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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
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Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: [President Address: US-Soviet
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Box: 31
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/18/2005
File Folder
[PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
FOIA
1/16/84] SPEECH 2/2
F06-114/9
Box Number
31
YARHI-MILO
3113
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
10834 MEMO
MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE DRAFT
1 12/16/1983 B1
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
10834
9182
matlock SYSTEM II
91508
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
December 16, 1983
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCEARLANE
JACK MATLOCK fam
RCM HAS SEEN
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Draft Presidential Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations
Attached is a copy of the current draft speech on U.S.-Soviet
relations. It has been coordinated with Rick Burt, and I
understand Secretary Shultz will review it tonight or early
tomorrow morning.
When I met with Secretary Shultz yesterday, he indicated that he
hoped the President could review the draft over the weekend, and
that he also hoped that the speech could be scheduled for Tuesday
evening, December 20.
I believe the draft is in pretty good shape, although it may need
some stylistic fine tuning. (The speech writers have not yet
seen it.)
I will be working on the following over the weekend:
1. The draft letter to Andropov, which I will revise to make
reference to the speech. (It would be appropriate to have it
delivered as soon as possible after the speech, unless it can be
approved in time to deliver it shortly before the speech is
delivered.)
2. A draft paper which Secretary Shultz would like to use
for discussion with the President, summarizing the conclusions of
the group he convened.
Secretary Shultz agrees that it would be well to confine
discussion of the mechanics of any "special channels" we might
consider to a smaller group than the one present at the breakfast
discussions.
I will be available over the weekend if you would like to discuss
any of these matters.
Enclosure: Draft Speech
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
NLRRF06-114/9 #10834
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011
2
Draft 12/16/83
SPEECH ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS
My fellow Americans:
We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love
and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition
of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future.
Before these holidays are upon us, I think it is a good time to
share my thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds
and all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in
the world.
When we think of world peace we think first of all of our
relations with the Soviet Union. Not because either the United
States or the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but
because the world cannot be at peace unless there is peace
between us. It is an awesome and sobering fact that, for the
first time in the history of mankind, two nations have the might,
not only to destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself.
Neither of our nations can have a higher interest than making
sure that this does not, indeed cannot, happen.
I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding
fact as well as I do. Yet, we are experiencing a period of
tension in our relations which is greater than we have seen for
2
many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is
and what we want to do about it.
Causes of Tension
If we look back over the seventies, we notice two things:
America tended to withdraw from the world and to neglect its
defenses while the Soviet Union increased its military might
steadily and enormously. The facts speak for themselves:
Throughout the 1970's, the Soviets devoted twice as much of their
gross national product to defense as the United States. They
deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks,
twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20
imtermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States
deployed no comparable weapons.
But the Soviets not only amassed a monstrous arsenal while
we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also began
to use these arms to establish their domination over other
countries. From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to
Kampuchea, the Soviets or their proxies have used force to
interfere in the affairs of other nations. And in Europe, their
deployment of SS-20 missiles was a blatant effort to threaten our
West European allies and split the NATO Alliance.
3
This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was
absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American
strength or else the danger of war would increase. History
teaches us that wars begin when one side feels that it can
prevail and therefore has something to gain. If we are to keep
the peace, we must make sure that we and our Allies are strong
enough to make clear to any potential aggressor that war could
bring no benefit but only disaster to him.
With your support and that of your representatives in the
Congress, we have stopped America's decline. Our economy is
regaining health, our defenses are on the mend, and our
commitment to defend our values has never been greater.
Now this, I think, has taken the Soviets by suprise. They
had counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. After all,
their propagandists have been saying for years that we were
destined for the dustbin of history, and they said it so often
that they may even have started believing it. But they can see
now that this isn't happening.
And not only that. Telltale signs are accumulating that it
is their system, not ours, that doesn't work. So it is no wonder
that the Soviets are feeling frustrated--and are showing it in
their shrill propaganda.
4
4
A Safer World
The harsh words that we have exchanged have led many to fear
that the danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets
are on a "collision course." This is understandable, but I
believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if we look beyond the
words and the diplomatic manoeuvering, one thing stands out: the
balance of power has been restored and this means that the world
is in fact a safer place.
It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviets
will produce a confrontation by miscalculating our strength or
will. And we, of course, have no intent to threaten them. We
did not do so even when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, so
how can anyone think that we would do so now, when they are armed
to the teeth?
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet
Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued
with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much
too high and are a danger in themselves. And there is a sad lack
of confidence in U.S.-Soviet relations. These are the conditions
which we must resolve to improve.
5
Our Aims
Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and
protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward
the Soviet Union end there. If we are to avoid an arms race,
with all the dangers it entails, we must do more. And it seems
to me that our government and the Soviet government should
concentrate our attention in three broad areas.
First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat
of force in solving international disputes.
