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Sino-Soviet Relations - Soviet Union (3)
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Sino-Soviet Relations - Soviet Union (3)
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Records of the National Security Council, Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs (Reagan Administration)
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.'s Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) Subject Files
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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: Sino-Soviet Relations - Soviet Union (3)
Box: 34
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection
Contact a reference archivist at: [email protected]
Citation Guidelines: https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing
National Archives Catalogue: https://catalog.archives.gov/
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/24/2005
File Folder
SOVIET UNION: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 3/3
FOIA
F06-114/10
Box Number
34
YARHI-MILO
3412
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
11434 CABLE
270311Z JUL 82
1 7/27/1982 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11435 CABLE
270621Z JUL 82
1 7/27/1982 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11425 CABLE
140020Z AUG 82
1 8/14/1982 B2 B3
PAR 3/28/2011
F2006-114/10
11436 CABLE
300946Z AUG 82
7 8/30/1982 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11426 MEMO
PIPES TO CLARK RE CONVERSATION WITH
1 9/28/1982 B1
MINISTER COUNSELOR OF PRC EMBASSY
(SAME AS 18809)
11427 PAPER
USSR-CHINA
1
ND
B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11437 CABLE
270940Z OCT 82
1 10/27/1982 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11438 REPORT
SINO-SOVIET TALKS
3 11/6/1982 B1
R
12/22/2015
M554/1
11428 MEMO
PIPES TO CLARK RE SINO-SOVIET
1 11/9/1982 B1
RELATIONS
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/24/2005
File Folder
SOVIET UNION: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 3/3
FOIA
F06-114/10
Box Number
34
YARHI-MILO
3412
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
11429 MEMO
SAME TEXT AS DOC #11428
1 11/9/1982 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11430 REPORT
CHINA-USSR
1
ND
B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11431 REPORT
CHINA; JAPAN
1 11/21/1982 B1
11439 REPORT
CHINA: DENG
1 11/21/1982 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11448 CABLE
CHINA/USSR
4 11/23/1982 B1 B3
D
7/18/2008
F06-114/10; D UPHELD
12/27/2012 M554/1
11440 PAPER
SINO-SOVET TALKS
15 11/24/1982 B1
R
12/22/2015
M554/1
11449 CABLE
080113Z DEC 82
1 12/8/1982 B1 B3
D
7/18/2008
F06-114/10; D UPHELD
12/27/2012 M554/1
11432 REPORT
SINO-SOVIET
1 4/2/1983 B1 B3
11441 PAPER
CHINESE ROLE IN STRATEGI TRIANGLE
3 6/30/1983 B1
R 12/22/2015 M554/1
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
c. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET 5/24/2005
File Folder
SOVIET UNION: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 3/3
FOIA
F06-114/10
Box Number
34
YARHI-MILO
3412
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
11433 REPORT
IRAN/IRAQ; LIBYA/TUNISIA; SOUTH
2 8/11/1983 B1
KOREA; SINO-SOVIET; TURKEY; SOUTH
AFRICA; UK
11442 CABLE
292249Z NOV 83
4 11/29/1983 B1
R 1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11447 PAPER
SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY
7 1/4/1984 B1
CHINA
R 1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11443 REPORT
SINO-SOVIET TALKS
1 2/21/1984 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11444 PAPER
CHINA'S VIEW OF THE US AND THE USSR
3 3/27/1984 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11445 PAPER
USSR: NUANCES IN CHINA POLICY
4 4/16/1984 B1
R
1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
11446 PAPER
USSR-PRC
1 5/8/1984 B1
R 1/2/2008
NLRRF06-114/10
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
China
PAGE 01
SECSTATE WASHDC 7977
DTG: 270311Z JUL 82 PSN: 020533
EOB929
AN006518
TOR: 208/0823Z
CSN: HCE072
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 SIGU-01 PIPE-01 /003 A3
E
X
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
D
EOB:
S
ROUTINE
DE RUEHC # 7977 2080528
R 270311Z JUL 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3064
E
C ONF I DENTIA L STATE 207977
X
EXDIS
D
E.O. 12065: RDS 1
TAGS:
PDIP CH
SUBJECT:
CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER FRASER
S
1.
0
ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AUSTRALIAN EMBOFF (STRICTLY PROTECT) PASSED US THE
SUBSTANCE OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER FRASER
E
AND PRC AMBASSADOR IN CANBERRA DURING THE COURSE OF A
DINNER PREPARATORY TO FRASER'S TRIP TO BEIJING.
X
SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWS.
D
3. FOLLOWING THE DINNER, AMBASSADOR LIN AND FRASER
TALKED ABOUT TAIWAN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER STRESSING
S
THAT IN TIME THE ISSUE WAS LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED IN
CHINA' S FAVOR. HE NOTED THAT MANY POSITIONS HAD BEEN
TAKEN IN PUBLIC BUT IN FACT, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
HAD SOLD LESS WEAPONS TO TAIWAN THAN ITS PREDECESSOR.
FRASER URGED THE CHINESE TO MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S PRE-ELECTION POSITIONS AND TO TAKE THE LONG
VIEW OF THE OVERALL U.S. COMMITMENT TO A FIRM STANCE
E
TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION AND BUILDING UP U.S. DEFENSE
X
CAPABILITIES.
D
4. LIN APPARENTLY THEN REFERRED TO A "CAMPAIGN OF RIGHT-
WING ELEMENTS" OCCASIONED BY SECRETARY HAIG'S
S
RESIGNATION AND THE PRIME MINISTER URGED THAT THE
CHINESE DISREGARD THE PUBLIC COMMENTARY AND CONCENTRATE
ON RESULTS. HE REITERATED HIS VIEW THAT WHAT THE U.S.
WAS DOING NOW WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER WHAT THE PREVIOUS
ADMIMINISTRATION HAD BEEN DOING AS FAR AS CHINESE
INTERESTS WERE CONCERNED.
5. THE PRECEDING INFORMATION SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE
SHARED WITH OTHERS, INCLUDING THE AUSTRALIANS. STOESSEL
BT
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/10 143434
BY
CN
NARA
DATE
1/2/08
CONF IDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAC
Sino-
INCOMING
Department of State
suret
TELEGRAM
PAGE 01
BELGRA 05900 01 OF 02 270850Z
8100
relates
ACTION EUR-00
FOR MANY YEARS IN THE CCP CC DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
LIAISON. FINALLY, THE CURRENT PRC EMBASSY DCM IS AN
2
INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-05 SS-10 CIAE-00 EA-06
EXPERIENCED SOVIET HAND, HAVING SERVED AS POLITICAL COUNSELOR
NSC-01 NSAE-00 PM-03 PA-01 SMS-01 SP-02 SPRS-01
IN MOSCOW FROM 1976 TO 1981.
/039 W
031313 270917Z /16
5. (C) THE YUGOSLAV ASSESSMENT. A SENIOR GOY OFFICIAL,
P R 270621Z JUL 82
WHO HAS EXCELLENT ACCESS AND HAS A SOLID RECORD OF PROVIDING
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RELIABLE INFORMATION, TOLD US THAT "EXTENSIVE CONTACT"
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6623
BETWEEN THE CCP AND CPSU DELEGATIONS OCCURRED "AT THE
USMISSION USNATO
TECHNICAL LEVEL." BECAUSE OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
DELEGATIONS, HE SAID THAT "IT WAS EXPECTED" THAT SERIOUS
AMEMBASSY BONN
CONTACTS WOULD TAKE PLACE--AND THEY DID. CONTINUING, HE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
ASSERTED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATIONS WAS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
ITSELF A "SIGNAL" OF THEIR MUTUAL INTEREST IN TALKING AND
AMEMBASSY PARIS
THAT BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THAT BELGRADE WOULD BE A "GOOD
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
PLACE" AND THE LCY CONGRESS A GOOD VENUE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
FOR QUIET CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THEIR SPECIALISTS. THIS SOURCE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
ALSO STATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS READ THE "SIGNAL"
AND, AT THE LAST MINUTE, BEEFED UP THEIR DELEGATION,
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 5900
INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER AND VERY SENIOR MFA
OFFICIALS, TO BETTER MONITOR ANY CCP-CPSU TALKS HERE.
LIMDIS
THE YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
RESULTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS.
E.O. 12065: XDS-1,2 7/26/02 (CLUNAN, J.L.) - OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, CH, UR, YO, PGOV, KN
SUBJECT: (C) RUMORED SINO-SOVIET HIGH LEVEL CONTACT AT
YUGOSLAV PARTY CONGRESS IN LATE JUNE
1. -(C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. THE COMPOSITION OF THE CCP AND
CPSU DELEGATIONS TO THE XII LCY CONGRESS (JUNE 26-29) RAISES
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER SIGNIFICANT SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS
OCCURRED. (BOTH DELEGATIONS CONTAINED SENIOR OFFICIALS WITH
EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS.)
A RELIABLE YUGOSLAV SOURCE CLAIMED EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS DID
TAKE PLACE "AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL" BUT CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE
OF RESULTS. PRC DCM MAINTAINED ONLY ONE SUPERFICIAL
SOCIAL CONTACT OCCURRED AND TOOK PAINS TO CHARGE SOVIETS
WITH PRODUCING SUCH RUMORS TO FURTHER MOSCOW'S INTERESTS.
WE BELIEVE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY SERIOUS CONTACTS
TOOK PLACE. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
2. (C) CPSU AND CCP DELEGATION COMPOSITION. WE ARE
STRUCK BY THE INCLUSION IN THE CCP AND CPSU DELEGATIONS
TO THE XII CONGRESS OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS
OF YUGOSLAVIA (JUNE 26-29) OF SENIOR OFFICIALS WITH
CONSIDERABLE BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE IN SINO-SOVIET
AFFAIRS.
3. (II) SOVIET DELEGATION LEADER, V.V. KUZNETSOV,
SERVED AS SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE PRC, ACCOMPANIED KHRUSHCHEV
TO CHINA IN 1958 AND LED THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE
1969-70 BORDER TALKS IN BEIJING. KUZNETSOV'S DEPUTY, OLEG
RAKHMANIN LIKEWISE HAS SERVED IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY
IN BEIJING; SINCE 1967 HE HAS SERVED IN THE CPSU CC DE-
PARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH CP'S OF "SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES.' FINALLY, SINCE 1972 HE HAS BEEN DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE FREINDSHIP SOCIETY.
4. (0) THE CHINESE SENT SIMILAR EXPERTISE. CCP DELEGATION
LEADER PENG ZHEN (A FULL MEMBER OF THE CCP POLITBURO)
EXCHANGED BITTER INSULTS WITH KHRUSHCHEV AT A ROMANIAN
DECLASSIFIED
PARTY CONGRESS IN 1960 (BRINGING THE SINO-SOVIET
DISPUTE OUT INTO THE OPEN FOR THE FIRST TIME), ATTENDED
THE XXII CPSU CONGRESS IN 1961 AND PARTICIPATED IN THE
NLRR F06-114/10 #11435
LAST KNOWN HIGH LEVEL CCP-CPSU DISCUSSIONS IN 1963.
ANOTHER DELEGATION MEMBER, WU XIUQUAN, HAS SERVED AS
RY
U
DIRECTOR OF THE MFA DEPARTMENT ON THE USSR AND EE, WAS
1/2/08
IN MOSCOW FOR THE SIGNING OF THE 1950 SINO-SOVIET TREATY
AND FOR STALIN'S FUNERAL IN 1953, AND LIKEWISE PARTICIPATED
IN THE 1963 INTER-PARTY DISCUSSIONS. WU HAS WORKED
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
China-
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
Miscul
3
PAGE 01
DIA WASHINGTON DC// 3397 DTG: 140020Z AUG 82 PSN: 045295
EOB151
AN003103
TOR: 226/0129Z
CSN: CRI189
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 SIGU-01 PIPE-01 /003 A2
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:
ROUTINE
DE RUEKJCS #3397 2260125
R 140020Z AUG 82
FM DIA WASHINGTON DC/
TO DIACURINTEL
FOIA(b)
AIG 7011
AIG 7046
AIG 7036
SECRET NOFORN
DIADIN 225-4A (AS OF: 1600 EDT 13 AUG 82)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
)
CHINA: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. (U)
)
1.
(S/NOFORN) CHIEF OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SOVIET AND
EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT YU HONGLIANG FLEW TO MOSCOW ON 8 AUGUST
FOR AN 8-DAY VISIT, ACCORDING TO DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN BEIJING.
2. (S/NOFORN) WHILE IN MOSCOW, YU IS TO BE THE GUEST OF THE
CHINESE AMBASSADOR, BUT HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DEVOTE PART OF HIS
VISIT TO MEETING SOVIET OFFICIALS. HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART, MIKHAIL
KAPITSA, HAS PAID SIMILAR UNOFFICIAL VISITS TO BEIJING ON AN ANNUAL
BASIS over THE PAST 3 YEARS AS "GUEST" OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR.
ACCORDING TO AN EAST GERMAN SOURCE, YU' S VISIT IS DESIGNED TO ADD A
"POLITICAL COLORATION" TO A SERIES OF NONPOLITICAL SINO-SOVIET
CONTACTS SINCE EARLY SPRING BETWEEN ATHLETES, SCIENTISTS,
ECONOMISTS, AND SCHOLARS. THE LAST VISIT TO MOSCOW BY A HIGH-
RANKING CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL WAS IN OCTOBER 1979, WHEN
A VICE FOREIGN MINISTER PARTICIPATED IN NORMALIZATION TALKS.
3.
(S/NOFORN) THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE FOR THIS PARTICULAR VISIT IS
UNDETERMINED, BUT IT LIKELY INVOLVES SOMETHING MORE SUBSTANTIVE
THAN THE MERE ADDITION OF A POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE MUSHROOMING
NUMBER OF SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS. THERE ARE AMPLE INDICATIONS THAT
BEIJING IS ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF TENSION WITH MOSCOW,
WITHOUT COMPROMISING ON POLITICAL PRINCIPLES OR POINTS OF MAJOR
DISAGREEMENT. THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY ELEMENTS WITHIN CHINA'S
LEADERSHIP WHO BELIEVE BEIJING HAS PLACED ITSELF AT A POLITICAL
DISADVANTAGE BY TILTING TOO FAR IN FAVOR OF MAJOR FREE WORLD
NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE US AND JAPAN. EVEN THE PRIME ADVOCATES
OF FREE WORLD TIES MAY NOW BE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS, FEARING THAT
CHINA HAS CAST ASIDE TOO MANY POLITICAL OPTIONS AND, AS A
CONSEQUENCE, IS NOW BEING "TAKEN FOR GRANTED" BY ITS NEW FRIENDS.
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BEIJING IS PROBABLY ATTEMPTING TO ADOPT
A MORE INDEPENDENT, NONALIGNED POSTURE IN WORLD AFFAIRS WITH A
RENEWED EMPHASIS ON NATIONAL PRIDE AND SOVEREIGNTY.
(DE CL OADR)
BT
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/10+11425
SECRET
BY RW NARA DATE 3/28/1/
SECRET-
CHINA
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING
(MSG 1709 DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010809
EOB692
AN009447
TOR: 242/1309Z
CSN: HCE501
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 BALY-01 SIGU-01 HELM-01 KIMM-01 PIPE-01
LAUX-01
/007
A1
E
X
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-00 BALY-00 ISEC-01 SIGU-00 HELM-00 KIMM-00
PIPE-00 LAUX-00 /001 A2
D
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: PUBS VP SIT EOB
S
EOB:
OP IMMED
STU6034
E
DE RUMJPG # 1709/01 2430954
O 300946Z AUG 82
X
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
(MSG ON SVC BY WH COMMCEN)
D
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6679
DECLASSIFIED
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3846
S
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1146
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0080
NLRR F06-114/10 #11436
S/E CRET SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 11709
BY Cir NARA DATE 1/2/08
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
E
TAGS: CH, US, PEPR
SUBJ: AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE AFTERMATH: CHINESE FOREIGN
X
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
REF: BEIJING 11609
1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
S
2. SUMMARY:
-
THE CHINESE HAVE SIGNALED THAT, WHILE THE SINO-AMERICAN
CRISIS IS PAST, MAJOR NEW STEPS IN BILATERAL OR
STRATEGIC COOPERATION WILL BE POSTPOHNWGPWXTAEMYRSH) 9;
SOME OPPORTUNITY TO SEE HOW THE AUGUST 17 JOINT COMMUNIQUE
E
IS IMPLEMENTED IN PRACTICE. PRIVATELY, AS REPORTED
X
REFTEL, CHINESE OFFICIALS ARE UPBEAT ON PROSPECTS FOR
THE RELATIONSHIP. PROVIDED NO SUBSTANTIAL DISPUTE over
D
ARMS SALES ERUPTS IN THE NEXT MONTH OR so, AND ASSUMING
THE DENGISTS FURTHER CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION AT THE
12TH PARTY CONGRESS, THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP IS LIKELY
TO SUPPORT A REVIVAL OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS INCLUDING
S
IN THE MILITARY REALM. THE NEW PHASE IN RELATIONS,
HOWEVER, IS NOT LIKELY TO USHER IN A NEW HONEYMOON IN
SINO-AMERICAN TIES.
