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[President Address: US-Soviet Relations 01/16/1984] Speech on US- Soviet Relations Background Material] (2)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: [President Address: US-Soviet Relations
01/16/1984] Speech on US- Soviet Relations
Background Material] (2)
Box: 32
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/18/2005
File Folder
[PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
FOIA
1/16/84] U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS-BACKGROUND
F06-114/9
MATERIAL JAN 24 SPEECH ON 2/5
Box Number
32
YARHI-MILO
3204
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
10881 MEMO
SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
4 1/4/1984 B1
MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, JANUARY 3,
1983
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
10878 MEMO
DEAVER/MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT
2 1/5/1984 B1
REAGAN RE YOUR SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
10879 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #10878
2 1/5/1984 B1
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
10880 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #10878
2 1/5/1984 B1
R
3/24/2011
F2006-114/9
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
DECLASSIFIED
10881
NLRR 114/9 # 10881
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
January 4, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz was
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Dobrynin, January 3, 1983
Dobrynin came in to see me on my first day in the office
following his return from Moscow December 23. He had
instructions responding to questions I had asked him before he
left for Moscow, and he appeared to be in a businesslike mood.
My questions essentially asked whether the Soviets are
ready for serious private dialogue with us. Dobrynin said he
had been instructed by his government to say that they are
ready for such a dialogue. He was authorized to conduct
personally whatever such discussion we desire. However, he
added, they also consider that Art Hartman in Moscow is an
appropriate channel for this private dialogue.
Recognizing that Gromyko and I are to meet for some three
hours later in the month, Dobrynin stressed that the Soviets
are not interested in dialogue for the sake of dialogue;
dialogue must have content. He asked me what I thought should
be discussed in Stockholm.
I agreed that content would be the key to any constructive
dialogue, and made the point that each side should be free to
bring any issue to the table. On the Stockholm meeting, I said
I thought we should review our relationship and how it should
be conducted, including mechanisms. On substance, I thought we
should discuss arms control (principally START, INF and
compliance, but also CDE, MBFR and confidence-building
measures) and regional issues (principally the Middle East, but
southern Africa and Afghanistan as well). I told Dobrynin I
would also want to discuss human rights. Characteristically he
asked why; I replied because of the importance of human rights
issues to you and to Americans generally. I said I saw no big
bilateral problems on which Gromyko and I needed to spend much
time in Stockholm, but added that there might be bilateral
issues for others to discuss.
I told Dobrynin that if the Soviets want further discussion
of the Stockholm agenda I am ready for it, but it could also be
conducted by Rick Burt and his deputy Sokolov.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
Dobrynin then referred to your letter to Andropov delivered
December 24, and asked specifically what the language on START
meant when it spoke of a common framework embodying a balance
between the interests and advantages of both sides. I replied
that we are prepared to look for a common framework that
accommodates the different force structures of the two sides.
Dobrynin also asked about the language concerning
"confidential exchanges of views at other levels" besides me
and Gromyko. On this, I said that there might be certain issues
on which we could designate others if this seemed appropriate.
In general, we agreed that the next step should be for both
sides to begin setting out content for productive dialogue. At
the same time, we also agreed that as that process moves along,
it would be worthwhile to step back from time to time and have
a more philosophical exchange on how different systems can
relate to one another. I recalled talks I had had with then-
Premier Kosygin about how free-market and centrally-planned
economies can deal with each other. Dobrynin's examples, such
as the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings on Cuba, had less to
do with differences between systems than with the advantages of
private channels like this one for handling sensitive issues
between the two countries.
Dobrynin then asked how I saw U.S.-Soviet relations shaping
up in 1984. I replied that I saw a question mark here: we
want dialogue, but also recognize that things can get out of
hand, particularly over differences concerning regional issues
like the Middle East. I said I expected the world economy to
improve this year, and also noted it would be an election year
for us. In this respect, however, I said that although
political pundits disagree on how this would affect U.S.-Soviet
relations, I expect you will play it straight and determine
your policy on the basis of what is good for the country,
without reference to partisan politics.
Dobrynin responded that the Soviets would respond to
anything constructive from Washington even though it is an
election year. I could not tell whether he was expressing an
official view or only speaking for himself, but this could mean
that the Soviets will not intervene in U.S. domestic politics
during the coming months.
Mention of our election gave me the opening to ask Dobrynin
about what is going on in Moscow. I said we had some sense of
a transitional atmosphere there and invited him to comment.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
Dobrynin replied that while in Moscow he had visited
Andropov at home, and Andropov had asked him questions about
what is going on here. Andropov seems to be conducting
business at home, and Politburo members see him regularly
there. Dobrynin said he had tried to get Armand Hammer in to
see Andropov at home, but the basic decision had been taken not
to receive visitors other than insiders. When I asked about
Andropov's illness, Dobrynin replied that he did not know, and
had not asked, noting that such matters are more sensitive in
the Soviet Union than here. But he did say that during his own
visit with Andropov, he (Dobrynin) reached for something
Andropov wanted, implying that Andropov has some incapacity in
arm movements at least. Politically, however, the agenda for
the Politburo's regular Thursday sessions was set by Andropov,
and his decisions on issues are final. I am passing these
observations to Bill Casey.
Overall, Dobrynin's comments left the impression that
Andropov is operating the government from his residence, but is
acting as a decisive leader at that distance. For my part I
commented that as far as we are concerned there is a functioning
Soviet government and we are prepared to deal with it.
In conclusion, Dobrynin said he had to raise one "unpleasant
matter" and handed me the text of an "oral statement" protesting
our declaration of areas of the Mediterranean as a "zone of
dangerous activities of the U.S. Navy." I said we would study
the démarche and respond appropriately. The text of the
démarche is being transmitted to the NSC staff by a Hill-
McFarlane memorandum.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 4 -
Drafted: EUR: RBurt
1/3/83 x29626
SECRET/SENSITIVE
10878
0102
5
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
January 5, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations
We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the State
draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to
put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy
and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian. We agree
on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to
compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we
believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive
and leaving out startling new initiatives.
Objective
We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at
this time is to articulate clearly and comprehensively your
policy toward the Soviet Union.
You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you
are following has not gotten through to all segments of our
public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your
policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than
lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some
quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet
system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to
negotiate. There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded
accommodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception
among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by
militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.
To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need
an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a compre-
hensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public
and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.
Audience
You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences
simultaneously:
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET.
Declassify on: OADR
NLRRF06-114/9#10878
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011
SECRET
2
b
U.S. opinion makers;
West European governments and publics;
Soviet leaders; and
--
The Soviet people.
The principal message we need to get across to each is:
U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the
result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.
Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing
with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.
Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid
negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you think
of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to
real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.
Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening
them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.
We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and
puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said
all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate
the inner consistency of your policy.
Newsworthiness
Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will
attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be
considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particu-
larly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back
here as well.
The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be
fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider
this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler
and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would
militate against achieving its objective with influential elites.
Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially
in Europe.
It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the
speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in
space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers
are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the
overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a
proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda
ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also
consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit.
We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober
exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initia-
tives for later speeches, following some consultation with the
Soviets.
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
SECRET
7
Draft: 12/18/83 (noon)
SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS
My fellow Americans:
We are entering a season of cheer, good fellowship, love
and hope. As these holidays approach, I want to share my
thoughts with you on a topic that is in all of our minds and
all of our hearts: how to strengthen and preserve peace in the
world.
When we think of world peace we must think first of all of
our relations with the Soviet Union. The United States or the
Soviet Union cannot bring peace to everyone, but the world
cannot be at peace unless there is peace between us. It is an
awesome and sobering fact that, for the first time in the
history of mankind, two nations have the might, not only to
destroy each other, but to destroy mankind itself. Neither of
our nations can have a higher interest than making sure that
such terrible capabilities are never used.
I believe that the Soviet leaders understand this
overriding fact as well as I do. Yet, we are encountering
obstacles to cooperation between our two nations greater than
we have seen for many years. I'd like to talk to you tonight
about why this is and what we can do about it.
8
- 2 -
Causes of Tension
If we look back over the experience of the 1970s, we notice
two things: America tended to question its role in the world
and to neglect its defenses while the Soviet Union increased
its military might and sought to expand its influence abroad
through the threat and use of force. The facts speak for
themselves: throughout the 1970s, while the U.S. defense
budget declined in real terms, the Soviets increased their
military spending by three-to-four percent every year. They
deployed six times as many ballistic missiles, five times as
many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over
360 SS-20 intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United
States deployed no comparable weapons.
The Soviets not only amassed an enormous arsenal while we
stood still and let our defenses deteriorate; they also used
these arms for foreign military adventures. From Angola to
Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the Soviets or
their proxies have used force to interfere in the affairs of
other nations. In Europe and in Asia, their deployment of new
missiles was at once an effort to split the NATO Alliance and
to threaten our friends and Allies on both these continents.
