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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
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File Folder
GORBACHEV SPEECHES 1985 3/3
FOIA
F06-114/7
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26
YARHI-MILO
2616
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9977 PAPER
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
/
3 June 1985
FB 85-10026
File:
Gorbacher
Special Memorandum
Malla
Gorbachev: Selected Statements on Domestic Affairs
FBIS
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CAS 7/18/02
2
This report is based exclusively on material carried in
foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without
coordination with other U.S. Government components.
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3
Contents
Economic Management
1
Encouragement of Innovation
1
Incentives and Cost Effectiveness
3
Decentralization
6
Technological Renovation
10
Agriculture
11
Collective Contracts
11
Private Plots
12
Agricultural Investment
14
Sociopolitical Issues
15
Public Participation
15
Separation of Party and State Functions
18
Cadres and Discipline
19
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[UASPI
h
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5
Gorbachev: Selected Statements on Domestic Affairs
Introduction
During his career as a national-level leader Mikhail Gorbachev has spoken out
publicly on a number of key domestic issues. On economic issues, his main
area of responsibility, he has stressed the need for greater reliance on material
incentives and other economic levers, criticized excessive central control, and
encouraged experimentation with new methods of management to increase
individual initiative and efficiency. Since becoming general secretary in
March, he has forcefully advocated changing the system of planning and
management.
This report provides a collection of Gorbachev statements on key domestic
issues, excerpted from his speeches and writings from the time of his
promotion to the CPSU Secretariat in 1978 to the April 1985 CPSU Central
Committee plenum. A separate collection of Gorbachev's comments on
international issues is being published as Special Memorandum FB 85-10025
of 30 May 1985, "Gorbachev: Selected Statements on International Affairs."
These publications are intended as companion reference volumes to FBIS
Analysis Report FB 85-10009 of 11 March 1985, "Gorbachev: A Political
Profile."
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Economic Management
Encouragement of Innovation
Gorbachev has frequently encouraged new approaches to solving economic
and sociopolitical problems, endorsing specific innovations and advocating
creative thinking. He expressed himself on this subject most forcefully at a
December 1984 ideology conference, three months before he became general
secretary.
Article in Kommunist, No. 14, September 1978
Today the whole country knows the Dynamo method, the Shchekino
experiment, and other remarkable initiatives. Like everything new and
progressive, their introduction involves a struggle against outmoded views
and traditions.¹
Article in Kommunist, No. 11, July 1980
In their organizational work it is now especially important for our leading
party and soviet cadres to rely on a wide party and production aktiv, to
skillfully use economic levers, and to creatively search for and make use
of everything new and advanced
The achievements of scientific-
technological progress, advanced experience, and also foreign practice
deserve the most intense study and introduction.
Lenin Day Speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (Pravda, 23 Apr 83)
We should everywhere use existing possibilities and reserves more fully,
introduce the achievements of scientific-technological progress more
energetically, and seek new approaches to management of production,
labor organization, and wages. On the initiative of workers themselves in
recent years such forms of progressive organization of labor activity and
material stimulation as the Shchekino method, the brigade form of labor
organization in industry and construction, and the collective contract in
agriculture have been introduced.
1 The Shchekino system, which pays workers for taking on additional responsibilities, is
controversial because it could result in layoffs for some workers and pressures on managers
and planners to run tighter, more efficient operations.
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Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (Pravda,
27 Mar 84)
We must give a more dynamic and purposeful character to economic
leadership, strengthen and multiply everything new and progressive,
comprehensively develop the creativeness and initiative of the masses, and
strengthen order, discipline, and good organization.
Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984, (Zhivoye Tvor-
chestvo Naroda, Moscow, 1984)
We need to constantly search for and promote fresh ideas and proposals,
and take active measures to implement them
Social scientists are still acting slowly and timidly in tackling the key the-
oretical problems of our development.
Responsible tasks face econom-
ic
science
In recent years many useful works have appeared. But
economic science has still not produced a detailed concept of ways to
change to a dynamic, highly effective economy and of creating an
improved economic mechanism. Not all research organizations are in
close touch with practical concerns. Some scholars sometimes cannot give
up outmoded ideas and stereotypes. Their theoretical findings often are
forced into preconceived schemes and are confined to the realm of
scholastic discussion.
Let us turn to such a basic and timely problem as the relationship of pre-
sent-day production forces and socialist production relations. In our
treatment of this we have far from fully overcome dogmatic ideas, which
sometimes do a disservice to our theory and practice
The present stage of development of Soviet society is characterized by
deep changes in the whole system of socialist production relations based
on qualitative improvements in production forces, which increase the
interaction and interpenetration of technical-economic, sociopolitical, and
spiritual-ideological factors. This makes it necessary to consider produc-
tion relations in close connection with forms of organization of labor and
production, management and planning, and the system of motivating
factors, and in the social context of people's activity in general
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I think that the slowing of economic growth at the end of the 1970's and
the beginning of the 1980's can be explained not only by the coming to-
gether of a number of unfavorable factors but also by the fact that the
need to change some aspects of production relations was not brought out
in time
If there is stagnant retention of outmoded elements of
production relations, a worsening of the economic and social situation can
occur.
Unfortunately, we do not always succeed in revealing and overcoming
growing contradictions in time. Often our efforts are hampered by the
force of inertia, conservative thinking, and the inability or unwillingness
to change established work forms and to change to new methods that
open the door to everything progressive and meet the needs of both today
and tomorrow
Science by its very nature always was the field for active competition of
ideas. Its development is unthinkable without debate, free, constructive,
creative exchange of opinions. Science is alien to expediency, temporiz-
ing, and also to excessive ambition and unwillingness to listen to the voice
of colleagues.
Incentives and Cost Effectiveness
To improve economic performance Gorbachev has stressed reliance on
material incentives and greater attention to cost effectiveness by managers
and workers.
Article in Kommunist, No. 11, July 1980
Even from specialists and leaders you cannot always get clear answers on
the return on expenditures, on what a centner of fertilizer, a cubic meter
of water, or an hour of worktime produces. Apparently some officials still
have no real taste for questions of economics.
Article in Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye, July 1981
Some leaders and specialists of kolkhozes and sovkhozes after the
changeover to guaranteed wages and centralized financing have in
essence forgotten to count money. When you talk with such officials on
the question of return on expenditures you often hear confused, contradic-
tory answers. As a result, financial accountability (khozraschet) is
3
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10
weakened. Now the attention of party organizations and economic leaders
should be concentrated on such decisive economic indicators as the rates
of growth of labor productivity, yield of fields and productiveness of
livestock farms, raising the quality of products, the return on expendi-
tures, and the effectiveness of use of resources, especially land, equip-
ment, fertilizer, and working time.
Speech to Yaroslavl plenum on food program, 16 June 1982 (Pravda, 17 Jun
82)
The assimilation of new methods of management is an important task.
Each kolkhoz and sovkhoz should now, figuratively speaking, earn the
money to cover its expenditures, produce more products and raise quality,
fight to lower its costs and economize on financial and material re-
sources
The additional funds allocated are not to cover mismanage-
ment and unskillful, thoughtless leadership, but are a powerful lever to
raise production and step up labor activity of agricultural workers. The
main form of material incentive should be rewards for achieving high end
results from work.
Article in Kommunist, No. 10, July 1982
It is important to clearly understand that raising purchase prices and
adoption of other measures to improve the economic mechanism are not
aimed at covering mismanagement in the work of kolkhozes and sovkhoz-
es. They are intended to strengthen the financial-economic position of
farms, create conditions for use of financial accountability methods, and
strengthen material incentives for labor collectives to raise the output of
agricultural products and efficiency
The time has passed when one could use bank credit without especially
worrying about repaying it. Now money for developing enterprises and
forming incentive funds must be earned. Now leaders, specialists, and all
agricultural workers must have deep understanding of questions of
economics and show initiative and enterprising spirit (predpriimchivost).
Article in Pravda, 10 February 1983
Under the new conditions, when the system of credit is becoming more
strict and financial discipline is rising, kolkhozes and sovkhozes will have
to base their expenditures on the income from sale of products and
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finance expanded production from their own funds. In other words, a
farm's economy must be built on the principles of financial accountabil-
ity, strict observance of economizing and thrift, and raising of the
effectiveness and quality of work.
Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (Pravda,
27 Mar 84)
Management depends more and more on economic levers to influence
production.
Some management organs and leading cadres still make
inadequate use of economic methods of management. They often ignore
such questions as the correlation between the growth of labor productivity
and the growth of wages, the return on investment, the use of funds, the
quality of products, and the role of these factors in strengthening the
economy. Some leaders and specialists fear financial accountability and
do not hurry to introduce it
Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (Zhivoye Tvor-
chestvo Naroda, Moscow, 1984)
We are obliged to look at things realistically. Attitudes toward labor at
the present stage are based not only on conscientiousness. Without
material interest, without precise calculation and nationwide checking on
the amount of labor and amount of consumption, without serious
accountability for one's assigned task, counting on a conscientious
attitude to labor by everyone would be simply utopian.
RSFSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Moscow, 20 February
1985 (Pravda, 21 Feb 85)
Raising the rates of scientific-technological progress is an insistent
demand of the time. But another thing is no less important-to use
effectively, in a thrifty way, everything that already is available. Life
shows that right now, using the same machine tools, the same equipment,
the identical land, one can produce more products, of better quality, and
with less expenditure
Huge reserves for developing our economy lie
here and they must be brought into operation.
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Decentralization
Gorbachev has argued that centralized ministerial controls must be reduced in
order to allow managers and workers to show more initiative. Since becoming
general secretary, he has spoken urgently about reorganizing economic
administration, both in industry and agriculture.
Article in Kommunist, No. 10, July 1982
Today this [Lenin's demand] means: orienting the system of management
toward final economic results, the optimal combination of territorial and
branch principles of administration, [combining] the advantages of cen-
tralization with independence and initiative for labor collectives, compre-
hensively strengthening economic methods of management, ending dupli-
cation in leadership, and the maximal encouragement of creative
initiative and enterprising spirit (predpriimchivost).
Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (Pravda, 23 Apr 83)
With his characteristic scholarly conviction and political passion, Lenin
consistently defended centralism as the foundation for organizing the
socialist economy, which represents a unified whole. And at the same
time he called for making room for creative work and local initiative.
Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (Zhivoye Tvor-
chestvo Naroda, Moscow, 1984)
As regards centralism, we also are for its development, which we
understand as raising the scientific operation and effectiveness of central-
ized leadership. This in no way means petty supervision and efforts to reg-
ulate everything from the center, rather the opposite. Skilled leadership
not only does not limit but on the contrary makes room for initiative for
people, labor collectives, and local organs.
Acceptance speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 11 March
1985 (Pravda, 12 Mar 85)
We must continue persistently to improve the economic mechanism and
the whole system of management.
This means unwavering implemen-
tation of planned development of the economy, strengthening socialist
ownership, expansion of the rights and raising of the independence and
responsibility of enterprises, and strengthening their interest in the final
results of work.
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Speech to conference of economic managers, Moscow, 8 April 1985 (Pravda,
12 Apr 85)
While strengthening centralized planning of the main directions [of the
economy], we propose to expand further the rights of enterprises, to
introduce genuine financial accountability, and on this basis to raise the
responsibility and also the interest both of the collective as a whole and of
each worker in the final results of labor
Genuine independence and responsibility for enterprises and associations
obviously can be achieved by correctly defining the rights and obligations
of each level of management. We will not resolve the problem of
independence if a director in each case must win approval for dozens of
things and discuss everything from A to Z. One must not draw the
resolution of every question to the center. The level of our economic
cadres makes it fully possible to decide many problems locally. One must
just remove from them the fetters of bad and excessive instructions,
decisively reduce accountability to higher organs, and free ourselves from
paperwork-which will simultaneously facilitate reduction of the man-
agement apparatus. This concerns both ministries and all-union industrial
associations.
The discussion [at the conference] showed how important it is to
supplement existing measures with improvements in the organizational
structure of management. Higher organs, which have become accustomed
to the old style of work, often do not facilitate consistent implementation
and development of principles of the management embodied in the
economic experiment. This is especially manifest at the level of all-union
industrial associations. We must tackle these questions without delay,
because if we do not change the methods of management at the level of
ministries and all-union industrial associations we will only be marking
time.
Another important area where changes are needed in the organizational
structures of management is the agroindustrial complex. The speeches
showed that we must carry the improvement of management of this
important sphere of the economy to its logical conclusion. The agroindus-
trial sphere, as was determined at the May 1982 CPSU Central
Committee plenum, should be planned, financed, and managed as a
single entity. We still have not managed to achieve this and, as a result,
we are suffering big losses.
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in
Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (Pravda,
24 Apr 85)
What is the cause of the difficulties?
Of course, the influence of
nature and a number of external factors had an effect. But the main
thing, I think, was that we did not in good time properly evaluate the
changes in objective conditions for development of production, the need
for speeding its intensification, for changes in the methods of manage-
ment, and, what is especially important, we did not demonstrate persis-
tence in working out and implementing major measures in the economic
sphere
The task of speeding the rates of growth, and by a considerable degree, is
fully achievable if we put at the center of all our work intensification of
the economy and speeding of scientific-technological progress, reorganize
management and planning, structural and investment policy, universally
raise organization and discipline, and basically improve the style of
work
No matter what question we consider or from what side we approach the
economy, in the final consideration everything depends on the need to
seriously improve management and the economic mechanism as a whole.
I had occasion to be convinced of this again during my recent meeting in
the CPSU Central Committee with workers and economic managers and
also during my visit to the Likhachev truck plant. The participants in
these meetings spoke with great concern about how troubled they were by
how defects in the system of administration, petty regulation, and
excessive paperwork complicate working conditions
Now we have a clearer concept of how to reorganize the economic
mechanism. While further developing the centralization principle in
resolving strategic tasks, we must move forward more boldly along the
path of expanding the rights of enterprises, their independence, and
introduce economic accountability, and on this basis raise the responsibil-
ity and interest of labor collectives in the final results of work.
The results of the large-scale experiment being conducted are seemingly
not bad. But they cannot fully satisfy us. We have reached a line where
we must cross over from an experiment to creation of a whole system of
management and administration. And this means that we should also
begin practical restructuring of the work of higher echelons of economic
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management and direct them primarily to resolving long-term socioeco-
nomic and scientific-technological tasks, to seeking the most effective
forms of combining science and production.
Life presents higher demands on planning, which is the heart of
management. It should become an active lever for intensifying produc-
tion, implementing progressive economic decisions, and ensuring bal-
anced and dynamic growth in the economy. Along with this, plans of
associations and enterprises must be relieved of the abundance of
indicators, and economic norms that make room for initiative and
enterprising spirit must be more widely applied.
It is time to begin improving the organizational structures of manage-
ment, liquidate excess units, simplify the apparatus, and raise its
effectiveness. It is important to do this also because some administrative
links have turned into obstacles and have begun to hamper movement.
We must sharply limit the number of instructions, statutes, and method-
ological instructions that sometimes fetter the independence of enter-
prises by capricious interpretation of party and government decisions
It is no less important to raise the responsibility of republic and local or-
gans for the management of economic and sociocultural construction, and
for satisfying the needs of workers. But for this, of course, we must
further expand the rights of local organs, strengthen their initiative and
interest in developing production, using resources, and organizing all
spheres of services for the public. Hence, they should locally answer fully
for resolving all questions within their jurisdiction and more quickly get
rid of feelings of being dependent
The management of the agroindustrial complex also requires further
improvement
Under the influence of departmental interests, rayon
and oblast associations often cannot properly coordinate decisions of
questions of comprehensive development of agriculture and associated
branches. If we are firmly convinced that there must be a single master
for the land and that agroindustrial associations bear full responsibility
for carrying out the Food Program-of which, I think, there is no
doubt-then we should implement steps to make it possible to manage,
plan, and finance the agroindustrial complex as a single whole at all
levels.
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Technological Renovation
Gorbachev has increasingly focused on the need for new technology and
modernization of industry to revive economic growth rates. He has called for
giving a higher priority to machine building in order to modernize the
country's industrial plant and improve productivity.
Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (Pravda, 23 Apr 83)
The development of heavy industry was and remains the necessary
precondition for resolving all economic and social tasks
What should
be put in the forefront here? The speeding up of the development and the
raising of the level of machine building as the basis for the technical re-
equipment of public production, use of modern technology, and improve-
ment of the quality of products.
Therefore, a preferential and
comprehensive growth of machine building and the significant improve-
ment of the machinery and equipment produced was and remains the
main path for development of heavy industry, strengthening its trans-
forming role in expanding and fundamentally renovating all branches of
the national economy.
USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Stavropol, 29 February
1984 (Pravda, 1 Mar 84)
The party highly rates the labor and achievements of Soviet machine
builders
We must give development of machine building a priority
character.
Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (Pravda,
24 Apr 85)
In the 12th Five-Year Plan primary attention should be given to
substantially raising the rate of replacement of equipment. The decisive
part here is played by machine building. Its development must be given
priority and in the 12th Five-Year Plan the rates of growth of this sector
must be increased by 50 to 100 percent.
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Agriculture
Collective Contracts
Gorbachev has consistently favored the use of material incentives to stimulate
initiative in agriculture. His views have been reflected in recent years in his
support for the collective contract system of farm labor and earlier in his advo-
cacy of the unregulated link system-both systems organize farmers into units
operating autonomously on the basis of contracts with kolkhozes and
sovkhozes.
Article in Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye, July 1981
The question of the unregulated system of labor organization with use of
contract-bonus (akkordno-premialnaya) pay for final results deserves
attention also. Last year this progressive system was applied in 30,000
brigades and links.
Article in Pravda, 10 February 1983
Among the complex of measures aimed at raising the effectiveness of
production and strengthening financial accountability, transfer to pro-
gressive forms of organization and pay of labor is very important. If we
don't change these matters, material and financial resources alone cannot
produce the desired results. The practice of advanced workers has fully
confirmed the high effectiveness of such forms of labor organization and
application of material incentives as collective (brigade, link) contracts
with use of contract-bonus pay, the shop structure of production, and
extension of pay in kind.
In collectives working on contract, the efficiency of labor and production
is higher, the personal interests of each worker is better combined with
the interests of the enterprise, the tie between labor and wages is
strengthened, and land, equipment, and other production funds are better
used. With less expenditure of labor and funds, as a rule, they get 20-30
percent more produce per unit of land. Naturally, their earnings are also
higher. In recent years the number of unregulated brigades and links in
agriculture has grown.
However, this progressive form is still being
spread too slowly.
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Speech at agricultural conference, Belgorod, 19 March 1983 (Pravda, 20 Mar
83)
Under the new conditions of management, we need basically different
approaches to the organization of production and especially to wages
One of the important methods for resolving this problem is use of the col-
lective contract
The main role in this is played by personal interest of
workers not in the amount of different kinds of work done, as is the case
with piecework (sdelnaya) pay, but in the final result-getting the
greatest quantity of high quality produce
Of course, for effective
work of contract collectives it is important to respect the requirements of
optimal management. The main thing here is to provide independence in
resolving a wide range of questions. It is well known that higher results
are attained via a proprietary attitude to the land and other resources.
But the feeling of being a proprietor (khozyain) does not arise by itself as
the result of introducing a collective contract. It develops on the basis of
active participation of workers in managing production. Expansion of the
rights of contract collectives in adopting management decisions is a very
important condition for raising operational effectiveness, the development
of labor activity and initiative
Despite the clear advantages of this progressive form of labor organiza-
tion and wages, the collective contract is still being introduced slowly
year we must start the stage of mass introduction of collective contracts
SO that in the 11th Five-Year Plan this progressive form of organization
and stimulation of labor firmly enters kolkhoz and sovkhoz production.