War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has
witnessed more than 150 wars since the end of Warld War Two
alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In many
other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in regional or
local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the
Soviet Union and its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has
suffered an outright Soviet invasion. This Soviet habit of
trying to extend its influence and control by fueling local
conflicts and exporting revolution is a dangerous practice which
6
exacerbates local conflicts, increases destruction and suffering,
and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more
difficult.
Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the
governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts
to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or
sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I
invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move
the world, and our own actions, in this direction.
Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles
of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons.
It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's
developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on
arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret
that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has
forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the
military balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious
circle of threat and response which drives the arms race.
Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat,
we have tried to reduce the number and destructive power of our
nuclear weapons. It is a little-known fact that our total
nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms
of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in
7
7
terms of its total destructive power. Just last month, we and
our allies agreed to eliminate an additional 1400 nuclear
warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal
of a thousand warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if all
our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in
Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not be
necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated for
each new one.
But this is not enough. And the sad fact is that we can
hardly go further until the Soviet Union adopts a similar policy
and negotiates seriously for substantially lower levels.
Third, we must work to establish greater confidence and
understanding. Without this, we will hardly be able to
accomplish much in reducing the use of force or lowering the
level of arms.
Confidence has many facets. Complying with past agreements
increases it while violating them undermines it. Respecting the
rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while denying these
rights injures it. Expanding contacts across borders and
permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase
it; attempts to seal one's people off from the rest of the world
diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and organized theft of
industrial secrets certainly hurts.
8
These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low
in our relations with the Soviets. But while we have a long way
to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep on
trying.
Our Approach
In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three
guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell
you what they mean to me.
Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of
world we live in and the nature of our adversaries. We must
recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a rival who
does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and
peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our
differences and unafraid to defend our values.
I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet
system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise
to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing
their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each
other. We don't walk away from the negotiating table because the
Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling
to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The
fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to
9
refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, it makes it all
the more imperative for us to talk.
Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully
or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is
necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation
and compromise. The Soviet leaders are supreme realists
themselves: if they make a concession, it is because they get
something in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer
something in return.
Strength is of course more than military might. It has many
components: economic health, political cohesion, Alliance
solidarity as well as adequate defenses. We are stronger in all
these areas than we were three years ago, and this gives us the
basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.
Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions. We will never walk away from a
negotiating table. To do so would be unforgivable given the
stakes involved for the whole world.
When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269
passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our
outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators
10
10
back to Geneva and Vienna because I understood that, no matter
how strong our feelings were about that dastardly act, it would
be irresponsible to interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not
merely atmospherics.
Some Real Problems
Reducing the risk of war--and especially nuclear war--is
unquestionably priority number one. A nuclear confrontation
could well be mankind's last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet
Union a comprehensive set of initiatives that would greatly
reduce the size of our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any
incentive to use these weapons, even in time of crisis.
The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken
off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. There
is no justification for these steps.
My negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table,
and to finish the search for agreements in INF and START. We
have proposals that would increase the security not only of our
two countries, but of the world at large. We are prepared to
negotiate on these proposals in good faith. Whenever the Soviets
are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.
11
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the likelihood of conflicts in which such
weapons might be used. Here we have proposed to the Soviets a
series of steps to reduce the chances for dangerous
misunderstanding and miscalculation in times of tension.
We call these proposals "confidence-building measures. "
They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva
negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union
exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and major
military exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senator Nunn
and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of
ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a
further safeguard against misunderstandings.
Our efforts have not stopped there. Together with our
allies and the other nations of Europe, we will be joining in a
conference on European security and confidence-building measures
in Stockholm. Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S.
Delegation to the opening of that conference next month. Our
goal will be to develop practical and meaningful ways to reduce
some of the apprehension and potential for misinterpretation
surrounding military activities. By doing so, we would be
diminishing the risks of surprise attack. This important task
needs to be a joint effort. We will be working closely with our
allies, but invite the cooperation of all others in this work as
well -- including the Soviet Union.
Arms control has been the most visible area of US-Soviet
dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to
12
defuse global tensions in the world that could escalate
dangerously. I think we and the Soviets should have a common
interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful
solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing
nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Here
we have sought to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on
Afghanistan, complementing the efforts of the United Nations
Secretary General, and on southern Africa, to supplement the
diplomatic efforts in the region itself which have been underway
for several years.
Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has
come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the
Soviets agree. We remain convinced that on issues like these it
should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a
constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated
solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us
ready to collaborate.
Our Approach in a Nutshell: Realistic Engagement
These problems are real. Only some of them can be solved.
All of them, however, can be managed peacefully. Not one of them
need lead to confrontation between our two countries.
One very real problem is that we have fluctuated in our
policies toward the Soviet Union in the past. We have gone from
periods of confrontation to periods of cooperation and- back
again. We tended either not to talk at all, and to count only on
13
our strength, or to do little more than talk, and neglect the
strength we need for productive dialogue.
Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic. There is
nothing wrong with talk: in today's world we and the Soviets,
different as we are, must talk. But talk that does not address
the real problems, thqt avoids unpleasant facts, creates
illusions. In a democracy, it is those illusions, and the
inevitable disillusionment, that lead to abrupt changes of
course, to worsening relations.
