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Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections
This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.
Collection: Matlock, Jack F.: Files
Folder Title: General - USSR [1984-1986] (3)
Box: 26
To see more digitized collections visit:
https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library
To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/9/2005
File Folder
GENERAL 3/5 [1984-1986]
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
26
YARHI-MILO
2609
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9945 PAPER
RECENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP SPEECHES:
14 3/7/1985 B3
POLITICAL AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE
PAR 5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9951 PAPER
USSR: GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC AGENDA
3 3/15/1985 B1
R 11/24/2009 F06-114/7
9952 CABLE
181553Z MAR 85
2 3/18/1985 B1
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9946 PAPER
USSR NEW PERSONNEL POLICY PRESSED
6 4/10/1985 B1
BY GORBACHEV
R
5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9947 PAPER
ARBATOV ON SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING
11 4/24/1985 B1
B3
D
5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9953 REPORT
USSR
1 9/4/1985 B3
D
5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9954 REPORT
USSR
2 9/4/1985 B1 B3
D
5/7/2013
F2006-114/7
9948 MEMO
DOBRIANSKY TO POINDEXTER RE
1 9/12/1985 B1
PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY ACTIVISTS
AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND OTHER
SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
R 3/16/2011 F2006-114/7
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
WITHDRAWAL SHEET
Ronald Reagan Library
Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES
Withdrawer
JET
5/9/2005
File Folder
GENERAL 3/5 [1984-1986]
FOIA
F06-114/7
Box Number
26
YARHI-MILO
2609
ID Doc Type
Document Description
No of Doc Date Restrictions
Pages
9949 MEMO
ARMACOST RE PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S.
1 9/12/1985 B1
BY ACTIVISTS AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND
OTHER SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
R
7/7/2008
NLRRF06-114/7
9950 MEMO
MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE
3 7/7/1985 B1
PROPOSED TRAVEL TO U.S. BY ACTIVISTS
AFFILIATED WITH WPC AND OTHER
SOVIET FRONT ORGANIZATIONS
R
6/25/2009
F2006-114/7
Freedom of Information Act [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
CONF IDENTIAL
Central Intelligence Agency
Souret Polity
FOIA(b) (3)
method
Washington, 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
0291
7 March 1985
Recent Soviet Leadership Speeches: Political
and Policy Significance
Summary
The round of legislative election speeches
given by top-ranking Soviet leaders in February
provided strong evidence of the disruptive impact of
General Secretary Chernenko's health problems on
Soviet politics and policies. Changes in election-
related protocol rankings, for example, suggest that
Chernenko's illness has increased pre-succession
maneuvering. These rankings indicate that Mikhail
Gorbachev, the party's unofficial second secretary,
has widened his advantage over Grigoriy Romanov, one
of his presumed rivals for Chernenko's post.
Meanwhile, Moscow city party boss Viktor Grishin is
associating himself more closely with Chernenko,
perhaps to establish himself as a champion of the
Politburo's old guard and an alternative candidate
to become the next general secretary.
The frequency with which Chernenko was
mentioned and the praise lavished on him suggest
that his Politburo colleagues, despite their concern
with his health, currently are not inclined to
replace him as general secretary. He nonetheless
does not appear to enjoy solid leadership backing.
His strongest support, to judge from the variations
in the praise he received, still is concentrated
among the Politburo's elders, and he has failed to
win the enthusiastic backing of younger leaders
This paper was prepared by
of the Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments or questions may be directed to
or
to Chief, Policy Analysis Division
SOVA M-85-10041
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR F06-114/7 # 9945
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
promoted during Andropov's tenure. The same
barometer suggests that doubts about Chernenko's
ability to resume a more active role are undermining
his support among such former allies as Ukrainian
party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Georgian
party leader Eduard Shevardnadze.
The speeches also suggest that preoccupation
with political succession may be causing Soviet
leaders to mark time on domestic policy issues.
References to the consumer goods program, which
Chernenko had strongly backed and which was to have
been completed by the end of last year, indicate
that it is still in the drafting stage. A program
for improving economic management, which was
reported to be in preparation last year, was not
even mentioned. There was no reference to
Chernenko's previous announcement that an upcoming
Central Committee meeting would be devoted to a
discussion of science and technology. This silence
lends credence to reports that precedence is being
given to preparing for the next party congress,
which may be held late this year, and to conserving
Chernenko's energies for the party's most essential
political business.
On the foreign policy front, Soviet leaders
from both ends of the political spectrum seemed to
move closer to center. Ukrainian party leader
Shcherbitskiy toned down the strong criticism of the
United States that has marked many of his past
statements, while party secretary Gorbachev, who has
usually taken a less harsh line, cast doubts on the
seriousness of US intentions at the upcoming arms
control talks. In some cases, this strategy may
have been adopted to enhance the "tough but
reasonable" image the Soviets are trying to project
as they prepare for the talks in Geneva.
Shcherbitskiy, for example, probably did not wish to
appear too antagonistic on the eve of his current
visit to the United States. Others, however, may
have altered their stance because it served their
own political interests to do so. Gorbachev, in
particular, may have been intent on enlarging his
constituency.
Elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Soviet republics
occur every five years. The results are predetermined, but the
regime devotes considerable attention to the process, with each
member of the Politburo and Secretariat delivering a speech in
his assigned electoral district. These speeches typically cover
2
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
a broad range of domestic and foreign policies and provide a
useful index to leadership thinking on key political issues. The
electoral campaign also provides an opportunity for foreign and
domestic observers to gauge the political standing of individual
leaders; the number of honorary nominations each leader receives
and the order in which the leaders speak are among the best
indicators we have of their rankings in the hierarchy. (See
table at annex.) The accolades accorded the general secretary by
his colleagues also provide a measure of the strength of his
political support and serve to identify his allies and
detractors.
Chernenko's Status
By 1 February, when party secretaries Nikolay Ryzhkov and
Yegor Ligachev began the round of leadership speeches, Chernenko
had been absent from public view for more than a month, and
numerous Soviet officials had acknowledged in private that he was
seriously ill. Throughout the election campaign, however, the
other leaders conveyed greetings from him to their constituents
and implied that he had recently spoken with them.
Chernenko was unable to appear for his own election speech,
whichwas read on his behalf by an unnamed individual, and it was
publicly announced that he had chosen not to appear upon the
recommendation of his doctors. Still, as the election campaign
closed, Soviet television viewers were shown a film clip of
Chernenko appearing at a "polling station" to cast his ballot.
The attempts to keep Chernenko's name and face before the public
show that the Politburo is, as yet, unwilling to replace him as
general secretary
The treatment accorded Chernenko in his colleagues' speeches
also suggests, however, that his poor health may have led some of
his former boosters to reassess their political loyalties. For
example, First Deputy Premier Geydar Aliyev's speech, according
to Pravda's account of it, was less effusive in its references to
Chernenko this time than during last year's round of speeches for
election to the USSR Supreme Soviet (the national legislature).