3. THE AUGUST 17 SINO-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE PROVIDES THE
CHINESE WITH NEW DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERABILITY WHICH BEIJING
HAS ALREADY STARTED TO EXPLOIT, THE BREAKTHROUGH WITH
THE AMERICANS HAS PROBABLY. REINFORCED BEIJING' S INCLINA-
TION TO INSIST ON MORE JAPANESE CONCESSIONS ON THE
TEXTBOOK ISSUE. THE COMMUNIQUE GIVES THE CHINESE A
STRONGER HAND IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH
CHINA WILL BE VERY CAREFUL TO AVOID ANYTHING THAT WOULD
APPEAR TO BE PLAYING THE SOVIETS OFF AGAINST THE
AMERICANS. YU HONGLIANG' S VISIT TO MOSCOW SUGGESTS
MAINTENANCE IF NOT GROWTH IN THE LIMITED, SELECTIVE,
NON-POLITICAL SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS UNDERWAY SINCE LAST
SPRING. YU REPORTEDLY TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT CHINA
WOULD PROVIDE AN EARLY RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET UNION' S
SECRET
SECRET
5
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING
(MSG 1709 DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010809
FEBRUARY 3 NOTE ON RESUMPTION OF BORDER TALKS. THE
CHINESE ARE ALSO MOVING TO RESUME MOMENTUM IN SINO-
INDIAN RELATIONS. IN ANY FUTURE HIGH-LEVEL SINO-
AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS, THE CHINESE MAY WISH TO RESUME
X
EXCHANGES ON STRATEGIC ISSUES, POSSIBLY INCLUDING
RELAXATION OF TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND
D
ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER RESISTANCE. END SUMMARY.
CHINA' S RHETORICAL POSTURE
S
4. CHINESE PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE WAKE OF THE
AUGUST 17 SINO-AMERICAN COMMUNIQUE DO NOT REVEAL
INDICATIONS OF ANY BASIC SHIFT IN CHINA' S FOREIGN
POLICY POSTURE. NOR DO WE EXPECT ANY SIGNIFICANT
ALTERATION IN THE NEAR TERM, ALTHOUGH THE PERIOD AFTER
THE UPCOMING 12TH PARTY CONGRESS COULD WITNESS IMPORTANT
E
CHANGES IN NUANCE. ALL HIGH LEVEL CHINESE FOREIGN
POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING
X
THOSE OF DENG XIAOPING AND HUANG HUA TO VISITING UNSG
PEREZ DE CUELLAR AND THE BARBADOS FOREIGN MINISTER,
D
POINT TO A CONTINUATION OF RHETORICAL FOREIGN POLICY
THEMES WHICH HAVE EVOLVED over THE PAST YEAR:
(A) RENEWED EMPHASIS ON CHINA'S INDEPENDENT FOREIGN
S
POLICY STANCE AND HER IDENTIFICATION WITH THE THIRD
WORLD; (B) CRITICISM OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FOR THEIR
"HEGEMONIC" ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE THIRD WORLD,
WITH THE USSR SINGLED OUT FOR SPECIAL ABUSE; AND
(C) UNYIELDING OPPOSITION TO SOVIET AGGRESSION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND MOSCOW' S SUPPORT OF VIETNAMESE AGGRES-
SION IN KAMPUCHEA, ACCOMPANIED BY A SLOW, SELECTIVE,
E
AND LIMITED EASING OF SOME BILATERAL TENSIONS WITH
MOSCOW.
X
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
5. AS REPORTED REFTEL, WHILE CHINESE OFFICIALS IN
PRIVATE ARE SOMEWHAT UPBEAT IN THEIR COMMENTS N FUTURE
S
PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, CHINESE STATE-
MENTS SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE GENERALLY SUGGEST THAT
BEIJING IS WAITING TO SSE HOW THE ACCORD IS IMPLEMENTED
IN PRACTICE BEFORE TAKING MAJOR SLEPS LO REVIVE THE
RELATIONSHIP. BARRING MAJOR CONTRETEMPS ON OUR ARMS
SALES TO TAIWAN over THE NEXT MONTH OR so, IT IS LIKELY
THAT A NEW PHASE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL BE
BT
X
D
S
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING 1709
DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010775
EOB693
AN009448
TOR: 242/1311Z
CSN: HCE502
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 BALY-01 SIGU-01 HELM-01 KIMM-01 PIPE-01
LAUX-01 /007 A1
X
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
D
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: PUBS VP SIT EOB
S
EOB:
OP IMMED
STU6047
DE RUMJPG # 1709/02 2430958
E
o 300946Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
X
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 668Ø
D
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3847
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1147
S
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0081
S E CRE T SECTION 02 OF 04 BEIJING 11709
EXDIS
USHERED IN. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT EVEN IN THE BEST
CONDITIONS THE ATMOSPHERE WILL BE AS WARM AS DURING THE
E
POST-NORMALIZATION HONEYMOON IN 1979, BUT NEITHER WILL
IT BE AS TENSE POLITICALLY AS IN RECENT MONTHS (BUT WE
SHOULD REMEMBER THAT EVEN DURING THIS TENSE POLITICAL
D
PERIOD, MOST BILATERAL PROGRAMS -- ECONOMIC, TRADE, AND
EXCHANGES -- HAVE CONTINUED LARGELY UNIMPAIRED) A
FAVORABLE TREND WOULD BE REINFORCED IF DENG EMERGES FROM
THE UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESS IN A STRENGTHENED POSITION,
S
THE DIFFERENCES over THE JAPANESE TEXTBOOK ISSUE ARE
RESOLVED, AND CHINA'S OPENING TO THE WEST IS CONTINUED,
IF NOT broadened. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS WILL REMAIN
THE PRINCIPAL UNDERPINNING OF THE RELATIONSHIP. VICE
FOREIGN MINISTER HAN XU' RECENT COMMENTS TO VISITING
MIT PROFESSOR WILLIAM GRIFFITH UNDERSCORED THIS POINT.
HAN READ OFF A STATEMENT STRESSING THE GENERAL THEME
OF SOVIET HEGEMONISM. HE SAID THAT, WHILE CHINA AND THE
U.S. DIFFER ON SOME THIRD WORLD ISSUES, THEY HAVE
SIMILAR VIEWS ON DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS IN THIRD WORLD
D
AREAS. HE CITED OUR PARALLEL POLICIES ON AFGHANISTAN
AND KAMPUCHEA TO SUPPORT HIS POINT.
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS
S
6. WHILE CHINA HAS INDICATED ITS INTENTION TO "WAIT
AND WATCH" U.S. ACTIONS ON COMMUNIQUE IMPLEMENTATION,
WE WOULD EXPECT BEIJING TO MOVE SOON TO EXPLOIT THE
NEW DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERABILITY IT HAS GAINED BY THE
BREAKTHROUGH IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE MOST
IMMEDIATE EFFECT COULD BE FELT IN SINO-JAPANESE AFFAIRS.
WITH THE SINO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT IN ITS POCKET, BEIJING
MAY HOPE THAT THE JAPANESE ARE ANXIOUS TO MAKE AMENDS
so AS NOT TO BE LEFT BEHIND. THUS, AS SUGGESTED BY THE
NEGATIVE CHINESE REACTION TO THE AUGUST 26 JAPANESE
PROPOSAL FOR COMPROMISING THE TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY, WE
WOULD EXPECT THE CHINESE TO keep THE PRESSURE ON TOKYO
AND EVEN TO ACCELERATE IT, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF
WRINGING A MORE FAVORABLE MODUS VIVENDI OUT OF THE
JAPANESE BEFORE THE SUZUKI VISIT (9/26-10/1) TAKES
PLACE. MOREOVER, WE CAN SPECULATE THAT THE TOUGH PRC
POSITION ON japan IS AT LEAST IN PART MOTIVATED BY A
SECRET
SECRET
7
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING 1709
DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010775
NEED OF PRC LEADERS TO SHOW THEIR OWN COLLEAGUES THAT
THEY CAN BE TOUGH ON ONE ISSUE OF FOREIGN POLICY, so
AS TO DAMP DOWN CRITICISM THAT THEY HAVE been TOO SOFT
IN THEIR COMPROMISE WITH THE U.S. IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON
X
TAIWAN.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
D
7. SINO-SOVIET AFFAIRS IS ANOTHER AREA WHICH COULD
S
WITNESS SOME NEW CHINESE MOVEMENT, EVEN THOUGH IT WILL
LIKELY AMOUNT MORE TO ADJUSTING SOME OF THE OUTER
FRINGES OF BILATERAL TIES RATHER THAN ANY SIGNIFICANT
IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONSHIP. WHILE THE SINO-AMERICAN
COMMUNIQUE ALSO GIVES THE CHINESE A STRONGER HAND IN
DEALING WITH MOSCOW, THE CHINESE WILL BE VERY CAREFUL
TO AVOID ANYTHING THAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE PLAYING THE
E
SOVIETS OFF AGAINST THE AMERICANS. FURTHER, THE CHINESE
WILL BE WARY OF PROJECTING THE IMPRESSION OF LOWERING
X
THE GLOBAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS, SINCE THIS COULD
INVITE OTHERS TO TAKE SIMILAR STEPS -- THE U.S. AND
D
WESTERN EUROPE ON THE WESTERN FRONT, JAPAN ON THE USSR' S
EASTERN FLANK, PAKISTAN VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISTAN, AND THE
ASEAN STATES WITH VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO A RELIABLE
S
THIRD WORLD DIPLOMATIC SOURCE HERE, WHOSE COMMENTS WERE
BASED ON CONVERSATIONS BY SOVIET MF A OFFICIALS WITH HIS
EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, IN THEIR RECENT MOSCOW TALKS WITH
VISITING CHINESE MF A SOVIET SPECIALIST YU HONGLIANG,
SOVIET MF A OFFICIALS KAPITSA AND ILICHEV URGED THAT CHINA
AND THE SOVIET UNION IGNORE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DIFFER-
ENCES AND CONCENTRATE THEIR ENERGIES ON REMOVING
E
OBSTACLES IN SIN -SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS. YU
RESPONDED BY REPEATING THE STANDARD CHINESE POSITION ON
X
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: NO IMPROVEMENT IS POSSIBLE UNLESS
D
THE SOVIETS ABANDON THEIR POLICY OF HEGEMONISM GENERALLY,
AND, SPECIFICALLY, PULL OUT OF AFGHANISTAN, CEASE
ASSISTING VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION AND SERIOUSLY ADDRESS
THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN MONGOLIA.
S
8. BEIJING' S CONTINUING ANTI-SOVIET POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING AROUND THE WORLD AND ONGOING
PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST MOSCOW DO NOT, HOWEVER, RULE
OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A FURTHER, CAUTIOUS WIDENING
OF NON-POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND AT SOME
POINT THIS YEAR OR NEXT, ACQUIESCENCE IN SOVIET
PROPOSALS FOR RESUMED BILATERAL BORDER TALKS. THESE
X
STEPS, WHILE MINOR IN RELATION TO THE ENORMOUS DIFFER-
BT
D
S
SECRET
SECRET
8
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING 1709
DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010777
EOB694
AN009449
TOR: 242/1313Z
CSN: HCE503
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 BALY-01 SIGU-01 HELM-01 KIMM-01 PIPE-01
LAUX-01 /007 A1
X
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
D
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: PUBS VP SIT EOB
S
EOB:
OP IMMED
UTS2053
DE RUMJPG #1709/03 2431001
E
O 300946Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
X
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6681
D
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3848
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1148
S
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0082
S E CR E T SECTION 03 OF 04 BEIJING 11709
EXDIS
ENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNIST GIANTS, WOULD REINFORCE
CHINA'S MANEUVERABILITY BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS,
E
MAGNIFY HER SELF-GENERATED IMAGE AS AN AUTONOMOUS
ACTOR ON THE WORLD STAGE, LESSEN THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY
X
THREAT TO CHINA FROM THE NORTH, AND PERMIT MORE CONCEN-
D
TRATION ON CHINA'S PRIORITY LONG-TERM GOAL OF ECONOMIC
MODERNIZATION. WE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER EXPECT THE CHINESE
TO GO BEYOND THESE LIMITED STEPS OVER THE FORESEEABLE
FUTURE (I.E. THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO RESUMPTION OF
S
NORMALIZATION TALKS) UNLESS MOSCOW DECIDED TO MAKE AN
IMPORTANT CONCESSION OR UNDERTOOK A MAJOR POLICY CHANGE
IN AN AREA OF VITAL CONCERN TO CHINA, SUCH AS THE SOVIET
MILITARY PRESENCE IN MONGOLIA, INDOCHINA, AND
AFGHANISTAN.
9. ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, YU HONGLIANG DEBATED THESE
ISSUES AT LENGTH IN HIS MOSCOW TALKS WITH ILICHEV AND
X
KAPITSA (THE SECOND SESSION WITH KAPITSA REPORTEDLY
LASTED THREE AND A HALF HOURS). THE SOVIET PRESSED FOR
D
A CHINESE ANSWER TO MOSCOW' S february 3 NOTE ANNOUNCING
SOVIET READINESS FOR BORDER TALKS AND CALLED FOR
STEPPED-UP SINO-SOVIET CONTACTS. YU POINTED TO THE
EXCHANGES OF VISITS BY SCHOLARS AND TECHNICIANS ALREADY
S
AGREED To, INCLUDING SOME SOVIET PHYSICISTS ATTENDING A
PHYSICS CONFERENCE IN CHINA AND A CHINESE METALLURGICAL
TEAM GOING TO THE USSR. HE remarked THAT THE TWO SIDES
SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SUCH CONTACTS. HE ALSO
TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR FEBRUARY 3 NOTE WAS
RECEIVING HIGH LEVEL CHINESE ATTENTION AND THAT BEIJING
WOULD SOON RESPOND TO IT.
SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
10. WHILE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE COMMUNIQUE,
THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS THAT THE CHINESE IN RECENT DAYS
HAVE MOVED TO RESTORE MOMENTUM IN THE SINO-INDIAN
NORMALIZATION PROCESS. AN INDIAN EMBASSY SOURCE HERE
(STRICTLY PROTECT) TOLD US THAT EARLY LAST week THE
CHINESE EMBASSY IN DELHI FORMALLY PROPOSED TO THE INDIAN
MF A THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF SINO-INDIAN TALKS TAKE PLACE
IN BEIJING IN DECEMBER. OUR SOURCE STATED THAT, IF THE
SECRET
-SECRET
9
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 02 OF 02 BEIJING 1709
DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010777
TALKS GO WELL, THERE WOULD BE A GOOD CHANCE FOR A
'HIGH LEVEL VISIT" (PRESUMABLY MRS. GANDHI OR A SENIOR
CHINESE LEADER) TAKING PLACE NEXT YEAR.
E
X
11. ONGOING CHINESE EFFORTS TO ATTRACT THE DALAI LAMA
BACK TO TIBET IS ALSO PARTLY AIMED AT EASING THE STRAINS
D
IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. THE SAME INDIAN SOURCE SAID
THAT AN OFFICIAL FROM YANG JINGREN' S CPC UNITED FRONT
WORK DEPARTMENT TRAVELLED SECRETLY TO NEW DELHI LAST
S
MONTH TO HOLD TALKS WITH THURTEN NAMGYAL JURCHEN, THE
CHIEF SPOKESMAN FOR THE TIBETAN NEGOTIATING TEAM IN
THEIR TALKS WITH YANG IN BEIJING EARLIER THIS YEAR.
THE EMISSARY CARRIED A LETTER FROM CPC CHAIRMAN HU
YAOBANG INVITING THE DALAI LAMA TO RETURN AND CONFIRMING
THAT ALL SECULAR TITLES HE PREVIOUSLY POSSESSED WOULD
BE RESTORED. DURING THE DALAI LAMA' S RECENT VISIT TO
E
MALAYSIA, THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN KUALA LUMPUR HELD
FURTHER TALKS WITH A MEMBER OF THE DALAI LAMA' S STAFF.