The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with
the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So
have we. If we are strong, and realitstic, and prepared to talk
to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there
is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable, productive
relationship that can be sustained without swings of euphoria and
despair.
That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union.
I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for
the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require
the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a
challenge to the Soviets. They must recognize that the days of
paper promises, of the one-way street and of atmospherics for the
sake of appearances are over. And they must recognize that even
if they spurn the cooperation we desire, we and our allies will
always be able to protect ourselves.
14
But we will not walk away from the negotiating table, and we
will be ready for negotiation whenever the Soviets are.
Realistic engagement is not a policy for tomorrow or next year;
it is a policy for the next decades. Our challenge is a peaceful
one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the best
from the Soviets, too.
Conclusion
No one can predict whether the Soviets will rise to this
challenge, but I am optimistic. Our two countries share with all
mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the
risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other
better in recent years; we should do everything we can to
increase contacts and understanding. We have never fought each
other; there is no reason we ever should. We have fought common
enemies together; today those enemies are named hunger,
pestilence, pollution, and, above all, war.
Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major
crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, President John F. Kennedy
defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as
realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:
15
"So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us also
direct attention to our common interests and to the means by
which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end
now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for
diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common
link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe
the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are
all mortal." "
Tonight, on the eve of Christmas and the approach of the New
Year, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and
rededicate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the
problems of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet
leaders and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in
realistic engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high
endeavor, they will never find us wanting.
WHSR
Time Stamp
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Robert
TO: WHITE HOUSE FARLAWE
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December 18, 1983
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
83rreig P 3 : 10
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Speech on US-Soviet Relations
Attached is a new draft of the speech on US-Soviet
relations which reflects the Department's comments on
the version received from your staff.
CHill perform
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Draft Speech
SECRET
DECL: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21/1997
By cvs NARA, Date 7/26/02
Draft: 12/18/83 (noon)
SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS
My fellow Americans:
We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love
and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my
thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and
all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the
world.
When we think of world peace we must think first of all of
our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the
Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world
cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an
awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the
history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to
destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of
our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that
such terrible capabilities are never used.
I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this
overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering
obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than
we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight
about why this is and what we can do about it.
20
- 2 -
Causes of Tension
If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice
two things: America tended to question its role in the world
and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased
its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad
through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for
themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense
budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their
military spending by three-to-four percent every year. They
deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as
many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over
360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United
States deployed no comparable weapons.
The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we
stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used
these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to
Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or
their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of
other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new
missiles was at once an effort to split the NATO Alliance and
to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.
This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was
absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American
21
- 3 -
strength or else the danger of war would increase. History
teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however
mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace,
we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough
to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no
benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is
deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not
military superiority.
With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted
America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our
defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our
commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.
This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may
have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have
been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of
history. They said it so often that they may have even started
believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong.
Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized
system is proving less able than the Western democracies to
adapt to the challenges of a new era.
A Safer World.
Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from
the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the
22
- 4 -
danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a
"collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This
is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken.
For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing,
one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored
and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.
It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet
leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our
strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We
did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of
nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are
armed to the teeth.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet
Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued
with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far
too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet
relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to
improve.
Our Aims
Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and
protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward
23
- 5 -
the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the
military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet
Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the
arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world,
and gradually to build greater confidence between our two
nations.
First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat
of force in solving international disputes.
War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has
witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War
Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa.
In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or
subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend
its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local
conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes
20
- 6 -
solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the
governments and peoples in areas where there are local
conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than
supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is
obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search
for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this
direction.
Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles
of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons
It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's
developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year
on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I
regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two
decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to
restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the
vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms
race.
Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet
threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have
been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a
25
- 7 -
little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at
its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of
warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its
total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our
allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads
from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a
thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three
years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles
have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and
we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads
will have been eliminated for each new one.
But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts
to reach agreements to radically reduce the numbers of nuclear
weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the
"zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to
eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms.
Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an
important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no
INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a
zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to
the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when
nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."
The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the
16
- 8 -
other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a
world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words.
Now is the time to begin making that vision a reality.
Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish
greater mutual confidence and understanding.
Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with
agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it.
Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while
denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across
borders and permitting a free interchange of information and
ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the
rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low
in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a
long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to
keep trying.
Our Approach
In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three
guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me
tell you what they mean to me.
27
- 9 -
Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of
world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a
long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our
notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change
abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and
unafraid to defend our values.
I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet
system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise
to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in
expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't
deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the
Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling
to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The
fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason
to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we
have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.
Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate success-
fully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is
necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation
and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves:
if they make a concession, it is because they get something in
return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something
in return.
28
- 10 -
Strength is of course more than military might. It has
many components. Economic health is the starting point;
equally important are political unity at home and solidarity
with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas
than we were three years ago. We have drastically reduced the
rate of inflation to its present low level and are on the road
to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation
of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its
ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet
Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic
values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this
gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the
Soviets.
Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to
ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.
When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269
passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our
outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators
back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming
proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings
29
- 11 -
were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt
efforts to achieve arms reduction.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
Real Problems, Realistic Solutions
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war
-- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority
number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's
last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive
set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of
our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these
weapons even in time of crisis. And I am more than ready to go
much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work
together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat
altogether.
The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken
off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and
to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on
the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would
- 12 -
increase the security not only of our two countries, but, of the
world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith.
Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet
them half-way.
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding
and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put
forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building
measures.' They cover a wide range of activities. In the
Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet
Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and
major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by
Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we
also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet
channels of communication as a further safeguard against
misunderstandings.
These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by
broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence
involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including
the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be
joining in a conference on European security opening next month
in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent
meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first
3)
- 13 -
session of the conference in recognition of the importance we
attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European
nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from
the Warsaw Pact will also attend.
Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop
practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and
potential for misinterpretation surrounding military
activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This
important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working
closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation
of all others -- including the Soviet Union.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find
ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could
escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common
interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful
solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing
nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus
we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these
regional conflicts and tensions, our respective interests, and
how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has
come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the
32
- 14 -
Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like
these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play
a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful,
negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they
will find us ready to collaborate.
Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union
is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, perhaps
more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and
ill will that hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and other
Soviet minorities to join close relatives abroad, over the
continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey
Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why Soviet
authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred of
their citizens to be reunited with their families in the United
States.
Our objectives in the human-rights field are not revolu-
tionary. We know that this is a sensitive area for the
Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are
not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in
- 15 -
results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the
obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants
-- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords.
Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can
contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American
relationship.
A Policy of Realistic Engagement
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed
peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can
keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a
better and more peaceful world for all mankind.
We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the
past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has
fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of
euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and
pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.
The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with
the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period.
So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to
talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us,
there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,
34
- 17 -
as I have said before, if these and other talks create the
basis for real progress and concrete results, I would be ready
to meet with Soviet President Andropov.]
Conclusion
Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the
best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too.
No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this
challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with
all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce
the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each
other better in recent years; we should do everything we can
to increase understanding. We have never fought each other;
there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought
alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies
are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major
crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an
approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and
hopeful today as when he announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to-our differences -- but let us
also direct attention to our common interests and to the
means by which those differences can be resolved. And if
we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help
- 16 -
productive relationship that can be sustained over the long
term, without swings of euphoria and despair.
That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union.
I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for
the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will
require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us.
It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match
our good will, we will be in a position to protect our
interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world.
But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.
Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such
communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers
reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:
We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact
countries the offer to work together with us to bring about
a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based
on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit
of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political
dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.
We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna.
Secretary Shultz will be prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko in Stockholm in January. If invited, he will
also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. [And
36
- 18 I. -
make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final
analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit
this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all
cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."
Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on
the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle
in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the
future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the
Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the
benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never
find us wanting.
2740m
Rm. 368
37
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE
SUBJECT: Speech on US-Soviet Relations
Attached is a new draft of the speech on US-Soviet relations,
which reflects the Deparment's comments on the version received
from your staff.
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Attachment: As Stated
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By as NARA, Date 7/26/02
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
38
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
Drafted: EUR/SOV: AVershbawn
12/16/83 632-8040 2739m
Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr
EUR: JDobbins
EUR: RBurt
Injurn
SECRET SENSITIVE
Draft: 12/17/83
SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS
My fellow Americans:
We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love
and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my
thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and
all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the
world.
When we think of world peace we must think first of all of
our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the
Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world
cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an
awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the
history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to
destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of
our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that
such terrible capabilities are never used.
I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this
overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering
obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than
we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight
about why this is and what we can do about it.
40
- 2 -
Causes of Tension
If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice
two things: America tended to question its role in the world
and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased
its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad
through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for
themselves: throughout the last decade, the Soviets devoted
twice as much of their gross national product to the military
as the United States. They deployed six times as many
L ballistic missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many
combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20
intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States
deployed no comparable weapons.
The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we
stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used
these arms to establish their domination over other countries.
From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the
Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the
affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their
deployment of new missiles was a blatant effort to split the
NATO Alliance and to threaten our friends and Allies on both
these continents.
This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was
absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American
41
- 3 -
strength or else the danger of war would increase. History
teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however
mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace,
we must make sure that we and our allies are strong enough to
convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no
benefit to him, but only disaster to all.
With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted,
America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our
defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are strong and our
commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.
This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may
have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have
been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of
history. They said it so often that they may have even started
believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong.
Indeed, signs are accumulating that it is their system, not
ours, that history is leaving behind. So it is no wonder that
Soviet leaders are feeling frustrated -- and are showing it in
their shrill propaganda.