The same was true of the speech by Georgian party leader
Shevardnadze, a longtime Chernenko supporter. Ukrainian party
chief Shcherbitskiy also seemed somewhat cooler toward Chernenko
than he was last year.
The findings in this memorandum are based chiefly on the versions of the
speeches that appeared in Pravda. Longer versions, which sometimes appear in
the newspapers of the locality where the speech is delivered, had been
received by the time of writing only for Gorbachev, Shevardnadze,
Shcherbitskiy, Chebrikov, and Romanov.
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The leadership speeches also suggest that Chernenko has
failed to win the enthusiastic backing of younger leaders whose
careers had advanced during Yuriy Andropov's tenure as party
chief. In comparison with other leaders, Ligachev, Ryzhkov and
KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov were sparing in their praise of
Chernenko. Ryzhkov said only that Chernenko was making a "great
personal contribution" to the party's work, and Chebrikov failed
to make any positive reference to him.
Chernenko was not without supporters. Members of the
Brezhnevite old guard--such as Moscow city party chief Grishin,
Kazakh party leader Dinmukhamed Kunayev, and Vice President
Vladimir Kuznetsov--were fulsome in their tributes, describing
him as an "outstanding figure of the party and state" and
praising his leadership qualities. Grishin offered the most
glowing praise, calling Chernenko a "purposeful, principled man
of great industry" and a "leader of the Leninist type,"
complimenting him for his "profound knowledge, ability, and
exactingness," and noting his "benevolent attitude and personal
modesty."
Other Leaders
The election campaign saw a further improvement in
Gorbachev's status in the leadership. He and Tikhonov received
more nominations--12 apiece--than any other leader except
Chernenko. Gorbachev also was given a constituency in Moscow, a
status symbol not accorded to other recent "number two" party
leaders. His speech received extensive media coverage, and in a
gesture signaling his special status, was attended by fellow
Politburo member Grishin and Central Committee Secretaries
Ligachev and Ryzhkov. Other than Gorbachev, only Chernenko and
Tikhonov had other members of the leadership in attendance at
their election speeches.
Gorbachev's succession prospects received another boost when
senior party secretary Romanov, a potential rival for Chernenko's
post, spoke before Party Control Committee Chairman Solomentsev,
thus apparently slipping in the leadership rankings. Solomentsev
and Russian Republic Premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov are the most
recent additions to the Politburo. Although Solomentsev's party
position might allow for higher standing than his junior
Politburo rank would normally justify, it can hardly explain his
outranking Romanov, a senior party secretary.
Grishin managed to capture the media spotlight by
capitalizing on his role as nominal "host" to the top three
leaders--Chernenko, Tikhonov, and Gorbachev--all of whom have
Moscow constituencies. He also made the announcement that
Chernenko would not be delivering his speech, and he showed up at
Chernenko's side when he cast his vote. By coming forward as
Chernenko's closest associate, Grishin may have been moving to
4
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
5
establish himself as a champion of the old guard and signaling a
willingness to contest Gorbachev's bid to become the next general
secretary.
Economic Policy
Soviet leaders gave less attention to economic issues in
this year's speeches than they did last year. Most leaders
focused on uncontroversial subjects, such as the campaign to save
labor and materials, and avoided specifics when dealing with the
potentially divisive issues of economic reform and resource
allocation priorities. All speakers portrayed the last two years
as particularly good ones in economic terms. Even sectors of the
economy that have been perennial laggards--transportatior and
construction--were accorded some kind words. Romanov, Aliyev and
party Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh sounded the only discordant
notes, pointing to the slow pace of raw materials extraction,
particularly fuels, as a serious problem area.
The speeches provided few hints about resource allocation
decisions for the next five-year plan. Romanov, the overseer of
defense industries, said that the Soviet party and state would
"continue to show tireless concern" for strengthening defense
capabilities, while Gorbachev merely assured his audience that
defense was being maintained "at the proper level." Such
differences in tone make it difficult to determine what decision
may actually have been made on the issue of defense spending--
especially in the absence of the late Defense Minister Ustinov,
whose representation of both party and military interests made
his statements on defense issues more definitive than most.
The speeches also shed little light on the regime's
investment plans. All leaders, major and minor, spoke with one
voice on the urgency of accelerating scientific and technical
progress in order to achieve intensive growth. Most, however,
did not go the next logical step and link this to the need for a
boost in investment growth. The exceptions were Gorbachev and
Romanov, who pushed for more resources for machine building, as
they did last year. No mention was made of Chernenko's
announcement in November 1984 that an upcoming Central Committee
meeting would be devoted to science and technology. This
omission lends credence to reports that precedence is being given
to preparing for the next party congress, which may be held late
this year, and to conserving Chernenko's energies for essential
political matters.
Soviet leaders were united on the importance of improving
living standards, with Chernenko and Tikhonov being the strongest
consumer advocates. Rather than promising an increased resource
commitment in all consumer-related areas, however, they indicated
that resources would be concentrated on selected targets such as
housing, education and health. Progress on the consumer goods
5
CONF IDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
program was variously characterized as "being worked out"
(Kapitonov and Aliyev) and "being completed" (Gorbachev).
According to US Embassy sources, the leaders have so far been
unwilling to give the program enough resources to make it
impressive enough to promulgate. Several speakers admonished
consumers that they would have to "work better to live better."
Most leaders gave little attention to agriculture and even
less to the new long-term land reclamation program that was the
subject of a Central Committee meeting held last October.
Gorbachev, who is responsible for overseeing agriculture and has
been highly critical of land reclamation in the past, failed even
to pay lip service to the program. The program was mentioned only
by Chernenko, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, the party boss of a region
strongly dependent on irrigation, and by Dolgikh, Demichev and
Solomentsev, leaders with no responsibility for agriculture. The
latter three may have alluded to the program simply to demonstrate
their support for Chernenko. Premier Tikhonov, an ally of
Chernenko's, made no mention of land reclamation but did refer to
the importance of the October meeting.
All of the major leaders vaguely noted the need to improve
economic management, and most claimed that the "five-ministry
experiment," a limited expansion of enterprise autonomy launched in
1984, is yielding positive results. Ryzhkov, who as party
secretary for economic management would presumably develop and
present any new reforms, emphasized that the purpose of the five-
ministry experiment was to give enterprises greater economic
autonomy "within the framework of our centralized plan-managed
economy"-- remark that is indicative of the leadership's
reluctance to embark on bolder reforms.
In contrast to the election speeches of a year ago, the
speakers no longer claimed that reform is one of the prerequisites
for a successful transition to intensive growth. Their remarks
also lacked the sense of urgency conveyed last year, when work was
reported to be in progress on a "program for the comprehensive
improvement of the entire management mechanism." This program was
not mentioned at all in this year's speeches although Gorbachev
said that improvement of the economic mechanism and management is
"on the agenda."
Foreign Affairs
The speakers who dealt with international issues almost all
focused on the upcoming Geneva arms control talks with the United
States. In doing so, leaders from both ends of the political
spectrum seemed to move somewhat closer to center. For example,
Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy refrained from expressing the
strong criticism of the United States that has marked many of his
past statements, probably to avoid clouding the atmosphere for his
6
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
7
current US visit. Instead, he cited recent remarks by Chernenko
that success in the talks requires good will and expressed the
"hope" that the United States would act accordingly.
