Ask the Scholar
Page 1 of 1
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: [President Address: US-Soviet
Relations 01/16/1984]
Box: 31
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/18/2005
File Folder
[PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
FOIA
1/16/84]
F06-114/9
Box Number
31
YARHI-MILO
3111
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10825 MEMO
FORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET
3 1/7/1984 B1
SPEECH
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
10825
0179
MEMORANDUM
CONF IDENT TAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
January 7, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
FROM:
DONALD R. FORTIER RDF (dictated and
signed a his
SUBJECT:
Soviet Speech
assence) S.S.
In preparing for my trip to Turkey I have not had as much time as
I would have liked to devote to the Soviet speech. I am
concerned about the present draft, however, and wanted to pass on
my basic thoughts to you.
All of us agree that the time has come to demonstrate to a
broader Western audience that we are not guided by a blind and
uncomprehending form of anti-Sovietism. We have to send a
message of reassurance, in part to resolidify support for the
inevitable competition that we will continue to face and in part
to rebut the Soviet argument that the world is becoming a more
dangerous place.
The speech does convey a sense of reassurance, but it does so in
a rather simple way. The speech will not impress either domestic
or foreign audiences with its thoughtfulness, and it fails to
send a very concrete message to the Soviets--a fact that will
only help to contribute to the impression that we are aiming at
an electoral audience rather than trying to achieve more durable
substantive gains.
The emptiness of the message to the Soviets is particularly
apparent, I think, in the presentation of "our goals" in the
first half of the speech. Instead of anything concrete, these
include vague appeals to let the Third World focus on economic
development, or to abolish nuclear weapons, or to stop stealing
Western industrial secrets. I doubt these are appeals with much
meaning for the Soviets, who speak a more sober language of
power, security, and interest.
Just to take two obvious examples, the point about the Third
World that Moscow would best understand (but which is not made in
the current draft) is a statement that we are concerned about the
risk of confrontations that are in neither side's interest.
Similarly, the Soviets will not know what to make of the
off-handed way compliance is treated in the section of the speech
on establishing a better working relationship. They know this
CONF IDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify OADR
NLRR RF06-11419 #10825
BY KML NARA DATE4/7/2011
CONFIDENTIAL
2
problem is coming and want to see how the President deals with
it. In light of where we're likely to be by the time of the
speech, we run a major risk of being misunderstood if we don't
say more to indicate the gravity of our concern on this issue.
The speech, in my view, also needs to be more direct and candid
about some of the difficulties that we face in trying to solve
problems between us. If the President discusses these
difficulties, his main message--the expression of a forthcoming
desire to work on disagreements or conflicts--may in fact be
taken even more seriously.
Having said this, I don't think that improving the speech
requires starting over. One small change that might begin to
move it in the right direction is to build on the important claim
made at the beginning that we see some important potential
"opportunities for peace" at this time. The President should
then ask the question what do we and the Soviets have to do to
seize these opportunities?--and give concrete, thoughtful
answers. In this way, the "goals" of the present draft would
become "tasks," or "challenges," or problems to be solved.
By focusing on key immediate tasks rather than long-term goals
the President would sound more programmatic and purposeful than
he is likely to now. He needs to sound as though his policy is
designed to reach more than just distant and possibly
unattainable goals. (Each of these "tasks" or "challenges, I
might add, could usefully include some historical comparisons,
indicating how the nature of the task is different or harder than
in the past but also why the opportunity for progress now
exists--after three years of trying to get our message across to
Moscow.)
This change from "goals" to "tasks" would, with some significant
re-drafting, send a different message in the entire first half of
the speech. The talk about our desire to reduce the use of force
would, for example, be made much less airy, focusing more on what
each side has to do (and not do) to limit the risk of superpower
conflict. This can sound tough but it has a constructive side.
For example:
"We believe that the situation in the Middle East has been
made more dangerous for all concerned by the introduction of
thousands of additional Soviet military personnel into Syria
in the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at
limiting these dangers. This is just one of many situations
around the world in which the Soviet Union could bring its
influence to bear to reduce risks for both sides. The
confidence created by such progress would be valuable in
trying to deal with other aspects of our competition."
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Similarly, using the three tasks of U.S. -Soviet relations in the
present draft, the President could say that the second
task--reducing armaments--requires some serious thinking about
how to increase strategic stability. Rather than simply try to
top the Soviets in a vague commitment to a non-nuclear world, we
can challenge them with our commitment to specific negotiating
measures. For example:
"Our thinking in the area of arms control has led us to
embrace the build-down approach to reducing strategic
weapons. [ One sentence explaining build-down. ] We wish
the Soviet Union would do the same, and call on its leaders
to do SO. This is a time when we need more, not less
discussion of this approach, for it is a formula that could
make it possible for both sides to rethink many of their
strategic programs."
The Soviets would be greatly intrigued to hear a hint that we
might not have to build everything we plan, and would begin to
ask what systems this could mean. In short, we would have their
interest.
As for the final task--developing a constructive working
relationship-- President could again make hard points and
soft--hard on issues like the need for compliance with past
agreements, soft-sounding on the obvious fact that we are willing
to work even for small improvements in the relationship.
I have gone over this first half of the speech at some length
because once it is recast, the remainder can be devoted to
elaborating our approach. I have fewer difficulties with the
rest of the text as it now stands, but it too could be
strengthened by more concreteness. (And by less rhetoric that
could open us to ridicule. For example, the President can't say
that "ignorance" is a common enemy of the U.S. and the USSR. The
country with the world's largest censorship apparatus is not an
enemy of ignorance!)
Finally, the concluding quote from JFK's American University
speech is a useful reminder of how different our job is from
Kennedy's. He was lucky enough to be able to produce an
agreement on a comparatively simple question--the test ban--in
six weeks. Because we have much less chance of such
breakthroughs, we have to give a more convincing proof that we
are doing everything prudent to achieve them and that if we fail
it will not be our fault. It just won't be enough to say "we all
breathe the same air."
CONFIDENTIAL
MATTOCK
National Security Council
The White House
04/28/19 04 28 PR:28 System # II
Package # 90014
SEQUENCE TO
HAS SEEN
DISPOSITION
Bill Martin
Bob Kimmitt
John Poindexter
/
&
Wilma Hall
Bud McFarlane
Bob Kimmitt
2
K
A
NSC Secretariat
3
A
Situation Room
Buan -- send copy of
Cunts to Matiock only ASAP.
Keep original 00 we can set
to at quickly. B.
I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action
CC:
VP
Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
Should be seen by:
(Date/Time)
Please send 05D comments to Jack
Inattacts. &
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Memo For ADM John TOINDEXTER 10/1
John,
Attached ARe
speech COMMENTS per
OUR CONVERSATION. /
believe edits Y INSERTS
ARE SELF- explanatory. HAVE
your speechwriter call MC
IF he Needs help deciphering
Colin
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
10 January 1984
Memo For Gen. Colin Powell
Attached are two proposed inserts and a mark-
up of the President's Speech.
Richard
PERCE
Attachments
PERCE /KLE
PROPOSED ADDITIONAL SPEECH MATERIAL:
COMMENTS.
In a few days, I will be sending to the Congress a report that outlines
the record of Soviet compliance with past arms control treaties. It is a
report that warrants the most serious of attention by all our lawmakers.
Its results, which I want to share with you, are of deep concern to all of
us who fervently want to reduce the risk of nuclear war through deep and
verifiable arms reductions.
Let me assure you, this report was carefully prepared. All the available
evidence was scrutinized for months. The relevant treaty provisions and
negotiating records were examined in detail. And all plausible explanations
for Soviet behavior were closely examined against the evidence available to us.
Based on this evidence, we have had no choice but to conclude that the
Soviets have violated a number of arms control treaties. Specifically, they
have violated the Biological Weapons Convention ban on toxin weapons; the
Helsinki Final Act procedures for notifying large military exercises, and,
almost certainly, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibitions concerning
the deployment of ABM radars. They have also violated critical provisions
of the SALT 11 treaty with respect to the encryption of telemetry needed to
verify compliance with that accord and at least one provision intended to
ensure that no more than one new type of ICBM is deployed by either party.
To all who have studied the Soviet compliance record it has been obvious
for some time that Moscow has exploited every loophole and ambiguity that could
be advanced as a justification for continuing their build up of nuclear weapons.
The Soviets have, since the first SALT I negotiations began in 1969, added
some 7,000 warheads to their inventory of strategic and intermediate nuclear
forces. What is perhaps most disturbing is that the earlier pattern of exploiting
8
loopholes and ambiguities has given way to an expanding pattern of out and
out violations -- actions lacking even the thin veneer of plausibility behind
which the Soviets have long violated the spirit of arms control agreements
while claiming adherence to their letter.
I have called upon Soviet President Yuri Andropov to take those actions
necessary to end the several violations that we have identified. And I have
initiated a comprehensive study of the options available to us to deal with
any violations that the Soviet leaders prove unwilling to reverse.
SUBSTITUTE PARAGRAPH 1
Today the United States has some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons deployed
than we had in the late 1960's. And the megatonnage of this reduced force
is barely a quarter of what it was in the 1960's, and the lowest level in
more than 25 years. Even our vital modernization program is aimed, not at
increasing our strategic forces, but at replacing weapons that are approaching
obsolesence with substitutes that are safer, more reliable and more capable
of withstanding attack from numerically superior Soviet forces.
Some of the strategic weapons in our inventory are 25 years old or
older. Many are nearing the end of their useful operational life. But
even after we have replaced obsolete forces we will have thousands fewer
nuclear warheads than in the late 1960's.
(NSC/Myer/BE)
January 5, 1984
FI
10
4:30 p.m.
comments
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club
dipped
Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your
distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during
these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of
the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of
peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet
Union and the other nations of Europe at an international
security conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold
our responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of
conflict. The conference will search for practical and
of ive make even small step, it in a
meaningful ways to increase European security [and preserve peace]
beginning onaluting road to a just peace
We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our
people for genuine progress.
We live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also
of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and
frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We
have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that
enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984
finds the United States in its strongest position in years to
establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with
the Soviet Union.
Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade
sumed filled with
of the seventies -- vears when the United States/ questioned its
self don't and sill represched
role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet
Page 2
Union increased its military might and sought to expand its
influence through threats and use of force.
Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American
people to change course, and we have. Today America can once
again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay
@nd fair
secure, and to find peaceful, solutions to problems through
negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.
History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the
aggressar mations
price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our
allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential
aggressor. that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our
goal is deterrence, plain and simple.
With the support of the American people and the Congress, we
halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the
best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.
Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values
has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.
America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by
surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening
ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was
inevitable. They said it SO often they probably started
believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.
Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the
differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist.
But we should always remember that we do have common interests.
And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level
Page 3
12
of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course
which I would call "constructive competition."
Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident
rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to
speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of
conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look
beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is
being restored and making the world a safer place.
now
The world is safer because there is less danger, that the
Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating
our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom
poses no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved
this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons+ and
could have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a
new chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-rayaged
economies of East and West, including those nations who had been
our enemies.
America's character has not changed. Our strength and
vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful
negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise
only if they can get something in return. America's economic and
military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,
today is a time of opportunities for peace.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of
the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working
Page 4
13
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These
are conditions which must be addressed and improved.
Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our
way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our
policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the
constructive
Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a
could
dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions
of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive
working relationship.
First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of
force in solving international disputes.
The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the
end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the
Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and
Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by
heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack
or subversion.
insert from pa5)
Most] of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
many
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
most
its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and
tolalitarian rule
exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases
suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic
problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and
weak
governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful
but
harmlen
14
Page 5
solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us
in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.
Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast
stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear
weapons.
notours are these conflicts as structive Hall aualso costur.
It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending
more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of
doest
fit a
their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious
move
circle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere
Shird
Secti
it occurs.
insert 4 Qu why, when we have enough to deshoy world X times wenedmore
under
A While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is
Point
needed to establish a stable military balance. In fact,
pq4
America's total nuclear stockpile has declined.
We have fewer
media matest wape
CASMITE
warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear
&
stategic
missui
FO
stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its
is
total destructive power.
Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an
additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This
comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from
Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned
intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over
if its soiret would PLE LIC to equal, lease
the next 5 years and we hope this will not be necessary, we sevel
will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead
deployed.
But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to
reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear
weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed
Page 6
15
here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range
missiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop
an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial
deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would
greatly
still/prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either
side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As
I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear
weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.
Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his
important!
country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
when
sol
If Sm bockg Cur countries she thissand geal, 44 should beg. vagar. with the
which
These are encouraging words. n But now is a time for
first toward
byRR.
that gral.
opportunity a time to move from words to deeds -and
Exsays
to return to the negoriatingtate
we
Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish
and
someih
a better working relationship with greater cooperation and
shoul
same
understanding.
soul.
Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.
Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.
Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the
relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts
across borders and permitting a free interchange of information
and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the
rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with
the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to
go, but we are determined to try and try again.
Page 7
In working toward these goals, our approach is based on
three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.
Realism means we start by understanding the world we live
in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition
with a government that does not share our notions of individual
liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank
in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our
values.
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This
should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied
away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not
mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk
when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because
they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy.
The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason
to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it
imperative that we talk.
Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or
we cannot do either.
protect our interests, if we are weak Our strength is necessary
not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and
solutions
compromise.
Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is
crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.
Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our
allies abroad. We are, for stronger in all these areas than 3 years
ago.
Page 8
17
Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. respect We
will never retreat fromnegotiations.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --
and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear
war
confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive
set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce
substantially the size of nuclear arsenaFs. And I am ready!to go
much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work
together and with others to rid our planet completely of the nuclear threat
altogether
AND No ONE MORE DEEPLY THAN 1
WHOLE
HAS BROKEN
The, world regrets that the Soviet Union, broke off
negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to
I
BOTH
CONTINUE TO
conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good
faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we
will meet them half way. of They thould not turs they impose
impecies Nilin- To wired will Donea That Ren
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and
miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we
call "confidence-building measures. They cover a wide range of
inf. reduction a The only
Page 9
wasington
further the
activities, /1 In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that resite of
the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of
"war by
mistake a
missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on miscalculate
congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to
improve direct U.S. Soviet channels of communication.
These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm
conference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful
ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for
misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to
diminish the risks of surprise attack.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
U.S. - Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to
defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets ÷
should have a common interest in promoting regional stability,
and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that
permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on
economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges
of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we
can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
Our approach is constructive, but little has come of it. We
remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet
Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based,
negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice,
they will find the United States ready to cooperate.
Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union
is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as
Page 10
19
any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that
hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the. emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others
who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing
harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.
Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union
must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under
international covenants in particular, its commitments under
and the chemical Y biological waifare treatics (wrong plant
the Helsinki Accords, Experience has shown that greater respect
for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the
Soviet-American relationship.
"
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace
:
between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.
These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet
Union, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both
nations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive
competition is a challenge for Americans; it will require
patience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets.
If they
WE, Ford OUR part, will MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH WE REQUIRE TO
cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our
DETER SOVIET RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE.
interests, and those of our friends and allies. But WE want
more
than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress
for peace. h him Pen 2 Ving different income Sixtems. when in National internet 1,
Term Ever Thems: die continue t. 13 amrs b. has
The
Frieche, Common
Page 11
20
Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such
communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva
and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting
should be followed by others, SO that high-level consultations
become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in
us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one
can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.
But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of
eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible
risks
dream, because eliminating those,is so clearly a vital interest
for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no
reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one
another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger,
=
disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an
approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he
announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let
us also direct attention to our common interests and to
the means by which those differences can be resolved.
And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we
can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in
the final analysis, our most basic common link is that
we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the
same air. We all cherish our children's future. And
we are all mortal."
I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress.
If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace.
The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be
Pace 12
21
norcase
difficult. But that should not indict the past Dr/ despair, the
future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest
if iteambe actived without compre mising our basic girls,
advances. We welcome compromise In this spirit of constructive
competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the
level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of
people everywhere. Let us begin now.
and the advances
we have madi since
the beginnings your
country.
22
(NSC/Myer/BE)
January 5, 1984
SEC Def
4:30 p.m.
P TROIA
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club
COMMENTS.
Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your
distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during
these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of
the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of
peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet
Union and the other nations of Europe at an international
security conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold
our responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of
conflict. The conference will search for practical and
If ive ca in make even small steps it is a
meaningful ways to increase European security [and preserve peace]
beginning on the long road to a just place
We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our
people for genuine progress.
We live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also
of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and
frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We
have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that
enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984
finds the United States in its strongest position in years to
establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with
the Soviet Union.
Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade
seemed filled with
of the seventies -- years when the United States/ questioned its
self donbts and silf uproaches
role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet
Page 2
Union increased its military might and sought to expand its
influence through threats and use of force.
Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American
people to change course, and we have. Today America can once
again demonstrate, with-equal conviction, our commitment to stay
at the sametime and fair
secure, and to find peaceful, solutions to problems through
negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.
History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the
aggressar nations
price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our
allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential
aggressor. that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our
goal is deterrence, plain and simple.
With the support of the American people and the Congress, we
halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the
best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.
Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values
has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.
America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by
surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening
ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was
inevitable. They said it SO often they probably started
believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.
Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the
differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist.
But we should always remember that we do have common interests.
And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level
Page 3
of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course
which I would call "constructive competition."
Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident
rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to
speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of
conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look
beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is
being restored and making the world a safer place.
now
The world is safer because there is less danger, that the
Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating
our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom
poses no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved
this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons and
could have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a
new chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-rayaged
economies of East and West, including those nations who had been
our enemies.
America's character has not changed. Our strength and
vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful
negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise
only if they can get something in return. America's economic and
military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,
today is a time of opportunities for peace.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of
the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working
Page 4
ah
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These
are conditions which must be addressed and improved.
Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our
way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our
policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the
Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a
dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions
of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive
working relationship.
First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of
force in solving international disputes.
The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the
end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the
Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and
Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by
heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack
or subversion.
insert from
/Most] of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
many
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
most
its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases
suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic
problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and
governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful
Page 5
solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us
in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.
Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast
stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear
weapons.
notours are these conflicts as structive, they acealso coutly.
nIt is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending
more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of
doesn't
fit her
their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious
move to
circle of threat and response which drives arms races evervwhere
Shidw,
section
it occurs.
A While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is
insert $ QU why, when we have enough to destroy world X times wenedmore
under
Point 1.
needed to establish a stable military balance. In fact,
pq4
muchan wapoy
America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer makethe
warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear
case for
strategic
modernate
stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its.
total destructive power.
Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an
additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This
comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from
Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned
intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over
if ite socrets would agree to equal, lower
the next 5 years and we hope this will not be necessary, IL we levels
will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead
deployed.
But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to
reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear
weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed
Page 6
here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range
missiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop
an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial
deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would
still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either
side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As
I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear
weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.
Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his
country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Since bothgour countries sharexhe same goal, we must begin againsmich the
These are encouraging words. / But now is a time for first step toward
opportunity -- a time to move from words to deeds -and
that goal.
to return to the negotiating table
Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish
a better working relationship with greater cooperation and
understanding.
Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.
Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.
Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the
relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts
across borders and permitting a free interchange of information
and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the
rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with
the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to
go, but we are determined to try and try again.
Page 7
In working toward these goals, our approach is based on
three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.
Realism means we start by understanding the world we live
in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition
with a government that does not share our notions of individual
liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank
in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our
values.
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This
should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied
away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not
mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk
when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because
they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy.
The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason
to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it
imperative that we talk.
Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or
we cannot do either.
protect our interests. If we are weak, Our strength is necessary
not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and
compromise.
Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is
crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.
Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our
allies abroad. We are for stronger in all these areas than 3 years
ago.
v
Page 8
Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We
will never retreat from-negotiations.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --
and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear
confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive
set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce
substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am ready:to go
much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work
together and with others to rid our planet completely of the nuclear threat
altogether
The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off
negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to
conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good
but to risure Drives
faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we
will meet them half way. of They should not Return - they impose
impossible Condition forther return- The urea will them Than Ren pre tention!