Private Plots
Gorbachev has looked to personal initiative of farmers on their private plots as
another practical means for boosting food output. He has defended the
legitimacy of private agriculture by arguing that it supplements state
production.
USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Stavropol, 2 February 1979
(Pravda, 3 Feb 79)
Subsidiary farms of enterprises and organizations and also private plots
of the population can play a substantial role. One should assist their
development and render them the necessary assistance.
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Article in Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye, July 1981
Private plots of kolkhozniks, workers, and employees require constant
attention. Their contribution to forming the country's food fund is
noticeable. Now this question is raised on the plane of integrating private
plots with public production, the ensuring of a closer collaboration
between public and private farming on the basis of the leading role of
public production and contract relationships, and of rendering all possible
aid to rural residents in more effectively working private plots.
Private
plots as a supplement to public farming make possible fuller use of labor
resources, fodder land, and facilities for livestock.
Article in Kommunist, No. 10, July 1982
At the Central Committee plenum attention was devoted to private plots
as an organic composite part of socialist agriculture at the present stage.
The significance of this sector is not limited only to the economic aspect
of the matter. It plays a big social and educational role. The main thing is
that private plots permit fuller use of reserves of labor and other
possibilities which they possess, and substantially supplement the food
fund. At the present time it is important to widen the integration of
private plots with public production and create the necessary organiza-
tional and economic preconditions for their effective functioning.
Article in Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, September 1982
At the same time it is recognized as important to support the population's
private plots. Our party regards these as an integral component of
socialist agriculture at the present stage, a substantial reserve for
supplementing food stocks, and an important condition for the fuller use
of manpower and other resources that can help to resolve a number of so-
cial tasks. But their potential must not be overestimated. The conjectures
being propagated in some places in the West about their "advantages"
are built on sand. Here labor productivity is half what it is on kolkhozes
and sovkhozes. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the private plot is
based on the public sector
The development of the private plot will
proceed above all in the direction of further integration with the public
sector.
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Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (Pravda,
24 Apr 85)
The task is to more fully utilize all reserves for increasing production of
food both in kolkhozes and sovkhozes and on private plots and subsidiary
farms of enterprises.
Agricultural Investment
Although during the Brezhnev regime Gorbachev echoed standard policy
advocating more resources for agriculture, he has increasingly placed his
stress on the need for more efficient use of resources.
USSR Supreme Soviet election campaign speech, Stavropol, 2 February 1979
(Pravda, 3 Feb 79)
The party will continue to hold to its principled line of increasing capital
investments in agriculture.
Article in Kommunist, No. 11, July 1980
Proceeding from deep scientific understanding of the role of agriculture
in communist construction, the July plenum indicated that the party
would continue to consistently implement the line of systematically
increasing capital investments in this branch SO that its share in the
general volume of resources allotted to develop the economy in the 11th
Five-Year Plan would be no lower than the present level.
Along with
this, the party gives special significance to raising the return on funds in-
vested in agriculture.
Article in Kommunist, No. 10, July 1982
Fulfillment of the decisions of the May Central Committee plenum on
strengthening the material-technical base of the agroindustrial complex
has special significance. Any deviation from this can be only in one
direction-in the direction of seeking out additional capital investments
and material resources to strengthen the economy of agriculture and
related branches, and increase the production of food goods.
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Article in Pravda, 10 February 1983
The capital investment directed into land improvement is still not
producing the proper return.
Many officials, carried away by new
water project construction, neglect questions of effective use of already
existing improved land.
It is understandable that work on improving
the use of land and raising yield requires the appropriate capital
investments.
Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (Pravda,
27 Mar 84)
Analyzing the key questions of strengthening the economy of the
agroindustrial complex, the reporter stressed that one cannot reduce the
process of intensification to just accumulation of funds alone. The main
thing in intensification is raising the output of products per unit of present
and future material and financial resources
Big attention should be devoted to use of irrigated and drained land.
However, improved lands are not being used effectively enough. In recent
years funds have been directed chiefly into new construction projects to
improve land. At the same time insufficient resources were allotted to
remodeling and maintaining the existing systems in proper condition.
Speech presenting award, Smolensk, 27 June 1984 (Pravda, 28 Jun 84)
Our state will continue to allot large amounts of funds to development of
the Non-Chernozem countryside, considering this a necessary condition
for increasing production and raising the return from the existing
economic potential. The task is to be more economical in managing these
resources.
Sociopolitical Issues
Public Participation
Recently, Gorbachev has been speaking about the need for greater openness
and more participation by the public in the political process.
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Report to ideology conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (Zhivoye Tvor-
chestvo Naroda, Moscow, 1984)
Our contemporary is a person of heightened culture and education, with a
broad scope of spiritual interests, who has seen and experienced much
A person living and working in society with such huge social experience
will not accept simplified answers to questions, will quickly catch
hypocrisy engendered by lack of ability or the fear of exposing real
contradictions in public development and the sources of the problems
which concern and agitate him. We must talk with him only in the
language of truth, which will not tolerate smoothing over, evasions, or
general and stilted phrases
Let us turn to questions of developing the political system of our society.
For example, the profound idea of the founders of Marxism-Leninism on
self-management is well known. Marx, Engels, and Lenin thought of the
transition to self-management by workers as a practical task of the
proletariat from the moment it came to power. They saw the main
content of this idea as ensuring the real, practical participation of a
greater and greater mass of workers in management-in working out,
discussing, adopting, and implementing socioeconomic decisions. Lenin
never set Soviet state power against self-management by the people
Nevertheless, in social sciences there still exists a poor and sometimes
even one-sided interpretation of self-management. In some of these, self-
management is linked to the activities of just certain parts of socialist so-
ciety (production or territorial); in others, it is set against state manage-
ment; in yet others, the practical implementation of principles of self-
management are put off to the transition to a higher phase of
communism
The scientific working out of such a seemingly traditional problem as the
principle of democratic centralism in present-day conditions is very
timely
The party has stood for and stands for the interconnected development of
both bases of democratic centralism in the economic and political life of
the country, for their optimal combination. This relates first of all to
expanding and deepening socialist democracy: the greater, fuller, and
deeper the masses' participation in management is, the more firm our
achievements and the more dynamic our development will be
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Publicity is an integral aspect of socialist democracy and a norm of all so-
cial life. Extensive, timely, and frank information is indicative of trust in
people and respect for their intellect and feelings and their capability to
understand various events themselves. It increases the activeness of the
working people. Publicity in the work of party and state organs is an ef-
fective means of struggle against bureaucratic distortions, and it makes
people more thoughtful in their approach to decisionmaking and organiz-
ing checks on the fulfillment of decisions and also in correcting shortcom-
ings and mistakes.
Closing speech at ideology conference, Moscow, 11 December 1984 (Pravda,
12 Dec 84)
It is impossible not to agree with the comrades who have noted that the
forms and methods of ideological work under present-day conditions
should be more varied and flexible and more fully suited to the innovative
character of the tasks to be resolved. Inertia in thinking, as a rule,
engenders inertia in practical matters too. Searching and creativeness,
sensitivity to new phenomena and processes, decisive rooting out of
formalism, red tape, and empty talk are the demands of life for all
workers on the ideological front.
We must continue to develop in Soviet people's consciousness a clear
understanding of the historical importance of our huge social triumphs
and at the same time expose existing difficulties and real contradictions
in the life of society and show the work of the party and people in
resolving them. In this one must remember that leaving questions
unanswered opens a gap for hostile propaganda.
Acceptance speech at CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 11 March
1985 (Pravda, 12 Mar 85)
The party regards as one of the main tasks of internal policy the further
improvement and development of democracy and the whole system of
socialist self-management of the people
This includes further raising
the role of soviets, and activation of trade unions, the komsomol, peoples
control, and labor collectives.
Deepening socialist democracy is
inseparably connected with raising public consciousness. The effective-
ness of educational work is manifested primarily in how workers,
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kolkhozniks, and intelligentsia participate in resolving big and small
problems, how they labor, and how they struggle against
shortcomings.
We must further expand openness (glasnost) in the work of party, soviet,
state, and public organizations.
The better informed people are, the
more conscientiously they act, the more actively they support the party,
its plans and program goals.
Separation of Party and State Functions
Gorbachev has spoken about the need to define more precisely the role of par-
ty organizations and to keep them from taking over functions of economic and
government organs. This may reflect his stated desire to grant more room for
economic managers to exercise initiative and for economic levers to produce
the most rational economic decisions.
USSR Supreme Soviet campaign speech, Moscow, 29 February 1984 (Pravda,
1 Mar 84)
This goal [raising the responsibility of cadres] is furthered also by precise
definition of the functions of party committees on one hand, and state and
economic organs on the other, ending the practice where officials of
various organizations, departments, and enterprises transfer to party
organs questions for which they themselves bear direct responsibility. In
Comrade K. U. Chernenko's speech at the February Central Committee
plenum this task was raised among those with first rank importance.
Speech to CPSU agricultural conference, Moscow, 26 March 1984 (Pravda,
27 Mar 84)
We should in practice carry out the CPSU Central Committee instruc-
tion on more precise definition of the functions of party and soviet organs.
It is abnormal when some rayon party committees substitute for agroin-
dustrial associations, when they circumvent the associations to decide
current economic questions, and when they interfere in matters which
belong in the direct competence of specialists and leaders of farms, thus
lowering the responsibility of cadres for their work.
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Cadres and Discipline
Since becoming general secretary, Gorbachev has stressed the need to tighten
discipline and replace ineffective officials.
Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (Pravda,
24 Apr 85)
The question of reinforcing order and discipline is especially topical
today
Life has shown what unanimous approval the people have given
to measures to impose order and what weighty results they have
produced. But one must directly say that recently attention to this most
important question has somewhat slackened. And here one must first of
all be more demanding on leaders of collectives who bear personal
responsibility for discipline. Often one encounters instances where leaders
of enterprises forgive indiscipline in workers in the hope that their
subordinates in turn will forgive their blunders. We will not condone such
a psychology of mutual forgiveness.
In order to strengthen discipline and order there is also another essential
condition. One cannot achieve significant results in any sphere of activity
as long as a party official substitutes for an economic leader, an engineer
for a messenger, a scholar works at a vegetable collection center, or a tex-
tile worker works on a livestock farm. Unfortunately, today this often
happens
Higher demands should be made on the tone, efficiency, and exactingness
of the coming rayon, city, oblast, and kray party conferences and union
republic party congresses. There must be no place at them, as sometimes
occurs, for eulogizing and compliments, or attempts to conceal the
essence of matters behind general words, to lay the blame for shortcom-
ings on objective circumstances or departmental misunderstandings.
A party member is evaluated on the basis of his actions and deeds. There
are and cannot be any other criteria.
During the course of the reports and elections leading party organs will be
formed and replenished with fresh forces and urgent cadre questions will
be decided. The recent plenums of party committees have convincingly
shown what mature cadres the party has. But at the same time they also
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Cadres and Discipline
Since becoming general secretary, Gorbachev has stressed the need to tighten
discipline and replace ineffective officials.
Report to CPSU Central Committee plenum, Moscow, 23 April 1985 (Pravda,
24 Apr 85)
The question of reinforcing order and discipline is especially topical
today
Life has shown what unanimous approval the people have given
to measures to impose order and what weighty results they have
produced. But one must directly say that recently attention to this most
important question has somewhat slackened. And here one must first of
all be more demanding on leaders of collectives who bear personal
responsibility for discipline. Often one encounters instances where leaders
of enterprises forgive indiscipline in workers in the hope that their
subordinates in turn will forgive their blunders. We will not condone such
a psychology of mutual forgiveness.
In order to strengthen discipline and order there is also another essential
condition. One cannot achieve significant results in any sphere of activity
as long as a party official substitutes for an economic leader, an engineer
for a messenger, a scholar works at a vegetable collection center, or a tex-
tile worker works on a livestock farm. Unfortunately, today this often
happens
Higher demands should be made on the tone, efficiency, and exactingness
of the coming rayon, city, oblast, and kray party conferences and union
republic party congresses. There must be no place at them, as sometimes
occurs, for eulogizing and compliments, or attempts to conceal the
essence of matters behind general words, to lay the blame for shortcom-
ings on objective circumstances or departmental misunderstandings.
A party member is evaluated on the basis of his actions and deeds. There
are and cannot be any other criteria.
During the course of the reports and elections leading party organs will be
formed and replenished with fresh forces and urgent cadre questions will
be decided. The recent plenums of party committees have convincingly
shown what mature cadres the party has. But at the same time they also
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again confirmed the need for the strictest observance of Leninist princi-
ples of selection, assignment, and training of cadres. Where these
principals are violated, where officials are advanced on the basis of
personal loyalty, servility, or protectionism there inevitably will be fading
of criticism and self-criticism and weakening of ties with the masses and,
as a result, failures in work.
The Politburo considers it principally important to continue the line of en-
suring stability of party leadership and correct combination of experi-
enced and young officials. However, this cannot be accompanied by any
kind of stagnation in the movement of cadres. In their letters to the
Central Committee, communists have been drawing attention to the fact
that some leaders who have held a post for a long time often cease to see
the new and become accustomed to shortcomings. There is something to
think about here. We must seek ways to more actively move leading
cadres. We must more boldly advance women and promising young
officials to responsible posts.
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30 May 1985
FB 85-10025
Statements
Special Memorandum
MATLOCK
Gorbachev: Selected Statements on International Affairs
FBIS
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
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CAS 7/10/02
30
This report is based exclusively on material carried in
foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without
coordination with other U.S. Government components.
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31
Gorbachev: Selected Statements on International Affairs
Introduction
During his relatively brief career as a national political leader, Mikhail
Gorbachev has compiled a modest record as a spokesman on international
issues. Before he became CPSU general secretary, his comments on foreign
affairs generally reflected prevailing policy positions, varying in tone and
content according to the audience but normally adhering to formulations
commonly used by other leaders. Since he succeeded Konstantin Chernenko in
March, Gorbachev has spoken out more frequently on international issues.
Like his predecessors, he has focused primarily on East-West relations and
arms control.
This report provides a collection of Gorbachev's statements on key internation-
al questions, excerpted from his speeches, writings, and statements at meetings
with foreign delegations from 1980 through the April 1985 CPSU Central
Committee plenum. It is intended as a companion to FBIS Analysis Report
FB 85-10009 of 11 March 1985, Gorbachev: A Political Profile. A collection
of Gorbachev's comments on domestic issues is being published separately.
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Contents
U.S.-Soviet and East-West Relations
1
Nuclear War and Arms Control
11
West Europe
15
China
17
The Third World
18
International Economics and Trade
22
International Communism
25
Defense and Military Preparedness
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U.S.-Soviet and East-West Relations
Gorbachev has depicted East-West relations during the 1980's in stark terms,
attributing the rise in tension to the "crisis of capitalism" and the policies of
the Reagan Administration. At the same time, he consistently has voiced
support for rebuilding detente and has predicted that "realistic" Western
political forces favoring East-West cooperation will eventually prevail. Since
becoming general secretary, he has frequently juxtaposed criticism of U.S.
policies with expressions of interest in easing tensions with Washington and in-
creasing bilateral cooperation.
Speech to Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) Congress, Ulaan-
baatar, 26 May 1981 (Pravda, 27 May 81)
The Soviet Union and its Communist Party consistently pursue a line
aimed at preserving and expanding the achievements of detente, of all
that is valuable and beneficial in international relations, and all that was
achieved during many years of unswerving, patient work.
Speech to Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Congress, Hanoi, 28 March 1982
(Pravda, 29 Mar 82)
U.S. imperialism is playing the role of organizer of the new crusade
against peace and progress. The aggressive and militant forces are
threatening to bring mankind to the brink of a world thermonuclear war.
The ideologists of the U.S. reactionary forces are calling for an extension
of U.S. domination to the whole world. In fact, there is no region on earth
where the situation has not become complicated as a result of the actions
of Washington and its zealous agents.
Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (Pravda, 23 Apr 83)
The years in which we are living will go down in history as a time of in-
tense class struggle in the foreign arena. Two courses, two diametrically
different approaches to international relations confront each other
unusually acutely. The main reason for the deterioration of today's
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international situation is the adventuristic approach of the most aggres-
sive forces of imperialism to the most important issue of modern times
[the issue of war and peace].
The reactionary tendency has triumphed in U.S. ruling circles. The war
party-to use Lenin's expression-has gained the upper hand. It tells
itself that force must be used immediately, taking no account of further
consequences. The most aggressive circles of imperialism, primarily
American imperialism, are trying to get out of the crisis [of capitalism], to
find a response to the historic challenge of socialism by means of the arms
race and by increasing the threat of war.
The aggressive strivings of imperialism are directed first and foremost
against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. Economic
sanctions and psychological war, attempts to organize a crusade against
communism, interference in the internal affairs of socialist states, up to
and including the nurturing of a counterrevolutionary fifth column, as for
example in Poland-all this is factual reality, irrefutable facts. Imperial-
ist reaction, as has already happened more than once, is hungrily waiting
for a replay of history, to stifle world socialism, to put a brake on the pop-
ular liberation movement. In essence they are giving an ultimatum to
socialism: Unless it gives up its positions, things will slide toward war. But
the alternative-either submission to the dictate of imperialism on a
world scale, or a world war-is mad and monstrous in its very basis.
It is well known that the aggressive tendencies of the ruling circles of the
Western camp are being resisted by a more realistic, sober tendency,
whose supporters are in favor of detente and cooperation. The develop-
ment of ties between the Soviet Union and many Western countries shows
that we have considerable areas of converging interests. This is a fine ba-
sis for the further implementation of Lenin's principle of peaceful
coexistence in international relations.
Speech to members of Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, 18 May 1983 (Pravda,
19 May 83)
We in the Soviet Union are confident that the seventies, which passed un-
der the sign of detente, were not a chance episode in mankind's difficult
history. The policy of detente is not a stage that has been traversed and is
gone. The term "detente" has become firmly established in political
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vocabulary because the future belongs to detente
We for our part will
persistently continue the line aimed at preventing the further exacerba-
tion of the international situation and preventing detente's positive
potential from being buried.
Speech to Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) Congress, Oporto, 16 Decem-
ber 1983 (Pravda, 17 Dec 83)
U.S. imperialism is the originator and strike force of this global policy [of
confrontation]. It is U.S. imperialism that has taken upon itself the
leadership function in knocking together all detachments of reaction in
the struggle against peace, freedom, democracy, progress, and socialism.
The essence of the present U.S. militarist course is to ensure dominating
positions in the world for the United States regardless of the rights and
interests of other states and peoples
The historically doomed doctrine of "crusades" has again been raised to
the level of the White House's practical policy. People at official levels in
the United States consider that normal relations can be conducted with
the USSR only when it changes its social system. People in Washington
are openly calculating on attaining military superiority over the USSR
and the socialist world.
U.S. imperialism is hoping that by means of militarism it will gain a com-
pletely free hand in the international arena as a whole
It is not difficult to imagine with what adventurism and contempt for in-
ternational law and the life of other peoples the U.S. military clique
would act on a global scale under the banner of a "crusade" if it
succeeded in attaining its goals, and primarily military superiority
Imperialism is not omnipotent. Its adventurous plans and actions encoun-
ter growing resentment and opposition all over the world and from the
most diverse social and political forces. Tens of millions of honest people
come out against the threat of war and the arms race regardless of their
party affiliation or their political, ideological, or religious views and
beliefs.