On the other hand, Gorbachev, who has taken a less harsh line
in the past, expressed strong skepticism about US intentions toward
the Geneva talks, perhaps in an effort to enlarge his political
constituency. In an effort to drive a wedge between the United
States and its allies, he also paid tribute to the "good sense" of
West Europeans in wanting to prevent their and Moscow's "common
home" from being turned into a "firing range" for the Pentagon.
Foreign Minister Gromyko, who devoted the most attention to
the talks, was particularly skeptical regarding US intentions and
critical of US policy. He alleged that "certain US circles" were
trying to achieve military superiority over the USSR and that US
plans to militarize space undermined the prospects for success in
Geneva. On the other hand, Gromyko set no preconditions for the
talks and did not state, as he has in the past, that they would be
jeopardized by continued US deployment of INF missiles in Europe or
by further US testing of ASAT components.
Romanov, who treated international affairs at great length,
described the current state of East-West relations as
"extraordinarily dangerous," a characterization that TASS watered
down in its English-language treatment of his speech. He also
alleged that Western efforts to attain military superiority had
brought mankind "close to the brink of thermonuclear
catastrophe." Still, Romanov was restrained in his comments on the
Geneva talks and claimed that the USSR is ready for "the most
radical decisions."
Boris Ponomarev, a candidate member of the Politburo who
oversees the Central Committee's International Department, claimed
the USSR is prepared for "radical" steps in Geneva, but expressed
greater skepticism than Romanov as to US intentions. He said that
the United States was lying when it claimed that its research
related to the Strategic Defense Initiative was not threatening to
the USSR. Perhaps to embellish the achievements of his department,
which is responsible for relations with communist parties in the
West and dealings with the non-communist left, Ponomarev spoke
repeatedly of the "increasing" strength of the antiwar movement.
Chernenko presented the most upbeat assessment of the
prospects for reaching an agreement at Geneva. Unlike several
other leaders, he refrained from charging that the United States
was not sincere in its approach to the talks and from attacking the
US position on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Moreover, he
averred that despite a divergence of views between the two sides
and "gloomy forecasts," which he disavowed, agreement is both
"necessary" and "possible."
7
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
8
Several speakers who discussed international affairs
concentrated on issues other than the Geneva talks. KGB Chairman
Chebrikov and party Secretaries Petr Demichev and Mikhail Zimyanin--
all of whom have special responsibilities for ideological matters--
stressed the need for Soviet citizens to be vigilant against
"subversive" efforts from outside. Chebrikov devoted particular
attention to this theme, alleging that there was a widespread
Western campaign of "ideological sabotage." Addressing his
constituents in Vladivostok, Chebrikov also paid particular
attention to Soviet relations with countries of East and Southeast
Asia, declaring that the USSR favors further progress in Sino-
Soviet relations--a point also made by Chernenko.
Political Issues
All speakers touched on the importance of strengthening
discipline and law and order, goals strongly associated with the
Andropov period. Chernenko pledged full compliance with the
discipline campaign, while acknowledging that much remained to be
done. Some of the toughest statements on the subject, however,
were made by leaders whose careers prospered under Andropov--
Aliyev, Gorbachev, Romanov, Vorotnikov, and Solomentsev.
Almost all the leaders shied away from the more sensitive
issue of corruption in high places, a problem that Andropov had
tackled but that has been dealt with only fitfully during
Chernenko's tenure. According to the version of his election
speech printed in the Georgian press, Georgian party chief
Shevardnadze said that voters had refrained from renominating some
unnamed incumbents "because of errors, serious oversights, and
failings committed by them." Gorbachev was quoted in a local
Moscow newspaper as warning that strict discipline would be
"expected for all" and that "no exceptions" would be made. The
fact that these passages were struck from Pravda's account of the
speeches suggests that some Soviet leaders considered them too
pointed.
All speakers referred to the upcoming 27th Party Congress, but
only Shevardnadze said that it would be held this year, as several
recent reports have suggested. Most speakers also mentioned that a
new edition of the CPSU program would be approved by the
congress. Grishin said that the program was being drafted under
Chernenko's "direct leadership." Chernenko himself went further
than any of the others in alleging progress, claiming that
preparation of the program was "entering the final stage." This
remark seems to be consistent with recent reports that a Central
Committee meeting soon will be convened to set a date for the
congress and unveil the party program for public discussion.
Few Soviet leaders made reference to plans to discuss possible
amendments to the party rules. Chernenko had raised this subject
in a speech last October, but he made no mention of it in his
8
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
9
election speech. Party Secretary Ligachev was the only leader to
indicate what the general thrust of the rule changes might be.
According to Ligachev, "additions to the party rules should serve
to consolidate discipline, which is severe and equal for all
communists
"
Their silence on this issue suggests that others
in the leadership, particularly members of the old guard, may see
such changes as possible threats to their own positions.
9
CONF IDENTIAL
Political Standings of Soviet Leaders as Revealed in 1985 Election Speech Schedule*
Last Year
This Year
Comment
Chernenko
Chernenko (in absentia) Topmost slot, as expected
Tikhonov
Tikhonov
Traditional slot for premier
Gorbachev
Gorbachev
Senior secretary under Chernenko
Ustinov
Died on 20 December 1984
Gromyko
Gromyko
Foreign Minister. top ranking government leader after
Premier Tikhonov
Kuznetsov
Candidate member of Politburo. spoke out of turn this
year due to illness
Grishin
Grishin
Moscow party leader continues to outrank other regional
chiefs
Romanov
Solamentsev
Heads party discipline unit. unusually high ranking for
recently elected (1983) full member of the Politburo
Shcherbitskiy
Romanov
Senior secretary now far outranked by Gorbachev
Solomentsev
Aliyev
First Deputy Premier moved up
$
Ponomarev
Spoke out of turn last year due to illness
Kunayev
Shcherbitskiy
Ukrainian party chief
slipping: preceded Grishin in
1979 and Solomentsev last year
Aliyev
Kunayev
Kazakh party chief moved down
Vorotnikov
Vorotnikov
RSFSR Premier junior and lowest ranking full member of
Politburo
Ponomarev
Secretary and senior among candidate Politburo members
Kuznetsov
Vice President equivalent
Dolgikh
Shevardnadze
Georgian party chief .moved up a notch among candidate
members
Shevardnadze
Dolgikh
Candidate Politburo member and party secretary slipped
a notch
Chebrikov
Chebrikov
KGB Chief and candidate Politburo member
Demichev
Demichev
Culture Minister and candidate Politburo member
Ryzhkov
Rusakov
Secretary for bloc relations, former Brezhnev
aide. .moved up
Kapitonov
Zimyanin
Secretary for propaganda and ideology. .moved up
Zimyanin
Kapitonov
Secretary for light industry and consumer goods slipped
a notch
Rusakov
Ligachev
Secretary for cadres. moved up
Ligachev
Ryzhkov
Secretary and head of Central Committee's Economics
Department.
slipped substantially
*Note: Leaders are listed in the reverse order from that in which they spoke. By long
established tradition, the lowest ranking leader speaks first and the highest ranking leader
speaks last.