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and
miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we
call "confidence-building measures. They cover a wide range of
only
That ful first This
Page 9
including i mproving the Orgen old hot line between washington 30
of moscorn with the latest electronic equipment, to reduce further the
activities, 1 In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that resile of a
the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of
"war by
mistake a
missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on miscalculation
congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to
improve direct U.S. Soviet channels of communication.
These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm
conference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful
ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for
misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to
diminish the risks of surprise attack.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
U.S. Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to
defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets .
should have a common interest in promoting regional stability,
and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that
permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on
economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges
of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we
can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
Our approach is constructive, but little has come of it. We
remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet
Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based,
negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice,
they will find the United States ready to cooperate.
Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union
is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as
Page 10
31
any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that
hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others
who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing
harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.
Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union
must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under
international covenants in particular, its commitments under
and the chemical + biological warface treatie.
the Helsinki Accords Experience has shown that greater respect
for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the
Soviet-American relationship.
"
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace
:
between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.
These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet
Union, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both
nations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive
competition is a challenge for Americans; it will require
patience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they
cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our
interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more
than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress
for peace, him Pan 2 Viry different in Septem. aroun where on Hatsual National intarists 2
Permit, Even Though due antimic recorries below
fundamints defference Is The Live always Crive
Page 11
Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such
communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva
and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting
should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations
become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in
us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one
can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.
But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of
eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible
risks
dream, because eliminating those,is so clearly a vital interest
for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no
reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one
another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger,
:
disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an
approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he
announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let
us also direct attention to our common interests and to
the means by which those differences can be resolved.
And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we
can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in
the final analysis, our most basic common link is that
we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the
same air. We all cherish our children's future. And
we are all mortal."
I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress.
If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace.
The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be
Page 12
33
nor cause
difficult. But that should not indict the past despair, for the
future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest
advances. constructive
if itcanbe We welcome achieved compromise, without compremising In this our spirit basic of goals
competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the
level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of
people everywhere. Let us begin now.
and the advances
we have made since
the beginnings of am
country.
34
(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 10, 1984
1:00 p.m.
ASC
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984
Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your
distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during
these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of
the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of
peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Tomorrow,
In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet
Union and the other nations of Europe at an international
security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our
responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of
conflict. The conference will search for practical and
meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace.
We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our
people for genuine progress.
We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of
opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and
frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We
have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that
enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984
finds the United States in its strongest position in years to
establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with
the Soviet Union.
2
Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade
of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its
35
Page 2
role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet
Union increased its military might and sought to expand its
influence through threats and use of force.
3
Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American
people to change course, and we have. Today America can once
again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay
secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through
negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace
B
History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the
price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our
allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential
aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In
other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.
With the support of the American people and the Congress, we
halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the
best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.
Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values
has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.
America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by
surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening
ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was
inevitable. They said it so often they probably started
believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.
A
Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the
differences between our two societies. But we should always
remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost
among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There
36
Page 3
is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would
call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do
so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive
cooperation.
Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from
the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of
heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This
is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the
move
words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being
restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because
there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will
underestimate our strength or resolve.
We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no
threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years
ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to
dominate the world. But we didn't Instead we nave used our power
to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped
in Europe and the Far East,
rebuild
war-ravaged economies ^ of East and West, including
of
those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former
enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.
America's character has not changed. Our strength and
vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful
negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise
only if they can get something in return. America's economic and
military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,
today is a time of opportunities for peace.
37
Page 4
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of
the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These
are conditions which must be addressed and improved.
Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our
way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our
policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the
Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a
dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions
of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive
working relationship.
First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of
force in solving international disputes.
The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the
end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the
Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and
Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by
heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack
or subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases
suffering, and makes solutions to real social' and economic
problems more difficult.
38
Page 5
Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and
governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful
solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us
in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.
Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast
stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear
weapons.
It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending
more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of
their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious
cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere
it occurs.
While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is
needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth
is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have
fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our
nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of
its total destructive power.
Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an
additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes
after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over
the last 3 -years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range
missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years --
and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated
five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.
But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to
reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals. It
39
was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in
November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles.
Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an
entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment
of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still
prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side.
Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have
said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will
be banished from the face of the Earth.
Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his
country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from
words to deeds.
Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish
a better working relationship with greater cooperation and
understanding.
W
Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.
Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.
Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the
relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts
across borders and permitting a free interchange of information
and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the
rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
(HUSERT
J have cited
The
examples 1 illustrate clearly why our relationship with
the Soviet Union is not what it should be We have a long way to
go, but we are determined to try and try again.
Page 7
40
In working toward these goals, our approach is based on
three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.
Realism means we start by understanding the world we live
in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition
with a government that does not share our notions of individual
liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank
in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our
values.
8
Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or
protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary
not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and
compromise.
Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is
crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.
Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our
allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were
3 years ago.
Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We
will never retreat from negotiations.
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I
don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders
who have never shied away from expressing their view of our
system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other.
We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist
Page 8
aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a
communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us
likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living
in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we
insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --
and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear
confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive
set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce
substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would
hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the
ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat
altogether.
The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet
Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear
forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on
strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the
negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START.
We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is
ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.
We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the
chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we
have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building
measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva
United States
negotiations, we have proposed that the #.S. and Soviet Union
Page 9
exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major
military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions,
we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet
channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions
with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications,
including the "Hotline."
These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the
conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to
develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and
potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities,
and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to
defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets
should have a common interest in promoting regional stability,
and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that
permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on
economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges
of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we
can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the
Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving
work together
broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make
that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.
A
Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet
Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as
Page 10
an atmosphere of
any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that
hangs permentes
over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others
who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing
so many
harassment of A courageous people, like Andrei Sakharov.
Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet
Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under
international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under
the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect
for human rights will can contribute to progress in other areas of the
Soviet-American relationship.
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace
between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.
These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet
Union, a policy of credible deterrence, and peaceful competition
and constructive cooperation
oven
that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long
haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge
for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be
prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and
allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine
cooperation; we seek progress Insurance for peace. the establishment of a furne and
stable peace.
Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such
communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva (Reper)
and we hoge that 40
this Session will msall
Page 11
the first Stef towArd
L
the establishment of grander
and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with
dologne and Dopenation
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting
discussions at the highert level,
should be followed by others, so that high level consultations including
become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.
clear
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in
us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one
can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.
But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the
dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an
impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital
interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each
other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought
world war II.
alongside one another in two world wors. Today our common
enemies are hunger, disease
and, above all, war.
More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an
approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he
announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said,
"but let us also direct attention to our common
interests and to the means by which those differences
can be resolved."
Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in
governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would
have to do with the things of everyday life for people
everywhere.
11
Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or
sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was
no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would
they debate the differences between their respective governments?
Page 12
Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their
children, and what each other did for a living?
Before they parted company they would probably have touched
on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and
the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided
they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.
Above all, they would have proven that people don't make
wars. People want to raise their children in a world without
fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things
over and above bare subsistance that make life worth living.
They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives
them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests
cross all borders.
If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be
peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of
arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams
of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us
begin now.
46
(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)
January 10, 1984
1:00 p.m.
ASC
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
MONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984
Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your
distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during
these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of
the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of
peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Tomorrow,
In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet
Union and the other nations of Europe at an international
security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our
responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of
conflict. The conference will search for practical and
meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace.
We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our
people for genuine progress.
We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of
opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and
frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We
have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that
enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984
finds the United States in its strongest position in years to
establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with
the Soviet Union.
Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade
of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its
Page 2
role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet
Union increased its military might and sought to expand its
influence through threats and use of force.
Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American
people to change course, and we have. Today America can once
again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay
secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through
negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.
History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the
price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our
allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential
aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In
other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.
With the support of the American people and the Congress, we
halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the
best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.
Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values
has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.
America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by
surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening
ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was
inevitable. They said it so often they probably started
believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.
Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the
differences between our two societies. But we should always
remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost
among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There
Page 3
is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would
call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do
so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive
cooperation.
Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from
the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of
heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This
is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the
words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being
restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because
there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will
underestimate our strength or resolve.
We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no
threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years
ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to
dominate the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power
to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped
in Europe and the Far East,
rebuild
war-ravaged economies ^ of East and West, including
of
those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former
enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.
America's character has not changed. Our strength and
vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful
negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise
only if they can get something in return. America's economic and
military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,
today is a time of opportunities for peace.
Page 4
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of
the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These
are conditions which must be addressed and improved.
Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our
way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our
policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the
Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a
dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions
of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive
working relationship.
First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of
force in solving international disputes.
The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the
end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the
Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and
Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by
heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack
or subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases
suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic
problems more difficult.
50
Page 5
Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and
governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful
solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us
in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.
Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast
stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear
weapons.
It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending
more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of
their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious
cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere
it occurs.
While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is
needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth
is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have
fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our
nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of
its total destructive power.
Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an
additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes
after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over
the last 3 -years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range
missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years --
and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated
five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.
But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to
reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals. It
51
Page 6
was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in
November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles.
Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an
entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment
of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still
prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side.
Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have
said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will
be banished from the face of the Earth.
Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his
country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from
words to deeds.
Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish
a better working relationship with greater cooperation and
understanding.
Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.
Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.
Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the
relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts
across borders and permitting a free interchange of information
and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the
rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
(INSERT A) J have cited
The examples ^ illustrate clearly why our relationship with
the Soviet Union is not what it should be We have a long way to
go, but we are determined to try and try again.
Page 7
In working toward these goals, our approach is based on
three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.
Realism means we start by understanding the world we live
in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition
with a government that does not share our notions of individual
liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank
in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our
values.
Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or
protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary
not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and
compromise.
Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is
crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.
Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our
allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were
3 years ago.
Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We
will never retreat from negotiations.
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I
don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders
who have never shied away from expressing their view of our
system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other.
We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist
53
Page 8
aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a
communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us
likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living
in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we
insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --
and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear
confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive
set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce
substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would
hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the
ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat
altogether.
The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet
Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear
forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on
strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the
negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START.
We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is
ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.