There is no doubt that sooner or later the ruling elite in the United States
will have to take into account the realities of today's world.
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Speech to Order of Lenin Award Ceremony, Smolensk, 27 June 1984 (Pravda,
28 Jun 84)
The international situation is now tense. The aggressiveness of imperia-
lism's reactionary circles, driven by the Reagan Administration, is being
strengthened. They are pushing through more and more new programs
for an arms buildup, including in space. From one day to the next, the
United States is whipping up an atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and
antisocialism and encouraging all sorts of extremist, ultrarightist, essen-
tially profascist forces' activities.
However, having become convinced that their overtly provocative state-
ments are discrediting U.S. policy, the White House rulers are now
hypocritically making declarations about devotion to peace and disarma-
ment but in fact staking as before on military strength in the hope of up-
setting the military-strategic parity between the United States and
USSR, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization, in their own
favor, at whatever cost.
The more aggressively the ruling circles of imperialism act, the greater
resistance they meet from the forces of peace, first and foremost the
Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole, the international
communist movement and other anti-imperialist forces, and the mass
antiwar movement in West Europe, Japan, and the United States itself.
The world does not want to and will not live under U.S. diktat. We are
convinced that sooner or later the world community of peoples will
manage to bring those politicians who, forgetting their responsibilities,
are creating a threat to the very existence of mankind, back onto the path
of realism
We do not consider the cause of detente to be irrevocably undermined.
Striving to achieve a turn for the better in the development of internation-
al life, the USSR
comes out in favor of an honest dialogue, filled with
real content, as well as serious negotiations on the basis of equality and
equal security.
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Speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist Revolution,
Sofia, 9 September 1984 (Pravda, 10 Sep 84)
The grim reality of the matter is that the world is at a fever pitch. The
threat of war is not subsiding. The practical moves by imperialist
reaction, and in the first place, by those who determine the foreign policy
course of the United States, are clearly oriented towards further danger-
ously stepping up international tension. Obsessed with the use of brute
force, Washington believes that it is permissible to dictate its will to
everyone, everywhere and in everything, and that this goes even as far as
overthrowing legitimate governments, establishing a policy of state
terrorism, and waging undeclared wars.
Report to Ideology Conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (Zhivoye Tvor-
chestvo Naroda, Moscow, 1984)
It is not us but capitalism that has to maneuver and masquerade and re-
sort to wars and terrorism, falsifications, and diversions in order to hold
back the inevitable onslaught of time. These are precisely the sources of
the global conflict going on between the two systems on an ever broader
front and the unceasing attempts at social revanchism, the plans for
which are nurtured by the imperialist ruling circles. The weapons
stockpiling and whipping up of militarism, material and psychological,
and preparations for nuclear war are essentially the acknowledgment by
capitalism of the fact that it has lost its historical capability. The general
crisis of capitalism is not only the aggravation of its economic, social, and
political contradictions. It is also a spiritual, ideological, and moral
crisis
A system without a future does not value either the past or present. This
is precisely the source of imperialism's adventuristic policy
The military-industrial complex has noticeably reasserted its sinister
influence and is playing an ever greater role in the policy of the leading
capitalist countries. Transnational capital, which strives to prevent the
new countries and peoples from taking the path of noncapitalist develop-
ment and hold the young states within the capitalist orbit, also contri-
butes to the intensification of confrontation. The establishment of
military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and
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the steady strengthening of peace-loving foreign policy positions of the
socialist community have reached ever sharper contradiction with the
aggressive strategic designs of imperialism
The "crusade" declared against communism is not merely rhetoric, not
only verbal abuse, to which Washington politicians are so susceptible. It
also includes far-reaching imperial ambitions. The design of the "20th
century crusaders" is to secure the global economic, political, and
military-strategic goals of imperialism, most of all American imperialism.
Speech to members of British Parliament, London, 18 December 1984
(Pravda, 19 Dec 84)
Nobody can dispute the obvious fact that in years of detente, people
began to live a calmer life, with greater confidence in their future.
In a word, there was an improvement in the international climate, but no
concessions by one side to the other. Here realism, founded on a
consideration of the mutual interests of countries with different social
systems, was revealed; here the mutual comprehension emerged that you
cannot build your security at the cost of causing detriment to the security
of others.
In other words, sense won out: The understanding that war is an
unsuitable, unacceptable method of solving vexed questions; that in a
nuclear war, just as in the arms race and in confrontation, it is impossible
to win. It became obvious that the "cold war" is an abnormal state of re-
lations constantly carrying the threat of war. All this formed the basic be-
ginning for the favorable development of international events in the
1970's. On this basis, the peaceful coexistence of states with different
social systems became more deeply and fully implanted in the whole
system of international relations. We also consider now that there is no
sensible alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence, nor can there be
one. I would like to stress this quite strongly and definitely
We see it as our aim to solve together, as no one alone could do, the most
important problems, which by their nature are common to us: how to pre-
vent war; how to halt the arms race and go over to disarmament; how to
settle existing conflicts and crises and avert potential ones; to create a sit-
uation in the world that would enable each country to concentrate its
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attention and resources on solving its own problems (and show me the
country that has none!); how to join forces in solving the worldwide
problems of the struggle against starvation and diseases, preserving the
environment, and providing mankind with power and raw material
resources.
It is our profound conviction that in the present conditions all countries
and peoples need constructive dialogue more than ever, a search for
solutions to key international problems to find spheres of agreement that
can lead to improving trust between countries and to establishing an
atmosphere in international relations that would be free from nuclear
threat, enmity and suspicion, fear and hostility.
Our country has specified its approach in clear and unambiguous form: to
overcome tension, resolve differences and disputed issues not by force and
threat but by negotiations, taking each other's legitimate interests into
account and not permitting interference in internal affairs. I should put it
like this: All must constantly learn to live together, proceeding from the
realities of the modern world that is continually changing in accordance
with its own laws
The Soviet Union stands for an improvement in interstate relations. In
politics and diplomacy there is always room for reasonable compromises;
there is a vast field for developing and strengthening mutual understand-
ing and trust upon a basis of close or coinciding interests. If only there
were a desire to cultivate this field!
Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(Pravda, 12 Mar 85)
As regards relations with the capitalist states, I want to say the following:
We will firmly follow the Leninist course of peace and peaceful coexis-
tence. The Soviet Union will always respond to good will with good will,
and to trust with trust, but everyone must know that we will never waive
the interests of the motherland and its allies.
We value the successes of detente achieved in the seventies and are
prepared to participate in a continuation of the process of establishing
peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation between states on principles of
equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs.
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Interview in Pravda, 8 April 1985
Relations between the USSR and the United States are an exceptionally
important factor in international politics, but we do not look at the world
solely through the prism of these relations. We realize the importance of
other countries in international affairs and take this into account in
assessing the general situation in the world.
Are there changes for the better in Soviet-American relations at this
time? There is no simple answer to this question. Some things gave
grounds for hope, but there continue to be a considerable and even great
number of things that inspire anxiety
On the whole relations remain tense.
It appears that some people in the United States regard this situation as
normal, considering confrontation virtually a natural state.
We do not consider this to be the case. Confrontation is not an inborn de-
fect in our relations. Rather it is an anomaly. There is nothing inevitable
about its continuation. We regard the improvement of Soviet-American
relations as not only extremely necessary but possible. Of course, it is im-
possible to manage without reciprocity here
I am convinced that serious impetus must be given to Soviet-American re-
lations at a high political level. We propose to the U.S. Government that
matters be conducted in such a way that everyone-our peoples and other
countries-can see that the political courses of the USSR and the United
States are directed not toward enmity and confrontation but toward the
search for mutual understanding and toward peaceful development.
Meeting with Speaker of U.S. House of Representatives Thomas (Tip)
O'Neill, 10 April 1985 (Pravda, 11 Apr 85)
The world situation is disquieting, even dangerous, and a kind of ice age
is being observed in relations between the USSR and the United States
(at least, this was SO until the most recent time).
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The Soviet leadership sincerely hopes that Soviet-American relations
return to a normal channel. We do not think that underlying the present-
day tensions in these relations is some fatal clash of national interests of
both countries. On the contrary, our peoples can gain much from the
development of broad and fruitful cooperation. To say nothing of the fact
that they are united by the dominating common interest in ensuring
security, preserving the very life of our peoples. The difference in the
social systems, in the ideology of our countries is no cause for curtailing
relations, much less for kindling hatred.
Practical experience has shown that Soviet-American mutually beneficial
cooperation is quite possible. A number of fundamental documents signed
by both sides in 1972 and 1973 laid the groundwork for fruitful
cooperation in various fields. This also contributed to spreading detente in
international relations as a whole, and to success of the European
conference in Helsinki, in particular. In 1972 the leaders of the USSR
and the USA put their signatures under a document saying that peaceful
coexistence between our two countries is the sole sensible alternative in
this nuclear age.
This concerns, of course, also the recognition of the right of every people
to arrange their life as they see fit, without interference in their internal
affairs, without attempts to shape other countries according to one's own
fashion, to impose one's will on other peoples.
A genuine improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA
requires political will on the part of the leaders of these countries. From
the Soviet side such a will exists. If it is displayed by the American side as
well, then many concrete questions now separating our countries gradual-
ly will begin to find their solution.
Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (Pravda, 24 Apr
85)
Through the imperialists' fault the international situation continues to be
alarming and dangerous. Mankind has found itself with a choice: either
the further fanning of tension and confrontation, or a constructive search
for the mutually acceptable accords that would halt the process of
material preparation for a nuclear conflict. The responsibility for the
existing situation lies, first of all, with the ruling circles of the United
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States, and this should be stated in all clearness. They continue to be the
initiators of the arms race, and they sabotage disarmament, a fact of
which the world community is well aware. On their initiative, more and
more types of mass annihilation weapons are created. Now they are
trying to extend the arms race to space. Hundreds of U.S. military bases
scattered all over the world also destabilize the situation in the world. The
United States openly claims the "right" to interfere everywhere; it
ignores, and often directly tramples underfoot, the interests of other
countries and peoples, traditions of international relations, and existing
treaties and agreements. It constantly creates hotbeds of conflicts and
military danger, heating up the situation in various parts of the world.
Today the United States is threatening the heroic people of Nicaragua
with military reprisal, trying to deny them freedom and sovereignty, as
was the case on Grenada. Solidarity with forces of progress and
democracy, with the countries and peoples fighting for their freedom and
independence and against the onslaught of reaction, is a matter of
principle for us. Here our line is as clear as it always was
We invariably advocate the development of normal, equal relations with
capitalist countries. Vexing problems and conflict situations should be
solved by political means-such is our firm conviction. The Politburo
bases itself on the fact that the interstate document of the period of
detente, including the Helsinki Final Act, have not lost their significance.
They are an example of how international relations can be built if one is
guided by principles of equality and identical security, by the realities
that have arisen in the world, if one does not strive for any advantage but
looks for mutually acceptable solutions and accords. It would appear that
in connection with the 10th anniversary of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe it would be useful if, on behalf of the states
that signed the Final Act, the will were expressed once again in Helsinki
to overcome the dangerous tension, to develop peaceful cooperation and
constructive principles in international life.
Our readiness to improve relations with the United States is
known,
for mutual benefit and without attempts to encroach upon the legitimate
rights and interests of each other. There is no sort of fatal inevitability of
confrontation between the two countries. If one is to interpret both the
positive and negative experience accumulated by the history of Soviet-
U.S. relations-both remote and recent history-it should be said that
the most rational thing is to look for ways to smooth out relations, to build
a bridge of cooperation, but to build it from both sides.
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Nuclear War and Arms Control
Following Soviet leadership practice of recent years, Gorbachev consistently
has emphasized the need to prevent a nuclear war through arms control
agreements while insisting that the Soviet Union will not allow the United
States and its allies to upset strategic parity. He has voiced hope that the pre-
sent U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva will bring results but
criticized the U.S. approach to the talks.
Speech to members of Canadian Parliament, Ottawa, 18 May 1983 (Pravda,
19 May 83)
A great deal of noise is made in the West about "the Soviet military
threat" and "Soviet military superiority."
What can be said about this? Such allegations do not square with the ac-
tual state of affairs. And those political and military leaders in the West
who by virtue of their position ought to know the facts know this. So why
are these myths being spread? Let me remind you that there were similar
instances during the fifties and sixties-first it transpired that the USSR
was considerably ahead in terms of bombers, then a large U.S. "missile
gap" was detected. After some time had passed these fabrications burst
like soap bubbles. But this did not fail to leave its mark. Mistrust of the
Soviet Union and its policy was persistently and deliberately sown in
people's minds. On the other hand, irreversible things also happened.
Farfetched pretexts were used to develop broad new military programs
and sharply crank up the arms race. Nobody can deny that the Soviet
Union merely reacted to the challenge made to it: All the main kinds of
strategic weapons were not introduced originally in the Soviet Union-we
only responded to them. We were compelled to do this by legitimate
concern for safeguarding our defense capability, nothing more. It was
repeatedly reiterated from our side at the highest level: The USSR does
not seek military superiority; we did not and do not have any such
intentions.
It must not be hoped that we will close our eyes to the feverish activity to
deploy nuclear weapons targeted on the USSR. We will do everything
necessary to preserve military strategic parity, which serves as a reliable
guarantee of peace. At the same time we are convinced of the erroneousness
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of the concept equating the stockpiling of weapons with the strengthening
of security. We are consistent and resolute opponents of the arms race. In
the complex and dangerous situation that has taken shape our country
states: There is no more important task in international politics at this
time than to avert the growing threat of nuclear war.
Speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist Revolution,
Sofia, 9 September 1984 (Pravda, 10 Sep 84)
The United States, having embarked upon the deployment of nuclear
missiles in a number of West European countries, having broken off the
talks in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons and strategic arms,
and having essentially rejected constructive dialogue on preventing the
militarization of space, is now giving assurances that it is in favor of cur-
tailing the arms race and is allegedly willing to seek appropriate accords
with the Soviet Union. Many people in the West echo the United States,
asserting that virtually the only obstacle to dialogue is the hard line and
obstinacy of the Soviet Union.
Speech to members of British Parliament, London, 18 December 1984
(Pravda, 19 Dec 84)
When we speak of war and peace, we ought, in doing so, to bear in mind
that the character of present armaments, primarily nuclear armaments,
has changed the traditional concept of these problems. Mankind is on the
threshold of a new stage in the scientific and technical revolution that will
also have an effect on further developing military equipment. Those
people who resort to arguments about "limited," "short-duration," or
"prolonged" nuclear wars evidently still remain the prisoners of stereo-
types that have outlived their time, when war was a great misfortune, but
did not threaten the end of mankind, as it does now. Inevitably the
nuclear age dictates new political thinking. The most acute and urgent
problem that currently disturbs all people on earth is the problem of
preventing nuclear war.
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RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech, Moscow, 20 February 1985 (Pravda,
21 Feb 85)
Today the world's peoples are showing enormous interest in the forthcom-
ing Geneva talks in the entire range of space and nuclear arms. The
Soviet Union is going into the talks with a sincere desire to achieve
concrete results. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the Washington
Administration's approach. On the eve of the talks, the United States has
embarked on activity which SOWS doubts as to the American side's real in-
tentions in agreeing to hold the Geneva talks. What can we say about
this? One thing only: Calculations of this kind are mistaken. Indeed its
very approach is unacceptable if there is seriously to be any question of
reaching agreements. The world public expects Washington to take a
constructive attitude toward the talks based on unswerving observance of
the principle of equality and identical security.
Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(Pravda, 12 Mar 85)
Never before has such a frightful threat loomed over mankind as in our
day. The only sensible way out of the present situation is an accord
between the forces opposed to each other on the immediate cessation of
the arms race, primarily the nuclear race, and the nonallowance of it in
space; an accord on an honest and equal basis, without attempts to
outplay the other side and dictate its conditions to it; an accord that will
help us all to move forward the desired goal: the full destruction and ban-
ning forever of nuclear weapons and the full elimination of the threat of
nuclear war. We are firmly convinced of this.
Interview in Pravda, 8 April 1985
Another conclusion which is equally topical is the need to end the arms
race. The development of the international situation has reached a point
where the questions arise: Where do you go from here? Is it not time for
the figures who determine states' policies to stop, ponder, and not allow
the adoption of decisions which would push the world toward a nuclear
catastrophe?
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There is an urgent need for international cooperation in organizing
dialogue and seeking realistic decisions that would ease tension in the
world and help bar the way to the arms race.
All states-large and small alike-must participate in this. It is under-
standable that the nuclear powers and primarily the Soviet Union and the
United States have a special role to play.
The new Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons have
begun in Geneva. This is a positive fact. Together with the United States,
we determined the subject and objective of the talks, and, to put it
concisely, we determined them as follows: not to start an arms race in
space, to curtail it on earth, and to proceed toward a radical reduction of
nuclear arms, with the ultimate objective of totally eliminating them.
This accord must now be implemented. The talks are important. I say this
primarily because the question of where the development of Soviet-
American relations and developments in the world as a whole go from
here is now being decided. The choice is as follows: either an arms race in
all areas and the growth of the war threat or the consolidation of general
security and a more stable peace for all.
Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (Pravda, 24 Apr
85)
The already concluded first stage of the Geneva negotiations provides
grounds for saying that Washington is not holding a course directed at
accord with the Soviet Union. This is evident if only from the fact that it
is altogether refusing to discuss the question of preventing the arms race
from spreading into space at the same time as discussing the question of
limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. In this way it is violating the
accord reached in January on the interlinking of the three directions:
preventing the arms race in space; reducing nuclear strategic weapons;
and reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. A question
arises: How to explain such a position? It is explained by the fact that
certain U.S. circles still want to achieve a dominant position in the world,
primarily in the military sphere
One cannot help being surprised, too, at the haste with which the U.S.
Administration replies with its standard and customary "no" to our
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proposals, which is obvious evidence of the United States' unwillingness
to steer the matter toward reasonable results. I will say one thing: An
arms race and talks on disarmament cannot be combined. That is clear, if
one is not to fall into hypocrisy and aim to deceive public opinion. The So-
viet Union will not facilitate such a course, and this should be known by
all those who are now engaged in a political game and not in serious poli-
cy. We would not want a repetition of the sorry experience of the previous
talks. For its part, the Soviet Union will persistently work in Geneva for
concrete, mutually acceptable agreements that would make it possible not
only to end the arms race but also advance the cause of disarmament.
Now as never before, political will is needed for the sake of peace on
earth, for the sake of a better tomorrow.
West Europe
Gorbachev has devoted considerable attention in his public statements to
relations with West Europe. While criticizing U.S. military policies in Europe,
he has been comparatively circumspect toward the West Europeans and has
emphasized that Moscow must not be preoccupied with the United States in
its dealings with the West.
Speech to PCP Congress, Oporto, 16 December 1983 (Pravda, 17 Dec 83)
Today we have to say with great alarm that the siting of Pershing II and
cruise missiles on FRG, British, and Italian territory has become a fact.
It is clear that this is just the starting point of the process of building up
the U.S. nuclear missile might on the West European continent. We are
talking about a large-scale military-political operation by the U.S.
leadership.
R. Reagan's Administration is leading matters toward a fundamental
change in the military-strategic and political situation in Europe. And if
they get away with it here on European soil, we can imagine the logic of
the subsequent actions by the incumbent U.S. politicians and strategists,
intoxicated by the feeling that they can get away with anything.
No one will make R. Reagan a gift of nuclear superiority! The fate of so-
cialism and progress will not be dependent on U.S. nuclear tyranny!
