTERS IN KIROV TO THE
CAMPS WHICH THE UNITS GUARDED.)
2. THE CAMPS RANGED IN SIZE FROM APPROXIMATELY 1, 000
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PRISONERS TO APPROXIMATELY 4, 800 PRISONERS. ALL OF THE
PRISONERS WERE COMMON CRIMINALS; THERE WERE NO POLITICAL
PR I,SOHERS AMONG THEM. THE PRISONERS IN ALL OF THE CAMPS WORKED
NLRR F06-114/9 # 10781
IN ONE ASPECT OR ANOTHER OF THE FORESTRY AND WOODWORKING
INDUSTRY. THE VARIATIONS IN THE SIZES OF THE CAMPS
BY KML NARA DATE 9/25/12
CORRESPONDED BOTH TO THE DEGREE OF SECURITY (REZHIM) IN FORCE
AND TO THE NATURE OF THE LABOR WHICH THE PRISONERS' PERFORMED.
THE LARGER CAMPS WERE THE MORE SECURE, AND THE PRISONERS AT
CONF IDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06- 10782
CONF IDENTIAL
PiPECiNE 56
BY
KMI
NARA
DATE
9/25/12
NATIONAL
SECURITY
COUNCIL
FOIA(b) (b)(3) 10782
MESSAGE CENTER
ADVERSE IMATIC AND LIVING CONDITIONS
2. CRIMINAL PRISONERS OFTEN WERE USED AS UNSKILLED LABORERS
IN THE 1970'S TO CLEAR AWAY FORESTS, DRAIN SWAMPS, AND TO
FASHION ROADWAYS FOR LAYING PIPELINES. THAT WORK ALSO WAS DONE
IN SOME AREAS BY MILITARY CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS. PEOPLE FROM
THE ASIAN REPUBLICS SUCH AS KAZAKHSTAN FREQUENTLY COMPRISED THE
WORK FORCE. THE CRIMINAL FORCE CREWS WERE USED FOR LAND
CLEARING WORK IN THE UKRAINE PRIOR TO THE WORK ON THE YAMAL GAS
PIPELINE PROJECT. WHEN THE CLEARING WORK WAS COMPLETED, THE
CRIMINAL WORK CREWS WERE REMOVED FROM THE WORK SITES BEFORE THE
SKILLED LABORERS AND KOMSOMOL CONSTRUCTION GROUPS ARRIVED.
EVERY EFFORT WAS MADE NOT TO INFORM THE LATTER GROUPS THAT
CRIMINAL LABOR HAD BEEN USED ON THE PROJECT.
3. AS OF THE MID-197ø'S BOTH POLITICAL AND CRIMINAL
PRISONERS WERE TASKED WITH PRELIMINARY CLEARING WORK AT
PIPELINE SITES. THOSE WORKERS EARNED NO WAGES. THE WORKERS
DESIGNATED AS "KHIMIYA" DID, HOWEVER, EARN WAGES FOR UNSKILLED
LABOR ON PIPELINE PROJECTS.
COMMENT: SOURCE INDICATED
THAT THE TERM KHIMIYA REFERRED TO THOSE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD
SERVED PRISON TERMS BUT WHO WERE DENIED THEIR CHOICE OF
RELOCATION SITE IN THE USSR. SUCH INDIVIDUALS WERE PLACED
INSTEAD ON VARIOUS WORK PROJECTS.)
4. IN THE LATE 1970'S WORKERS WHO HELD UNSKILLED JOBS ON
PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS EARNED ABOUT 300 RUBLES PER
MONTH. THOSE WHO HELD SKILLED JOBS SUCH AS PIPE WELDING EARNED
600-700 RUBLES PER MONTH. THE ADDITIONAL PAY WAS REFERRED TO
AS "CLIMATIC" OR HARDSHIP ALLOWANCES.
5. THERE WERE FOUR CATEGORIES OF CRIMINAL CAMPS IN THE
USSR. THE CAMP OF GENERAL REGIME (LAGER' OBSHCHEGO REZHIMA)
DIST: 22 SEPTEMBER 1982
WAS FOR INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED FOR LIGHT OFFENSES WITH TERMS OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGDENCY
UP TO SEVEN YEARS. THE CAMP OF INTENSIFIED REGIME (LAGER'
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION
USILENNOGO REZHIMA) WAS FOR FIRST OFFENDERS OF SERIOUS CRIMES.
THE CAMP OF STRICT OR SEVERE REGIME (LAGER' STROGOGO REZHIMA)
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
WAS FOR CRIMINALS SENTENCED FOR MURDER, RAPE, AND OTHER SERIOUS
REPORT CLASS
CRIMES. THE CAMP OF SPECIAL REGIME (LAGER' OSOBOGO REZKIMA)
WAS FOR REPEAT OFFENDERS, INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE CONSIDERED TO BE
COUNTRY: USSR
ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS TO SOCIETY. A CAMP DESIGNATED AS
SUBJECT: USE OF CRIMINAL LABOR ON SOVIET PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION
"USILENNOGO REZHIMA" WAS LOCATED NEAR KOLOMYYA AND PRISONERS AT
(D01: 1930'S TO 1977)
THAT CAMP WERE USED AS UNSKILLED LABORERS ON THE UZHGOROD
REF:
SECTION OF THE ORENBURG PIPELINE. A CAMP DESIGNATED AS
SOURCE:
"STROGOGO REZHIMA" AT SOKI RYANY NEAR CHERNOVTSY ALSO SUPPLIED
UNSKILLED LABOR TO THE PIPELINE PROJECT. WORKERS AT THE LATTER
CAMP NORMALLY DID MINING AND QUARRY WORK.
6. ONLY CRIMINAL CAMPS WERE LOCATED IN THE AREA OF
IVANO-FRANKOVSK. CAMPS FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS USUALLY WERE
LOCATED IN THE LESS POPULATED EASTERN REGIONS OF THE USSR IN
ORDER TO DECREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTACT WITH OTHER SOVIET
SUMMARY: AS OF THE MID-1970S WORKERS FROM PRISON CAMPS WERE
CITIZENS. SUCH CAMPS WERE LOCATED IN CONSTRUCTION SITES ALONG
SUPPLYING UNSKILLED LABOR ON GAS AND OIL PIPELINE PROJECTS IN
THE URENGOY SECTION OF THE PIPELINE AND WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE
THE USSR. SPECIFICALLY, PRISON CAMP LABOR WAS USED FOR
SUPPLIED UNSKILLED LABOR FOR THE PROJECT.
PRELIMINARY WORK SUCH AS CLEARING FORESTS AND PREPARING ROADS
7. IN 1975 OR 1976 THE IVANO-FRANKOVSK DEPARTMENT OF THE
AT THE GAS COMPRESSOR STATION AT BOGORODCHANI. SUCH WORKERS
MOSCOW SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR DRILLING EQUIPMENT
RECEIVED NO WAGES AND USUALLY WERE HOUSED IN TENT COMMUNITIES.
PROVIDED BORING EQUIPMENT AND ACCEPTED CONTRACT WORK
END SUMMARY
ASSIGNMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE GAS COMPRESSOR STATION AT
1. DURING THE PERIOD COVERING ROUGHLY 1960-1967 THE
BOGORODCHANI, OUTSIDE OF IVANO-FRANKOVSK. CRIMINAL CAMPS
AVAILABILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT WAS MORE . THAN
LOCATED IN THE AREA SUPPLIED THE UNSKILLED LABOR FOR THAT
ADEQUATE TO COVER CONSTRUCTION ON OIL AND GAS PIPELINES IN THE
PROJECT. UNITS FROM THE MVD FORCES ATTACHED TO IVANO-FRANKOVSK
USSR. AS OF THE LATE 1970'S, HOWEVER, FUNDING AND SKILLED
GUARDED THE CRIMINAL LABORERS.
LABOR BECAME INCREASINGLY SCARCE. PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION WORK
IN PARTICULAR GREW MORE LABOR INTENSIVE. DATING BACK TO THE
YEARS OF THE 193ø'S THROUGH 1950'S YOUNG PEOPLE HAD A VERY
8. THE SOVIETS GENERALLY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN INVESTING
ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE ABOUT SIGNING UP FOR DUTY ON OIL AND GAS
THE LABOR AND CAPITAL REQUIRED TO ERECT TEMPORARY HOUSING AT
PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS; DURING THE 1970'S IT BECAME
CONSTRUCTION SITES FOR COMPRESSOR STATIONS. IF THE
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO RECRUIT INDIVIDUALS TO WORK UNDER
CONSTRUCTION SITES WERE RELATIVELY CLOSE TO A CITY OR VILLAGE,
CONF IDENT
CONF IDENT IAL
51
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 02 OF 02 CIA DCD/HEADQUARTER 1923 DTG:221508Z SEP 82 PSN: : 042632
SKILLED LABOR RECEIVED HOUSING WITHIN THE CITY. IF THE SITES
WERE AT A GOOD DISTANCE FROM CONSTRUCTION SITES, THE WORKERS
LIVED IN TENTS. THE CRIMINAL LABOR FORCE WAS PLACED IN TENT
COMMUNITIES REGARDLESS OF THE LOCATION OF CONSTRUCTION SITES IN
ORDER TO SEGREGATE THOSE WORKERS FROM THE LOCAL POPULACE.
9.
COMMENT: BASED ON HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN WORK
AT VARIOUS OIL AND GAS DRILLING SITES, SOURCE IS OF THE OPINION
THAT THE SOVIETS DEFINITELY ARE CAPABLE OF COMPLETING THE YAMAL
PIPELINE WITH OR WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY.
THE ABSENCE OF THAT TECHNOLOGY, LIKELY WOULD DELAY COMPLETION
OF THE PROJECT BY SEVERAL YEARS AND WOULD DRAW CAPITAL AND
LABOR RESOURCES FROM OTHER SECTORS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY.)
10.
11.