This was the situation we faced when I took office. It was
absolutely clear that we had to reverse the decline in American
9
- 3 -
strength or else the danger of war would increase. History
teaches us that wars begin when one side feels, however
mistakenly, that it can prevail. If we are to keep the peace,
we must make sure that we and our allies remain strong enough
to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no
benefit to him, but only disaster to all. Thus, our goal is
deterrence through the maintenance of a military balance -- not
military superiority.
With your support and that of the Congress, we have halted
America's decline. Our economy is regaining health, our
defenses are on the mend. Our alliances are solid and our
commitment to defend our values has never been more clear.
This may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may
have counted on us to keep on weakening ourselves. They have
been saying for years that we were destined for the dustbin of
history. They said it so often that they may have even started
believing it. But they can see now that they were wrong.
Indeed, signs are accumulating that their rigid and centralized
system is proving less able than the Western democracies to
adapt to the challenges of a new era.
A Safer World
Recently, we've been hearing some strident rhetoric from
the Kremlin. These harsh words have led many to fear that the
10
- 4 -
danger of war is rising, even that we and the Soviets are on a
"collision course." There is talk of a new "Cold War." This
is understandable, but I believe it is profoundly mistaken.
For if we look beyond the words and the diplomatic posturing,
one thing stands out: the balance of power is being restored
and this means that the world is in fact a safer place.
It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet
leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our
strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten them. We
did not do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of
nuclear weapons, much less would we do so now, when they are
armed to the teeth.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
as safe as it should be, or that our relations with the Soviet
Union are what we would like them to be. The world is plagued
with tragic conflicts in many areas. Nuclear arsenals are far
too high. And there is a sad lack of confidence in U.S.-Soviet
relations. These are the conditions which we must seek to
improve.
Our Aims
Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and
protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward
- 5 -
the Soviet Union end there. Relying on the foundation of the
military balance we have restored, we must engage the Soviet
Union in a sober and realistic dialogue designed to reverse the
arms race, to promote peace in war-ravaged regions of the world,
and gradually to build greater confidence between our two
nations.
First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat
of force in solving international disputes.
solemn respons, bility.
Preventing War, for me, is public enemy number one. The world has
witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War
Two alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa.
In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or
subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates--and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. The Soviet habit of trying to extend
its influence and control by fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution is dangerous. It exacerbates local
conflicts, increases destruction and suffering, and makes
12
- 6 -
solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer for all to assist the
governments and peoples in areas where there are local
conflicts to negotiate peaceful solutions, rather than
supplying arms or sending in armies? The answer, I believe, is
obvious, and I invite the Soviet leaders to join us in a search
for ways to move the world, and our own actions, in this
direction.
(Doese this
them
into the m. E
peace process
Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles
of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons
It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's
developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year
on arms--almost 20 percent of their national budgets. And I
regret that the relentless Soviet build-up over the past two
decades has forced us to increase our defense spending to
restore the military balance. We must find ways to reverse the
vicious circle of threat and response which drives the arms
race.
Even while modernizing our defenses to meet the Soviet
threat, we have built and maintained no more forces than have
been necessary to ensure a stable military balance. It is a
13
- 7 -
little-known fact that our total nuclear stockpile is now at
its lowest level in 20 years in terms of the number of
warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its
total destructive power. Just two months ago, we and our
allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads
from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal of a
thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last three
years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles
have to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and
we hope this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads
will have been eliminated for each new one.
But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts
to reach agreements to radically reduce the numbers of nuclear
weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the
"zero option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to
eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms.
Although NATO's deployment this month of INF missiles was an
important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no
INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a
zero option for all nuclear arms. As I said in my speech to
the Japanese Parliament, "Our dream is to see the day when
nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth."
The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Ustinov, announced the
- 8 -
other day that the Soviet Union shares with us the vision of a
world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words.
Now is the time to begin making that vision a reality.
Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish
greater mutual confidence and understanding.
Confidence is built on deeds, not words. Complying with
agreements increases it, while violating them undermines it.
Respecting the rights of one's own citizens bolsters it, while
denying these rights injures it. Expanding contacts across
borders and permitting a free interchange of information and
ideas increase it; attempts to seal one's people off from the
rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful trade can help and
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why confidence is so low
in our relations with the Soviet Union. But while we have a
long way to go in building confidence, we are determined to
keep trying.
Our Approach
In working toward these goals, I base my approach on three
guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. Let me
tell you what they mean to me.
15
- 9 -
Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of
world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a
long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our
notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change
abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and
unafraid to defend our values.
I have been forthright in explaining my view of the Soviet
system and of Soviet policies. This should come as no surprise
to the Soviet leaders, who have never been reticent in
expressing their view of us. But this doesn't mean we can't
deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk because the
Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because they cling
to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over democracy. The
fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason
to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age, the fact we
have differences makes it the more imperative for us to talk.
Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate success-
fully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is
necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation
and compromise. Soviet leaders are supreme realists themselves:
if they make a concession, it is because they get something in
return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something
in return.
16
- 10 -
Strength is of course more than military might. It has
many components. Economic health is the starting point;
equally important are political unity at home and solidarity
with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas
than we were three years ago. We have drastically reduced the
rate of inflation to its present low level and are on the road
to a strong recovery. The NATO Alliance, with the initiation
of intermediate-range missile deployments, has proven its
ability to restore the military balance upset by the Soviet
Union. And there is a renewed sense of pride in our democratic
values and in America's vital role in world affairs. All this
gives us a firmer basis for dealing effectively with the
Soviets.
Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.
We will never retreat from negotiations. To do so would be to
ignore the stakes involved for the whole world.
When the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner with 269
passengers aboard, many thought that we should express our
outrage by cutting off negotiations. But I sent our negotiators
back to Geneva, and I sent them back with new, more forthcoming
proposals. I understood that, no matter how strong our feelings
17
- 11 -
were about that act, it would be irresponsible to interrupt
efforts to achieve arms reduction.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
Real Problems, Realistic Solutions
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war
--- and especially nuclear war is unquestionably priority
number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's
last. Thus I have proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive
set of initiatives that would reduce substantially the size of
our nuclear arsenals, and eliminate any incentive to use these
weapons even in time of crisis. And I am more than ready to go
much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work
together and with others to rid the world of the nuclear threat
altogether.
The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken
off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and
to conclude agreements in INF and START. We have proposals on
the table that are ambitious yet fair, proposals that would
18
- 12 -
increase the security not only of our two countries, but. of the
world at large. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith.
Whenever the Soviets are ready to do likewise, I pledge to meet
them half-way.
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding
and miscalculation in times of tension. We have therefore put
forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building
measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the
Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet
Union exchange advance notifications of our missile tests and
major military exercises. Following up on suggestions by
Senators Nunn, Warner and the late Senator Henry Jackson, we
also proposed a number of ways to improve direct US-Soviet
channels of communication as a further safeguard against
misunderstandings.
These bilateral proposals will soon be supplemented by
broader negotiations on measures to enhance confidence
involving all the nations of Europe, East and West, including
the Soviet Union. Together with these nations, we will be
joining in a conference on European security opening next month
in Stockholm. The Foreign Ministers of NATO, at their recent
meeting in Brussels, agreed that they would attend the first
- 13 -
session of the conference in recognition of the importance we
attach to the goal of increasing the security of all European
nations. We and our Allies hope that Foreign Ministers from
the Warsaw Pact will also attend.
Our goal in the Stockholm conference will be to develop
practical and meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and
potential for misinterpretation surrounding military
activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack. This
important task needs to be a joint effort. We will be working
closely with our allies, but we will also need the cooperation
of all others -- including the Soviet Union.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
US-Soviet dialogue. But world peace also requires that we find
ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts that could
escalate dangerously. We and the Soviets should have a common
interest in promoting regional stability, in finding peaceful
solutions to existing conflicts that will permit developing
nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus
we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these
regional conflicts and tensions; our respective interests, and
how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
Our approach has been constructive. So far not much has
come of these efforts. But we are prepared to continue if the
20
- 14 -
Soviets are willing. We remain convinced that on issues like
these it should be in the Soviet Union's best interest to play
a constructive role in achieving broad-based, peaceful,
negotiated solutions. If the Soviets make that choice, they
cooperate.
will find us ready to collaborate.
Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union
is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, perhaps
more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and
ill will that hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and other
Soviet minorities to join close relatives abroad, over the
continuing harassment of courageous figures like Andrey
Sakharov. It is difficult for me to understand why Soviet
authorities find it impossible to allow several hundred of
their citizens to be reunited with their families in the United
States.
Our objectives in the human rights field are not revolu-
tionary. We know that this is a sensitive area for the
Soviets, and here too our approach is a flexible one. We are
not interested in propaganda advantage; we are interested in
21
- 15 -
results. We ask only that the Soviet Union live up to the
obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants
-- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki accords.
Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can
contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American
relationship.
A Policy of Realistic Engagement
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But I believe they can be managed
peacefully. With determination as well as good will, we can
keep the peace between our two mighty nations and make it a
better and more peaceful world for all mankind.
We have achieved less than we might in this regard over the
past decade because our approach to the Soviet Union has
fluctuated so dramatically. We have gone from periods of
euphoric hope for cooperation to periods of excessive fear and
pessimism. Either approach is dangerous, and unrealistic.
The Soviet Union has remained much the same country, with
the same purposes and values, throughout the postwar period.
So have we. If we are strong, and realistic, and prepared to
talk to the Soviet Union on all the serious issues between us,
there is no good reason why we cannot develop a stable,
22
- 16 -
productive relationship that can be sustained over the long
term, without swings of euphoria and despair.
That is the objective of my policy toward the Soviet Union.
I call this policy "realistic engagement." It is a policy for
the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It will
require the kind of patience that does not come naturally to us.
It is a challenge to the Soviets as well. If they cannot match
our good will, we will be in a position to protect our
interests, and those of our friends and allies in the world.
But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.
Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such
communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers
reaffirmed in their recent Declaration of Brussels:
We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact
countries the offer to work together with us to bring about
a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based
on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit
of mankind, we advocate an open, comprehensive political
dialogue, as well as cooperation based on mutual advantage.
We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna.
Secretary Shultz will be prepared to meet with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko in Stockholm in January. If invited, he will
also be prepared to visit Moscow for further talks there. [And
23
- 17 -
as I have said
I would hope that, if these and other talks create the basis
for real progress and concrete results in our relationship, I
will be ready to meet with Soviet President Andropov.
]
Conclusion
Our challenge is a peaceful one. It will bring out the
best in us; it calls for the best from the Soviet Union too.
No one can predict how the Soviets will respond to this
challenge. But I do know that our two countries share with all
mankind an interest in doing everything possible to reduce the
risk of nuclear war. Our peoples have gotten to know each
other better in recent years; we should do everything we can to
increase understanding. We have never fought each other; there
is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside
one another in the past; today our common enemies are hunger,
disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
Twenty years ago this year, in the aftermath of a major
crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, John F. Kennedy defined an
approach to dealing with the Soviets that is as realistic and
hopeful today as when he announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let us
also direct attention to our common interests and to the
means by which those differences can be resolved. And if
we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help
2t
- 18 -
make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final
analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit
this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all
cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal." "
Tonight, as we look toward Christmas, we should reflect on
the lessons of the past, and rededicate ourselves to a struggle
in good faith to solve the problems of the present and the
future. I appeal to the Soviet leaders and the people of the
Soviet Union to join with us in realistic engagement to the
benefit of all mankind. In this high endeavor, they will never
find us wanting.
2740m
10879
25
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
January 5, 198$4
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations
We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the draft
of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to put
too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy
and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian. We agree
on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to
compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we
believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive
and leaving out startling new initiatives.
Objective
We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at
this time is to articulate clearly and comprehensively your
policy toward the Soviet Union.
You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you
are following has not gotten through to all segments of our
public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your
policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than
lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some
quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet
system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to
negotiate. There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded
accomodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception
among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by
militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.
To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need
an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a compre-
hensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public
and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.
Audience
You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences
simultaneously:
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
NLRRF06-11419#10879
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011
26
SECRET
2
U.S. opinion makers;
West European governments and publics;
--
Soviet leaders; and
--
The Soviet people.
The principal message we need to get across to each is:
U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the
result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.
Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for
dealing with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.
Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid
negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you think
of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to
real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.
Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening
them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.
We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and
puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said
all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate
the inner consistency of your policy.
Newsworthiness
Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will
attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be
considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particu-
larly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back
here as well.
The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be
fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider
this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler
and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would
militate against achieving its objective with influential elites.
Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially
in Europe.
It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the
speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in
space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers
are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the
overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a
proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda
ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also
consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit.
We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober
exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initia-
tives for later speeches, following some consultation with the
Soviets.
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
SECRET
US-USSR
0102
MEMORANDUM
27
10880
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
January 5, 1984
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
MICHAEL K. DEAVER AND ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Your Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations
We have considered carefully your initial reactions to the State
draft of your speech on U.S.-Soviet relations: that it seemed to
put too much into one speech, that it contained nothing newsworthy
and covered no new ground, and that it was pedestrian. We agree
on all points, and the speech writers have worked on the text to
compress it and make the language less pedestrian. However, we
believe that there are good reasons for making it comprehensive
and leaving out startling new initiatives.
Objective
We believe the principal reason you need to make the speech at
this time is to articulate clearly and comprehensively your
policy toward the Soviet Union.
You have of course done so in the past, but the coherent view you
are following has not gotten through to all segments of our
public or to Allied publics. There is unfounded fear that your
policies are leading to confrontation and raising rather than
lowering the risks of nuclear war. There is confusion in some
quarters as to how you square a realistic view of the Soviet
system and opposition to their ideology with a readiness to
negotiate. There are charges that past rhetoric has impeded
accommodation. And in Europe particularly there is a perception
among many elite groups that your thinking is dominated by
militarism and that you are too quick on the trigger.
To clear up these serious and fundamental misconceptions, we need
an authoritative statement which puts your approach in a compre-
hensive framework. This can provide a firm basis for our public
and private diplomacy for the balance of the year and beyond.
Audience
You will be, in effect, addressing four important audiences
simultaneously:
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
NLRRF06-114/9 # 1080 # 10880
BY KML NARA DATE 4/7/2011
SECRET
2
28
U.S. opinion makers;
West European governments and publics;
Soviet leaders; and
--
The Soviet people.
The principal message we need to get across to each is:
U.S.: The world is not more dangerous, but safer as the
result of your policies and we are strong enough to negotiate.
Europe: You have a coherent, responsible strategy for dealing
with the Soviets and are serious in the desire to negotiate.
Soviet leaders: You are willing to deal with them as valid
negotiating partners, on a basis of equality, whatever you think
of their system, but will insist that negotiations be directed to
real problems and that solutions be fair and verifiable.
Soviet people: You wish them well and are not threatening
them. You recognize and reciprocate their desire for peace.
We believe that the draft works in each of these messages and
puts them into a coherent overall framework. While you have said
all this before, it is important to put it together to demonstrate
the inner consistency of your policy.
Newsworthiness
Even if the speech covers no new ground, we believe it will
attract major attention. The overall tone and approach will be
considered news--even if it shouldn't be. This will be particu-
larly true in Europe, and European perceptions will play back
here as well.
The speech as written is obviously too detailed and complex to be
fully appreciated by the average citizen. But we do not consider
this a defect, given its primary objective. To make it simpler
and less detailed, and thus enhance its mass appeal, would
militate against achieving its objective with influential elites.
Their attitude seeps gradually to the public at large, especially
in Europe.
It is possible, of course, to introduce a new initiative into the
speech -- such as, for example, a proposal for cooperation in
space. However, this has certain dangers: (1) headline writers
are likely to concentrate on the new initiative rather than the
overall policy enunciated; (2) the Soviets would consider a
proposal made first in a public speech as merely a propaganda
ploy; and (3) some Americans and West Europeans might also
consider it a sort of grandstanding unlikely to bear real fruit.
We believe it is preferable to devote this speech to a sober
exposition of our overall policy and save specific policy initia-
tives for later speeches, following some consultation with the
Soviets.
Prepared by:
Jack Matlock
SECRET
(Myer/NSC)
January 5, 1984
10:30 a.m.
Al
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club
Thank you for the warm welcome. F In just a few days, the
including
United States will join ell the nations of Euorpe, to include the
Soviet Union, ie the opening of-a security conference in
Stockholm. The goal of the conference will be to find practical
and meaningful ways to increase European security. It is part of
our constant search to strengthen and preserve peace.
We live in a time of peace with not enough peace. And
because America's highest aspiration is a durable peace, these
are frustrating times -- as they have been for decades. It is
high time to move forward and today is a time of opportunity to
do so.
In our search for genuine progress we must think first of
about
all of our relations with the Soviet Union. Neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union can bring peace to everyone, but the
world cannot be at peace. unless there is peace between us. Our
two nations have the might, not only to destroy each other, but
to destroy civilization itself. Neither of our nations can have
a higher interest than reducing the risk of war and making sure
that nuclear weapons are never used.
we
Soviet leaders understand this as well as X do. Yet, our
search for ways to reduce the level of arms and to build a
cooperative working relationship is still being frustrated. Why
is this so and what we can do about it?