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People in the West claim that the installation of U.S. missiles will
strengthen peace and security in Europe. This is a gross deception. There
still are many people in Europe who remember how, returning from
Munich in 1938, the British and French political leaders of the time
assured their peoples that they had brought them peace. But they brought
them war.
The reality prevailing in Europe today is exceptionally difficult and
dangerous. The level of security reached on the continent is being
consigned to the past together with the loss of many of detente's gains.
Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (Pravda, 23 Apr 83)
The appeal "No to War" is resounding throughout Europe. It has met
with a response in the United States, and the other NATO countries are
having to take account of the actions of public forces against the arms
race and against the deployment of American missiles in West Europe.
These actions express a new level of human consciousness and activity of
the masses.
Speech to members of British Parliament, London, 18 December 1984
(Pravda, 19 Dec 84)
It is well known that Europe in the 1970's became the cradle of the policy
of detente. Important trends in cooperation took shape then between the
countries of West Europe and the Soviet Union and other socialist
countries. The United States and Canada joined in this process, signing
the Helsinki Final Act.
The way relations between states develop in Europe has a great influence
on the way the international situation as a whole develops.
We all agree that we live in a vulnerable, fairly fragile, but interconnect-
ed world; in a world where, whether you like it or not, it is essential to co-
exist with each other. Whatever else divides us we have but one planet.
Europe is our common home; a home, and not a "theater of military
action."
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RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech, Moscow, 20 February 1985 (Pravda,
21 Feb 85)
While attaching great significance to the normalization of relations with
the United States and to honest talks with it on all the topical problems of
international life, at the same time, we never forget for a minute that the
world is not limited to that country alone, but is a much bigger place. The
Soviet Union has and does devote great and constant attention to its
relations with all states that want peace and equal, mutually advanta-
geous cooperation
Soviet people believe in the good sense of West Europeans and in their in-
terest in preventing Europe, our common home, from being turned into a
theater of military actions and a firing range for testing Pentagon
doctrines of "limited" nuclear war. We are pleased to note the desire of
many West European states for political dialogue. For its part, the USSR
has been and remains attached to the policy of good-neighborly relations
among all European states.
China
Gorbachev's statements on China before he became general secretary followed
closely the prevailing Soviet line, with harsh criticism in the early 1980's
giving way to virtual silence after efforts to ease tensions began in 1982. Since
assuming the top leadership post, he has underscored Moscow's interest in
improving bilateral ties with Beijing and reconfirmed China's status as a
"socialist" country.
Speech to MPRP Congress, Ulaanbaatar, 26 May 1981 (Pravda, 27 May 81)
While aggravating the international situation the imperialists have found
active accomplices-the Beijing leaders who consider the struggle against
the socialist community one of the main trends of their foreign policy.
The situation in the vast Asian Continent is tense. The policy of
imperialism and Chinese hegemonism directly contradicts the vital
interests of the Asian states and threatens their security
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Everywhere Beijing is closely following this provocative policy, [of the
imperialists] ignoring not only the interests of peace but also the interests
of the Chinese people itself. This is demonstrated by its hostile policy to
its neighboring states, including the Mongolian People's Republic, and by
the rough pressure on the Indochinese countries.
Speech to VCP Congress, Hanoi, 28 March 1982 (Pravda, 29 Mar 82)
Washington is playing the "China card" in an attempt to make the most
of the anti-Sovietism and hegemonism of the Chinese ruling circles to
further the global strategy of the United States.
Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(Pravda, 12 Mar 85)
We will do everything dependent upon us to broaden interaction with all
the socialist states and to enhance the role and influence of socialism in
world affairs.
We would like a serious improvement in relations with the PRC and
consider that given reciprocation this is fully possible.
Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (Pravda, 24 Apr
85)
Purposefully and persistently the Soviet Union will strengthen mutual
links and develop cooperation with other socialist countries including the
People's Republic of China. Our stance on this question is known. It
remains in force.
The Third World
Gorbachev has hewed closely to standard Soviet formulations regarding
the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, blaming
economic backwardness on Western "neocolonialist" policies and accusing
the United States of threatening the independence of Third World
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countries. As general secretary, Gorbachev has offered routine pledges of
Soviet support for the developing countries' efforts to increase their
independence.
Speech to VCP Congress, Hanoi, 28 March 1982 (Pravda, 29 Mar 82)
In the Near East region the United States is encouraging Israel's
predatory policy and preventing the elimination of the consequences of
Israeli aggression and the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Arab
people of Palestine. In southern Africa it is only thanks to imperialism's
support that the citadel of racism-the Republic of South Africa-is
preserved and that Angola, Mozambique, and other African states are
subjected to the racists' attacks.
In the Central American and Caribbean region the U.S. Administration
is threatening Cuba, preparing a plot against Nicaragua, and helping the
bloody Salvadoran junta to stifle that country's freedom-loving people.
In Asia the U.S. imperialists are frenziedly deploying extremely danger-
ous activities
The imperialists who pose as defenders of human rights did not say
anything when Pol Pot, a disciple of the Maoists, brazenly massacred
hundreds of thousands of his compatriots. And now when the Kampu-
chean people with the assistance of fraternal Vietnam have revived and
are building a peaceful life, they stage-manage the adoption of slanderous
resolutions of all kinds while preparing an armed intervention with the
participation of traitors to the Kampuchean people, including Pol Pot.
Beijing and Washington are inflating the so-called "Kampuchean prob-
lem" which does not exist in fact; this problem has been settled for a long
time now by the Kampuchean people themselves
Article in Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, No. 10, 1982
Soviet people are well aware of the world's food situation and the
difficulties which the people of many countries experience in this
connection. Malnutrition and hunger are still the cause of serious illnesses
and death for millions of people on various continents on the globe. The
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epicenter of the world food crisis lies in the developing countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America which have only recently gained liberation
from colonial oppression.
The Soviet Union regards this crisis as one of the most important global
socioeconomic problems confronting mankind in the second half of this
century
The main causes of the existing food situation in the liberated countries
are explained by imperialist policy, which has always been aimed at
securing economic advantages for monopoly capital. Today this is
manifested in the implementation of a neocolonialist policy which hinders
the creation of an independent national economy in young states and in
particular the creation of a multisector agriculture.
The governments of developing countries and the public in those countries
note that the socialist states' support is effective, selfless, and just and is
built on fundamentally different principles from those applied by capital-
ist powers. U.S. imperialism, for instance, has always used food "aid" to
establish its influence in various "Third World" countries and secure its
own strategic interests there. The U.S. practice of using grain deliveries
as an instrument of political pressure has become particularly well
known. Those who are unwilling to submit to diktat are cut off from the
food market. The blockade on food sales to Cuba has been operating for
more than 20 years now. This "punishment" has now been extended to
Nicaragua and a number of other states which have secured liberation
from colonial domination. Attempts have also been made to apply it to
the Soviet Union and certain other socialist countries.
Report to Ideology Conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (Zhivoye Tvor-
chestvo Naroda, Moscow, 1984)
The United States has entangled many developing countries in its
economic tentacles. Taking root in their economies and sucking out their
vital fluids, they doom such countries to protracted backwardness and
economic and political dependence. Bank loans at usurious rates are the
reason for the enslavement of young nation-states. Imperialism is directly
responsible for the starvation and poverty of millions of people in
developing countries.
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Economic expansion is accompanied by political and military aggression.
What imperialism is doing in Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Middle East,
Afghanistan, and South Africa cannot be characterized as anything other
than state terrorism, the most flagrant violation of the norms of
international law and a manifestation of modern neocolonialism.
Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(Pravda, 12 Mar 85)
The Soviet Union has always supported the struggle of the peoples for lib-
eration from the colonial yoke and today, too, our sympathies are on the
side of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America that are
following the path of strengthening their independence and social renew-
al. To us they are friends and partners in the struggle for lasting peace,
and better, just relations between peoples.
Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (Pravda, 24 Apr
85)
We are advocating the further expansion of many-sided cooperation with
the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The CPSU and the So-
viet state invariably support the right of all peoples, in accordance with
their own choice, to determine their own socioeconomic present and to
build their future without any outside interference whatsoever. Attempt-
ing to refuse the peoples this sovereign right is a hopeless and doomed
matter.
Meeting with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, 29 April 1985 (Pravda,
30 Apr 85)
Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet Union was resolutely coming
out in defense of the inalienable right of the Nicaraguan people to free,
democratic and independent development and was in solidarity with the
struggle waged by Nicaragua against the aggressive intrigues of
imperialism.
The USSR will continue to give friendly Nicaragua assistance in
resolving urgent problems of economic development and also political and
diplomatic support in its efforts to uphold its sovereignty. The Soviet
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leadership proceeds from the assumption that in the present-day situation
broad international solidarity with Nicaragua is an inalienable part of the
common struggle for peace and for the right of all the peoples to freedom
and independence.
The Soviet participants in the meeting wished the leadership and people
of Nicaragua success in their heroic struggle and in accomplishing the
complex and responsible tasks facing the country.
International Economics and Trade
Gorbachev's speeches and writings on international issues indicate that he
takes a particular interest in the world economy and Soviet foreign economic
relations. Although he has used harsh language to score U.S. trade and
monetary policies, he has repeatedly reaffirmed Moscow's interest in expand-
ing economic cooperation with the West.
Article in Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, No. 10, 1982
The Soviet Union has no intention of renouncing the benefits of the
international division of labor and international trade. This too is
reflected in the documents of the CPSU Central Committee May
plenum. "It is quite natural," it was noted at the plenum, "that the draft
program provides for cooperation with foreign countries, primarily social-
ist countries."
The USSR's cooperation with interested liberated countries will be
further developed. While helping them to strengthen their agriculture, we
will at the same time be importing the traditional produce of tropical and
subtropical farming, which is in demand but is not produced in our
country.
The elaboration of the Food Program has revived interest in the
development of cooperation with the Soviet Union on the part of a
number of firms and organizations in capitalist states. The Soviet stance
on this question is well known and has always been characterized by a
constructive approach. We favor all-around cooperation and mutually
advantageous trade with those who do this without discrimination or
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political pressure. The USSR does not intend to cut itself off from
mutually advantageous economic relations, but we cannot help drawing
conclusions from the actions of U.S. aggressive circles which resort to the
policy of sanctions and boycotts.
Report to Ideology Conference, Moscow, 10 December 1984 (Zhivoye Tvor-
chestvo Naroda, Moscow, 1984)
The attempts to subordinate world economic ties and trade and financial
credit relations to the egoistic interests of American monopolies are
obvious. Artificially raising interest rates, American monopolies have of
late been attracting up to $100 billion of foreign capital annually to
finance their economy. At the same time, the overall sum of direct capital
investments by American business in foreign enterprises, according to the
latest estimates, has exceeded $260 billion, and their finished products
are assessed at more than $1 trillion. All of this is having a destabilizing
influence on U.S. economic partners.
Speech to British business leaders, London, 20 December 1984 (Pravda,
21 Dec 84)
Life itself confirms that the creation of a material base to consolidate and
deepen detente is not possible without firm, stable international economic
relations
We are confident of our potential to solve for ourselves issues arising from
our national economy. At the same time we do not rule out the broadest
cooperation with foreign firms
No country or group of countries is able now to have a monopoly of the
achievements of the scientific-technical revolution. What is required is
broad international cooperation, and, in our opinion, there are opportuni-
ties for this to be achieved. Let us have greater realism and mutual trust,
gentlemen
We have always stressed that all manner of artificial restrictions in
foreign economic ties bring no benefits to the trading partners and
contradict the long-term interests of developing cooperation. I think that
you, likewise, share this point of view
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It is necessary to give trade and economic cooperation a steady and
forward-looking momentum and to create an atmosphere that would
facilitate this process. It is no secret that certain circles in the West strive
to portray the Soviet Union's readiness to take part in the process almost
as a sign of weakness. The opponents of "economic detente"-and
unfortunately they are still not extinct in the world-try to turn trade
with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries into a kind of
instrument of political pressure.
The view that trade between East and West benefits socialist countries
alone, is, in my view, just as groundless. Businessmen present in this hall
know very well that trade can only be mutually advantageous. It has been
known from time immemorial that you cannot make a deal without
getting mutual advantages. Likewise, there is no side that will agree to
trade to its own detriment.
Discrimination in trade harms above all those who initiate it, since it
rebounds on them through loss of profitable orders.
Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (Pravda, 24 Apr
85)
There is a broadening and intensification of the economic expansion of
the United States. The manipulation of bank rates, the predatory role of
the transnational corporations, political limitations on trade, and all sorts
of boycotts and sanctions are creating an atmosphere of tension and
distrust in international economic relations, disorganizing the world
economy and trade, and undermining its legal foundations. There is a
strengthening of the exploitation of the ex-colonial countries and a
blocking of their economic decolonialization process. Concentrating in its
hands a growing amount of the financial and material resources of other
countries, the United States directly or indirectly puts them into the
service of its gigantic military programs.
In these conditions ever-growing interest is aroused in the world by the
idea of elaborating and implementing measures to normalize internation-
al economic relations and to ensure economic security for states
The Soviet Union advocates fruitful and all-around economic and
scientific-technical cooperation built on principles of mutual advantage
and excluding any discrimination. It is ready to further expand and
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strengthen trade relations, to develop new forms of economic ties, based
on mutual interest in the joint development of scientific-technical and
technological innovations, in planning and building enterprises, and in the
use of raw material resources. In posing the question in this way it is nec-
essary to look attentively into the state of our foreign economic ties, to
take a somewhat more profound look at them, taking into account the
long-term view. Despite international tension there are favorable opportu-
nities here. The approach to mutually advantageous economic ties and
foreign trade should be broad, large scale, and directed toward the future.
We are in favor of extensive, mutually advantageous cooperation at many
levels with the states of West Europe, Japan, and other capitalist
countries.
International Communism
Gorbachev has staked out standard Soviet positions on political issues
involving foreign communist parties, insisting that all attempts at ideological
innovation and adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to particular "national"
conditions must be tempered by a firm commitment to orthodox principles of
"socialist and proletarian internationalism."
Speech to PCP Congress, Oporto, 16 December 1983 (Pravda, 17 Dec 83)
Under today's conditions the significance of the cohesion of all forces of
social progress and democracy, and primarily of the communist move-
ment, is greater than ever before. Our movement was born under the
banner of proletarian internationalism. Its inexhaustible strength is
contained in loyalty to this principle. Experience has proved that the
parties which permit deviations from the fundamental principles of
Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism for the sake of some
expedient or transient goals inevitably encounter, in the final analysis, the
negative consequences of such actions, difficulties, and at times even such
turns of events as lead to the weakening of class positions. Unity and co-
hesion comprise the main condition for new victories by the forces of
socialism, peace, and progress. The relations between the CPSU and the
PCP are a worthy example of such unity and international solidarity.
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Speech to ceremony marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist
Revolution, Sofia, 9 September 1984 (Pravda, 10 Sep 84)
The fraternal countries are assuredly advancing to ever higher stages in
their economic and social maturity. International experience has substan-
tially enriched our ideas of the world of socialism, of its general laws, and
the special features of the methods and forms in socialist construction,
answering the conditions and traditions of the individual countries. The
main conclusion here is that fidelity on the part of the communist parties
to Marxist-Leninist teaching and the ability to put it into practice are the
decisive guarantees of successful development along the path of socialism.
The CPSU, along with the other fraternal parties, will continue to take a
principled stance on issues concerning the essence of Marxism-Leninism
and will decisively defend the purity and revolutionary spirit of Lenin's
teaching.
Of course, we do not regard revolutionary theory as something frozen nor
do we seek in it universal recipes suitable for all cases in life. Reality en-
riches the theory with new experience, and experience creatively inter-
preted in light of Marxist-Leninist science becomes a powerful weapon in
the hands of communists
Confronted with the united, cohesive, and internationalist front of the
socialist community countries, the imperialist forces are trying in various
roundabout ways to weaken it. To this end, the notorious policy of
differentiation was set in motion. The imperialists brazenly assert their
right to punish some and reward other socialist countries. The crusade
against communism and the psychological war that have been proclaimed
by the U.S. Administration are indeed aimed at undermining proletarian
socialist internationalism, and deep recognition of the unity of the
national and internationalist interests of every fraternal country is greater
than ever before. No one can remain aloof in the struggle that imperial-
ism is imposing upon our community. The strengthening of the socialist
community is a common cause that requires joint and active efforts
Our wide-ranging ties with the socialist states located here [the Balkans]
are growing stronger and deeper. I would also like to say that our country
favors normalization of relations with the People's Socialist Republic of
Albania. With good will on both sides, this issue can be resolved in the in-
terests of the peoples of both states and the cause of peace and socialism.
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61
Defense and Military Preparedness
Gorbachev consistently has vowed that Moscow will do everything necessary
to maintain a reliable defense for the Soviet Union and its allies. He also has
emphasized that heightened East-West tension underscores the need for a
strong military capability.
Speech to MPRP Congress, Ulaanbaatar, 26 May 1981 (Pravda, 27 May 81)
The realistic analysis of the international situation once again convinces
us of the necessity to maintain the defense of the socialist community at
the necessary level. We have a solid shield for peaceful labor of the Soviet
people and its allies.
Lenin Day speech, Moscow, 22 April 1983 (Pravda, 23 Apr 83)
The might of the defensive alliance of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty
is guarding peace and the gains of socialism. If the situation demands it,
the peoples of the socialist community are doing and will do everything
necessary in order that their defense should be even stronger; even more
effective. Surrounded by the love of the entire people and the concern of
the Communist Party and the Soviet state, the USSR's Armed Forces are
vigilantly protecting the peaceful life of the Soviet people and of the
entire community of the fraternal socialist countries.
Speech to Order of Lenin Award Ceremony, Smolensk, 27 June 1984 (Pravda,
28 Jun 84)
In the face of imperialism's increased aggressiveness we have to be on our
guard, display high vigilance, and strengthen our defense as never before.
Speech marking the 40th anniversary of the Bulgarian Socialist Revolution,
Sofia, 9 September 1984 (Pravda, 10 Sep 84)
Concentrating their efforts on tackling creative tasks, the CPSU and the
Soviet state are giving unremitting attention to the strengthening of the
defense potential of the country. This diverts no small part of our
resources. But the countries of the socialist community cannot act in any
other way. We are all obliged to do this in order to reliably guard the so-
cialist gains of our peoples lest anyone try to speak to the socialist world
in the language of force.
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Speech to Extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 11 March 1985
(Pravda, 12 Mar 85)
In a complicated international situation it is important now as never
before to maintain the defense potential of our socialist homeland at such
a level that potential aggressors will know well that any encroachment on
the security of the land of the Soviets and its allies, on the peaceful life of
the Soviet people, will be met with a shattering retaliatory blow. Our
glorious Armed Forces will continue to have at their disposal everything
necessary for this.
Speech to CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 23 April 1985 (Pravda, 24 Apr
85)
The achievement of military-strategic balance with the states of the
aggressive NATO bloc is an exceptionally important historic gain for the
fraternal countries of socialism. This parity must be cherished by all
possible means, for the sake of peace. It reliably deters the aggressive ap-
petities of imperialism. Nor shall we in the future spare any effort to en-
sure that the USSR Armed Forces have all that is required to reliably de-
fend our fatherland and its allies, SO that nobody will be able to catch us
unawares.