CONF IDENTIAL
PiPECiNE 58
CONF IDENTIAL
(forced
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
cabor)
MESSAGE CENTER
10778
PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9372
DTG: 232323Z SEP 82 PSN: 044879
EOB409
AN007372
TOR: 267/0014Z
CSN:HCE547
RIGHTS ISSUE; B. OUR BELIEF THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE THESE
DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 MYER-01 NAU-01 PIPE-01 RENT-01 WEIS-01
CHARGES. YOU MAY MAKE AVAILABLE TO THEM TESTIMONY IN
ROBN-01 /007 A3
PARA 5 BELOW, POINTING OUT ITS ORIGIN, AND EXPRESS OUR
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST
WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION WE ARE ABLE
TO UNCOVER ON THIS ISSUE. YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
WELCOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THEY MAY HAVE.
SIT: CKLS
EOB:
DECLASSIFIED
5. (U) "SELECTED TESTIMONY FROM THE SOVIET UNION"
WRITTEN ACCOUNT BY MRS. A;P. FROM MOSCOW, JULY 1982
OP IMMED
NLRRF06-114/9#10778
MY UNCLE IS AN OFFICER IN THE SOVIET ARMY AND SERVES IN
DE RUEHC #9372 2662355
THE NORTH IN THE HANTY-MANSSIYSKIY AUTONOMOUS REGION.
0 232323Z SEP 82 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011
AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, MY UNCLE ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN
MOSCOW SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN DISMISSED FROM THE ARMY FOR
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
HEALTH REASONS. IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATIONS I
LEARNED THE FOLLOW, NG:
STATE 269372
IT WAS TRUE THAT MY UNCLE HAD PARTICIPATED AS A CONSTRUC-
INFORM CONSULS: ALSO FOR PAOS
TION ENGINEER IN VARIOUS PROJECTS FROM THE NEW PORT ON
E.O. 12356: DECL: 9/20/92
THE YAMAL PENINSULA TO PERM IN THE URALS. THE OFFICERS
;AGS: SHUM, PINS, UR
AND SOLDIERS HAD BEEN TOLD QUITE OPENLY THAT THE CON-
SUBJECT: ISSUE OF FORCED LABOR AND THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE
STRUCTION OF THE GAS PIPELINE FROM SIBERIA TO WESTERN
EUROPE WOULD GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE
DEFENSE OF THE NORTHERN U.S.S.R. FOR ONE THING, IT
1. (C) SINCE MID-SUMMER, THE ISSUE OF FORCED LABOR, INCLUD-
INCREASES THE INFLUX OF WORKERS TO THE NORTH AND SECONDLY,
ING POLITICAL PRISONERS, ON THE USSR-EUROPE GAS PIPELINE
THE GAS PIPELINE WILL FACILITATE THE SUPPLY OF FUEL TO
AND OTHER MAJOR PROJECTS IN THE USSR HAS APPEARED IN WEST
THE VARIOUS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE NORTH. IN THIS
EUROPEAN AND OTHER MEDIA. MOST REPORTS HAVE EMANATED FROM
AREA WE NEED NOT BUILD ANYTHING OURSELVES ANYMORE -- ALL
THE FRANKFURT-BASED INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS. NONE OF THESE REPORTS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED. FRENCH
PREPARATORY WORK IS COMPLETED BY PRISONERS, AND ONLY AFTER
AND FRG GOVERNMENTS HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT THEIR
THAT, VOLUNTEER LABOR BRIGADES ARRIVE ON THE SCENE.
EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN ASKED TO INVESTIGATE THESE
ALLEGATIONS. THE U.S. EMBASSY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO
THE SAME. THE LIKELIHOOD OF OUR DISCOVERING DIRECT EVIDENCE
TELEPHONE REPORT BY MR. P.S. FROM MOSCOW, JULY 1982
OF THE USE OF FORCED LABOR ON PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION IS
REMOTE, CONSIDERING RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON EMBASSY TRAVEL
"I WAS FIRED FROM THE MOSCOW MINING INSTITUTE BECAUSE I
AND SOVIET DESIRE TO COUNTER THESE CHARGES, BUT IT IS
HAD CRITICIZED THE REGIME, AND NOW NO ONE IN TOWN WILL
IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIVELY SEEK TO
HIRE ME.
DISCOVER THE FACTS, AND THAT THE ISSUE REMAIN ALIVE.
THE KGB TOLD ME: 'YOU CAN VOLUNTEER NOW TO WORK ON THE
GAS PIPELINE, BEFORE WE SEND YOU THERE BY FORCE. AT THIS
2. (C) GIVEN THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR ON
POINT, YOU STILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO WORK THERE AS A
MAJOR PROJECTS IN REMOTE AREAS REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE MANUAL
VOLUNTEER.'
INPUT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PRISON LABOR IS BEING USED, OR
THAT IT WAS USED IN THE PRELIMINARY STAGES. WE DO NOT KNOW
SO I WENT TO TYUMEN, WHERE I WAS ORDERED BY CONSTRUCTION
WHETHER POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE USED. WHILE THIS ISSUE IS
HEADQUARTERS TO REPORT TO THE URENGOY DISTRIBUTING
OF EQUAL CONCERN TO EUROPLANS AND AMERICANS, WE SHOULD AVOI
STATION AS AN ELECTRICIAN. I WORKED IN URENGOY, A DIRTY
GIVING IT A "MADE IN USA LABEL." S.OFFICIALS SHOULD
SMALL TOWN OF HASTILY PUT UP PRIMITIVE SHACKS, FOR A YEAR,
ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP IT CAREFULLY, FOCUSING APPROPRIATE ATTEN-
SHARING WITH THREE OTHER WORKERS A SMALL ROOM IN A
TION NOT ONLY ON THE QUESTION OF FORCED LABOR ON THE PIPE-
DORMITORY.
LINE PROJECT, BUT ALSO ON THE BROADER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE
REPRESENTED BY THE APPROXIMATELY FOUR MILLION SOVIET
ON THE VERY FIRST DAY I WAS TOLD THAT THERE WERE ALSO
PRISONERS UNDERGOING SOME FORM OF INVOLUNTARY LABOR.
PRISONERS WORKING AT THIS SITE, AND THAT I WAS NOT TO
SPEAK WITH THEM OR TELL ANYONE ABOUT THEM IF I DID NOT
WANT TO BE LOCKED UP WITH THEM.
3. (C) PARA 5 CONTAINS EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENTATION
RELEASED IN MID-AUGUST BY THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR ELEVEN MONTHS I WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE HOW BADLY AND
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE IT IS IMPRACTICABLE TO VERIFY
UNFAIRLY THE PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES WERE BEING TREATED.
THE DETAILED ASSERTIONS, SOME OF WHICH APPEAR TO BE EX-
THEY WERE SUPERVISED BY THE VOLUNTEERS WHO, OF COURSE,
AGGERATED, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE WORTHY OF ATTENTION.
ONLY DID THE EASIER JOBS. THE DANGEROUS JOBS WERE DONE
ONLY BY PRISONERS; SOMETIMES THEY WERE PROMISED THAT THEY
4. (C) ACTION REQUESTED.
WOULD BE RELEASED EARLY.
ALL POSTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHER POSTS WHERE, IN
YOUR JUDGMENT, YOU ARE LIKELY TO RECEIVE A FAIR HEARING,
DURING THE ELEVEN MONTHS, I WITNESSED NUMEROUS FATAL
SHOULD EXPRESS IN APPROPRIATE CONVERSATIONS WITH HOST
ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY EXPLODING GAS AND GAS POISONING.
GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTORORGOANIZATIONS, INCLUDING UNIONS.
DURING THE SUMMER, CONCRETE WAS DELIVERED BY OPEN TRUCKS;
AND MEDIA: A. OUR CONCERN OVER THIS HUMAN
EN ROUTE IT HAD HARDENED TO THE POINT WHERE THE PRISONERS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
59
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9372
DTG: 232323Z SEP 82 PSN: 044879
HAD TO HACK IT OUT BIT BY BIT SO THAT THEIR HANDS STARTED
THESE SETTLEMENTS RARELY HAVE A NAME; IN MOST CASES THEY
BLEEDING.
ARE REGISTERED UNDER "SPECIAL WORKFORCE NO. ALONG
WITH THE DESIGNATION OF THE CAMP ADMINISTRATION FOR THE
THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT ARRIVING FROM ABROAD ALSO HAD TO BE
REGION IN QUESTION.
UNLOADED AND TRANSPORTED MANUALLY BY THE PRISONERS. AGAIN
AND AGAIN, THERE WERE ACCIDENTS DURING THE TEST RUNS;
ARRIVING MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS MUST IMMEDIATELY
BECAUSE OF MISTAKES IN THE OPERATION OF THE EQUIPMENT,
BEGIN WORK ON THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO THEM BY THE COMMANDANT.
IT KEPT BREAKING DOWN AND THE PRISONERS HAD TO MOVE THE
HEAVY PIPES AGAIN AND AGAIN, WITHOUT PROPER MECHANICAL
IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS, THE
AIDS; OFTEN THE ROPES, WHICH WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH, WOULD
WORKFORCE INCLUDES DEPORTEES AND PEOPLE SENTENCED FOR
BREAK, CAUSING MORE LIVES TO BE LOST. I TRIED SEVERAL
"PARASITISM"; IN KIRPICHNY, THEIR NUMBERS TOTALED APPROXI-
TIMES TO LODGE A COMPLAINT ABOUT THIS WITH THE TRADE
MATELY 6, 000.
UNIONS, BUT I WAS TOLD: "YOU DON'T HAVE TO FEEL SORRY
FOR THE MOST PART, THE WORK INVOLVED PREPARATION OF GLASS
WOOL, WRAPPING OF PIPES, EXCAVATION, MOUNTING OF INSTRU-
FOR THESE PEOPLE, THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED LONG AGO.
MENTS AND PIPE SUPPORTS, LAYING OF ELECTRIC AND TELEPHONE
THEY SHOULD BE GLAD TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFORM."
CABLES, AND VARIOUS CHORES IN THE PETROCHEMICAL FIELD.