When we look back over the experience of the 1970's we
notice two things: America tended to question its role in the
Page 3
30
And we S hould not forget the
dangerous, we must keep it within bounds. We and the Soviet
also that we alu have
assued at proformal differences
Union have. few common interests But, so long as the United
States and the Western Alliance remain strong, we do share
Formost is
several fundamental interests that of avoiding war and reducing
And both to should
the level of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer
a course which I would call "constructive competition."
Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some strident
rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to
speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of
conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. For
if we look beyond the words, what stands out is the fact that the
deterence
balance of power is being restored and this means that the world
is a safer place.
It is safer because there is less danger that the Soviet
leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating our
strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. We did not
do so thirty-five years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear
weapons, much less would we do so now.
Our strength provides the basis for stability and
meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders are realists. They know
that it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something
in return. It is our strength that permits us to offer something
in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunity.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
safe enough, or that our relations with the Soviet Union are what
we would like them to be. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in
Page 4
31
many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And
the working relationship between our two countries is not what it
must be. These are conditions which must be improved.
Essential as deterrence is in preserving the peace and
protecting our way of life, we must not let our policy toward the
Soviet Union end there. We must engage the Soviet Union in a
dialogue that is as cordial and cooperative as our differences
permit, a dialogue that will serve to reduce the level of arms,
promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, and build a
constructive working relationship between our two nations.
First, we need to find ways to eliminate the use and threat
of force in solving international disputes.
Preventing war is my solemn responsibily. The world has
witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War Two
alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In
other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily
armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or
subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution just exacerbates local conflicts, increases
suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic
problems more difficult.
Page 5
32
Would it not be better and safer to assist the govenments
and peoples in areas where there are local conflicts to negotiate
peaceful solutions? The answer is obvious, and I call upon the
Soviet leaders to join with us in a search to move the world, and
our own actions, in this direction.
Second, we need to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles
of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.
It is nothing less than a tragedy that the world's
developing nations spend more than 150 billion dollars a year on
arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must
find ways to reverse the vicious circle of threat and response
which drives arms races everwhere it occurs.
While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is
necessary to establish a stable military balance. Our total
nuclear stockpile is now at its lowest level in 20 years in terms
of the number of warheads, and at the lowest level in 25 years in
terms of its total destructive power. And just two months ago,
we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear
warheads from Western Europe. This comes on top of the removal
during Thepast
of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe ever the last three
years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have
to be deployed in Europe over the next five years -- and we hope
this will not be necessary -- five existing warheads will have
been eliminated for each new one.
But this is not enough. We need to accelerate our efforts
to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear
weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I proposed the "zero
Page 6
33
option" for intermediate-range missiles in an effort to eliminate
in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although
NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important
achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile
deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for
all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the
day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the
Earth.
Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that the
Soviet Union shares the vision of a world free of nuclear
weapons. These are encouraging words. Now is the time to move
from words to deeds.
Third, we must work with the Soviet Union to establish a
solid working relationship with greater cooperation and
understanding.
Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.
Complying with agreements helps, while violating them hurts.
Respecting the rights or one's own citizens bolsters the
relationship, while denying these rights injures it. Expanding
contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of
information and ideas increase confidence; attempts to seal one's
people off from the rest of the world diminish it. Peaceful
trade can help and organized theft of industrial secrets
certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why our working
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. But
while we have a long way to go, we are determined to keep trying.
Page 7
34
In working toward these goals, our approach is based on
three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.
Realism means that we start by understanding the sort of
world in which we live. We must recognize that we are in a
long-term competition with an adversary who does not share our
notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change
abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and
unafraid to defend our values.
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This
should come as no surprise to the Soviet leaders, who have never
ours.
been reticent in expressing their view of us. But this doesn't
mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk
because the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because
they cling to the fantasy of the triumph of communism over
democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system
is no reason to refuse to talk. In fact, in this nuclear age,
the fact we have differences makes it all the more important for
us to talk.
Strength means that we know we cannot negotiate successfully
or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is
necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation
and compromise.
Strength is of course more than military strength. It has
many components. Economic health is the starting point. Equally
important are political unity at home and solidarity with our
allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were
three years ago.
Page 8
35
Dialogue means that we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, by negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We
will never retreat from negotiations.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --
and especially nuclear war -- is unquestionably priority number
one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The
4
comprehensive set of initiative that we have proposed would
reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am more
than ready to go much further: If the Soviet Union is willing,
we can work together and with others to rid the world of the
nuclear threat altogether.
The world can only regret that the Soviet Union has broken
off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to
conclude agreements in INF and START. We are prepared to
negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to
do likewise, we will meet them half-way.
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and
miscalculation. We have therefore put forward proposals for what
we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range
Page 9
36
of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that
the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of our
missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on
congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to
improve direct US-Soviet channels of communication.
These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm
conference. We will work hard to develop practical and
meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for
misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to
diminish the risks of surprise attack.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
US-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires that we
find ways to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the
Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional
and
stability, in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts
that will permit developing nations to concentrate their energies
on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in
exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on
how we can contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
Although our approach has been constructive, not much has
come of our efforts. Nevertheless we remain convinced that on
issues like these it should be in the Soviet Union's best
interest to play a constructive role in achieving broad-based,
leaders
negotiated solutions. If the Soviet make that choice, they will
find us ready to cooperate.
Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union
is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, perhaps as
Page 10
37
much as
more than any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill
will that hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
and others who wish to
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians and over
1
the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei
family
abroad
Sakharov.
We are not interested in propaganda advantage. We ask only that
the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed
under international convenants -- in particular, its commitments
under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater
respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other
areas of the Soviet-American relationship.
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But we. can and we must-- keep the peace
between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.
That is the objective of our policy toward the Soviet
Union. I call this policy constructive competition. Rx is a ao
His is Our of
n
policy for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans and
will require patience. It is a challenge to the Soviets as well.
If they cannot meet us half-way, we will be prepared to protect
our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want
more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation.
Cooperation must begin with communication. We seek such
communication. As the sixteen NATO Foreign Ministers reaffirmed
in their recent Declaration of Brussels:
Page 11
38
We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact
countries the offer to work together with us to bring
about. a long-term constructive and realistic
relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and
reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate
an open, comprehensive political dialogue, as well as
cooperation based on mutual advantage.
We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva and Vienna.
Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet with Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be
followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a
regular and normal component of US-Soviet relations.
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in
us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one
leaders
can predict how the Soviets will respond to this challenge. But
I do know that our two countries share with all mankind an
interst in doing everything possible to reduce the risk of
nuclear war. We have never fought each other; there is no
reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one
another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger,
disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
More than twenty years ago, President Kennedy defined an
approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he
announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let
us also direct attention to our common interests and to
the means by which those differences can be resolved.
And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we
can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in
the final analysis, our most basic common link is that
we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the
same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we
are all mortal."
Page 12
39
I call upon the Soviet leadership to move from pause to
progress. If the Soviet Union joins us in a genuine give and
take, and truly wants fair outcomes, they will happen. The
journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be
difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the
future. I can send no stronger signal. America is prepared for
a major breakthrough or modest advances. We do not fear
compromise. In a spirit of constructive competition, we can
strengthen peace, reduce greatly the level of arms, and brighten
the hopes and dreams of people everywhere. Let us begin now.
4.
SPEECH ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
We recently marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment
of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union --
what better time to review the history of U.S.-Soviet relations
in order to understand of the problems in this relationship we
face today. The ancient Greek philosopher Sophocles said "a
sensible man judges of present by past events." I believe we
must know what has happened in the last 50 years in order to
understand what is happening today and to anticipate what may
happen tomorrow in coping with the first nation to pose a direct
threat to this country since the War of 1812.
On November 16, 1933, President Roosevelt expressed to the
Soviet Government the hope "that the relations now established
between our people may forever remain normal and friendly, and
that our Nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual
benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world."
This is indeed a hope we still cherish. What went wrong in the
last 50 years to prevent the realization of this worthy aspiration?
The illusions some may have had about the Soviet Union in
those days should have vanished in 1939 when the Soviet Union
signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany and then joined
Germany in destroying and devouring Poland. In the following
years, the Soviet Union attacked Finland, annexed part of it and
then proceeded to annex Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Between
1939 and 1945 the Soviet Union annexed about 262 thousand square
miles of territory, an area larger than France and almost as
2
41
large as Texas. In contrast, the United States voluntarily gave
the Philippines independence in 1946, a move planned for 1944,
but interrupted by the war.
After the Soviet Union was attacked by its former ally,
Germany, in 1941, the United States provided it with Lend-Lease
assistance which eventually totalled nearly $11 billion. Much of
this assistance was delivered at great peril to Allied seaman on
the notorious Murmansk run. Despite this assistance, the Soviets
regarded the Western Allies with suspicion and never fully
cooperated with them in the war effort.