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Jack FYI
EUR Press Guidance
Garby
65
June 27, 1985
USSR: GORBACHEV'S JUNE 26 COMMENTS ON GENEVA TALKS
Q: What is the U.S. reaction to Gorbachev's comments on the
Geneva talks in his June 26 speech, in which he accused the
U.S. of "marking time" in the talks, charged that SDI is a
"blind wall blocking the way to agreements," and warned that
the USSR cannot allow the talks to be used anew as a decoy,
as a cover for military preparations whose purpose is to
ensure U.S. strategic superiority?"
A: -- WE ARE ASTONISHED BY MR. GORBACHEV'S DISTORTED CHARACTER-
IZATION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS,
AND BY HIS THINLY-VEILED THREAT TO SUSPEND THE TALKS.
-- AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S UNJUSTIFIED WALK-OUTS
FROM THE INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS AT THE END OF 1983, OUR
EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS
WERE SET BACK BY MORE THAN ONE YEAR.
-- THE SOVIET UNION'S APPARENT THREAT TO SUSPEND THE ONGOING
NEW NEGOTIATIONS CASTS DOUBT ON ITS SERIOUSNESS IN THE TALKS,
AND ITS READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN
JANUARY BETWEEN SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
ESTABLISHING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW TALKS.
IT IS THE SOVIET UNION AND NOT THE UNITED STATES THAT IS
"MARKING TIME" IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER ALMOST TWO FULL
ROUNDS OF TALKS, WE HAVE YET TO SEE ANY CONCRETE NEW
PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR ARMS, OR TO
ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE AND
FLEXIBLE POSITIONS PUT FORWARD BY THE UNITED STATES.
-- THEY HAVE ALSO REFUSED TO ENGAGE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE
DISCUSSION OF THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION THAT EMERGING
66
- 2 -
DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES COULD MAKE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
MORE STABLE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, AND TO ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
AGREED GOAL OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
-- INSTEAD, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS SOUGHT UNILATERALLY TO
IMPOSE PRECONDITIONS, LINKING DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS
REDUCTIONS TO PRIOR U.S. AGREEMENT TO SOVIET DEMANDS THAT WE
ABANDON RESEARCH UNDER THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.
-- THE HYPOCRISY OF THIS POSITION IS ALL THE MORE STRIKING,
WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE FACT THAT IT IS THE SOVIET UNION WHICH
HAS THE WORLD'S ONLY DEPLOYED ABM SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL
ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM, WHICH IS UNDERMINING THE ABM TREATY
THROUGH CONSTRUCTION OF THE KRASNOYRASK RADAR, AND WHICH HAS
BEEN ENGAGED FOR MANY YEARS AND AT A HIGHER LEVEL OF EFFORT
IN THE SORT OF RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE NOW BEING
UNDERTAKEN UNDER SDI.
-- MR. GORBACHEV'S ALLEGATION THAT THE U.S. IS USING THE
GENEVA TALKS AS A "COVER" FOR MILITARY PROGRAMS IS ALSO
STRIKING WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE FACT THAT, DURING THE TWO
YEARS WHEN THE PREVIOUS INF NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY,
DURING WHICH THE UNITED STATES DEPLOYED NO NEW LRINF
MISSILES, THE SOVIET UNION ADDED SOME 300 SS-20 WARHEADS TO
ITS ARSENAL.
-- U.S. NEGOTIATORS, FOR THEIR PART, HAVE BROAD AUTHORITY AND
FLEXIBILITY TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS THAT MEET THE INTERESTS
AND CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. WHEN THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED
TO TAKE A SIMILARLY CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, PROGRESS WILL BE
POSSIBLE.
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
25 September 1985
67
USSR
Handling of Gorbachev Speeches Fails To Follow Pattern
Soviet media treatment of General Secretary Gorbachev's speeches
has diverged sharply from the predictable pattern that was observed
for the previous three general secretaries. The media's seemingly
erratic handling of the speeches suggests that no fixed guidelines
have been established for broadcast and publication of the new
leader's public remarks, which appear to include substantial
extemporaneous sections. There are no indications that the
anomalies reflect factional infighting.
Since Gorbachev became general secretary, the longstanding pattern of
dissemination of the top Soviet leader's speeches has been shattered. Whereas
the speeches of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were released in one
standard version regardless of the medium, Gorbachev's speeches have
repeatedly appeared in two or even three substantially different versions.
So far no precise or predictable pattern has emerged. Sometimes the television
or radio versions-especially if they are videotapes of Gorbachev delivering his
speech rather than an announcer reading the speech-are the most complete.
In other cases, the fullest version appears later in pamphlet form.
Some of the variations may be traceable to Gorbachev's habit of departing
from his written text while delivering a speech, a practice that is evident in his
televised speeches. Not all variations can be explained in this fashion, however.
The irregular handling may, to some extent, also reflect personal editorial
whims of the general secretary. Whatever the reason, there have been no
indications that the changes reflect any tampering with Gorbachev's speeches
against his wishes or any effort to accommodate other leaders' concerns.
During the period from mid-March, when he became party chief, to late
September, Gorbachev delivered 28 speeches that were reported in some
fashion. Most were short, ceremonial speeches such as at dinners for visiting
foreigners. Three (his 18 June speech to media editors, his 1 July plenum
9
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68
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CONFIDENTIAL
25 September 1985
speech, and his 11 July Minsk speech to military leaders) were mentioned in
Soviet media and may have been important but were not published by the
central press or broadcast by Soviet radio or television at the time and, as far
as can be determined, have not been released subsequently. Nine substantive
speeches were given broad media publicity, and it is the handling of these
speeches that has manifested a highly irregular pattern:
8 April Speech to Economic Managers Conference. This speech,
Gorbachev's first substantive speech after becoming general secretary, was
disseminated in unusual fashion but did not appear in more than one version.
Initially, Pravda and TASS carried only a short report on the conference,
including only two or three paragraphs describing Gorbachev's opening
speech. Apparently a decision was made later to publicize Gorbachev's sharp
comments on economic management in detail. Three days after the speech—
on the evening of 11 April-TASS presented an extensive version of his short
opening and closing speeches, and this version with minor variations appeared
the next morning in Pravda and later in the journals Kommunist and
Partiynaya Zhizn (Party Life). No pamphlet version of this conference speech
has been issued, however.
23 April CPSU Central Committee Plenum Speech. Gorbachev's next
important speech-on economic questions-was handled in traditional
fashion, with only one version appearing on radio and television and in the
press. In keeping with usual Soviet practice for speeches to Central Committee
plenums, there was no broadcast of Gorbachev delivering the speech.
8 May Speech on World War II Anniversary. This ceremonial speech was
broadcast live and published in Pravda, Kommunist, Partiynaya Zhizn, and in
pamphlet form.
17 May Speech in Leningrad. This speech appeared in several variations.
Initially, Soviet radio and television on 17 May and Pravda and
Leningradskaya Pravda the next day carried a short summary of his speech,
omitting many controversial passages that were subsequently released. Four
days later, on 21 May, Moscow radio broadcast a long (50-minute) recorded
version. This broadcast, the most complete account of the speech, included
numerous personal comments (for example, referring to his dealings with
Leningrad leaders) that had been omitted from the earlier version.¹ Later,
another long account appeared in pamphlet form and in Kommunist and
1 See the Trends of 30 May 1985, pages 6-9.
10
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FBIS TRENDS
25 September 1985
69
Partiynaya Zhizn. This published version, however, dropped some of the
statements included in the 21 May radio account and added some other
remarks. Further complicating the picture, even the initial short Pravda
version contained some comments not in either of the longer radio or pamphlet
versions.
11 June Speech to Science and Technology Conference. Replays of this
speech continued the bewildering pattern of differing versions. Soviet
television on the 11th broadcast a 73-minute recording of Gorbachev's speech.
The version released by TASS and printed by Pravda and Partiynaya Zhizn
was shorter but included sections not in the television version. A few days later
a third version appeared in pamphlet form (signed to press on 17 June) and
printed in Kommunist (signed to press on 19 June). The latter version also
included substantial sections not in the television version.
26 June Speech in Dnepropetrovsk. This address was carried on the same
day in lengthy recordings on television that differed considerably from the
version published in Pravda the next day and later in the two party journals. A
third account of the speech came out later in pamphlet form (signed to press
on 9 July). The Pravda version omitted many significant statements about
economic policy but at the same time included others not in the television
version (for example, that reorganization of administration would start with
the agro-industrial complex and machine building).
27 June Speech in Kiev. This speech, which was shorter and less
substantive, was handled differently than his Dnepropetrovsk address. Only
short recorded excerpts appeared on television, and no version was published
in Pravda, the local Ukrainian papers, Kommunist, or Partiynaya Zhizn.
Eventually a longer version did appear in pamphlet form (signed to press on
9 July), including an interesting statement that "not the market, not
spontaneous forces of competition, but primarily the plan should determine the
main aspects of economic development."
6 September Speech in Tyumen. Soviet television telecast a long (79-minute)
videotape of Gorbachev's speech on the day of delivery. Pravda on
7 September carried a much shorter version, omitting most of his critical
remarks.
7 September Speeches in Tselinograd. No version of Gorbachev's first
speech in this Kazakh city appeared until three days after the event, when
television carried a long (71-minute) videotape of his address. Pravda followed
11
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CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
25 September 1985
10
Partiynaya Zhizn. This published version, however, dropped some of the
statements included in the 21 May radio account and added some other
remarks. Further complicating the picture, even the initial short Pravda
version contained some comments not in either of the longer radio or pamphlet
versions.
11 June Speech to Science and Technology Conference. Replays of this
speech continued the bewildering pattern of differing versions. Soviet
television on the 11th broadcast a 73-minute recording of Gorbachev's speech.
The version released by TASS and printed by Pravda and Partiynaya Zhizn
was shorter but included sections not in the television version. A few days later
a third version appeared in pamphlet form (signed to press on 17 June) and
printed in Kommunist (signed to press on 19 June). The latter version also
included substantial sections not in the television version.
26 June Speech in Dnepropetrovsk. This address was carried on the same
day in lengthy recordings on television that differed considerably from the
version published in Pravda the next day and later in the two party journals. A
third account of the speech came out later in pamphlet form (signed to press
on 9 July). The Pravda version omitted many significant statements about
economic policy but at the same time included others not in the television
version (for example, that reorganization of administration would start with
the agro-industrial complex and machine building).
27 June Speech in Kiev. This speech, which was shorter and less
substantive, was handled differently than his Dnepropetrovsk address. Only
short recorded excerpts appeared on television, and no version was published
in Pravda, the local Ukrainian papers, Kommunist, or Partiynaya Zhizn.
Eventually a longer version did appear in pamphlet form (signed to press on
9 July), including an interesting statement that "not the market, not
spontaneous forces of competition, but primarily the plan should determine the
main aspects of economic development."
6 September Speech in Tyumen. Soviet television telecast a long (79-minute)
videotape of Gorbachev's speech on the day of delivery. Pravda on
7 September carried a much shorter version, omitting most of his critical
remarks.
7 September Speeches in Tselinograd. No version of Gorbachev's first
speech in this Kazakh city appeared until three days after the event, when
television carried a long (71-minute) videotape of his address. Pravda followed
11
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CONFIDENTIAL
71
25 September 1985
the next day with a shorter version. A videotape of a second, shorter speech on
7 September was also carried by Soviet television, on 10 September, but
nothing was published in Pravda. Pravda did, however, announce on
15 September that the next issue of Partiynaya Zhizn would include versions
of both the first Tselinograd speech and his earlier address in Tyumen.
Other Media
The appearance of varying versions of speeches in the
Irregularities
central media has occurred for at least one other
Soviet leader on one occasion since Gorbachev became
party chief.² CPSU Secretary Yegor Ligachev's speech to the 26 July CPSU
conference of regional organizational secretaries was published in a short
version in the 27 July Pravda, but longer versions later appeared in
Kommunist and Partiynaya Zhizn-with each journal printing slightly
different versions. No pamphlet of Ligachev's speech is known to have
appeared. (U/FOUO)
2 As in the past, longer versions of speeches delivered outside Moscow by Soviet leaders below
the rank of general secretary are often published in the local press. Thus, when Ligachev
delivered a speech in Yerevan on 1 June, the local papers carried a much longer version than
Pravda.
12
CONFIDENTIAL
R036R I1111)LCZCRYRCYN
72
BC-GORBACHEV 2NDLD (WRITETHROUGH)
GORBACHEV OFFERS U.S. 50 PER CENT STRATEGIC ARMS CUT
(EDS: ADDS INFO GRAFS 11 TO END)
PARIS, OCT 3, REUTER - SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV SAID
TODAY THE KREMLIN HAD OFFERED THE UNITED STATES 8 JOINT 50 PER
File
CENT CUT IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
GORBACHEV MADE PUBLIC THE PROPOSAL, PRESENTED BY SOVIET
NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA, IN A SPEECH AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY THE
SPEAKER OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
Garbacher state they ments
HE ALSO ANNOUNCED A CUT IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SS20 MEDIUM
RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES DEPLOYED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE OVER THE
NEXT TWO MONTHS.
"*A FEW DAYS AGO, WE ADDRESSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES A PROPOSAL TO AGREE ON A COMPLETE BAN ON BOTH SIDES OF
OFFENSIVE SPACE WEAPONS AND A TRULY RADICAL REDUCTION OF 50 PER
CENT IN NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF
THE OTHER SIDE," HE SAID.
GORBACHEV SAID THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS TO STOP THE ARMS RACE
AND CREATE A BREAKTHROUGH FOR PEACE.
HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE TO REACH A
SECOND SOVIET-AMERICAN ACCORD ON THE REDUCTION OF MEDIUM RANGE
NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE "WITHOUT THE DIRECT LINK WITH THE
PROBLEM OF SPACE AND STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS."
UP TO NOW THE SOVIET UNION HAS INSISTED THAT THE THREE
SUBJECTS BEING DISCUSSED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN GENEVA TALKS
MUST BE TREATED AS A SINGLE PACKAGE.
GORBACHEV SAID MOSCOW WAS PREPARED FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH
FRANCE AND BRITAIN ON THE PLACE OF THEIR NUCLEAR DETERRENTS IN
THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF FORCES.
**THIS POTENTIAL IS GROWING FAST AND WE CANNOT CLOSE OURE EYES
TO IT", HE SAID,
GORBACHEV RECALLED THE SOVIET UNION'S MORATORIUM ON THE
INSTALLATION IN EUROPE OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AND ADDED:
""THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL SS20 MISSILES WHICH THE SOVIET
UNION HAS IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE IS NOW 243."
GORBACHEV SAID THIS NUMBER WAS THE SAME AS IN JUNE 1984, WHEN
MOSCOW BEGAN TO INSTALL EXTRA MISSILES IN RESPONSE TO SIMILAR
U.S. DEPLOYMENTS OF CRUISE AND PERSHING WEAPONS.
""THE SS-20 MISSILES WHICH WERE THEN DEPLOYED IN A
SUPPLEMENTARY WAY ARE NOW WITHDRAWN FROM OPERATIONAL SERVICE
AND THE FIXED INSTALLATIONS OF THESE MISSILES WILL BE
DISMANTLED IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS," GORBACHEV SAID.
GORBACHEV SAID, HOWEVER, THAT OTHER SOVIET COUNTER-MERSURES
13
ANNOUNCED EARLIER TO PERSHING AND CRUISE DEPLOYMENTS, AND
AFFECTING U.S. TERRITORY, WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE.
AN OLDER GENERATION OF SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, THE
SS-5, HAD BEEN COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN FROM SERVICE AND THE
KREMLIN WAS DOING THE SAME WITH ITS SS-4 MISSILES,
**THIS MEANS THAT ALTOGETHER THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE
MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE OF THE USSR IS MUCH LOWER THAN IT
WAS 10 OR 15 YEARS AGO," HE SAID.
GORBACHEV ALSO SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO BAN THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WERPONS,
USING THE SAME METHOD AS THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH
BANS THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALSO READY TO ESTABLISH A ZONE IN
CENTRAL EUROPE FREE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND SAID THE PROBLEM OF
RELIABLE VERIFICATION COULD BE SOLVED.
BUT GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SEARCH FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY
THROUGH NEW WEAPONS UNDER A PROGRAM FOR "*STAR WARS** WAS ""AN
EXTREMELY DANGEROUS ILLUSION."
HE SAID EUROPEAN SECURITY DEPENDED ON **PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE,
DETENTE, DISARMAMENT, AND THE STRENGHENING OF CONFIDENCE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION."
HE SAID SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WERE READY TO ACCEPT R PROPOSAL BY
NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AT THE STOCKHOLM EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
ON MUTUAL EXCHANGES OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES.
"ME ARE READY TO ACCEPT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IN THE HOPE THAT
IT WOULD HELP TO OVERCOME MISTRUST AND BLOCK INSIDIOUS
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR:" HE SAID.
74
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9
Firbacher
File
speeches
NOTE TO JACK MATLOCK
FROM:
KARNA 1V
48
You probably have this - but just for
the file, it's the translation of
Gorbachev's speech to the French
Parliament (CBS sent it over).
OCT.03 '85 15:53
eere, -INNMS Lanirol P.01 P.175
EVE
M KAWA know
NESHINGTON NEWS IN
Speech in the French Parliament
202
659-2586
October 3, 1985
ATTN: PETER KENDALL
who d did
Mr. Chairman,
Esteemed Deputies and Senators,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am gratified by the opportunity to speak in the parliament
of France, to meet with you - elected representatives of the
French people. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity
and to thank the President of the Republic for the kind
invitation to visit your country.
Today is the second day of our delegation's visit. Impor Lant
meetings have been held and an exchange of views has been started
on topical questions of bilateral relations and international
affairs. of course, it is yet early to sum up the results of the
talks with President Mitterrand and other statesmen of France.
But it is obvious already that both sides are showing desire to
impart a new impulse to the development of relations between our
countries and, with due account to the existing realities, to
bring closer our positions on international problems.
When talking with the President of the Republic and when
addressing you today I strive, naturally. for the essence, the
main directedness of the Soviet state's foreign policy to be
understood better, to a fuller extent in France. Like the foreign
policy of any state, it is determined first of all by internal
requirements.'
Permit me to dwell briefly on this question. I believe you
know what a long and in many respects difficult road has been
traversed by my country in the years of existence of Soviet
government. From tsarist Russia we inherited extreme economic
backwardness. Three quarters of the population were illiterate.
Within a very short period of time, if the yardstick of history
is. applied, the USSR turned into a mighty, in all respects modern
power with a high level of the people's culture. We put an end to
unemployment and ensured for the population such social boons as
free provision of houcing, medical Services and education. I will
name a few figures illustrating the country's economic
development. In the post-war years alone our national income grew
more than 16 times while industrial output increased 24 times
over. During the same time the real incomes of Soviet people
increased six-fold.
Pride in our successes does not make us complacent. We see
that at the present stage society's increased maturity sets
before us much more scopeful tasks which in many ways are new
ones by their content. W3 are fully avare also of the
shortcomings that exist in our work, of the existing difficulties
and problems, quite often sufficiently serious ones. The main
task that we set ourselves today can be expressed in a brief
formula: to accelerate society' s social and economic development.
OCT.03 '85 15:54
P.02
76
-2-
This requires that many things be raised to a higher level -
the scientific and technical base of the national economy, the
methods of management and man himself, his consciousness, skills
and qualification. In short, we have set off on the road to
achieving a new qualitative state of society.
Our main task is to make the economy more efficient and
dynamic, to thake the life of people spiritually richer, more
full-blooded and meaningful, to develop the socialist
self-government of the people.