X
WHILE NEITHER WE NOR OUR INDIAN SOURCE ARE AWARE OF THE
OUTCOME OF THESE EXCHANGES, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT
D
CONTINUING CHINESE OVERTURES COULD EVENTUALLY BEAR
FRUIT, POSSIBLY LEADING TO A VISIT TO TIBET BY THE DALAI
LAMA THIS YEAR OR NEXT TO TEST THE WATERS REGARDING A
S
RETURN TO RESIDE ON A MORE permanent BASIS.
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
12. THE AUGUST 17 COMMUNIQUE STRENGTHENS THE BASIS FOR
CHINA' S POLICY OF SEEKING COMMON GROUND AND NARROWING
DIFFERENCES WITH ASEAN. THE COMMUNI QUE RESTORES THE
E
U.S. POSITION OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH BEIJING AND ASEAN
CAPITALS, AND ENHANCES THE POSSIBILITY OF SINO-AMERICAN-
X
ASEAN COOPERATION AGAINST HANOI'S OCCUPATION OF
D
KAMPUCHEA. BEIJING NO DOUBT SEES BETTER PROSPECTS FOR
MAXIMIZING SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK AND THE DKCG AT THE
UPCOMING UNGA SESSION. IT MAY USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS
TO ENCOURAGE OTHERS, INCLUDING THE U.S., TO GIVE MORE
S
ASSISTANCE TO THE KAMPUCHEAN RESISTANCE. ANOTHER AREA
FOR POSSIBLE CHINESE MOVEMENT IS KOREA, A SUBJECT WHICH
HAS been ON THE BACK BURNER AS SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
HAVE BECOME TENSE OVER THE PAST YEAR OR so. STEPS THE
U.S. AND CHINA COULD TAKE TO REDUCE TENSIONS ON THE
PENINSULA WAS A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION DURING ZHANG WENJIN' S
E
STRATEGIC TALKS IN WASHINGTON IN 1980. BEIJING MAY BE
X
PREPARED FOR RENEWED EXCHANGES IN THIS AREA DURING ANY
BT
D
S
SECRET
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01
BEIJING 1709
DTG: 300946Z AUG 82 PSN: 010806
EOB696
AN009450
TOR: 242/1314Z
CSN: HCE505
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 BALY-01 SIGU-01 HELM-01 KIMM-01 PIPE-01
LAUX-01 /007 A1
E
X
DISTRIBUTION: ISEC-01 /001 A2
D
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: PUBS VP SIT EOB
S
EOB:
OP IMMED
STU6050
DE RUMJPG #1709/04 2431005
E
O 300946Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
X
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6682
D
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3849
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1149
S
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0083
SECRE T SECTION 04 OF 04 BEIJING 11709
EXDIS
HIGH-LEVEL SINO-AMERICAN CONSULTATIONS THAT MAY TAKE
PLACE. FOR THEIR PART, WE CAN EXPECT THE CHINESE TO
E
FOLLOW-UP THE COMMUNIQUE BY USING OUR CONSULTATIONS TO
PRESS THE U.S. TO GIVE MORE ATTENTION TO THIRD WORLD
X
CONCERNS, TO APPLY MORE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND SOUTH
D
AFRICA IN PROMOTING SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN AND
NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS, TO AVOID "OVER-REACTING" TO CUBAN
AND SOVIET PROVOCATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, AND TO SUPPORT
GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. HUMMEL
S
BT
E
X
D
S
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
USSR / ASIA
- 3 -
12
3.
USSR-CHINA: NO EARLY BREAKTHROUGH, BUT SOVIETS HAVE HOPES
Recent Soviet statements indicate no expectation of an early
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Soviet
observers are now putting a more positive gloss on Chinese internal
developments than was the case in the past. Many even profess to
see reason to hope that Beijing will eventually adopt a foreign
policy more favorable to the USSR.
The most pessimistic of the recent rash of assessments
appeared in the current issue of the Soviet party journal
Kommunist under a pseudonym for the party's top China expert.
The article harshly denounced Beijing's "direct collusion with
imperialist reactionaries' and claimed the "heritage of Maoism"
continues to dominate Chinese domestic and foreign policy.
Although the writer contends that Sino-Soviet relations are un-
likely to improve any time soon, he does point out the possibility
of future Sino-American differences and he notes Brezhnev's
observation at the April Party Congress that domestic changes
underway in China might lead in time to a less antagonistic
Chinese posture toward the Soviet Union.
Other Soviet comments echo condemnation of China's present
course, but several are more optimistic about the future:
--Mikhail Kapitsa, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's foremost
expert on China, told Indian and Canadian diplomats in
April that he expected Beijing eventually to adopt a
"multi-polar" foreign policy, perhaps after China gets
what it wants from the West.
--The Soviet DCM in Beijing told US diplomats that Kapitsa's
visit to China in April was more successful than his
trip last year; although there was no substantive progress,
the atmosphere was more positive. The Soviet diplomat
also claimed he saw evidence in the Chinese press of an
ongoing debate over Sino-Soviet relations. This debate
suggested to him that Beijing was reconsidering its
hostile stance toward the USSR.
i
--Alexander Bovin, senior Izvestiya political commentator,
told Japanese journalists in late April that he expected
Sino-Soviet relations to be "normalized" by the late 1980's.
He claimed that domestic changes in China reflected a "return
to good sense" and that these changes would be reflected in
Chinese foreign policy.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/10 *11427
CONFIDENTIAL
BY Cis NARADATE 1/2/08
CONFIDENTIAL
cluna- USSR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
13
PAGE 01
BEIJING 4725
DTG:270940Z OCT 82 PSN: 035043
EOB911
AN011461
TOR: 300/0958Z
CSN:HCE054
4. THE ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT'S COMMENTS"COINCIDE WITH
DISTRIBUTION: CHLD-01 BLAR-01 SIGU-01 LAUX-01 PIPE-01 DUR-01
STATEMENTS MADE BY DENG XIAOPING IN HIS RECENT CONVERSA-
/006 A3
TIONS ON THE SINO-SOVIET TALKS WITH FRG PRESIDENT CARSTENS.
Deng
ACCORDING TO FRG EMBASSY NOTES RECORDED DURING THE
M
SESSION, DENG STATED THAT, "THE AIM OF THE CHINESE SIDE
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
IS TO REDUCE THE THREAT TO CHINA." DENG THEN WENT ON TO
usn
SIT: PUBS EOB
REMARK THAT, "IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SOLVE ALL OF OUR
EOB:
PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT PROGRESS ON ONE OR ANOTHER
OF THE BASIC ISSUES IS A PRECONDITION FOR CONTINUING THE
TALKS."
OP IMMED
5. ACCORDING TO THE ROMANIAN, DURING AN EXCHANGE ON
UTS9622
INDOCHINA, QIAN ASKED THAT THE SOVIETS INTERVENE WITH
DE RUMJPG #4725 3000941
VIETNAM AND REQUEST HANOI TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM
0 270940Z OCT 82
KAMPUCHEA. QIAN STATED THAT THIS STEP WOULD PROVE
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
ADVANTAGEOUS TO BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE VIETNAMESE.
IL' ICHEV"RESPONDED BY RESTATING THE STANDARD SOVIET
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8639
POSITION ON"KAMPUCHEA.
INFO"RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3759
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 2095
6. COMMENT. THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS AFTER"THE
AMEMBASSY BONN 0659
EXCURSION TO XI'AN IS INTRIGUING. PAST PRACTICE HERE,
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0215
FOR INSTANCE DURING THE BORDER TALKS IN BEIJING IN 1977
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3975
AND 1978, INCLUDED AN EXCURSION ONLY AFTER THE ROUND OF
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1183
TALKS WAS COMPLETED. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD THEN
AMEMBASSY TOKYO"0374
FLY BACK TO MOSCOW. WE WOULD ADD, HOWEVER, THAT ONE
USMISSION USNATO 0486
YUGOSLAV DIPLOMAT HAD TOLD US DURING THE FIRST WEEK"OF
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
THE CURRENT TALKS THAT THEY WOULD LAST UNTIL NOVEMBER 6.
AIT TAIPEI
HUMMEL
AMCONSUL HONG KONG"5009
BT
ZEN/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
ZEN/AMCONSUL SHANGHA
CONFIDENTIAL BEIJING 14725
CINOPAC ALSO FOR POLAD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UR, CH, PEPR, PBOR
SUBJECT: SINO-SOVIET TALKS CONTINUE.
NLRR Fob -114/10 "11437
REF BEIJING 14586 (NOTAL)
1.
ENTIRE TEXT.
BY as NARA DATE 1/2/08
2. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A RELIABLE THIRD WORLD SOURCE WJOSE
COUNTRY HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT --
CONTRARY TO EARLIER INDICATIONS -- THE SINO-SOVIET TALKS
ARE CONTINUING HERE. THE TALKS WERE BROKEN OFF
OCTOBER 20 AFTER"APPARENTLY HITTING AN IMPASSE (REFTEL)
WITH THE SOVIETS, AS IN THE 1979 OCTOBER-NOVEMBER MOSCOW
NORMALIZATION TALKS, PRESSING FOR NEGOTIATION OF A STATE-
MENT OF PRINCIPLES BEFORE ADDRESSING SPECIFICS AND THE
CHINESE INSISTING ON"GOING DIRECTLY TO THE CONCRETE
ISSUES. ACCORDING"TO"OUR"SOURCE, QIAN QICHEN AND
IL'ICHEV CONTINUED INFORMAL EXCHANGES DURING THE
OCTOBER 22-24 EXCURSION TO XI'AN. THE TALKS HAVE RESUMED
FOLLOWING THEIR RETURN TO BEIJING AND THE SOVIET DELEGA-
TION IS EXPECTED TO DEPART ON OCTOBER 29.
OUR SOURCE SPECULATED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET
TALKS WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR IN
MOSCOW.
3. OUR SOURCE CITED A ROMANIAN DIPLOMAT AS TELLING HIM
THAT THE CHINESE HAVE TOLD THE ROMANIANS THEY HAVE REASON
TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS"WILL BE OFFERING SOME SORT OF
PROP?SAL ON TROOP REDUCTIONS ALONG SINO-MONGOLIAN OR
SINO-SOVIET BORDER AREAS." THE ROMANIAN QUOTED THE CHINESE
AS COMMENTING THAT CHINA DOES NOT EXCLUDE RECEIVING SOME
POSITIVE RESULTS IN THIS AREA, AND KNOWS THAT THERE IS NO
PROSPECT FOR MOVEMENT ON THE AFGHANISTAN AND KAMPUCHEAN
ISSUES.
CONFIDENTIAL
sino sou
SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
china 11/6/82
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - NOVEMBER 6, 1982
14
1. SINO-SOVIET TALKS: BEIJING'S PERSPECTIVE
In its approach to the October Sino-Soviet talks, China
has sought to keep the process alive, prod the Soviets to make
concessions, and reassure other governments as well as China's
domestic audience that no fundamental change is imminent.
*
*
*
Chinese leaders have expressed approval of the first round
of talks. While demonstrating flexibility, they have also
stressed that major improvements are contingent on a reversal of
what they view as a Soviet strategy of weakening China.
Deng Xiaoping told a Japanese visitor that the distance
between the parties was "beyond measure," but the talks were
worthwhile and that China would agree to "100 meetings" if neces-
sary. Deng's comments indicate that China, for the first time,
will accept movement on one or two of the major issues rather
than demanding full-scale resolution. The primary Chinese aim
reportedly is to lessen Soviet support for Vietnam. They have
told Thai officials that they proposed linking staged Vietnamese
withdrawal from Kampuchea with steps to normalize both Sino-Soviet
and Sino-Vietnamese relations.
Believing that Moscow primarily wants the appearance of im-
proved relations, the Chinese have withheld highly visible
improvements, in the hope of gaining Soviet concessions with
respect to "containment" policies on China's periphery. For
example, Beijing has stressed that these talks, unlike those held
in 1979, are "private consultations," not formal negotiations to
improve relations. Despite China's evident interest in upgrading
cultural and economic contacts, Beijing has not yet entered into
any new agreements. Indeed, it seems to have dismissed Moscow's
revival of earlier Soviet offers for a general statement of
mutual peaceful intentions as mere rhetoric.
It appears that the next round will address cosmetic "ges-
tures" underscoring mutual peaceful intentions. The Chinese
apparently were disarmed by the Soviet willingness to discuss a
mutual pullback of forces along the border. Such an agreement
would appear to meet past Chinese demands that both sides with-
draw from "disputed" territories. But Beijing would want to
portray a pullback as an admission by Moscow that the Soviet
Union has illegally occupied Chinese territory rather than as
"proof" that the Soviets do not pose a threat to China.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M554 #11438 #11438
BY RW NARA DATE 12/22/15
6
SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
- 2 -
15
2. SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION: MOSCOW WEIGHS THE OPTIONS
Moscow would prefer to improve Sino-Soviet relationships by
expanding bilateral ties, while relegating basic differences to
the background. Chinese resistance, however, and Moscow's inter-
est in directing its resources against the US, may prompt the
Soviets to be more accommodating. The least costly step might be
to relax tensions along the Sino-Soviet border.
*
*
*
Brezhnev's endorsement last September of a "gradual" improve-
ment of relations on the basis of "common sense, mutual respect,
and mutual advantage" has set the tone for the Soviet negotiating
position during the first round of normalization talks. The prag-
matic tenor no doubt reflects Moscow's view that its more compre-
hensive approaches in 1979 had stymied normalization efforts.
In any event, the Soviet delegation reportedly came to Beijing
with a memorandum containing a number of proposals for economic
and cultural cooperation.
Chinese sources state that the Soviets also resurrected
their earlier proposal for an agreement on principles to guide
Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow presumably raised this issue as
a counter to China's call for a major shift in Soviet policies
toward Vietnam and Afghanistan and for a reduction of Soviet mili-
tary forces in Mongolia and Siberia. The Soviets, however, appar-
ently do not expect the Chinese to accept the proposal.
Nonetheless, recent Soviet commentary aimed at domestic
audiences pointed out the need for flexibility toward China.
This suggests that Moscow may be looking for a way to accommodate
Beijing's major concerns. Measures to reduce friction along the
Sino-Soviet border would seem to offer the best prospect for for-
ward movement.
Moscow reportedly agreed to discuss mutual troop reductions
during the Beijing consultations (last March Brezhnev proposed
resumption of border talks and agreement on bilateral confidence-
building measures). One possible compromise might well be a
formal demilitarization of the disputed islands in the Amur and
Ussuri rivers. If accomplished under the rubric of confidence-
building measures, such a step would also breathe some life into
the moribund multilateral Asian confidence-building measures
scheme proposed by Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress in March
1981.
7
SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
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16
3. SINO-SOVIET TALKS: EFFECT ON MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS
Substantial military reductions along the Soviet-Chinese
border are unlikely now, even if Moscow and Beijing agree on
other measures to improve relations. Soviet deployments in the
Far East are directed against perceived US and Japanese threats
as well as against China. Moscow may agree to a pullback once a
new rail link to the Far East is completed, but such an accord
would not affect the overall size of Soviet forces in the Far
East.
*
*
*
The Soviets have been augmenting their forces in the Far
East since the mid-1960s. The buildup was motivated initially
by the emergence of China as a major rival and later by Moscow's
fear that China's rapprochement with the US and Japan might result
in a US-Chinese-Japanese alliance. Meanwhile, the Chinese have
made only limited improvements to their forces.
As a consequence, the USSR now has a clear superiority over
China along the border. Moscow has about 435,000 troops in the
Far East, and it could call on another 75,000 KGB border guards
for operations in the area. Beijing has about 1.7 million troops
opposite the USSR and Mongolia, but these forces have much less
firepower and only limited offensive capabilities.
Beijing has demanded that Moscow discuss a withdrawal of
Soviet troops from the border and a pullout of Soviet forces from
Mongolia. Because the large Soviet presence along the border is
needed to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, neither of these
issues is likely to be resolved soon. The Soviets, however, may
agree to a cosmetic reduction in the disputed border areas (see
map). By the late 1980s, when the Soviets complete the Baikal-
Amur Mainline railway, Moscow will have a new rail link to the
Far East that is farther from the border. The Soviets may then
be more disposed to pull back some forces.
We doubt that a Chinese pullback of forces from the border
would be an important Soviet objective. China's main force
units are already 100-200 miles away from the frontier in strong
defensive positions. Instead, the Soviets hope to limit Chinese
military modernization by discouraging the export of Western
technology to Beijing.