We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the
chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we
have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building
measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva
United States
negotiations, we have proposed that the H.S. and Soviet Union
54
Page 9
exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major
military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions,
we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet
channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions
with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications,
including the "Hotline."
These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the
conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to
develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and
potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities,
and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to
defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets
should have a common interest in promoting regional stability,
and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that
permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on
economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges
of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we
can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the
Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving
broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make
that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.
Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet
Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as
55
Page 10
any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that
hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others
who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing
so many
harassment of A courageous people, like Andrei Sakharov.
Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet
Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under
international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under
the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect
for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the
Soviet-American relationship.
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace
between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.
These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet
Union, a policy of credible deterrence, and peaceful competition
and constructive peration
that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long
haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge
for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be
prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and
allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine
cooperation; we seek progress for peace.
Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such
communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva
Page 11
and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting
should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations
become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in
us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one
can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.
But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the
dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an
impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital
interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each
other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought
world war II.
alongside one another in two world wars. Today our common
enemies are hunger, disease
and, above all, war.
More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an
approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he
announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said,
"but let us also direct attention to our common
interests and to the means by which those differences
can be resolved."
Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in
governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would
have to do with the things of everyday life for people
everywhere.
Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or
sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was
no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would
they debate the differences between their respective governments?
Page 12
Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their
children, and what each other did for a living?
Before they parted company they would probably have touched
on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and
the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided
they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.
Above all, they would have proven that people don't make
wars. People want to raise their children in a world without
fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things
over and above bare subsistance that make life worth living.
They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives
them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests
cross all borders.
If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be
peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of
arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams
of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us
begin now.
INSERT A
58
Cooperation and understanding are especially important
to arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting
evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of
several arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern
of taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements.
Such actions jeopardize the arms control process.
I will soon submit to the Congress the report on these
Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see
to it that our modernization program takes them into account so that
we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our
discussions with the Soviet government on activities which under-
mine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove
impediments to
arms control, which offers us the means to
improve the security of both our countries and to create a safer
world.
Page data
- Page
- 1
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- document
- Media ID
- 188236446f6fa551
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 215872208
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "215872208",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/215872208",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "[President Address: US-Soviet Relations 01/16/1984]",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/215872208",
"collections": [
"Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)",
"Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/rr-0170/7452065/40-351-215872208-031-011-2018.pdf",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/rr-0170/7452065/40-351-215872208-031-011-2018.pdf",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/rr-0170/7452065/40-351-215872208-031-011-2018.pdf",
"imageCount": 1,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "215872208",
"label": "[President Address: US-Soviet Relations 01/16/1984]",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/215872208"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "215872208",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/215872208",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "[President Address: US-Soviet Relations 01/16/1984]",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/215872208",
"collections": [
"Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)",
"Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/rr-0170/7452065/40-351-215872208-031-011-2018.pdf",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/rr-0170/7452065/40-351-215872208-031-011-2018.pdf",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/rr-0170/7452065/40-351-215872208-031-011-2018.pdf",
"imageCount": 1,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/215872208",
"naId": 215872208,
"levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 1,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "document",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/reagan/rr-0170/7452065/40-351-215872208-031-011-2018.pdf",
"mediaId": "188236446f6fa551",
"ocrText": "Ronald Reagan Presidential Library\nDigital Library Collections\nThis is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.\nCollection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files\nFolder Title: [President Address: US-Soviet\nRelations 01/16/1984]\nBox: 31\nTo see more digitized collections visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library\nTo see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:\nhttps://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection\nContact a reference archivist at: [email protected]\nCitation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing\nNational Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET\nRonald Reagan Library\nCollection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES\nWithdrawer\nJET\n5/18/2005\nFile Folder\n[PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS\nFOIA\n1/16/84]\nF06-114/9\nBox Number\n31\nYARHI-MILO\n3111\nID Doc Type\nDocument Description\nNo of Doc Date Restrictions\nPages\n10825 MEMO\nFORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET\n3 1/7/1984 B1\nSPEECH\nR\n3/24/2011\nF2006-114/9\nFreedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]\nB-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]\nB-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]\nB-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]\nB-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]\nB-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]\nB-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]\nB-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]\nB-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]\nC. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.\n10825\n0179\nMEMORANDUM\nCONF IDENT TAL\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nINFORMATION\nJanuary 7, 1984\nMEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE\nFROM:\nDONALD R. FORTIER RDF (dictated and\nsigned a his\nSUBJECT:\nSoviet Speech\nassence) S.S.\nIn preparing for my trip to Turkey I have not had as much time as\nI would have liked to devote to the Soviet speech. I am\nconcerned about the present draft, however, and wanted to pass on\nmy basic thoughts to you.\nAll of us agree that the time has come to demonstrate to a\nbroader Western audience that we are not guided by a blind and\nuncomprehending form of anti-Sovietism. We have to send a\nmessage of reassurance, in part to resolidify support for the\ninevitable competition that we will continue to face and in part\nto rebut the Soviet argument that the world is becoming a more\ndangerous place.\nThe speech does convey a sense of reassurance, but it does so in\na rather simple way. The speech will not impress either domestic\nor foreign audiences with its thoughtfulness, and it fails to\nsend a very concrete message to the Soviets--a fact that will\nonly help to contribute to the impression that we are aiming at\nan electoral audience rather than trying to achieve more durable\nsubstantive gains.\nThe emptiness of the message to the Soviets is particularly\napparent, I think, in the presentation of \"our goals\" in the\nfirst half of the speech. Instead of anything concrete, these\ninclude vague appeals to let the Third World focus on economic\ndevelopment, or to abolish nuclear weapons, or to stop stealing\nWestern industrial secrets. I doubt these are appeals with much\nmeaning for the Soviets, who speak a more sober language of\npower, security, and interest.\nJust to take two obvious examples, the point about the Third\nWorld that Moscow would best understand (but which is not made in\nthe current draft) is a statement that we are concerned about the\nrisk of confrontations that are in neither side's interest.\nSimilarly, the Soviets will not know what to make of the\noff-handed way compliance is treated in the section of the speech\non establishing a better working relationship. They know this\nCONF IDENTIAL\nDECLASSIFIED\nDeclassify OADR\nNLRR RF06-11419 #10825\nBY KML NARA DATE4/7/2011\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2\nproblem is coming and want to see how the President deals with\nit. In light of where we're likely to be by the time of the\nspeech, we run a major risk of being misunderstood if we don't\nsay more to indicate the gravity of our concern on this issue.\nThe speech, in my view, also needs to be more direct and candid\nabout some of the difficulties that we face in trying to solve\nproblems between us. If the President discusses these\ndifficulties, his main message--the expression of a forthcoming\ndesire to work on disagreements or conflicts--may in fact be\ntaken even more seriously.\nHaving said this, I don't think that improving the speech\nrequires starting over. One small change that might begin to\nmove it in the right direction is to build on the important claim\nmade at the beginning that we see some important potential\n\"opportunities for peace\" at this time. The President should\nthen ask the question what do we and the Soviets have to do to\nseize these opportunities?--and give concrete, thoughtful\nanswers. In this way, the \"goals\" of the present draft would\nbecome \"tasks,\" or \"challenges,\" or problems to be solved.\nBy focusing on key immediate tasks rather than long-term goals\nthe President would sound more programmatic and purposeful than\nhe is likely to now. He needs to sound as though his policy is\ndesigned to reach more than just distant and possibly\nunattainable goals. (Each of these \"tasks\" or \"challenges, I\nmight add, could usefully include some historical comparisons,\nindicating how the nature of the task is different or harder than\nin the past but also why the opportunity for progress now\nexists--after three years of trying to get our message across to\nMoscow.)\nThis change from \"goals\" to \"tasks\" would, with some significant\nre-drafting, send a different message in the entire first half of\nthe speech. The talk about our desire to reduce the use of force\nwould, for example, be made much less airy, focusing more on what\neach side has to do (and not do) to limit the risk of superpower\nconflict. This can sound tough but it has a constructive side.\nFor example:\n\"We believe that the situation in the Middle East has been\nmade more dangerous for all concerned by the introduction of\nthousands of additional Soviet military personnel into Syria\nin the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at\nlimiting these dangers. This is just one of many situations\naround the world in which the Soviet Union could bring its\ninfluence to bear to reduce risks for both sides. The\nconfidence created by such progress would be valuable in\ntrying to deal with other aspects of our competition.\"\nCONF IDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\n3\nSimilarly, using the three tasks of U.S. -Soviet relations in the\npresent draft, the President could say that the second\ntask--reducing armaments--requires some serious thinking about\nhow to increase strategic stability. Rather than simply try to\ntop the Soviets in a vague commitment to a non-nuclear world, we\ncan challenge them with our commitment to specific negotiating\nmeasures. For example:\n\"Our thinking in the area of arms control has led us to\nembrace the build-down approach to reducing strategic\nweapons. [ One sentence explaining build-down. ] We wish\nthe Soviet Union would do the same, and call on its leaders\nto do SO. This is a time when we need more, not less\ndiscussion of this approach, for it is a formula that could\nmake it possible for both sides to rethink many of their\nstrategic programs.\"\nThe Soviets would be greatly intrigued to hear a hint that we\nmight not have to build everything we plan, and would begin to\nask what systems this could mean. In short, we would have their\ninterest.\nAs for the final task--developing a constructive working\nrelationship-- President could again make hard points and\nsoft--hard on issues like the need for compliance with past\nagreements, soft-sounding on the obvious fact that we are willing\nto work even for small improvements in the relationship.\nI have gone over this first half of the speech at some length\nbecause once it is recast, the remainder can be devoted to\nelaborating our approach. I have fewer difficulties with the\nrest of the text as it now stands, but it too could be\nstrengthened by more concreteness. (And by less rhetoric that\ncould open us to ridicule. For example, the President can't say\nthat \"ignorance\" is a common enemy of the U.S. and the USSR. The\ncountry with the world's largest censorship apparatus is not an\nenemy of ignorance!)\nFinally, the concluding quote from JFK's American University\nspeech is a useful reminder of how different our job is from\nKennedy's. He was lucky enough to be able to produce an\nagreement on a comparatively simple question--the test ban--in\nsix weeks. Because we have much less chance of such\nbreakthroughs, we have to give a more convincing proof that we\nare doing everything prudent to achieve them and that if we fail\nit will not be our fault. It just won't be enough to say \"we all\nbreathe the same air.\"\nCONFIDENTIAL\nMATTOCK\nNational Security Council\nThe White House\n04/28/19 04 28 PR:28 System # II\nPackage # 90014\nSEQUENCE TO\nHAS SEEN\nDISPOSITION\nBill Martin\nBob Kimmitt\nJohn Poindexter\n/\n&\nWilma Hall\nBud McFarlane\nBob Kimmitt\n2\nK\nA\nNSC Secretariat\n3\nA\nSituation Room\nBuan -- send copy of\nCunts to Matiock only ASAP.\nKeep original 00 we can set\nto at quickly. B.\nI = Information\nA = Action\nR = Retain\nD = Dispatch\nN = No further Action\nCC:\nVP\nMeese Baker Deaver Other\nCOMMENTS\nShould be seen by:\n(Date/Time)\nPlease send 05D comments to Jack\nInattacts. &\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nMemo For ADM John TOINDEXTER 10/1\nJohn,\nAttached ARe\nspeech COMMENTS per\nOUR CONVERSATION. /\nbelieve edits Y INSERTS\nARE SELF- explanatory. HAVE\nyour speechwriter call MC\nIF he Needs help deciphering\nColin\nOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\n10 January 1984\nMemo For Gen. Colin Powell\nAttached are two proposed inserts and a mark-\nup of the President's Speech.\nRichard\nPERCE\nAttachments\nPERCE /KLE\nPROPOSED ADDITIONAL SPEECH MATERIAL:\nCOMMENTS.\nIn a few days, I will be sending to the Congress a report that outlines\nthe record of Soviet compliance with past arms control treaties. It is a\nreport that warrants the most serious of attention by all our lawmakers.\nIts results, which I want to share with you, are of deep concern to all of\nus who fervently want to reduce the risk of nuclear war through deep and\nverifiable arms reductions.\nLet me assure you, this report was carefully prepared. All the available\nevidence was scrutinized for months. The relevant treaty provisions and\nnegotiating records were examined in detail. And all plausible explanations\nfor Soviet behavior were closely examined against the evidence available to us.\nBased on this evidence, we have had no choice but to conclude that the\nSoviets have violated a number of arms control treaties. Specifically, they\nhave violated the Biological Weapons Convention ban on toxin weapons; the\nHelsinki Final Act procedures for notifying large military exercises, and,\nalmost certainly, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibitions concerning\nthe deployment of ABM radars. They have also violated critical provisions\nof the SALT 11 treaty with respect to the encryption of telemetry needed to\nverify compliance with that accord and at least one provision intended to\nensure that no more than one new type of ICBM is deployed by either party.