THE PRISON CAMP WAS NOT LOCATED IN URENGOY BUT TWO KILO-
SOME CONSTRUCTION AREAS, WHERE THE WORK INVOLVED PERMA-
METERS AWAY, IN THE TAIGA, SO THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY
FROST, REMOVAL OF GROUND WATER AND BLASTING OF ROCKS ARE
HAD NO IDEA THAT IT WAS THERE. BUT I HAD OCCASION TO
SURROUNDED BY WOODEN FENCES AND BARBED WIRE AND GUARDED
TALK TO THE SOLDIERS ASSIGNED TO THE CAMP, AND THEY NOT
BY ARMED SOLDIERS AND GUARD-DOGS. THIS IS WHERE THE
ONLY TOLD ME OF THE HIGH MORTALITY RATE AMONG THE
PRISONERS FROM CAMP NO. 34/2 ARE TAKEN BY CLOSED CARS
PRISONERS, BUT ALSO OF THE FREQUENT SUICIDES COMMITTED
EACH DAY. THEY KEEP MOVING FROM ONE SITE TO THE NEXT
BY DESPAIRING YOUNG SOLDIERS WHO COULDN'T TAKE ALL THAT
ALONG THE ROUTE WHERE THE GAS PIPELINE IS TO BE LAID.
MISERY ANYMORE AND KILLED THEMSELVES WITH THEIR OWN
WEAPONS IN THEIR WATCH TOWERS.
THE FOOD IS POOR, THERE IS NO MEDICAL CARE WHATSOEVER,
THE HUTS AND FREIGHT CARS ARE COLD, DRUNKENNESS IS COMMON
THE SADDEST SIGHT WERE THE MANY FEMALE PRISONERS WHO HAD
AMONG THE WORKERS. IT ALSO HAPPENS THAT MINIMUM-SECURITY
TO DO THE SAME WORK AS THE MEN AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITES.
PRISONERS ARE SENTENCED AGAIN, SENT BACK TO THE PRISON
COMPLETELY FILTHY OR SOAKING WET THEY RETURNED TO THEIR
CAMPS, AND HAVE TO WORK BEHIND BARBED-WIRE FROM THEN ON.
HUTS IN THE EVENING; THEY WEREN'T ABLE TO CHANGE OR WASH
THEIR CLOTHES.
AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE TYUMENLAG COMPLEX CONSISTS OF
FOURTEEN CAMPS, LOCATED IN NIZHNAYA TAVDA, USSETSK,
DURING THE WINTER, THE MVD GUARDS WOULD BE STANDING AROUND
YALUTOROVSK, ZAVODOUKOVSK IMPIM, MALITSA, TOBOLSK (2) AND
A FIRE IN HEAVY SHEEPSKIN COATS, WARMING THEIR HANDS,
TYUMEN (2).
WHILE IN THE PRISONERS HAD TO WORK IN THE COLD, DRESSED IN
THIN WORK PANTS AND SHORT COATS WITH HARDLY ANY LINING."
THE HARDEST JOBS SUCH AS EXCAVATION OF TRENCHES, LAYING
OF RAILROAD TRACKS, MIXING OF CONCRETE, AND CONSTRUCTION
TELEPHONE REPORT BY MR. I.P. FROM TYUMEN, JUNE 1982
OF RAILINGS FOR SCAFFOLDING ARE DONE NOT ONLY BY MEN,
BUT ALSO BY DEPORTED WOMEN AND MINORS FROM REFORMATORIES.
ON JUNE 15, 1982, MR. I.P. TELEPHONED AN ACQUAINTANCE IN
THE WEST WITH THE FOLLOWING REPORT:
AT THE PRESENT TIME, MORE THAN 100, 000 FORCED LABORERS
ARE ASSIGNED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GAS PIPELINE FOR
"WHILE I WAS STILL AT THE CAMP, I HEARD OF THE POSSIBILITY
OF WORK ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GAS PIPELINE FOR EUROPE.
EUROPE IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES. THEIR WORK INCLUDES
BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULT LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN
MANUFACTURE OF WORK CLOTHES--THIS IS ONE BY FEMALE
THE CAMPS, MANY PRISONERS ARE WILLING TO EXCHANGE LIFE IN
PRISONERS OR INMATES OF PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS. NEVERTHE-
A CAMP FOR THE LIFE OF FORCED LABORERS, WHO WORK UNDER
LESS, THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF WORK CLOTHES; FOR INSTANCE,
MINIMUM SECURITY CONDITIONS.
PROTECTIVE GLOVES ARE ISSUED ONLY EVERY SIX MONTHS. THE
WORKERS WRAP RAGS AROUND THEIR HAND, BUT INJURIES AND
THUS I VOLUNTEERED AND, ALONG WITH APPROXIMATELY 50
ECZEMA ARE A FREQUENT OCCURRENCE AMONG THE WORKERS
MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS FROM VARIOUS CAMPS, WAS TAKEN
HANDLING BARBED WIRE, CONCRETE, GLASS WOOL, OR ASBESTOS.
TO THE FACILITY FOR PRISONERS IN TRANSIT IN TYUMEN, WHERE
ACCIDENTS ARE THE ORDER OF THE DAY, BUT WHEN PEOPLE CALL
WE REMAINED FOR TEN DAYS, UNTIL THE MILITIA AND THE MVD
THE EMERGENCY STATION THE MEDICS WANT TO KNOW FIRST
HAD DECIDED WHERE TO PUT US. WITH SEVERAL OTHERS I WAS
WHETHER THE INJURED PERSON IS A VOLUNTEER OR A ZEK (THAT
ASSIGNED TO "SPECIAL WORKFORCE NO. 7" IN KIRPICHNY, A
IS WHAT THEY CALL THE CAMP POPULATION, I.E., MINIMUM-
SMALL PLACE NEAR TYUMEN, WHERE I REPORTED TO THE COMMANDANT
SECURITY PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES). IF THE INJURED PERSON
FOR MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES.
IS A ZEK, THE MEDICS USUALLY TAKE THEIR TIME ARRIVING."
ALONG WITH FOUR OTHERS, I WAS HOUSED IN AN EMPTY FREIGHT
C POSTS SHOULD ALSO DRAW UPON, AND MAKE AVAILABLE TO
CAR WHICH HAD BARELY ENOUGH ROOM FOR FOUR COTS. WE HAD
APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENTS, DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT OF
9/22/82 ON FORCED LABOR ISSUE. TEXT FOLLOWS:
ELECTRICITY, BUT NO WATER. OTHERS LIVED IN HUTS WHICH
7. U PRESS STATEMENT
DATED BACK TO THE CAMPS BUILT UNDER STALIN, OR IN HASTILY
ERECTED DORMITORIES, TWO-STOREY BUILDINGS WITHOUT ANY
AMENITIES.
FORCED LABOR IN USSR
CONF IDENT IAL
CONF DENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9372
DTG: 232323Z SEP 82 PSN: 044879
BRIGHT. FOR EXAMPLE, CHARGES OF USE OF FORCED LABOR HAVE
BEEN MADE IN THE PAST AGAINST THE USSR IN THE
U, WE HAVE RECEIVED A GROWING NUMBER OF REPORTS THAT THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION ILO,. HOWEVER, THE
USSR HAS USED A LARGE NUMBER OF PRISONERS -- INCLUDING
SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO ALLOW AN
THOUSANDS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS -- TO WORK ON MASSIVE
ILO MISSION TO VISIT THE USSR TO INVESTIGATE THESE CHARGES.
LABOR PROJECTS. ACCORDING TO AT LEAST ONE SUCH REPORT,
FOR EXAMPLE, AT LEAST 100,000 SUCH FORCED LABORERS ARE
BEING USED ON THE HEAVY INFRASTRUCTURE WORK OF CLEARING
U, BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THESE CHARGES, AND THE
SWAMPS, CUTTING TIMBER AND BUILDING ACCESS ROADS FOR THE
MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WHICH THEY IMPLY, WE
YAMAL GAS PIPELINE. THESE FORCED LABORERS REPORTEDLY
BELIEVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY
INCLUDE RELIGIOUS DISSIDENTS AND OTHER PRISONERS OF
TO INVESTIGATE THEM. THE USG, FOR ITS PART, IS THOROUGHLY
CONSCIENCE.
EXAMINING THE INFORMATION BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THIS
U THESE REPORTS HAVE COME FROM A WIDE VARIETY OF
ISSUE, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNMENTS
INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, IN EUROPE, ASIA AND THE
HAVE INDICATED SIMILAR INTENTIONS. AS OUR EXAMINATION
US. THE SOURCES INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; LABOR
PROCEEDS, WE WILL -- WHEREVER POSSIBLE -- MAKE OUR
ORGANIZATIONS; LABORERS WHO HAVE MANAGED TO EMIGRATE FROM
FINDINGS AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC. WE HOPE THAT OTHER
THE SOVIET UNION AFTER WORKING UNDER THESE CONDITIONS; AND
GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS WILL DO THE SAME. SHULTZ
LETTERS REACHING ASIA AND THE WEST FROM THE USSR.
BT
U, WE ARE NOT CLAIMING TO HAVE EVIDENCE RESEMBLING A
"SMOKING GUN." GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY
AND THE OFFICIAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET MEDIA, MOREOVER,
THERE MAY NEVER BE A "SMOKING GUN." BUT THE INFORMATION
BEING RELEASED BY THIS WIDE RANGE OF KNOWLEDGEABLE
INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS SPANNING THREE CONTINENTS,
SOME WITH FIRST HAND EXPERIENCE OF THESE LABOR CONDITIONS,
GOES INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND DESERVES SERIOUS
EXAMINATION.