Better relations between Moscow and Beijing may reduce the
Soviet buildup, but Moscow will continue to add more modern ships
and Backfire bombers to the Pacific Fleet to counter a perceived
threat from the US. Moscow will also continue to improve its
ground forces to enhance Soviet territorial security and to pre-
vent China from taking advantage of any Soviet involvement in a
war with NATO.
SECRET/NOFORN
9
Pypes
MW
7897
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
17
CONFIDENTIAL
November 9, 1982
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM:
RICHARD PIPES is
SUBJECT:
Sino-Soviet Relations
I am struck by the extraordinarily warm telegram of greetings
sent by the Chinese leadership to Moscow on the anniversary
of the revolution. It reads:
"On behalf of the Chinese people, we send the Soviet
people warm congratulations and the best wishes on
the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist
Revolution. A lengthy friendship exists between the
peoples of China and the USSR. Relations between
China and the USSR were friendly for a long period
of time. The Chinese side is genuinely striving to
remove all obstacles which stand in the way of
normalizing Sino-Soviet relations and is striving
to put relations between the two countries onto the
path of healthy development. This is in the basic
interests of the peoples of China and the USSR,
and in the interests of peace in Asia and in the
whole world. We wish the Soviet people happiness."
[Emphasis added.]
I believe nothing so conciliatory in tone has been sent by
Beijing to Moscow since the 1960s: it may indicate that
China is more eager for a rapprochement than its leaders
tell us.
CC: Gaston Sigur
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National Security Council
The White House
18
Package #
82 NOV y P12: 37
ACTION
John Poindexter
SEQUENCE TO HAS P SEEN
/
I
Bud McFarlane
m
Jacque Hill
2
Judge Clark
Lu
I
John Poindexter
Staff Secretary
Sit Room
Information I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further
Action
DISTRIBUTION
cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other
COMMENTS
China
7897
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
19
CONFIDENTIAL
November 9, 1982
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK
FROM:
RICHARD PIPES M
SUBJECT:
Sino-Soviet Relations
I am struck by the extraordinarily warm telegram of greetings
sent by the Chinese leadership to Moscow on the anniversary
of the revolution. It reads:
"On behalf of the Chinese people, we send the Soviet
people warm congratulations and the best wishes on
the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist
Revolution. A lengthy friendship exists between the
peoples of China and the USSR. Relations between
China and the USSR were friendly for a long period
of time. The Chinese side is genuinely striving to
remove all obstacles which stand in the way of
normalizing Sino-Soviet relations and is striving
to put relations between the two countries onto the
path of healthy development. This is in the basic
interests of the peoples of China and the USSR,
and in the interests of peace in Asia and in the
whole world. We wish the Soviet people happiness." "
[Emphasis added.]
I believe nothing so conciliatory in tone has been sent by
Beijing to Moscow since the 1960s: it may indicate that
China is more eager for a rapprochement than its leaders
tell us.
CC: Gaston Sigur
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRR 06-114/10 #11428
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PAGE 3
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CELEBRATION OF THE SIXTY-
FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION, CHINA HAS
MADE SEVERAL GESTURES WHICH MAY SIGNAL A RESPONSIVENESS
TO ONGOING SOVIET OVERTURES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. FIRST,
RADIO PEKING IN RUSSIAN BROADCAST THE TEXT OF A TELEGRAM
FROM THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
WHICH IS REPORTED BY AFP TO HAVE APPEARED IN YESTERDAY'S
PRAVDA. THE TELEGRAM IS ESPECIALLY WARN IN TONE. AS
REPORTED BY RADIO PEKING, IT READS: "ON BEHALF OF THE
CHINESE PEOPLE, WE SENT THE SOVIET PEOPLE WARM CONGRATU-
LATIONS AND THE BEST WISHES ON THE 65TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION. A LENGTHY FRIENDSHIP
EXISTS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE USSR. RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR WERE FRIENDLY FOR A LONG PERIOD OF
TIME. THE CHINESE SIDE IS GENUINELY STRIVING TO REMOVE ALL OBSTACLES
WHICH STAND IN THE WAY OF NORMALIZING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND IS
STRIVING TO PUT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ONTO THE
PATH OF HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THIS IS IN THE BASIC INTERESTS OF THE
PEOPLES OF CHINA AND THE USSR, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN ASIA
AND IN THE WHOLE WORLD. WE WISH THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAPPINESS."
YET ANOTHER GESTURE BY PEKING TOWARD MOSCOW IS TO BE SEEN IN THE
FACT THAT THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, YANG SHOUZHENG, IS REPORTED BY UPI
TO HAVE ATTENDED THE REVOLUTION DAY PARADE IN RED SQUARE "FOR THE
FIRST TIME IN RECENT MEMORY." FURTHER, AS MONITORED IN MUNICH,
CHINESE RADIO BROADCASTS TO THE SOVIET UNION ON NOVEMBER 7 CARRIED AT
LEAST TWO ACCOUNTS OF HOW WARMLY RECENT CHINESE VISITORS TO THE USSR
HAVE BEEN TREATED. THESE BROADCASTS ALSO INCLUDED A LENGTHY SPEECH BY
A CHINESE OFFICIAL FROM THE SOCIETY OF SINO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP IN
PEKING FULL OF RATHER EFFUSIVE PRAISE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE
USSR SINCE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION. WITH EFFORT, THE OFFICIAL SAYS,
FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES "WILL STRENGTHEN AND DEVELOP."
END MSG-F
1858
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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS NOVEMBER 21, 1982
1. CHINA: DENG MOVING ON MILITARY AND PROVINCIAL REORGANIZATION
Since the 12th Party Congress last September, the Dengist
leadership has quickened the pace of reformist appointments to
key military and provincial positions. Opposition to reform
policies in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) appears to have
weakened, and efforts to streamline provincial bureaucracies
have begun. The reformists are taking advantage of the favorable
political climate to pursue their personnel changes.
The initial results of the 12th Party Congress suggested
that Deng made only limited progress in purging the military
opposition to his reformist policies. It now appears, however,
that Deng may have strengthened his control over key parts of
the PLA. The Congress named a close associate of Deng's as
Executive Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. Three more
Deng supporters have assumed positions as Deputy Secretaries-
General of the Commission.
These changes, combined with the recent replacement of con-
servative Wei Guoqing as head of the PLA's General Political
Department, have allowed Deng to begin his military reorganiza-
tion. Moreover, in view of the accession of Zhang Aiping to the
Defense Ministry, Deng also may be able to accelerate moderniza-
tion of the PLA. In late October and early November, four new
commanders and four new political commissars were announced for
eight of China's 11 military regions, and other changes are
expected to follow.
A similar reshuffling has been underway at the provincial
level. Two provinces have received new governors and another is
reportedly slated to change. In addition, the replacement of
First Party Secretaries in at least seven of the 29 provinces and
municipalities is expected soon. Several new provincial appoint-
ees are personal associates of Hu Yaobang, Deng's designated
heir, who is displaying more confidence and authority. Finally,
Deng is making progress in streamlining provincial bureaucracies
by reducing staff and appointing younger, better trained officers
to key jobs. Media commentary is emphasizing that opponents of
current policies and officials guilty of corruption must be removed,
and trials of "Gang of Four" followers have resumed.
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FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR
UNITED STATES OF
CITE
(U) SINO-SOVIET TALKS: SETTING AND CHRONOLOGY
Note: This paper repeats the full text of INR Report 502-CA
BUREAU OF
and appends a limited-distribution chronology for the period
February 1981-September 1982.
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH
(C/NF) Summary
Moscow and Beijing over the past several
months have been exploring the possibilities for
CURRENT
limited accommodation. Agreement was reached in
early September to begin "exploratory" talks in
Beijing on October 5. The first round was con-
ANALYSES
cluded on October 21, and a second will be held in
Moscow early next year.
Moscow's willingness to resume talks reflected
its hope of capitalizing on Sino-US differences.
Beijing's interest stemmed, in part, from its uncer-
tainty regarding Sino-US relations and from a desire
for more flexibility in dealing with Washington.
But Beijing responded positively to Soviet overtures
only after the signing of the Sino-US communique
had eased the crisis over arms sales to Taiwan.
The difficulties that Moscow and Beijing have
experienced in their relations with the West, com-
bined with pressing domestic problems, provide a
confluence of interest in exploring ways to regu-
larize the relationship and open the door to gradual
improvement. As the talks began, the Chinese were
looking for signs of change in Soviet Asian
policies, especially with respect to Vietnam. The
Soviets hope to reduce tensions but are not prepared
BY
to sacrifice major interests in South and Southeast
Asia and in Mongolia. Although both sides have
RW
seemed pessimistic about the chances for rapid prog-
ress, more regular contact between officials and
NARA DATE 12/22/15
NLRRM554 #11440
expanded cultural and economic ties seem likely.
DECLASSIFIED
*
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INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED
November 24, 1982
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(C/NF) Barriers to Improvement of Relations
There are major constraints on the ability of both China and
the USSR to make even minor concessions, e.g., a Chinese reduction
or deferral of longstanding demands for changes in Soviet policy
on China's periphery or Soviet adjustment of the disposition of
border troops. Constraints center on wide-ranging conflicts of
interest in third-party relations. These are compounded by the
lack of trust developed over the years and the problems of build-
ing a domestic consensus behind efforts to improve relations.
For Moscow, even limited gestures toward China have costs.
Hanoi has been disturbed by the shift in the tenor of Soviet
treatment of China. The Soviets also appear concerned that better
ties with the PRC might increase Beijing's influence with East
European and other communist and socialist parties.
Beijing will be trying to gain flexibility vis-a-vis both
superpowers while minimizing their ability to use China as a pawn.
Chinese leaders, Deng Xiaoping in particular, will be most
concerned about managing the impact of Sino-Soviet contacts on
relations with the West. These relations continue to have high
priority for China's security and development and for eventually
regaining Taiwan and Hong Kong. Beijing's caution has been
evident in its efforts to play down contacts with the Soviets;
officials stress that the current talks are a notch below the
formal negotiations of 1979.
Nevertheless, in moving toward talks with Moscow, Deng has
given ground to other Chinese officials, including some of his own
reformers, who favor a less strident anti-Soviet stance. These
leaders doubt US strength and reliability as a strategic and
economic partner. In the past, Deng has countered such opposition
with the argument that Moscow would never ease its pressure
against China and would interpret a conciliatory approach as a
sign of weakness, and that a strong Western connection was not
only possible but China's only long-term guarantee. So far, he
could claim that events (particularly Afghanistan) have tended to
support him.
(C/NF) What Does Moscow Want?
By pressing on with the current talks, the USSR is primarily
interested in exploiting strains in Sino-US relations to discourage
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political and military cooperation between China and the US.
Soviet propaganda and diplomacy have emphasized Sino-US differ-
ences and, by recalling common Sino-Soviet socialist tradition,
have sought to play to elements in China that oppose Deng's
opening to the West.
Moscow's decision to give greater prominence to its China
policy was manifested in Brezhnev's speeches in Tashkent last
March, in Baku in September, and to a Kremlin meeting of senior
military officers on October 27. His comments reflected an
anticipation of increased Chinese receptivity, based in part on
internal Chinese developments, and also placed Soviet overtures
toward China in the context of worsening USSR-US relations.
The Soviets are likely to counter Chinese demands for major
changes in Soviet foreign policy by pressing for high-profile
statements of mutual intent. They will in particular try to bring
about new formal exchange agreements. Moscow believes that such
contacts would give it leverage with the West and would seem to
testify to its benign intentions toward China without changing
anything in the strategic-military balance, which weighs heavily
in Moscow's favor. (Indeed, the Soviets have continued the steady
upgrading of their forces facing China.) If these tactics do not
maintain the momentum, Moscow might also consider a token gesture
regarding troops on the Sino-Soviet border.
(C/NF) What Does Beijing Want?
Beijing's decision to talk with Moscow reflects Chinese
uneasiness about the future of Sino-US cooperation and its impli-
cations for China's strategic situation. But it is also part of a
larger effort, first evident in 1979, to stabilize relations with
all states on China's periphery. This effort is likely to
characterize the coming period of succession politics.
As General Secretary Hu Yaobang indicated at the 12th Party
Congress, China wants to encourage Soviet willingness to reduce
the military threats along its border and in Mongolia and Afghan-
istan, as well as reduce Soviet support of Hanoi. Beijing has not
been able to narrow the gap between its military capabilities and
those of Moscow, although improvements in China's international
position and its caution in dealing with Moscow have made justifi-
cation of the direct use of force more difficult for the Soviets.
Beijing's offer to resume talks does not seem to reflect a
change in China's assessment of the Soviet threat. Beijing prob-
ably is reopening communications as one more in a series of steps,
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- 3 -
characteristic of Chinese foreign policy under Zhou Enlai, to "buy
time" to build a stronger domestic and international position from
which to deal with Moscow and its allies. As such, the offer to
talk appears to stem from a renewed Chinese appreciation of the
difficulties--including problems in Sino-US relations--in reaching
that goal, as well as the risks of Deng's more confrontationist
policy.
The current approach to Moscow is consistent with past
patterns. From 1969 (after the Sino-Soviet border clashes) to
1978, Beijing used annual border talks with Moscow to keep rela-
tions stable while Sino-US detente proceeded. In 1975, Beijing's
release of a captured Soviet helicopter crew removed an important
irritant at a time of stalemate in Sino-US relations and domestic
crisis in China. In 1979, after Sino-US normalization and China's
attack on Vietnam, Beijing broke off the cycle of border talks but
offered wide-ranging political discussions with both Moscow and
Hanoi to ease tension. (Beijing put these off indefinitely after
the Afghanistan invasion, however.)
Beijing has laid even more careful groundwork for its current
move. It has allowed nonpolitical contacts to increase for the
past year or so, especially since early 1982 when Beijing's public
rhetoric also began to reflect greater balance in its treatment of
the US and USSR.
Even if little progress is made, talks could serve China's
objective of undermining Hanoi's confidence in Moscow's support
and thus induce Vietnamese caution in the region. China also may
hope that talks will provide it more flexibility in dealing with
the US. They serve as a reminder of China's geopolitical impor-
tance and also suggest that Beijing can handle its problems with
or without Washington. A more balanced approach to the super-
powers strengthens China's socialist and Third World credentials
by providing evidence of its independence of Washington.
Prepared by Carol Hamrin; Frank Crump
x20511
x28657
Approved by Wever Gim
x21338
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- I -
Chronology of Sino-Soviet Relations:
February 1981-September 1982
1981
February 23. (LOU) In his report to the 26th CPSU Congress,
Brezhnev spoke positively of "changes taking place in China's
domestic policies" but saw no improvement in foreign policies. He
said the USSR wanted ties with China on a "good neighborly basis"
and repeated earlier Soviet proposals aimed at normalizing rela-
tions. His language was considerably more positive than that used
at the 25th Congress in 1976.
March. (U) The Soviet Embassy in Beijing presented Brezhnev's
proposal for Far East confidence-building measures (CBMs) to the
Chinese Foreign Ministry (according to Moscow radio, March 2,
1982).
April. (C) The first authoritative exposition of Soviet
views of China in more than a year, under the pseudonym O. Borisov,
appeared in Kommunist. The author was the first deputy chief of
the Central Committee Department of Liaison with Foreign Communist
Parties, Oleg Rakhmanin. The article expressed concern over
increasing US-Chinese military cooperation and China's internal
developments.
April 17-24 (approx.) (C) Mikhail Kapitsa, chief of the
Second Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
visited Beijing. He described his reception as slightly warmer
than in 1980. Kapitsa proposed, inter alia, resumption of Sino-
Soviet normalization talks, which the Chinese rejected; and he
discussed Brezhnev's CBM proposals, on which the Chinese remained
noncommittal.
April 20-28. (C) The Soviet-Chinese Bilateral Border Railway
Commission met (according to Soviet sources, for the first time in
10 years) in Khabarovsk and signed a protocol; details unspecified.
June 14-16. (U) US Secretary of State Haig visited Beijing.
Soviet reporting emphasized threat of Sino-American military
cooperation.
June 16. (C) Moscow and Beijing signed 1981 bilateral trade
agreement. The anticipated combined trade total of just over
400 million Swiss francs was the lowest in several years. Chinese
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1981 (cont'd)
sources claimed that economic priorities reduced the demand for
Soviet machinery and that Moscow was unwilling to provide raw
materials in desired quantities.
June 16. (C) President Reagan reaffirmed US commitments to
Taiwan. Chinese report summing up the Haig visit indirectly
criticized the President's remarks.