31 - Mr. Richard Combs
Director, Office of East European Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217
32 - Mr. Steve Coffey
PM/SNP
Department of State
Room 7317 State
33 - Honorable Michael H. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Department of State
Room 7240
34 - Mr. Richard Burt
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Department of State
Room 6226
35 - Mr. Bill Courtney
Special Assistant, Office of Under-Secretary
. for Political Affairs
Department of State
Room 7240
36 - Mr. W. D. Howells
Director, Office of Political-Military Analysis INR/PMA
Department of State
Room 6638
37 - Mr. Donald Graves
INR/SEE/ST
Department of State
Room 4844
38 - Mr. Robert Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe
Department of State
Room 4758
39 - Ms. Martha C. Mautner
Deputy Director
Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Department of State
Room 4758
40 - Mr. Morton Abramowitz
Director/INR
Department of State
Room 6531
41 - Mr. Mark Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Department of State
Room 6219
42 - Mr. Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4217
43 - Mr. Stephen Sestanovich
Director, Political-Military Affairs
National Security Council
Room 391
44 - Mr. Alexander Vershbow
Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Department of State
Room 4225
45 - Mr. Raymond Firehock
Chief, Intelligence Division
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Room 6510A, NS Annex
46 - Mr. Jay Kalner
ACDA/SP
Department of State
Room 4495
47 - The Honorable Richard Perle
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Internal Security Policy)
Room 4E838
Department of Defense
48 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Rm 4E830
Pentagon
49 - Ms. Linda Wetzel
OASD/ISP/EUR-NATO
Department of Defense
Room 4D800, Pentagon
13
51 - General William Odom
HQDA (DAMI-ZA)
Department of the Army
Room 2E464, Pentagon
52 - MG James C. Pfautz, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
Room 4A932, Pentagon
53 - Mr. Eugene Rodenburg
Office of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
Room 5B686, Pentagon
54 - Mr. Charles Carr
NSC Staff
Room 300, EOB
56 - COL Tyrus Cobb, USA
NSC Staff
Room 373, EOB
57 - Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
58 - Mr. John Lenczowski
Staff Member, NSC
Room 368, EOB
59 - Ms. Paula Dobriansky
Staff member, National Security Council
Room 373, EOB
60 - Ambassador Jack Matlock
Special Assistant to The President
for European and Soviet Affairs
Room 368 OEOB
61
41
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
10 April 1985
USSR
New Personnel Policy Pressed by Gorbachev
The Gorbachev regime is giving high priority to the implementation
of a cadre policy adopted last October. As cadre supervisor under
Chernenko, Gorbachev probably played an important role in formu-
lating the policy and now, as general secretary, he appears to be try-
ing to use it to accelerate the pace of personnel changes.
Since Gorbachev became general secretary on 11 March, numerous regional
plenums on cadre policy have been held and have stressed the need for new,
higher leadership standards. A few of these plenums were held before
Chernenko's death, but since the March CPSU plenum, 12 republics and
numerous provincial party organizations have addressed the issue. Accounts of
the recent meetings have been replete with tales of abuses, errors in cadre se-
lection, and leadership shortcomings; in some cases, officials have been
replaced. Several accounts have cited statements at the March plenum to
justify a more aggressive approach to personnel matters.
The new policy was initially adopted at the 18 October meeting of the
Politburo. According to the Pravda account the next day, Chernenko raised
"several questions of present-day cadre policy," while the Politburo ordered an
improvement of cadre work and called for the promotion of younger leaders,
women, and rank-and-file workers. The report on the meeting was balanced
with an admonition that young officials must learn from "experienced cadres
of the older generation" in order "to gain experience and acquire necessary
tempering." According to Pravda the Politburo called on local party organiza-
tions to develop concrete measures to improve cadre work. Chernenko revealed
in a 5 November speech to Soviet bloc youth leaders that the Politburo had
adopted a formal decision on personnel matters.
Although the Politburo decision was never published, subsequent commentary
indicated that the new cadre policy called for more aggressive promotion of
new leaders and less tolerance of incompetent officials. For example, a
19 November Pravda editorial on the subject stated that "higher demands" of
DECLASSIFIED
12
CONFIDENTIAL
NLRRF06-114/7*9946
BY KML NARA DATE 5/7/13
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
10 April 1985
Now the North seems to have gone further in redefining the relationship
between the two sets of talks, possibly to enhance its flexibility in developing a
North-South dialogue even in the absence of progress in tripartite talks. In his
speech, Ho Tam argued that even though Korean questions cannot be solved
"completely" without holding tripartite talks, it was necessary to take "every"
step possible in the direction of a settlement. We should make no bones about
a get-together of the North and the South," he said. He asserted that
parliamentary talks would "speed up" implementation of tripartite talks by
demonstrating agreement between the two Koreas and overcome U.S. "suspi-
cions" of the proposal for three-way talks.
The new North Korean proposal also moves one of the major agenda items
from the proposed tripartite talks-a North-South declaration of nonaggres-
sion-to the inter-Korean dialogue. By putting talks on this issue in a strictly
bilateral setting, Pyongyang appears to be signaling that the nonaggression
declaration is no longer bound to a U.S.-DPRK peace agreement, as it was in
the proposal for tripartite talks. Shifting the forum for discussion of the
nonaggression declaration also appears to mark a fundamental change in the
North's stance on the South's authority to negotiate on military-related issues.
Previously, Pyongyang had argued that the nonaggression declaration had to
be discussed in a tripartite forum because the South does not have the power,
on its own, to settle such questions. (U/FOUO)
11
CONFIDENTIAL
22
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
10 April 1985
competence are now being applied to cadres because the tasks that face
leaders are becoming increasingly complex. It sharply criticized party organi-
zations that continue to tolerate shortcomings and strongly condemned
selection of cadres based on personal ties or nepotism.
Definition of the new cadre policy became sharper after Gorbachev's election.
A 2 April Pravda editorial linked the need to improve cadre work with the
March plenum, stressing that practical results should be the main criterion in
judging cadres and insisting that leaders must demonstrate "initiative," a
"feeling for innovation," and an understanding of economics. Similarly, party
Secretary Romanov told the Hungarian party congress on 26 March that the
CPSU is now demanding "greater responsibility" from cadres as well as
greater "creativity and initiative."