Before the war ended, the seeds of the Cold War were sown at
the Yalta Conference in early 1945 where the Soviets agreed to
holding free elections and establishing democratic governments in
Eastern Europe and most specifically in Poland. Stalin reportedly
once stated that "whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it
his own social system", and he was true to his word. After
Soviet troops occupied Eastern Europe and much of Central Europe,
Stalin largely ignored the Yalta agreements and proceeded to
establish Communist regimes in areas his troops occupied. This
led to profound and lasting contention between the USSR and the
Western Allies who were devoted to promoting freedom,
independence, and well-being throughout all of Europe west of the
Soviet Union.
The so-called revisionist historians, determined to fault
our post-war policy in Europe, have tried to make the United
States equally responsible for the Cold War. They, and others,
have too easily ignored the nature of the Soviet regime and
Stalin's character. In the postwar years, the Western Powers
3
42
were headed by freely-elected democratic leaders. Stalin, on the
other hand, was the tyrant who brought about the deaths of
millions of his fellow countrymen during the 1930s -- through
forced collectivization and later the great purges. No doubt
many brave Soviet troops lost their lives needlessly in the war
because Stalin had killed off most of the Red Army leaders in
years preceding Hitler's attack. Stalin's successor, Khrushchev,
who knew him well, later attacked him for his "brutality,
persecution mania, suspiciousness, and capriciousness.
As soon as World War II ended, the United States demonstrated
its peaceful intentions by unilaterally disarming with a rapid
demobilization. From 13 million in uniform in 1945 we went down
to 1.4 million by 1947. During the same period, Soviet forces
reduced from 12 million to four million, but the Soviets still
stationed 30 divisions with half a million troops in Central and
Eastern Europe, which is about what they have there today. U.S.,
British and French forces in Europe at that time were down to 10
weak divisions.
Although we had a monopoly of atomic weapons, we kept very
few on hand during the first postwar years. Indeed, in 1946, we
offered to establish international control over atomic weapons
through the Baruch Plan. This farsighted offer foundered on
Soviet opposition -- most importantly on the unwillingness of the
Soviets to permit on-site inspection to prevent cheating. This
has, incidentally, remained a major impediment in reaching other
arms control agreements with the Soviets. What we did not know
at the time, was that the Soviets had been working on an atom
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43
bomb since the early 1940s and were to have their own three years
after we proposed the Baruch Plan. In any case, a historic
opportunity was lost, and succeeding generations have had to live
with the threat of nuclear war because of this Soviet
intransigence.
Soviet hostility toward the United States had already been
made clear when, in February 1946, Stalin gave a speech indicating
his belief that war was inevitable with the Western powers. Even
a staunch liberal like Supreme Court Justice William Douglas
regarded this as a "declaration of World War III."
Stalin's postwar designs became even clearer when the
Soviets refused to evacuate northern Iran when they had agreed to
and demanded joint control of Turkey's Dardanelles Straits --
after having laid claim to considerable Turkish territory. To
the West in Central Europe, the division of Germany was beginning
as the Soviets communized their occupation zone and obviously
opposed a united Germany which they could not control -- even
though we proposed guaranteeing the demilitarization of Germany
for 25 or even 40 years. Incidentally, the Soviets began building
up German armed forces in their zone years before Germans were
armed in the Western zones. While the Soviets promoted their
objectives with armed forces and secret police, the United States
offered Europe economic assistance.
Increased Communist threats to Greece and Turkey in 1947
resulted in the Truman Doctrine and U.S. aid for these threatened
countries. Later that year, Secretary of State George Marshall
proposed a U.S.-financed plan for the economic recovery of war
torn Europe. The plan was open to all of Europe -- East and West
5
44
-- including the Soviet Union. Stalin correctly recognized that
this Marshall Plan would promote the freedom and independence of
the countries involved and would have nothing to do with it;
moreover, he would not let any of the Eastern European countries
under his control participate. The Soviets then declared war on
the Marshall Plan and tried to foment strikes and riots in France
and Italy -- attempting to use the large Communist parties in
these countries to this end. When this failed, Stalin sought to
tighten his hold over areas under his control and influence. In
February 1948, the Communists seized complete control of
Czechoslovakia and placed considerable pressure on Finland. In
June, the Soviets attempted to take over West Berlin by first
forcing out the Western Allies through a blockade of the city. A
dramatic U.S.-British airlift kept this city of over two and a
quarter million supplied for nearly a year before the Soviets
gave up their attempt to starve the West Berliners into submission.
About the time the Berlin Blockade began, Stalin decided
that the Yugoslav Communist leader Tito was not sufficiently
submissive and sought to have him replaced. Tito and the
Yugoslavian people successfully resisted this attempt and were
given considerable U.S. economic and military assistance to help
them maintain their independence -- even though Tito had been
anything but friendly to the U.S. before he fell out with Stalin.
The events of 1948 encouraged West European countries to
combine in their own defense, first with the Brussels Treaty and
in 1949 with the formation of NATO which included the U.S. In
response to the Berlin Blockade, the U.S. stationed B-29 bombers
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45
in Western Europe, the first U.S. strategic deployment in Europe
since World War II. Nineteen forty-nine also saw the first
successful Soviet atomic bomb test and the Communist takeover of
China.
In 1949, the U.S. withdrew all of its troops from South
Korea -- except for a 500-man advisory group; moreover, both
General MacArthur and Secretary of State Acheson had publicly
excluded South Korea from the U.S. Pacific defense perimeter.
Stalin no doubt concluded that the U.S. would not defend South
Korea, and in June 1950, the North Koreans attacked the South.
They were led then by Kim Il-Sung who is still in power and who
was most recently responsible for the terrorist attack in Rangoon
which murdered a number of high-ranking South Korean officials.
The U.S. immediately came to South Korea's rescue and, later
joined by several Allies, fought a costly and bloody war for the
next three years. This blatant act of Communist aggression,
encouraged if not ordered by Stalin, led to a rapid strengthening
of U.S. and West European defenses. Our defense budget soared
from $13 billion a year to about $50 billion. A NATO military
command was established under General Eisenhower, and U.S. troops
were sent to bolster West Europe's weak defenses; moreover, there
was a concerted effort to enable West Germany to contribute to
its own defense in a European Defense Community (EDC) with
France.
Stalin died in 1953, and his successors sought to dampen
Western defense efforts by resorting to a policy of detente.
Soviet leader Malenkov publicly declared in August 1953 that a
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4b
lessening of tension might lead to a disintegration of this
Western alliance. Indeed, the EDC concept was defeated in the
French Chamber of Deputies a year later.
After Stalin's death, President Eisenhower was urged to have
a summit meeting with the new Soviet leaders. He insisted,
however, that the Soviets do something concrete to demonstrate
good intentions. In 1955, the Soviets agreed to the Austrian
State Treaty, which they had consistently blocked for eight
years. A summit was held in Geneva a few months later, but
produced no results. President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" summit
proposal to ensure against surprise attacks was rejected out of
hand by the Soviets; however, the Soviets capitalized on the
"Spirit of Geneva", created by the mere fact of a summit, to
promote their detente campaign, which was reinforced by significant
conciliatory moves in other areas. This was beginning to erode
NATO's cohesion. For example, Iceland asked us to remove our
troops and bases from that country, but reversed this decision
when detente ended.
Soviet detente successes were nullified by the brutal
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in the fall of 1956.
Prior to this, the courageous Poles had stood up to the Soviets
emboldening the Hungarians to follow their example. This was a
bad time for the Soviets -- there was even an anti-Communist
uprising in North Vietnam. It was also not an easy time for us,
however. In October 1956 the British, French and Israelis, to
our dismay, attacked Egypt, and the Soviet leader Khrushchev
sought to exploit this situation to increase Soviet influence in
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47
the Mid East. The Soviets even threatened to rocket Paris and
London if the British and French did not remove their forces from
Egypt. A year later, we began to feel threatened by Soviet
rockets.
In 1957, we were alarmed by the first successful Soviet test
of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which could reach
this country in about half an hour and against which we had no
defense. This Soviet achievement was especially dramatized by
the launching of Sputnik, the world's first satellite. Overnight
we acquired a collective inferiority complex in the face of this
Soviet technology. We were behind the Soviets in a critical
area.
The Soviets then sought to exploit our sense of inferiority.
In November 1958, Khrushchev threatened to take actions designed
to remove Western protection of West Berlin. At this time we
believed in the so-called "missile gap", and it was some time
before we had sufficient intelligence data to the contrary. We
did, however, manage to forestall Soviet action until the discovery
that there was no "missile gap" decreased Khrushchev's ability to
threaten us.
Thwarted in efforts to force us out of Berlin, the Soviets
and their East German puppets sealed off East Berlin in August
1961 to stem the enormous flow of refugees to West Berlin. The
infamous Berlin Wall was erected to augment the "iron curtain" of
barbed wire and mine fields which seals in the Soviet Bloc.