It is not difficult to understand that not only reliable
peace but also a calm, normal international situation are a
paramount condition of attaining these aims. And it is these
priorities that determine our foreign policy, a policy in which,
naturally, we strive to take into account in full measure the
interests and requirements of other peoples, all the realities of
the present epoch.
Our world, a multifaced and contradictory world, is rapidly
approaching the end of the century and the milleniun. It has more
than its fair share of complex problems of a political, economic
and social nature. The co-existence on our planet of two social
systems, each of which is living and developing according to its
laws, has long become a reality.
But one must see the other reality as well. And this reality
is that the inter-connection and inter-dependence of countries
and continents is becoming increasingly closer. This is an
insvitable condition of the development of the world economy, of
scientific and technological progress, the accaleration of the
exchange of information and the movement of people and things -
on land and even in outer space. In short, the entire development
of human civilisation.
Alas, it is not elways that the gains of civilisation are a
boon for people. All too often and too vigorously the
achievements of science and technology are being used also for
the creation of means of annihilating humans, for the development
and stockpiling of ever more terrible types of weapons.'
In these conditions Hamlet's famous question, "To be, or not
to be" is being set already not before a single individual but
before markind. It develops into a global problem. There can be
only one answer to it - markind, civilisation must survive at all
cost. But this can be ensured only if we learn to live together,
to get along on this small planet by mastering the difficult art
of showing consideration for each other's interests. This we call
the policy of peaceful. coexistence.
We are strong enough to give a crushing rebuff to any attempt
to encroach on our people's security and peaceful work. But we
hold that it is not by force of arms but only and exclusively by
force of example one must prove the correctness of one's
ideology, the advantages of the system that each people has
chosen or its own will. Such is our firm conviction.
P.03
77
OCT.03 '85 15:55
Gorby A-C
-3-
I spoke yesterday to the President about our perception
of the main axis of contradictions, the struggle of the two
tendencies in world politics. We regard as extremely dangerous
the view, no matter how it is being justified, that the tasks
facing the international community can be solved by the creation
and stockpiling of ever new and more destructive types of arms -
on Earth and in outer space. We regard as dangerous also actions
that preserve and aggravate international tension. It is
incandescent as it is. It is so incandescent that now it has
become extremely difficult to reach agreement not only on
complex, urgent matters but also on relatively simple problems.
If we do not stop the present tendencies, tomorrow we will not be
able to. overcome their monstrous inertia. It will become even
more difficult to talk.
That is why we consider it so important already now,
immediately, before it is too late to stop the "infernal train"
of the arms race, to start the reduction of arms, improve the
international situation and develop peaceful cooperation among
peoples. This is in mutual interest, this is everybody's task.
Nobody can permit hinself to sit it out on the sidelines.
The Soviet Union, as you probably know, not only issues calls
but also acts in this direction.
We have unilaterally suspended the further deployment of
medium-range missiles in Europe and called on the United States
to respond in kind. We stopped all nuclear explosions and called
on the United States to respond in kind. Quite naturally, we
address this call to the other nuclear powers as well.
The Soviet Union proposes to start a reduction of the armed
forces and armaments of both sides in Central Europe - and to
start with a reduction of Soviet and American troops. Moreover,
we are prepared to reduce more troops than the Americans.
As for outer space, we are for its use exclusively for
peaceful purposes and persistently call for the reaching of
agreement on this because a transfer of the arms race into outer
space will make the reduction of nuclear arsenals objectively
impossible. As you know, we have submitted to the United Nations
Organisation a proposal on peaceful cooperation in the peaceful
exploration of outer space.
And now I would like to inform you of the new steps taken by
the Soviet Union. They pursue the same aim: to stop the baleful
process of the arms race and ward off the war danger overhanging
mankind.
First. A few days ago we proposed to the government of the
United States to come to terms on the total prohibition of space
strike arms for both sides and to reduce really radically, by 50
per cent, the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's
11
territory.
In other words, we propose a practical solution. to the very
same tasks that were agreed upon by both sides early this year as
being the aims of the Geneva talks: not only to stop Line arms
race but also to drastically lower the level of armaments and at
the same time avert an arms race in alter space.
P.04
78
OCT.03 '85 15:56
---
Joby
There is hardlv any need to sav how all this would strenzthen
strategic stabilitv and mutual trust.
I can inform YOU that our delegation in Geneva has been
instructed to present concrete orooosals on this question and
authorised to give the partners exhaustive explanations.'
I am saving all this because a multitude of versions and
false rumairs are alreadv circulating in the West concerning our
nrmosal. and it is time for some clarification.
Second. Concerning mediun-range nuclear weanons in Eurone.
with the aim of making easier agreement on their soeediest mutual
reduction ( as We are often told, in Wastern Eurooe. too. there is
great interest in this) we consider it nossible to conclude a
corresponding agreement seraratelv. outside of direct connection
with the problem of snace and strategic arms. This road. as it
andears to us. mav turn art to be practical.
In this connection I consider it important to explain our
position, on such a question as the place of the nuclear notential
of France and Britain in the Bironean balance of forces. This
notential is growing ranidlv and we can no longer ignore it. It
was said from the French side that the nuclear forces of France
are not subject to discussion without her narticipation. This
stands to reason. It follows from this that it is time to start
between us a direct dialozue on this theme and trv to find an
acceptable wav out through ioint effort. The Soviet Union is
prenared for such a direct dialogue with France just as with
Britaín. of course.
Here I want to stress that we will take into account the
security interests of France in the most attentive manner. And
todav. as it annears to us. the question of a reduction of her
armaments does not stand.
Third. You know that we have announced a moratorium on the
denlovment of medium-range missiles in Eurone. The number of
SS-20 missiles that the Soviet Union has on standbv alert in the
Euronean zone is now 243. This means that it preciselv accords
with the level of June 1984 when the additional deployment. of our
missiles was started in response to the deployment. of American
medium-range missiles in Eurone. The SS-20 missiles that were
additionally denloved in the process have been withdrawn from
standbv alert and the stationary installations for housing these
missiles will be disnantled within the next two months. As to our
renlv measures in respect of the territory. of the United States
itself thev continue to remain in force.
I would also wish to explain the meaning with. which We invest
the term "Euronean zone". in this case. This is the zone in which
madium-rance missiles canable of striking targets on the
territory of Western Airone are deployed.
It should be added to this that. we have alreadv totally
phased out the old. and very nowerful. SS-5 missiles and are
continuing to chase out SS-4 missiles. This means that on the
whole the number of medium-range carrier missiles in the
Euronean zone of the USSR is now much smaller than ten or evan
fifteen vears ago. In accepting this self-limitation we proceed
from the broad interests of Bironean security. I think Dirone is
now entitled to exnect a renlv sten bv the United States - the
termination by it of the further denlovment of its medium-range
P.05
79
OCT.03 '85 15:57
Gorby A-C
-5-
missiles on the European' continent.
You see what serious stens the Soviet Union is taking. In
combination with the previous actions our latest proposals. as it
seens to us. are a backage of constructive and realistic measures
the imnlementation of which would brinz about a genuine
breakthrouth in the development of international relations. A
breakthrouzn in favour of D3RCA. security and coonsration anone
neonles.
This. if vou please. is our programme of improving the
explosive international situation that threatens Deace. We expect
that in response to our pronosals the West too will traverse its
part of the road.
-I. would like to stress that the realisation of the orozramne
or coosed bv us would also signify substantial advance to an aim
that is so desired by all the neonles and is so important to them
the prohibition and total liquidation of nuclear arms.
the total deliverv of markind from the threat of nuclear war.
There can be no victors in a nuclear war. It seens that all
responsible politicians are in agreement on this. It is time to
draw a practical conclusion from this - to stoo the nuclear arms
race. And we believe that this demand will be supported bv all
honest. realistically thinking political forces. public figures.
all people who cherish their homeland. their life. the life of
their children and trandchildren.
The task of totallv prohibiting chemical weanons and
liquidating their stockniles is becoming ever more ursent. At the
conference on disarmament in Geneva the Soviet Union is activelv
taking nart in the drafting of a relevant convention. We are
meeting our partners. in the talks hal f-way in a number of
substantial asnects. including in respect of verification. T am
sure that it, is ouite possible to reach agreement. on reliable
-.verification.
Incidentally. the following thought also promots itsalf
here. If it. was nossible to reach agreement on the
non-roliferation of nuclear arms whv not anoly the sane method
in resnect of chemical weanons? This would be in the general
channel of efforts to achieve their total prohibition. The Soviet
Union would be prepared to take nart in the drafting of an
international accord on the non-proliferation of chemical
weasons. We are also prenared to do everything depending on us
for the creation of a zone in the centre of Dirone free from
chemical weanons.
As T sneak here. in Paris. in the heart, it. can be said. of
Western Birone. I cannot but speak about some substantial
problems of Euronean security. about now we in the Soviet Union
see them.
I will start. with the most general question. what. after all.
is security in Europe? It is absence of war and war danger. The
inter-depandence. the intertwining of the destinies of peoples.
desoite the difference of the social roads chosen bv then. is
felt. in Eurone with special force. Bacause of
density. over-saturation with armaments Airona. like no other
continent. is vulnerable in an armed conflict. the more so a
nuclear one.
P.06
OCT.03'85 15:58
80
Gorby A-C
This means nat Firobe's security cannot be ensured bv
military means, by military Corde. This is an absolutelv new
situation and means a departure from traditions. from a mentality
and manner of action that took centuries. even milleniums to
form. It is not at once that human thairt adjusts itself to
something that is new. This applies to all. We are feeling this.
we have started the rethinsinz. the adjustment to full conformitv
with the new realities of many customary thinzs. including in the
military and. naturally. the political fields. W3 would want such
a rething to take place both in Western Europe and bevond it.
30 far fear of unaccentable retribution is one or the
obstacles to war. to the use of militarv force. But everybodv
understands. however. that. it. is impossible to build a lasting
neace 3 fear alone. But the entire question is where to search
for the alternative to fear or. to use military lantuage.
deterrence?
i3 see what attemots are now being made to find a wav out -
by usinz new arns in the so called 'star ware'. This is an
illusion. and an extremelv dangerous one at that. It is naive in
general to search for 3 solution of the problem of security in
the perfection of the shield and the sword. Security in Eurone.
just as international security 33 a whole. can be achieved only
on the road of beaceful coexistence. relaxation of tension.
disarmament. strengthoning of trust and Invelopment or
international cooperation.
This is a lont and difficult road. the more so that it
requires the overcoming of nutual suspicions. mistrust and
prejudices accumulated over decades. Rut, there is no other road.
if we want to live. And like anv long road. it. begins with the
first steps which often are the most. difficult ones to make. We
understand this and want to heln ensure the solution of the task
- for ourselves and for voi. It is this that motivates the
oronosals that I have alreadv mentioned.
This applies also to the conference in Stockholm which is
discussing the incortant problem of nutual trust in the militarv
field. As it aonears to us. the contours of future accords are
gradually beginning to take shane there. They include making more
concrete and imparting maximun effectiveness to the principle of
the non-use of Corce, They include a definite set of
confidence-buildina measures in the military field. these se to
sav safetv fuses to prevent an erroneous interoretation of the
actions of the other side in conditions of an aggravation of the
militarv confrontation. \ number of states. first of all neutral
ones. propose to reach arreement on mutual exchanges of annual
plans of militarv activity subject to notification. is are
prepared for such an accord in the none that it will help
overcome suspiciousness and incorde covert preparations for war.
P.07
81
OCT.03 '85 15:59
GoRby A-C
-7-
The ideas of setting up nuclear-free zones in various parts
of the world, including on our continent - in the north of Europe
and in the Balkans, are spreading ever more wider. We support
these ideas, are ready to take part in the appropriate guarantees
where this is required. We view as useful the idea to create a
corridor free of nuclear arms along both sides of the line
dividing the two military-political groupings. We also hold that
states that do not possess nuclear arms and do not have them on
their territory have full right to reliable guarantees of their
security based on international law, guarantees that nuclear arms
will not be used against them.
Many aspects of European cooperation are recorded in the
Helsinki Final Act. We hold that it is a serious achievement and
fully retains its importance. When the tenth anniversary of the
Helsinkt accords was marked, all the participants in the
all-European process declared for its continuation. The Soviet
Union is prepared to take the most vigorous part in this. Every
European country has contributed a share of Its national
experience to the Helsinki process. This is a common asset of the
peoples of Europe, and it should be protected and multiplied by
joint effort.
The political climate in Europe depends in no small measure
on the development of economic ties between the West and the
East. Here, too, an innovative approach is necessary. The
solution of the tasks of industrial, technical and scientific
progress that face each country today could be made much easier
by an effective utilisation of the international division of
labour. We in the Soviet Union are prepared for this, including
for the search of new forms of co-production and cooperation. It
goes without saying that this implies principles of mutual
advantage, equality and a serious approach.
The establishment of more businesslike relations hetween the
CMEA and the EEC also appears to be useful to us. The countries
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance have displayed in
this respect a constructive initiative which appears to have been
met favourably. It is important for it to produce concrete
results. Here, as it has already been stated, in the measure in
which the EEC countries come out as a "political unit", we are
prepared to find a common tongue with them on concrete
international problems as well. This could be done in various
forms, including also parliamentary ties, among them with whose
who represent the European Parliament.
Without uniting the efforts of all Biropean countries it
will not be possible really to solve also such an acute problem
as preserving and improving the environment on our continent. In
many of its areas, figuratively speaking, the land is beginning
to burn under the feet, the rain falling from the sky is an acid
one, if not fiery, while the sky itself cannot be seen because of
smoke. European rivers and seas are acquiring a pitiful state. In
our time, it seems, we did not act with sufficient
far-sightedness and generated such problems that now simply defy
solution within national framworks. Here truly there is a field
in which we all must become aware of the continent's common
destiny.
P.08
OCT.03 '85 16:00
82
Gorby A-C
-8-
Much can be done in the broad sphere that is called the
"humanitarian" one. The preservation by common effort of the
cultural values of the past, cultural exchanges that mutually
enrich one of the cradles of mankind's spiritual values - Europe
- does this not deserve the closest attention? It is with
interest that we are preparing for such an out of the ordinary
event as the "Cultural Forum" opening in a few days in Budapest.
Also belonging to this sphere is the expansion of information
about each other's life, cultivation of feelings of mutual
sympathy and respect. The mutual study of each other's languages
is of much importance from this point of view. Extensive
exchanges of school pupils, students and teachers is a promising
thing. It is very important for the young generations to have
correct. parceptions of each other because it is for them to build
peaceful Europe. The pooling of efforts in the struggle against
diseases - old and new ones - is a task of immanse importance.
The Sovlet Union attaches the most sectous importance to
ensuring human rights. It is only necessary to free this problem
From hypoartey and spicalations, From Attempts at Incerference in
the Internal affairs of other cointries. Such problems are eather
acite in present-day Europe 25 the position of migrant workers,
mivel marria044, of We ace for
approsching such problems in a positive and humane spirit with
full respect for the sovereign rights of all states.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I believe that in the present situation It 19 especially
Important not to emulate medieval fanatics and not to spread
deological ilfferences to Inter-state relations. Stability in
these relations, their lesser susceptibility to political
situations will strengthen also stability in Europe as a whole.
We do not think, for Instance, that there Le s taboo for life
on the possibility of establishing contacts in some form between
the. Narsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic alliance as
organisations. Not to speak of overcoming Europe's division into
opposing groupings in a more or less foreseeable future. As is
known, this is exactly what we and our allies are proposing. But,
as we see it, even in conditions of the existence of the two blocs
it is possible to create such a modus vivendi which would blunt
the acuteness of the present confrontation.
And, of cousse. It 19 mare Deportant Loday chan ever Battie
to develop a more intensive political dialogue between the East
and the Tast, to use all the already established forms ot this
dialogue - regular meetings at various levels, including of
course the highest one, political consultations, broad contacts
of the scientific and cultural communities.
We regard the development of parliamentary ties as a very
important matter as well. I would like to stress this
particularly as I am speaking within these walls. This includes,
naturally, also the development of parliamentary ties with
France. Deputies of the National Assembly and Senate of France
can be assured that they are welcome guests in Moscow. I state
this on behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
P.09
83
OCT.03 '85 16:01
Garaby A-C
-9-
Such, in most general outline, are our views on how really it
is possible to achieve, and within a comparatively short period
of time at that, an improvement of the situation on our continent
and to increase Europe's role in overcoming the present stretc's
of confrontation.
I will add yet one moment. The need of more active
interaction to eliminate the seats of conflict and tension
existing in vařious areas has never been felt more than now. The
fact that the Soviet Union and France, despite their belonging to
opposing military-political groupings, have much in common in the
approach to a number of presently existing regional problems and
situations is one of the examples of the possibilities of such
interaction. For instance, the situation in the Middle East, in
Central America, South Africa, and so on. Our contacts with the
French leaders confirm this.
When proposing an expansion of goodneighbourhood and
cooperation with Western Europe we have no intention at all to
belittle the importance of a possible contribution to this by
Canada which belongs to NATO and at the sama time has signed the
Helsinki Act. Neither does our European policy have an
anti-American directedness.
Since one hears numerous speculations on this theme pereit m
to dwell on it in greater detail. The very way the question is
posed :- that by improving relations with Western Europs we want
to drive a wedge, to set it at loggerheads with the United States
- is absurd. Firstly, we want to have good relations not only
with Western Europe but also with the United States. Just as for
that matter also with China, Japan and other countries. We are
not pursuing a metternich-like policy of "halance of forces",
of setting one state against another, knocking together blocs and
counter-blocs, creating "axes" and "triangles", but a policy of
global detente, of strangthening world security and developing
universal international cooperation. Secondly, W3 are realists
and we understant how strong are the ties - historical, political
and economic - linking Western Europe and the United States.
Esteemed Deputies,
The best minds of mankind have warned about the danger of our
consciousness lagging behind the rapidly changing life. This is
especially topical today. Man is already appearing in the
galaxial distances. But how much remains undone on Earth! Not &
single nation, not a single state is capable of solving the
existing problems alone. But the old haggage of disunity,
confrontation and mistrust impedes unification.
I know that by far not everybody in this hall accepts our
world outlook, our ideology. Being a realist I am not trying to
convert anyone into our creel. Any philosophy is approached by
individuals and peoples themselves, only achieving it through
much suffering, only on accepting it with their minds and hearts.
But despite all differences In political and philosophical vlews,
in ideals ant values we must remember one thing: we all are
keepers of the fire of life handed down to us by the previous
generations.
P.10 84
OCT.03 '85 16:01
GoRby A-C
-10-
Each had its own mission and each in its own way enriched
world civilisation. The glants of the Renaissance and the Great
French Revolution, the heroes of the October Revolution in
Russia, of Victory and the Resistance - they all have fulfilled
their duty to history.
And what about our generation? It has made great discoveries
but it has also found recipes for the self-deatruction of the
human race. On the threshold of the third millenium we must burn
the black book of nuclear "alchemy". May the 21st century become
the first century in life without fear of universal death.
We will fulfill this mission if wa unite our efforts. The
Soviet Union is prepared to make its contribution to orensuring a
peaceful, free and flourishing future of Europe and all the other
continents. We will stint nothing for this.
Thank you for your attention.