June 17. (C) Comprehensive and authoritative review of
China's position on outstanding border issues published in Renmin
Rebao--the first such detailed discussion to appear in official
Chinese party organs. The article, by the deputy to the 1979
political talks, Li Huichuan, reiterated basic Chinese conditions
for settlement of the problem.
Late June. (LOU) The 6th Chinese Communist Party Plenum
reaffirmed the important role of Mao's thought and the correctness
of his foreign policies (i.e., a continuing anti-Soviet focus and
opening to the West). But it was ambiguous with regard to the
rationale for the Sino-Soviet split and made no reference to
Soviet revisionism.
June 27 and July 1. (LOU) Two authoritative Soviet articles
under the Aleksandrov pseudonym strongly condemned Maoism and US-
Chinese military cooperation, but omitted criticism of PRC leaders
by name and reiterated interest in normalizing relations.
July 22. (U) Beijing protested a June Soviet-Afghan border
treaty covering the Pamirs area, over which Beijing asserts
historic claims.
August. (S) Moscow initiated a series of demarches in
Western and other capitals against Sino-US military cooperation.
August. (LOU) Kommunist carried an authoritative article
under the O. Vladimnov pseudonym, charging that the 6th Plenum had
codified Maoist elements of anti-Soviet and great-power hegem-
onism. The article described Haig's visit to China as a
"qualitative change" in the international situation.
August 10. (U) Soviets delivered a letter in Beijing follow-
ing up on Brezhnev's proposal for discussions of CBMs in the Far
East, according to a March 1982 Soviet broadcast in Mandarin.
Beijing reportedly criticized the proposal and said that the
Chinese would not meet with a Soviet representative to discuss it.
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- III -
1981 (cont'd)
August 11. (C) Moscow rejected the Chinese protest concern-
ing the USSR-Afghanistan border treaty.
Early Autumn. (S/NF/NC/OC) Delegation of Chinese Central
Committee officials visited Berlin as guests of the Chinese
Ambassador; held discussions with their counterparts in the
Socialist Unity Party (SED).
September 17. (U) Moscow's Chinese-language service reported
a gala in Moscow commemorating the centenary of Chinese writer
Lu Xun; the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR attended. A book
exhibit devoted to Lu Xun also opened in Moscow.
September 18. (U) Internal Chinese media reported the Lu Xun
evening party, noting the attendance of their Ambassador and quot-
ing Soviet orientalist Fedorenko's positive comments on Lu Xun's
anti-imperialist views.
September 18. (LOU) The Soviet journal International Life
responded authoritatively to the June 17 Li Huichuan article on
border issues. The Soviet response, like the Chinese statement,
was a reiteration of previously held positions.
September 25. (S/NF/NC/OC) The USSR formally proposed a
resumption of talks on border and political issues and invited
Yu Hongliang, chief of the Soviet and East European Department of
the Chinese Foreign Ministry, to Moscow. He declined but invited
Kapitsa to come to Beijing again.
September 30. (LOU) The Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
attended a Chinese embassy reception in Prague for the first time
since the Afghanistan invasion.
September 30. (LOU) Official Soviet greetings on China's
national day showed no abatement of hostility.
October 10. (U) Chinese Communist Party General Secretary
Hu Yaobang, in a speech for the 70th anniversary of the 1911
Revolution, enunciated China's "independent" foreign policy for
the first time, projecting a more balanced approach to both
superpowers.
October 20. (C) The Soviet proposal for resumption of border
talks was leaked to the foreign press (probably initially by
Moscow).
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1981 (cont'd)
October 20. (U) "Senior members" of the Soviet Institute of
Oriental Studies gave an interview to the Guardian expressing
optimism that China would move toward an equidistant position
between the US and the USSR and professing to see positive signs
in Chinese developments and Sino-Soviet relations.
October 28-31. (LOU) PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited
the US. Chinese press accounts emphasized discussion of problems
in bilateral relations.
November 6. (U) PRC message on Soviet national day stressed
desire for friendship, but with no change in basic position.
November 20. (LOU) Chinese gymnasts, the first team to go to
the USSR for a world championship meet since the Olympic boycott
over Afghanistan, were given an unprecedented reception hosted by
Sergey Tikhvinskiy, vice chairman of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship
Society. Moscow's Mandarin service and Chinese domestic media
reported the event.
December 3. (S/NF/NC/OC) At the fourth session of the fifth
National People's Congress, Vice Premier Ji Pengfei reiterated
Chinese common strategic interests with the US, which he described
as the weaker of the two hegemonists. He said China was trying to
conduct some business and increase people-to-people exchanges with
Moscow, but believed a policy of maintaining equal distance between
the US and the USSR would be dangerous. He enunciated a more
independent line on Third World issues along with criticism of US
policy on Taiwan, which he described as intolerable.
December 16. (U) The Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed
resumption of contacts with China for scientific and technical
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of experts in several areas.
December 26. (S/NF/NC/OC) Beijing responded to Moscow's
September 25 call for border talks, stating that the time was not
ripe.
1982
January 8. (LOU) Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman
Li Xiannian, in an interview with the Italian Communist Party
newspaper Unita: recalled early Soviet assistance to China, said
Sino-Soviet rift was over state issues rather than ideology,
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- V -
1982 (cont'd)
disavowed any preconditions for border discussions with the USSR,
but stated Afghanistan and Vietnam would be discussed. He denied
close relations between the US and China, because the US was still
an imperialist country.
January 14-30. (LOU) Senior Soviet China expert and head of
USSR Diplomatic Academy Sergey Tikhvinskiy visited Beijing as a
guest of the Soviet Ambassador.
January 25. (U) Li Xiannian, speaking at Spring Festival
rally, defined hegemonism to include the US as well as the USSR;
indirectly warned the US on Taiwan.
January 28. (U) Moscow reported the death of Mikhail Suslov,
Politburo member with oversight over Central Committee Department
for liaison with ruling communist parties.
Early February. (C) Moscow replied to Beijing's December 26
note on border talks, stating it had completed its preparations
and was ready to negotiate.
February 6. (LOU) Radio Moscow Mandarin broadcast described
Beijing's foreign policy as anti-socialist and reiterated Lenin's
dicta on relationship between foreign and domestic policies,
implying China might not be a "genuine" socialist country.
February 6. (C) Beijing and Moscow signed an agreement on
container transit via railway, under negotiation for year and a
half. Moscow agreed to lower freight rates by 15 percent. Agree-
ment focused primarily on Chinese shipments westward but also
provided framework for eventual Soviet use of Chinese facilities
for eastward shipment.
February 9. (LOU) The Soviet Ministry of Higher and
Secondary Specialized Education proposed an exchange with Beijing
of college students and teachers, especially in language.
February 12. (S/NF/NC/OC) In response to questions from
Japanese journalists, Soviet Council of Ministers Chairman
Tikhonov called for concrete reciprocal steps toward better
relations but said the process could not be one-sided. The Soviet
version, but not the Japanese, denounced the Chinese leadership
for consistent animosity toward the USSR. The Chinese dismissed
Tikhonov's comments as nothing new.
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36
1982 (cont'd)
February 14-15. (U) Politburo member Chernenko, in an
interview with Le Monde, said Moscow wanted to develop relations
with China in a spirit of good neighborliness and on the basis of
principles of peaceful coexistence.
February 18-April 3. (C) China and Mongolia agreed on
meticulous "joint inspection of their boundary," the first to be
conducted under their 1964 protocol although the protocol called
for such review every five years if necessary.
February-March. (S/NF/NC/OC) Delegation from international
relations department of the German Democratic Republic's ruling
party visited China as guests of the GDR Ambassador; claimed
achievement of aims of maintaining momentum of contacts between
parties and exploring areas of future cooperation.
March. (S/NF/NC/OC) A French Communist Party delegation
visited Beijing; visit by party leader George Marchais to China
planned for autumn 1982.
March. (S/NF) Jop Wolff, Politburo member of Dutch Communist
Party, visited Beijing; Dutch-Chinese parties agreed to reestab-
lish relations this summer.
March (approx.) (S/NF/NC/OC) Hungarian Communist Party
rejected high-level contacts with Beijing to avoid offending the
USSR but agreed to middle and lower level exchanges.
March 1. (LOU) Three Chinese economists arrived in Moscow
as guests of the Chinese Ambassador, to study planning and other
aspects of the Soviet economy.
March 16. (U) An increased level of amicability in annual
bilateral negotiations on border navigation was implied by press
statements of both sides.
March 23. (LOU) A delegation of Chinese gymnasts visited
the USSR, participated (in Riga) in the first purely bilateral
athletic competition in decades.
March 24. (LOU) Brezhnev in speech at Tashkent stressed
China's status as a socialist country and recalled earlier
cooperative relationship with USSR; reiterated proposals for
bilateral CBMs and border talks in most positive Soviet overture
toward China in many years.
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- VII -
1982 (cont'd)
March 30. (C) A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman responded
negatively to Brezhnev's March 24 overture, rejecting his attacks
on China and calling for deeds, not words. Chinese leaders spoke
to foreign visitors about Soviet intervention in parts of the
world and said China could not place faith in Brezhnev's offer
while the USSR maintained more than 1 million troops on the
Sino-Soviet border and until the Soviet "communist party" modi-
fied its behavior. (These comments were not reported in Chinese
media.)
March 30. (C) A Chinese UN delegation accorded equal
treatment to US and Soviet colleagues at reception in New York.
April. (S/NF/NC/OC) Mikhail Leontiyevich Titarenko, adviser
on China to the CPSU Central Committee, visited China.
Early April. (S/NF/NC/OC) Beijing made known its intention
to send small groups of specialists--especially in economic,
commercial, scientific, and technical fields--to the USSR on a
regular and selective basis to exchange views.
April 2. (U) Soviet foreign media reported that a Chinese
historian was in Dushanbe for an international scholars meeting.
April 15. (C) Pravda, in first objective report on Chinese
subjects in long while, ran article on Beijing opera.
Mid-April. (U) Chinese leaders' comments to foreign
visitors, as reported in the Chinese press, began to treat both
superpowers more equally as "hegemonist" and to stress China's
alignment with the Third World.
April 16. (S/NF/NC/OC) Sino-Soviet trade and payments
agreement for 1982 signed, providing for reopening border trade
(no details) and an increase in combined trade of nearly 200 mil-
lion Swiss francs over 1981 (but still below 1980 level). Large
increases in Chinese trade with some East European states also
reported to be pending; the trade increase with Poland (30 per-
cent) was reported to be an expression of Chinese solidarity with
Jaruzelski's regime.
April 16. (C) Soviet sources reported an exchange of notes
with China on reestablishment of border trade in the Far East and
reopening of two border points in Xinjiang Province (closed since
the late 1960s).
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1982 (cont'd)
April 17. (C) As evidence of improved Sino-Soviet relations,
Moscow's Ambassador in Beijing referred to increased publication
in both countries of each other's literature (e.g., the complete
works of Gorkiy and Lu Xun) and to talks between tourist officials
on exchanges of tourists next year.
April 17-19. (C) The PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong
juxtaposed positive accounts of developments in Sino-Soviet
relations with problems in Sino-American relations, implying
linkage while ostensibly denying it.
May. (S/NF/NC/OC) PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested
strengthened research on USSR. Increasing support among working-
level officials for more balanced approach toward the USSR was
reported.
May 7-9. (LOU) US Vice President Bush visited China. Moscow
commentary on visit focused on Chinese-American differences over
Taiwan by omitting references to strategic cooperation, in
contrast with treatment of June 1981 Haig visit and earlier
high-level visits.
May 13-21. (LOU) Kapitsa visited Beijing; given higher level
of protocol attention than in 1981.
May 15. (U) Chinese press announced that Soviet athletes,
among others, would participate in invitational track meet in
China in June.
Mid-May. (C) Chinese Minister of National Defense told an
American visitor that China saw US and USSR as about equal in
strength. He said border dispute with USSR was serious but
problem was not the limited territory involved; rather, it was the
borderline itself, which China considers center of river channel.
May 18. (U) Brezhnev speech to Soviet Komsomol Congress
alluded to possibility of Sino-Soviet negotiations on nuclear
missile reductions.
May 20. (LOU) Authoritative Alexandrov article in Pravda
reaffirmed policy line toward China enunciated by Brezhnev in March.
May 21. (U) Chinese friendship associations held a
commemoration meeting for two Russian painters. Reported in
Chinese domestic media.
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- IX -
1982 (cont'd)
May 31. (LOU) Premier Zhao Ziyang, in an interview upon
departure for Tokyo, said China's relations with USSR would remain
unchanged no matter what happened in Sino-US relations. He spoke
of "Soviet hegemonism" as the source of "major differences of
principle" between the USSR and China, but said China advocated
resolution through negotiation.
Late May. (S/NF/NC/OC) Chinese characterized May 20 Pravda
article as containing no evidence of change in Soviet policy and
said China continued to demand deeds, not words, from the Soviets.
Early June. (U) Chinese trade promotion group departed Moscow
after first visit there in decade. Meetings were held at vice-
ministerial level and reportedly reciprocated 1979 Soviet visit.
Early June. (S/NF) Faculty members at university-level
institutions in Guangdong Province reportedly were told to encour-
age students to study Russian, a directive they regarded as sig-
naling a change in central leadership attitudes toward the USSR.
June 11. (LOU) Huang Hua criticized the USSR indirectly and
did not tag Moscow as the most dangerous source of a new world
war, thus reverting to practice of the early 1970s which treated
the superpowers more equally.
June 15. (LOU) Beijing used the centenary of the birth of
Comintern leader Dimitrov to support its efforts to expand Chinese
influence in the communist movement at the expense of Moscow. It
stressed independence from the CPSU and from the Soviet path to
socialism.
June 18-20. (U) Four Soviet Olympic gold medalists
participated in Beijing track meet, reportedly the first sports
delegation to visit China in 16 years. Soviet internal media
covered the event; Moscow television carried clips showing Soviet
and other participants.
June 29. (U) Zhou Peiyuan, China's most notable scientist
and vice chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, said PRC hoped for expanded cultural, scientific, and
sports ties with USSR but that Soviet Government was hampering
such exchanges, according to Japanese press source.
June 29, (U) Evening event commemorating 55th anniversary of
the Canton (now Guangshou) Commune was held in Moscow, with
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1982 (cont'd)
Chinese Embassy officials in attendance, according to a Soviet
Chinese-language broadcast.
Early July. (U) Two articles in People's Daily spoke of
China's need and desire to work for stable borders and good
relations with all its neighbors.
July 8. (U) Chinese Sports Daily announced that three Soviet
athletes would participate in Beijing Marathon in September.
July 10. (C) Chinese Ministry of Health delegation visited
the GDR for 14 days to study organization and efficiency of health
and social delivery systems. Chinese Embassy officials in Berlin
described visit as continuation of usual exchanges in health
matters but noted some improvement in recent relations and PRC
interest in further improvement.
July 13. (U) Commemoration in Moscow of the 55th anniversary
of Nanchang uprising (Canton Commune) was attended by the Chinese
Ambassador. Chinese internal and Soviet external media reported
the event.
July 27. (C) Soviet diplomat reported that China would send
delegation of fish specialists to USSR and USSR would send delega-
tion interested in silk textile manufacture to PRC; said to be
response to Soviet December 16 proposal for exchange of scientific
delegations.
August 8. (S) Chief of Soviet and East European Department
of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hu Hongliang, in Moscow as
guest of Chinese Ambassador.
Mid-August. (S) A three-man delegation from the Chinese Academy
of Sciences' Institute of Soviet Affairs reported to be in Moscow.
August 17. (U) Sino-American communique on Taiwan issued.
Early September. (C) Preparation to recommence student
exchange with USSR and Eastern Europe indicated by a Beijing
University Graduate School announcement, which stated that results
of its entrance examinations would be used to qualify applicants
for scholarships in these countries.
September 4. (U) Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang's report
to the 12th Congress stressed both the threat to China by Soviet
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41
1982 (cont'd)
containment policies and China's desire to resume friendship
between the two peoples. A lengthy account based on official
Chinese press releases was reproduced in Soviet newspapers without
comment.
September 14. (U) Agreement on delivery of printed matter
signed in Beijing. The Soviets simultaneously opened an
exhibition of Soviet books in the Chinese capitol.
September 26. (U) Brezhnev in a speech in Baku stressed the
importance of achieving normalization of relations with China and
the contribution such a change would make to strengthening peace
and stability in Asia and worldwide.