U, RELIABLE ESTIMATES PLACE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FORCED
LABORERS IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY AT APPROXIMATELY FOUR
MILLION. FURTHER, IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT THE SOVIET
UNION HAS A HISTORY OF USING FORCED LABOR ON A MASS SCALE
-- INCLUDING POLITICAL PRISONERS -- ON MAJOR PROJECTS,
PARTICULARLY IN SIBERIA -- WHERE THE OFFICIAL PRESS HAS
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE SOVIET
WORKERS TO GO THERE VOLUNTARILY. TO CITE ONLY TWO
EXAMPLES, SOME 250,000 FORCED LABORERS ARE BELIEVED TO
HAVE PERISHED DURING THE 1930'S WHILE WORKING ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BIELOMORSK CANAL. AND IN THE 1970'S
THOUSANDS OF FORCED LABORERS WERE REPORTED TO BE BUILDING
THE BAIKAL-AMUR RAILWAY EXTENSION IN SOUTHEASTERN SIBERIA.
U, AS REGARDS FOREIGN LABORERS, THE OFFICIAL SOVIET
MEDIA ITSELF HAS ADMITTED THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND VIETNAMESE
AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN LABORERS HAVE BEEN IMPORTED INTO
THE USSR AND HAS INTIMATED THAT MANY THOUSANDS MORE ARE
LIKELY TO BE IMPORTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. INFORMATION ON
THE NATURE OF THIS PROGRAM IS FRAGMENTARY. WE DO NOT KNOW
WHETHER OR NOT THE VIETNAMESE LABORERS ARE WORKING ON THE
SIBERIAN PIPELINE. BUT WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT
INDICATIONS THAT VIETNAMESE MAY BE COERCED INTO WORKING IN
THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THAT A PORTION OF THE
SALARY PAID TO THEM MIGHT BE DEDUCTED TO OFFSET VIETNAM'S
DEBTS TO THE HOST COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED
REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE PLACING
LIMITATIONS ON THE ABILITY OF THESE WORKERS TO COMMUNICATE
WITH THEIR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OUTSIDE THE USSR. WE
BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION BE
GIVEN TO THIS SITUATION, GIVEN THE OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY OF
EXPLOITATION OF THESE WORKERS.
U, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO
ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH ABOUT THESE VERY SERIOUS CHARGES BY
PERMITTING AN OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION OF LABOR CONDITIONS ON
ITS VARIOUS SIBERIAN PROJECTS AND THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH
SOVIET POLITICAL PRISONERS LIVE AND WORK. WE WOULD
WELCOME SUCH AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION,
BUT THE PROSPECTS FOR OBTAINING THIS ARE PROBABLY NOT
CONF DENT
PIPELLNE
United States Department of State
61
Washington, D.C. 20520
9/29/82
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Conference Report No. 97-891 dated September 29
accompanying H.R. 6956 directed the Secretary to undertake an
investigation into allegations that forced labor is being
employed, and human rights violated, by the Soviet authorities
in the construction of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline.
There is clear evidence that the Soviet Union is using
forced labor on a massive scale. This includes the use of
political prisoners. We have information from a variety of
sources which confirms that the Soviets routinely employ a
portion of their 4 million forced laborers, the world's largest
forced labor population, as unskilled workers on domestic
pipeline construction. It cannot yet be conclusively
established whether such labor is being used specifically on
the export pipeline project, but a number of reports suggest
that forced labor has been used in some of the site preparation
and other preliminary work on the export pipeline including
clearing the forests, leveling the right-of-way, building
roads, and constructing living quarters.
There is, in fact, a long history to the use of forced
labor in the Soviet Union. This has included the use of forced
labor -- including thousands of political prisoners -- on
numerous large-scale development projects. The Baikal-Amur
rail line, the Bielomorsk and Volga-Don canals, the Moscow
subway, and the Kama River truck plant are a few of the better
known Soviet projects built with forced labor. Among the
groups that Soviet authorities traditionally press into forced
labor are political prisoners and prisoners of conscience
convicted for "anti-Soviet agitation" or under broadly-worded
"hooliganism" and "parasitism" laws. For nearly thirty years,
complaints have been registered in the International Labor
Organization, and in other international bodies, against the
use of such laws to punish and exploit political and religious
dissidents in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet authorities not only have failed to provide
responses satisfactory to the ILO on any of these complaints,
but also have attacked the ILO supervisory machinery itself.
Their continuing refusal to cooperate with the ILO authorities
puts the burden of proof on the Soviet Union with regard to the
numerous and grave charges of forced labor lodged against
them. We strongly believe that the Soviet authorities should
open all of their labor camps and large-scale labor brigades to
independent international investigation.
The Honorable
Jamie L. Whitten, Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives
- 2 -
We welcome Congressional interest in this question. Forced
labor in the USSR is a human rights issue of deep concern to
the Administration, as expressed most recently in our official
statement of September 22. Decency compels us to express our
distress at the Soviet Union's exploitation of forced labor.
For those who believe in the promotion of world peace through
law, it is crucial that the international community investigate
and demand remedial action when confronted with serious charges
of violations of international agreements. Obviously, the
closed nature of Soviet society renders difficult the discovery
of facts on this issue, as well as the production of convincing
evidence. But be assured that we will continue diligently to
conduct this investigation. We also are pursuing this issue
vigorously through the ILO.
As our preliminary report, I am transmitting under this
cover a copy of the Administration's statement of September 22
and a packet of reports and documents which will provide for
you the status of our efforts up to now. This packet includes
a historical summary of Soviet forced labor questions before
the ILO; a study entitled "The Soviet Forced Labor System,"
which includes maps and graphics of the pipeline network and
forced labor camps; documentation and testimony from hearings
sponsored by the Frankfurt-based International Society for
Human Rights; and a summary of actions by other governments and
international labor bodies. Intelligence information pertinent
to the issue will be made available through the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees.
Sincerely
Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations
Enclosure:
Preliminary report
COPIES TO - PIPES
PIPELINE 63
RAYMOND
ROBINSON
BLAIR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
9/29/82
Letter of Transmittal
Cover
Departmental Press Statement
Tab 1
Historical Summary of Forced Labor
in the Soviet Union
(including ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labor)
Tab 2
"The Soviet Forced Labor System"
Tab 3
Documentation from August 1982 Hearings
held by International Society for Human Rights
Tab 4
CIA Memorandum: "Forced Labor in the USSR":
Preliminary Evaluations.
Tab 5
Summary of Publicly Announced Actions taken by other
Governments and International Labor Bodies
Tab 6
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Conference Report No. 97-891 dated September 29
accompanying H.R. 6956 directed the Secretary to undertake an
investigation into allegations that forced labor is being
employed, and human rights violated, by the Soviet authorities
in the construction of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline.
There is clear evidence that the Soviet Union has used --
and continues to use -- forced labor on a massive scale. This
includes the use of political prisoners. We have information
from a variety of sources which confirms that the Soviets
routinely employ a portion of their 4 million forced laborers,
the world's largest forced labor population, as unskilled
workers on domestic pipeline construction. It cannot yet be
conclusively established whether such labor is being used
specifically on the export pipeline project, but a number of
reports suggest that forced labor has been used in some of the
site preparation and other preliminary work on the export
pipeline including clearing the forests, leveling right-of-way,
building roads, and constructing living quarters.
There is, in fact, a long history. to the use of forced
labor in the Soviet Union. This has included the use of forced
labor -- including thousands of political prisoners -- on
numerous large-scale development projects. The Baikal-Amur
rail line, the Bielomorsk and Volga-Don canals, the Moscow
subway, and the Kama River truck plant are a few of the better
known Soviet projects built with forced labor. Among the
groups that Soviet authorities traditionally press into forced
labor are political prisoners and prisoners of conscience
convicted for "anti-Soviet agitation" or under broadly-worded
"hooliganism" and "parasitism" laws. For nearly thirty years,
complaints have been registered in the International Labor
Organization, and in other international bodies, against the
use of such laws to punish and exploit political and religious
dissidents in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet authorities not only have failed to provide
responses satisfactory to the ILO on any of these complaints,
but also have attacked the ILO supervisory machinery itself.
By its continuing refusal to cooperate with the ILO
authorities, the USSR has, in effect, assumed the burden of
proof with regard to the numerous and grave charges of forced'
labor lodged against it. We believe it is incumbent upon the
Soviet authorities to open all of their labor camps and
large-scale labor brigades to independent international
investigation.
The Honorable
Jamie L. Whitten, Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives
65
- 2 -
We welcome Congressional interest in this question. Forced
labor in the USSR is a broad human rights issue which has long
been of of deep concern to the Administration, as expressed
most recently in our official statement of September 22.
Decency compels us to express distress at the Soviet Union's
exploitation of forced labor. For those who believe in the
promotion of world peace through law, it is crucial that the
international community investigate and seek remedial action
when confronted with serious charges of violations of
international agreements. Obviously, the closed nature of
Soviet society renders difficult the discovery of hard facts
and irrefutable evidence. But be assured that we will continue
diligently to conduct this investigation. We also are pursuing
this issue vigorously through the ILO.
As our preliminary report, I am transmitting under this
cover a copy of the Administration's statement of September 22
and a packet of reports and documents which will provide for
you the status of our efforts up to now. This packet includes
a historical summary of Soviet forced labor questions before
the ILO; a study entitled "The Soviet Forced Labor System,"
which includes maps and graphics of the pipeline network and
forced labor camps; documentation and testimony from hearings
sponsored by the Frankfurt-based International Society for
Human Rights; and a summary of actions by other governments and
international labor bodies. Intelligence information pertinent
to the issue will be made available through the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees.
Sincerely
Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations
Enclosure:
Preliminary report
Letter to Whitten
Draft: EUR/P:TJClear
Approve: EUR:RBurt
Clear: WH/OPB/OPT:RSchuettinger
NSC : WRaymond
NSC:PDobrianski
DOD/ASD/ISP : DFeith
DOL/ILAB:GHolmes
DOL/ILAB:TKucherov
CIA : SMoscowitz
CIA : JBeckwith
CIA/SOVA/SE/M:AGoodman
CIA/OGI/GD/ERA:CMalanick
CIA/SOVA/SE:DWhitehouse
USIA/EU:APerlman
USIA/P:FKnecht
USIA/P/G:RMcLellan
DOS/EUR/SOV:LGoodrich
DOS/PA/OAP:SKane
DOS/INR/SEE:DGraves
DOS/S/IL:DTurnquist
DOS/HA/PP:HSimon
DOS/EUR/P:SSteiner
DOS/IO/LAB: : PHilburn
DOS/EUR:MPalmer
DOS/H/EUR:TTowell
DOS/P:RHecklinger
0709A
September 22, 1982
PRESS STATEMENT
Forced Labor in the USSR
We have received a growing number of reports that the USSR
has used a large number of prisoners -- including, thousands of
political prisoners -- to work on massive labor projects.