These inhuman barriers are the most visible and dramatic evidence
of
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48
the enormous gap between Soviet-controlled Europe and free Europe
where people may come and go as they please.
Spurred by the perceived missile gap, the U.S. accelerated
its strategic build-up until we had gained a considerable lead
over the Soviets. At no time, however, did we ever attempt to
exploit this lead. We threatened no one. In a misreading of our
national will, in 1962 Khrushchev attempted to place missiles in
Cuba in order to gain a strategic advantage and to obtain a
military position in this hemisphere. This profound Soviet
miscalculation brought our two countries to the brink of
disaster. Fortunately, then, as now, we and the Soviets shared a
desire to avoid nuclear war. Our military advantage in 1962 and
cool nerves promoted a peaceful, if imperfect, resolution of this
most serious crisis in our relationship.
By 1963, the Soviets felt compelled to return to a strategy
of detente. We, too, had had enough of the tensions of the
previous year. We concluded a limited test ban agreement, agreed
to establish the "hot line" for emergency communications between
the White House and the Kremlin, and for a time the Soviets
stopped jamming the Voice of America.
In time, we reduced our defense expenditures, and in the
mid-1960s froze the level of our ICBM force at 1,054 which has
never been exceeded. Those who advocated this unilateral "freeze"
believed that the Soviets would stop when they reached parity
with us; however, in 1969, the Soviets reached this level and
kept going until they had over 50 percent more ICBMs than did we.
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49
In 1967 the U.S. and the USSR began to move toward arms
control. A nuclear nonproliferation agreement was reached, but
progress toward strategic arms talks was interrupted by the
Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Here
it should be noted that Soviet combat troops have, since World
War II, only been used to suppress Communist countries or a
friendly, Marxist-ruled country like Afghanistan. That should
tell us something about the nature of Soviet alliances.
Although the Soviets had a numerical advantage in ICBMs, we
were ahead of them in ICBM and anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
defense technology. This gave the Soviets the incentive to
negotiate. Had the Congress, for example, not approved funds for
our ABM defense, we would probably have never reached an
agreement limiting these systems.
The 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev summit resulted in SALT I and the
ABM Treaty and promoted a number of agreements designed to
promote closer ties between our countries. Detente was in full
bloom. Unfortunately, the Soviets and we have totally different
views of what detente means. For us the words of Franklin
Roosevelt 50 years ago define what we would like in the relation-
ship: normal and friendly relations and cooperation for our
mutual benefit and world peace. The Soviets officially define
detente or "peaceful coexistence" as simply: a form of struggle
between Communism and capitalism short of engaging in all-out
war.
During the detente of the 1970s, the Soviets sought our
technology and favorable trade terms while forging ahead with
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50
their own arms buildup and expansionist designs. In the period
1972 - 1981 Soviet arms expenditures increased about 50 percent
while U.S. arms expenditures increased less than 25 percent, and
by 1981, Soviet expenditures were about two-thirds higher than
ours. The USSR continued providing North Vietnam with massive
military assistance used against U.S. and South Vietnamese forces
fighting to defend the South from Communist aggression. The
Soviets helped prolong the 1973 Mid East War, and at one time we
had reason to be concerned about a large-scale Soviet
intervention in that war. This is not how we envisaged detente.
The Communist victory in Indochina, Watergate, and Congres-
sional restrictions on the Executive Branch of our Government
encouraged Soviet adventurism. In 1975, the Soviets flew in
Cuban troops to ensure Marxist-Leninist control of Angola; the
Soviets and Cubans went into Ethiopia in large numbers; and
Soviet presence and influence increased in other areas. Then, in
1979, came the invasion of Afghanistan where over 110,000 Soviet
troops are now battling Afghan freedom fighters. More recently,
we saw the Soviets force the suppression of budding freedom in
Poland, and we should all, by now, be aware of what the Soviets
are doing in our own hemisphere. I have recently addressed this
issue.
In reviewing the last 50 years, a pattern should have become
clear. The United States has devoted enormous human and material
resources to help preserve the freedom and independence of those
who have sought our assistance. The Soviet Union has done just
the opposite. It has promoted totalitarian control and tyranny
in countries under its control or influence. Do those in West
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51
Europe who have been exercising their democratic right to
demonstrate against us or anybody else realize that massive
American economic and defense assistance, beginning in World
War II, has played a key role in making this freedom possible?
They have only to look East to see what might have been. Let
anyone try demonstrating against the Soviet Union in any Soviet
Bloc country and see what happens. Those who tried to form a
peace movement in the Soviet Union are now all in jail.
We should not expect eternal gratitude from those we have
helped, because the preservation of freedom and independence of
others has been and continues to be in our national interest.
Each country falling under totalitarian control represents an
incremental impoverishment of our Nation and of the world,
economically, politically and socially.
Although it may have escaped your attention, there is an
encouraging aspect to U.S. -Soviet relations which has emerged
over the years. It has long been clear that the one thing our
two nations have in common is a sincere desire to avoid a thermo-
nuclear war. And this is of enormous importance, to say the
least. We have gone through periods of great tension without
going to war, and I am confident that by following our best
instincts and by making the necessary sacrifices, a major war can
be avoided indefinitely.
Why then, you might ask, does the Soviet Union devote so
much of its resources to building up its armed forces -- at great
cost to its hapless and long-suffering people -- if it does not
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52
intend to launch World War III? Bear in mind, that without its
impressive military power, the Soviet Union would not be a
superpower. By most measures it would rank below several other
nations. To the Soviets, military power is political power which
can be used to intimidate and coerce the less powerful. Soviet
leaders also depend on force to maintain their control over the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc countries. The danger comes when a
feeling of dominant military power encourages the Soviets to take
risks which could inadvertently lead to war.
For this reason, it is imperative that we and our Allies
maintain and strengthen our defenses. We must do our part to
prevent dangerous Soviet miscalculations. There is another
reason for strengthening our defenses. Only this provides the
Soviets an incentive to negotiate meaningful arms control agree-
ments. The Soviets did not agree to negotiate on limiting
intermediate-range missiles until they were convinced we were
prepared to counter those proliferating SS-20 missiles the
Soviets have targeted on Western Europe. We expect the Soviets
to return to those negotiations and to negotiate seriously on
missile reductions.
As you know, I have been and remain devoted to equitable and
verifiable arms reductions both nuclear and conventional, and to
concluding agreements on confidence building measures which
reduce the risk of inadvertent war or surprise attacks. I am
confident that if we build our defenses while seeking arms
reductions, there is no reason why we cannot avoid the horrors of
nuclear war.
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53
We also look forward to the time when someday Franklin
Roosevelt's 50-year old hope for normal and friendly relations
with the Soviet Union will be realized; however, this requires
the Soviet Union to abandon its constantly-expressed hostility
toward the United States and other Western countries and to
abandon its expansionist goals. The historical record is clear.
The Soviets have for decades consistently pursued expansionism,
and we have opposed such a policy. The nature of our relationship
with other countries is best exemplified by our relations with
our neighbors Canada and Mexico whose borders with us are
undefended on both sides. The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
even seals its borders with neighboring Communist countries in
Europe.
The effort of the Soviet regime to isolate its own people
from the rest of the world is too well known to require
elaboration. A powerful regime which fundamentally distrusts its
own people, its own allies and everyone else is bound to be
difficult for us all to live with. Still we must persevere in
our efforts to maintain the peace and to seek a stable relationship
with the Soviet Union.
There should be no fundamental reason why the United States
and the Soviet Union cannot live in peace with each other.
Certainly there is no animosity between our peoples. Let the
Soviet leaders concentrate on improving the lot of their people
in every regard. Let them give up spreading an oppressive
influence and ideology to other countries. Let them seek truly
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54
normal relations with other countries. Let them join with us in
reducing nuclear and conventional arms; then Franklin Roosevelt's
hope can be realized, and the prospects for world peace will be
strengthened.
*****
55
Soviet Speech
During these first days of 1984, I would like to share with
you -- and the people of the world -- my thoughts on a subject of
great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet
Union and the other nations of Europe at an international
security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our
respsonsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of
conflict. The conference will search for practical and
meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace.
We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our
people for genuine purposes.
We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of
opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and
frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We
have, and will continue to struggle for a lsting peace that
enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984
finds the United States in its strongest position in years to
establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with
the Soviet Union.
Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade
of the seventies -- years when the United States seemed filled
with self doubt and self reproach and neglected its defenses,
while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to
expand its influence by armed force and threats. During this
period, the USSR devoted twice as much of its gross national
product to military expenditures as the United States. It
deployed six times as many ICBM's, five times as many tanks,
twice as many combat aircraft and, of course, over 360 SS-20
2
intermediate-range missiles at a time when the United States had
56
no comparable weapons.