Prior to Chernenko's death, there was some evidence of dissatisfaction with
the pace of change in personnel. The Russian republic paper Sovetskaya
Rossiya appeared to signal its concern in its treatment of remarks by
Chernenko on cadres in a December Kommunist article. Chernenko had
stated that a "constant intake of fresh forces" is needed along with "skillful
combining of experienced cadres of the older generation with young promising
officials." A 4 January Sovetskaya Rossiya editorial on his article ignored
half his formula, asserting that "the Central Committee demands
the
constant intake of fresh forces and bold promotion of promising young
officials," with no mention of the older generation. Under Andropov and
Chernenko, Sovetskaya Rossiya had published articles urging faster promo-
tion of members of the younger generation.¹
Personnel Changes
The new cadre policy has been evident in a surge of
personnel changes that have taken place since the
October decision. Many of the most significant changes involved installation
of outsiders, often a sign of dissatisfaction with the incumbent leaders.
Starting in December a large number of ministers and oblast first secretaries
and executive committee chairmen in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
other republics were retired. More recently the changes have included higher-
level officials:
The USSR Petroleum Industry Minister N. A. Maltsev was ousted and put
on pension at the early age of 56 on 12 February. Maltsev's disgrace was evi-
dent when he failed to receive the customary expression of thanks from the
1 Previous Sovetskaya Rossiya articles on this theme are discussed in the Trends of 20 June
1984, pages 11-12.
13
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
10 April 1985
Politburo and his ministry was sharply criticized by CPSU Secretary
Dolgikh on 15 February for poor work in developing oil production. Maltsev
was replaced by 61-year-old Gas Industry Minister V. A. Dinkov.
An official from Moscow was sent to take over leadership of the Altay party
organization on 18 February following the "sudden" death on 29 January of
the 57-year-old Altay first secretary, N. F. Aksenov. The transfer of power
took place amidst signs of disfavor with local leaders. The management of
agriculture in Altay had been sharply criticized at a Supreme Soviet
Presidium session, reported in the 15 January Izvestiya, and concern about
the Altay leadership had been suggested by a visit there in early January by
cadres Secretary Ligachev, reported in the 13 January Pravda. Ligachev
was accompanied on the visit by 55-year-old RSFSR Housing and Munici-
pal Services Minister F. V. Popov, who was selected as Altay party leader
following Aksenov's death.
The premier of Turkmenistan was demoted to the minor post of chairman of
the republic committee on prices on 28 February. On 18 March he was re-
placed by S. A. Niyazov, who had been a candidate member of the republic
bureau until September 1984, when he lost his positions in the republic and
went to another unspecified post.
An inspector from the CPSU Central Committee, V. V. Bakatin replaced
70-year-old Kirov Province First Secretary I. P. Bespalov on 21 March.
Following several years of sharp criticism of his ministry, P.S. Neporozhnyy
was finally retired as USSR Minister of Power and Electrification on
24 March. Although the 75-year-old minister retired on grounds of poor
health, the failure of the Politburo to thank him for his 20 years of service
suggested that he was leaving under a cloud. Over the past year there have
been exposures of corruption in his ministry and his first deputy was fired
and expelled from the party.² His replacement was 56-year-old A. I.
Mayorets, who, as Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry, has been
one of the leaders of the regime's economic experiment.
On 26 March RSFSR Premier Vorotnikov shook up the top leaders of his
RSFSR government, replacing several aging deputy premiers with
outsiders.³
2 See the Trends of 5 December 1984, page 17.
3 See the Trends of 3 April 1985, pages 10-11.
14
CONFIDENTIAL
24
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
10 April 1985
A woman with minimal experience was selected over many more senior
officials on 27 March to be the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
Presidium-the republic's second-ranking position. The new president,
50-year-old Valentina S. Shevchenko, replaced Aleksey Vatchenko, who
died on 22 November. Shevchenko previously held primarily ceremonial
posts: deputy chairman of the presidium, and chairman of the Ukrainian
Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
Unlike her predecessor, who was a Shcherbitskiy protege and a powerful
political figure, Shevchenko has no power base and little experience in party
politics. She is the only woman currently holding one of the top leadership
positions in a Soviet republic and her selection may be a response to the call
for advancing women in the new cadre guidelines. At a 25 March republic
plenum on cadres that added Shevchenko to the Politburo, Shcherbitskiy
appeared to associate himself with her promotion by sharply criticizing those
who show "unfounded timidity" in advancing women. (U/FOUO)
15
CONFIDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
CONFIDENTIAL
10 April 1985
Hungary
Broad Personnel Changes Made at 13th Party Congress
Personnel changes announced at the 25-28 March 13th MSZMP
Congress appear to reflect the party's efforts to solve problems
raised by an aging party leader, prepare the next generation of party
leaders and reorder responsibilities in the Secretariat.
The most significant organizational change at the congress was the creation of
a new post of deputy general secretary. The job was given to 62-year-old
cadres Secretary Karoly Nemeth, who has been a member of the Politburo
since 1970, longer than any other leader except
Kadar and trade union leader Sandor Gaspar.
Nemeth appears to have retained his other
responsibilities, having been reappointed to the
chairmanships of the Central Committee advi-
sory groups on party work and youth.
The position of deputy general secretary may
have been created to ease the burden on
72-year-old Janos Kadar, who has limited his
public activities in recent years. Restrictions on
his activities were evident at the congress. At
previous congresses he has delivered the
lengthy Central Committee report, but this
Deputy General Secretary
time the report was distributed in written form
Karoly Nemeth. Nepszava,
and Kadar only gave short supplemental
26 March)
remarks.
The party reversed a trend of recent years by reducing the size of the Central
Committee to 105 members. Since the 1962 congress, the size of the Central
Committee had steadily increased from 81 members to a peak of 127 members
elected at the 1980 congress. At the current congress, one-third of the
members were not reelected.
16
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL (entire text)
DEPARTMENT
OF
THIS YOUR ADVANCE COPY is PROVIDED
File Soviet Politin 15
STATE
FOR WIDER PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL FOR
*
*
CITE FURTHER IN REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, NOT on
distribution. DO
UNITED
AMERICA
INTELLIGENCE LISTINGS OF FINISHED
STATES
OF
(U) USSR: GORBACHEV'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL AGENDA
BUREAU OF
Summary
INTELLIGENCE
The new Soviet General Secretary must tackle a
number of major domestic issues in the months ahead.
AND RESEARCH
His first priority will be to staff key posts in
the party and government with his own people. To
that end, Gorbachev is likely to organize a plenum
sometime this spring for revamping the Politburo
and the Secretariat. The plenum may also convene a
CURRENT
party congress in December which in turn would
clear the way for a shake-up of local party fief-
doms and the CPSU Central Committee.
ANALYSES
Naming a new premier at a spring meeting of
the Supreme Soviet would allow Gorbachev to put his
own stamp on the next Five-Year Plan (1986-90),
which Premier Tikhonov's inner cabinet is now
drafting. The government ministries under the
premier also require new blood if Gorbachev is to
be able to deepen the industrial management experi-
ment which he clearly favors. Finally, Gorbachev
may wish to assume the "Presidency" at an early
date in order to enhance his stature and authority
internationally.