I
85
ONF IDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
File: speech
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 4649
DTG:161706Z OCT 85 PSN: 038552
E0B972
AN010579
TOR. 289/1753Z
CSN:HCE365
4. GORBACHEV WAS MOST CANDID WHEN DISCUSSING THE FYP.
DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 RAY-01 CANN-01 SEST-01 LENC-01
HE LED OFF BY ACCUSING UNNAMED CADRES OF "INERTIA" AND
LEHR-01 MAT-01 DANZ-01 /009 A4
INABILITY TO ADAPT TO CHANGED CONDITIONS. AS A RESULT,
THE ORIGINAL XII FYP WAS FLAWED: IT HAD BEEN POSSIBLE,
HOWEVER, TO CORRECT "MUCH" AND 31N THE MAIN" THE FYP'S
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
OUTLINE WAS IN KEEPING WITH "REQUIREMENTS". GORBACHEV
SIT: SIT PUBS EOB
CALLED FOR AN ALMOST DOUBLING OF NATIONAL INCOME WITHIN
EOB:
15 YEARS. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD IMPLY A SUSTAINED
GROWTH RATE OF ABOUT 4.6 PERCENT ANNUALLY WHICH APPEARS
UNREALISTIC IN VIEW OF PAST SOVIET PERFORMANCE AND
CURRENT PROBLEMS. END COMMENT.) THIS IS TO BE REACHED
OP MMED
BY CONCENTRATING CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN: MACHINE BUILD-
STU4911
ING, AND THE CHEMICAL, ELECTRONIC AND ELECTRICAL
DE RUEHMO #4649/01 2891709
ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES BUT HE FAILED TO MENTION
0 161706Z OCT 85
ENERGY, AGRICULTURE OR THE FOOD AND CONSUMER PROGRAMS
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
IN HIS LIST OF PRIORITIES AND INCREASING LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY BY 130-150 PERCENT ("V 2.3-2.5 RAZA").
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6065
GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGED PAST PROBLEMS WITH SUCH AN
APPROACH, WHEN HE CALLED FOR "MORE ENERGETIC
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION THAN IN THE PAST OF RESTRUCTURING THE
ECONOMY AND THE CONCENTRATION OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT
CONFIDENT AL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 14649
IN PRIORITY DIRECTIONS. GORBACHEV URGED THAT
THE ACTUAL FYP ITSELF BE WORKED OUT AS THE GUIDELINES
ARE DEBATED DURING THE RUN-UP TO THE CONGRESS, ALLOWING
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
THE PLAN TO BE "AFFIRMED" SOON AFTER THE CONGRESS.
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, PROP, UR
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE OCTOBER 15 PLENUM
NEW PARTY PROGRAM
ENTIRE TEXT.
5. SORBACHEN DEVOTED THE LARGEST PORTION OF HIS
REMARKS NEW PART PROGRAM. -E CLAIMED THAT THE
1961 PROGRAM WAS BASICALLY CORRECT, BUT IMPLICITLY
2. SUMMARY: GORBACHEV DELIVERED THE MAIN REPORT AT
CRITICIZED IT ON A NUMBER OF POINTS: IT WAS EXCESSIVELY
OCTOBER 15 CPSU PLENUM, A SHORT AND RATHER BLAND SPEECH.
DETAILED, CONTAINED "GROUNDLESS FANTASY", "BOOKISH
HE ACCUSED UNNAMED CADRSS OF INERTIA, ADMITTED THAT THERE
PEDANTRY", AND PLAYED WITH DEFINITIONS. THE PROGRAM
HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING THE GUIDELINES FOR THE
SHOULD BE A "CLEAR AND PRECISE STATEMENT" OF THE
FIVE-YEAR PLAN BUT NEVERTHELESS ANNOUNCED AN AMBITIOUS
PARTY'S GOALS. IN A RATHER CURIOUS STATEMENT,
GOAL OF ALMOST DOUBLING NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCTION
GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE POLITBURO CONSIDERED THAT THE
IN 15 YEARS. GORBACHEV ALSO CRITICIZED THE 1961 PARTY
DRAFT REVISION "ON THE WHOLE" MET THIS DEMAND.
PROGRAM, AND SUGGESTED A NEW VIEW OF THE TRANSITION
FROM SOCIALISM TO COMMUNISM. IN A DEFENSIVE RATHER THAN
EXPANSIONIST UECTION ON FOREIGN POLICY, HE DESCRIBED
6. IN HIS OUTLINE OF THE PROGRAM'S DOMESTIC GOAL
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS THE BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN
GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED NOW-FAMILIAR THEMES: INCREASING
POLICY AND MENTIONED FORMULATION ON SOCIALIST UNITY WHICH
EFFICIENCY, MORE OPENNESS, BETTER "SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY"
RECOGNIZES A DEGREE OF DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL
INCREASING LIVING STANDARDS AND THE GENERAL WELFARE.
COMMUNIST MOVENENT. LITTLE INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED
ON THE REVISIONS TO THE PARTY BY-LAWS. IN STYLE AND
APPROACH, PARTICULARLY TO THE NEW ECONOMIC PLAN, THE
7. GORBACHEV DEVOTED MORE ATTENTION TO IDOLOGY THAN
SPEECH HARDLY SEEMED NEW. END SUMMACY.
NORMAL. ADDRESSING THE MOST DISCREDITED SECTION IN
THE 1961 PROGRAM, HE BRIEFLY OUTLINED WHAT APPEARS TO
INTRODUCTION
BE A NEW VIEW OF THE TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO
BT
3. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE PLENUM ON OCTOBER 15 WAS
BRIEF BY COMPARISON TO OTHER SPEECHES HE HAS MADE
RECENTLY, AND MAY REFLECT SOME EDITING OF HIS REMARKS.
THE PLENUM, HOWEVER, WAS APPARENTLY BRIEF: CC MEMBERS
CARS HAD ALL DEPARTED BY 2 P.M. THE SPEECH CONTAINED
LITTLE NEW OR STARTLING, AND IN THE MAIN WAS A REPETITION
OF KNOWN GORBACHEV POSITIONS. HIS REMARKS WERE DIVIDED
and
THEMATICALLY INTO THRES PARTS CORRESPONDING TO THE THREE
DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY THE PLENUMC THE NEW EDITION OF
THE PARTY PROGRAM; THE MAIN GUIDELINES FOR THE 12TH
Matler
FIVE-YEAR PLAN (FYP) AND FOR THE PERIOD TO 2000; AND
THE REVISIONS TO THE PARTY BY-LAWS. NONE OF THESE
DOCUMENTS HAS YET APPEARED IN THE PRESS.
DECLASSIFIED
ECONOMIC PLANS
NLRR Fob-114/7 #9981
Cr
NADA
CONFIDENTIAL
7/7/08
CONFIDENTIAL
86
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 4649
DTG: 161706Z OCT 85 PSN: 038555
E0B973
AN010578
TOR: 289/1754Z
CSN: HCE366
PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF "SOCIALIST SELF-MANAGEMENT"
IN ALL GROUPS AND AT ALL LEVELS.
DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 RAY-01 CANN-01 SEST-01 LENC-01
LEHR-01 MAT-01 DANZ-01 /009 A4
11. COMMENT: THIS SPEECH IS BLAND BY COMPARISON WITH
GORBACHEV'S PREVIOUS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. GORBACHEV'S
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
CADRE COMMENTS PROBABLY FORESHADOW FURTHER PERSONNEL
SIT: SIT PUBS EOB
CHANGES, ESPECIALLY IN THE CENTRAL MINISTRIES. THE
EOB:
ECONOMIC GOALS STRIKE US AS VERY AMBITIOUS, AND IT
WILL TAKE A REMARKABLE IMPROVEMENT IN BOTH MANAGEMENT
AND PERFORMANCE TO ACHIEVE THEM. THESE IMPROVEMENTS
HAVE ELUDED THE SOVIETS IN THE PAST, AND MUCH WILL
OP IMMED
DEPEND ON WHETHER GORBACHEV IS WILLING OR ABLE TO
STU4922
UNDERTAKE MEASURES TO CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF HE
DE RUEHMO #4649/02 2891713
ECONOMIC MECHANISM. TO ALL APPEARANCES, THIS DECISION
0 161706Z OCT 85
HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE.
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6066
12. "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" IN THE SOVIET LEXICON
MEANS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SIDE, COMPETITION BY MEANS
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SHORT OF WAR. IT IS HARDLY A PASSIVE APPROACH. NEVER-
THELESS, GORBACHEV'S EMPHASIS IN THIS SPEECH, WHICH
CONF DE N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 14649
THE PARTY PROGRAM WILL PRESUMABLY MIRROR, SUGGESTS THAT
HE WANTS TO APPLY MARFIST IDEOLOGY PRAGMATICALLY INN
PURSUIT OF MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. THIS WOULD
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
APPEAR TO BE AT LEAST A RHETORICAL RETREAT FROM THE
TAGS: ECON, PGOV, PINR, PINS, PREL, PROP, UR
OPTIMISTIC BOMBAST OF THE 1961 PARTY PROGRAM AND EVEN
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV'S SPEECH TO THE OCTOBER 15 PLENUM
THE OFT-STATED CLAIM OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS THAT THE
WORLD "CORRELATION OF FORCES" HAD ALREADY SHIFTED IN
COMMUNISM: I.E., THERE IS NO PRECISE BOUNDARY AND,
FAVOR OF SOCIALISM. END COMMENT.
INDEED, SOCIALISM is NOT AN "INDEPENDENT ENTITY". FOR
HARTMAN
ELABORATION, WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE PROGRAM'S
BT
PUBLICATION.
8. GORBACHEV ALSO BRIEFLY ADDRESSED THE NATURE OF
"REAL SOCIALISM", A SUBJECT OF KEEN INTEREST TO
YUGOSLAVIA, CHINA AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES.
GORBACHEV NOTED THE "ASPIRATION" TO PROMOTE "THAT
DIALECTIC UNITY OF DIVERSITY WHICH ENCOMPASSES THE
WHOLE LIVING FIBER OF THE REAL SOCIALIST WORLD". THIS
COMPLEX FORMULATION, WHICH WE EXPECT WILL BE DISCUSSED
IN MORE DETAIL IN THE PROGRAM ITSELF, MAY BE AN ATTEMPT
TO ACCOMMODATE SOME DIVERSITY AMONG MOSCOW'S FRIENDS
AND ALLIES WHILE PROMOTING "UNITY" (I.E., THE SOVIET
POSITION) TO THE GREATEST EXTENT PRACTICABLE.
9. GORBACHEV'S DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IS
NOTABLE FOR ITS DEFENSIVENESS. IN AN ADDRESS WHICH
PROVIDES BASIC GUIDANCE ON PARTY IDEOLOGY, GORBACHEV
MAKES NO CLAIM THAT COMMUNISM IS SPREADING OR WILL
SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. HIS EMPHASIS INSTEAD IS
ON THE DANGEROUS POLICIES OF "IMPERIALISM", PARTICULARLY
AMERICAN, AND ON THE CONSEQUENT NEED TO PREVENT WAR.
HE DESCRIBES "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
OPPOSING SYSTEMS" AS THE BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY. HE USES WORDS LIKE "REALISTICALLY" AND
"FLEXIBLY" TO CHARACTERIZE THE MANNER IN WHICH THAT
POLICY SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.
PARTY STATUTES
10. GORBACHEV OFFERED LITTLE CONCRETE INFORMATION ABOUT
THE CHANGES IN THE PARTY BY-LAWS. HE SAID BOTH THE
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTY MEMBERS WILL
BE INCREASED, AND HINTED THAT SOME REVISIONS
IN PARTY-STATE RELATIONS ARE IN THE OFFING: EACH MUST
CARRY OUT ITS FUNCTIONS, BUT THE PARTY MUST ACTIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL
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CSN: HCE262
DISTRIBUTION: CANN-01 MAN-01 MALY-01 DOBR-01 STEI-01 SOMM-01
FILE-01 MAT-01 1008 A4
E
X
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
D
SIT: VP SIT PUBS PEAR EOB
EOB:
S
OP IMMED
STU8965
DE RUEHMO # 8738/01 3621741
O 281739Z DEC 85 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASS) MOSCOW
E
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8852
X
2
E
N
A
SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 18738
D
EXDIS
S
FOR EUR/SOV: MARK PARRIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: 1/1/86
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GORBACHEV TV ADDRESS
E
1. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL SOVIET TRANSLATION
X
OF GORBACHEV REMARKS FOR U.S. TELEVISION ON JANUARY 1.
D
BEGIN TEXT:
-
2. ADDRESS
S
BY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
3. DEAR AMERICANS.
4. I SEE A GOOD AUGURY IN THE WAY WE ARE BEGINNING
E
THE NEW YEAR WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED THE YEAR OF PEACE.
X
WE ARE STARTING IT WITH AN EXCHANGE OF DIRECT MESSAGES--
PRESIDENT REAGAN' S TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND MINE TO
D
YOU.
-
S
5. THIS, I BELIEVE, IS A HOPEFUL SIGN OF CHANGE
WHICH, THOUGH SMALL, IS NONETHELESS A CHANGE FOR THE
BETTER IN OUR RELATIONS. THE FEW MINUTES THAT I WILL
BE SPEAKING TO YOU STRIKE ME AS A MEANINGFUL SYMBOL
OF OUR MUTUAL WILLINGNESS TO GO ON MOVING TOWARD EACH
OTHER WHICH IS WHAT YOUR PRESIDENT AND I BEGAN DOING
AT GENEVA. FOR A DISCUSSION ALONG THOSE LINES WE
HAD THE MANDATE OF OUR PEOPLES. THEY WANT THE
CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TO CONTINUE UN-
INTERRUPTED AND TO YIELD TANGIBLE RESULTS.
-
6. AS I FACE YOU TODAY, I WANT TO SAY THAT SOVIET
PEOPLE ARE DEDICATED TO PEACE-- HAT SUPREME VALUE
EQUAL TO THE GIFT OF LIFE. WE CHERISH THE IDEA OF
PEACE, HAVING SUFFERED FOR IT. TOGETHER WITH THE
PAIN OF UNHEALING WOUNDS AND THE AGONY OF
IRRETRIEVABLE LOSSES, IT HAS BECOME PART AND PARCEL
OF OUR FLESH AND BLOOD. IN OUR COUNTRY THERE IS
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21 1997
By
as
as
NARA, Date 7/18/02
CONF IDENT IAL
88
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NOT A SINGLE FAMILY OR A SINGLE HOME THAT HAS NOT
KEPT ALIVE THE MEMORY OF THEIR KITH AND KIN WHO
PERISHED IN THE FLAMES OF WAR--THE WAR IN WHICH THE
E
SOVIET AND AMERICAN PEOPLES were ALLIES AND FOUGHT
X
SIDE BY SIDE.
-
D
7. I SAY THIS BECAUSE OUR COMMON QUEST FOR PEACE HAS
ITS ROOTS IN THE PAST, AND THAT ME ANS WE HAVE A
HISTORIC RECORD OF COOPERATION WHICH CAN TODAY INSPIRE
S
OUR JOINT EFFORTS FOR THE SAKE OF THE FUTURE.
-
8. THE MANY LETTERS I HAVE RECEIVED FROM YOU AND MY
CONVERSATIONS WITH YOUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN--SENATORS,
CONGRESSMEN, SCIENTISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND STATESMEN--
E
HAVE CONVINCED ME THAT IN THE UNITED STATES, TOO,
PEOPLE REALIZE THAT OUR TWO NATIONS SHOULD NEVER BE AT
X
WAR, THAT A COLLISION BETWEEN THEM WOULD BE THE
GREATEST OF TRAGEDIES.
D
-
9. IT IS A REALITY OF TODAY' S WORLD THAT IT IS
S
SENSELESS TO seek GREATER SECURITY FOR ONESELF THROUGH
NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS. AT PRESENT, EVERY NEW STEP
IN THE ARMS RACE INCREASES THE DANGER AND THE RISK
FOR BOTH SIDES, AND FOR ALL HUMANKIND.
-
10. IT IS THE FORCEFUL AND COMPELLING DEMAND OF
E
LIFE ITSELF THAT WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE PATH OF
CUTTING BACK NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND KEEPING OUTER SPACE
X
PEACEFUL. THIS IS WHAT WE ARE NEGOTIATING ABOUT AT
D
GENEVA, AND WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE THOSE TALKS TO
BE SUCCESSFUL THIS YEAR.
-
S
11. IN OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE WE SHOULD BE GUIDED
BY AN AWARENESS OF THE FACT THAT TODAY HISTORY HAS
WILLED OUR TWO NATIONS TO BEAR AN ENORMOUS
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PEOPLES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES
AND, INDEED, THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES, FOR PRESERVING
LIFE ON EARTH. OUR DUTY TO ALL HUMANKIND IS TO OFFER
IT A SAFE PROSPECT OF PEACE, A PROSPECT OF ENTERING
E
THE THIRD MILLENIUM WITHOUT FEAR. LET US COMMIT
X
OURSELVES TO DOING AWAY WITH THE THREAT HANGING over
HUMANITY. LET US NOT SHIFT THAT TASK ONTO OUR
D
CHILDREN' S SHOULDERS.
-
S
12. WE CAN HARDLY SUCCEED IN ATTAINING THAT
GOAL UNLESS WE BEGIN SAVING UP, BIT BY BIT, THE MOST
PRECIOUS CAPITAL THERE IS--TRUST AMONG NATIONS AND
BT
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FILE-01 MAT-01 /008 A4
E
X
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
D
SIT: VP PEAR PUBS SIT
EOB:
S
OP IMMED
STU8966
DE RUEHMO #8738/02 3621742
O 281739Z DEC 85 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
E
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8853
X
C ONF IDENTIA L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 18738
D
EXDIS
S
FOR EUR/SOV: MARK PARRIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: 1/1/86
TAGS: PREL, US, UR
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GORBACHEV TV ADDRESS
E
PEOPLES. AND IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO START
MENDING THE EXISTING DEFICIT OF TRUST IN SOVIET-
X
AMERICAN RELATIONS.
-
D
13. I BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE MAIN RESULTS OF MY
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IS THAT, AS LEADERS
S
AND AS HUMAN BEINGS, WE WERE ABLE TO TAKE THE FIRST
STEPS TOWARD OVERCOMING MISTRUST AND TO ACTIVATE
THE FACTOR OF CONFIDENCE. THE GAP DIVIDING US IS
STILL WIDE, TO BRIDGE IT WILL NOT BE EASY, BUT WE
SAW IN GENEVA THAT IT CAN BE DONE. BRIDGING THAT GAP
WOULD BE A GREAT FEAT--A FEAT OUR PEOPLE ARE READY
TO PERFORM FOR THE SAKE OF WORLD PEACE.
E
-
X
14. I AM REMINDED OF THE TITLE OF A REMARKABLE
D
WORK OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, THE NOVEL "THE
WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT.' IN THAT PHRASE LET ME
JUST SUBSTITUTE HOPE FOR DISCONTENT. AND MAY NOT
ONLY THIS WINTER BUT EVERY SEASON OF THIS YEAR
S
AND OF THE YEARS TO COME BE FULL OF HOPE FOR A BETTER
FUTURE, A HOPE THAT, TOGETHER, WE CAN TURN INTO
REALITY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE SHALL SPARE NO
EFFORT IN WORKING FOR THAT.
-
15. FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THE YEAR 1986 MARKS THE
BEGINNING OF A NEW STAGE IN CARRYING OUT OUR
CONSTRUCTIVE PLANS. THOSE ARE PEACEFUL PLANS: WE
HAVE MADE THEM KNOWN TO THE WHOLE WORLD.
-
16. I WISH YOU A HAPPY NEW YEAR. TO EVERY AMERICAN
FAMILY I WISH GOOD HEALTH, PEACE AND HAPPINESS.