42
- 4 -
A Safer World
These harsh words have led many to fear that the danger of
war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision
course.' There is talk of a new "Cold War. "1 This is
understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For
if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one
thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored and
this means that the world is in fact a safer place.
It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet
leadership will produce a confrontation by underestimating our
strength or resolve. We, of course, have no intent to threaten
them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a
monopoly of nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when
they are armed to the teeth.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet
Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued
with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much
too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet
relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to
improve.
Our Aims
Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and
protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward
43
- 5 -
the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the
military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet
Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the
arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world,
and gradually to build greater confidence between our two
nations.
First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat
of force in solving international disputes.
War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has
witnessed more than 150 conflicts / since the end of World War
Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa.
In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or
subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in Local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend
its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local
conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes
"
- 6 -
solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the
governments and peoples in areas where there are local
conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than
supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is
obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search
for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this
direction.
Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles
of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons
It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's
developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year
on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I
regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two
decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to
restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the
vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms
race.
Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet
threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have
been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a
45
- 7 -
little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at
its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of
warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its
total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our
allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads
from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a
thousand nuclear warheads from Europe three years ago. Even if
all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed
in Europe over the next five years--and we hope this will not
be necessary--five existing warheads will have been eliminated
for each new one.
But this is not enough. As I said in my speech to the
Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear
weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth." We
cannot begin to make that dream a reality, however, until the
Soviet Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously
for substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.
Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish
greater mutual confidence and understanding.
Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with
agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it.
Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while
- 8 -
denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across
borders and permitting a free interchange of information and
ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the
rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low
in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a
long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to
keep trying.
Our Approach
In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three
guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me
tell you what they mean to me.
Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of
world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a
long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our
notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change
abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and
unafraid to defend our values.
I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet
system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise
to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in
47
- 9 -
expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't
deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the
Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling
to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The
fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason
to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we
have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.
Strength is of course more than military might. It has
many components. Economic health is the starting point;
equally important are political unity at home and solidarity
with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas
than we were three years ago. We have virtually eliminated the
scourge of inflation and are on the road to a strong recovery.
The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range
missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the
military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a
renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in
America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a
firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.
Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
48
- 10 -
We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to
ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.
When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269
passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our
outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators
back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming
proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings
were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt
efforts to achieve arms reduction.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and
not merely atmospherics.
Real Problems, Realistic Solutions
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war
-- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority
number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's
last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive
set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of
our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these
weapons even in time of crisis.
- 11 -
The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken
off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and
to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on
the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would
increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the
world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith.
Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet
them half-way.
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding
and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put
forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building
measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the
Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet
Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and
major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by
Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we
also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet
channels of communication as a further safeguard against
misunderstandings.
These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by
50
- 12 -
broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence
involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including
the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be
joining in a conference on European security opening next month
in Stockholm. Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S.
Delegation to the first session of that conference.
Our goal there will be to develop practical and meaningful
ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinter-
pretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the
risks of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a
joint effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but
we will also need the cooperation of all others -- including
the Soviet Union.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find
ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could
escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common
interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful
solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing
nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus
we have sought to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on
Afghanistan, complementing the efforts of the United Nations
Secretary General, and on southern Africa, to supplement the
- 13 -
diplomatic efforts in the region itself which have been
underway for several years.
Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has
come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the
Soviets are willing We remain convinced that on issues like
these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play
a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful,
negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they
will find us ready to collaborate.
A Policy of Realistic Engagement
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed
peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can
keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a
better and more peaceful world for all mankind.
We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the
past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has
fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of
euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and
pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.
52
- 14 -
The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with
the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period.
So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to
talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us,
there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,
productive relationship that can be sustained over the long
term, without swings of euphoria and despair.
That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union.
I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for
the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will
require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to
us. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. They must
recognize that the days of atmospherics for the sake of
atmosphere are over. If they cannot match our good will, we
will be in a position to protect our interests, and those of
our friends and allies in the world. But we want more than
deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.
We will stay at the negotiating table, and we will be ready
for negotiation whenever the Soviets are. Our challenge is a
peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for
the best from the Soviet Union too.
- 15 -
Conclusion
No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this
challenge, but I am optimistic. Our two countries share with
all mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce
the risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each
other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to
increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there
is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside
one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger,
disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major
crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an
approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and
hopeful today as when he announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us
also direct attention to our common interests and to the
means by which those differences can be resolved. And if
we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help
make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final
analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit
this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all
cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."
Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on
the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle
in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the
54
- 16 -
future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the
Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the
benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never
find us wanting.
2735m
Draft 12/17/83
SPEECH ON U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS
My fellow Americans:
We will soon begin a season of cheer, good fellowship, love
and hope. And as the year draws to a close we have the tradition
of reflecting on the past and making resolutions for the future.
As these holidays approach, I want to share my thoughts with you
on a topic that is in all of our minds and all of our hearts:
how to strengthen and preserve peace in the world.