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STATE
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*
*
YOUR PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL
FOR WIDER DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT
UNITED
AMERICA
FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR
CITE
STATES
OF
(U) THE CHINESE ROLE IN THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
BUREAU Of
(C) Summary
INTELLIGENCE
China over the past two years has reoriented
its foreign policy. It has stressed its independ-
AND RESEARCH
ence of both the US and the USSR and has emphasized
its Third World credentials. Beijing has stated
its belief, moreover, that the 1980s will witness
the continued decline of the influence of the US
and the USSR over their allies and clients. It has
ASSESSMENTS
launched a foreign policy that is intended to take
advantage of this perceived weakening of both super-
powers in order to gain some freedom of maneuver
AND
between the US and the USSR.
RESEARCH
As part of this new foreign policy, Beijing
has resumed talks with the Soviets and has cooled
relations with the US. At the same time, however,
it has not sought equidistance between the two
superpowers because it has concluded that China's
interests are best served by continued close
association with the West. Despite its deep
dissatisfaction with certain US policies, there-
fore, China has elected to limit its freedom of
maneuver.
*
(C) China could revert to hostility toward
both the US and the USSR, although thus far it has
shown no inclination to do so. It is difficult to
see how the Chinese could move closer to the
Soviets under present circumstances; even Soviet
compromises on security issues would only ease, not
BY
overcome, Beijing's suspicions of the USSR.
Beijing's current problems with Moscow as well as
RW
NLRR
its perception of the political ramifications of
the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF) underscore Beijing's dilemma within the
NARA DATE 12/22/15
DECLASSIFIED
triangle.
SECRET
Declassify: OADR (multiple sources)
WARNING NOTICE
Report 646-AR
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
June 30, 1983
METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
us
- 2 -
(C) The Soviet Problem
China's main objectives in entering into talks with the USSR
have been to ease tensions, expand trade and exchanges, and probe
for Soviet willingness to compromise on the basic issues dividing
the two countries. Both its independent foreign policy and its
contacts with the Soviets are intended to gain China greater
leverage in the US-USSR-China triangle. But leverage is only one
means of serving China's broader interests and is not an end in
itself. Thus, Beijing has been unwilling to make unreciprocated
concessions to Moscow on basic issues or to give the false impres-
sion that the talks are making progress just to gain leverage with
the US. Apart from fearing that such dissembling might gain
Moscow more leverage with the US, China sees that its broader
interests could be undermined.
This view results from the seriousness with which China
regards its Soviet problem. China remains deeply suspicious of
Soviet motives and regards the USSR as the major threat to its
security. But this threat is seen by Beijing as primarily
political--i.e., China believes that the Soviets hope to use their
military and political presence along its periphery to intimidate
it and to deny China its rightful role in Asian affairs. Thus,
only if Moscow ceases such efforts at intimidation will Beijing
find it possible to improve relations. In short, leverage within
the triangle, from the Chinese perspective, must be tied to
Beijing's broader security concerns and should not be pursued in a
way that redounds to Moscow's advantage.
Managing the Problem
(C) Beijing believes that the USSR is currently constrained
by problems at home and abroad and is unlikely in the near future
to mount a direct military threat to China. Thus, China has
entered into talks with the Soviets to ameliorate tensions and in
the long term to attempt to improve relations. But Beijing's pri-
mary purpose has not been to gain leverage within the triangle or
to discomfit the US. Rather, its broader intention is to secure
China's interests within the triangle by easing the Soviet threat.
(S/NF/NC/OC) Nevertheless, China continues to be highly
skeptical of Soviet good faith in undertaking talks; in recent
weeks the Chinese have been increasingly outspoken about their
differences with the USSR. Premier Zhao Ziyang told a foreign
leader in April that it would be meaningless to continue the dia-
logue with the Soviets without a solution to the major issues.
General Secretary Hu Yaobang claimed in a recent interview that
some 200 Soviet spies had been arrested last year and that the two
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- 3 -
countries could conceivably go to war over Indochina. Such state-
ments reflect the depth of Beijing's concern over Soviet behavior
and are particularly striking in that they tend to deny China the
leverage that it could gain from the appearance of successful
talks with the USSR.
(C) Arms Control Talks
Soviet-US arms talks also demonstrate Beijing's difficulty in
maneuvering between the superpowers. China is not a participant
in these talks and in the past has depicted them as a sham and a
plot by the superpowers to assure their domination over the rest
of the world. But China realizes that its interests can be
directly affected by the outcome of such talks. Long fearful that
the US and the USSR would conclude arms control agreements that
disregarded its interests, China currently is concerned over the
prospects for an INF agreement that would allow the USSR to move
SS-20s freely to Asia.
Because China already faces an overwhelming Soviet nuclear
force, the military implications of such an agreement are not its
main concern. Rather, it fears that the world would see the
agreement as having been concluded without regard for China's
interests, thus further demonstrating Beijing's political weakness
within the triangle. Clearly hoping to block an INF agreement of
this nature, China has joined Japan in voicing concern that the
current talks in Geneva could lead, in the words of a recent
Chinese commentary, to "selling out the security interests of a
third country."
(C) Pursuit of Independence
Despite Beijing's rhetoric, China's foreign policy will be
based on a pragmatic judgment that Chinese interests are best
served by resisting Soviet threats, maintaining regional stabil-
ity, and modernizing through association with the West. Thus,
while Beijing has adopted policies to enhance China's independence
within the triangle, this independence is restricted by Beijing's
own choices and by its definition of Chinese national interests.
While highly abrasive to the US at times, China's foreign policy
will continue on balance to be favorable to US interests.
Prepared by John P. Sontag
632-2574
Approved by Wever Gim
632-1338
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49
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 01 OF 04
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CSN: HCE669
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
NLRR F06 -114/10 #11442
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0000
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INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
BY Gs NARA DATE 1/2/06
D
ECRE T STATE 338650
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EXDIS
E.O. 12356:
DECL: OADR
TAGS:
PREL CH UR
SUBJECT:
CHINESE EMBASSY ON 3RD ROUND OF SINO-SOVTET
NORMALIZATION TALKS
REF: BEIJING 18036
E
X
1.
(S) ENTIRE TEXT)
D
I
2. SUMMARY. IN "PERSONAL, UNOFFICIAL 4RIEFING"
NOVEMBER 22, PRC EMBASSY SOVIET SPECIALIST-RAN THROUGH
S
RESULTS OF OCTOBER ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZTION
TALKS. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, CHINESE ACCEPTED-SOVIET
PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF TIES IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WITH
IMPLEMENTATION GENERALLY dependent ON SUBSEQUENT
AGREEMENT ON SPECTFIC POSSIBILITIES. ON MULTILATERL
ISSUES, CHINESE PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS, FORMALLY FOR FIRST TIME IN THESE TALKS, ON
E
AFGHANISTAN, KAMPUCHEA AND MILITARY FORCES ON CHINESE
X
BORDERS WITH USSR AND MONGOLIA. SOVIETS-GENERALLY
REFUSED TO DISCUSS "THREE OBSTACLES" SERIOUSLY, BUT
D
SOVIET NEGOTIATOR IL' ICHEV DID PROPOSE ESTABLISHING
GROUP TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES ON BORDER
I
ISSUES; CHINESE TURNED IT DOUN, BUT PROPOSALS REMAIN ON
TABLEFOR NEXT ROUND IN MARCH 1984. DEPTOFF NOTED H
S
SOME CHINESE PROPOSALS, INCLUDING ELIMINATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BORDER REGIONS WHICH IN CHINESE VIEW
INCLUDES SS-20'S, CALL FORMALLY FOR RECIPROCAL ACTION
AND THUS POINT TOWARD NEGOTIATION. PRC EMBOFF SAID
CHINESE DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THESE 'CONSULTATIONS" AND
NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL
DECISION IF SOVIETS ACCEPTED DISCUSSION OF CHINESE
PROPOSALS. DEPTOFF ALSO POINTED OUT THAT UNLIKE U.S.
CHINESE ACCEPT CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN
MULTILATERAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL ISSUES WHERE PROGRESS
IS POSSIBLE EVEN WITHOUT PROGRESS ON "THREE
OBSTACLES. PRC EMBOFF ACCEPTED DISTINCTION BUT SAID
IT HAD LITTLE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SINCE PROGRESS ON
BILATERAL ISSUES WILL IN FACT BE LIMITED UNLESS THERE
IS PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES. END SUMMARY.
3. PRC EMBASSY SOVIET SPECIALIST 1ST SECRETARY HOU
SECRET
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 8650
DTG: 292249Z NOV 83 PSN: 054498
ZHITONG CALLED NOVEMBER 22 AT HIS REQUEST ON EUR/SOV
DIRECTOR SIMONS TO PROVIDE 'PERSONAL, UNOFFICIAL"
READOUT ON 3RD ROUND OF SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION TALKS
E
IN OCTOBER. BRIEFING MAY PROVIDE USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO
X
PREVIOUS REPORTING, BUT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY HELD IN
VIEW OF HOU'S INSISTENCE ON UNOFFICIAL CHARACTER, TO
D
PROTECT HIM.
4. HOU CHARACTERIZED THE DISCUSSIONS AS CALM AND
S
FRANK, BUT SAID THE RESULTS HAD been DIFFERENT ON
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND BILTERAL ISSUES.
5. ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES THERE HAD been ALMOST NO
PROGRESS. IN THIS AREA THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SOVIET
PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. FOR INSTANCE, THE SOVIETS HAD
E
PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED PUBLICLY-ANNOUNCED BILATERAL
CONSULTATIONS ON U.S. -KOREAN EXERCISES IN SOUTH KOREA
X
AND ON THE DANGERS OF JAPANESE MILITARISM. IN EARLY
JULY GROMYKO HAD SENT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN BEIJING
D
IN TO PROPOSE THAT CHINA JOIN OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
IN A PUBLIC APPEAL CONCERNING THE DANGERS OF
IMPERILISM. THE CHINESE HAD REPLIED JULY 26 IN
S
BEIJING THAT THEY ALREADY APPRECIATED THESE DANGERS;
THAT THE BASIC DANGER WAS THE HEGEMONISM OF THE USSR
AND THE U.S., AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO COMMON
STRUGGLE WITH THE SOVIET UNION so LONG AS THE SOVIET
UNION ITSELF THREATENED CHINA; AND THAT CHINA ALWAYS
FIGHTS IMPERIALISM ANYWAY.
6. IN THE THIRD ROUND IN OCTOBER THE SOVIETS HAD
REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE THREE OBSTACLES ON THE GROUND
X
THAT THEY AFFECTED THIRD COUNTRIES, AND DEPUTY MINISTER
D
CHEN HAD TOLD THEM THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO IF THEY
WISHED SUBSTANTIAL NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH
CHINA.
S
7. IN THE BILATERAL AREA, THERE HAD BEEN EXCHANGES ON
THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:
(1) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED TO DOUBLE BILATERAL
TRADE. THE CHINESE HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE, WITH
IMPLEMENTATION CONTINGENT ON agreement CONCERNING
E
SPECIFIC PRODUCTS.
X
(2) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED PUTTING TRADE ON A
D
LONG-TERM CONTRACTUAL BASIS, I.E. A LONG-TERM TRADE
agreement. THE CHINESE HAD TURNED THIS DOWN.
(3) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED A LONG-TERM AGREEMENT
S
ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION, AND PROPOSED TO SEND ARKHIPOV
TO BEIJING TO BEGIN NEGOTIATING IT. THE CHINESE HAD
NOT ACCEPTED.
(4) DURING KAPITSA'. S VISIT IN september, THE SOVTETS
HAD PROPOSED TO REEQUIP OLD FACTORIES THAT THEY HAD
BUILT. THE CHINESE HAD AGREED IN OCTOBER TO EXPERTMENT
WITH REEQUIPMENT OF TWO SUCH FACTORIES, TO SEE HOW IT
MIGHT WORK.
(5) THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED TO INCREASE EXCHANGES
IN TEN AREAS, INCLUDING CULTURE, SPORT, TECHNOLOGY AND
CIVIL AVIATION. THE CHINESE HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO
A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT IN SUCH AREAS, BUT NOT TO ANY
CONCRETE MEASURES. THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED, LAST
MARCH, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS STUDYING IN
THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND THAT NUMBER HAD INCREASED
SLIGHTLY SINCE THEN.
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PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 8650
DTG: 292249Z NOV 83 PSN: 054498
8. IN THE INTERNATIONAL AREA, THE CHINESE HAD MADE
E
THREE PROPOSALS. SOME ELEMENTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND
X
EVEN PUBLICIZED BEFORE; FOR INSTANCE, MAO ZSEDONG HAD
VOICED THE CHINESE DEMAND THAT soviet TROOPS OPPOSITE
D
CHINA BE REDUCED TO 1964 LEVELS. BUT AS CHINESE
PROPOSALS IN THIS FORUM THEY WERE NEW. THEY WERE:
S
-- (1) FOUR POINTS ON AFGHANISTAN, BASED ON THE UN
RESOLUTION. THE FIRST THREE COVERED SOVIET WITHDRAWAL,
NON-INTERFERENCE AND THE RETURN OF REFUGEES. IF THE
SOVIETS BEGAN FULFILLMENT OF THESE THREE, THE CHINESE
WOULD CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
GUARANTEES.
E
-- (2) ON KAMPUCHEA, THE CHINESE DEMANDED AGREEMENT TO
X
THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS, AND, SPECIFICALLY, VIETNAMESE
COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. IF VIETNAM COMMITTED
D
ITSELF TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND ACTUALLY BEGAN
WTTHDRAWING ITS MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE CHINESE WOULD
AGREE TO JOIN TALKS AMONG THE DIRECTLY INTERESTED
S
PARTIES ON A FINAL, COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.
-- (3) ON THE BORDER, THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED A NUMBER
OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, AND THE CHINESE HAD
PROPOSED A LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES BY:
E
--- A) WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCES FROM
MONGOLIA;
X
D
0) NO MILITARY EXERCISES IN THE BORDER REGIONS (NOT
GEOGRAPHICALLY DEFINED);
C) REDUCTION IN SOVIET TROOP LEVELS TO THOSE OF
S
1964, BEFORE brezhnev;
--- D) NO OFFENSIVE FORCES PERMANENTLY IN THE BORDER
REGIONS; AND
E) ELIMINATION AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN THE BORDER REGIONS. SS-205 WERE NOT SPECIFIED, BUT
E
FROM THE CHINESE POINT OF VIEW ARE CLEARLY INCLUDED.
X
D
9. SOVIET DELEGATION CHIEF IL'ICHEV (UHOM HOU
CHARACTERIZED AS 'VERY.CLEVER AND CUNNING" ON THE BASIS
OF HIS OWN LONG SERVICE ON THE BORDER TALKS) HAD IN
TURN PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY GROUP TO
S
CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH SIDES. THE CHINESE HAD
REFUSED. DESPITE THIS TURNDOWN, THE PROPOSALS OF BOTH
SIDES REMAIN ON THE TABLE.
10. DURING HIS SEPTEMBER VISIT, KAPITSA HAD INVITED
CHEN TO VISIT MOSCOW FOR DISCUSSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES, AND CHEN HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT NO DATE
HAD BEEN SET. DURING THE OCTOBER 3RD ROUND, IL'TCHEV
HAD PROPOSED THAT THE FOURTH ROUND CONVENE IN MARCH IN
MOSCOW, AND THIS THE CHINESE HAD ACCEPTED.
11. SIMONS THANKED HOU FOR THE BRIEFING, AND COMMENTED
THAT THE CHINESE PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE BORDER WERE
OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO HIM. DURING LAST MONTH'S
TALKS IN BEIJING (REFTEL), THE U.S. GROUP HAD ASKED HOW
THE CHINESE PLANNED TO HANDLE THE SS-20 ISSUE WITHIN
SECRET
SECRET
52
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER
PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 865Ø
DTG: 292249Z NOV 83 PSN: 054498
THE STRUCTURE OF THEIR NORMALIZATION TALKS WITH THE
SOVIETS. THE REPLY HAD BEEN THAT THE CHINESE HAD ADDED
THE SS-20'S UNDER THE RUBRIC OF THE OBSTACLE CONCERNING
E
THE SOVIET MILTTARY BUILDUP ON THE SINO-SOVTET BORDER
X
AND IN MONGOLIA. CONSEQUENTLY, SIMONS SAID, HE HAD
ØEEN PROCEEDING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS MEANT THE
D
CHINESE DID NOT CONSIDER THE SS-20' AS A TOPIC FOR
BILATERAL NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT RATHER TN
THE CATEGORY OF THINGS THE SOVIETS HAD TO DO IF THERE
WAS TO BE FULL OR SUBSTANTIAL NORMALIZATION OF
S
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. IF HE UNDERSTOOD HOU'S
PRESENTATION CORRECTLY, HOWEVER, THE FIVE CHINESE
PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE BORDER INCLUDED TWO ITEMS
REQUIRING UNILATERAL SOVIET ACTION ; ITHDRAWAL FROM
MONGOLIA AND REDUCTION OF TROOP LEVELS TO 1964 LEVELS)
AND THREE THAT CALLED FOR ACTION OY BOTH SIDES, AT
E
LEAST FORMALLY (NO EXERCISES, NO OFFENSIVE FORCES
PERMANENTLY, AND ELTMINATION AND DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR
X
WEAPONS). HOU HAD SAID THAT IN THE CHINESE VIEW THE-
LATTER INCLUDED THE SS-20'S. HE ASKED HOU' S VIFWS ON
D
UHAT THE CHINESE WOULD DO IF THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THIS
CHTNESE PROPOSAL. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT CHINA MIGHT
FIND ITSELF IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON
S
SS-20 S, OR VERY CLOSE TO IT.