END TEXT. COMBS
BT
CONF IDENT
90
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
9 April 1986
DECLASSIFIED
USSR-U.S.-West Europe
NLRRF06-114/7#9978
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
Gorbachev Assails U.S. Policy, Stresses Adherence to Dialogue
General Secretary Gorbachev's 8 April speech sharply condemning
U.S. and West European arms control policies appears to reflect
growing Soviet frustration with the absence of substantive progress
in East-West relations. However, while contending that
improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is unlikely without a change in
Washington's attitude toward the Soviet Union, Gorbachev gave no
indication that he intends to reverse his public commitment to a
continuing dialogue with the United States.
In a speech in the industrial city of Togliatti, Gorbachev voiced frustration
with the state of East-West relations and expressed dissatisfaction with the
lack of progress, particularly on arms control issues, since the Paris and
Geneva summits. In addition to repeating familiar criticism of specific U.S.
positions on nuclear testing, SDI, and INF, he accused the Administration of
staging a series of provocative actions that he characterized as designed to
undermine the "spirit of Geneva":
The U.S. demand that Moscow reduce its UN staff by 40 percent.
The dispatch of U.S. naval forces off the Crimean coast in the Black Sea.
An attack on Libyan forces "to demonstrate America's might."
A "provocative" nuclear test on the eve of the expiration of the unilateral
Soviet test moratorium and Washington's prompt rejection of Moscow's
proposal for an urgent summit to discuss a test ban.
Gorbachev argued that the Reagan Administration's approach to U.S.-Soviet
relations rested on basic misperceptions and that any significant improvement
in bilateral ties depends on a reassessment in U.S. thinking. At a time when
the world situation demands an "entirely new way of thinking," the U.S.
leadership, he claimed, "cannot yet drop old habits." He added that "to all
appearances" the Administration "does not want to reckon with the reality of
the Soviet Union."
1
CONFIDENTIAL
91
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
9 April 1986
Implications for
Despite his negative assessment of U.S. policy,
Summit
Gorbachev reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to
pursuing a policy of dialogue with Washington.
Consistent with the position he elaborated at the party congress in February,
he stated that Moscow is seeking "a way out of confrontation," arguing that
"we have no alternative." Recognition of the necessity of accommodation, he
noted, is what motivated Soviet arms control initiatives, led to the summits in
Paris and Geneva, and gave impetus to Soviet efforts to implement the accords
reached at Geneva.
[Worker] About your meeting with President Reagan in the near future-when is it to take
place, or
[Gorbachev, interrupting] We put the question like this-the meetings must continue, we must
meet, we must converse, we cannot let things reach collision-point. But it must be done in such
a way that these meetings bring some sort of benefit, that there is some sort of progress. If we
just meet like that, exchange pleasantries and handshakes, while all the military programs are
implemented-who needs meetings like that? It would be a fraud. We have said this quite
plainly.
Gorbachev, conversation with automotive
workers in Togliatti, Kuybyshev region,
Soviet television, 8 April 1986
On the question of a "new meeting" with President Reagan, Gorbachev said
that he wished to make "absolutely clear" that he favored holding such a
meeting and that the Soviet Union attached "no preconditions" to it. At the
same time, however, he reiterated past pronouncements linking the next
summit to specific results, noting that such a summit should mark a "step
forward" and produce "practical results" toward curbing the arms race.
However, Gorbachev did not repeat earlier suggestions that INF and a nuclear
test moratorium represented areas where agreement could be reached quickly.
Adding "one more thing," he asserted that the next summit "can take place if
the atmosphere of Geneva is preserved, or it would be more correct today to
say revived."
Gorbachev's statement represents his most forceful expression of Moscow's
public commitment to a second summit. His discussion of the summit question
in his 25 February report to the party congress was characterized by an
2
CONFIDENTIAL
92
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
9 April 1986
apparently deliberate ambiguity that seemed intended to cast doubt on the
utility of a second summit in the absence of substantive progress on arms
control issues. This ambiguity, subsequently reinforced by statements from a
number of lower level officials, appeared calculated to press the
Administration for progress on arms control without openly threatening to a
special summit in Europe to discuss the question of banning nuclear tests, but
Moscow signaled that this was not intended to substitute for a Washington
summit in 1986 as agreed in Geneva.
Criticism of
Gorbachev's Togliatti speech also signaled un-
West Europeans
happiness with the West European reaction to his 15
January disarmament proposals and apparent
pessimism about the prospects for West European support for the Soviet plan.
For the first time since offering the proposals, he specifically accused the
British and French governments of failing to display a "serious abandon the
summit. In his 29 March television address Gorbachev called for approach"
on the INF issue. London and Paris, he charged, are falsely claiming that
acceptance of the Soviet proposals would, on the one hand, allow Moscow to
shift its Europe-based intermediate-range missiles to Siberia from where they
could be "promptly carried back" to Europe and would, on the other hand,
leave West Europe exposed to superior Soviet conventional forces. In fact,
Gorbachev insisted, Moscow is proposing both the "elimination" of Soviet
intermediate-range missiles based in the European USSR and "reductions in
conventional weapons and armed forces."
Gorbachev's speech also seemed aimed at putting pressure on the West
European governments that have recently signed agreements with the United
States for cooperation on SDI. He warned that through. involvement in that
"disastrous plan," West European governments were becoming "participants
in a new, even more dangerous round of the arms race." His comments
followed the delivery of a "statement" from the Soviet Embassy in Rome to
the Italian Foreign Ministry at the end of March criticizing the Italian
Government's recent agreement with Washington concerning Italian
participation in SDI and the presentation of a much stronger statement to
FRG Foreign Minister Genscher by the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on
4 April in connection with the 27 March signing of the U.S.-West German
agreement on SDI cooperation.
I In his 28 February address to the 27th CPSU Congress, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
chastised "statesmen from NATO countries" for "losing their enthusiasm" for removal of
U.S. and Soviet INF from Europe and for "resorting to more and more reservations"
following the presentation of the Soviet proposal, but he did not mention any West European
state by name.
3
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93
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
9 April 1986
Soviet pressure on West Germany over Bonn's participation in SDI was also
apparent in Premier Ryzhkov's 8 April remarks to visiting FRG Economics
Minister and Free Democratic Party leader Martin Bangemann. By signing
"secret agreements" with the United States on SDI the Bonn Government,
Ryzhkov declared, is assuming "grave responsibility for the escalation of the
arms race," and this, along with its participation in Western trade embargoes
"cannot but burden the FRG's relations with the Soviet Union."
Domestic Concerns Gorbachev's remarks appeared intended, in part, to
allay domestic concern over Soviet arms control
policies. He observed that the Central Committee had received "numerous
letters" from Soviet citizens who he said had expressed concern that the West
is using talk about peace and "fruitless negotiations" to outstrip the Soviet
Union in developing arms. This, he stated, "is not going to happen."
Washington, he said, is not dealing with "faint hearts" in the USSR. Despite
all U.S. pressures, he emphasized, "the arms race will not wear us out, we will
not be removed from space, and we will not be overtaken in technology."
Gorbachev stressed that SDI posed neither an insurmountable military nor
technological threat to the Soviet Union. If the United States pushes ahead
with its plans, he said, the Soviet Union will find a "convincing answer and not
necessarily in outer space." Moscow's call for a ban on "space strike
weapons," he added, rests not on a "fear of lagging behind" but on an
understanding of its "responsibility."
Gorbachev's remarks appeared to reflect sensitivity to the need to maintain
domestic support for Moscow's arms control policies, whose unilateral aspects
appear to have generated domestic concern and, possibly, opposition,
particularly among the military. His speech in Togliatti, which was broadcast
in full on Soviet television, came less than two weeks after his nationally
televised 29 March address to the Soviet people to announce the latest Soviet
proposal on nuclear testing. On that occasion as well he responded to letters to
the Central Committee by pledging that the Kremlin would not neglect the
security interests of the country. In the past, Gorbachev had been careful to
point to popular support for Moscow's arms control policies and to stress that
Soviet policy is made by the political leadership and is not based solely on
military concerns.²
2 Gorbachev's efforts to stress the collective nature of Soviet arms control policies, together
with evidence of domestic concern, particularly on the question of Moscow's unilateral test
moratorium, are discussed more fully in the Trends of 2 April 1986, pages 1-4.
4
CONFIDENTIAL
94
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FBIS TRENDS
9 April 1986
Recent Soviet media commentary on Western reaction to Moscow's arms
control proposals has underscored the Kremlin's apparent concern over the
possible faltering of domestic support for Gorbachev's disarmament program.
For example, in a discussion of European reaction to Gorbachev's proposals
broadcast by Moscow radio's English-language service to the United Kingdom
on 5 April, a journalist from the Russian republic newspaper Sovetskaya
Rossiya observed that his newspaper's readers are worried about the prospects
for detente in Europe and "can't begin to understand why West European
governments are refusing to give a positive reply" to the USSR's 15 January
disarmament proposals. This, the journalist added, is a "repetitive theme in
our mail." (U/FOUO)
5
CONFIDENTIAL
95
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
9 April 1986
File
USSR-U.S.-West Europe
anto
Wallod'
Gorbachev Assails U.S. Policy, Stresses Adherence to Dialogue
General Secretary Gorbachev's 8 April speech sharply condemning
U.S. and West European arms control policies appears to reflect
growing Soviet frustration with the absence of substantive progress
in East-West relations. However, while contending that
improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is unlikely without a change in
Washington's attitude toward the Soviet Union, Gorbachev gave no
indication that he intends to reverse his public commitment to a
continuing dialogue with the United States.
In a speech in the industrial city of Togliatti, Gorbachev voiced frustration
with the state of East-West relations and expressed dissatisfaction with the
lack of progress, particularly on arms control issues, since the Paris and
Geneva summits. In addition to repeating familiar criticism of specific U.S.
positions on nuclear testing, SDI, and INF, he accused the Administration of
staging a series of provocative actions that he characterized as designed to
undermine the "spirit of Geneva":
The U.S. demand that Moscow reduce its UN staff by 40 percent.
The dispatch of U.S. naval forces off the Crimean coast in the Black Sea.
An attack on Libyan forces "to demonstrate America's might."
A "provocative" nuclear test on the eve of the expiration of the unilateral
Soviet test moratorium and Washington's prompt rejection of Moscow's
proposal for an urgent summit to discuss a test ban.
Gorbachev argued that the Reagan Administration's approach to U.S.-Soviet
relations rested on basic misperceptions and that any significant improvement
in bilateral ties depends on a reassessment in U.S. thinking. At a time when
the world situation demands an "entirely new way of thinking," the U.S.
leadership, he claimed, "cannot yet drop old habits." He added that "to all
appearances" the Administration "does not want to reckon with the reality of
the Soviet Union."
DECLASSIFIED
1
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRRF06-114/7*9979
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
96
9 April 1986
Implications for
Despite his negative assessment of U.S. policy,
Summit
Gorbachev reaffirmed Moscow's commitment to
pursuing a policy of dialogue with Washington.
Consistent with the position he elaborated at the party congress in February,
he stated that Moscow is seeking "a way out of confrontation," arguing that
"we have no alternative." Recognition of the necessity of accommodation, he
noted, is what motivated Soviet arms control initiatives, led to the summits in
Paris and Geneva, and gave impetus to Soviet efforts to implement the accords
reached at Geneva.
[Worker] About your meeting with President Reagan in the near future-when is it to take
place, or
[Gorbachev, interrupting] We put the question like this-the meetings must continue, we must
meet, we must converse, we cannot let things reach collision-point. But it must be done in such
a way that these meetings bring some sort of benefit, that there is some sort of progress. If we
just meet like that, exchange pleasantries and handshakes, while all the military programs are
implemented-who needs meetings like that? It would be a fraud. We have said this quite
plainly.
Gorbachev, conversation with automotive
workers in Togliatti, Kuybyshev region,
Soviet television, 8 April 1986
On the question of a "new meeting" with President Reagan, Gorbachev said
that he wished to make "absolutely clear" that he favored holding such a
meeting and that the Soviet Union attached "no preconditions" to it. At the
same time, however, he reiterated past pronouncements linking the next
summit to specific results, noting that such a summit should mark a "step
forward" and produce "practical results" toward curbing the arms race.
However, Gorbachev did not repeat earlier suggestions that INF and a nuclear
test moratorium represented areas where agreement could be reached quickly.
Adding "one more thing," he asserted that the next summit "can take place if
the atmosphere of Geneva is preserved, or it would be more correct today to
say revived."
Gorbachev's statement represents his most forceful expression of Moscow's
public commitment to a second summit. His discussion of the summit question
in his 25 February report to the party congress was characterized by an
2
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apparently deliberate ambiguity that seemed intended to cast doubt on the
utility of a second summit in the absence of substantive progress on arms
control issues. This ambiguity, subsequently reinforced by statements from a
number of lower level officials, appeared calculated to press the
Administration for progress on arms control without openly threatening to a
special summit in Europe to discuss the question of banning nuclear tests, but
Moscow signaled that this was not intended to substitute for a Washington
summit in 1986 as agreed in Geneva.
Criticism of
Gorbachev's Togliatti speech also signaled un-
West Europeans
happiness with the West European reaction to his 15
January disarmament proposals and apparent
pessimism about the prospects for West European support for the Soviet plan.
For the first time since offering the proposals, he specifically accused the
British and French governments of failing to display a "serious abandon the
summit. In his 29 March television address Gorbachev called for approach"
on the INF issue. London and Paris, he charged, are falsely claiming that
acceptance of the Soviet proposals would, on the one hand, allow Moscow to
shift its Europe-based intermediate-range missiles to Siberia from where they
could be "promptly carried back" to Europe and would, on the other hand,
leave West Europe exposed to superior Soviet conventional forces. In fact,
Gorbachev insisted, Moscow is proposing both the "elimination" of Soviet
intermediate-range missiles based in the European USSR and "reductions in
conventional weapons and armed forces."
Gorbachev's speech also seemed aimed at putting pressure on the West
European governments that have recently signed agreements with the United
States for cooperation on SDI. He warned that through involvement in that
"disastrous plan," West European governments were becoming "participants
in a new, even more dangerous round of the arms race." His comments
followed the delivery of a "statement" from the Soviet Embassy in Rome to
the Italian Foreign Ministry at the end of March criticizing the Italian
Government's recent agreement with Washington concerning Italian
participation in SDI and the presentation of a much stronger statement to
FRG Foreign Minister Genscher by the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn on
4. April in connection with the 27 March signing of the U.S.-West German
agreement on SDI cooperation.
1
In his 28 February address to the 27th CPSU Congress, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
chastised "statesmen from NATO countries" for "losing their enthusiasm" for removal of
U.S. and Soviet INF from Europe and for "resorting to more and more reservations"
following the presentation of the Soviet proposal, but he did not mention any West European
state by name.
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Soviet pressure on West Germany over Bonn's participation in SDI was also
apparent in Premier Ryzhkov's 8 April remarks to visiting FRG Economics
Minister and Free Democratic Party leader Martin Bangemann. By signing
"secret agreements" with the United States on SDI the Bonn Government,
Ryzhkov declared, is assuming "grave responsibility for the escalation of the
arms race," and this, along with its participation in Western trade embargoes
"cannot but burden the FRG's relations with the Soviet Union."
Domestic Concerns
Gorbachev's remarks appeared intended, in part, to
allay domestic concern over Soviet arms control
policies. He observed that the Central Committee had received "numerous
letters" from Soviet citizens who he said had expressed concern that the West
is using talk about peace and "fruitless negotiations" to outstrip the Soviet
Union in developing arms. This, he stated, "is not going to happen."
Washington, he said, is not dealing with "faint hearts" in the USSR. Despite
all U.S. pressures, he emphasized, "the arms race will not wear us out, we will
not be removed from space, and we will not be overtaken in technology."
Gorbachev stressed that SDI posed neither an insurmountable military nor
technological threat to the Soviet Union. If the United States pushes ahead
with its plans, he said, the Soviet Union will find a "convincing answer and not
necessarily in outer space." Moscow's call for a ban on "space strike
weapons," he added, rests not on a "fear of lagging behind" but on an
understanding of its "responsibility."
Gorbachev's remarks appeared to reflect sensitivity to the need to maintain
domestic support for Moscow's arms control policies, whose unilateral aspects
appear to have generated domestic concern and, possibly, opposition,
particularly among the military. His speech in Togliatti, which was broadcast
in full on Soviet television, came less than two weeks after his nationally
televised 29 March address to the Soviet people to announce the latest Soviet
proposal on nuclear testing. On that occasion as well he responded to letters to
the Central Committee by pledging that the Kremlin would not neglect the
security interests of the country. In the past, Gorbachev had been careful to
point to popular support for Moscow's arms control policies and to stress that
Soviet policy is made by the political leadership and is not based solely on
military concerns.²
2 Gorbachev's efforts to stress the collective nature of Soviet arms control policies, together
with evidence of domestic concern, particularly on the question of Moscow's unilateral test
moratorium, are discussed more fully in the Trends of 2 April 1986, pages 1-4.
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Recent Soviet media commentary on Western reaction to Moscow's arms
control proposals has underscored the Kremlin's apparent concern over the
possible faltering of domestic support for Gorbachev's disarmament program.
For example, in a discussion of European reaction to Gorbachev's proposals
broadcast by Moscow radio's English-language service to the United Kingdom
on 5 April, a journalist from the Russian republic newspaper Sovetskaya
Rossiya observed that his newspaper's readers are worried about the prospects
for detente in Europe and "can't begin to understand why West European
governments are refusing to give a positive reply" to the USSR's 15 January
disarmament proposals. This, the journalist added, is a "repetitive theme in
our mail." (U/FOUO)
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9 April 1986
Beijing-Pyongyang-Moscow
Pyongyang Plays Down Kim Chong-il's Role in Ties to Beijing
Pyongyang appears to be making a special effort to distance Kim Il-
song's son and chosen successor, Kim Chong-il, from relations with
Beijing, a trend that contrasts with the younger Kim's continuing
visibility in Soviet-North Korean affairs.
North Korean media treatment of Chinese party chief Hu Yaobang's 1 April
meeting with a Korean delegation headed by the new Nodong Sinmun editor-
in-chief, Yi Song-pok, is probably related to the general chill evident in Sino-
Korean relations over the past two years. According to a 3 April KCNA report
on the meeting, Yi extended greetings to the Chinese leadership only from
Kim Il-song, and not also from Kim Chong-il. Last August-the last time Hu
received a North Korean delegation-Pyongyang media had similarly
departed from their usual practice of reporting greetings from both Kim Il-
song and Kim Chong-il.
It is not clear how the junior Kim figures in Sino-Korean relations, but there
does seem to be a correlation between Pyongyang's portrayal of his role and
the warmth of North Korea's ties to China. In 1983, after Kim went to China
on an "unofficial" visit-his first, and to date, only publicized foreign travel-
North Korean media highlighted Kim's part in cementing ties with Beijing.
However, in 1985, a year after the chill in Sino-Korean ties began, Pyongyang
began to downplay Kim Chong-il's role in the relationship. Coinciding with
this development, Kim began assuming a prominent role in Soviet-Korean
affairs.
Kim's notably reduced role in Sino-Korean relations is reflected in his failure
to meet publicly with any visiting Chinese delegation since May 1985. He was
conspicuously absent when Chinese Vice Premier Li Peng led an unusually
high-level PRC delegation to Pyongyang for the 35th anniversary celebrations
of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean war last
October.
DECLASSIFIED
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BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13