\nTo all who have studied the Soviet compliance record it has been obvious\nfor some time that Moscow has exploited every loophole and ambiguity that could\nbe advanced as a justification for continuing their build up of nuclear weapons.\nThe Soviets have, since the first SALT I negotiations began in 1969, added\nsome 7,000 warheads to their inventory of strategic and intermediate nuclear\nforces. What is perhaps most disturbing is that the earlier pattern of exploiting\n8\nloopholes and ambiguities has given way to an expanding pattern of out and\nout violations -- actions lacking even the thin veneer of plausibility behind\nwhich the Soviets have long violated the spirit of arms control agreements\nwhile claiming adherence to their letter.\nI have called upon Soviet President Yuri Andropov to take those actions\nnecessary to end the several violations that we have identified. And I have\ninitiated a comprehensive study of the options available to us to deal with\nany violations that the Soviet leaders prove unwilling to reverse.\nSUBSTITUTE PARAGRAPH 1\nToday the United States has some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons deployed\nthan we had in the late 1960's. And the megatonnage of this reduced force\nis barely a quarter of what it was in the 1960's, and the lowest level in\nmore than 25 years. Even our vital modernization program is aimed, not at\nincreasing our strategic forces, but at replacing weapons that are approaching\nobsolesence with substitutes that are safer, more reliable and more capable\nof withstanding attack from numerically superior Soviet forces.\nSome of the strategic weapons in our inventory are 25 years old or\nolder. Many are nearing the end of their useful operational life. But\neven after we have replaced obsolete forces we will have thousands fewer\nnuclear warheads than in the late 1960's.\n(NSC/Myer/BE)\nJanuary 5, 1984\nFI\n10\n4:30 p.m.\ncomments\nPRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club\ndipped\nThank you very much for inviting me back to visit your\ndistinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during\nthese first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of\nthe world on a subject of great importance to the cause of\npeace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet\nUnion.\nIn just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet\nUnion and the other nations of Europe at an international\nsecurity conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold\nour responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of\nconflict. The conference will search for practical and\nof ive make even small step, it in a\nmeaningful ways to increase European security [and preserve peace]\nbeginning onaluting road to a just peace\nWe will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our\npeople for genuine progress.\nWe live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also\nof opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and\nfrustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We\nhave and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that\nenhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984\nfinds the United States in its strongest position in years to\nestablish a constructive and realistic working relationship with\nthe Soviet Union.\nSome fundamental changes have taken place since the decade\nsumed filled with\nof the seventies -- vears when the United States/ questioned its\nself don't and sill represched\nrole in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet\nPage 2\nUnion increased its military might and sought to expand its\ninfluence through threats and use of force.\nThree years ago we embraced a mandate from the American\npeople to change course, and we have. Today America can once\nagain demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay\n@nd fair\nsecure, and to find peaceful, solutions to problems through\nnegotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.\nHistory teaches that wars begin when governments believe the\naggressar mations\nprice of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our\nallies must remain strong enough to convince any potential\naggressor. that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our\ngoal is deterrence, plain and simple.\nWith the support of the American people and the Congress, we\nhalted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the\nbest recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.\nOur alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values\nhas never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.\nAmerica's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by\nsurprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening\nourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was\ninevitable. They said it SO often they probably started\nbelieving it. But they can see now they were wrong.\nNeither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the\ndifferences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist.\nBut we should always remember that we do have common interests.\nAnd the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level\nPage 3\n12\nof arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course\nwhich I would call \"constructive competition.\"\nNevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident\nrhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to\nspeak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of\nconflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look\nbeyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is\nbeing restored and making the world a safer place.\nnow\nThe world is safer because there is less danger, that the\nSoviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating\nour strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom\nposes no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved\nthis 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons+ and\ncould have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a\nnew chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-rayaged\neconomies of East and West, including those nations who had been\nour enemies.\nAmerica's character has not changed. Our strength and\nvision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful\nnegotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise\nonly if they can get something in return. America's economic and\nmilitary strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,\ntoday is a time of opportunities for peace.\nBut to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is\nsafe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of\nthe world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working\nPage 4\n13\nrelationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These\nare conditions which must be addressed and improved.\nDeterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our\nway of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our\npolicy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the\nconstructive\nSoviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a\ncould\ndialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions\nof the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive\nworking relationship.\nFirst, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of\nforce in solving international disputes.\nThe world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the\nend of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the\nMiddle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and\nAfrica. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by\nheavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack\nor subversion.\ninsert from pa5)\nMost] of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,\nmany\nbut many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and\nmost\nits surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an\noutright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and\ntolalitarian rule\nexporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases\nsuffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic\nproblems more difficult.\nWould it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and\nweak\ngovernments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful\nbut\nharmlen\n14\nPage 5\nsolutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us\nin cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.\nSecond, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast\nstockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear\nweapons.\nnotours are these conflicts as structive Hall aualso costur.\nIt is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending\nmore than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of\ndoest\nfit a\ntheir national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious\nmove\ncircle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere\nShird\nSecti\nit occurs.\ninsert 4 Qu why, when we have enough to deshoy world X times wenedmore\nunder\nA While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is\nPoint\nneeded to establish a stable military balance. In fact,\npq4\nAmerica's total nuclear stockpile has declined.\nWe have fewer\nmedia matest wape\nCASMITE\nwarheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear\n&\nstategic\nmissui\nFO\nstockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its\nis\ntotal destructive power.\nJust 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an\nadditional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This\ncomes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from\nEurope over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned\nintermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over\nif its soiret would PLE LIC to equal, lease\nthe next 5 years and we hope this will not be necessary, we sevel\nwill have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead\ndeployed.\nBut this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to\nreach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear\nweapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed\nPage 6\n15\nhere, in November 1981, the \"zero option\" for intermediate-range\nmissiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop\nan entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial\ndeployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would\ngreatly\nstill/prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either\nside. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As\nI have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear\nweapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.\nLast month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his\nimportant!\ncountry shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.\nwhen\nsol\nIf Sm bockg Cur countries she thissand geal, 44 should beg. vagar. with the\nwhich\nThese are encouraging words. n But now is a time for\nfirst toward\nbyRR.\nthat gral.\nopportunity a time to move from words to deeds -and\nExsays\nto return to the negoriatingtate\nwe\nOur third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish\nand\nsomeih\na better working relationship with greater cooperation and\nshoul\nsame\nunderstanding.\nsoul.\nCooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.\nComplying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.\nRespecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the\nrelationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts\nacross borders and permitting a free interchange of information\nand ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the\nrest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while\norganized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.\nThese examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with\nthe Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to\ngo, but we are determined to try and try again.\nPage 7\nIn working toward these goals, our approach is based on\nthree guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.\nRealism means we start by understanding the world we live\nin. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition\nwith a government that does not share our notions of individual\nliberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank\nin acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our\nvalues.\nI have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This\nshould come as no surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied\naway from expressing their view of our system. But this does not\nmean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk\nwhen the Soviets call us \"imperialist aggressors,\" or because\nthey cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy.\nThe fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason\nto refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it\nimperative that we talk.\nStrength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or\nwe cannot do either.\nprotect our interests, if we are weak Our strength is necessary\nnot only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and\nsolutions\ncompromise.\nStrength is more than military power. Economic strength is\ncrucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.\nEqually important is unity among our people at home and with our\nallies abroad. We are, for stronger in all these areas than 3 years\nago.\nPage 8\n17\nDialogue means we are determined to deal with our\ndifferences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to\ndiscuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for\npractical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. respect We\nwill never retreat fromnegotiations.\nOur commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we\ndo insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not\natmospherics.\nIn our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --\nand especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear\nwar\nconfrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive\nset of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce\nsubstantially the size of nuclear arsenaFs. And I am ready!to go\nmuch further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work\ntogether and with others to rid our planet completely of the nuclear threat\naltogether\nAND No ONE MORE DEEPLY THAN 1\nWHOLE\nHAS BROKEN\nThe, world regrets that the Soviet Union, broke off\nnegotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has\nrefused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our\nnegotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to\nI\nBOTH\nCONTINUE TO\nconclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good\nfaith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we\nwill meet them half way. of They thould not turs they impose\nimpecies Nilin- To wired will Donea That Ren\nWe seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,\nbut also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and\nmiscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we\ncall \"confidence-building measures. They cover a wide range of\ninf. reduction a The only\nPage 9\nwasington\nfurther the\nactivities, /1 In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that resite of\nthe U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of\n\"war by\nmistake a\nmissile tests and major military exercises. Following up on miscalculate\ncongressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to\nimprove direct U.S. Soviet channels of communication.\nThese bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm\nconference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful\nways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for\nmisinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to\ndiminish the risks of surprise attack.\nArms control has long been the most visible area of\nU.S. - Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to\ndefuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets ÷\nshould have a common interest in promoting regional stability,\nand in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that\npermit developing nations to concentrate their energies on\neconomic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges\nof views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we\ncan both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.\nOur approach is constructive, but little has come of it. We\nremain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet\nUnion's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based,\nnegotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice,\nthey will find the United States ready to cooperate.\nAnother major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union\nis human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as\nPage 10\n19\nany other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that\nhangs over our relationship.\nMoral considerations alone compel us to express our deep\nconcern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over\nthe virtual halt in the. emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others\nwho wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing\nharrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.\nOur request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union\nmust live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under\ninternational covenants in particular, its commitments under\nand the chemical Y biological waifare treatics (wrong plant\nthe Helsinki Accords, Experience has shown that greater respect\nfor human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the\nSoviet-American relationship.\n\"\nConflicts of interest between the United States and the\nSoviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace\n:\nbetween our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful\nworld for all mankind.\nThese are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet\nUnion, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both\nnations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive\ncompetition is a challenge for Americans; it will require\npatience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets.\nIf they\nWE, Ford OUR part, will MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH WE REQUIRE TO\ncannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our\nDETER SOVIET RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE.\ninterests, and those of our friends and allies. But WE want\nmore\nthan deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress\nfor peace. h him Pen 2 Ving different income Sixtems. when in National internet 1,\nTerm Ever Thems: die continue t. 13 amrs b. has\nThe\nFrieche, Common\nPage 11\n20\nCooperation begins with communication. We seek such\ncommunication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva\nand Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet\nwith Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting\nshould be followed by others, SO that high-level consultations\nbecome a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.\nOur challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in\nus. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one\ncan predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.\nBut our two countries share with all mankind the dream of\neliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible\nrisks\ndream, because eliminating those,is so clearly a vital interest\nfor all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no\nreason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one\nanother in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger,\n=\ndisease, ignorance and, above all, war.