*
Politburo and Secretariat Revamping
Chernenko's death has reduced the ruling
Politburo to 10 voting members (two based far from
Moscow); it usually has 12-15. If Gorbachev is to
have a stable working majority in the Politburo, he
my BY
must bring into that body a number of allies, mostly
from the ranks of Politburo candidates and central
NLRR
party secretaries. They would likely include
Vladimir Dolgikh (Politburo candidate and secretary
for heavy industry); Yegor Ligachev (secretary for
NARA DATE
DECLASSIFIED
party organization) ; and Nikolay Ryzhkov (secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR (Mautner, M.)
Report 1029-CA
March 15, 1985
16
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
for economics). Ligachev, a vocal advocate of the rejuvenating of
cadres, would then be eligible to take over Gorbachev's now-vacated
portfolio covering personnel and ideology. A new CPSU secretary
for agriculture might also be named at a spring plenum.
Inasmuch as Premier Tikhonov will be 80 in May and has
resisted major changes in management procedures, Gorbachev pre-
sumably wishes to retire him posthaste. A Supreme Soviet session
following the next party plenum could be the occasion to award
that top government post to either of two reputed backers of
Gorbachev: USSR first deputy premier Geydar Aliyev (61) or
Russian Republic premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov (59), who stood next
to Gorbachev at Chernenko's bier on March 11. Either of these
figures could be relied upon to hack away at the deadwood in the
higher economic bureaucracy. Neither has shown much liking for
the land improvement scheme that Chernenko announced last October
despite Gorbachev's known misgivings about such overly ambitious
projects.
Party Congress
Recent rumors have it that the 27th CPSU Congress will be
held in late 1985 rather than spring 1986. Gorbachev's accession
makes that prospect even more likely. An earlier congress would
allow him to solidify his position more rapidly. The General
Secretary, after all, delivers the congress keynote report, which
makes him the arbiter of the proceedings and source of ideological
guidelines for the future.
The role of General Secretary as formulator of ideology will
be accented at the 27th Congress, because it is scheduled to enact
a new edition of the party's program. Gorbachev may well disagree
with the traditionalist guidelines that Chernenko laid down for
this exercise and may seek to change them. He may also have his
own ideas about the changes in the party by-laws which the 27th
Congress is to ratify.
Equally if not more important is the fact that a party
congress allows the General Secretary to build political support
via the promotion of party careerists to the Central Committee.
This body of 320 or so voting members has as its backbone 80 first
secretaries of regional party committees--the real centers of
local government in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev doubtless will
want to oust many of the oldtime party barons who are entrenched
in posts that carry membership in the Central Committee. The
cycle of regional party committee election meetings that precede
the party congress, along with special local plenums, would be the
occasion for Gorbachev to renovate the bureaucratic pyramid if he
can pull it off.
CONFIDENTIAL
17
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
The "Presidency"
In Soviet law, this is a collective body--the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet. It lacks the vast prerogatives of an American
chief executive. Nevertheless, the chairman of the Presidium is
effectively "head of state" and enjoys the high profile that
attaches to what in the Soviet Union is a largely ceremonial
office. Since 1977, each party chief sooner or later has occupied
the chairmanship.
Gorbachev almost certainly will be impelled to follow in the
footsteps of his recent predecessors on this score. One reason
has to do with the USSR Defense Council, which sets military-
strategic priorities. The General Secretary invariably heads the
Council while the Supreme Soviet Presidium is technically entitled
to determine its composition. Divided authority in this key area
could work against Gorbachev's control of the system. A second
reason is the ability to represent the USSR in international deal-
ings. Summitry and VIP visits would require Gorbachev's having
the rank of head of state if international agreements were to be
signed.
Other Duties
Aside from having to negotiate all such matters with his
Politburo colleagues, Gorbachev will have to become personally
involved in the day-to-day operations of governance if he is to
dominate the scene. Indeed, one of the pressures for a shift of
power away from the old guard presumably was a recognition that
the Soviet system cannot function long without an energetic man
at the top to kick the inert bureaucracies into action and arbi-
trate the constant jurisdictional and substantive squabbles that
plague them. Thus, Gorbachev's strictly operational tasks in the
near term promise to be formidable. They may become even more so
should a power conflict erupt with the surviving Chernenkoists or
other younger leaders, such as Romanov, trying to block him.
Prepared by Sidney Ploss
632-9186
Approved by Martha C. Mautner
632-9536
CONF DENTIAL
18
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 3339
DTG:181553Z MAR 85 FSN:055000
EOB347
AN009862
TOR: 077/17092
CSN:HCE395
GROMYKO REVEALED. FOR EXAMPLE, THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEEN
DIRECTING THE SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS CHAIRING THE
DISTRIBUTION: STE DOBR-01 RAY-01 SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01
POLITBURO SESSIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF CHERNENKO WHILE
EHR-01 MAT-0: /008 A4
SOVIET OFFIC ALJ HAD BEEN PRIVATELY INDICATING THAT THIS
WAS THE CASE FOR SOME TIME, IT IS NONETHELESS EXTRA-
ORDINARY THAT THIS WOULD BE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED, EVEN
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
EX POST FACTO.
SIT:
EOB:
4. GROMYKO SEVERAL TIMES INVOKED HIS OWN PERSONAL
OPINION IN ASSESSING GORBACHEV'S WORTHINESS TO ASSUME
THE GENERAL SECRETARYSHIP. HE PRAISED, IN PARTICULAR,
OP IMMED
THE LATTER'S ABILITY TO CONDUCT THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
STU1033
THE COUNTRY. GORBACHEV, HE WENT ON, HAD THE CAPACITY
DE RUEHMO #3339/01 0771556
FOR FINDING THE RIGHT SOLUTION TO PROBLEMS THAT WERE
0 181553Z MAR 85
INHERENTLY COMPLEX; AND HAD THE GIFT OF WORKING OUT
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISES. GROMYKO ALSO STATED
--PERHAPS WITH AN EYE TO THE MILITARY GORBACHEV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8353
UNDERSTOOD THE NECESSITY OF "KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY."
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1103
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 7517
5. THE LENGTHS TO WHICH GROMYKO WENT TO ENDORSE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 1847
GORBACHEV MAY INDICATE THAT THERE WERE MISGIVINGS, IF
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0895
NOT OPPOSITION, WITHIN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO HIS
USDEL NST GENEVA 0038
ELECTION. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S COLLECTIVE FEATHERS
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1603
MAY HAVE BEEN IN PARTICULAR NEED OF SMOOTHING OVER THE
AMCONSUL MUNICH 9837
FASHION IN WHICH THE PLENUM WAS CONVENED. THE
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 1593
UNPRECEDENTED RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE PLENUM WAS STAGED
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0842
MUST HAVE ALLOWED FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF ONLY A
USIA WASHDC 0378
FRACTION OF THE WHOLE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.