According to at least one such report, for example, at least
100,000 such forced laborers are being used on the heavy
infrastructure work of clearing swamps, cutting timber and
buiding access roads for the Yamal gas pipeline. These forced
laborers reportedly include religious dissidents and other
prisoners of conscience.
These reports have come from a wide variety of individuals
and organizations, in Europe, Asia and the US. The sources
include human rights organizations; labor organizations;
laborers who have managed to emigrate from the Soviet Union
after working under these conditions; and letters reaching Asia
and the West from the USSR.
We are not claiming to have evidence resembling a "smoking
gun. " Given the closed nature of Soviet society and the
official control of the Soviet media, moreover, there may never
be a "smoking gun. But the information being released by this
wide range of knowledgeable individuals and organizations
spanning three continents, some with first hand experience of
these labor conditions, goes into considerable detail and
deserves serious examination.
Reliable estimates place the total number of forced
laborers in the Soviet Union today at approximately 4 million.
Further, it is well established that the Soviet Union has a
history of using forced labor on a mass scale -- including
political prisoners -- on major projects, particularly in
Siberia -- where the official press has acknowledged that it is
difficult to persuade Soviet workers to go there voluntarily.
To cite only two examples, some 250,000 forced laborers are
believed to have perished during the 1930's while working on
the construction of the Bielomorsk Canal. And in the 1970's
thousands of forced laborers were reported to be building the
Baikal-Amur railway extension in Southeastern Siberia.
As regards foreign laborers, the official Soviet media
itself has admitted that several thousand Vietnamese and other
Southeast Asian laborers have been imported into the USSR and
has intimated that many thousands more are likely to be
imported in the near future. Information on the nature of this
-2-
program is fragmentary. We do not know whether or not the
Vietnamese laborers are working on the Siberian pipeline. But
we are very concerned about indications that Vietnamese may be
coerced into working in the USSR and Eastern Europe and that a
portion of the salary paid to them might be deducted to offset
Vietnam's debts to the host country. In addition, we have
received reports that the Soviet authorities are placing
limitations on the ability of these workers to communicate with
their families and friends outside the USSR. We believe it is
important that international attention be given to this
situation, given the obvious possibility of exploitation of
these workers.
The Soviet Government could contribute to establishing the
truth about these very serious charges by permitting an
objective examination of labor conditions on its various
Siberian projects, and the conditions in which Soviet political
prisoners live and work. We would welcome sucb an independent
international investigation, but the prospects for obtaining
this are probably not bright. For example, charges of use of
forced labor have been made in the past against the USSR in the
International Labor Organization (ILO). However the Soviet
authorities have consistently refused to allow an ILO mission
to visit the USSR to investigate these charges.
Because of the seriousness of these charges, and the
massive human rights violations which they imply, we believe
the international community has a responsibility to investigate
them. The USG, for its part, is thoroughly examining the
information being brought to bear on this issue, and we
understand that several other governments have indicated
similar intentions. As our examination proceeds, we will --
wherever possible -- make our findings available to the
public. We hope that other governments and private
organizations will do the same.
716A
U.S. Department of Labor
Bureau of International Labor Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20210
OFLABOR OF LABOR
October, 1982
UNITED STATES OF
The International Labor Organization:
FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION
For close to thirty years the Soviet Union has been under
more or less constant pressure from the International Labor
Organization (ILO) to bring its law and practice into line
with international treaties on forced labor. (See attached
chronology.) The ILO is the only UN agency with tripartite
representation (i.e., governments, workers and employers).
At times, ILO pressure has taken the form of outright cen-
sure of Soviet policies. Today, the primary points of con-
tention in the ILO are Soviet laws concerning persons
"leading a parasitic way of life" and those concerning mem-
bership on collective farms (kolkhoz). These laws are
viewed by the ILO as legislative mechanisms for sustaining
and legitimizing a system of forced or compulsory labor.
UN Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor
The first time forced labor in the Soviet Union was raised
as a serious issue came in 1948 when the AF of L proposed
that the ILO initiate a survey of forced labor in all member
countries. However, since the USSR had been expelled from
the ILO in December 1939 following its invasion of Finland,
but was a member of the fledgling UN, responsibility for the
survey was partly assumed by ECOSOC. The survey was finally
conducted in 1952 by an independent Commission of Inquiry
(appointed jointly by the ILO and ECOSOC), and completed in
1953.
Generally, the Commission found little evidence of forced
labor in non-communist countries. But the Commission left
no doubt that in both law and practice the Soviet Union
employs forced labor for the interests of the national eco-
nomy and as a means of political coercion:
"Given the general aims of Soviet penal legislation,
its definitions of crime in general and of political
offenses in particular, the restrictions it imposes on
the rights of the defense in cases involving political
offenses, the extensive powers of punishment it
accords to purely administrative authorities in
respect of persons considered to constitute a danger to
society, and the purpose of political re-education it
assigns to penalties of corrective labour served in
camps, in colonies, in exile and even at the normal
70
-2-
place of work, this legislation constitutes the basis
of a system of forced labor employed as a means of
political coercion or punishment for holding or
expressing political views and it is evident from the
many testimonies examined by the Committee that this
legislation is in fact employed in such a way."
"Soviet legislation makes provision for various
measures which involve compulsion to work or place
restrictions on the freedom of employment; these
measures seem to be applied on a large scale in the
interests of the national economy, and considered as a
whole, they lead, in the Committee's view, to a system
of forced or compulsory labour constituting an impor-
tant element in the economy of the country."
(Italics added. Source: Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Forced Labour, Geneva (1953), p.98)
The report was adopted first by ECOSOC in 1954, and later by
the ILO in 1956, two years after the USSR renewed ILO mem-
bership. Needless to say, the Soviet bloc vehemently
opposed adoption of the Commission's conclusions. Perhaps in
an effort to strengthen its denial of the Commission's
conclusions, that same year (1956) the USSR ratified ILO
Convention 29 concerning Abolition of Forced Labor.
Convention 29 was formulated by the ILO in 1930, and is pri-
marily aimed at the abolition of forced labor in colonial
territories. (See attached summary of Convention 29 for
definition of forced labor.)
ILO Regular Supervision
While ratification may have been important to improve its
political image, this step brought the USSR under the pur-
view of ILO regular supervisory machinery. As a signatory,
the USSR became legally bound to report annually (now
biennially) on its implementation of Convention 29.
The ILO's regular supervisory process is composed of two
steps: the first is a legal review of government reports by a
19-member independent Committee of Experts (COE), the second
a more political review by a Conference Committee on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CACR).
While the COE currently has two members from the Soviet bloc
(USSR and Poland), it has gained a solid reputation of
objectivity and impartiality which rests on the fact that
its members are highlyrespected international lawyers and
jurists who, in theory, act independently of their govern-
ments.
71
-3-
Every year, in March, the COE issues an analysis of how well
member States are living up to their treaty obligations.
This report is then passed to the CACR which meets during,
and is part of, the annual ILO June Conference. Here,
governments are called on -- mainly by the workers and
employers groups -- to explain discrepancies between the
Convention and their law and practice. Depending on whether
or not the workers and employers groups are satisfied with
government explanations, the case can be "adjourned" until
the next review session or it can be highlighted in the
CACR's report on a so-called "special list."
ILO Censure of Soviet Forced Labor
Fifteen years after ratification, in 1971, the Committee of
Experts issued its first public report on the USSR's applica-
tion of Convention 29. Its report explained the ILO's long
silence: since 1962 the Experts had been sending direct
requests to the Soviet government for information on com-
pulsory labor of persons "evading socially useful work and
leading an anti-social, parasitic way of life." Since the
information received from the Soviet government had been
unsatisfactory, repeated requests were made over a period of
ten years.
Nevertheless, the 1971 report marked a renewed ILO interest
in public examination of Soviet forced labor policies.
While the Experts' report did not lead to a full-blown
discussion at the 1971 ILO Conference, in subsequent years
the ILO did highlight in the "special list" and "special
paragraphs" of the CACR report the continuing Soviet failure
to uphold Convention 29. Such censure of Soviet policies by
the ILO Conference is the most forceful means available to
the ILO to bring pressure to bear on the government.
In its 1971 report the Experts concluded that under a "Ukase"
(decree) of 1961, as amended in 1965 and again in 1970, com-
pulsory labor could be ordered by an administrative body (the
Executive Committee of a Soviet of Working People's
Deputies), non-compliance being punishable by imprisonment or
corrective labor. Since labor is exacted under a menace of
penalty, not performed voluntarily, the Experts view Soviet
law as contravening Convention 29.
The next year, in 1972 the COE noted that the new Labor Code
of the RSFSR adopted in 1971 no longer contained a provision
permitting the call-up.of labor for "carrying out important
state work." However, the Experts reiterated their call for
the abolition of compulsory labor involving so-called
"parasites."
-4-
In 1974, for the first time, no report had been received
from the Soviet government. Nevertheless, the COE issued a
report that took public issue with (a) the obligations
imposed on collective farms with regard to planning of agri-
cultural production, (b) the restrictions preventing ter-
mination of membership on a collective farm, and (c)
anti-parasite legislation.
What happened at the 1974 ILO Conference broke a long, tacit
moratorium on public denunciation of the Soviet Union. The
CACR, working from the Experts' report, formally took up the
issue of forced labor in the Soviet Union, resulting in a
protracted and heated debate. The Soviet government rep-
resentative adamantly refused to admit any of the Experts'
findings or to accept the need for any remedial action. In
an historic decision, the CACR decided by vote to impose the
most severe form of censure on the USSR for violating
Convention 29: criterion 7 of the "special list."