\nMore than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an\napproach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he\nannounced it:\n\"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let\nus also direct attention to our common interests and to\nthe means by which those differences can be resolved.\nAnd if we cannot end now our differences, at least we\ncan help make the world safe for diversity. For, in\nthe final analysis, our most basic common link is that\nwe all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the\nsame air. We all cherish our children's future. And\nwe are all mortal.\"\nI urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress.\nIf the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace.\nThe journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be\nPace 12\n21\nnorcase\ndifficult. But that should not indict the past Dr/ despair, the\nfuture. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest\nif iteambe actived without compre mising our basic girls,\nadvances. We welcome compromise In this spirit of constructive\ncompetition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the\nlevel of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of\npeople everywhere. Let us begin now.\nand the advances\nwe have madi since\nthe beginnings your\ncountry.\n22\n(NSC/Myer/BE)\nJanuary 5, 1984\nSEC Def\n4:30 p.m.\nP TROIA\nPRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club\nCOMMENTS.\nThank you very much for inviting me back to visit your\ndistinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during\nthese first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of\nthe world on a subject of great importance to the cause of\npeace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet\nUnion.\nIn just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet\nUnion and the other nations of Europe at an international\nsecurity conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold\nour responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of\nconflict. The conference will search for practical and\nIf ive ca in make even small steps it is a\nmeaningful ways to increase European security [and preserve peace]\nbeginning on the long road to a just place\nWe will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our\npeople for genuine progress.\nWe live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also\nof opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and\nfrustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We\nhave and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that\nenhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984\nfinds the United States in its strongest position in years to\nestablish a constructive and realistic working relationship with\nthe Soviet Union.\nSome fundamental changes have taken place since the decade\nseemed filled with\nof the seventies -- years when the United States/ questioned its\nself donbts and silf uproaches\nrole in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet\nPage 2\nUnion increased its military might and sought to expand its\ninfluence through threats and use of force.\nThree years ago we embraced a mandate from the American\npeople to change course, and we have. Today America can once\nagain demonstrate, with-equal conviction, our commitment to stay\nat the sametime and fair\nsecure, and to find peaceful, solutions to problems through\nnegotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.\nHistory teaches that wars begin when governments believe the\naggressar nations\nprice of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our\nallies must remain strong enough to convince any potential\naggressor. that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our\ngoal is deterrence, plain and simple.\nWith the support of the American people and the Congress, we\nhalted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the\nbest recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.\nOur alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values\nhas never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.\nAmerica's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by\nsurprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening\nourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was\ninevitable. They said it SO often they probably started\nbelieving it. But they can see now they were wrong.\nNeither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the\ndifferences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist.\nBut we should always remember that we do have common interests.\nAnd the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level\nPage 3\nof arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course\nwhich I would call \"constructive competition.\"\nNevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident\nrhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to\nspeak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of\nconflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look\nbeyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is\nbeing restored and making the world a safer place.\nnow\nThe world is safer because there is less danger, that the\nSoviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating\nour strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom\nposes no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved\nthis 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons and\ncould have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a\nnew chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-rayaged\neconomies of East and West, including those nations who had been\nour enemies.\nAmerica's character has not changed. Our strength and\nvision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful\nnegotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise\nonly if they can get something in return. America's economic and\nmilitary strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,\ntoday is a time of opportunities for peace.\nBut to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is\nsafe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of\nthe world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working\nPage 4\nah\nrelationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These\nare conditions which must be addressed and improved.\nDeterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our\nway of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our\npolicy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the\nSoviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a\ndialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions\nof the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive\nworking relationship.\nFirst, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of\nforce in solving international disputes.\nThe world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the\nend of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the\nMiddle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and\nAfrica. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by\nheavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack\nor subversion.\ninsert from\n/Most] of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,\nmany\nbut many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and\nmost\nits surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an\noutright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and\nexporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases\nsuffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic\nproblems more difficult.\nWould it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and\ngovernments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful\nPage 5\nsolutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us\nin cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.\nSecond, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast\nstockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear\nweapons.\nnotours are these conflicts as structive, they acealso coutly.\nnIt is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending\nmore than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of\ndoesn't\nfit her\ntheir national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious\nmove to\ncircle of threat and response which drives arms races evervwhere\nShidw,\nsection\nit occurs.\nA While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is\ninsert $ QU why, when we have enough to destroy world X times wenedmore\nunder\nPoint 1.\nneeded to establish a stable military balance. In fact,\npq4\nmuchan wapoy\nAmerica's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer makethe\nwarheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear\ncase for\nstrategic\nmodernate\nstockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its.\ntotal destructive power.\nJust 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an\nadditional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This\ncomes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from\nEurope over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned\nintermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over\nif ite socrets would agree to equal, lower\nthe next 5 years and we hope this will not be necessary, IL we levels\nwill have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead\ndeployed.\nBut this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to\nreach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear\nweapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed\nPage 6\nhere, in November 1981, the \"zero option\" for intermediate-range\nmissiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop\nan entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial\ndeployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would\nstill prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either\nside. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As\nI have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear\nweapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.\nLast month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his\ncountry shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.\nSince bothgour countries sharexhe same goal, we must begin againsmich the\nThese are encouraging words. / But now is a time for first step toward\nopportunity -- a time to move from words to deeds -and\nthat goal.\nto return to the negotiating table\nOur third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish\na better working relationship with greater cooperation and\nunderstanding.\nCooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.\nComplying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.\nRespecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the\nrelationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts\nacross borders and permitting a free interchange of information\nand ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the\nrest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while\norganized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.\nThese examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with\nthe Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to\ngo, but we are determined to try and try again.\nPage 7\nIn working toward these goals, our approach is based on\nthree guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.\nRealism means we start by understanding the world we live\nin. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition\nwith a government that does not share our notions of individual\nliberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank\nin acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our\nvalues.\nI have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This\nshould come as no surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied\naway from expressing their view of our system. But this does not\nmean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk\nwhen the Soviets call us \"imperialist aggressors,\" or because\nthey cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy.\nThe fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason\nto refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it\nimperative that we talk.\nStrength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or\nwe cannot do either.\nprotect our interests. If we are weak, Our strength is necessary\nnot only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and\ncompromise.\nStrength is more than military power. Economic strength is\ncrucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.\nEqually important is unity among our people at home and with our\nallies abroad. We are for stronger in all these areas than 3 years\nago.\nv\nPage 8\nDialogue means we are determined to deal with our\ndifferences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to\ndiscuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for\npractical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We\nwill never retreat from-negotiations.\nOur commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we\ndo insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not\natmospherics.\nIn our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --\nand especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear\nconfrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive\nset of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce\nsubstantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am ready:to go\nmuch further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work\ntogether and with others to rid our planet completely of the nuclear threat\naltogether\nThe world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off\nnegotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has\nrefused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our\nnegotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to\nconclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good\nbut to risure Drives\nfaith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we\nwill meet them half way. of They should not Return - they impose\nimpossible Condition forther return- The urea will them Than Ren pre tention!\nWe seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,\nbut also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and\nmiscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we\ncall \"confidence-building measures. They cover a wide range of\nonly\nThat ful first This\nPage 9\nincluding i mproving the Orgen old hot line between washington 30\nof moscorn with the latest electronic equipment, to reduce further the\nactivities, 1 In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that resile of a\nthe U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of\n\"war by\nmistake a\nmissile tests and major military exercises. Following up on miscalculation\ncongressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to\nimprove direct U.S. Soviet channels of communication.\nThese bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm\nconference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful\nways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for\nmisinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to\ndiminish the risks of surprise attack.\nArms control has long been the most visible area of\nU.S. Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to\ndefuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets .\nshould have a common interest in promoting regional stability,\nand in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that\npermit developing nations to concentrate their energies on\neconomic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges\nof views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we\ncan both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.\nOur approach is constructive, but little has come of it. We\nremain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet\nUnion's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based,\nnegotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice,\nthey will find the United States ready to cooperate.\nAnother major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union\nis human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as\nPage 10\n31\nany other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that\nhangs over our relationship.\nMoral considerations alone compel us to express our deep\nconcern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over\nthe virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others\nwho wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing\nharrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.\nOur request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union\nmust live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under\ninternational covenants in particular, its commitments under\nand the chemical + biological warface treatie.\nthe Helsinki Accords Experience has shown that greater respect\nfor human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the\nSoviet-American relationship.\n\"\nConflicts of interest between the United States and the\nSoviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace\n:\nbetween our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful\nworld for all mankind.\nThese are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet\nUnion, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both\nnations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive\ncompetition is a challenge for Americans; it will require\npatience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they\ncannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our\ninterests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more\nthan deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress\nfor peace, him Pan 2 Viry different in Septem. aroun where on Hatsual National intarists 2\nPermit, Even Though due antimic recorries below\nfundamints defference Is The Live always Crive\nPage 11\nCooperation begins with communication. We seek such\ncommunication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva\nand Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet\nwith Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting\nshould be followed by others, so that high-level consultations\nbecome a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.\nOur challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in\nus. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one\ncan predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.\nBut our two countries share with all mankind the dream of\neliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible\nrisks\ndream, because eliminating those,is so clearly a vital interest\nfor all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no\nreason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one\nanother in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger,\n:\ndisease, ignorance and, above all, war.\nMore than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an\napproach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he\nannounced it:\n\"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let\nus also direct attention to our common interests and to\nthe means by which those differences can be resolved.\nAnd if we cannot end now our differences, at least we\ncan help make the world safe for diversity. For, in\nthe final analysis, our most basic common link is that\nwe all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the\nsame air. We all cherish our children's future. And\nwe are all mortal.