USMISSION USNATO 8205
USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2997
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3102
6. SUPPORT FOR THIS INTERPRETATION MAY BE FOUND PERHAPS
IN GROMYKO'S WARNING THAT THE OUTSIDE WORLD CONSTANTLY
CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 03339
SEEKS TO UNCOVER SPLITS WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP,
AND HIS APPEAL TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO SHOW
E.O. 12356: DECL:0ADR
UNANIMITY IN SELECTING GORBACHEV. IN THIS CONNECTION,
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR
WE NOTE THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GROMYKO'S NOMINATING SPEECH OF GORBACHEV
ELECTED GORBACHEV "YEDINODUSHNO" RATHER THAN
AT MARCH 11 CPSU PLENUM
"YEDINOGLASNO" WHICH WAS THE FORMULATION USED IN THE
PLENUM REPORTS OF BOTH THE CHERNENKO AND ANDROPOV
ELECTIONS. WHILE BOTH WORDS CAN BE TRANSLATED AS
1.
C
ENTIRE TEXT.
UNANIMOUSLY, "YEDINOGLASNO" CARRIES A MORE PRECISE
MEANING AND CONNOTES THAT A VOTE WAS ACTUALLY TAKEN.
IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE USE OF THE WORD
2. SUMMARY: A BROCHURE OF MATERIALS ON THE MARCH 11
"YEDINODUSHNO" THIS TIME AROUND INDICATES THAT AN ACTUAL
PLENUM INCLUDED THE TEXT OF THE GROMYKO NOMINATION
VOTE WAS NOT TAKEN ON GORBACHEV'S ELECTION BUT RATHER
SPEECH, WHICH HAD BEEN OMITTED FROM NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS
THAT HE WAS DECLARED THE GENERAL SECRETARY BY
OF THE PROCEEDINGS. FOREGOING ANY PRAISE OF THE LATE
ACCLAMATION. (THE STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE JUNE 1983
CHERNENKO, GROMYKO LAUNCHED INTO A WARM, LENGTHY
PLENUM PROVIDES A POSSIBLY REVEALING DISTINCTION
ENDORSEMENT OF GORBACHEV THAT STRIKES THE OBSERVER AS
BT
DESIGNED ACTUALLY TO PERSUADE PLENUM PARTICIPANTS THAT
HE WAS THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE JOB. HERE WAS NO CUT-AND-
DRIED ENDORSEMENT, AND IT RAISES THE INTRIGUING
POSSIBILITY THAT THE POLITBURO WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE
MIGHT BE SOME DOUBTERS AMONG THE BREZHNEV-CHERNENKO
COTERIE IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. PERHAPS WITH AN EYE
TO THE FOREIGN AUDIENCE, GROMYKO'S ENUMERATION OF
GORBACHEV'S VIRTUES EMPHASIZED HIS ABILITY TO FIND A
COMMON GROUND AND HIS ABILITIES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
DECLASSIFIED
THE BROCHURE DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY SPEAKERS OTHER THAN
GORBACHEV AND GROMYKO, SUGGESTING EITHER THAT NO NEW
NLRR #9952
"SECOND SECRETARY" HAS BEEN CHOSEN OR THAT HIS IDENTITY
IS FOR THE MOMENT BEING CONCEALED. END SUMMARY.
C1 NARA DATE 7/7/08
BY
3. GROMYKO'S NOMINATION DEPARTED STRIKINGLY FROM THE
USUAL DRY RECITATION OF CAREER ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH HAVE
IN THE PAST COMPRISED FORMAL NOMINATING SPEECHES.
CONFIDENTIA
19
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT
PAGE 01
MOSCOW 3339
DTG: 81553Z MAR 85 PSN: 054990
EOB341
AN009861
TOR 077/1700Z
CSN: HCE392
DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 RAY-01 SEST-01 ROBN-01 LENC-01
LEHR-01 MAT-01 /008 A4
WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT:
EOB:
OP IMMED
STU1035
DE RUEHMO #3339/02 0771557
O 181553Z MAR 85
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8354
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1104
AMEMBASSY BERLIN 7518
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 1848
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0896
USDEL NST GENEVA 0039
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 1604
AMCONSUL MUNICH 9838
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 1594
AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0843
USIA WASHDC 0379
USMISSION USNATO 8206
USDEL MBFR VIENNA 2998
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 3103
C ON FIDENT I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 03339
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UR
SUBJECT: TEXT OF GROMYKO' S NOMINATING SPEECH OF GORBACHEV
BETWEEN THESE TWO PHRASES IN ITS TREATMENT OF ANDROPOV' S
NOMINATION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME
SOVIET).
7. FINALLY, THE PLENUM MATERIALS DID NOT reveal THE
PARTICIPATION OF ANY THIRD SPEAKER, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE
WHEN A SIMILAR BROCHURE WAS PUBLISHED AFTER THE
FEBRUARY PLENUM WHICH ELECTED CHERNENKO. REVELATION
THAT GORBACHEV HAD CLOSED THE plenum SERVED TO FLAG HIS
NEW ROLE AS "SECOND SECRETARY. THIS TENDS TO REINFORCE
SUGGESTIONS WE HAVE HEARD FROM A NUMBER OF SOVIET
SOURCES THAT NO DECISION HAS been REACHED ON THE
DESIGNATION OF A NEW "SECOND SECRETARY. HARTMAN
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
FILE
37
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
6944
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
CAS 7/18/02
SECRET ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES ROSEBUSH
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
U.S.-Soviet November Meeting
Mrs. Reagan has indicated to Bud that she would like to
receive relevant reading material for the upcoming November
meeting. Attached at Tab A are classified and unclassified
versions of Mrs. Raisa Gorbachev's biography which will be
of interest to Mrs. Reagan.
Attachment
Tab A
Mrs. Raisa Gorbachev's Bio
SECRET ATTACHMENT
S
7209
S₄₁
41
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
SECRET
September 12, 1985
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER
FROM:
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
SUBJECT:
Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations (S)
Per our conversation, I have attached a follow-up memo from you
to Mike Armacost reaffirming our policy on proposed travel to the
U.S. by activists affiliated with the WPC and other Soviet front
organizations. As you will recall, the President approved the
continued implementation of our present policy on a case-by-case
basis (Tab II). Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to
Armacost which clarifies our policy. (S)
Kd
Ken DeGraffenreid concurs. (U)
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum a Tab I. (S)
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memo to Armacost
Tab II
Memo from McFarlane to President w/approval
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/7#9948
BY RW NARA DATE 3/16/11
7209
THE WHITE HOUSE
42
WASHINGTON
SECRET
September 12, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. ARMACOST
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
SUBJECT:
Proposed Travel to U.S by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations (S)
Over the past few months, the Department of State has forwarded
us various visa application requests by members of the WPC and
other Soviet front organizations. State has also expressed
concern that the present policy has come under increasing
congressional and judicial challenge. (S)
The President has reviewed our policy on handling visa requests
by members of the WPC and other Soviet front organizations. He
has reaffirmed the present policy which has been to utilize the
discretionary authority of section 212 (a) (27) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and handle visa applications on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of the
applicant's involvement in Soviet front organizations, the
purpose of the trip and the estimated extent of damage to our
foreign policy interests. This strategy comports with the letter
of the law, is in accordance with executive authority and
adequately protects our national security interests. (S)
Under this policy, it is anticipated that visits by senior World
Peace Council officials to the U.S. would in almost all cases not
be in the U.S. interest and that visas would be denied. (S)
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
BY Cir NARADATE 6/25/09
FROM:
ROBERT C. McFARLANE
SUBJECT:
Proposed Travel to U.S. by Activists Affiliated
with WPC and Other Soviet Front Organizations
Issue
Whether to continue our present policy on requests to visit the
United States by activists affiliated with the World Peace
Council (WPC) and other Soviet front organizations.