As the Soviet arsenal grew, so did Soviet aggressiveness.
From Angola to Afghanistan, from El Salvador to Kampuchea, the
Soviet Union and its proxies have tried to force their will on
others. History teaches that wars begin when governments believe
the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our
allies must be strong enough to convince any potential aggressor
that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. So when we
neglected our defenses, the risks of serious confrontation grew.
Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American
people to change course, and we have. With the support of the
American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline.
Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the
sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are
solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more
clear.
America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by
surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening
ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was
inevitable. They said it so often they probably started
believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.
This may be the reason we've been hearing such strident
rhetoric from the Kremlin recently. These harsh words have led
some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger
of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken.
Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out: Deterrence is
more credible and it is making the world a safer place; safer
because there is less danger now that the Soviet leadership will
underestimate our strength or resolve.
3
Certainly in the first three years of this Administration we
57
have witnessed nothing akin to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1973
threat of Soviet military intervention in the Middle East or the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. At no time in the past
three years has either the United States or the Soviet Union
placed its armed forces on alert. Yes, we are safer now.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of
the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These
are conditions which must be addressed and improved.
Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the
differences between our two societies and our philosphies. But
we should always remember that we do have common interests. And
the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of
arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course
which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition;
and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in
constructive cooperation.
Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for
demonstrating, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay
secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through
negotiations. That is why I say that 1984 is a year of
opportunities for peace.
But if the United States and the Soviet Union are to rise to
the challenges facing us and seize the opportunities for peace
which are at hand, we must do more to seek out areas of mutual
interest and build on them. I propose that our governments make
a major effort to see if we can make progress in three broad
problem areas.
4
First, we need to find ways to reduce -- and eventually to
58
eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international
disputes.
The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the
end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the
Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and
Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by
heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack
or subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and
exporting totalitarian rule only exacerbate local conflicts,
increase suffering, and make solutions to real social and
economic problems more difficult. Furthermore, such activity
carries with it the risk of confrontations.
It would be better and safer if we could work together to
assist governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful
solutions to their problems. That should be our goal. But we
must recognize that the gap in American and Soviet perceptions
and policy is so great that our immediate objective must be more
modest. As a first step, I believe our governments should
jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the
risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in these areas. And if we
succeed in this, we should be able to move further toward our
ultimate goal.
Our second task should be to find ways to reduce the vast
stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear
weapons.
5
It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending
59
more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of
their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious
cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere
it occurs.
While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is
needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth
is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have
fewer nuclear weapons today than we had 28 years ago. And our
nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of
its total destructive power.
Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an
additional 1,400 nuclear weapons from Western Europe. This comes
after the removal of a thousand nuclear weapons from Europe over
the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range
missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years --
and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated
five existing nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed.
But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to
reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals,
provide greater stability and build confidence.
Our third task is to establish a better working relationship
with each other, one marked by greater cooperation and
understanding.
Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.
Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.
Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the
relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts
across borders and permitting a free interchange of information
and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the
6
rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while
60
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
Cooperation and understanding are especially important to
arms control. In recent years, we have been disturbed by
mounting evidence that the Soviet Union has breached important
elements of several arms control agreements. It has also
established a pattern of taking advantage of any imprecision or
ambiguity in agreements. Such actions jeopardize the arms
control process.
I will soon submit to the Congress the report on these
Soviet activities which it requested from me. I will of course
see to it that our modernization program takes them into account
so that we will not be at a disadvantage. But I will also
continue our discussions with the Soviet government on activities
which undermine agreements. I believe it is in our mutual
interest to remove impediments to arms control, which offers us
the means to improve the security of both our countries and to
create a safe world.
The examples I have cited illustrate clearly why our
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We
have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try
again. We may have to start in small ways, but start we must.
In working toward these goals, our approach is based on
three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.
Realism means we start by understanding the world we live
in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition
with a government that does not share our notions of individual
liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank
in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our
values.
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61
Strength means we can negotiate successfully and protect our
interests. If we are weak we can do neither. Our strength is
necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation
and solutions. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise
only if they can get something in return. America's economic and
military strength permit us to offer something in return.
Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is
crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.
Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our
allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3
years ago.
Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss the problems that divide us, and to work for practical,
fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never
retreat from negotiations.
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I
don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders
who have never shied away from expressing their view of our
system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other.
We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist
aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a
communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us
likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living
in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakable. But we
insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --
and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear
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62
confrontation could well be mankind's last. That is why I
proposed over two years ago, a zero solution for intermediate
range missiles. Our aim was and continues to be to eliminate an
entire class of nuclear arms.
Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I
have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons
will be banished from the face of the earth. Last month, the
Soviet defense minister stated that his country shares the vision
of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words,
but the Soviets should back them up with concrete proposals that
would lead to this nuclear-free world.
The framework for such proposals exists; the Soviet leaders
should take advantage of it.
We have undertaken a set of initiatives that would reduce
substantially the size of our nuclear arsenals and reduce the
risk of a nuclear confrontation by providing greater stability.
In the most recent round of negotiations on strategic arms we
proposed -- with strong Congressional support -- a novel concept
to "build-down" the nuclear arsenals on both sides by removing
more than one old weapon for each new one deployed. This
proposal was not intended to disadvantage the Soviet Union. But
it was intended, quite simply, to reduce the numbers of these
horrendous weapons and to make deterrence safer by moving to
fewer, more modern and safer weapons. We regret that the Soviet
Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear
forces, and that it refused to set a date for the resumption of
the talks on strategic arms and on conventional forces in Europe.
Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table to
work toward agreements in INF, START and MBFR. We will negotiate
9
in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do
63
likewise, we will meet them halfway.
We seek both to reduce nuclear arsenals, and to reduce the
chances for dangerous misunderstanding and miscalculation. So we
have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building
measures.' They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva
negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union
exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major
military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions,
we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet
channels of communication. Last week, we had further discussions
with the Soviets here in Washington on improving communications,
including the "Hotline."
These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the
conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to
develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and
potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities,
and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to
defuse tensions and regional conflicts.
Let us take the Middle East as an example. The Soviet Union
has made the situation in that part of the world more dangerous
for all concerned by introducing thousands of its military
personnel and countless sophisticated weapons into Syria during
the past year. Our efforts in that region are aimed at limiting
these dangers. The Soviets have announced to the world time and
again that they have important interests in the Middle East. So
do we. Everyone's interests would be served by stability in that
region. I challenge the Soviets to security in the Middle East.
9a
The confidence created by such progress would certainly help us
64
to deal more positively with other aspects of our relationship.
Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet
Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as
Page 10
65
any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that
hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others
who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing
harassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.
Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet
Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under
international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under
the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect
for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the
Soviet-American relationship.
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace
between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.
These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet
and constructive cooperated
Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition
It is a polia not
that will serve both nations and people everywhere. for the 1ong)
just for This year, but for the long term.
haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge
for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be
prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and
allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine
cooperation; we seek progress for peace.
Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such
communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva
Page 11
66
this week
and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting
should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations
become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in
we can't
us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No
one
can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.
But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the
dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an
risks
impossible dream, because eliminating these is so clearly a vital
interest for all of us. Our two countries have never fought each
other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we fought
common encauses -- World Warth.
ongside one another in two world wars. Today our common
enemies are hunger, disease
ignor
and, above all, war.
More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an
valid
approach that is as realistic and hopeful ful today as when he
announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said,
"but let us also direct attention to our common
interests and to the means by which those differences
can be resolved."
Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in
governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would
have to do with the things of everyday life for people
everywhere.
Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or
sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was
no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would
they debate the differences between their respective governments?
Page 12
67
Or, would they find themselves comparing notes about their
children, and what each other did for a living?
Before they parted company they would probably have touched
on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and
the problems of making ends meet. They might even have decided
they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.
Above all, they would have proven that people don't make
wars. People want to raise their children in a world without
fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things
over and above bare subsistance that make life worth living.
They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives
them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests
cross all borders.
If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be
peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of
arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams
of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us
begin now.
68-77
0045
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
MEETING ON SOVIET SPEECH
DATE:
Thursday, January 5, 1984
LOCATION:
Cabinet Room Oval office
TIME:
4:00 P.M.
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE
I. PURPOSE:
To discuss draft of speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations.
II. BACKGROUND:
the subject
You are scheduled to make a speech on January 12 at the National
Press Club.
III. PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
Edwin Meese III
James A. Baker, III
Michael K. Deaver
Robert C. McFarlane
Richard G. Darman
David R. Gergen
Jack F. Matlock
Ben Elliott
IV. PRESS PLAN:
None
V.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:
Comment on speech draft as you desire and solicit comments of
others.