When we think of world peace we think first of all of our
relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the Soviet
Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world cannot be at
peace unless there is peace between us. It is an awesome and
sobering fact that, for the first time in the history of mankind,
two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but
to destroy mankind itself. Neither of our nations can have a
higher interest than making sure that such terrible capabilities
are never used.
I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this overriding
fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering obstacles to
cooperation between our two nations greater than we have seen for
- 2 -
many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight about why this is
and what we want to do about it.
Causes of Tension
If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice
two things: America tended to question its role in the world and
to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased its
military might steadily and enormously. The facts speak for
themselves: Throughout the last decade, the Soviets devoted
twice as much of their gross national product to the military as
the United States. They deployed six times as many ballistic
missiles, five times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft
and, of course, over 360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a
time when the United States deployed no comparable weapons.
But the Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while
we stood still and let our defenses deteriorate, they also used
these arms to establish their domination over other countries.
From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the
Soviets or their proxies have used force to interfere in the
affairs of other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deploy-
ment of new missiles was a blatant effort to threaten our friends
and allies and to split the NATO Alliance.
286
This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was
absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American
strength or else the danger of war would increase. History
51
- 3 -
teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however mistaken-
ly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace, we must
convince
make sure that we and our Allies are strong enough to make clear
to any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit to
him, but only disaster to all.
With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted
America's decline. Our economy is regaining health and our
defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are strong and our
commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.
This may have taken the Soviet leaders by surprise. They
may have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. After
all, they have been saying for years that we were destined for
the dustbin of history. They said it so often that they may even
have started believing it. But they can see now that they were
wrong.
And not only that. Signs are accumulating that it is their
system, not ours, that history is leaving behind. So it is no
wonder that Soviet leaders are feeling frustrated--and are
showing it in their shrill propaganda.
A Safer World
These harsh words have led many to fear that the danger of
war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a "collision
course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This is
- 4 -
understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken. For if
we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing, one thing
stands out: the balance of power is being restored and this
means that the world is in fact a safer place.
It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet
leadership will produce a confrontation by underestimating our
strength or resolve. We, of course, have no intent to threaten
them. We did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a
monopoly of nuclear weapons; much less would we do so now, when
they are armed to the teeth.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet
Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued
with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are much
too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet
relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to
improve.
Our Aims
Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and
protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward
the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the
military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet
Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the
arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world,
- 5 -
and gradually to build greater confidence between our two
nations.
First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat
of force in solving international disputes.
War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has
witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two
alone. Today armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America and Africa. In
other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or
subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. This Soviet habit of trying to extend
its influence and control by fueling regional and local conflicts
and exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local
conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes solu-
tions to real social and economic problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the
governments and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts
to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than supplying arms or
sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is obvious, and I
invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search for ways to move
the world, and our own actions, in this direction.
- 6 -
Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles
of armaments in the world, particularly those of nuclear weapons.
It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's develop-
ing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on arms-
--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I regret that
the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two decades has
forced us to increase our defense spending to restore the mili-
tary balance. We must find ways to reverse the vicious circle of
threat and response which drives the arms race.
Even while modernizing our forces to meet the Soviet threat,
we have built and maintained no more forces than have been
necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a little-
known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest
level in 20 years in terms of the number of warheads, and at the
lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.
Just two months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an
additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes
on top of the removal of a thousand warheads from Europe three
years ago. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles
have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years--and we
hope this will not be necessary--five existing warheads will have
been eliminated for each new one.
But this is not enough. As I said in my speech to the
Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when nuclear
weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth. We cannot
- 7 -
begin to make that dream a reality, however, until the Soviet
Union adopts a similar policy and negotiates seriously for
substantially lower levels of nuclear arms.
Third, we must work to establish greater confidence and
understanding.
Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with
agreements increases it while violating them undermines it.
Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while
denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across
borders and permitting a free interchange of information and
ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the
rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low
in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a long
way to go in building confidence, we are determined to keep on
trying.
Our Approach
In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three
guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me tell
you what they mean to me.
- 8 -
Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of
world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term
competition with an adversary who does not share our notions of
individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must
be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend
our values.
I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet
system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise
to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in expressing
their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't deal with each
other. We don't refuse to talk because the Soviets call us
"imperialist aggressors," or because they cling to the fantasy of
the triumph of communism over democracy. The fact that neither
of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk.
In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we have differences makes
it all the more imperative for us to talk.
Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully
or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is neces-
sary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and
compromise. The Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves:
if they make a concession, it is because they get something in
return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something in
return.
Strength is of course more than military might. It has many
components. Economic health is the starting point; equally
- 9 -
important are political unity at home and solidarity with our
allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were
three years ago. We have virtually eliminated the scourge of
inflation and are on the road to a strong recovery. The NATO
Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range missile
deployments, has proven its ability to restore the military
balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a renewed sense
of pride in our democratic values and in America's sense of pride
in our democratic values and in America's vital role in world
affairs. All this gives us a former basis for dealing effectively
with the Soviets.
Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical,
fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never
retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to ignore the
stakes involved for the whole world.
When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269
passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our
outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators
back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming
proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings
were about that horrible act, it would be irresponsible to
interrupt efforts to achieve arms reduction.
- 10 -
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and not
merely atmospherics.
Real Problems, Realistic Solutions
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of
war--and especially nuclear war--is unquestionably priority
number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's
last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive
set of initiatives that would greatly reduce the size of our
nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these
weapons, even in time of crisis.
The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken
off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to
conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on the
table that are ambitions yet fair, proposals that would increase
the security not only of our two countries, but of the world at
large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. Whenever the
Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet them half-way.
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and
miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put
forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures."
- 11 -
They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotia-
tions, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange
advance notifications of our missile tests and major military
exercises. Following up on suggestions by Senators Nunn, Warner
and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we also proposed a number of
ways to improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication as a
further safeguard against misunderstandings.
These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by
broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence involving
all the nations of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet
Union. Together with these nations, we will be joining in a
conference on European security opening next month in Stockholm.
Secretary of State Shultz will lead the U.S. Delegation to the
first session of that conference.
Our goal there will be to develop practical and meaningful
ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpreta-
tion surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks
of surprise attack. This important task needs to be a joint
effort. We will be working closely with our allies, but invite
the cooperation of all others -- including the Soviet Union.
Arms control has been the most visible area of US-Soviet
dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find ways to
defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could escalate
dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in
promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful solutions to
existing conflicts that will permit developing nations to concen-
trate their energies on economic growth. Thus we have sought to
- 12 -
engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on Afghanistan, comple-
menting the efforts of the United Nations Secretary General, and
on southern Africa, to supplement the diplomatic efforts in the
region itself which have been underway for several years.
Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has
come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the
Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like
these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play a
constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful, negotiated
solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they will find us
ready to cooperate.
Realistic Engagement
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed peace-
fully. With determination as well as good will, we can keep the
peace between our two mighty nations and make it a better and
more peaceful world for all mankind.
We have achieved less than we might over the past decades
because our approach to the Soviet Union has fluctuated so
dramatically. We have gone from periods of euphoric hope for
cooperation to periods of excessive fear and pessimism. Either
approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.
The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with
the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period. So
have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to talk
- 13 -
to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us, there
is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable, productive
relationship that can be sustained without swings of euphoria and
despair.
That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union.
I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for
the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will require
the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us. It is a
challenge to the Soviets as well. They must recognize that the
days of atmospherics for the sake of atmosphere are over. If
they cannot match our good will, we will be able to protect our
interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world. But
we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.
We will stay at the negotiating table, and we will be ready
for negotiation whenever the Soviets are. Our challenge is a
peaceful one. It will bring out the best in us; it calls for the
best from the Soviet Union, too.
The Challenge
No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this
challenge, but I am optimistic. Our two countries share with all
mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the
risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each other
better in recent years; we should do everything we can to in-
crease contacts and understanding. We have never fought each
other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought
alongside one another in the past; today our common enemies are
hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
- 14 -
Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major
crisis in U.S. -Soviet relations, President John F. Kennedy
defined an approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as
realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences--but let us
also direct attention to our common interests and to the
means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we
cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make
the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis,
our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small
planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our
children's future. And we are all mortal."
Tonight, on the eve of Christmas and the approach of the New
Year, we should reflect on the lessons of the past, and rededi-
cate ourselves to a struggle in good faith to solve the problems
of the present and the future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders
and the people of the Soviet Union to join with us in realistic
engagement to the benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor,
they will never find us wanting.
Draft: 12/17/83 (pm)
SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS
My fellow Americans:
We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love
and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my
thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and
all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the
world.
When we think of world peace we must think first of all of
our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the
Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world
cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an
awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the
history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to
destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of
our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that
such terrible capabilities are never used.
I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this
overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering
obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than
we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight
about why this is and what we can do about it.
70
- 2 -
Causes of Tension
If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice
two things: America tended to question its role in the world
and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased
its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad
through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for
themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense
budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their
military spending by three-to-four percent every year. They
deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as
many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over
360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United
States deployed no comparable weapons.
The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we
stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used
these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to
Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or
their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of
other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new
missiles was a blatant effort to split the NATO Alliance and to
threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.
This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was
absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American
- 3 -
strength or else the danger of war would increase. History
teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however
mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace,
we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough
to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no
benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is
deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not
military superiority.
With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted
America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our
defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our
commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.
This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may
have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have
been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of
history. They said it so often that they may have even started
believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong.
Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized
system is proving less able than the Western democracies to
adapt to the challenges of a new era.
72
- 4 -
A Safer World
Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from
the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the
danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a
"collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This
is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken.
For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing,
one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored
and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.
It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet
leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our
strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We
did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of
nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are
armed to the teeth.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet
Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued
with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far
too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet
relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to
improve.