Background
Section 212 (a) (27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states
that a visa should not be granted to anyone whose visit to the
U.S. carries a risk of "potentially serious adverse foreign
policy consequences." In the last several years, our use of this
discretionary authority has come under challenge by some in the
Congress.
Most recently, we dealt with a case in which a visa application
was submitted by Werner Rumpel, a Vice President of the WPC, to
visit the United States for two weeks ostensibly to attend a
series of meetings with various peace and disarmament organi-
zations. The WPC is a Soviet active measures front organization
which has been heavily involved in anti-American propaganda and
activities. You have characterized the WPC publicly in this way.
(Press interviews: December 10, 1982/May 25, 1984.)
Discussion
Our approach to visa denial has been to utilize the discretionary
authority of Section 212 (a) (27) selectively and handle these
applications on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the
degree of involvement in the WPC and other organizations, the
purpose of the trip, and the estimated extent of damage to our
foreign policy interests. We believe that this strategy comports
with the letter of the law, is in accordance with the broad
Executive discretion which exists in the area of foreign policy,
and adequately protects our national security interests.
Congressional critics contend that the Administration has been
utilizing Section 212 (a) (27) excessively and has refused visas
when no valid foreign policy grounds existed. There have also
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been a number of court challenges to our use of 212 (a) (27)
authority including the pending case of Mrs. Allende (widow of
the late Salvador Allende). Essentially, Congressional critics
seek to pass legislation which would sharply curtail the applic-
ability of 212 (a) (27). However, because the purposes of the WPC
are so clear, we believe few in the Congress would express
concern over denial of visas to WPC senior officers.
We believe that these criticisms are also supported by those who
seek to eliminate Executive discretion in key foreign policy
areas. It is therefore unlikely that any restraint on our part
would change their opinions. In light of these considerations,
it is important that we continue to implement our present policy
which features the application of 212 (a) (27) on a case-by-case
basis.
The Administration's critics also contend that refusal to issue
visas to communist or pro-Soviet spokesmen and active measures
operators violates the constitutional guarantee of free speech.
However, this is an absolutist interpretation. It ignores the
fact that there are instances in which the exercise of free
speech has been legitimately restricted to protect private and
public interests (e.g., to prevent libel, to prevent the release
of classified information, etc.). The exclusion of foreign
nationals whose presence in the U.S. is likely to affect adversely
U.S. interests clearly belongs to the category in which certain
free speech restrictions are justified.
Moreover, WPC activists and leaders of other fronts are clearly
agents of influence of the Soviet Union. Some are formally
recruited and paid by Moscow, the KGB, or the International
Department of the CPSU; others are what the Soviets call "trusted
contacts" who follow Soviet direction without being paid. They
are in no sense independent free-thinking individuals who are
participating in rational open-minded debate. There may be times
when it serves our interests to allow such individuals to enter
the U.S. For the most part, however, their purpose is ultimately
to destroy democratic institutions. They seek to mobilize U.S.
support, usually unwitting, for this effort.
Additionally, such individuals impose a further obligation on our
already strained counterintelligence capabilities. The FBI is
tasked with ascertaining the scope of Soviet active measures in
the U.S. as well as other Soviet intelligence activities.
Permitting additional Soviet active measures personnel to enter
the U.S. would further diminish the FBI's coverage of other
Soviet activities. Unless the FBI specifically requests that we
allow such personnel to enter so that they can take advantage of
their presence, we should as a rule refuse to allow such persons
to enter the U.S.
In the recent Rumpel case, State and NSC, while in agreement on
the overall principles guiding our policy, disagreed over its
application. State recommended that a visa be issued to Rumpel
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for the following reasons: a) uncertainty as to whether Rumpel's
specific activities here will be seriously detrimental to U.S.
foreign policy interests; and b) increasing Congressional, media
and judicial challenge to our foreign policy refusal authority.
Taking into account his rank within the WPC and the purpose of
his trip, we recommended against issuing a visa to Rumpel. Over
the last several years, we have built up a careful and documented
case of the serious threat posed by active measures using both
government and private resources. Granting Rumpel a visa belies
the seriousness of our purpose and would be perceived both here
and abroad as a step back in our efforts. We also believe that
failure to deny Rumpel a visa would send the wrong signal to
Congress about our determination to uphold and enforce Executive
discretion in appropriate cases such as this. State was informed
of our position. It was agreed that Rumpel would be denied a
visa.
RECOMMENDATION
That we continue to implement our present policy on a
case-by-case basis.
Approve RR
Disapprove
Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky/
Ken deGraffenreid
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7598
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
September 26, 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
FROM:
PAULA DOBRIANSKY
SUBJECT:
Presidential Message re: Ukrainian Congress
Committee of America
I have reviewed and, with the exception of one minor deletion,
concur with the proposed Presidential letter to the Ukrainian
Congress Committee of America. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum
to Anne Higgins for your signature forwarding the revised letter.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.
Approve
Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab I
Memo to Anne Higgins
Tab A
Edited Letter
Tab II
Backup documents
47
7598
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
MEMORANDUM FOR ANNE HIGGINS
FROM:
WILLIAM F. MARTIN
SUBJECT:
Presidential Message re Ukrainian Congress
Committee of America
We have reviewed your proposed letter from the President to the
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and, with the exception
of one minor deletion, concur with its content.
Attachment:
Tab A
Edited Letter
48
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 24, 1985
It is an honor to join with members of the Ukrainian
Congress Committee of America as you gather to
commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of World
War II.
In his farewell address to the cadets of West Point,
General Douglas MacArthur reminded us that "The
soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the
greatest act of religious training -- sacrifice he must
suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war. "
More than forty years ago, your brothers-in-arms gave
flesh-and-blood meaning to General MacArthur's words
as they offered their last full measure of devotion in
resisting the twin tyrannies of Nazism and Communism
that ravaged their homeland. In the darkness of untold
hardships, their spirit of courage and self-sacrifice
shone brightly.
Although the shadow of tyranny continues to darken
your ancestral lands, a spirit of hope and the yearning
for liberty live on to inspire a new generation. I wish
to express my solidarity with the brave people of X
Ukraine in your resolve to advance the cause of free-
dom and self-determination for your beloved homeland.
God bless you.
1-10
49
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 24, 1985
TO:
WILLIAM MARTIN, NSC
FROM: ANNE HIGGINS am Sr and
RE:
UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA
Attached for your review/approval is a proposed Presidential
Message for the above-named group. They are having an event
to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of WWII. Linas
Kojelis in the Office of Public Liaison will be hand-carrying
the message on October 1.
Please respond by Monday, September 30.