1,. HOU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE QUESTTON, BUT HAD TWO
COMMENTS. FIRST, THE RECIPROCAL CHARACTER OF THIS
PROPOSAL WAS IN FACT "ONLY" FORMAL. SECOND, THE
CHINESE MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE TALKS AND
NEGOTIATTONS. THESE TALKS ARE CO4SULTATIONS. IF THE
E
SOVIETS INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ONE OR MORE OF
THE CHINESE PROPOSALS, THERE WOULD BE A SUBSEQUENT-
X
POLITICAL DECISION AS TO WHETHER TO ENTER INTO ACTUAL
D
NEGOTIATION CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION. BUT, HE
ADMITTED, THE LINE BETWEEN CONSULTATIONS AND
NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT BE THAT CLEAR TO OUTSIDERS.
S
13. SIMONS ALSO NOTED THAT THE CHINESE AND U.S.
APPROACHES have MUCH IN COMMON, BUT DIFFER IN ONE
RESPECT CONCEPTUALLY: CHINA MAKES A RADICAL
DISTINCTION BETWEEN BILATERAL ISSUES AND MULTILATERAL
ISSUES IN TERMS OF VALUE AND WEIGHT, WHEREAS THE U.S.
DOESNOT. FOR THE U.S., CONCERNS ON ALL ISSUES ARE
E
EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS INDICATIONS OF OUR GENERAL PROBLEM
X
IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WHEREAS THE CHINESE
D
ADMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON
BILATERAL ISSUES even WITHOUT PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL
I
ISSUES. HO SAID THE DISTINCTION WAS VALID, BUT NOT
S
TERRIBLY SIGNIFICANT IN PRACTICAL TERMS, SINCE ABSENT
PROGRESS ON THE THREE OBSTACLES THERE WILL IN FACT BE
ONLY LIMITED PROGRESS ON BILATERAL ISSUES AS WELL. SHULTZ
BT
NN
SECRET
sino-sov,
-
SOV ,
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PD
COPY IS PROVIDED FOR
TO APPROVAL
DEPARTMENT
OF
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OH
STATE
CITE
53
*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(ii)
SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA1
BUREAU OF
Summary
INTELLIGENCE
Soviet scholarly writings on contemporary China
have been largely neglected in the West. But recent
AND RESEARCH
research on this material not only has cast new
light on Soviet perceptions of China but also has
exposed differing views about socialism in general
among groups of academic specialists in the USSR.
A survey of available Soviet academic output
ASSESSMENTS
over the last 14 years (1968-82) reveals diverse
views on Chinese developments grouped around ortho-
AND
dox and pragmatic interpretations of socialism.
Part of this dichotomy in the outlook on China may
RESEARCH
be due to the organizational structure of the Soviet
community of China watchers.
Orthodox viewers were dominant throughout the
period; but dissenters never fell silent, though
their opposition always was muted. Moreover, the
two camps existed rather isolated from each other,
published their findings separately, and rarely
referred to each other's output.
The issue which seems to have agitated both
groups most is what went wrong with Chinese social-
ism. It is here where possible allusions to the
1/ The principal findings in this paper are based
on a monograph of the same title by Gilbert
Rozman, Princeton University. Rozman's work
NLRR Fub 114/10 #11447
was commissioned by the National Council for
DECLASSIFIED
BY DATE NARADATE 1/2/08
Soviet and East European Research, which is
supported by funds from the Departments of
Defense and State, the Arms Control and Disarm-
ament Agency, and the Central Intelligence
Agency. The views expressed in this paper
are not necessarily those of the US Government.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Decontrol: 3/31/84
Report 750-AR
January 4, 1984
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
54
- ii -
Soviet experience loom largest. The mainstream Soviet experts
seem to strive to divert any comparison between de-Stalinization
and de-Maoization by placing all blame for the deformation of
Chinese socialism on the resurgence of rightist tendencies. In
contrast, the pragmatic scholars see the greatest danger in the
drive for recentralization of control in the state rather than in
the burgeoning power of such social and political forces as peas-
ants, intellectuals, and traditional associations.
What, if any, influence these differing expert views on China
have on Soviet decisionmakers is less clear. Given the normally
tight rein on Soviet academic research, however, this prolonged
scholarly dispute concerning Chinese contemporary developments
suggests a link with possible disagreement among Soviet leaders on
that issue as well as on broader questions affecting the future of
socialism. There is good reason, therefore, for continued moni-
toring of this literature for clues about Soviet elite thinking on
China and socialism in general.
******
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55
Organizational Structure
Soviet specialists' differing interpretations of China need
to be seen in the context of the actual course of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. For the bulk of the more than two decades since the onset
of the Sino-Soviet discord, hardliners have dominated Soviet China
watchers. When the short-lived Institute of Chinese Studies closed
its doors in the early 1960s, there followed a hiatus of 5-6 years
during which Soviet leaders seem to have debated what to do with
the field of Chinese studies. Contemporary work on China lagged
as some scholars concentrated on working on pre-revolutionary
China and others moved to institutes where China was of peripheral
interest. Nevertheless, these individuals did not abandon Chinese
studies altogether and seem to have provided the impetus later for
a more pragmatic approach to Chinese politics.
The main strain of China watchers came into existence in the
late 1960s. This group was composed largely of newly trained
people affiliated with the Institute of the Far East directed by
M. I. Sladkovski. But in the allocation of responsibilities,
leadership in the China field was largely in the hands of
O. B. Rakhmanin, S. L. Tikhvinsky, and M. S. Kapitsa. This power-
ful trio helped set the hardline orientation for Chinese studies
which has remained dominant to this day.
Work from this group soon began to appear in authoritative
newspapers and journals. In the early 1970s, the Institute of the
Far East began to publish a yearbook on China and a journal titled
Far Eastern Affairs. Later the Institute, tightly controlled by
these three men, also trained and graduated about 10 specialists
annually in Chinese studies. These scholars were expected to carry
on a hardline orientation emphasizing the negative in Chinese
affairs, regardless of developments in China.
Against this chorus of criticism of China, a more nuanced
analysis of Chinese politics was barely audible through the 1970s.
It gained greater strength after Mao's death and again in the wake
of the partial rapprochement between the two communist giants in
1981-82. This view on China, however, came from institutes not
specifically devoted to Chinese studies. Notable have been the
Institute of Oriental Studies where L. P. Deliusin is chief of
Chinese studies; the Institute of the International Workers' Move-
ment--V. G. Gel'bras, section chief; the Moscow State Institute of
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56
- 2 -
International Relations--A. V. Meliksetov, head of Chinese studies;
and the Institute of the USA and Canada--V. P. Lukin, section
chief. Outside academia, such well-known political observers as
Alexander Bovin and F. M. Burlatsky also have promoted a new look
at China.
Muted Dissent
Established Soviet practice emphasizes unity of views, and
efforts are constantly being made to mute differences in the field
of Chinese studies. The fact that dissenters from the hardline
view are scattered in many institutes, however, not only affords
them protection but also avoids the impression of a concerted
attack on what is still the dominant orientation.
Still, the question remains how these mavericks have managed
to operate when their powerful opponents obviously would have
liked to silence them. One can only speculate as to who supports
them further up the line, but it would appear that they enjoy some
protection from their respective institutes, the Academy of
Science Administrators, and other high officials. In some
instances specific linkages can be established; e. g., Gel'bras
and A. M. Rumiantsev, a member of the Academy of Sciences; and
Burlatsky and G. A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA
and Canada.
The head of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Deliusin, was
associated with Andropov before the latter became head of the
KGB. Whether this connection offered Deliusin a protective mantle
cannot be stated with certainty. However, he has come to be
regarded as one of the foremost China experts and his annual
conferences on China have attracted large contingents of experts
from all over the world. What is more, Deliusin's personal ties
to a number of the more pragmatic scholars on China have made him
the unofficial spokesman of an academic camp known for its nuanced
interpretation of contemporary Chinese developments.
Socialism Under Scrutiny
One of the key issues threading itself through the work of
many Soviet China watchers is the nature of the class struggle and
its effect on the deformation of Chinese socialism; here can be
found the most visible clues in the approach of the pragmatic group
regarding possible similarities between Stalinism and Maoism.
While there is never any direct reference to deviations from
socialism in the Soviet Union similar to Mao's, the careful reader
clearly is made aware of them.
The conservative school of thought, on the other hand,
stresses dissimilarities. The Chinese, though fulfilling many of
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- 3 -
the requisite conditions for a transition to socialism in 1949,
forfeited their opportunity principally because of the wrongheaded
leadership of the Communist Party. Failure to understand Marxism-
Leninism, lack of background and experience, and insufficient con-
trol over bourgeois and petty-bourgeois influences caused the
Chinese leaders to adopt incorrect policies. In short, insuffi-
cient ideological education and political control were decisive in
dooming the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party.
In spite of this emphasis on the dissimilar, Soviet conserva-
tive writers also condemn the Chinese system for excesses reminis-
cent of the Stalinist era. The brutal nature of collectivization
is cited, as is the lack of consumer goods and housing construc-
tion, the tragic consequences of the personality cult, and the
existence of forced labor. Lest the comparison become too inescap-
able, these writers take refuge in Lenin as the proper point of
reference and suggest that Chinese transgressions were consider-
ably worse than those under Stalin even though the latter are not
acknowledged specifically.
Consistent with their depreciation of Chinese developments in
the post-Mao period, the hardliners argue that Maoism continues in
China without Mao. They see rightist tendencies and anarchy and
depict China as constantly moving further from socialism.
A rather different tack is taken by the more pragmatic Soviet
writers. Obviously, their way of drawing parallels between defor-
mities in China under Mao and in the Soviet system is indirect and
found only in widely scattered publications. The shift in empha-
sis, however, is unmistakable. While the conservatives attribute
the failures of the Mao leadership to its inability to overcome
the influence of Chinese history and culture, the pragmatists see
insufficient awareness of that past as a major stumbling bloc in
developing a proper socialist China. This context provides the
background for sharply opposed conclusions regarding the primary
source of the serious problems plaguing today's China.
China Really Means the Soviet Union
Four key issues affecting contemporary China, but not it
alone, provide the basis for these contrasting assessments: the
place of expert knowledge in society, the extent of popular partic-
ipation in decisionmaking, the importance of material well-being
of the population, and the extent of legal checks on the power of
officials.
Regarding experts--i.e., intellectuals--Soviet pragmatists
argue that their abuse harmed the building of Chinese socialism.
By defending the need for critical and independent judgment in the
policy process, the pragmatists seem to enshrine the primacy of
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4
expertness over ideological orthodoxy. Soviet hardliners, however,
oppose such championing of intellectuals and warn of the group's
continued bourgeois influence. Rather than trusting intellectuals,
they see in the failure to reeducate them after the revolution both
the error of Mao's way and a continuing threat to the future of
Chinese socialism.
This reaffirmation by Soviet hardliners of the commanding
role of politics emerges most strongly in their appreciation of
the role of officials and the party in China. China's problems,
they aver, can be met best by centralization and discipline. A
more tightly run Communist Party and the elimination of the last
vestiges of influence of the national bourgeoisie seem necessary
elements for redressing China's flawed socialism. Opponents of
the hardliners, on the other hand, speak of the need for eradicat-
ing the privileged position of the ruling stratum as essential for
the de-Maoization of Chinese society. Such criticism is advanced
with caution, but is reflected in the call for a new breed of
officials, better educated and more accessible to experts as well
as more humane in methods of governance.
This recognition of the value of intellectuals also extends
to other social classes in China. It entrusts older, qualified,
and experienced workers and peasants with greater responsibility
and sides with experts in the perennial debate between "red" and
"expert." A corollary of this view is the acceptance of greater
worker participation in the decisionmaking process and awareness
of the need for more effective representation of worker interests.
The implicit accession to the demand for a certain diffusion of
power also clashes with the hardline perspective of continued
centralization and tighter discipline.
Soviet scholars disagree on the importance of the question of
improving the material well-being of the Chinese population. For
the pragmatists the system's success is most likely to be effected
by encouraging production through material incentives. Moreover,
peasants who prosper as the result of hard work deserve praise,
suggesting the virtue of a concessionary attitude on the part of
the regime toward the people's desire for an expanded private sec-
tor. In contrast, the conservative Soviet view is guarded about
the advantage of emphasizing material awards, seeing in it a threat
to central planning and party control over the economy which ulti-
mately would turn China to the right.
In the area of legal procedures, Soviet analysts again occupy
contrasting positions in their evaluations of individual rights
and obligations to the state. Although neither group is optimis-
tic about early positive changes in the post-Mao period, the prag-
matists derive some hope from the ostensibly more relaxed current
official position toward intellectuals and the recognition of the
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need for material incentives. The conservatives, not surprisingly,
see danger in bourgeois forms of reward and deem improvement possi-
ble only by a redirection of Chinese foreign policy and greater
reliance on control emanating from the Chinese Communist Party.
Their view of progress in China seems almost to boil down to a
formula which tends to equate the health of China's society with
the extent of its fealty to the Soviet Union.
Sectarians Versus Pragmatists: The Old Debate
However indirect, the essential concern reflected in these
views is the impact of certain institutional processes on the
socialist systems in both the Soviet Union and China. In this
general sense, the debate keeps alive the longtime argument
between Soviet conservatives and pragmatists. The former always
see the threat to the system as coming from internal and external
bourgeois influence, which must be combatted by strengthened
controls and greater discipline. The pragmatists regard the
stifling role of the state as the principal obstacle to the sur-
vival of socialism which can be overcome only by relaxed controls
and greater involvement of the individual in the decisionmaking
process.
Prepared by Eric Willenz
632-2225
Approved by E. Raymond Platig
632-1342
SINO-SOVIET
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 07/4/10 #1143
2/21/84
60
CONFIDENTIAL
BY Cis NARA DATE 1/2/08
- 2 -
2. MOSCOW CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT SINO SOVIET TALKS
Moscow appears to be encouraged by the relatively favorable
atmosphere surrounding the scheduled resumption of Sino-Soviet
consultations in early March in Moscow. Although the Soviets
recognize the limits to rapprochement created by Beijing's
"three obstacles" to normalization, they are aiming at a long-
term process of engaging Beijing in a range of consultations and
agreements.
*
*
*
The March round will take place against the background of
progress in trade negotiations and Beijing's gesture of sending
a senior associate of Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier Wan Li, to
Andropov's funeral. Beijing has also agreed to invite Deputy
Premier Arkhipov, an economic specialist with diplomatic exper-
ience in China, to Beijing for economic discussions, probably
in May.
Soviet officials have expressed satisfaction that Zhao
Ziyang resisted alleged pressure during his US visit to join in
a "strategic relationship" with the US, but the Soviet press has
complained that Zhao proposed closer Sino-US cooperation in
Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The Soviets are, no doubt concerned
that President Reagan's trip to China, coming after the Moscow
talks, will again highlight these aspects of Chinese foreign
policy. But above all, the Soviets understand that major prog-
ress at the Sino-Soviet talks is unlikely because of Beijing's
long-standing insistance on at least a partial resolution of the
"three obstacles" (Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and border issues).
Although Moscow has refused to discuss matters pertaining
to "third countries," Soviet officials have implied that mili-
tary dispositions near the China border might be negotiable, if
approached by Beijing on a "reciprocal" basis. Moscow insists
that Mongolian aspects of the border be discussed with Mongolia,
but says it would not object to tripartite discussions. The
Chinese, for their part, have been playing up to the Mongolians,
in effect suggesting that they do not need Soviet troops on
their soil.