\"\nI urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress.\nIf the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace.\nThe journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be\nPage 12\n33\nnor cause\ndifficult. But that should not indict the past despair, for the\nfuture. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest\nadvances. constructive\nif itcanbe We welcome achieved compromise, without compremising In this our spirit basic of goals\ncompetition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the\nlevel of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of\npeople everywhere. Let us begin now.\nand the advances\nwe have made since\nthe beginnings of am\ncountry.\n34\n(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)\nJanuary 10, 1984\n1:00 p.m.\nASC\nPRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS\nNATIONAL PRESS CLUB\nMONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984\nThank you very much for inviting me back to visit your\ndistinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during\nthese first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of\nthe world on a subject of great importance to the cause of\npeace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet\nUnion.\nTomorrow,\nIn just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet\nUnion and the other nations of Europe at an international\nsecurity conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our\nresponsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of\nconflict. The conference will search for practical and\nmeaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace.\nWe will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our\npeople for genuine progress.\nWe live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of\nopportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and\nfrustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We\nhave and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that\nenhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984\nfinds the United States in its strongest position in years to\nestablish a constructive and realistic working relationship with\nthe Soviet Union.\n2\nSome fundamental changes have taken place since the decade\nof the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its\n35\nPage 2\nrole in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet\nUnion increased its military might and sought to expand its\ninfluence through threats and use of force.\n3\nThree years ago we embraced a mandate from the American\npeople to change course, and we have. Today America can once\nagain demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay\nsecure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through\nnegotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace\nB\nHistory teaches that wars begin when governments believe the\nprice of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our\nallies must remain strong enough to convince any potential\naggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In\nother words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.\nWith the support of the American people and the Congress, we\nhalted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the\nbest recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.\nOur alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values\nhas never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.\nAmerica's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by\nsurprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening\nourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was\ninevitable. They said it so often they probably started\nbelieving it. I think they can see now they were wrong.\nA\nNeither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the\ndifferences between our two societies. But we should always\nremember that we do have common interests. And the foremost\namong them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There\n36\nPage 3\nis no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would\ncall credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do\nso, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive\ncooperation.\nRecently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from\nthe Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of\nheightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This\nis understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the\nmove\nwords, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being\nrestored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because\nthere is less danger that the Soviet leadership will\nunderestimate our strength or resolve.\nWe do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no\nthreat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years\nago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to\ndominate the world. But we didn't Instead we nave used our power\nto write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped\nin Europe and the Far East,\nrebuild\nwar-ravaged economies ^ of East and West, including\nof\nthose nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former\nenemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.\nAmerica's character has not changed. Our strength and\nvision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful\nnegotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise\nonly if they can get something in return. America's economic and\nmilitary strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,\ntoday is a time of opportunities for peace.\n37\nPage 4\nBut to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is\nsafe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of\nthe world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working\nrelationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These\nare conditions which must be addressed and improved.\nDeterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our\nway of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our\npolicy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the\nSoviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a\ndialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions\nof the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive\nworking relationship.\nFirst, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of\nforce in solving international disputes.\nThe world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the\nend of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the\nMiddle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and\nAfrica. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by\nheavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack\nor subversion.\nMost of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,\nbut many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and\nits surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an\noutright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and\nexporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases\nsuffering, and makes solutions to real social' and economic\nproblems more difficult.\n38\nPage 5\nWould it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and\ngovernments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful\nsolutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us\nin cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.\nSecond, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast\nstockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear\nweapons.\nIt is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending\nmore than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of\ntheir national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious\ncycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere\nit occurs.\nWhile modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is\nneeded to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth\nis, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have\nfewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our\nnuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of\nits total destructive power.\nJust 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an\nadditional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes\nafter the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over\nthe last 3 -years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range\nmissiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years --\nand we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated\nfive existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.\nBut this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to\nreach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals. It\n39\nwas with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in\nNovember 1981, the \"zero option\" for intermediate-range missiles.\nOur aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an\nentire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment\nof INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still\nprefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side.\nIndeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have\nsaid before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will\nbe banished from the face of the Earth.\nLast month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his\ncountry shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.\nThese are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from\nwords to deeds.\nOur third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish\na better working relationship with greater cooperation and\nunderstanding.\nW\nCooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.\nComplying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.\nRespecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the\nrelationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts\nacross borders and permitting a free interchange of information\nand ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the\nrest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while\norganized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.\n(HUSERT\nJ have cited\nThe\nexamples 1 illustrate clearly why our relationship with\nthe Soviet Union is not what it should be We have a long way to\ngo, but we are determined to try and try again.\nPage 7\n40\nIn working toward these goals, our approach is based on\nthree guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.\nRealism means we start by understanding the world we live\nin. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition\nwith a government that does not share our notions of individual\nliberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank\nin acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our\nvalues.\n8\nStrength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or\nprotect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary\nnot only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and\ncompromise.\nStrength is more than military power. Economic strength is\ncrucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.\nEqually important is unity among our people at home and with our\nallies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were\n3 years ago.\nDialogue means we are determined to deal with our\ndifferences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to\ndiscuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for\npractical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We\nwill never retreat from negotiations.\nI have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I\ndon't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders\nwho have never shied away from expressing their view of our\nsystem. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other.\nWe don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us \"imperialist\nPage 8\naggressors\" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a\ncommunist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us\nlikes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living\nin this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.\nOur commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we\ninsist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not\natmospherics.\nIn our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --\nand especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear\nconfrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive\nset of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce\nsubstantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would\nhope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the\nultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat\naltogether.\nThe world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet\nUnion broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear\nforces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on\nstrategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the\nnegotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START.\nWe will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is\nready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.\nWe seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the\nchances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we\nhave put forward proposals for what we call \"confidence-building\nmeasures.\" They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva\nUnited States\nnegotiations, we have proposed that the #.S. and Soviet Union\nPage 9\nexchange advance notifications of missile tests and major\nmilitary exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions,\nwe also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet\nchannels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions\nwith the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications,\nincluding the \"Hotline.\"\nThese bilateral proposals will be broadened at the\nconference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to\ndevelop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and\npotential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities,\nand to diminish the risks of surprise attack.\nArms control has long been the most visible area of\nU.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to\ndefuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets\nshould have a common interest in promoting regional stability,\nand in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that\npermit developing nations to concentrate their energies on\neconomic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges\nof views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we\ncan both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.\nWe remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the\nSoviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving\nwork together\nbroad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make\nthat choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.\nA\nAnother major problem in our relationship with the Soviet\nUnion is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as\nPage 10\nan atmosphere of\nany other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that\nhangs permentes\nover our relationship.\nMoral considerations alone compel us to express our deep\nconcern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over\nthe virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others\nwho wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing\nso many\nharassment of A courageous people, like Andrei Sakharov.\nOur request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet\nUnion live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under\ninternational covenants -- in particular, its commitments under\nthe Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect\nfor human rights will can contribute to progress in other areas of the\nSoviet-American relationship.\nConflicts of interest between the United States and the\nSoviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace\nbetween our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful\nworld for all mankind.\nThese are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet\nUnion, a policy of credible deterrence, and peaceful competition\nand constructive cooperation\noven\nthat will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long\nhaul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge\nfor the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be\nprepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and\nallies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine\ncooperation; we seek progress Insurance for peace. the establishment of a furne and\nstable peace.\nCooperation begins with communication. We seek such\ncommunication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva (Reper)\nand we hoge that 40\nthis Session will msall\nPage 11\nthe first Stef towArd\nL\nthe establishment of grander\nand Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with\ndologne and Dopenation\nSoviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting\ndiscussions at the highert level,\nshould be followed by others, so that high level consultations including\nbecome a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.\nclear\nOur challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in\nus. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one\ncan predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.\nBut the people of our two countries share with all mankind the\ndream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an\nimpossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital\ninterest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each\nother; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought\nworld war II.\nalongside one another in two world wors. Today our common\nenemies are hunger, disease\nand, above all, war.\nMore than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an\napproach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he\nannounced it:\n\"So, let us not be blind to our differences\" he said,\n\"but let us also direct attention to our common\ninterests and to the means by which those differences\ncan be resolved.\"\nWell, those differences would turn out to be differences in\ngovernmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would\nhave to do with the things of everyday life for people\neverywhere.\n11\nSuppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or\nsharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was\nno language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would\nthey debate the differences between their respective governments?\nPage 12\nOr, would they find themselves comparing notes about their\nchildren, and what each other did for a living?\nBefore they parted company they would probably have touched\non ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and\nthe problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided\nthey were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.\nAbove all, they would have proven that people don't make\nwars. People want to raise their children in a world without\nfear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things\nover and above bare subsistance that make life worth living.\nThey want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives\nthem satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests\ncross all borders.\nIf the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be\npeace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of\narms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams\nof those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us\nbegin now.