When the CACR report came up for adoption in the plenary
Conference, quorum was not reached, due primarily to a con-
figuration of political issues bringing together the Soviet
and Arab blocs. This lack of formal endorsement, however,
did not nullify or abort the supervisory process. The Soviet
government was still required to report the next year on its
progress toward upholding forced labor standards.
The ILO continued to apply pressure on the Soviet Union, par-
ticularly in 1976 and 1977 when the CACR criticized the USSR
in a special paragraph of its report for not respecting
Convention 29. In 1977 there was a repeat of the 1974
events, with the CACR report not being adopted due to the
lack of a quorum.
Since 1977, the ILO has not formally censured the USSR on the
forced labor issue. But almost every year at the June
Conference the CACR continues to examine, question and probe
the Soviet delegation for admissions, concessions, promises.
Despite this pressure the Soviet response remains unsatisfactory.
1/ The "special list", developed in 1964, included seven
criteria, arranged into two separate groups. The first six
concerned the supply of reports and information to the
Experts and ILO Conference, not matters of substance. The
seventh criterion, listed under a separate heading
"Application of Ratified Conventions", was applied to
governments that had demonstrated a "continued failure to
implement fully the Conventions concerned." The "special
paragraph" was considered to be a somewhat less severe form
of censure. The "special list" system was revised in 1980.
13
-5-
Current Issues: Persons "Leading a Parasitic Way of Life"
The history of this aspect of the Soviet forced labor issue
has been marked by a total reluctance on the part of the
Soviet government to concede that its legislation infringes
Convention 29. When in 1975 earlier anti-parasite legisla-
tion was repealed, following pressure from the Experts and
Conference Committee, it was immediately replaced by Section
209 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR to which the COE has taken
exception ever since. Specifically, under current legisla-
tion a "parasite" is defined as someone living off unearned
income, unemployed, earning money through illegal means, or
evading socially useful labor.
In their current observations, the Experts cover familiar
ground: the Soviet government persistently claims that
Section 209, and Ordinances of 1973 and 1976 which also
define vagrancy, can be applied only to gamblers and
fortune-tellers. However, the Experts argue that these laws
do not specify "only" gamblers and fortune-tellers, and can
therefore be applied to any physically capable person who is
unemployed.
The use of Section 209 (whether actual or potential) is
viewed by the Experts as a means of directly or indirectly
compelling all citizens to work. The Experts argue that if
the Penal Code provision is indeed aimed at illegal income
from fortune-telling or gambling, then it should be amended
to reflect this fact.
The Conference Committee has often taken the issue one step
further, discussing how legislation has been applied in
practice. A frequent example submitted by the CACR is that
of dissidents who are fired, unable to find employment within
their allowed district of employment due to "troublemaker"
status, then arrested several months later for leading a
"parasitic way of life". The charge may involve imprison-
ment, exile, or detainment in a corrective labor camp. In
other words, CACR discussions lead one to the conclusion that
Soviet legislation on parasites plays a central role in admi-
nistrative control of dissidents and of those refused Soviet
exit permission.
Recently, in 1980 when the Soviet government was under
extreme pressure from the CACR, the Soviet representative
unexpectedly agreed that the legislation on parasitism should
be clarified, and he stated that new formulations could be
74
-6-
expected before the next Conference. Indeed, he claimed that
discussions and consultations with the ILO Secretariat were
already underway. However, subsequent Soviet positions at
the 1981 and 1982 Conferences revealed that no new legisla-
tion would be forthcoming.
Termination of membership on collective farms
Although the Soviet position has appeared to be somewhat less
rigid in regard to this issue, its implications in terms of
Soviet agriculture are far-reaching.
As in the case of "parasites", the Soviet legal position is
straightforward: members of a collective farm cannot pre-
sently leave it unless its management committee and general
meeting consent. This inhibition of freedom of movement is
tightened further by a requirement that collective farmers
cannot take up other employment unless they produce their
work books which must be maintained by the farm management.
This too is a restriction on the choice of work.
The CACR has frequently pointed out the problems with this
legislation. If management denies a request to leave the
farm or refuses to hand over the workbook, the worker is
either forced to stay on the farm or risk unemployment and
subsequent arrest for leading a "parasitic" way of life. The
ILO Experts have repeatedly asked the Soviet government to
amend its legislation so that workers on farms may terminate
their membership, or employment, by simply giving management
sufficient notice of their intention to leave.
Five times in recent years the Soviet government has promised
that the problem was being solved. In 1977 the government
stated that "measures (to) put the legislation formally into
line with (Convention 29)" would be taken "before the next
session of the Committee of Experts and maybe even earlier."
In 1978, the government indicated that "consultations which
were under way (with the ILO were) well advanced and that
it could be hoped that they would lead to a solution in the
near future. Again in 1979, its report referred to these
consultations, prompting the COE to express hope that "the
government will soon be able to indicate the solution
adopted."
In 1980, the USSR representative claimed that his government
understood the COE's point of view, adding that:
"consultations were under way aiming not at the establishment
75
-7-
of the right to leave a collective farm but at clearly
spelling it out. It was therefore not a question of
substance but of formulation." In other words, the Soviet
government appeared to be claiming that legislation already
granted the right to leave a collective farm, but just needed
to be further clarified.
Finally, in 1982 the Soviet government reiterated that con-
sultations are being held with the Soviet employer and trade
union organizations concerned. In addition, it pointed to a
decree adopted on March 4, 1982 concerning timely con-
sideration of a member's request to leave a farm as evidence
of Soviet compliance with Convention 29. However, a question
was raised by the US worker delegate about Order No. 597
adopted by the Central Committee of the Council of Ministers
on July 10, 1980 and which amended the model rules for
collective farms. This issue remains unresolved and further
discussion can be expected at the 1984 Conference.
Limitations on ILO Supervision of Soviet Forced Labor
The means available to the ILO to exert pressure on the
Soviet Union, despite the efforts noted above, is necessarily
limited. Convention 29 is by no means the only, or most
important treaty formulated by the ILO on forced labor.
Indeed, in 1957 the ILO adopted a Convention (No. 105 con-
cerning the abolition of forced labor) which is in many ways
more applicable to the modern state, and certainly more rele-
vant to the use of forced labor in the Soviet Union.
Convention 105 prohibits a government from employing forced
labor for purposes of: political coercíon or discipline;
economic development; racial, social, national or religious
discrimination; labor discipline; or punishment for having
participated in strikes. This Convention, however, cannot be
applied to the USSR because the USSR it is not a signatory
state. Consequently, the ILO is only able to pursue the
issue of Soviet forced labor under the provisions of
Convention 29, which is not as relevant or powerful an
instrument as would be Convention 105.
76
CHRONOLOGY
1940
USSR no longer an ILO member. Expelled from
ILO in December 1939 following its invasion
of Finland.
1948
AF of L proposes survey of forced labor.
1952
Joint ILO and ECOSOC Committee conducts survey
on forced labor (UN Ad Hoc Committee on Forced
Labor).
1953
ECOSOC approves forced labor survey.
1954
USSR rejoins ILO.
1956
ILO approves forced labor survey.
USSR ratifies ILO Convention 29 concerning
abolition of forced labor.
1962-
1970
ILO Committee of Experts (COE) requests infor-
mation from Soviet government on its application
of Convention 29.
1971
COE's first report on Soviet adherence to'
Convention 29.
1974
ILO Conference Committee on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (CACR) censures
Soviet Union for non-compliance with Convention
29 under criterion 7 of the "special list";
report not adopted by the Conference.
1976
CACR highlights Soviet failure to adhere to
Convention 29 in a special paragraph of its
report; report is adopted by the Conference.
1977
CACR again highlights Soviet Union in a special
paragraph of its report; report is not adopted
by the Conference.
77
ILO CONVENTION NO. 29
Convention Concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labor, 1930
Convention 29 defines "forced or compulsory labor" as "all work or service
which is exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which the
said person has not offered himself voluntarily." States which ratify
Convention 29 undertake to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labor in
all its forms, and within the shortest possible period.
The Convention specifically prohibits forced or compulsory labor imposed for
the benefit of private individuals, companies or associations, exacted as a
tax, or used to punish a community for crimes committeed by any of its mem-
bers. Convention 29 also requires the abolition of forced labor for the
transport of persons or goods (e.g. porters and boatmen) and for work
underground in mines. Compulsory cultivation may only be authorized as a
precaution against famine or deficiency of food supplies, and only under the
conditions that the produce remains the property of those producing it.
Five kinds of work or service are exempted from the Convention's definition of
forced labor: compulsory military service, certain civic obligations, certain
forms of prison labor, work exacted in emergencies and minor communal ser-
yices. Prison labor is allowed provided that it is supervised by a public
authority, and not used by private companies or individuals.
However, before resorting to forced or compulsory labor, the highest civil
authority of the territory must have determined:
(a) that the work is of important direct interest to the community called upon
to do the work;
(b) that the work is of present or imminent necessity;
(c) that it has been impossible to obtain voluntary labor by offering wage
rates and working conditions not less favorable than those prevailing for
similar work;
(d) that the work will not lay too heavy a burden on the present population,
taking into consideration the labor available and its capacity to undertake
the work.
Other selected provisions of the Convention include:
(a) no person may be subject to forced or compulsory labor for more than
sixty days per year, including the time spent traveling to place of
employment.
(b) such persons shall be paid prevailing wage rates, incuding overtime.
(c) such persons shall work normal hours, including days of rest and holi-
days.
Other articles of the Convention set out standards governing workmen's com-
pensation, safety and health, and age limits.