Even if the consultations fail to deal with China's secur-
ity concerns, Moscow is likely again to raise proposals similar
to those it has now tabled at the CDE in Stockholm. These
include military confidence-building measures of a kind that
Beijing has previously rejected as inadequate. Moscow probably
hopes that atmospheric improvements and possible agreements on
minor issues will eventually persuade Beijing to agree on a
declaratory instrument, such as the nonaggression pact that the
Soviets have unsuccessfully advocated for over a decade.
FILE
sino-
It
CONFIDENTIAL (entire text) sov. PD
61
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OF
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*
*
UNITED
AMERICA
(U) CHINA'S VIEW OF THE US AND THE USSR
STATES
OF
Summary
BUREAU OF
China has adjusted its posture in the US-USSR-
China triangle over the past three years, disclaim-
INTELLIGENCE
ing a community of strategic interests with the
US. Most recently, China has declared that Soviet
AND RESEARCH
power and US power are now more or less in balance,
and Beijing has substantially improved its own
nonpolitical ties with Moscow. Despite these
changes, China's world view appears basically unal-
tered, and what has emerged in Chinese-US-Soviet
relations is by no means an equilateral triangle.
ASSESSMENTS
China wants the benefits without the appear-
AND
ance of a close relationship with the US. In return,
the Chinese are prepared to affirm by word and deed a
relationship that is friendly but nonallied. Such a
RESEARCH
relationship in Chinese eyes has to include a work-
able understanding on the issue of Taiwan. Notably,
in contrast to "the three issues / dividing Beijing
and Moscow, the Chinese portray Taiwan as a problem
on which a Sino-American modus vivendi already has
been reached; the question in their view is whether
the US will fulfill its commitment.
China also accepts that the relationship will
include sharp disagreement over some international
issues of importance to the US and avoidance of the
appearance of joining forces to oppose the Soviets.
In short, China will seek a high degree of coopera-
tion with the US but also will want respect as an
autarkic, socialist, and developing world power.
As this sort of relationship develops, the contra-
diction between China's rhetoric and its Realpolitik
policies will continue and perhaps even increase.
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/10 #11444
******
BY 1/2/08
1/ The three issues are the Soviet military pos-
ture along the Soviet-Chinese border and Soviet
involvement in Kampuchea and Afghanistan.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR (Bellocchi, N.)
Report 807-AR
March 27, 1984
CONFIDENTIAL
62
View of the USSR
Although less fearful of an immediate Soviet attack, Beijing
is quite aware of the continuing growth of Soviet forces around
China's periphery. This growth probably has been a major factor
in moving China to reduce tensions with the Soviets and to adjust
its public position in triangular politics; but it also has con-
firmed China's longstanding strategic perceptions as well as the
current value it places on consolidating relations with the US.
China's fundamental differences with the USSR, however, do
not appear to have diminished, and they are no less severe,
although less numerous, than US-Soviet conflicts of interest.
China in effect has established a normal adversarial relationship
with the USSR that is somewhat similar to the mix of confronta-
tion, negotiation, trade, and contact that characterizes US-Soviet
relations.
View of the US
Thus, even though China deliberately has separated itself
from identification with the US, strategic compatibility between
the two countries has not actually diminished. In fact, because
of the continued growth of the long-term Soviet threat, it prob-
ably has increased. The Chinese seem to recognize, now even more
than they did in 1980, that Western economic and technological
help is essential for their modernization.
At the same time, the gap between Chinese rhetoric and actual
strategic views and interests has widened. This gap had closed in
1979-81 when Beijing began to talk openly of a united front with
the US against Soviet hegemonism. Since 1981, the Chinese have
distanced themselves from the US, stressed their independent
foreign policy, and resumed their propaganda posture of attacking
both superpowers' "struggle for hegemony."
This shift resulted from a number of factors, but perhaps
most important were suspicion of the Reagan administration's
intentions regarding Taiwan and the perceived need by Beijing to
demonstrate both that it was not dependent on its proto-alliance
with the US and that it had a viable alternative to the united-
front strategy. Criticism of Deng's tilt toward the US began with
conservative elders in Beijing in 1981, but a consensus likely was
growing throughout the country: A more independent posture would
increase China's leverage with both superpowers; open and close
CONFIDENTIAL/ RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
CONFIDENTIAL
63
- 2 -
identity with the US was no longer necessary or desirable; and
China's diplomatic effectiveness was being eroded by the percep-
tion of an extreme anti-Sovietism in Chinese policy. The Reagan
administration's tough stand against the Soviets and its hard line
on some Third World issues also argued for putting more apparent
distance between China and the US.
Some New Shifts
President Reagan's scheduled April trip that will complete
this year's exchange of high-level state visits, China's strong
desire to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement and other
agreements with the US, and willingness at least to give the
impression of a budding military relationship with Washington
suggest that Chinese leaders have concluded that they, for the
time being, have burnished their independent image and maximized
their leverage in the strategic triangle. These developments also
suggest that a consensus in long-term US-Chinese security concerns
persists. Parallel US-Chinese interests and cooperation in such
vital areas as Korea, Indochina, and Afghanistan also reflect a
continuing Sino-American understanding about Asia, the main ele-
ment of which remains the maintenance of national stability and
the containment of Soviet power and influence.
The US decision to remove discriminatory restrictions on
technology transfers to China was a major factor in the improve-
ment of bilateral ties over the past year, convincing the Chinese
that the Reagan administration seeks a durable and long-term rela-
tionship. But two other Chinese calculations were equally or more
important. First, Beijing apparently has concluded that the
August 17, 1982, communique gives it the means to restrain US arms
sales to Taiwan by increasing the US stake in good bilateral rela-
tions with China. Second, Chinese officials keep hinting that
they do not expect that future talks with the Soviets will lessen
basic differences. Given the continuing Soviet buildup in the
region and the muted but ongoing potential for Sino-Vietnamese
conflict over Kampuchea, the Chinese well may believe that rela-
tions with the Soviets could worsen over the next few years.
Prepared by Jay Taylor
632-1338
Approved by Natale H. Bellocchi
632-2402
CONFIDENTIAL/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NSC-White HOUSE
CONFIDENTIAL (entire text)
sino /USSR
64
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purthar REPRODUCE. distimbuta on
UNITED
AMERICA
(U) USSR: NUANCES IN CHINA POLICY
STATES
OF
BUREAU OF
Summary
INTELLIGENCE
The continuity of Soviet China policy through
two recent successions points to a consensus con-
AND RESEARCH
cerning China among Soviet leaders, who would like
to reduce tensions and improve relations to the
extent possible without major concessions to
Beijing. Soviet officials differ, however, on the
prospects of Sino-Soviet relations and on such
questions as whether Deng Xiaoping is moving China
ASSESSMENTS
toward socialism or away from it.
AND
As the current Sino-Soviet consultations pro-
ceed and trade and other contacts expand, these
differences could translate into disputes about
RESEARCH
policy, especially about the wisdom of offering
more significant concessions to China than those
offered so far. One such potentially controversial
move would be the withdrawal of some Soviet mili-
tary units from Mongolia.
******
Orthodoxy of the "Old China Hands" -
China specialists in the CPSU Central Commit-
tee agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
NLRR DECLASSIFIED F06-14/10 #11445
the Institute of the Far East--the major specialized
BY NARADATE 1/2/08
academic organization--have been described as the
orthodox wing of Soviet China watchers. This group
includes veterans of the Sino-Soviet split who have
become bureaucratically cautious and who view China
as intrinsically anti-Soviet. They typically refer
to the Deng Xiaoping post-Mao reform program as
"Maoism without Mao."
Some US observers have discerned within this
group two subgroups: one of "pragmatists," princi-
pally in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
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Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)
Report 820-AR
April 16, 1984
65
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- 2 -
other of ultra-orthodox specialists principally in party organiza-
tions. The Foreign Ministry pragmatists include Deputy Foreign
Ministers Mikhail Kapitsa and Leonid Ilichev, as well as China
specialist Sergey Tikhvinskiy (now rector of the Diplomatic Aca-
demy), all of whom have played key roles in the Sino-Soviet consul-
tations and tend to emphasize the progress made in the last two
years in such practical areas as trade, technical assistance, and
exchanges.
The subgroup of party specialists, on the other hand, tends
to be more pessimistic. It includes such men as Oleg Rakhmanin,
deputy chief of the department responsible for liaison with ruling
communist parties, who has been a prolific writer about China
under various pseudonyms (e.g., Pravda's "I. Aleksandrov"), and
Ivan Kovalenko, a deputy chief of the party's International Depart-
ment responsible for Japan who also has an interest in China. The
subgroup of party specialists generally emphasizes that no basic
improvement in relations with China is possible as long as Beijing
persists in its "three demands": that Moscow withdraw its mili-
tary presence from Afghanistan and Mongolia and the Vietnamese do
the same in Kampuchea..
The views of the two subgroups are variously reflected in
policy statements. Gromyko's election address on February 27,
1984, for example, followed the cautiously optimistic Chinese
Foreign Ministry line. The address cited progress in Sino-Soviet
consultations with no mention of the "obstacles" raised by Beijing.
Four days later Chernenko stressed that the USSR would not negoti-
ate concerning the interests of third countries, a reference to
Beijing's three demands that presumably reflected the position of
the more conservative subgroup. In any case, the difference is
one of nuance and timing, and both views are encompassed within
Moscow's negotiating strategy.
Soviet military officials undoubtedly must be included among
the most orthodox of the establishment China watchers, although
their views are much less accessible to Western observers. The
Soviet Armed Forces for more than a. decade have been engaged in
augmenting and modernizing border defenses near China--an operation
which by now has acquired bureaucratic momentum and created vested
interests that will be difficult to budge. Furthermore, the Soviet
military is accustomed to working with worst-case scenarios: It
will continue to regard China and China's potential allies, the US
and Japan, as the putative enemy, regardless of diplomatic consid-
erations.
1/ See also INR Report 750-AR, "Soviet Perceptions of Contemporary
China," January 4, 1984, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE, Decontrol:
3/31/84.
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46
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- 3 -
Impact of Less. Orthodox Observers
The Soviet Union also has less orthodox China watchers,
however, whose views may in fact become more significant as
relations with Beijing develop. Some of these individuals are
academicians, such as political scientist Fedor Burlatskiy, who
are not primarily China specialists but have developed an interest
in China for various reasons. Some are China scholars, such as
L. P. Deliusin from the Institute of Oriental Studies, which
generally specializes in more conventional Sinology and avoids
contemporary China issues. The less orthodox commentators on
China also include such figures as the popular and influential
newspaper and television personality Aleksandr Bovin.
These observers have taken a particular interest in Deng
Xiaoping's post-Mao reform program, perhaps in some cases because of
the relevance of aspects of that program to the post-Stalin Soviet
Union. The academicians in this group have long argued that Soviet
Sinology itself needs reform, to get out of its ideological rut.
The group tends to take a more optimistic view of China, interpret-
ing Dengism as a return to socialism rather than a deviation and
therefore arguing that China eventually will return to the Soviet
model. Bovin has suggested in a television commentary that in the
current Sino-Soviet consultations, even some of China's conditions--
e.g., the question of military deployment near the border--might be
negotiable if approached on a "reciprocal" basis.
All of the viewpoints described--except possibly that Deng's
reforms might have applicability in the USSR--are part of Soviet
establishment thinking. Among the China watchers mentioned,
Burlatskiy has come the closest to stating that the problems of
ineffectiveness and demoralization that Deng Xiaoping is address-
ing are actually generic to autocratic societies; but even
Burlatskiy maintains a degree of ambiguity that prevents his writ-
ing from expressing overt dissidence. It thus has been possible
for formulations developed by the less orthodox China watchers to
be used by Soviet leaders, as Brezhnev did in Tashkent in 1979 when
he offered an olive branch to Beijing in the form of calling China
a "socialist" country. This has since become standard Soviet
nomenclature, bringing to an end a period of several years during
which China's "socialism" was debated by Soviet academics but
avoided by Soviet leaders.
Degrees of Influence in Policy
The not-surprising fact that there are nuances in Soviet
thinking about China does not affect present policy but may become
more significant if the trend toward Sino-Soviet rapprochement con-
tinues. Eventually Moscow may work out a negotiating strategy
that will try to accommodate Beijing's three "obstacles" without
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67
- 4 -
compromising overriding Soviet interests. In the same way, Beijing
may accept interpretations that amount to less than its full bill
of demands. Without some mutual accommodation, there can be only
a very limited rapprochement. But at the time of accommodation,
factionalism and policy differences could prove a seriously dis-
ruptive factor in Moscow as well as in Beijing.
It is conceivable that the Kremlin leadership at some point
in the process of consultation with Beijing will consider a dra-
matic gesture designed to elicit or respond to a corresponding
Chinese move. The Soviets could, for example, agree to move a
division from Mongolia back to the USSR without significantly
degrading Soviet border defenses. Remaining in Mongolia would be
four divisions as well as Mongolian forces that have been modern-
ized in recent years. Moreover, the division that would be with-
drawn could be reintroduced into Mongolia at any time. In any
case, Mongolia constitutes a significant buffer against Chinese
attack; it is virtually the only border area where the Soviets
could conduct a defense in depth. Kremlin consideration of a
token withdrawal from Mongolia nonetheless could become very con-
troversial.
Such action would be supported by the less orthodox China
specialists who would see it as useful encouragement of China's
post-Mao effort to strengthen socialism through reform. The pro-
posal might also be supported by Foreign Ministry pragmatists as a
constructive diplomatic move to encourage a meaningful response
from Beijing. But the orthodox China specialists are likely to be
bitterly opposed, arguing that such a gesture would be interpreted
as a sign of weakness and likely would only encourage Beijing in
its intrinsically anti-Soviet orientation. The most adamant
opposition might come from the military with its predilection for
worst-case scenarios. Clearly only a decisive Soviet leadership
could push such a proposal through its own policymaking apparatus.
Soviet moves regarding the consultations with Beijing so far
have been well within the scope of the consensus among various
groups of China specialists, however, and seem not yet to have
been controversial. Differences in formulations, expressions of
optimism or pessimism by various officials, and varying degrees of
observance of the moratorium on polemics still reflect tactical
moves rather than factionalism. But the potential for controversy
well may be one of the ingredients that have kept the Soviet stance
toward China relatively static, changing even less over time than
the Chinese position toward the USSR.
Prepared by Peter W. Colm
Approved by Martha C. Mautner
632-9212
632-9536
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USSR-CHINO
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BY Cil NARA DATE 1/2/08
68
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 8, 1984
1. USSR-PRC: ECONOMIC PROGRESS DESPITE POLITICAL DEADLOCK
Soviet First Deputy Premier Arkhipov will visit China for
ten days beginning May 10, leading the highest-level Soviet
economic delegation to visit the PRC since the 1950s. Progress
is expected on trade and other economic issues, but deadlocked
political issues will only be discussed in other forums during
the coming months.
*
*
*
The visit is purposely reminiscent of the 1950s, when
Arkhipov managed Soviet aid from its embassy in Beijing and
became the friend of PRC elder statesmen. It is expected that
discussions will be held on a long-term trade agreement and
establishment of a joint economic committee--measures that the
PRC has resisted in the past. Agreement may also be reached on
a previous Soviet offer to renovate three or four of the major
plants constructed with Soviet aid in the 1950s.
For Moscow, improvements in economic relations are seen as
steps toward the eventual improvement of overall relations.
Nevertheless, Moscow recognizes that it cannot match the West
in volume of trade and technology transfer. For Beijing, the
visit is an opportunity to gain more support for modernization,
since Soviet technology may be cheaper and more adaptable than
the state-of-the-art technology that Beijing is discussing with
Western suppliers. Arkhipov's visit will also allow the PRC to
receive a high-level Soviet delegation shortly after President
Reagan's departure, thus demonstrating the efficacy of its
"independent" foreign policy.
The political atmosphere for the visit is less than
optimal. Moscow has criticized as inadequate Beijing's efforts
during President Reagan's visit to maintain some distance from
US positions on strategic issues. It is concerned about
Chinese military action near the Vietnam border. And on the
eve of Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow it is trying to extract an
advantage from various issues relating to Korea. For Beijing,
there is also the constant irritant of Moscow's refusal to
negotiate the major strategic problems cited by Beijing as
barriers to better relations.
The Arkhipov visit is not likely to lead to a dramatic
breakthrough but will mark a continuing growth in Sino-Soviet
economic relations. Political issues will not be deferred for
long, however. PRC Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen is
reportedly going to Moscow toward the end of the month to
resume his talks with Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Kapitsa;
regular Sino-Soviet political consultations will resume in
October; and the two foreign ministers are scheduled to meet at
the UNGA in New York this fall, if not earlier.
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