13
- 5 -
Our Aims
Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and
protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward
the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the
military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet
Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the
arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world,
and gradually to build greater confidence between our two
nations.
First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat
of force in solving international disputes.
War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has
witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War
Two alone. Armed conflicts are raqing in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa.
In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or
subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend
74
- 6 -
its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local
conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes
solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the
governments and peoples in areas where there are local
conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than
supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is
obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search
for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this
direction.
Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles
of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons
It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's
developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year
on arms-almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I
regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two
decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to
restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the
vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms
race.
15
- 7 -
Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet
threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have
been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a
little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at
its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of
warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its
total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our
allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads
from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a
thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three
years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles
have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and
we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads
will have been eliminated for each new one.
But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts
to reach agreements to radically reduce the numbers of nuclear
weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the
"zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to
eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms.
Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an
important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no
INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a
zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to
the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when
nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."
- 8 -
The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the
other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a
world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words.
Now is the time to make that vision a reality.
Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish
greater mutual confidence and understanding.
Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with
agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it.
Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while
denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across
borders and permitting a free interchange of information and
ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the
rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low
in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a
long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to
keep trying.
Our Approach
In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three
guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me
tell you what they mean to me.
11
- 9 -
Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of
world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a
long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our
notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change
abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and
unafraid to defend our values.
I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet
system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise
to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in
expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't
deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the
Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling
to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The
fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason
to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we
have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.
Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate success-
fully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is
necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation
and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves:
if they make a concession, it is because they get something in
return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something
in return.
18
- 10 -
Strength is of course more than military might. It has
many components. Economic health is the starting point;
equally important are political unity at home and solidarity
with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas
than we were three years ago. We have virtually eliminated the
scourge of inflation and are on the road to a strong recovery.
The NATO Alliance, with the initiation of intermediate-range
missile deployments, has proven its ability to restore the
military balance upset by the Soviet Union. And there is a
renewed sense of pride in our democratic values and in
America's vital role in world affairs. All this gives us a
firmer basis for dealing effectively with the Soviets.
Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to
ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.
When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269
passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our
outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators
back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming
proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings
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were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt
efforts to achieve arms reduction.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, and
not merely atmospherics.
Real Problems, Realistic Solutions
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war
-- and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority
number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's
last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive
set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of
our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these
weapons even in time of crisis.
The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken
off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and
to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on
the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would
increase the security not only of our two countries, but of the
world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith.
Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet
them half-way.
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We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding
and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put
forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building
measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the
Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet
Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and
major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by
Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we
also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet
channels of communication as a further safeguard against
misunderstandings.
These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by
broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence
involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including
the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be
joining in a conference on European security opening next month
in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent
meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first
session of the conference in recognition of the importance we
attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European
nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from
the Warsaw Pact will also attend.
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in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent
meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first
session of the conference in recognition of the importance we
attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European
nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from
the Warsaw Pact will also attend.
Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop
practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and
potential for misinterpretation surrounding military
activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This
important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working
closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation
of all others -- including the Soviet Union.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find
ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could
escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common
interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful
solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing
nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus
we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these
regional conflicts and tensions, our respective interests, and
how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
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Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has
come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the
Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like
these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play
a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful,
negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they
will find us ready to collaborate.
Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union
is human rights. It is Soviet abuses in this area, perhaps more
than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill
will that hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience in the
Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews,
Armenians and other Soviet minorities to join close relatives
abroad, over the continuing harassment of courageous figures
like Andrey Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why
Soviet authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred
of their citizens to be reunited with their families in the
United States.
Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolu-
tionary. We know that this is a sensitive area for the
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Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are
not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in
results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the
obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants
-- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords.
Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can
contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American
relationship.
A Policy of Realistic Engagement
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed
peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can
keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a
better and more peaceful world for all mankind.
We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the
past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has
fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of
euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and
pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.
The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with
the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period.
So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to
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talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us,
there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,
productive relationship that can be sustained over the long
term, without swings of euphoria and despair.
That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union.
I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for
the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will
require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us.
It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match
our good will, we will be in a position to protect our
interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world.
But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.
Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such
communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers
reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:
We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact
countries the offer to work together with us to bring about
a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based
on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit
of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political
dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.
We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna.
Secretary Shultz will be prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign
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Minister Gromyko in Stockholm in January. If invited, he will
also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. And
I would hope that, if these and other talks create the basis
for real progress in our relationship, I will be able to meet
with Soviet President Andropov.
Conclusion
Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the
best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too.
No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this
challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all
mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the
risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each
other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to
increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there
is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside
one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger,
disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major
crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an
approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and
hopeful today as when he announced it:
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"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us
also direct attention to our common interests and to the
means by which those differences can be resolved. And if
we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help
make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final
analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit
this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all
cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."
Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on
the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle
in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the
future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the
Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the
benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never
find us wanting.
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