78
The Use
of Forced
Labor
on the
Siberian
Gas-Pipeline
DOCUMENTATION
ISHR
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
IGFM
79
CONTENT
page
Map: Gas-Pipeline Siberia-Europe
1
Preface - Dr. Reinhard Gnauck
2
Extract from the Soviet Constitution of 1977
3
It is nothing new Yuri Below
4
Extract from the Nuremberg-Process-Judgement
5
A juridical historic commentary - Prof. Wosslensky
6
Definitions
9
Selected statements by witnesses - from the West
10
- Peter Bergmann
1
- Avraham Shifrin
12
- Machmet Kulmagambetov
13
- Einar Komp
14
- Georgii Dawydov
14
- Boris Weil
15
- Julia Vosnessanskaya
16
Description of the camp Ja Z - - 34/2 in Tyumen
17
Selected statements by witnesses - from the Soviet Union
24
- A. P. , Moscow
24
- P. S. , Moscow
25
- I. P. , Tyumen
26
Literature
28
Literature - compiled by Prof. A. Kamínski
30
Open-Letter to the Chancellor
32
Press-Review
34
ISHR organizes help: "EURO-Parcels for the Poorest of the Poor" 38
What is the ISHR (IGFM)?
39
Yamal
Medveshye
KOMI ASSR
Vuktyl
Salechard
URENGOY
Neftejunansk
Mikun
Punga
Ivdel
CHANTY-
LENINGRAD
MANSI
SURGUT
Serov
Ust-Ischim
Beryosove
TYUMEN
Tavda
MOSCOW
Kunour
Lysva
UBHGOROD
S S R
C
R
P
GAS-PIPELINE SIBERIA-EUROPE
= forced labour camp
PREFACE
In recent months, reports gathered from telephone calls and letters arriving
from the Soviet Union have confirmed that large numbers of prisoners are being
employes as cheap labour on the construction of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline
to Europe, There are civil rights campaigners, prisoners of conscience,
victims of religious persecution and even women to be found amongst these
prisoners.
As in the case of other large construction projects in the USSR the work is
performed under inhuman conditions: with poor food, clothing and accommodation,
and severe punishments for failure to achieve the desired output.
The reports on the human dimension of the pipeline are at first hand. They are
a sign from the prisoners themselves, a call for help!
For this reason the ISHR (IGFM) released the information to the press and thereby
to the public. The ISHR (IGFM) also appealed to the German Chancellor Schmidt
to drop the projects on humanitarian grounds, in an open letter reproduced on
page32 The response surprised us all. From the public at large the reaction was
one of overwhelming support. The proofs are increasing each day. However,
whilst the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still looking into the matter, Chancellor
Schmidt has already informed concerned members of the public that these reports
are "not true". The Soviet news agency, Tass, even speaks of "filthy lies".
(8th August 1982)
The ISHR (IGFM) therefore has provided a documentary file so that the reader may
reach his own decision. We should like to suggest to the governments of Western
Europe, that they have the working conditions on the pipeline investigated by
an international committe of trades unionists. We feel that this is also in the best
interest of the Soviet Union.
We hope that our efforts will lead to renewed reflection about this pipeline project.
Should we share the guilt of exploiting forced labourers? The Nuremberg processes
condemned the use of concentration camp prisoners as forced labour. So too,
does the United Nations regularly condemn the use of forced labour as slavery.
We too can play our part. We as the ISHR (IGFM) should like to ask all concerned
people to stand up and be counted - send a parcel to a prisoner or to his family.
We can assisst you to do so (see page 38).
Reinhard Gnauck, M.D.
Francfort/M., in August 1982
Chairman
International Society for Human Rights
(Internationale Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte e. V.)
CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNION
OF THE SOCIALIST
SOVIET REPUBLICS
adopted at the
7th Extraordinary Session of
the Prime Soviet of USSR
at the
9th Legislation Period
on 7th October 1977
Статья 60. Обязанность и дело чести каждого спо-
собного K труду гражданина CCCP - добросовестный
труд B избранной им области общественно полезной
деятельности, соблюдение трудовой дисциплины. Укло-
нение oT общественно полезного труда несовместимо
C принципами социалистического общества.
Article 60.
It is the duty and the honour of every citizen
of the USSR who is able to work to provide
conscientous labour in his common and useful
field of work chosen by him and the observation
of discipline at work.
Any refusal to perform useful labour to the
benefit of the society is not comparable with
the principles of the socialist society.
The last category includes finally those who being either
Disablement claims of a prisoneræe generally not
prisoners nor banished are sentenced to penal servitude by
accepted. Article 27 oftièprinciples of the legisla-
verdict of the court and carry on working in the same shop as
tion for correction labour" stipulates: "work is
before their judgment. However the greatest part of their
compulsory for all prisoners". Consequently every-
salary is withheld by the state. It is maybe the most impudent
body is bound to work and fulfil the work norms even
form of slavery in the Soviet Union. A variant of this form is
disabled of the first group who in civil are in bed-
"the 15 days detention for hooliganism". The people concerned
ridden state and dependent on assistance of others.
are to word as unskilled workers of burden carriers. This last
They are also expected to work 48 hours and have no
group of servitude labourers constitutes the psycholøgical
vacation privilege And either the advanced age or
and social bridge between the "free" salves of the Soviet
the qualification of prisoners is taken into consi-
society and the slaves of state.
deration by the administration.
The labour colonies are subdivided into four different regimes:
Only the regime of the labour colony is of decisive
importance. The principles stipulate expressively that
1. the general regime
2. the strengthened regime
people detained in colonies with severe regime are
3. the severe regime
4. the special regime.
to be assigned to heavy work. But as the Soviet news-
paper "Kasachstanskaja Prawda" mentioned, and this
There are furthermore five groups of colonies for the people
applies also to other colonies:
"Prisoners are princi-
who have commited a crime through want of care or imprudence,
pally to perform the heaviest work. and the work norms
as well as six groups of colonies for people "being already on
are critical values. We can change nothing about it.
the mend" (these last groups are collecting camps where the
A labour colony is not a sanatorium but a penal' esta-
conditions of detention are no more quite so hard). In the
blishment where one works in the sweat of thy brow".
prisons there are two regimes: the general regime and the
What does labour cost to the state? Almost nothing.
severe regime.
The greatest part of the wages of those hard workers
In the Soviet Union the penal execution is not limited to the
is withdrawn:
detention. Its main principle is to exploit as much as possible
1. To cover the maintenance charges of the admini-
the sentenced people. So it was in the GOULAG of Stalin and
stration - i.e. guards and supervisors costs.
so it is nowadays. But the second principle of the Soviet
2. For the food and clothing of prisoners.
execution of punishment was modified in the course of years.
As the state has no other expenses in connection
Under the commandment of Stalin (from 1939) these principles
with the existence of the prisoners, the Soviet forced
were exploitation and extermination. The alm was "expiation
labourers finance themselves their slavery. All de-
through privations and suffering". As the manual of the Uni-
ductions made it remains to the prisoner 10 % of his
versity Lomonossov in Moscow in the chapters treating
wages (25 % for disabled of the first and second
The Soviet Legislation for Correction Labour" states it,
groups). However even this ridiculous remaining amount
a punishment is unconceivable without expiation, consequently
is paid only if the prisoner has not offended the
without suffering and privations.
regime of the colony and fulfilled the work norms.
In case the prisoner has not fulfil these conditions
Nowadays the Soviet legislation allows no more to inflict
(what happens quite often) he receives no salary at
"useless suffering, not indispensable for the aim of the
all. Furthermore the administration is in title to
punishment". It is of course an uncurrate notion which can be
assign the prisoner to underpaid jobs such as main-
interpreted in different manners.
tenance of the colony and adjoining estates.
In short, if the camps of Stalin were camps of extermination,
In his writing "About the Dialectical and Historical
the present colonies are centers of torture, where the main
Materialism" Stalin has characterised amongst other
method is the intensified exploitation of manpower.
things the extent of exploitation in different social
orders. The exploitation of soviet prisoners corres-
For prisoners the scheduled time of work is 48 hours a week
ponds to the exploitation of slaves in slave-hołding
against. 41 hours for the "free" wage labour in the Soviet Union.
societies
described by Stalin, and on the
The prisoners have no vacation privilege even if they have been
model of which he probably organized the Soviet labour
sentenced to 15 or 25 years. The only day off is Sunday but also
camps.
this day can be declared working day by the administration of
In connection with correction labour the Soviet legislation
the colonies. The years detention do not count as years of
states "a legal relationship between the Soviet state and
service and are consequently not considered when the person
retires. If a prisoner becomes disabled during the years of
detention, he is not in title to receive disable pension
until he is set free.
IT IS NOTHING NEW
There has been forced labour in the Soviet Union since the very first day of
it's existence.
Lenin considered forced labour to be the best means of creating the "new man".
It was supposed to stimulate the collective consciousness in people. The founders
of the Soviet Union valued man only in terms of their use to society. They con-
sidered human beings only as a tool.
The first forced labourers in the Soviet Union were intellectuals and orthodox
priests, imprisoned on the Solovetskii Islands in the White Sea in the year 1918.
Later, millions of people, accused of the most various crimes, were interned in
prison camps. Most of the accusations were purely pretexts, used to generate
cheap labour. In the 30 years since Stalin's death, such prisoners as these have
built hundreds of factories, canals, roods and whole towns. All of these were
so-called "Great achievements of Communism", including such projects as the White
Sea - Baltic Canal, the Dnieper hydro-electric works, the BAM (Baikal-Amur-
-Magistrale railway), the Moscow Underground, the Volga-Don Canal and huge metal
foundries in the Urals and Kazachstan.
Millions of prisoners died before Kruschev exposed Stalin's personality cult in
1956. However whilst only sentenced prisoners had been inducted into forced
labour up till then, Kruschev introduced a change: henceforth only an administra-
tive order was necessary to force people to work.
The tragedy of all this is the way in which these prisoners are deprived of all
their rights, are made to live in inhumane conditions separated from their
families and suffer from malnutrition and insufficient medical care.
Our attention should not be directed exclusively to the prisoners of conscience.
All men have a right to decent treatment and so we should be concerned for all
categories of forced labourers.