\n46\n(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)\nJanuary 10, 1984\n1:00 p.m.\nASC\nPRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS\nNATIONAL PRESS CLUB\nMONDAY, JANUARY 16, 1984\nThank you very much for inviting me back to visit your\ndistinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during\nthese first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of\nthe world on a subject of great importance to the cause of\npeace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet\nUnion.\nTomorrow,\nIn just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet\nUnion and the other nations of Europe at an international\nsecurity conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our\nresponsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of\nconflict. The conference will search for practical and\nmeaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace.\nWe will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our\npeople for genuine progress.\nWe live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of\nopportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and\nfrustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We\nhave and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that\nenhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984\nfinds the United States in its strongest position in years to\nestablish a constructive and realistic working relationship with\nthe Soviet Union.\nSome fundamental changes have taken place since the decade\nof the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its\nPage 2\nrole in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet\nUnion increased its military might and sought to expand its\ninfluence through threats and use of force.\nThree years ago we embraced a mandate from the American\npeople to change course, and we have. Today America can once\nagain demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay\nsecure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through\nnegotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.\nHistory teaches that wars begin when governments believe the\nprice of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our\nallies must remain strong enough to convince any potential\naggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In\nother words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.\nWith the support of the American people and the Congress, we\nhalted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the\nbest recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.\nOur alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values\nhas never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.\nAmerica's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by\nsurprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening\nourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was\ninevitable. They said it so often they probably started\nbelieving it. I think they can see now they were wrong.\nNeither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the\ndifferences between our two societies. But we should always\nremember that we do have common interests. And the foremost\namong them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There\nPage 3\nis no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would\ncall credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do\nso, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive\ncooperation.\nRecently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from\nthe Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of\nheightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This\nis understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the\nwords, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being\nrestored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because\nthere is less danger that the Soviet leadership will\nunderestimate our strength or resolve.\nWe do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no\nthreat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years\nago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have tried to\ndominate the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power\nto write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped\nin Europe and the Far East,\nrebuild\nwar-ravaged economies ^ of East and West, including\nof\nthose nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former\nenemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.\nAmerica's character has not changed. Our strength and\nvision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful\nnegotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise\nonly if they can get something in return. America's economic and\nmilitary strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,\ntoday is a time of opportunities for peace.\nPage 4\nBut to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is\nsafe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of\nthe world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working\nrelationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These\nare conditions which must be addressed and improved.\nDeterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our\nway of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our\npolicy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the\nSoviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a\ndialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions\nof the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive\nworking relationship.\nFirst, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of\nforce in solving international disputes.\nThe world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the\nend of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the\nMiddle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and\nAfrica. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by\nheavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack\nor subversion.\nMost of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,\nbut many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and\nits surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an\noutright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and\nexporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases\nsuffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic\nproblems more difficult.\n50\nPage 5\nWould it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and\ngovernments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful\nsolutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us\nin cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.\nSecond, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast\nstockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear\nweapons.\nIt is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending\nmore than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of\ntheir national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious\ncycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere\nit occurs.\nWhile modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is\nneeded to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth\nis, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have\nfewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our\nnuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of\nits total destructive power.\nJust 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an\nadditional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes\nafter the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over\nthe last 3 -years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range\nmissiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years --\nand we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated\nfive existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.\nBut this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to\nreach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals. It\n51\nPage 6\nwas with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in\nNovember 1981, the \"zero option\" for intermediate-range missiles.\nOur aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an\nentire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment\nof INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still\nprefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side.\nIndeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have\nsaid before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will\nbe banished from the face of the Earth.\nLast month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his\ncountry shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.\nThese are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from\nwords to deeds.\nOur third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish\na better working relationship with greater cooperation and\nunderstanding.\nCooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.\nComplying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.\nRespecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the\nrelationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts\nacross borders and permitting a free interchange of information\nand ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the\nrest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while\norganized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.\n(INSERT A) J have cited\nThe examples ^ illustrate clearly why our relationship with\nthe Soviet Union is not what it should be We have a long way to\ngo, but we are determined to try and try again.\nPage 7\nIn working toward these goals, our approach is based on\nthree guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.\nRealism means we start by understanding the world we live\nin. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition\nwith a government that does not share our notions of individual\nliberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank\nin acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our\nvalues.\nStrength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or\nprotect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary\nnot only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and\ncompromise.\nStrength is more than military power. Economic strength is\ncrucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.\nEqually important is unity among our people at home and with our\nallies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were\n3 years ago.\nDialogue means we are determined to deal with our\ndifferences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to\ndiscuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for\npractical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We\nwill never retreat from negotiations.\nI have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I\ndon't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders\nwho have never shied away from expressing their view of our\nsystem. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other.\nWe don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us \"imperialist\n53\nPage 8\naggressors\" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a\ncommunist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us\nlikes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living\nin this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.\nOur commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we\ninsist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not\natmospherics.\nIn our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --\nand especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear\nconfrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive\nset of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce\nsubstantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would\nhope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the\nultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat\naltogether.\nThe world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet\nUnion broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear\nforces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on\nstrategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the\nnegotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START.\nWe will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is\nready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.\nWe seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the\nchances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we\nhave put forward proposals for what we call \"confidence-building\nmeasures.\" They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva\nUnited States\nnegotiations, we have proposed that the H.S. and Soviet Union\n54\nPage 9\nexchange advance notifications of missile tests and major\nmilitary exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions,\nwe also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet\nchannels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions\nwith the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications,\nincluding the \"Hotline.\"\nThese bilateral proposals will be broadened at the\nconference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to\ndevelop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and\npotential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities,\nand to diminish the risks of surprise attack.\nArms control has long been the most visible area of\nU.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to\ndefuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets\nshould have a common interest in promoting regional stability,\nand in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that\npermit developing nations to concentrate their energies on\neconomic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges\nof views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we\ncan both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.\nWe remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the\nSoviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving\nbroad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make\nthat choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.\nAnother major problem in our relationship with the Soviet\nUnion is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as\n55\nPage 10\nany other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that\nhangs over our relationship.\nMoral considerations alone compel us to express our deep\nconcern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over\nthe virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others\nwho wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing\nso many\nharassment of A courageous people, like Andrei Sakharov.\nOur request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet\nUnion live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under\ninternational covenants -- in particular, its commitments under\nthe Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect\nfor human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the\nSoviet-American relationship.\nConflicts of interest between the United States and the\nSoviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace\nbetween our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful\nworld for all mankind.\nThese are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet\nUnion, a policy of credible deterrence, and peaceful competition\nand constructive peration\nthat will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long\nhaul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge\nfor the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be\nprepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and\nallies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine\ncooperation; we seek progress for peace.\nCooperation begins with communication. We seek such\ncommunication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva\nPage 11\nand Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with\nSoviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting\nshould be followed by others, so that high-level consultations\nbecome a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.\nOur challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in\nus. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one\ncan predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.\nBut the people of our two countries share with all mankind the\ndream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an\nimpossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital\ninterest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each\nother; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought\nworld war II.\nalongside one another in two world wars. Today our common\nenemies are hunger, disease\nand, above all, war.\nMore than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an\napproach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he\nannounced it:\n\"So, let us not be blind to our differences\" he said,\n\"but let us also direct attention to our common\ninterests and to the means by which those differences\ncan be resolved.\"\nWell, those differences would turn out to be differences in\ngovernmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would\nhave to do with the things of everyday life for people\neverywhere.\nSuppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or\nsharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was\nno language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would\nthey debate the differences between their respective governments?\nPage 12\nOr, would they find themselves comparing notes about their\nchildren, and what each other did for a living?\nBefore they parted company they would probably have touched\non ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and\nthe problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided\nthey were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.\nAbove all, they would have proven that people don't make\nwars. People want to raise their children in a world without\nfear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things\nover and above bare subsistance that make life worth living.\nThey want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives\nthem satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests\ncross all borders.\nIf the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be\npeace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of\narms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams\nof those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us\nbegin now.\nINSERT A\n58\nCooperation and understanding are especially important\nto arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by mounting\nevidence that the Soviet Union has breached important elements of\nseveral arms control agreements. It has also established a pattern\nof taking advantage of any imprecision or ambiguity in agreements.\nSuch actions jeopardize the arms control process.\nI will soon submit to the Congress the report on these\nSoviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course see\nto it that our modernization program takes them into account so that\nwe will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also continue our\ndiscussions with the Soviet government on activities which under-\nmine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual interest to remove\nimpediments to\narms control, which offers us the means to\nimprove the security of both our countries and to create a safer\nworld."
}