Prepared by: Jack Matlock
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR
White CVS House Guidelines, NARA, Date August 7/31/02 28 1997
By
DRAFT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT
78-84
The President intends to make a speech dealing with
U.S. -Soviet relations on Monday, January 16, at the National
Press Club.
Questions and Answers
Q.
Is the speech connected with the report on compliance?
A.
No, not directly. His speech will set forth his views of
the relationship and his policy in broad terms.
Q.
Will it contain new initiatives?
A.
I doubt it, since the purpose of the speech is not to make
new proposals--we have diplomatic channels for that--but to
explain his attitude and policy.
Q.
Is the speech meant to be a signal to the Soviets?
A
We assume the Soviets will pay attention to his statement,
along with the world public.
Q.
Is this a sign that the President is seriously worried about
the U.S. - Soviet relationship? Are we on the brink of war?
A.
No, the speech is not the result of any specific event and
certainly does not reflect alarm that we are on a collision
course--because we are not. The President will be speaking
on the subject because he has a genuine desire to improve
the relationship and believes it will be helpful to spell
out his policy and his goals in comprehensive fashion.
85
SYSTEM II PROFILE
UNCLASSIFIED
ID 8490014
RECEIVED 05 JAN 84 17
TO
MCFARLANE
FROM DARMAN, R
DOCDATE 05 JAN 84
KEYWORDS USSR
SPEECHES
SUBJECT: PRES SOVIET SPEECH
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE
DUE: 06 JAN 84 STATUS S FILES SII
FOR ACTION
FOR CONCURRENCE
FOR INFO
MATLOCK
FORTIER
LEHMAN, R
POINDEXTER
KIMMITT
URGENT
COMMENTS ** URGENT MEMO DUE TO MCFARLANE BY 0800 AM 6 JAN
REF#
LOG
NSCIFID
( B /
)
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED
ACTION REQUIRED
DUE
COPIES TO
DISPATCH
W/ATTCH FILE
(C)
SYSTEM II
86
Document No.
90014
WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM
1/5/84
--
DATE:
ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:
SOVIET SPEECH (1/5/84
SUBJECT:
ACTION FYI
ACTION FYI
VICE PRESIDENT
JENKINS
MEESE
McFARLANE
BAKER
McMANUS
DEAVER
MURPHY
STOCKMAN
OGLESBY
DARMAN
P
SS ROGERS
FELDSTEIN
SPEAKES
FIELDING
SVAHN
FULLER
VERSTANDIG
GERGEN
WHITTLESEY
HERRINGTON
KIMMITT
HICKEY
ELLIOTT
REMARKS:
This will be discussed with the President tomorrow. (Please hold close.)
Thank you.
RESPONSE:
Richard G. Darman
Assistant to the President
Ext. 2702
87
(NSC/Myer/BE)
January 5, 1984
4:30 p.m.
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: National Press Club
Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your
distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during
these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of
the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of
peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet
Union and the other nations of Europe at an international
security conference in Stockholm. We are determined to uphold
our responsibility as a major power to ease potential sources of
conflict. The conference will search for practical and
meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace.
We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our
people for genuine progress.
We live in a time not only of challenges to peace but also
of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and
frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We
have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that
enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984
finds the United States in its strongest position in years to
establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with
the Soviet Union.
Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade
of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its
role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet
Page 2
88
Union increased its military might and sought to expand its
influence through threats and use of force.
Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American
people to change course, and we have. Today America can once
again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay
secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through
negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.
History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the
price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our
allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential
aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. Our
goal is deterrence, plain and simple.
With the support of the American people and the Congress, we
halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the
best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt.
Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values
has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.
America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by
surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening
ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was
inevitable. They said it so often they probably started
believing it. But they can see now they were wrong.
Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the
differences between our two societies. Our rivalry will persist.
But we should always remember that we do have common interests.
And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level
Page 3
89
of arms. There is no rational alternative but to steer a course
which I would call "constructive competition."
Nevertheless, we've recently been hearing some very strident
rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to
speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of
conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look
beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is
being restored and making the world a safer place.
The world is safer because there is less danger that the
Soviet leadership will provoke a confrontation by underestimating
our strength or resolve. We have no desire to threaten. Freedom
poses no threat, it speaks the language of progress. We proved
this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and
could have dominated the world. But we used our power to write a
new chapter in the history of mankind, rebuilding the war-ravaged
economies of East and West, including those nations who had been
our enemies.
America's character has not changed. Our strength and
vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful
negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise
only if they can get something in return. America's economic and
military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes,
today is a time of opportunities for peace.
But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is
safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of
the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working
Page 4
90
relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These
are conditions which must be addressed and improved.
Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our
way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our
policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the
Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a
dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions
of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive
working relationship.
First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of
force in solving international disputes.
The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the
end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the
Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and
Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by
heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack
or subversion.
Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems,
but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and
its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an
outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and
exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases
suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic
problems more difficult.
Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and
governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful
Page 5
91
solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us
in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.
Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast
stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear
weapons.
It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending
more than $150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of
their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious
circle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere
it occurs.
While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is
needed to establish a stable military balance. In fact,
America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer
warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear
stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its
total destructive power.
Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an
additional 1, 400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This
comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from
Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned
intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over
the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we
will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead
deployed.
But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to
reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear
weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed
Page 6
92
here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range
missiles. Our aim was and remains to eliminate in one fell swoop
an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial
deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would
still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either
side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As
I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear
weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.
Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his
country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.
These are encouraging words. But now is a time for
opportunity -- a time to move from words to deeds.
Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish
a better working relationship with greater cooperation and
understanding.
Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words.
Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts.
Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the
relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts
across borders and permitting a free interchange of information
and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the
rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while
organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.
These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with
the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to
go, but we are determined to try and try again.
93
Page 7
In working toward these goals, our approach is based on
three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.
Realism means we start by understanding the world we live
in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition
with a government that does not share our notions of individual
liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank
in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to defend our
values.
I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. This
should come as no surprise to Soviet leaders who have never shied
away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not
mean we can't deal with each other. We do not refuse to talk
when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors," or because
they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy.
The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason
to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it
imperative that we talk.
Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or
protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary
not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and
compromise.
Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is
crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery.
Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our
allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than 3 years
ago.
Page 8
94
Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our
differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to
discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for
practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We
will never retreat from negotiations.
Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we
do insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not
atmospherics.
In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war --
and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear
confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive
set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce
substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And I am ready to go
much further: If the Soviet Union is willing, we can work
together and with others to rid our planet of the nuclear threat
altogether.
The world regrets that the Soviet Union broke off
negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has
refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our
negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to
conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good
faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we
will meet them half way.
We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons,
but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and
miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we
call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of
Page 9
95
activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that
the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of
missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on
congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to
improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.
These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the Stockholm
conference. We will work hard to develop practical, meaningful
ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for
misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to
diminish the risks of surprise attack.
Arms control has long been the most visible area of
U.S. -Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to
defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets
should have a common interest in promoting regional stability,
and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that
permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on
economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges
of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we
can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.
Our approach is constructive, but little has come of it. We
remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet
Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based,
negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice,
they will find the United States ready to cooperate.
Another major problem in our dialogue with the Soviet Union
is human rights. It is Soviet practices in this area, as much as
96
Page 10
any other issue, that have created the mistrust and ill will that
hangs over our relationship.
Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep
concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over
the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others
who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing
harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.
Our request is simple and straightforward: The Soviet Union
must live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under
international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under
the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect
for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the
Soviet-American relationship.
Conflicts of interest between the United States and the
Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace
between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful
world for all mankind.
These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet
Union, a policy of constructive competition that will serve both
nations and people everywhere for the long haul. Constructive
competition is a challenge for Americans; it will require
patience. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they
cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our
interests, and those of our friends and allies. But We want more
than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress
for peace.
97
Page 11
Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such
communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva
and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz is prepared to meet
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting
should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations
become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in
us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one
can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge.
But our two countries share with all mankind the dream of
eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible
dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest
for all of us. We have never fought each other; there is no
reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one
another in the past. Today our common enemies are hunger,
disease, ignorance and, above all, war.
More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an
approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he
announced it:
"So, let us not be blind to our differences -- but let
us also direct attention to our common interests and to
the means by which those differences can be resolved.
And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we
can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in
the final analysis, our most basic common link is that
we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the
same air. We all cherish our children's future. And
we are all mortal."
I urge the Soviet leadership to move from pause to progress.
If the Soviet government wants peace then there will be peace.
The journey from proposals to progress to agreements may be
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98
difficult. But that should not indict the past or despair the
future. America is prepared for a major breakthrough or modest
advances. We welcome compromise. In this spirit of constructive
competition, we can strengthen peace, we can reduce greatly the
level of arms, and, yes, we can brighten the hopes and dreams of
people everywhere. Let us begin now.