If we are not careful, we too shall suffer because of the existence of forced
labour. No man is an island, and we run the risk of coarsening ourselves and
our civilisation by allowing ourselves to become accustomed to the fact of
forced labour.
Yuri Below
Francfort, in August 1982
Leader of the working group on the USSR
in the International Society for Human Rights
85
"Regarding crimes against humanity,
there is no doubt that political opponents
have been murdered in Germany before the war
and that many of them were detained in
concentration camps under disgracing and
horrible conditions. Such policy of horror
has certainly been pursued in a great style
and was in many cases pre-fixed and organized."
Extracted from a judgement of the
Nuremberg Processes - 1946
NATIONAL SLAVES IN THE SOVIET UNION
However the method of extermination was different. In the
A JURIDICAL HISTORIC COMMENTARY
camps of Stalin the prisoners were rarely executed or murdered
they died rather of exhaustion due to famine and cold as well
by Prof. Michael Wosslensky, Munich
as to the hard work they performed.
After the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
The usual Soviet formula proclaims vehemently:
Union (Feburary 1956) the execution of punishment in the Soviet
The Soviet State was born with the word "Peace" on the lips.
Union was a little humanized. The word "colony" replaced the
Another expression followed soon afterwards: penal servitude
word "camp". GOULAG (Administration of the camps of the Home
Office in the Soviet Union) was changed into GOUITU (Adminis-
On 18th January 1918 only two months after the October Revolution
trative body for penitentiary matters) and the number of
the Commissariat of Justice Issued a decree concerning "penal
prisoners decreased. It increased again in the course of the
working groups".
last ten years.
The first concentration camps, houses of correction and penal
But the principles of the Soviet execution of punishment
labour colonies were established during the Red Terror in
September 1918. In spring 1919 the 8th Congress of the Party
remainded unchanged. The prisoners are exploited to slave
Assembly formulated the program of the Bolshevist Party
labour, and in the opinion of the Western countries they are
specifying amongst other things the principles of the
still very many. In the Soviet towns there are on an average
execution of punishment in the Soviet Union: in future
as many prisons as in the Occidental towns, but in 1971 only
prisons were to be replaced by houses of correction "in order
0,3 % of condemned people were detained in prisons and it is
to subjugate the condamned persons to a producing work useful
well known that the Soviet prisons are overcrowded.
to the society".
As a result there are in the Soviet Union 330 times more
In the year 1929 Trotzky justified the must of penal servitude
prisoners of other categories. They amount therefore to
in socialism and advocated the "militarisation of labour" and
several millions. and form a special class of the Soviet
the creation of "labour armies".
Society: the class of the national slaves.
After Stalin had come to power, instead of the labour armies
In the paper I read at the 2nd World Congress for Soviet
the concentration camps became the core of penal servitude.
and Eastern studies (Garmisch Partenkirchen, 30.9.-4.10.1980)
I already mentioned the existence of this lowest class of the
On March 1928 a decree was issued concerning "penal policy
Soviet society.
and the status of penal institutions" as an extension of
labour colonies.
The constitution of the Soviet Union does not mention it -
with the exception possibly of a vague allusion in its
The decree of 6th November 1929 of the Central Executive
article 60: "The refusal to accomplish a labour useful to
Committee and the Council of the Commissarles of the Soviet
the society is incompatible with the principles of the
Union defined penal institutions as being houses of correction
socialist society".
In remote regions of the Soviet Unions as well as labour
colonies for those people whose punishment did not exceed
Other official Soviet sources such as "The Principles of the
three years.
Legislation for Correction Labour in the Soviet Union and the
Republics of the Union or the Penal Codes of the Republics of
In the course of the liquidation of the Koulaks as a class,
the Union and the Manual "The Soviet Legislation for Correction
the stalinien labour camps played a new role. ^ decree
Labour" give information about the status of theses disfran-
issued on 7th April 1939 concerning the penal labour camps
chised people.
asserted that contrarily to the concentration camps of the
bourgeols regimes, they were no institutions serving the
Most of them are detained in colonies for correction labour
purpose to exterminąte physically the ennemies of the class.
and in case of juvenile delinquents in colonies for educational
labour.
As this was written three years before the Nazis came to
power and the first extermination camps appeared, the train
Apart from the prisoners included in the categories mentioned
of thoughts of Stalin can be followed easily. Indeed from
above, there are also the slave labourers who are not consi-
1939 the camps in the Soviet Union became real extermination
dered as prisoners: the banished who live in exile under the
camps. The evidence is given by the number of their victims.
supervision of the local. authorities, are forced to slave
Under the command of Kruschev five to six millions of
labour but allowed to move about freedly within the limits
these victims of the GOULAG were posthumously rehabilited.
of the place where they are living in exile. As this category
But this was only a few of them. The Koulaks for instance
of slave labourers was previously assigned to the construction
have never been rehabilited, although Kruschev confided
of important chemical plants, one calls them in slang "chemists"
to Churchill that the number of Koulaks exterminated in the
As to the prisoners, in the slang of the camps one calls them
Stalinien camps amounted to more than 10 millions that is
"Zek " (an abbreviation of the word "zakloutchonny" prisoner.
more than in the concentration camps of the Nazis.
the sentenced people" and he insists on the fact that
Sources:
this relationship is not set forth in a contract but
originates from a judgment execution and ends on the
day the prisoner is legally discharged or dies.
1. "Swod uzakonenlj", Moskwa 1918. Nr. 19, Art. 284
2. "Programma KPSS", Moskwa 1961. Seite 106
In the definition of slave exploitation given by Stalin it is pointed out
3. L. Trotzky: Terrorism and Communism", Ann-Ha:bour-Un. 1961.
that slaves may be sold, tortured or even killed. This applies to
pp. 134 - 147, 168 - 169
Soviet prisoners. The German Democratic Republic is the only country
4. "Sbornik Normatiwnych Aktow po Sowjetskomu Isprawitelno-Trudowomu-
of the East Block where It is usual practice to sell prisoners to other
Prawu", Moskwa 1959. Seite 206
states. On the other hand in the Soviet Union prisoners may be
5. dto. Selte 224
"leased" to other institutions through the GOUITU. Some colonies
6. dto. Selte 231
serve as suppliers of labourers. The colony and the business in question
7. Slehe Ju. M. Tkatschewskij
conclude a contract according to which one party has to supply the
"Sow. Isprawitelno-Trudowoje Prawo", Moskwa 1971. Selte 38
labourers while the other binds Itself to organize the labour of prisoners
8. M. Wossienskij:"Clags-Structure of the Sovlet Society", (11. World Congress
In production zones specially prepared and is willing to pay the
for Sovlet and East-European Study), Garmiach-Partenkirchen 1980.
salary corresponding to the services - this saiary being paid of course
Selte 795
to the colony admin istration and not to the prisoner.
9. "Varfassung (Grundgesetz) der UdSSR", Moskau 1977. Seite 29
10. Ju. M. Tkatschewskij, a.a.O. Selte 23
Tortures and extermination of prisoners in practice under Stalin have
11. dto. Selte 23
been described above. Nowadays the Soviet penal execution represents
12. "Osnowy Trudowogo-lsprewltelnogo Sakonodatelstwa RSFSR" Art. 28
a permanent torture of the prisoners and we are not speaking of
13. dto. Art. 28
abuses commited by some officials but of rulesprescribed by the Soviet
14. Slehe "Osnowy ...", Art. 31
legislation.
15. Slehe "Osnowy Art. 27
16. "Kasachelanskaja Prewda", 14.3.1973
The Soviet law points out that the principal element
of the colony regime is "the compulsory isolation of
the sentenced people and their permanent surveillance".
The prisoners wear prison uniforms, their mail is sub-
mitted to censor, the parcels sent to them are control-
led. They are not allowed to have money or valuables
with them. Nonobservance is punished and the good seized
for the benefit of the state.
We have here deliberately not described infrigements or
official oppression from the authorities of the colonies.
Our information based only on soviet sources and espe-
cially on the Soviet legislation. The Soviet slave la-
bour is in the practice worse than the theory but the
theory is sufficient to enable to take a grave view of
the situation. It can also not hide the existence of
the slaves of state in the Soviet Union.
One can not choose one's neighbours and the social
structure in the pretended real socialism is as it is.
But this does not mean that the West may confidently
participate to the exploitation of the slave labourers
of the East. This causes a big political et moral da-
mage above all to the West itself.
DEFINITIONS
88
The people sentenced to slave labour in the Soviet Union are subdivided in
several categories:
1)
Banished persons: Many prisoners having served a sentance in a penal
camp are superimposed the punishment of banishment. Some are sent by the
court directly into banishment without having been sentenced first to detention
in a camp. Within the limits of the place where they have to stay as banished
persons, the sentenced people my move freely. However they remain permanently
under the control of the local police and must observe curfew. Without permis-
sion of the police they must not leave the place.
2)
Prisoners forced to slave labour in camp-owned factories or, if the fac-
tory or building site is not too far from the camp, are taken to work in convoy
under close guard.
3)a) Prisoners being granted conditional freedom sent generally only in
spring and summer to work on so-called "Great Economic Projects" i.e. the
gas pipeline. In the slang of the Soviet camps these sites are called
"chemistries" and the prisoners under limited control are the "chemists".
This category does not live in camps during its assignment there, is not under
the control of the guards of the camp. It is the reason why these people are called
"prisoners under limited supervision". They remain however under the
permanent control of the local police and are not allowed to leave the place.
In autumn they are generally taken back to their camp. The months spent at
the site of forced labour are not considered as time of detention, i.e. not
deducted from their sentence.
b) The people sent for "parasitism" either by sentence of the court or only
by order of the administration directly and without passing through a camp or
a prison to "Great Economic Projects". (The people who have worked on private
basis for themselves instead of for the state also fall into this category).
- "Great Economic Projects" are projects of national importance, to the
construction of which labourers from all parts of the Soviet Union are assigned.
- In statements made by witnesses one hears sometimes "prisoners" when
they mean "prisoners under limited control". Some witnesses speak generally
of sentenced people and make no difference between the categories.